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THE 



GENERAL HISTORY 





IN FIVE BOOKS. 



TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK. 



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BY MR. HAMPTON. 



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LONDON: 

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY J. DAVIS, MILITARY CHRONICLE AND MILITARY 

CLASSICS OFFICE, 38, ESSEX-STREET, STRAND; AND TO BE HAD 

OF THE BOOKSELLERS. 



1811. 



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THE PREFACE, 



Among all the historians of antiquity, whose works have been adjudged worthy of the 
admiration or regard of later times, there is none, perhaps, so little known, as the author 
who is now offered to the public The werds grave, judicious, excellent, are, indeed, trans, 
mitted from pen to pen, and fill the month of every critic. But though the name of Poly- 
bius be thus still accompanied with some mark of respect and honour, his real character 
has remained almost unnoticed ; and his writings, even though confessed to be the object of 
esteem and praise, by degrees have fallen under that kind of neglect and general disregard, 
which usually foreruns oblivion. 

It may be useful, therefore, to consider some of the chief among the causes that have 
concurred to produce so perverse an accident, before we attempt to lead the reader into a 
•closer view of those many excellences that are peculiar to the following history, and 
which drew towards it the attention of the wise and learned, in the enlightened times of 
Greece and Rome. 

Amidst all the advantages which the moderns are by many supposed to have gained 
against the antients, with respect to the points of useful knowledge, and the enlargement 
of all true and solid science, it cannot but be allowed, that, in the art of writing, the latter 
still maintain their rank unrivalled ; and that the graces and charms, the exactness, 
strength, and energy, which make severally the character of their most perfect compo-^ 
sitions, are in vain sought for in the productions of the present age. Those, therefore, 
that take into their hands the remains of any celebrated name either of Greece or 
Rome, are, in the first place, accustomed to expect, if not a faultless work, yet some dis- 
play, at least, of that superiority which the warmest emulation has not yet been able to 
exceed; some beaming of those excellences, which strike and captivate the mind, and 
render irresistible the words of wisdom, when delivered through the lips of beauty. It is 
not, therefore, judged sufficient, that the matter be grave and weighty, Unless the manner 
also be enchanting. In vain are things disposed in order, and words made expressive of 
the sense. We demand, likewise an arrangement that may please, the fancy, and a harmony 
that may fill the ear. On the other hand, if the style be such as rejects the embellish- 
ments of art, yet let us find in it at least that full and close conciseness, that commanding 
dignity, that smooth and pure simplicity ; in a word, those naked graces which outshine 
all ornament. 

Such are the expectations of every reader, who has gained a taste sufficient to discern, 
that these beauties are, in fact, diffused through all the finished pieces of antiquity. For 
though, even among the antients, there were as many different styles as authors, yet 
hature, and sound criticism which drew its rules from nature, referred them all to two or 
three different kinds, of which each had its established laws ; which, while they served to 
instruct the writer in his art, afford likewise a sure criterion by which his works were either 
censured or approved. Was it the purpose of an author to recite past events, or convey 
lessons of instruction, in a language simple and unadorned? It was demanded by these 
laws that his style should be concise and pure ; that the sentiment and diction should be' 
closely joined, and no word admitted that did not add somewhat to the sense : that through 
the whole should be found a certain air of ease and freedom, mixed, however, with 
strength and dignity ; and that, void of all appearance of study and art, he should strive 
to make even negligence itself alluring. If, on the contrary, his desire was to excel in the 
florid kind, the same laws required that the simple charms of nature should be ado nul 
with all the elegance and pomp of art; that splendid images should flatter and delude the 
fancy; that the diction should be noble, polite, and brilliant ; that every word should be 
djessed in smiles; and that the periods should be measured with the nicest care, joined 
together in the softest bands of harmony, and flow intermingled without obstacle or pause. 
Lastly, with respect to that likewise which was called the intermediate kind of compo- 
sition, these laws were careful also to prescribe the proper temperament in which the beau- 
ties of the former two should meet and be united ; and to adjust the mixture of ihe grace- 
ful and austere, the artificial and the simple, 'in such exact proportion, that the one never 
should prevail against the other, but both govern, through the whole with a kind of mingled 
sway. 

Now, with regard to the author of the following work, it must freely be acknowledged, 
:that, instead of having gained any approved degree of excellence in either- of these esta- 
blished modes of composition, he, on the contrary, revolts alike against the laws of all/ 
Instead of charms that might allure, an energy that might command, or flowing softness 
that might carry with it the attention of the reader, we meet, at every step, some defor- 
mity which excites disgust, some coldness which offends, some obstacles which expose o«r 



THE PREFACE. 



patience to the severest proof. Instead of elegant Simplicity, we find in every part a rustic 
coarseness; instead of a neat and clear conciseness, a redundance of impure expression; 
instead of an assemblage of kindred images, allusions remote and forced ; and in the place 
of a full, majestic, and continued harmony, sounds that fatigue and wound the ear ; periods 
broken and transversed. It cannot, therefore, be greatly wondered at, that many, even 
among the warm admirers of antiquity, should have been discouraged from perusing 
writings which are void of all the charms of nature and art; which display neither elegance 
nor strength ; neither ease nor dignity, simplicity nor majesty ; but are in every part 
disfigured, either by tasteless and ill sorted ornaments, or a negligence that is wholly des- 
titute of grace. 

But besides the titter want of all those beauties that reign through the compositions of 
the other celebrated antients, there is also in Polybius one eminent vice, which must be 
allowed to have been no less the cause than that now mentioned, of the almost general 
disregard t;; which his works have been condemned. This is the obscurity which is found, 
as we ntoygay, in every page, through all the following history. For it is not that ob- 
scurity which springs solely from those antient manners, custom, science, discipline^ 
which, though they were familiar to the times in which the author wrote, are unknown to 
the^present age. Nor is it that only on the other hand, which is caused by the ravages of 
years ; that which never fails to attend a mangled or corrupted text •, but it is such as 
may well be termed a congenial and inbred obscurity ; an obscurity which results from 
complicated and embarrassed sense, from periods disordered and transposed, from useless 
expletives, and from words which are either destitute of any signification, or employed in 
one so different from their own, that even those who are most conversant in the language 
are oftentimes entangled in a maze of doubt and intricacy, from which, after all their 
efforts, they are never able to get free. 

Some other causes, of lighter moment, might be mentioned, as having in part contri- 
buted to produce the effect of which we are speakiug* ; but these are the principal, and 

* Among these we may just take notice of an opinion which has prevailed with many, 
that the following history, with respect both to the matter which it contains, and tha 
manner also in which the work is executed, tends principally to promote the improve- 
ment of that knowledge which relates to war, and cannot even be easily understood, but 
by these only who have passed their life in camps. This prejudice, if it drew not its 
heginiag, seems, however, to have been chiefly propagated, from the pains of a lively 
Frenchman, who some years ago presented the author to the public in all the pomp of 
military dress ; and, under the weight of an enlarged and bulky comment, in which the 
sentiment now mentioned is every where industriously repeated and enforced, stifled the 
merit of a judicious and sensible translation. But his profession, it seems, was that of 
arms ; and most admirably does self-love perform its part : for, being first persuaded, 
that among all the objects of human knowledge and inquiry, there was none more noble 
and important than the art in which himself was skilled, he boldly mistakes, for the cha- 
racteristical distinction in the original, that which was only an incidental excellence; and 
from thence forms, as he expresses it, the grand design of raising, upon those materials 
■ that were before him, a complete military structure; as if the purpose of this great his- 
torian had been simply to compose a body of tactics, or a treatise on the stratagems of 
war ; and not rather to illustrate and explain the most sublime of all the subjects of 
civil science, which the annals of mankind can boast; to shew, " from what causes, and 
from what kind of government, almost the whole habitable world, in less than the course 
of fifty-three years, was reduced beneath the Roman yoke." But, indeed, the whole 
weakness and absurdity of this conceit will appear so manifest, from the very first pages 
of the history, that it is not necessary to employ, in this place, any greater pains to ex- 
pose it. I shall, therefore, only add, with respect to the opinion above-mentioned, that, 
first, it is by no means in general true, as the favourers of this opinion are ever ready to 
affirm, that the description of sieges aud battles, as they occur in antient authors, can- 
not easily be understood, but by those only who have passed their life in camps. If, in- 
deed, the business that is here required were t» weigh the difficulties, and to decide con- 
cerning the expediency or the rashness of any military enterprise; to applaud, or to 
condemn, the disposition of an army in the field ; to display the prudence, or to detect 
the errors, of a general ; this would doubtless be a province which every man of letters 
would willingly resign to those whose studies and experience had qualified them in a more 
peculiar rnanner'to be judges in it. But when the task, as in reading or translating, is 
simply to apprehend the meaning of the terms in any antient and dead language, it is 
clear (hat this can be only done, and that in most cases it has been done effectually, by 
surveying the analogy of the language, examining well the context, and tracing all the 
various significations, in which the same terms are used by different writers. Secondly, 
these descriptions, as they are more full and perfect, are more perspicuous also in Poly- 
bius, than those that are in other writers. For, as he had been himself employed in the 
exercise of arms, and had. joined to a consummate skill, a long experience likewise in 
the art of war, he from thence was able to relate all military events with clearness and 
precision; t» assign to every term its own proper place and peculiar se»se; aQ d to: 



THE PREFACE. 



most important. And, indeed, to say the truth, how reasonable must it be thought, 
that such an author should at once be abandoned to oblivion or contempt: unless, per- 
haps, there should be found, under this rough covering, some delicious kind of fruit; 
some excellences, which may be esteemed a more than equal counterpoise to his defects. 
And this is that which we shall now consider. 

In all the various histories of that great people, whose power, from -small and con- 
temptible beginings, was by degrees extended to the limits of the world, and whose virtue, 
policy, and laws, are still respected and approved, if there be any part more useful, more 
important, and more illustrious, than the rest, it is, beyond all doubt, that very period 
■which furnished the materials of the following work. A p?riod, not weakened and de- 
formed by senseless fictions, the offspring of wild vanity and impure tradition ; but restira* 
on the grounds of solid truth, and unsuspected testimony:' A period which displays this 
celebrated empire, not struggling with the dangers ani ills of feeble infancy, noriottering 
nndcr the oppresive weight of age; but firm in manly strength, mature in vigour, active, 
ardent, uncoutrouled, invincible. In the scene here presented to us, we are not, on the 
one hand, led to view the momentary wars, the precarious and uu meditated conquests, 
the intestine feuds and jealousies, the rage and madaess of a half-instructed and half- 
poiicied people, rough and savage in their manners, virtuous to an extreme, and exulting 
in a licentious and ungovernable freedom. Nor is it, on the other hand, fhe sad picture 
of a state, corrupted and dispirited through the soft rrts of luxury, disgraced by vices, 
and enslaved by tyrants. The annals of this period oilVr a far nobler speetaele; a go- 
vernment at perfect growth, and flourishing in the foirest form; a steady, deep, extensive, 
and foreseeing, policy, a people joined together by great and generous sentiments, even 
more than by the ties of common interest ; a sovereign power, exerted solely to maintain 
the general good; a liberality restrained by reason, and submissive to the authority 
of laws. 

A state, thns framed and thus conducted, could net long remain insensible of its own. 
inherent strength and force. From this time, therefore., it seemed to he a matter of small 
moment and importance to the Romans, that they sheuld be able effectually to employ 
their talents and their powe-r, to maintain their empire in tranquillity and dignity, to 
afford security to their allies, and hold all the neighbouring states under due restraint. 
Seated, as it were, upon a strong and lofty eminence, they begin now to extend their views, 
even to countries the most remote ; and resolved to be id the most powerful kingdoms to 
their laws. Tba conquest of the world was judged to hr. an easy task, to a people -whose 
expectations of success were not founded upon their armies, however strong and nume- 
rous, nor even upon their military skill and discipline, however perfect and accomplished ; 
but sprung solely from the exertion of a steady wisdom, and sedate discernment ; from a 
foresight which had weighed all difficulties ;■ from regular designs, whose joint depen- 
dence was of itself sufficient to carry them into execution ; from vigorous counsels, which 
disdained resistance ; and from a firmness, which derided nil success, and rose superior 
to the heaviest strokes of fortune. Nor did the event in any point deceive their hopes. 
The most skilful, dextrous, and undaunted, general, of all that the world had seen, is 
vain lea(krirts-arniy from the extreme boundaries of Spain, traverses the Pyrenseans and 
the A1-* , and falls like thunder upon Italy. Battle after kittle lost, the bravest of the 
legions slain, the country wasted and destroyed, provinces revolting or subdued, in vain 
threaten the extinction of the name of Rome. The Roma:\s, conscious still of their 
superior force, and standing firm against misfortune, are persuaded that unless themselve* 
first lose all hope, their country never can be lost. Their wouuds, though deep nod 
bleeding, instead of draining from the members all their vital strength, serve only to call 
for new streams of vigour from the heart. Their policy, thiir manners, the frame itself 
of the republic, all join to afford resources inexhaustible, and which seem even to be 
multiplied by their defeats. Thus armedj and thus supported, what wonder was it, that 
in the end they should prevail against an enemy, whose very government itself, instead 
of being fortified with the like advantages, was such as baffled even the fortune and the 
skill of their own enterprising and triumphant general, and readered useless all his vic- 
tories. Annibal, enfeebled by success, exhausted by continual conquest, and in vain 
exerting his utmost efforts to subdue a people, who rose with redoubled strength from 

avoid that intricacy, in which the historians who have transmitted to us an account of the 
Roman wars are frequently entangled. In the last place, we may remark, that the inten- 
tion of the author, in that very comment of which we have beeu speaking, was not, a* 
is commonly supposed, to illustrate or remove tbc difficulties of the original, but .chiefly 
to accommodate to his own favourite system the battles which are there described ; and to 
make, as himself declares, " Polybius more subservient to the comment, thaD the com- 
ment to Polybius. 1 ' From hence, therefore,. has it happened, as it might indeed most 
reasonably be expected, and as every candid and judicious reader will be ready to acknow- 
ledge, that in the execution of this bold design, numberless passages are tortured, mis- 
understood, and misapplied ; and that even the prints, which are added in the \\ ork, are 
in many important points defective, and iu many also repugnant to the plaiu ex,prjs=i4>a9 
of the text. 



vi THE PREFACE. 



every fail, was at last forced to return, and employ all his courage and abilities, to rescue 
his own proper country from that destruction, with which he had so lately threatened 
Rome. But what courage, what abilities could prolong- the existence of an .empire, desti- 
tute of all internal force, and which carried in its bosom the immediate causes of decay 
and dissolution ? The haughty Carthage, the tyrant of Spain and Afric, the sovereign 
mistress of the sea,_ bends her neck to the yoke-, and from this time leaves full leisure to 
the Romans to pursue, step by step, the traces of their design ; to remove each obstacle, 
as they advanced; to divide, unite, oppose, and counterbalance, the interests and the 
strength of the most formidable states, till they all become alike incapable of resisting, 
and were in fui*n compelled to feel and to acknowledge, that they had no laws left, no 
counsels, ciistoms, manners, policy, but the sole will of this invincible and wise re- 
public*. 

Siteh were the times in which Polybius lived; and such the spectacle which he chose 
to illustrate in his writings. A spectacle, transcending all that can be offered to our 
view ; I do not say in the rude age of Rome, but in those admired and boasted annals 
likewise, which belong to the later periods of this great empire; as much as disorder is 
excelled by union ; effeminate baseness, by heroic bravery ; corrupted manners, by dis- 
interested virtue; vile submission, by a generous and. manly love of liberty; or the little 
arts of jealous tyrants and ambitions ministers, temporary shifts, and expedients of a day, 
by that enlarged and powerful policy, which looks forward to all future time, embraces 
every object, and attracts within the circle of its system every possible event. 

As the subject, therefore, is thus great and interesting, let us, in the next place, exa- 
mine likewise, whether the work itself be not distinguished also by some peculiar charac- 
ters of excellence, that raise it above other histories, and which serve clearly to illustrate 
and enforce the dignity and whole importance of the events of which it treats. 

If we consider first, what kind of talent, genius, and abilities, should be required, to> 
display in the fullest light the wonders of so august a scene, and to point out distinctly, 
to the present and to future times, all the advantages that might be drawn from a period 
thus pregnant with instruction, it would at ontie be obvious to remark, that such a 
work must very far exceed the highest reach of any rhetorician, however eloquent and 
learned, or' any sophist, however penetrating or acute; and could only be successfully 
performed, by one whose knowledge of mankind, and long practice in the affairs of go- 
vernment, joined to an habitual and close attention to the designs, the workings, and 
effects, of policy, had enabled him to lift up the veil, and to view at leisure the secret 
springs, that actuated and pushed forwards all the great machine: by one, whose fortunes 
and condition had opened to him the means of being perfectly instructed and informed:* 
by one, who had been himself a witness to the events which he relates, or had received 
his accounts at least from those that were : by one, whom credulity or vanity nevey 
could incline to disgrace the truth by splendid miracles, and deform fact by fiction : and^ 
lastly, by one whose natural love of virtue, and consciousness of the trust in which he 
had engaged, should force his own passions, humour, interest, to fall back and disappear, 
and substitute in their place an exactness, candour, and fidelity, superior to reproach or 
©ensure, and exempt from all suspicion. 

Such must be the writer, to whose testimony we should yield a full assent, ( whose 
authority we should submit, and whose wisdom we should blindly trust, to guide us> 
through the long labyrinth of causes and events, into a clear and comprehensive view of 
the motions, advancement, and whole progress of the Roman greatness: and such, in 
every point, was that historian, whose character we are here endeavouring to describe. 
Illustrious by his birth, and not less distingnished"by the greatness of his sentiments, 
the wisdom of his counsels, his skill in war, his steady virtue, and sincere attachment to 
the interest of his country, he began to be considered, even in early age, as the chief 
support of that republic, in whose firmness were deposited the small remains of Grecian 
liberty. As, on the one hand, therefore, his rank and his abilities, with the important 
parts which he sustained in every public measure and debate, disclosed to him all the 
various scenes of government; so the condition of the times, and his earnest zeal for 
the general good, urged him, on the other hand, to call forth every talent into action ; to 
survey, with the nicest care, the present and pa3t fortunes of his country; to trace back- 
wards every step, by which subjection had advanced towards them in the place of glory ; 
and to revive, to weigh, and examine, the designs, effects, and influence, of that artful 

* It seemed unnecessary to enter here into any more circumstantial or particular detail 
of the design and limits of the history, or to enumerate singly all the events which it 
contained : not only because the author himself has given a very distinct and clear ac-* 
count botli of the general form and nature of his undertaking, and of the distribution 
and the order of its several parts ; but because it has happened likewise, that of the whole 
original work, which was extended to the number of forty books,- five only have been 
rescued from the hand of time. Yet these, as they are come to us entire, so are they 
perfect also with respect to the sub jeets of which they treat ; and will, if I mistake 
not, fully exemplify all that is aguined concerning the character and peculiar talents etf 
th(t authyr. 



THE "PREFACE. 



aud ambitious policy, which, after having - conquered or deluded so many different 
nations, had at last triumphed likewise over Greece, and, under the specious pretence 
of restoring every city to independency and freedom, had in reality infolded all alike in 
silken fetters, to be loosened, or strained close, as occasion should demand. 

Such talents, such experience, and such researches, might doubtless have delayed,, 
though not averted, the last fatal stroke, which uot long afterwards completed the des- 
truction of the Achseans, and uf Greece. B-.it the Romans, from whose attention the 
,rnost distant danger never could escape, made haste to deprive a people, whom they 
had destined to be slaves, of the assistance and support of every citizen, whose courage 
or abilities seemed likely to spread wide a contagious spirit, and, together with the 
love of freedoVn, to inspire also, by degrees, a strength sufficient to shake off the yoke. 

This banishment, which was decreed in common to all the inhabitants of Pelopon- 
nesus whose virtue was become their crime, as it was honourable to Polybius, proved 
bighly beneficial likewise to all future times. Torn by violence from the service of his 
country, and fixed to a long abode in that great city, which was the fountain of all the 
counsels that directed and sustained the Roman empire, he bad now both leisure and the 
means to draw together the instruction that was requisite for carrying into execution 
the design which he had formed; to compare observation with fact and certainty; to 
•copy the detail of all great events from authentic monuments^ and from the memoirs of 
those illustrious persons who had been the chief actors in the scene ; to view closely, and 
without disguise, the manners, temper, inclinations, and whole conduct, of a people 
who bad thus forced the most powerful kingdoms to receive their laws; to inspect all the 
movements of that regulated wirdom which had saved their state from imminent ruin; 
and to fiTtce to their sources those internal springs of strength and vigour, which had 
nourished and enlarged its growth; in a word, to compose thai history, which, piercing 
through the clouds of ignorance and error, assigned to every incident its own genuine mo- 
tive ; unfolded the most complicaied causes; and, by joining to an exact and accurate 
description of wars, embassies, and treaties, a full and distinct display of the councils, 
maxims, laws, the prudence, constancy, and courage, with the whole military aud domestie 
discipline that were peculiar to the Romans, made it manifest to all mankind, that the 
greatness to which this people had now raised the empire was by no means the work of 
fortune, or the effect of a bold and enterprising 1 rashness, hut the necessary and mature 
result of strenuous efforts and regular designs, conducted by a firm and penetrating policy, 
■which no precautions could elude, and no force was able to subdue. 

in discharging a t.'sk of so great extent and difficulty, and of such vast importance, like- 
wise in its use, it cannot surely be thought astonishing or strange, that this wise historian' 
should have been diverted, or withheld from paying a due attention to the embellishments 
of art, and charms of eloquence. But whatever censure-may be thrown upon him for hav- 
ing slighted all those graces, which would, doubtless, have diffused some lustre through 
his work, it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that, together with them, he has 
.rejected likewise ail (he false, those specious, ornaments, which disgrace the compositions 
even of the most esteemed and wisest antients. The desire to strike and to surprise, to 
please and captivate, diversified, perhaps, according to the different talents of the writer, 
has in all times covered history with a delusive glare, which serves only to mislead us from 
that knowledge which is the object of our search. Hence that unnatural mixture of record 
with tradition, truth with fable, and the long train of brilliant wonders, which are scattered 
through the annals of almost every age; and every people. Hence those discourses and 
harangues, which, having been forged aud moulded in the shade of contemplative and ob- 
scure retirement, confounded all distinctions of men, characters, and times. Hence like- 
wise all the laboured pageantry, the adventitious and far sought circumstances, which are 
(brought to swell description, and to adorn and dignify the scene: to fill the mind with 
admiration; to melt into compassion; or to subdue by terror. Hence, lastly, that am- 
bitious care, which is discovered even in the gravest writers ; who, not content with having 
copied the bare features of the original that was before them, like painters call forth all 
their skill to give also a finishing to the piece; and join, to the resemblance that is found 
in nature, those strokes which enlarge and heighten each deformity, or spread a fuller 
brightness over every beauty. But to the author whose work we are now considering, it was 
reserved as his peculiar praise, to have first discerned, that history, if she would prove 
a secure and useful guide, must walk hand in hand with life: aud that instruction, whe- 
ther moral or political, was never to be fixed upon the weak foundation of imaginary facts. 
It is not, therefore, the writer, whom we view before ue, eager of applause, and impatient 
to draw from us an admiration of his art, in having decked the truth in a splendid dress, 
and thrown into her train a gay assemblage of well fancied possible eveuts. But it is the 
statesman, the general, the philosopher, who speaks to us, as in his closet, in familiar lan- 
guage; recounts simply all that was transacted ; confirms fact by testimony, and en- 
ables us to derive an easy and immediate proof likewise from the prudence or misconduct 
of past times, by reflections deep and solid, and such as our own reason cannot but ap- 
prove, when they are gently enforcd upon us, as by the authority of a parent, or urged 
\yjth the fond affection of a friend. 



THE PREFACE. 



Haw steadily, indeed, must we revere, and how willingly attend to the lessons of a man, 
whose probity shines out in every part, even far more conspicuous than his wisdom? 
Blinded by no interest, nor seduced by any mistaken zeal, as he never is himself deceived, 
so> neither does he attempt to lead others into error. Unmoved by the ill fate of Greece, 
and his own loss of friends and dignity, he describes even those events, which seldom fail to> 
awaken some resentment, grief, or jealous, hatred, with all the coldness of an tinconcerned 
spectator ; and pays due homage, though urrwixed with adulation, to those great qualities 
which had raised the structure of the Roman glory upon the ruins of his own degenerate 
country. Hence it is that we discern, even upon the slightest view, a certain candour and 
siacerity spread through his work, which we in vain should find to hope in other writers t 
a Candour which never hides the faults of friends, nor tarnishes the virtues of an enemy : a 
candour which presents all objects in their naked state, free from the disguise of passiou ; 
and which weighs contending testimonies in an equal scale: in a word, a candour, which, 
like asi artless honesty of face, carries even in its air and first appearance those strong 
proofs of genuine and unfeigned simplicity, which irresistibly command on r approbation; 
aad engage our favour. Such was the author, who, when living, was the friend, the com- 
panion and instructor of the generous and heroic Scipio ; and whose writings, in a later 
age, were the earnest study and chief consolation also of the wise and virtuous Brutus. 

It remains that I now speak a word or two concerning the translation: not to mislead 
the opinion, or prevent the judgment, of the reader, but simply to inform him, what it is 
that he is chiefly to expect from my own endeavours, in the following work. 

There are two things, imconnected and distinct, which are demanded always of trans- 
lators : that they understand well the text, and render it also well. With regard to the 
first of rhese, in what degree I have been exempted from error, must be wholly left to 
Others to determine. I can only say, that I have spared no pains to arrive at a full and 
entire conception of the sense: by tracing the author closely through his own peculiar 
turn and use of sentiments and languages; by comparing different texts-, consulting 
different versions ; and by weighing all the explanations and corrections that have occasion, 
ally been proposed. 

But in a task of this kind, barely to understand the meaning of an author, though it 
often, indeed, may require both patience and activity, is by much the least part of the 
toil. To render every word by an equivalent expression, and every sentence in the same 
just measure to preserve each different character of sentiment and phrase; and to deli- 
neate, stroke by stroke, the movements of the mind or heart ; these are the difficulties in. 
translating, that demand an attention, time, and pains, which never can he fully known, 
hut by those alone who have made the trial As these difficulties, however, are either 
slighter, or more hard to be surmounted, according to the several stamps of excellence, 
and the various modes of beauty, that are peculiar to the originals, it nvust be acknow- 
ledged, that in the works of the author who is now before us, they are such as by no means 
Bhould discourage any one from attempting to give a perfect copy of it in a different lan- 
guage. For there are here no beauties whose spirit might be lost in being transfused; no 
force nor elegance, nor just propriety, that demand an exact similitude of corresponding 
terms ; bo flowing, regulated numbers, whose harmony can only be preserved by the same 
fixed accents and chosen sounds ; no painting of the passions, in which even the smallest 
ehange would mar the likeness, and destroy ail the beauty of the piece. But, on the other 
liand, the very want of all these excellences, while it freed me from a heavy and labo- 
rious duty, at the same time imposed a task upon me, not less difficult than the otheiu 
the task of veiling those deformities that might have raised disgust; and of clothing the 
author,, aot in any ostentatious or splendid habit, but in a dress, which, though suitable 
in- every part to his own deportment, air, and character, might be also such as should 
draw towards him the attention and the favour of the present age With this view, I have 
not scrupled to endeavour through the whole, as well by changing sometimes the expres- 
sion, as by breakingthe order likewise of the sentences, to soften what appeared too harsh, 
and to give a modest polish to all that was found too rough. In a word, my chief care 
and pains, after the task of reporting faithfully the sense, have been employed to spread 
one simple, grave, and sober colouring over all the work; to render the fiction strong, 
expressive, even, and correct; and to give to the periods a roundness, a stability, and 
varied cadence. If this part, therefore, of the labour, should be judged to have been 
executed with success, it is hoped that auy omissions, or mistakes,, of lighter moment, 
may more readily obtain excuse. 

1 shall only add, that when I first engaged in this work many years ago, my intention 
was to have joined with the translation such observations and remarks, as might have 
served not only to explain the difficulties, but to illustrate also, and enforce the strong 
sense and wise reflections that are spread through the following history; to have cleared 
the obscurity which arises oftentimes from remote allusions, or an imperfect detail 
of facts ; to have opened those peculiarities of customs and of manners, which, whenever 
they occur, raise doubt and hesitation in the unlearned reader; to have pointed out the 
uses, or defects, of various institutions, in religion, laws, and government; and abewe all 
the rest, to have traced, step by ster, the advancement of the Roman greatness; to have 
railed back also to the scene, the illustrious times of Greece, and compared the glory of 



THE PREFACE. j X 



that country with its last decline ; and, in a word, to have displayed, in one entire and con- 
nected view, the whole conduct and the various fortunes of those great nations, whose 
sages and whose heroes seemed to have soared above the ordinary limits of humanity, and 
whose story, while it instructs and warms, should teach us also to spurn away those nar- 
row politics, and that base depravity, which have fixed shackles upon our own contracted 
wisdom, and feeble virtue. Such was my design; the first draught of which was nearly finish- 
ed, and materials collected in large abundance for the whole. But various accidents, from 
time to time, obstructed the progress of it : and I have now neither leisure nor inclination 
to complete it. Yet as I had gone through the most difficult and irksome, as well as the 
most useful, part likewise of the whole performance, I was not willing entirely to suppress 
it. For, I flatter myself, that the public will owe me some acknowledgement, if this trans- 
lation should prove the means of spreading into many hands a treasure of inestimable 
value, which the roughness and inelegance, and numerous difficulties that occur, both in 
the language and construction and sense of the original, hare hitherto confined to a few. 
If this, indeed, should be the event, I neither shall regret the labour which the one part 
of the work has cost me, nor grieve for the disappointment in the other ; but shall think 
my pains well rewarded, in having thus been able to bring into the open light a merit 
which had long languished in obscurity; and to substitute, in the place, perhaps, of 
studies, either trifling or pernicious, the knowledge of an author, whose writings, though 
broken and imperfect, not only contain the fullest lessons of civil prudence, but also every 
where abound with strong incitements to the practice of all those social virtues which 
siidear men to themselves, and render them useful citizens to their country. 



VOL. I. NO. 3. 



THE 

GENERAL HISTORI 

OF 



<^%. 




BOOK I. CHAP. I. V^pp'^ 

If those who have been employed before me, in relating the transactions of 
former times, had been altogether silent concerning the singular use and ex«* 
cellence of history, it might perhaps be necessary to begin this work with 
advising ajj^ man kind to apply themselves with earnestness to that kind of 
study ; since the knowledge of past events arrords the best instructions for the 
regulation and good conduct of human life. But as the greater part, or 
rather all of them, have takers every occasion to declare, repeating it, as we 
may say, from one end of their writings to the other, that history supplies the 
only proper discipline to train and exercise the minds of those who are inclined 
to enter into public affairs, and that the evil accidents which are there re- 
corded to have befallen other men contain the wisest and most effectual Its- 
sons for enabling us to support our own misfortunes with dignity and coinage 
there is little need to repeat again what others have so often urged with elo» 
quence and force. But, indeed, the subject itself which I am engaged to 
treat may well exempt me from this task ; since it is of a kind so new and 
singular, that it cannot fail to excite the attention of every reader. For what 
man is there so sordid and insensible, that he would not wish to be informed 
in what manner, and through what kind of government, almost the whole 
habitable world, in less than the course of fifty three years, was reduced to the 
Bioman yoke ? an event of which there is no example in any former time. 
Or who, on the other hand, is so passionately fond of any other kind of spe- 
culation, or of any branch of science, as to think it more worthy of his care 
and pains than this inquiry ? 

That the subjectof this work deserves more than a common share of atten- 
tion and regard, on account both of its novelty and greatness, will most evi- 
dently appear, if we take a view of all the antient states that are chiefly cele- 
brated in history, and compare them with the Roman. 

The Persians were, for some time, possessed of a very wide dominion; but 
whenever they laboured to extend it beyond the bounds of Asia, the attempt 
was always unsuccessful, and, indeed, almost proved fatal to them. The 
Lacedaemonians, after many struggles, obtained the sovereignty of Greece ; 
but within twelve years were again divested of it. The Macedonian kingdom 
was at first extended from the provinces that border on the Asiatic coast, as 
far as to the Danube ; the whole including but a small and inconsiderable part 
of Europe. After some time, indeed, they found means to break the Persian 
monarchy, and joined Asia to their empire. But though the general opinion 
of mankind may, perhaps, have taught us always to regard this people as a veiy 
flourishing and poteut state, it cannot be denied a great part of the world was 
totally exempted from their sway. Afric, Sicily, and Sardinia, were never 
visited by their arms ; and these fierce and warlike nations, who possessed the 
western parts of Europe, were utterly unknown and undiscovered by them. 



12 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



But the Romans, disdaining to confine their conquests within the limits of a 
few countries only, have forced almost the whole habitable world to pay sub- 
mission to their laws, and have raised their empire to that vast height of power, 
which is so much the wonder of the present age, and which no future times 
can ever hope to exceed. And this is the event which I design to explain, in 
the following narration : and from thence it will be evident what great advan- 
tages may be derived from an attentive and close perusal of political history. 

The point of time, from whence I begin my work is theK'hundred-fortieth 
Olympiad : the transactions are as follow. In Greece, the social war, con- 
ducted by Philip, the son of Demetrius, and father of Perseus, in conjunction 
with the cities of Achaia, against the ./Etolians. In Asia, the war between An- 
tiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, for the sovereignty of Coele-syria. In Italy 
and Afric, that between the Carthaginians and the Romans, which is most 
frequently stiledthe war of Annibal. These events are the next in order to 
those with which the history of Aratus is concluded. 

Now, before this period, the great transactions of the world were single, 
distinct and unconnected, both in place and time, while each proceeded from 
motives peculiar to itself, and was directed to its own proper end. But from 
this time history assumes an entire and perfect body : the affairs of Italy and 
Afric were now conjoined with those of Asia and Greece ; and all moved to- 
gether towards one fixed and single point. And this it was that first deter- 
mined me to choose this aera for the beginning of my work : for it was not till 
after they had broken the strength of Carthage in the war just mentioned, 
that the Romans, imagining that by this success they had accomplished the 
chief and most important part of their intended enterprise, and opened to 
themselves the way to universal empire, now first resolved to enlarge their 
conquests, and spread their armies over Greece and Asia. 

If mankind were already sufficiently acquainted with the condition and past 
fortunes of these republics, which contended thus together for the sovereignty 
of the world, there would, perhaps, be nooccasion to have recourse to the former 
parts of their story, in order to explain the strength and number of their 
forces, or the probable hopes of success, by which they severally were excited 
to so great and difficult an undertaking. But because the Greeks are, for 
the most part, strangers to the antient state, power and exploits, both of the 
Carthaginians and Romans, I thought it necessary to prefix this book, and 
that which follows, to the body of my history, to remove all doubts that might 
occur, and to exhibit clearly to the reader's view, the councils, strength, 
resources, upon which the Romans supported those great designs, which ren- 
dered them the masters of the world, both by land and sea. For, from the 
recital which I design to make in these preliminary books, it will be seen, be- 
yond ail doubt, that this vast project was neither formed nor carried into exe- 
cution, but upon reasons the most fair and solid, and which gave strong as- 
surances of success. 

The circumstances of this great event, which so justly raise the admiration 
of the present age , will also afford one very eminent advantage to my work, 
which will distinguish it from every other history : for, as all the great trans- 
actions of this world were now forcibly attracted to one side, and compelled 
— to move in one direction towards the same single end, I shall thence be able 
to connect together, and dispose into one perfect body, the series of different 
events, and to exhibit, in one point of view, the whole variety of action. It 
was this, indeed, which gave me the first inclination to write the history of 
these times. Another motive was, that no one has hitherto composed a Gene- 
ral History : for, if this task had ever before been attempted, I should myself 
have been less solicitous to engage in such an undertaking. There are many, 
indeed, who have written an account of particular wars ; and, among them, 
some, perhaps, have added a few coincident events : but no man, as far at 
Jeast as I can learn, has ever yet employed his pains in collecting all the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 13 

Lggg-,1— ■ ,„ — i — i 1 , 1 g, . .nitiniwBw— ww^n^Maag—MBPawB»_ 

great transactions of the world into one regular and consistent body, remark" 
ing also the time of their commencement, the motives to which they owed their 
birth, and the end to which they were directed. I therefore judged it to be a 
task that might prove highly useful to the world, to rescue from oblivion 
this great and most instructive act of fortune : for, in all the vast variety of 
disorders, struggles, and changes, which the power of this deity introduces into 
human life, we shali find none equal to that long and desperate scene of con- 
tention, none worthy to be compared for their importance with those events 
which have happened in the present age. But this is what the writers of par- 
ticular histories can never set before us in its full and proper light. It might 
with equal reason be supposed, that, by single visiting all the noted cities of 
the world, or from a view of each delineated on paper, we should be able to 
acquire a right notion of the figure of the earth, with the due order and ar- 
rangement of all its parts. But surely this must be thought a most absurd 
conceit. In a word, whoever is persuaded that the study of particular histories 
is alone sufficient to convey a perfect view and knowledge of the whole, may 
very properly be compared with one, who, on surveying the divided members 
of a body that was once endued with life and beauty, should persuade him- 
self that he had from thence obtained a just conception of all the comeliness 
and active vigour which it had received from nature. But let these broken 
parts be again placed in order, restored to all their first activity and life, and 
be once more offered to their view, he will be ready then to acknowledge, that 
all his former notions were as remote from truth, as the shadows of a dream are 
differentNfrom realties : for though some faint conception of the whole may, 
perhaps, arise from a careful examination of the parts, no distinct or per- 
fect knowledge can ever «be expected from it. In the same manner it must 
also be confessed, that particular relations are by no means capable of yield- 
ing any clear or extensive view into general history ; and that the only 
method which can render this kind of study both entertaining and instructive 
is that which draws together all the several events, and ranges them in their 
due place and order, distinguishing also their connection find their difference. 
I shall begin this book with the first expedition of the lionisns out of Italy ; 
which is the next in order to those events with winch the history of Ti- 
maeus is concluded, and which happened in the hundred and twenty-ninth 
Olympiad. I must, therefore, relate at what time, in what manner, and -on ^ 
what occasion, this people, after they had firmly settled and secured their 
governments at home, resolved to pass over into Sicily : for that was the first 
country, beyond the bounds of Italy, i nt ° which they sent their armies. I 
shall mention, in the plainest and most simple manner, what it was that gave 
rise to this invasion, that the reader may not be forced to perplex his mind 
with searching after the causes of that which was itself the genuine and imrne-. 
diate cause, and the very entrance to the work be from thence involved in in- 
superable darkness and uncertainty. And since it will be necessary to give an , 
abstract also even of some events that passed before this period, I shall take 
care to choose some known and undisputed aera, and to begin with facts 
which are clear, precise, and well established : for, when the beginning of a 
history is involved in a kind of intricacy or obscurity, the parts which follow 
can never obtain any great degree of credit or regard. But, on the other 
hand, when the introduction to the subject is made intelligible and clear to 
all, the subsequent narration will easily gain admission and belief. 



In the year, then, which was the nineteenth after the engagement near 
^gospotamus, and the sixteenth before the battle of Leuctra ; the year when 
the Lacedaemonians confirmed the treaty which Antalcidas had made with 
the Persians; and the elder Dionysius, having some time before defeated the 



14 GENERAL HISTORY '.OF POLYBIUS. ' 

Greeks of Italy near the river Helleporus, laid siege to Rhegium : in this same 
year, the Gauls took Rome by storm, and remained masters of all the city, the 
capital only excepted. But the Romans, having yielded to such conditions as 
the conquerors thought proper to impose, were once more restored, beyond all 
hope, to the possession of their country. From this time, being as it were 
again renewea in strength and vigour, they made war upon the states that were 
contiguous to their own ; and having, partly by their bravery, and partly with 
the aid of fortune, reduced all the Latins to their yoke, they next attacked the 
Tyrrhenians ; after these the Gauls, and then the Samnites, whose country lay 
contiguous to the territory of the Latins, and bounded it towards the north 
and east. Some time afterwards, the people of Tarentum, having treated an 
embassy from Rome with great indignity and insult, and being apprehensive 
that the Romans were preparing vengeance for the affront, invited Pyrrhus 
into Italy. This happened the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, and 
received that signal overthrow at Delphi, which drove them, with the remains ' 
of their army, into Asia. But the Romans, who had already reduced the 
Tyrrhenians and the Samnites to their yoke, and had returned with conquest 
from many engagements also with the Gauls, were now beginning to enlarge 
their views, and resolved to seize upon the rest of Italy; as if the whole coun- 
try had belonged to them by a natural and proper right. Their former com- 
bats had completely trained and exercised them in the use of arms. They 
attacked the Tarentines with vigour, and persisted in the war with so much 
firmness, that they at last drove Pyrrhus out of Italy, and then turned their 
arms against the cities which had been confederated with that prihce against 
them. And having, by a course of wonderful success, forced all the inhabit- 
ants of Italy,' except the Gauls, to receive their laws, they were now at leisure 
to march against a body of Roman soldiers, who had possessed themselves of 
Rhegium. 

The two cities, Messana and Rhegium, both situated upon the same straits, 
had both experienced the same misfortune. Not long before this time, a 
body of Campanian mercenaries, who had served in_the armies of Agothocles, 
invited by the beauty and rich condition of Messana, watched their time for 
gaining possession of the place by treachery. They soon found means to be 
received as friends within the city ; where they killed one part of the inhabit- 
ants, and drove the rest without the walls. And, having taken to themselves 
the wives and children of those unhappy^ men, as they fell into the hands of 
every one at the very time of the disorder, they made afterwards a division of 
their lands and riches; and thus, with little difficulty, gained full possession 
of a very splendid city, and fertile territory. This success soon excited others- 
to follow the example. The inhabitants of Rhegium, alarmed by the en- 
trance of Pyrrhus into Italy-, and being also under no small apprehensions of 
some danger from the Carthaginians, who were at that time the sole masters 
of the sea, implored the assistance of the Romans, who sent them a garrison 
of four thousand men, under the command of Decius Companus, These, 
for some time, remained firm in their duty, and guarded the liberties ©f the 
city ; but, being at last suduced by the commodious situation of the place, 
and by the wealth and flourishing condition of the citizens, they resolved to 
imitate the example -which the Campanrans had so lately set before them ; 
and, beiug assisted also by them in the execution of their design, they drove 
out or killed the inhabitants, and obtained entire possession of the citv. 

This horrid act of treachery raised great indignation in the Romans ; but 
the wars in winch they were then involved restrained their vengeance. As hoon 
as these were ended, they marched and laid siege to Rhegium. J he place 
soon fell into their hands; but the greatest part ot the garrison was destroyed 
in the assault : for they fought like men who well foresaw the consequences of 
their crime. About three hundred only that, were taken alive were seat to 
Rome ; and, being conducted by the praetors into the forum, were first 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 15 



scourged and then beheaded. By this just severity the Romans .hoped that 
they should again recover their character of good faith among their allies: 
they restored the city also, with all the lands, to the former inhabitants. 

The Mamertines of Messana, for this was the name which the Campanian 
mercenaries had assumed, as long as they were supported by the Romans who 
had possessed themselves of Rhegium, not only remained in quiet and secure 
enjoyment of their own city and proper territoiy, but made frequent incur- 
sions also into the adjacent countries ; creating no small terror and disturbance, 
both to the Carthaginians and the Syracusaus ; and exacting contributions 
from many parts of Sicily. But no sooner had the siege of Rhegium de- 
prived them of the assistance of those allies, than they were themselves so 
vigorously pressed by the Syracusan forces, that they were constrained to 
abandon all the open count) y, and to keep close behind their walls. The 
occasion was as follows. 

A little before this time, when some dissention had been raised between 
the citizens of Syracuse and the army, the troops, while they Jay encamped 
in the neighbourhood of Mergana, elected two magistrates out of their own 
body, Artemidorus, and ^Hiero, who was afterwards king. Hiero was then 
extremely young ; but he seemed to have been singularly formed by nature 
to sustain the regal dignity. As soon as he was invested with this new autho- 
rity, he found some means, by the assistance of his friends, to gain admission 
into the city: and, having there drawn all the chiefs of the opposite faction 
into his power, he shewed, in his whole deportment, such proofs of clemency 
and true greatness, that the "people, though they were by no means. satisfied 
with the liberty which the army had assumed, with one voice declared him 
praetor. But it was so easy to discern, from his first behaviour in this office, 
that he had some more exalted post in view : for, having remarked that, 
as often as the forces, with the magistrates at their head, were obliged to take 
the field, some new com motions and disorders were always raised among the 
citizens ; and observing also, that a certain Syracusan, named Leptines, was 
the first in favour with the people, and far superior in his influence and 
credit to all the rest of thel inhabitants, he resolved to contract a close alliance 
•with him, and to marry his daughter ; being persuaded that, by the help of 
his authority, he would be able to keep all things quiet and secure at home, 
whenever himself should be engaged in the command of the army abroad. 
Some time afterwards, observing that the mercenaries, who had been long 
employed in the Syracusan armies, were become uutractable and mutinous, 
he ordered all the forces to take the field, and to march against the barba- 
rians of Messana. Being incarnped within fight of the enemy near Ceuturipe, 
he drew up his army in order of battle along the side of the Cyamosorus. But 
having stationed the Syracusan troops, both infantry and cavalry, at a distance 
from the rest, as if he had intended an attack from a different quarter, he op- 
, posed the mercenaries only to the enemy, by whom they were entirely defeated 
and destroyed. But as soon as the slaughter was begun, himself with all the 
forces of the city returned back again to Syracuse. Having thus happily 
accomplished his design, and cleared the army of its seditious members, 
and having filled their place with a sufficient number of new mercenaries, 
levied by himself, from that time he 'continued to discharge the duties of 
his post, without any tumult or disorder. And when the Mamertines, elated 
by their past success, had spread themselves over all the country, without any 
fear or caution, he led against them the forces of the city, which were now com- 
pletely armed and disciplined, and came to au engagement with them upon the 
banks of the river Longanus, in the plain of Mylae ; and, having obtained an 
entire victory, in which their generals also were taken prisoners, bergave an 
effectual check to the insolence oi those barbarians, and,, on his return to Sy« 
recuse, was saluted king by tue army. 



16 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



The Mamertines, who had been before deprived of the assistance which they 
had been accustomed to receive from Rhegium, were now so broken and dis- 
heartened by this last defeat, that they considered their affairs as almost des- 
perate. In this state, some among them had recourse to the Carthaginians, 
and delivered the citadel into their hands ; while the rest sent ambassadors to 
Rome, to make an offer of their city, and to implore the protection of the Ro- 
mans for a people sprung, as they pretended, from one common stock with 
themselves, The Romans were, for some time, under great perplexity and 
doubt. To comply with this demand, appeared to be in a high degree im- 
proper and absurd. They had lately punished, with the last severity, a body 
of their own citizens, for having betrayed the public faith- in seizing Rhe- 
gium; and, if they now should support the Mamertines, who not only had 
surprized Messana by the very same kind of perfidy, but had assisted in taking 
Rhegium also, it would be difficult to find any fair apology for such conduct. 
On the other hand, as the Carthaginians, besides the dominions which they 
possessed in A trie, were masters also of many parts of Spain, and of all the 
islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas, it was greatly to be feared, that, 
if Sicily should now fall into their hands, they would soon become too formi- 
dable neighbours, since they would then lie close to every part of Italy, and. 
encircle them on every side. It was easy also to discern, that they must very 
soon be able to reduce the island, if the Mamertines were not now supported : 
for, if once they were permitted to possess Messana, they would find it no 
hard task to conquer Syracuse, since they were already masters of almost all 
the other parts of Sicily. The Romans saw the danger, and considered it as 
a matter of the last necessity, to obviate and prevent these consequences, and 
not suffer Messana to fall into the hands of those who might, from thence, be 
able to lay, as it were, a bridge for passing into Italy. Yet, after many long- 
debates upon the subject, the senate even at last refused to pass any decree 
concerning it ; because the manifest absurdity on one side seemedstill to draw 
with equal weight against the advantage on the other. But the people, who 
!iad been much exhausted by their former wars, and wished for some occasion 
to repair their shattered fortunes, being incited partly by the great utility which 
would confessedly accrue to the republic from the war, and animated also by 
the shew of those advantages with which the praetors, in their speeches, flat- 
tered every private man, resolved that the desired assistance should be sent, 
and made a law for that purpose, commanding Appius Claudius, one of the 
consuls, to pass over to Messana. The Mamertines, partly by the means of 
fraud, and partly by Open force, drove out the Carthaginian commander from 
the citadel, and delivered the city to the Romans. 

The Carthaginians, when they had first crucified their general, for his cow- 
ardise and ill conduct in relinquishing the citadel, made haste to draw to- 
gether all their forces to retake Messana : and, having stationed their fleet 
near Pelorus, and posted their land army on the side of Senae, they began to 
press the siege with vigour. At the same time Hiero, imagining that this oc- 
casion might be favourable for driving the Mamertines entirely out of Sicily, 
entered into treaty with the Carthaginians ; and, beginning his march from 
Syracuse, he came and invested the city on the other side, having encamped 
near the mountain called Chalcidicus. 

The consul Appius passed the Straits in an adventurous manner by nigh*t, 
and was received into Messana ; but finding that the place was closely pressed 
on every side, and reflecting with himself that the affair was full of hazard, 
and that little reputation was likely to be gained from a war, in which the ene- 
my were so much superior both by land and sea, he sent offers of accommo- 
dation to both camps, desiring only that the Mamertines might remain unmo- 
lested. But, as this proposal was rejected, he was forced to venture on a 
battle, and resolved to make hi* first attack upon the Syracusans. He 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 17 



accordingly drew his forces out of the city, and offered battle to Hiero, who 
readily accepted it. The fight was long and obstinate ; but at last the Ro-» 
mans obtained the victory, and drove back the enemy to their camp ; and, 
having spoiled the dead, they returned again to Messana. 

But Hiero, beginning now to apprehend some worse event, as soon as night 
came on, returned back again with his army, in all haste, to Syracuse. When 
Appius, on the following; day, was informed of this retreat, he immediately 
conceived new hopes, and resolved to attack the Carthaginians without dela}\ 
He gave orders, therefore, to the troops, to take their repast betimes ; and, 
marching out of the city at break of day, he charged the enemy, killed great 
numbers of them, and forced the rest to fly to the neighbouring cities. After 
these signal victories, the siege being raised, and no forces appearing in the 
field, the Romans wasted, at their leisure, the country of the Syracusans and ' 
their allies : and at last advanced to Syracuse itself, in order to besiege it. 

Such were the causes, and such the time and manner, of the first expedition 
of the Romans out of Italy : and here I fix the beginning of my work ; having 
first run through the times which just before preceded it, in order more 
clearly to explain the genuine and real grounds of this transaction : for," that 
the reader might be able to obtain a just and perfect knowledge of the pauses 
of the present power and greatness of the Romans, it was proper previously to 
acquaint him both with the time and manner in which this people first re- 
covered into better hopes, after they had beheld their country lost ; and by 
what means afterwards, when they had vanquished all the neighbouring states, 
they found occasion to extend their conquests beyond the bounds of Italy. 
Nor let it be thought in any manner strange, if, in the subsequent parts of this 
history, when I was speaking of the states that are chiefly; celebrated in the 
world, I should look back to ages that are more remote : for this I shall do, 
merely for the sake of beginning from such facts as will best enable me to dis- 
cern from what causes, and in what time and manner, they severally grew to 
that condition in which they are seen to flourish in the present times. But I 
now must hasten to the task that is before me ; mentioning first, in few words, 
the events which are designed to be the subject of these preliminary books. 

The first then is the war in Sicily between the Carthaginians and the Ro- 
mans ; and, after it, the African war. Next will follow a recital of the actions 
of Amilcar and of Asdrubal in Spain ; with the invasion also of Illyria by the 
Romans, who then, for the first time, sent their armies into those parts of Eu- 
rope. After these transactions come the battles, which the Romans were forced 
to sustain in Italy against the Gauls : about which time it was that the war' of 
Cleomenes broke out in Greece ; with an account of which I shall conclude 
the second book, and close the introduction to my history. 

To enter into a minute detail of all the parts and circumstances of these wars, 
would be labour quite unnecessary to myself, and attended with no great ad- 
vantage to the reader : for, it is not my design to write the history, but rather 
to give a general and summary account of these transactions, such as may 
serve for an introduction to my history ; and, by making a short recital of the 
chief events, in the order in which they were transacted, and carrying on the 
narration, in one regular and connected series, to the time from whence my 
own work commences, to prepare the reader for the accounts that follow, and 
make the whole both easy and intelligible. I design, however, to be somewhat 
more particular and copious in describing the war in Sicily between the Car- 
thaginians and the Romans: for, it is not easy to find in history any one more 
considerable, either with respect to the time of its duration, the diligence and 
forces by which it was sustained, the constant and uninterrupted course of im- 
portant actions that happened in it, or the great and sudden turns cf fortune 
that attended it. And because the public manners and civil institutions both 
of Rome and Carthage were as yet pure and unimpaired ; as their wealth was 
moderate, and their strength nearly equal, it will be more easy to form a per- 

VOL. 1. NO. 3. C 



is GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

feet judgment from this war, of the powers peculiar to the constitution of each 
republic, than from those that followed. 

Another motive, which inclined me not less strongly to give a more minute 
description of the Sicilian war, was because Fabius and Philinus, who are es- 
teemed the most skilful writers on the subject, have by no means shewn a due 
exactness or fidelity in A'eir relations. I cannot, indeed, persuade myself, that 
they would knowingly deviate from the truth. The characters of the men, 
and the whole tenor-of their lives, exclude all suspicion: but, as it happens 
in the case of lovers, a certain secret affection and partiality towards their 
friends and countrymen seem to have fixed insensibly some prejudices upon 
them. To these it must be imputed, that Philinus, in every part of his his- 
tory, so highly praises the virtue, courage, and wisdom, of the Carthaginians ; 
allowing none of all these qualities to the Romans : while Fabius, on the other 
hand, takes all occasion to deprecate the Carthaginians, and extol the Ro«« 
mans. Now such a disposition, when it is shewn in other circumstances, is 
truly commendable. It is, in part, the character of a good man to love his 
country and his friends, and to hate the enemies of both ; but an historian 
must divest himself of these affections, and be ready, on many occasions, to 
speak largely in the praises even of an enemy, when his conduct deserves ap- 
• piause ; nor scruple to condemn "his most esteemed and dearest friends, as of- 
ten as their actions call for censure. 

Truth is the eye of history : for, as an animal, when deprived of sight, be- 
comes incapable of performing its natural and proper functions ; so, if we take 
away truth from history, what remains will be nothing but an useless tale. 

Now, if we pay a proper regard to truth, we shall find it necessary, not only 
to condemn our friends on some occasions, and commend our enemies; but also 
to commend and condemn the same persons, as different circumstances may 
require : for, as it is not to be imagined that those who are engaged in great 
affairs should always be pursuing false or mistaken measures ; so neither is it 
probable that their conduct can at all times be exempt from error. An histo- 
rian, therefore, in all that he relates, should take care to be. directed in his 
judgment by the genuine and real circumstances of every action, without re- 
garding the actors of it. The following examples may serve to shew the truth 
of these remarks. 

Philinus, in the beginning of his second book, gives this account of the af- 
fairs of Sicily : "that Messana was invested by the Carthaginians and Syra- 
cusans ; that the Romans had no sooner passed the Straits, and gained admis- 
sion into the city, than they sallied out and attacked the Syraeusans, but were 
repulsed with considerable loss ; that they next made a like attempt upon the 
Cavthaginians ; in which engagement they not only were defeated, but lost 
also many of their men, who fell alive into the hands of the enemy." He then 
adds, " that immediately after this action, Hiero was so struck with terror, 
that he not only set fire to his camp, and fled away by night te Syracuse, but 
abandoned all the fortresses in the district of Messana ; that the Carthaginians, 
in the same manner, deserted their entrenchments, and retired to their cities, 
not daring to oppose the Romans in the field ; that the generals, observing 
that their troops were quite disheartened, were afraid to venture on a second 
battle ; that the Romans pursued closely after them in their retreat, and, 
having plundered and destroyed the country, advanced even to Syracuse, in, 
order to besiege it." 

A relation so absurd must needs confute itself. The armies which, as this 
historian writes, were laying siege to Messana, and which had gained the vic-^ 
tory in two engagements, on a sudden become dispirited and heartless, aban- 
don all the open country, and are themselves besieged; while the Romans, be- 
sieged and twice defeated, are yet described as pursuing the flying enemy, in 
possession of the open country, and at last laying siege to Syracuse. Facts so 
opposite can never be reconciled together. It is evident that either the first, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. ■ 19 



or the subsequent, part of this narration must be false : but the latter is un- 
doubtedly true : for the Romans actually laid siege to Syracuse, as this writer 
himself admits ; and afterwards to Echetla, a city standing on the frontier be- 
tween the Carthaginian and the Syracusan territories. It follows, therefore, 
that the facts are false which are affirmed ; and that the Romans were victo- 
rious in the two engagements, in which they are represented b}' this historian 
to have been defeated. Such then is the character of Philinus : for the same 
mistakes are to be found in almost every part of this performance. Nor is the 
history of Fabius in this respect more accurate, as I shall hereafter take occa- 
sion to demons! rate. But I now return from this digression ; and shall en- 
deavour, by a regular, though short, ,deductioiV"of the principal events, to set 
before the reader a clear and just description of the war. 



CHAP. II. 

As soon as the news of thpse victories which had been gained by Appius were 
received at Rome, the Romans chose for consuls M. Octacilius and M. Va- 
lerius, and sent them both into Sicily, with all their forces. The armies of 
this republic, besides the troops which are raised amongst the allies, are com- 
posed of four legions. These are levied every year; and each of them consists 
of four thousand foot, and three hundred horse. At their first arrival, many 
cities, both of the Carthaginians and the Syracusans, immediately submitted, 
to them. When Hiero saw that a general dread and consternation had spread 
through all the island, and considered likewise the numbers and the strength 
of the legionary forces, he began to think that the issue of the war would 
necessarily be determined by these circumstances in favour of the Romans. 
He sent ambassadors, therefore, to the consuls, with proposals for a treaty. 
The offer was embraced with pleasure by the Romans, chiefly for the sake of 
securing provisions for the army ; for, as the Carthaginians were masters of 
the sea, it was greatly to be feared that their supplies would be intercepted. 
And, indeed, the forces of the former year had been reduced to great ex- 
tremity, through the want of necessaries. Perceiving, therefore, that the 
friendship of this prince might prove highly serviceable to them in this respect, 
they accepted it with joy, and agreed to a treaty with him, upon these con- 
ditions : " That he would pay a hundred talents of silver, and restore, without 
ransom, all the Roman prisoners." Thus the alliance was concluded; and 
from this time Hiero, sheltered under the protection of the Romans, whom he 
supplied from time to time, as their necessities required, possessed his king- 
dom in security, pursuing always the right paths of glory, and employing all 
his pains to gain the applause and favour of his subjects. Aud, indeed, so 
prudent was his conduct, both in the general tenor of his policy, and in every 
single act of government, that he reaped from it the most lasting fruits, and 
enjoyed a fame to which few princes have been able to aspire. 

. As soon as the treaty was confirmed at Rome, in an assembly of the people, 
it was resolved, for the time to come, to send two legions only into Sicily : for, 
as by this alliance the burden of the war was become much lighter to them 
than before, so they considered likewise that a smaller army might more easily 
be supplied with necessaries. But when the Carthaginians saw that Hiero 
was become their enemy, and that the Romans were preparing to pursue the 
war with all imaginable vigour, they soon were sensible, that it neither would 
be possible for them to oppose the enemy in the field, nor even to retain what 
they then possessed in Sicily, without a more considerable force. They, 

therefore, made great levies in Liguria, and among the Gauls, and greater still 
in Spain, and embarked them all for Sicily : and, because Agrigentum was the 

strongest of all the places in the island that were subject to their power, and 

the most commodious alio for the occasions of the war, they resolved to make 



20 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

that city their place of arms, and removed into it their stores and all the 
forces. 

The consuls, who had made the alliance with the king of Syracuse, were 
now returned to Rome ; and L. Postumius and Q. Mamilius, who succeeded 
them in office and command, arrived in Sicily with the legions. As soon as 
they had seen the designs and the preparations of the enemy, they resolved to 
act more vigorously than before. Neglecting, therefore, all the other business 
of the war, they marched directly to Agrigentum with all their forces ; and en- 
camping at the distance of eight stadia from the city, shut up the Carthagi- 
nians within their walls. It was now the time of harvest; and, as the siege was 
likely to be of long continuance, the Roman soldiers were eagerly employed 
in getting in the corn, and had spread themselves over all the country, without 
care or caution. The Carthagians, seeing this disorder, sallied out upon the 
foragers, and routed them with little difficulty. They then ran towards the 
camp to plunder it, and with great fury attacked the troops that were left to 
guard the entrenchments : but the excellence of the Roman discipline, upon 
this occasion, as on many others, proved' the cause of their safety : for the sol- 
diers, remembering that those who yielded their place in battle, or fled basely 
from their post, were also punished with death, not only sustained the charge 
against an enemy that far exceeded them in numbers, but also pressed their 
adversaries with so much force and vigour, that, though they lost many of their 
men, they destroyed a great number of the Carthaginians ; and, having at last 
surrounded them on every side, when they were just now ready to tear away 
the palisade of the entrenchments, they drove them back with considerable 
loss, and pursued them even to the city. After this action, the Carthaginians 
were less frequent in their sallies ; and the Romans used more precaution 
when they went abroad to forage. 

As the enemy never appeared without the walls, unless to engage in some 
slight skirmishes, the consuls, having divided their army into two bodies, 
posted one of them near the temple of iEsculapius, and the other on the side 
which looked towards H«eraclea, and fortified with works on both sides of the 
city the space that lay between the camps. They drew a line round the city, 
to obstruct the sallies of the besieged, and another on the side towards the 
country, to repel all the approaches from that quarter, and to intercept all 
succours. The space between the lines and the camps was secured by ad- 
vanced bodies of troops, and by works thrown up at proper distances, as the 
nature of the ground required. The allies had brought together to Erbessus 
provisions and every kind of stores ; and, as this city stood at no great distance 
.from the Roman camps, their convoys went and returned continualK , and sup- 
plied them with all things in great abundance. 

In this condition things remained for near five months ; in which time many 
slight engagements happened, but no decisive action. But the besieged were 
greatly pressed by famine : for the numbers that were within the walls were 
not fewer than fifty thousand men. Annibal, therefore, who commanded in 
the city, finding that all things tended to the last extremity, dispatched mes- 
senger after messenger to Carthage, to solicit some relief. The Carthaginians 
embarked some troops and elephants, and sent them into Sicily to Hanno, 
their other general. Hanno ordered all these forces to be drawn together to 
Heraclea ; and, having made himself master of Erbessus, by some secret prac- 
tices among the citizens, he cut off all supplies from the Roman camp, and 
constrained them, in their turn, to feel the miseries of the besieged. Indeed, 
so great was the extremity to which they were .reduced, that they often were 
inclined to raise the siege ; which at last they must have been compelled to 
do, if Hiero had not practised every method of address and diligence, to fur- 
nish them, from time to time, in moderate quantity, with such supplies as were 
chiefly wanted. 

But when Hanno saw that the Roman army was disheartened by sickness as 
%vell as famine, while, on the other hand, his own troops were fresh and fit for 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. m 

action, taking with him the elephants, which were about fifty in number, and 
the rest also of his forces, he marched in haste from Heraclea, having sent 
away the Numidian horse before, with orders that they should approach the 
Roman camp, provoke their cavalry to action, and immediately retire back 
again towards the main army. These troops accordingly advanced ; and no 
sooner had they reached the nearest camp, than the Roman cavalry came pour- 
ing out against them, and began to attack with fury. But the Numidians 
observed their orders, and maintained a flying fight till they were joined by 
Hanno with the other forces ; and then, suddenly facing round, they fell with 
Tio'our upon the enemy, killed great numbers of them, and pursued the rest 
even close to their entrenchments. After this action, Hanno fixed his camp 
upon a hill called Torus, at the distance often stadia from the Romans. 

In this situation they both remained during two whole months. Many slight 
engagements happened every day between them ; but no action that was ge- 
neral or decisive. But as Annibal now made continual signals by fires from 
the city, and sent messengers from day to day to Hanno, to acquaint him that 
the multitude were no longer able to support the miseries of the famine, and 
that great numbers had deserted to the enemy, this general resolved at last to 
venture on a battle. The Romans, on their part also, for the reasons which 
have been already mentioned, shewed an equal eagerness to engage. They 
■drew out their forces on either side, and ranged them in order upon the ground 
that lay between the camps. The fight was long and obstinate ; but, alter 
some time, the Carthaginian mercenaries, who composed the first line, gave 
oround, and, falling back upon the elephants and the ranks that were behind 
them, threw the whole army into such disorder, that a general rout ensued. 
The o-reatest part of the troops were destroyed in the place ; a siffall number 
only escaped to Heraclea. - The baggage, and almost all the elephants, were 
taken. When night came on, the Romans, partly from the joy which their 
victory inspired, and partly through the fatigue which they had suffered in the 
action, neglected to guard their camp with the usual care. Annibal, whose 
affairs were desperate, considered this as the very moment of his safety. About 
midnight, therefore, he began his march out of the city, with all the foreign 
troops, filled up the lines with sacks of matting that were stuffed with chaff, 
and passed unobserved by the enemy. In the morning, the Romans, perceiv- 
ing what had happened, gave some little disturbance to the rear, but soon re- 
turned, and marched directly to the gates of Agrigentum ; and, finding no re- 
sistance, they entered the city and plundered it, and brought away many pri- 
soners, with rich spoil of every kind. 

The news of this success filled the Roman senate with joy, and inspired them 
with o-veater hopes than those which they had at first conceived. Instead of 
beino- satisfied with having relieved the Mainertines, and enriched themselves 
by the war, they now began to think that it would be no hard task to drive 
the Cartha<rinia us entirely out of Sicily, and, by the acquisition of that island, 
to add no small increase to the strength of their republic. To this point, there- 
fore, they directed all their views : and, indeed, on the part of the land forces, 
every thing seemed to promise a fair accomplishment of their designs. 1 he 
two new consuls, L. Valerius and T. Octacilius, maintained their ground in 
Sicily, and carried on the war with equal prudence and success. But, on the 
other hand, as-long as the Carthaginians should be suffered to remain sole mas- 
ters of the sea, the event must still be doubtful: for, though after the time 
when Agrigentum had first fallen into their hands, many of the Inland cities, 
in despair of being able to resist the Roman legions, had embraced the party, 
yet a greater number of those that stood along the coast revolted from them, 
through terror of the Carthaginian fleets. Thus the success on one side was 
still balanced by some equal loss". It was considered likewise, that the mari- 
time parts of Italy were often pillaged and insulted by the enemy, while the 



?? ' GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS 

coasts of Afric remained secure and unmolested. For all these reasons thev 
at last resoived that they would oppose the Carthaginians upon the Tea * 

Among the motives which induced me to enter into a more minute aescrin- 
tion of the war m bicily, this was not tile least,_that I might take occasion M 
explain the tune and manner in which the Romans first equ pped a navala 
mament together with the causes that gave birth to that attempt 

W^!!" 6SIgtl f 1 WaS ' \° brin 8' the war to a speedy and effectual conclusion 
With tins view, they resolved to build a hundred quinqueremes and twentl' 

triremes But one great difficulty occurred : their builder, were en i«Sy un- 

acquamtedwrth the -manner of constructing quinqueremes, the use of which 
was then unknown m Italy. But in this design we may observe a most con- 

spumous proof of that bald and daring spirit which is peculiar flti? 

who thnno-h A^^-i-,.* v n xi ° °f" il,,,!l *- 1 ' is pecunai to tne Komans, 

I?l "1 ° Rli the means that such a » enterprise required 

and before thy had even gamed the least degree of knowledge or expeiTence 
m mantime affairs, could.it once conceive, and carry into execution so vast ! 
project, and make the first trial of their forces against the Cart hag nians who 
had received from their ancestors the undisputed sovereignty of the ea ' The 
following fact may serve to confirm the truth of this reflection. When th s 
people first resolved to send their forces over to Messana, they had neither any 
decked vessels, or ships of transport, nor even a single fn^ate but having 
borrowed among the Tarentines, Eieates, Locrians, § and Neapolitans som f 
^e 3 viseS. "' " ' f " W trU ' emeS ' *** h ° ld] y emWked ^e legionlm 
The Carthaginians bore down upon them in their passage : when one of 
their qumqueremes advancing to the fight with too great eagerness struck 
upon the ^ids, and was taken by the Romans. Thi* vessel was "now made 

hen '»\ ? ™u e] ° f theiF ? Cet '" Snd ' indted ' wlth<Mt *°™ such IndSS 
then ^d t of ski 1 must soon have forced them to abandon the desig.a. ' 

V\ mle the workmen were busy in building and fitting out ships, others were 

*£?£* < Tnr° ge t r a h ^*f°^ '«>*»* ^en, m'tWe^Sc 
i *u i was done in the following manner: they placed benches 

s rii^'r^r P ffi WhiCh th V° WerS ™h ai ^ d in the^me orfeJ^S 
sea, with a ptoper officer among them to give the command. In this sitintmn 

to fall back together, and again to bend forwards ; to contract and extend 
their arms y to begin and leave off according to the signals. After "thisp^ 
pamration, he vessels being now completely 8 finished, Ihey sailed out to I it 
and, when they had spent some little time in perfecting their exercise ad- 
«ce" ed " g " *"" 0l ' Italy ' a§Teeably t0 the °^rs -hieh they had before 

\, J° T Cn ; ] ComeIius ' w ^° commanded the naval forces, had sailed, a few days 
before with seventeen ships towards Messana, to provide whateve- miohtbe 
wanted for the fleet; and had left directions with the other captains that 
they would follow, him as soon as they were ready. But while he lay at Met 
wna, having received some intelligence which gave him hopes of taking the 
town or Lipara by surprise, he too easily engaged in the design, and steered 

e & thr U att! nT'f ^ f^\ Wl * **? ***" ** m ^ tione d ' But on the new. 
Ln avtv h!' I al p Wh i° WaS - tieU statl ^ed at Panormus, immediately 

sent away the senator Boodes, with twenty ships. Boodes, sailing to the 
place by mght, blockaded up the Romans in the port. As soot as day 
appeared, the.sadors all fled from their ships, and escaped to land; and 
Cornelius being struck with terror, and perceiving no means of safety, sur- 
A nih!l mSdf tU ****«*?> who immediately returned back again to 
Ann bal carrying with them the Roman consul, and all his squadron! Not 

S Li 78 ? ' l^ eXpl01 , fc ' While the ^fortune of the Romans was 
t and 7f' a ° accident of the same kind proved almost fatal to 

Atmibal inmseli: for, having received information that the whole Roman 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. S3 



fleet had steered their course along the coast of Italy, and were now at no 
great distance, he presently advanced with fifty vessels, designing to take a 
view of their numbers, and of the order in which they sailed ; but he had 
scarcely doubled the promontary of Italy, when he found himself at once in 
the verv midst of the enemy, who were all disposed in perfect order, and 
ready to engage. A great part of his ships were taken ; but himself escaped 
with the rest, though uot without the greatest difficulty. The Romans then 
held on their course to Sicily: and being there informed of what had hap- 
pened to Cornelius, they sent messengers to Duilius, who commanded the 
land forces in the island, and waited his arrival. At the same time, having 
received intelligence that the Carthaginians were at no great distance, they 
began to make the necessary preparations for an engagement. But because 
their ships were built with little skill, and were both slow and heavy in their 
motions, it was resolved to balance these defects by the use of certain machines, 
which some person in the fleet had invented for the occasion, and which were 
afterwards called by the Romans, corvi. The description of them is as 
follows: — 

They erected on the prow of every vessel around pillar of wood, of about 
twelve feet in height, and of three palms breadth in diameter, with a pulley 
at the top. i To this pillar was fitted a kind of stage, eighteen feet in length, 
and four feet broad, which was made ladderways, of strong timbers laid 
across, and cramped together with iron ; the pillar being received into aa 
oblong square, which was opened for that purpose, at the distance of six ieet 
within the end of the stage. On either side of the stage lengthways was a 
parapet, which reached jus£ above the knee. At the farthest end of this 
stage, or ladder, was a bar of iron, whose shape was somewhat like a pestle; 
but it was sharpened at the bottom, or lower point ; and on the top of it was a 
ring. The whole appearance of this machine very much resembled those 
that are used in grinding corn. To the ring just mentioned was fixed a rope, 
by which, with the pulley that was at the top of the pillar, they hoisted up 
the machines, and, as the vessels of the enemy came near, let them fall 
upon them, sometimes on their prow, and sometimes on their sides, as occa- 
sion best served. As the machine fell, it struck into the decks of the enemy, 
and held them fast. In this situation, if the two vessels happened to lay- 
side by side, the Romans leaped on board from all parts of their ships at 
once. But in case they were joined only by the prow, they then entered two 
and two along the the machine ; the two foremost extending their bucklers 
right before them, to ward off the strokes that were aimed against them in 
front; whilst those that followed rested the boss of their bucklers vtfpon the 
top of the parapet on either side, and thus covered both their flanks. Having 
in this manner prepared their vessels for the. combat, they now only waited 
for the time to engage. 

As soon as Duilius heard of the misfortune that had happened to the 
other consul, he left the care of the army to the tribunes, and hastened to 
the (ieet: and having received information that the enemy were employed ia 
ravaging the plain of Mylae, he presently steered his course that way. The 
Carthaginians beheld their approach with joy; and immediately drew out 
their Meet, which consisted of a hundred and thirty ships : despising the inex- 
perience of the Romans, and flattering themselves with such assurance 
of success, that they even disdained to form their squadron into any kind of 
order, and, turning their prows towards the enemy, bore down instantly upon 
them, as to a certain spoil. The commander of the fleet was the same Annibal,. 
who made his retreat by night from Agrigentum. He sailed in a vessel of seven 
banks of oars, which had formerly belonged to Pyrrhus. As they approached 
more nearly to the Roman fleet, the sight of those strange naaebines, erected 
on the prow of every ship, occasioned some little hesitation and surprise. 
After some time, however, as their contempt of the enemy again took place, 



24 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

n . .,! !,! i, „ . ,i i i»iiii.ii ii m» . »mi ii. . i numimii uamgMaaaa W 

they advanced with the same ardour as before; but when their vessels, as 
soon as they were joined in action, were grappled fast by these new instru- 
ments of war, and when the Romans, instantly advancing along the machines 
towards them, maintained the light upon their very decks, one part of the 
Carthaginians were immediately destroyed, and the rest threw down their 
arms, being struck with terror by this new kind of combat, which seemed to 
resemble an engagement upon land. The ships that had advanced the fore- 
most to the fight", beiug thirty in number, were taken with their men. Among 
these was the general's ship. But Annibal himself found means to get on 
board a boat, and escaped, though not without the greatest hazard. 

The rest of the squadron were now advancing to the fight; but having 
observed the fate of their companions, they at first turned aside, in order to 
elude the stroke of the machines. But as their ships were light, and easy in 
their motions, they soon resumed their confidence, and began to fall upon the 
Roman vessels, some in stern, and some upon their sides ; being persuaded, 
that, with this precaution, they should be secure from danger; but when 
they saw, with great astonishment, that, on which side soever they advanced, 
the corvi still hung over them, they were at last content to seek their safety in 
flight, with the loss of fifty ships. 

This great and unexpected success upon the sea encouraged the Romans 
to pursue the war with double ardour. They land their forces upon the 
island, near iEgesta; raise the sitge of that city, when it was reduced to the 
last extremity ; and take RJarcella by storm. 

About the time when this victory was gained by sea, Amilcar, who comanded 
the latad forces of the Carthaginians, and was encamped near Panormus, 
having heard that some dispute had happened between the Romans and their 
allies, concerning the post of honour in the field, and that the allies were pre- 
paring to encamp apart between Thermse and Paropus, fell suddenly upon 
them with all his forces, when they had just raised their camp, and killed 
nearly four thousand men. 

About the same time, Annibal returned back to Carthage,- with the ships 
that had escaped in the late engagement. Not long afterwards he sailed 
from thence to Sardinia with the fleet ; taking with him also some officers of 
the chiefest note ; but being there surprised one day by the Romans, wfeo, 
from the time they first appeared upon the sea, had resolved to attempt the 
conquest of this island, and being blocked up by them in a certain harbour, 
so that many of his vessels fell into their hands, he was seized and crucified by 
the Carthaginians, who got safe to land. 

The succeding summer produced in Sicily nothing memorable on the part 
©f the Romans ; but the consuls of the following year, A. Atilius and C, 
Sulpicius, having led the army to Panormus, where the Carthagknans then 
lay in winter quarters, drew up their forces in order of battle before the town; 
but when the enemy kept close behind their walls, they directed their route 
back again to Hippana, and took it hi the first assault. Mytistratum was 
also taken, but not without much labour, and a siege of long continuance ; 
for the natural situation of the place had rendered it very strong. They then 
marched to Camarina, which not long before had revolted from them : and 
having advanced their works close against the city, and with their engines 
battered down the walls, they soon forced it to surrender. After this success, 
the town of Enna, with many other little places that belonged to the Car- 
thaginians, submitted to the Romans, who then resolved to form the siege 
of Lipara. 

In the following year, Atilius* the Roman consul, who theu lay at anchor 
in the port of Tyndaris, having perceived the Carthaginian fleet passing very 
near him, in a careless manner and without any order, made haste immediately 
to pursue them with ten ships, and gave orders to the rest to follow as soon 
as they were ready; but when the Carthaginians saw that one part of the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYEIUS. 



enemy were already under sail, while others had scarcely yet got on bea;d, 
and that the foremost ships had advanced far before the rest, they suddenly 
turned upon thern, and, surrounding them on every side, sunk the other 
vessels, and had almost taken that in which the consul sailed ; but because 
his ship was lighter than the rest, and well supplied with a body of the most 
skilful rowers, by the help of those advantages he escaped the danger. But 
in a short time afterwards, the rest of the Roman squadron advanced in order ; 
and having all turned their prows in one line against the enemy? they en- 
gaged them with such vigour and success, that they took ten of their ships 
with all the men, destroyed eight more, and forced the others to retreat in 
haste towards the Liparean islands. 

As the advantages in this engagement had seemed to be on both sides equal, 
they both resumed their naval preparations with greater vigour than before ; 
and resolved to employ their whole attention to obtain the sovereignty of the sea. 
During this time the armies upon land performed no exploit that deserves to 
be related, but wasted the whole campaign in slight and inconsiderable actions, 
of little moment or importance. Inr'ihe following summer, the Romans 
having employed, as we have said, their utmost diligence to complete their 
naval preparations, sailed out to sea, with a fleet of three hundred and thirty 
decked ships and cast anchor at Messana. From thence, leaving Sicily on 
the right, and doubling the promontary Pachynus, they steered their course 
towards Ecnomus, where their army at that time lay. The Carthaginians, 
having also drawn together a fleet which consisted of three hundred and 
fifty ships of war, sailed first to Lilybaeum, and from thence to Heraclea of 
Minos. The design of the Romans was to divert the war from Sicily to 
Afric, and constrain the Carthaginians to employ their strength in the defence 
of their own proper country. The Carthaginians on the other hand, being 
sensible that their coasts were open, and that the people of the country must 
become an easy prey, if the enemy should once gain the land, resolved to in- 
tercept them in the attempt, and force them to a battle. 

When such were the sentiments on either side, it was easy to discern, that 
an engagement soon must follow. The Romans, therefore, made such a dis- 
position of their forces, that they were equally prepared, either to proceed in 
their intended descent upon the coasts of Afric, or to accept a battle, in case 
that it should now be offered by the Carthaginians. They selected from the 
land army all their choicest troops ; and, having divided the fleet into four sepa- 
rated bodies, assigned to each of them a double name. The first division was 
called the first legion, and first squadron; and so the rest. The last only, 
not being distinguished by any such particular denomination, was stiled \as 
general, the triarii ; the name which is appropriated to the last division in 
the armies upon land. The whole fleet consisted of an hundred and forty 
thousand men ; each vessel containing one hundred and twenty soldiers, and 
three hundred seamen. On the other hand, the forces of the Carthaginians, 
whose preparations were made wholly for the sea, amounted to more than a 
hundred and fifty thousand; if we compute them from the number of their 
ships. How impossible is it, I do not say to behold so vast an armament, but 
even to hear a bare description of it without being fixed in admiration, both 
of the importance of the contest, and of the power and strength of the two 
republics that were thus engaged. 

The Romans, having considered that the course which they were obliged 
to steer lay through the open sea, and that the chief advantage of the enemy 
consisted in the lightness and celerity of their ships, resolved to make such a 
disposition as might render the whole fleet firm, compact, and very difficult to 
be broken. For this purpose, two vessels carrying six banks of oars, being 
those in which the consuls sailed, were first placed side by side in front ; each 
of these was followed by a line of vessels ; the first squadron making one line ; 
and the second the other; the ships of either line extended themselves to a 

YOL. I. NO. 3. D 



26 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



greater distance still as they advanced, and gradually widening the area of 
the figure. Their prows were all turned outwards. The first and second 
squad ions being thus disposed in form of a wedge, they drew up the third 
division in a line behind, so that the whole resembled, the figure of a triangle: 
the third squadron constituting the base. These last were followed by the 
transports, which they held in tow. Last of all came the triarii, Or fourth 
division, ranged likewise in a line of single ships, but so extended as to cover 
both the flanks of the line before them. This disposition resembled, as I said, 
the figure of a triangle, the upper part of which was hollow, and the base 
solid; the whole being strong, and proper for action, and such as could not 
easily be broken by the enemy. 

Trie Carthagenian generals, having animated their men as the occasion re- 
quired, and represented to them, in few words, that if they should gain the 
victory in the present combat, the business of the war would still be confined 
to Sicily, as before: but that in case they were defeated, they must then be 
forced to defend their country, families, and possessions, against the Romans, 
ordered all immediately to get on board. The forces, beiug fully sensible of 
the truth of what was spoken to them, received the order with alacrity, and 
came sailing from the harbour full of hope and eager resolution,. The gene- 
rals, having remarked the disposition of the enemy, ranged three parts of all 
their fieet in a line of single ships, extending the right wing far out to sea, 
with design to surround the Romans, and turning all their prows towards them. 
The remaining part was posted on the left, very near to shore, and in the 
figure which is called the forceps. The right wing, composed of all the 
quinqueremes and gallics, which, from their lightness and celerity, were most 
proper for the design of surrounding the enemy, was led by Hanno, whose 
army was defeated in the siege of Agrigentum ; and the left was committed to 
the care of Amilcar, who commanded in the former battle of Tyndaris. This 
general took his station in the centre of the line, and, as soon as the fight began, 
put in practice the following stratagem. 

The Romans, when they saw that the enemy were ranged in a line of single 
ships, began the combat by- attacking their centre. But the Carthaginians in 
the centre received orders from Amilcar immediately to retreat, that they 
might thus force the Romans to break the order of their battle. They fled 
accordingly with the greatest haste: and the Romans followed them with 
eagerness. By this contrivance, the first and second squadrons of the Romans 
were soon divided from the third, which held the transport ships in tow, and 
from the triaiii, who were drawn up behind to support the rest. When they 
were separated to a sufficient distance, the Carthaginians, upon a signal given 
froraAmi! car's ship, suddenly turned about, and fell with fury upon the vessels 
that pursued them. The fight was obstinate; and the advantages on both 
sides for some time equal. For, though the Carthaginians were far superior 
in the lightness of their ships, and in their skill in advancing or retreating, 
and attacking Lhe enemy on every side; yet the Romans derived no less 
assr ranee 6t victory, from the vigour and courage of their troops, the advan- 
tage . their machines, and the presence of both the consuls, under whose eye 
the soldiers fought. Such was the state of the action on that side. 

About this time Hanno, who commanded in the right wing at some distance 
from the vessels that were first engaged, stretched out to sea, and, bearing 
down upon the *:ria ii, threw them into great disorder. The Carthaginians 
also that were ranged along the coast, having changed their disposition, and 
(turned their prows in front towards the enemy, advanced against the squadron 
that towed the transports. Thus the whole squadron consisted at once of 
three different combats, maintained in different places. And because, in each 
of these divisionSj the strength of the combatants was nearly equal, the suc- 
cess was ah tor some time equal. But in the progress oi the action, the affair 
was brought at last to a decision: a different one, perhaps, than what might 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 2? 



reasonably have been expected in such circumstances. For the Roman squa- 
dron, that had begun the engagement, gained so fall a victory, that Amilcar 
was forced to fly, and the consul Manlius brought away the vessels that were 
taken. 

The other consul, having now perceived the danger in which the triarii and 
the transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with the second 
squadron, which was still entire. The triarii, having received these succours, 
when they were just upon the point of yielding, again resumed their courage, 
and renewed the fight with vigour : so that the enemy, being surrounded on 
every side in a manner so sudden and unexpected, and attacked at once both 
in front and rear, wereat last constrained to steer away to sea. 

About this time Manlius also, returning from the engagement, observed that 
the ships of the third squadron were forced in close to shore, and there blocked 
up, by the left division of the Carthaginian fleet. He joined his forces, there- 
fore, with those of the other consul, who now placed the transports end triarii 
in security, and hastened to assist those vessels, which were so invested by the 
enemy that they seemed to suffer a kind of siege. And, indeed, they must 
all have been long before destroyed, if the Carthaginians, through apprehension 
of the corvi, had not still kept themselves at a distance, and declined a close 
engagement. But the consuls, having now advanced together-, surround the 
enemy, and take fifty of their ships, with all the men. The rest, being but 
few in number, steered clos? along the shore, and saved themselves by flight. 

Such were toe circumstances of this engagement; in which the victory at 
last was wholly on the side of the Romans. Twenty-four of their ships we're 
sunk in the action; and more than thirty of the G'arthagimans; No vessel of 
the Romans fell into the hards of the enemy; but sixty-four of the Cartna- 
ginians were taken with their men. 

After this success, the Romans, having supplied the fleet with new provi- 
sions, repaired the vessels that were taken from the enemy, and shewn such 
care of their naval forces as the late victory well deserved, again sailed out to 
Sea, and steered their course towards the coast of Afric. The foremost ships 
arriving at Hermaea, cast anchor there, and waited for the rest of the fleet. 
The promontory, called Hermaea, is situated upon the extreme edt>eofthe 
gulph of Carthage, from whence it extends far out to sea, and points towards 
the coast of Sicily. When the other vessels were arrived, they a!i sailed to- 
gether along the coast, till they came to Aspis ; and having there disembarked 
their forces, drawn their ships to land, and thrown up an entrenchment round 
them, they resolved immediately to invest the city, having first in vain invited 
the inhabitants to surrender. 



CHAP. III. 

The Carthaginians who had escaped from the late engagement, and re- 
turned safe to Carthage, were persuaded that the Romans, elated by so great 
a victory, would immediately direct their course towards that cits'. They 
made, therefore, the necessary disposition, both by land and sea, for securing 
alt the approaches to the coast, l. But when they heard that the enemy had 
already disembarked their troops, and were laying siege to Aspis, havirig now 
lo3t all hooe of being able to prevent their landing, they began to levy forces, 
and employed all their care to fortify the city and the adjoining country. 

The Romans soon forced Aspis to surrender ; and having left in the place a 
proper garrison, they sent some messengers to Rome, to convey the news of 
their success, and to receive instructions with regard to the measures that 
were next to be pursued. They then decamped with all their forces, and 
marched through the country to waste and plunder it. Finding no resistance 
from the enemy, they destroyed many houses of great magnificence, and re- 



38 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

turned back again to their ships, carrying with them a great quantity of cattle, 
slnd more than twenty thousand slaves. 

The messengers about this time returned from Rome, with orders that one 
of the consuls should remain in Afric, with the forces that were necessary, and 
the other to carry back the fleet. Regulus, therefore, was left behind, with 
fifteen thousand foot, five hundred horse, and forty of the ships; while Man- 
lius, taking with him the prisoners, and the rest of the naval forces, passed 
safely along the coast of Sicily, and arrived at Rome. 

The Carthaginians, perceiving from the preparations that were made, that 
the enemy had no design to leave the country, chose at first two generals, 
Bostar, and Asdrubal, the son of Flanno, and sent afterwards for Amilcar like- 
wise, from Heraclea. Amilcar sailed in haste to Carthage, with five thousand 
foot, and five hundred horse; and being declared their general, he held a con- 
sultation with Asdrubal and the other chief, concerning the measures that were 
most proper to he taken. It was soon resolved that they should lead the forces 
against the enemy, and not suffer them thus to waste the country without 
resistance. The consul, after some days, advanced again with his army through 
the country; storming all the posts that were not fortified with walls, and 
reducing the rest by siege. Being at last arrived near Adis, a city of some 
importance, he encamped be. -e it, prepared his works, and began to press 
the siege with vigour. The Carthaginians, in order to relieve the place, and 
save the country round it from destruction, directed their march that way with 
all their forces, and fixed their camp upon a hill, which, indeed, overlooked 
the enemy, but was in every other respect a very improper situation for their 
army. For as their chief strength consisted in their elephants and cavalry, 
they should in prudence have encamped upon the open plain ; whereas, by 
marching into places that were steep, confined, and craggy, they seemed to 
instruct their enemies in what manner they best might act against them. And 
this indeed was the event. For the Romans, wisely judging that the 
strongest and ,most servicable part of the Carthaginian army, and that 
which they had the greatest cause to dread, was rendered wholly useless 
by their situation, resolved to seize the occasiou and engage the enemy, before 
they should descend into the plain. They drew out their forces, therefore, by 
break of day, and began the attack on both sides of the hill. The Cartha- 
ginian cavalry and elephants were not able to perform any service in the 
action. But the mercenaries stood for some time firm, and maintained the 
fight with, so much vigour, that they forced the first legion to give ground. 
But when these troops were attacked behind, and dispersed with little diffi- 
culty by the Romans who had ascended the hill on the other side, the whole 
array then fled at once from the camp, and a general rout ensued. The ele- 
phants, with the cavalry, gained the plain, and escaped. The Romans, having 
for some time pursued the infantry, returned back to the camp- and pillaged 
it, and marched afterwards at leisure through the country, wasting and de- 
stroying all the cities in their way ; and having at last possessed themselves of 
Tunis, there they encamped; because this city not only seemed commodious 
for the occasion of the war, but was also situated with great advantage for 
investing Carthage itself, and all the adjoining country. L* 

The Carthaginians were now reduced to a condition, which, indeed, seemed 
next to desperate. For besides these two defeats, the one by sea, the other 
upon land, which were both occasioned not so much ibr want of courage in the 
troops, as by the unskilful conduct of the generals, the Numidians had also 
sent detachments into their territories, and committed even greater devasta- 
tions than the Romans. The people all left their habitations in the country, 
and fled to Carthage. Their numbers soon occasioned the most dreadful fa- 
mine in the place : while the apprehension also of a sudden siege filled every 
heart with, consternation and dismay. But Regulus, who had given so great 
■a shock to the strength of Carthage, both by land and sea, that the city itself 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. *a 

m 1 1 m ""—in iiiii. " 1 11 1 1 — 

seemed almost ready to surrender to him, began now to fear, that anew consul 
might arrive fro. 11 Rome, and rob him of the glory of finishing the war. He in- 
vited, therefore, the Carthaginians to a treaty. The offer was embraced 
with pleasure ; and some of the chiefs of the city were sent to settle the con- 
ditions with him. But so far were they from yielding their consent in any 
point to the terms that were proposed, that they scarcely could submit to hear 
them : for Regulus, as if he had been already master of their fate, seemed 
to think, that every thing which he was inclined to grant should be accepted 
by them as mere grace and favour. But the ambassadors, perceiving that 
though they should entirely be reduced beneath the Roman yoke, no. worse 
conditions could be imposed than those that now were offered, not only re- 
turned again without concluding any treaty, but' were greatly offended also 
and incensed by the unyielding haughtiness of the consul. The Carthagi- 
nian senate, when they knew the terms that were demanded, assumed a noble 
constancy ; and, though they were almost ready to despair of safety, resolved 
to encounter every danger, and put in practice every expedient that time 
might offer, rather than. by a base submission, to disgrace the glory of their 
former actions. 

About this time, one of those that had been sent by the Carthaginians into 
Greece, to raise some mercenaries in that country, returned to Carthage, bring- 
ing with him a large body of troops. Among them was a certain Lacedaemo- 
nian, named Xantippus, who had been educated in the Spartan discipline, and 
from thence had gained a perfect knowledge in the art of war. As soon as he 
was informed of all the circumstances of the late defeat, and had seen the na- 
ture of the Carthaginian forces, with the number of iheir horse and elephants, 
he began first to reflect within himself, and afterwards to declare among his 
friends, that the Carthaginians had not been vanquished by the Romans, but 
owed their losses to their own* mistakes, aud to the want of skill in their com- 
manders. This discourse being soon spread among the people, as it happens 
in such conjunctures, came at last to the ears of the generals and the magis- 
trate?, who ordered Xantippus to be called. When he came before them, he 
explained with so much clearness the causes of their late misfortune, and 
shewed such strong assurances of victory, in case they now would yield to his 
advice, and choose the open plains for their encampments, inarches, and 
battles, that the chiefs with one voice applauded all his sentiments, and com- 
mitted the care of the army to him. 

From the time when this discourse was first known among the people, a kind 
of joyful rumour began to spread through all the city, and raised a general ex- 
pectation of some happy change : but when Xantippus drew up the troops in 
order without the walls, and formed them into several bodies, training and in- 
structing each of them to move according to the rules of military discipline, 
a skill, so visibly superior to that of the other generals, forced loud applauses 
from the multitude. They demanded to be led immediately against the 
enemy, and seemed to be assured, that, under such a chief, they could never 
Suffer any loss. The generals, when they saw the courage of the soldiers thus 
restored, harangued them in such words as the time required, and in a few 
days afterwards began their march. Their army was composed of twelve 
thousand foot, and four thousand horse, besides the elephants, which amounted 
to near a hundred. The Romans were under some surprise, when they saw 
that the Carthaginians, now, for the first time, chose the open plains, both for 
their inarches and encampments. They resolved, however, to meet and en- 
gage them without delay. Having advanced, therefore, with all their forces, 
on the first day they fixed their camp at the distance of ten stadia only from 
the enemy. On the following day, the Carthaginian generals held a consult-, 
ation, in order to determine what was necessary to be dune ; but the soldiers 
ran together in crowds, and, calling aloud upon the name of Xantippus, de- 
manded to he led without delay against the enemy. The generals, perceiving 



so GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBFTS, 



the great alacrity and confidence of the troops, and being also strongly ur^ed 
by the entreaties of Xantippus, who pressed them instantly to seize the oc- 
casion that was offered, gave orders to prepare for the engagement, and com- 
mitted to Xantippus the care and disposition of the whole. Xantippus, being 
entrusted with this power, ranged the elephants in a single line, in front : and, 
behind them, at a moderate distance, the Carthaginian phalanx. He posted 
on the right wing one part of the mercenaries ; the rest, that were mo>-e lightly 
armed, were equally distributed into another wing, together with the horse. 

The Romans also drew up their army in battle with equal readine!->s. Their 
chief care was, to secure themselves against the elephants, which they greatly- 
dreaded. For this purpose, having placed their light-armed troops in front, 
they drew up the legions in deep and close order behind, and divided the 
cavalry upon the whirls. Thus they lessened the visual extent of their front; 
but gave a greater depth to the body of their army. So that, upon the whole, 
their disposition was well adapted to sustain the shock of the elephants, but 
was wholly ineffectual for resisting the Carthaginian cavalry, which in numbers 
far exceeded that of the Romans. 

In this order both armies stood a while, expecting the signal to engage ; 
but, when Xantippus ordered the elephants to approach, and break the ranks 
of the enemy, while the horse, on either wing, advancing in the same moment 
to the charge, endeavoured tosurronud them, then the Romans, clashing their 
armour after their custom, ran forward, with loud cries, to the engagement. 
Their horse, overpowered ,by numbers, were soon turned to flight ; but the 
infantry of the left wing, led on by their contempt of the mercenary troops, 
and being desirous likewise to avoid the shock of the elephants, fell furiously 
upon the right wirtg of the Carthaginians, and, having routed them with little 
difficulty, pursued them even to their camp. The troops that first encoun- 
tered with the elephants were soon destroyed, and trampled down in heaps ; 
but the main body of the army remained for some time firm, by reason of the 
depth and closeness of the files : but when the hindmost ranks were obliged to 
face about, and engage the cavalry that had now surrounded them ; and 
when- those, who had forced their way beyond the elephants, were" charged 
by the Carthaginian phalanx, which was still entire, — then were the Romans 
distressed on every side, and destitute of all resource. The greatest part were 
trodden down in heaps, under the enormous weight of the elephants, and the 
rest destroyed in their very ranks by the javelins thrown from the horse. A 
small number only hoped to find their safety in flight : but as their way lay 
through the flat and open country, the elephants soon overtook, and destroyed 
the greater part. About five hundred only were taken alive, and among 
these, the consul Regulus. The Carthaginians lost in the action eight 
hundred of their mercenary forces, who were attacked and routed by the left 
wing of the Roman army. Of the Romans, about two thousand men, being 
those that had charged the mercenaries, were separated, in the course of the 
pursuit, to a distance from the army ; and, having thus escaped the general 
slaughter, they retreated safe to Aspis. The rest all were slain upon the [lace, 
the consul alone excepted, and those that v»ere taken with him. The Cartha- 
ginians, having spoiled the dead, returned back again to Carthage, exulting 
in their success, and carrying with them the consul Regulus, and the other 
prisoners. 

How wide a field of reflexion is opened to us by this event ! and what ad- 
mirable lessons does it contain for the good conduct of human life ! In the 
fate of Regulus we may discern, how little confidence sbonld be reposed in 
fortune, especially when she flatters with the fairest hopes : for he who, a few- 
days before, beheld the miserable state, to which the Carthaginians were re- 
duced, without remorse or pity, was now himself led captive by them, and 
forced to implore his safety of those very enemies, to whom he had shewn no 
mercy. We may also remark, in this event, the truth of that saying of Eu- 
pides ; " that one wise couusel is better than the strength of many ;" for 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 31 



here, the wisdom of one man defeated legions that were thought invincible ; 
infused new life into a people, whose losses had even almost rendered them 
insensible of misery ; and saved their tottering- state from ruin. Let the reader 
then take care to reap some profit from these examples ; and apply them to 
the improvement of his life and manners : for, siuce there are two sources 
only, from whence any real benefit can be derived, — our own misfortunes, 
and those which have happened to other men ; and since the first of these, 
though generally, perhaps, the most effectual, is far more dangerous and pain- 
ful than the other, it will always be the part of prudence to prefer the latter, 
which will alone enable us, at all times, to discern whatever is fit and useful, 
without any hazard or disquiet. And hence appears the genuine excellence 
of history, which, without exposing us to the labou* or cost of suffering, in- 
structs us how to form our actions upon the truest models, and to direct our 
judgment right in ail the different circumstances of life. But let us return 
from this digression. 

After a victory so complete, the Carthaginians set no bounds to the expres- 
sions of their joy, but poured out incessant acts of acknowledgments to the 
gods, and strove to outdo each other in all the acts of hospitality and kindness. 
But Xantii pus, who had thus saved ther state from ruin, returned buck again 
to Greece, within a short time after. In this he shewed great prudence and 
discernment : for signal and important services seldom fail to excite sharp 
malevolence and calumny, which, though a native of the country, supported 
by his friends and family, may, perhaps, be able to resist and conquer, yet 
foreigners are usually oppressed and ruined by them. Some writers give a 
different account of the departure of this general, which I shall examine in its 
proper place. 

As soon as the Romans heard that the affairs in Afric had proved so con- 
trary to all their hopes, they immediately prepared a fleet, to bring away the 
men that had escaped in the late engagement. On the other hand, the Cartha- 
ginians advanced, and laid siege to Aspis, hoping to get these troops into their 
hands ; bat, meeting with a htout and vigorous resistance, they were, at last, 
obliged to raise the siege. Being then informed, tlfat the Romans were fitting 
out a fleet, with design to return to Afric, they repaired all their old vessels, 
and built some ntw ; and having, in a short time, equipped a fleet of two 
hundred ships, sailed out to sea, to observe the motions of the enemy. 

In the beginning of the summer, the Romans came out to sea, with a 
fleet of three hundred and fifty ships, under the command of the consuls, 
M. ^Emilias and Servius Fulvius, and sailed along the coast of Sicily 
towards Afric. Near the promontory Hermueu, having' met with and 
engaged the Carthaginians, they defeated them even in the first attack with 
little difficulty, and took a hundred and fourteen of their vessels with 
all their men. They then received on board the troops that had escaped 
to Aspis, and directed their route back again to Sicily. But when they 
had completed the greatest part of their course, and were now approach- 
ing the Camarin j an coast, they were suddenly attacked by a tempest 
so great and terrible, that no words can sufficiently describe the horrors of it s 
Of four hundred and sixty-four vessels no more than eighty escaped the fury 
of this storm; the rest being either buried in the ocean, or dashed against 
the rock:-i and promontaries. The whole shore was covered with dead bodies 
and broken ships, so that history can scarce afford another example of so 
great and general a destruction. I his misfortune was "not so much to be 
ascribed to the accidr it, as to the imprudent obstinacy of the consuls : for the 
pilots bad given them repeated warnings, not to sail alon^ the exterior coast 
of Sicily, which looks towards Afric, where the shore was open, and afforded 
no convenient harbour, especially too, as the season was then the most un- 
favourable to navigu.ion, the constellation of' Orion being not quite passed, 
and the dog star ju»t ready to appear. But the consuls despised their admo- 



32 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



nitions, and held on their course along the coast, being tempted by the hope 
of gaining certain towns, which they flattered themselves would surrender 1o 
them without resistance, upon the first approach of their victorious fleet. 
Thus were they hurried, by the prospect of some slight advantage, into mis- 
fortunes that were irretrievable, and- which forced from them an acknowledge- 
ment of their rashness, when it was now too late to remedy it. But such in 
truth is the disposition of the Romans. Hot and violent in their pursuits, 
they persuaded themselves, that whatever they undertook must of necessity 
be accomplished, and that nothing is impossible, which they have once re- 
solved to carry into execution. Their success has been often owing to this 
persuasion ; though it cannot be denied, that^ on many occasions, it has also 
proved the only cause of their misfortunes, especially upon the sea : for, in 
land engagements, where the contest only lies against the strength of men, and 
human preparation, this confidence alone will frequently force the victory on 
their side. Yet even in such conjunctures, they have sometimes been deceived 
in the event. But when they presume to encounter with the winds and sea, 
and challenge all the elements to combat, what wonder is it, if they are then 
involved in the worst calamities ! for such was now the punishment that befel 
their rashness, — the same that in former times had happened to them, and 
which must again hereafter happen, unless they find some means to moderate 
that daring and impetuous spirit, by which they are persuaded, that both land 
and sea are at all times subject to their controul. 

The destruction of the Roman fleet, together with the victory that had 
been obtained by land against them not long before, inclined the Carthagi- 
nians to believe that they now should prove superior to the enemy both by 
land and sea. They resumed their preparations, therefore, with greater dili- 
gence and vigour than before ; and in a short time afterwards sent Asdrubal 
to Sicily ; having added to his army the forces that were brought from Hera- 
elea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. They refitted also two 
hundred ships, and equipped them for the war. Asdrubal, being arrived at 
Lilybaeum without any accident, exercised his troops and elephants, and 
seemed resolved to maintain the field against the enemy. 

The Romans having received a full account of the destruction of their 
vessels, from these that had escaped the storm, were sensibly afflicted for 
their loss ; but having determined not to yield, they resolved to build another 
fleet, entirely new, which should consist of two hundred and twenty ships. 
And what will scarcely obtain belief, in three months' time this vast armament 
was completely finished, and sailed out to sea, under the command of the 
two new consuls, A. Atilius and Cn. Cornelius. They passed the straits; 
and being joined at Messana by the vessels that had escaped the storm, so 
that their whole fleet now consisted of three hundred ships, they directed their 
course towards Panormus, the most considerable of all the Carthaginian 
cities, in order to besiege it. They threw up works on both sides of the place, 
and planted their machines against it. And having with little difficulty battered 
down the fort that stood nearest to the sea, they entered immediately by the 
breach, and made themselves masters of the New Town upon the first 
assault. The Old, despairing to make any long resistance, surrendered at dis- 
cretion. The consuls having thus gained possession of the city left in it a 
sufficient garrison, and returned to Rome. 

In the following summer, the consuls Cn. Servilius and Sepronins sailed 
again to Sicily with all the. fleet, and from thence steered their course to 
Afric. They made many descents upon the coast, but without performing 
any action of importance. But as they were sailing near the island Menins, 
which is inhabited by the Lotophagi, and lies contiguous to the little Syrtis, 
their ignorance of the coast proved almost fatal to them : for, as the sea was 
then at ebb, their fleet stuck fast upon the sands. In this distress, they had 
almost lost all hopes of safety : but, some time afterwards, the tide suddenly 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 3$ 



returned when they least expected it, and freed them from the danger : for, 
having thrown over all their baggage and heavy furniture, they at last set their 
vessel , afloat again, though not without much pains and labour ; and, steer- 
ing back to Sicily with great precipitation, cast anchor at Panorama. From 
thence as they passed the Straits, and were sailing on to Rome, with their 
usual disregard of every thing that might befal them, they were again attacked 
by a very dreadful storm, in which a hundred and fifty of their vessels 
perished. 

The Romans were unable to support such great and repeated losses ; and, 
though their ardour was not slackened, nor their zeal in the least abated, they 
were forced, by mere necessity, to lay aside all farther attempts upon the sea, 
and depend entirely upon their land forces for a happy issue of the war. 
They therefore sent the. consuls, L. Cecilius and Cn. Publius, into Sicily 
with the legions, equipping only sixty vessels, to convey provisions to the 
army. 

On the other hand, these misfortunes seemed to open to the Carthaginians 
the fairest prospect of advantage and success. They were now sole masters 
of the sea, which was abandoned by the Romans ; and, with regard to the ai'- 
mies upon land, they began to be persuaded, and not without good reason, 
that their troops would prove superior to the enemy : for the Romans, having 
heard what horrible destruction the elephants had spread among their ranks, 
in the battle that was fought in Afric, were so possessed with apprehensions of 
the fury of these beasts, that, during the course of two whole years from that 
engagement, though they frequently fixed their camp within the distance of 
five or six stadia from the enemy, in the neighbourhood of Selinus and Liljr- 
baeum, they never once dared to venture on a battle, or even to trust their 
army in the plains. They reduced, indeed, the towns of Lipara and Thermae, 
but, during the siege of both, were always careful to post their troops in places 
that were steep and difficult of access. When the Romans saw that so great 
dejection and dismay had spread through all the army, they resolved to change 
their measures, and resume their naval preparations. As soon, therefore, as 
C. Atilius and L. Manlius were elected consuls, they built fifty ships, and 
began to make levies for the sea with the greatest diligence. 

The Carthaginian general Asdrubal, having remarked the consternation 
that had of late appeared amongthe Romans, whenever their armies were forced 
to take the field ; and being informed, that one of the consuls had returned to 
Italy with one half of the troops, and that Cecilius was left behind Pauormus 
with the rest, to cover the harvest of the allies, which was just now ripe, 
marched his army from Lilybaeum towards Panormus, and encamped upon 
the frontier of the district. Cecilius saw the confidence with which the enemy 
advanced towards him, and, with design more to heighten it, kept his army- 
close within the city. Asdrubal, deceived by this appearance, grew bolder 
than before ; and, being persuaded that the Romans wanted courage to oppose 
him, advanced with his army through the passes, destroyed the harvest every 
where, and wasted all the country. The consul still kept close behind the 
walls, till the enemy should have passed a river that ran near the city. But 
no sooner had the elephants with&he army gained the other side, than Cecilius 
sent against them a part of his light armed forces, to harrass the foremost 
troops, and constrain the Carthaginians to draw up all their army in order of 
battle. When this was done, he placed his light armed troops before the en- 
trenchments, with orders, that they should throw their javelins at the elephants 
as they advanced ; and, whenever they found themselves too closely pressed, 
retire back again to the trenches, and from thence sally out from time to 
time, and make a fresh discharge upon them. The combatants were sup- 
plied with weapons in great numbers by the artificers of the city, who were 
drawn up in order for that purpose at the foot of the walls. The consul him- 
self was posted with the legions without the gate that looked toward the 

VOL. 1. NO. 3. E 



34 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 



left wing of the enemy, and sent away continual detachments to support the 
light-armed forces. As soon as the right grew warm, the leaders of the ele- 
phants, in hopes of securing to themselves the honour of the victory, advanced 
with eagerness against the foremost combatants, turned them to flightwith little 
difficulty, and pursued them close to the entrenchments. But the elephants* 
being now exposed to all the fury both of the archers from the walls, and of 
those that were posted in the trenches, who launched their weapons at them 
without remission, and with sure success, grew mad at last with rage, and, 
turning back upon their own forces, trampled them down in heaps, and broke 
and dissipated all the ranks. Cecilius seized the time of this confusion, and, 
advancing against the left wing of the Carthaginians, with the legions that 
were still entire and disposed in perfect order, fell upon the enemy in flank, 
and .soon caused a general rout. Many were destroyed in the place, and the 
rest forced to fly in great disorder. Ten elephants were taken, with the In- 
dians who conducted them. The rest, having thrown their guides, were sur-« 
rounded after the engagement, and were all likewise taken. After this great 
victory, it was confessed by all, that Cecilius, by his wise and skilful conduct, 
had infused new life and spirit into the Roman armies, and had given them 
confidence once more to face the enemy in the field. 

The account of this success was received at Rome with the greatest joy ;■ 
not so much because the loss of the elephants had weakened the Carthaginian 
array, as because a victory once gained against those beasts had restored the 
courage of the legions. They therefore resumed their first design, and re- 
solved to employ again a naval armament ; and thus, by exerting together alL 
their strength, to bring the war at last to a conclusion. When all their prepa- 
rations were completed, the consuls, with a fleet of two hundred ships, steered 
their course to Sicily. It was now the fourteenth year of the war. They, ar- 
rived at Lilybaeum, and, being joined by the legions that were there encamped, 
they prepared to lay siege to the city : for they had considered with themselves, 
that if they could once be able to obtain possession of this place, it would be 
easy to transport their forces from thence to Afric. The Carthaginians, on 
their part, penetrated into this design, and made the same reflections upon 
the consequences of it. Neglecting, therefore, all the other business of the 
war, they made haste to draw together all their forces, and resolved to use their 
utmost efforts to defeat the enemy in this attempt : for, in their present cir- 
cumstances, the loss of Lilybaeum would leave them destitute at once of all 
resource, since the Romans already were possessed of all the other cities of 
importance in the island, Drepanum alone excepted. 

But, lest this part of the history should prove obscure and unintelligible to 
those who are unacquainted with the places of which we now are speaking, 
we shall endeavour, in a few words, to give the reader some right conception 
of the manner in which the island and its several parts are situated. 

The whole of Sicily, in its situation, bears the same respect to Italy as the 
Peloponnesus does to the rest of Greece. But in this they are different, — that 
the one is an island, separated from the continent by a narrow sea ; the other a 
peninsula, the approach to which lies along a narrow neck of land. The form 
of Sicily is triangular ; and the angles are so many promontories. The first, 
inclining to the south, and extending into the Sicilian sea, is called Pachy- 
mis. The second, named Pelorus, and standing to the north, bounds the 
Straits upon the western side, and is distant from Italy about twelve stadia. 
The third, which is the western promontory, called Lilybaeum, stands oppo- 
site to the shore of Afric, and lies commodious for passing over to those pro- 
montories which we before have mentioned, being distant from them above a 
thousand stadia. It also divides the seas of Afric and Sardinia. 

Adjoining to this last promontory was a city of the same name, which the 
Ror/ans were now preparing to besiege. It was secured by a wall and 
ditcii, of a very uncommon strength and depth ; and by standing lakes that were 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. - SS 

filled frith the waters of the sea ; and, as the passage to the harbour lay over 
these, it was not to be entered without the greatest hazard, by those that .were 
unacquainted with the ground. The Romans encamped on both sides of 
the town ; and having fortified the space between their camps with an en- 
trenchment and a wall, began their first attack against a fort that stood upon 
the shore on the side of the African sea. By making* their approaches without 
remission, and adding new Works continually to the former, they at last de- 
molished six of the towers that stood contiguous to the fort, and prepared to 
batter down the rest. As the siege was pressed with all imaginable earnesr* 
lless and vigour, the towers already in part destroyed, and the rest so weak- 
ened as to threaten speedy ruin, while the enemy gained ground in their ap- 
proaches every day, and advanced their works still nearer to the city, the gar- 
rison within, though it amounted to full ten thousand men, besides the inha- 
bitants, were seized with the utmost consternation. But Imilco, who com- 
manded in the city, by his pains and unwearied ardour, gave no small resistance 
to the progress of the enemy; repairing every where the breaches; digging 
countermines; and transporting himself from place to place; hoping to find 
some moment in which he might be able to set fire to the Roman works. For 
this purpose he made many desperate sallies both by night and day, in which 
greater numbers sometimes were destroyed than even in regular engagements. 

While things were in this condition., some of the chief officers that led the 
mercenary troops formed the design of betraying the city to the enemy ; and, 
thinking themselves secure of the compliance of the soldiers, went privately by 
night to the Roman camp, and concerted the project with the consuls. But a 
certain Achaean, named Alexo, who, some time before, had saved the town of 
Agrigentum from some treacherous attempts that were contrived against it by 
the Syracusan mercenaries, having made discovery of this treason likewise, in- 
formed the Carthaginian commander of it. Imilco presently called together 
the other officers, and having, partly by his earnest exhortations and intreaties, 
and partly also by the promise of great rewards, engaged them to stand firm in 
the interests of the Carthaginians, he sent them to confirm the troops in their 
fidelity. To the Gauls he deputed likewise Annibal, who had long served 
among them. He was the son of that Annibal who lost his life in Sardinia. 
To the other mercenaries, he sent Alexo, who was held in high esteem and cre- 
dit by them. These generals, having assembled all the troops, and harangued 
them as the time required, and having engaged their own assurance for the 
payment of those rewards that were now promised by Imlico, prevailed with 
little difficulty, and checked all their inclinations to revolt. When those, 
therefore, who had "left the city were returned, and began to propose aloud the 
terms which they had brought, the garrison were so far from embracing the 
conditions, that they even refused to hear them, and, with stone's and javelins, 
drove back the traitors from the walls. Thus were the Carthaginians brought 
to the very brink of ruin by the treason of their mercenaries ; and in this man- 
ner were they rescued by Alexo, whose virtue, as we have observed, had once 
before afforded the means of safety to the Agrigentines upon a like occasion, 
and preserved to them their city, liberties, and laws. 

CHAP. IV. 

During this time no accounts had been received at Carthage of any thing 
that passed at Lilybaeum. But being persuaded that the besieged must cer- 
tainly be in want of some relief, they filled fifty ships with soldiers, and sent 
them away under the command of Annibal, the son of Amilcar, who was ge- 
neral of the triremes, and an intimate friend of Adherbal. They exhorted 
him to use the greatest diligence, to take advantage of the first favourable 
moment, and to make some bold attempt to enter the city with his succours, 
Annibal soon sailed out to sea with all the forces, which amounted to ten 



3 6 GENERAL HISTORY OF PQLYB IUS. 

thousand men ; and casting anchor atiEgusa, between Carthage andLilybaeum, 
wailed for a fresh and favourable wind. As soon as it began to blow, he spread 
all his sails, and steered his course directly towards the harbour's mouth; the 
troops being ranged in order upon the decks, and ready to engage. The 
Romans, surprised by an attempt so bold and unexpected, and being appre- 
hensive also that their own vessels might be carried into the harbour by the 
wind together with those of the enemy, stood fixed in wonder and astonish- 
ment, and made no resistance to the entrance of the Carthaginians. The 
multitude within the city ran together in crowds upon the walls, anxious for 
the event, but filled with joy at the sight of these unexpected suecours, which 
they now invited and encouraged by the loudest cries and shouts. At last the 
Carthaginians gained the port, and safely disembarked their forces, without 
any opposition from the Romans: a circumstance which afforded greater plea- 
sure to the Lilybaeans than even the arrival of the troops themselves; though 
these were then so necessary to their affairs, and so greatly increased both 
their strength and hopes. 

When Imilco saw that both the former forces of the city, and those that 
were now arrived, were animated to a high degree of alacrity and confidence ; 
the first, by reason of the relief which they had received; the latter, because 
they had yet encountered with no hardships; he resolved to take advantage 
of their present ardour, and endeavour to set fire to the Roman works; he 
therefore called all the troops together, and having harangued them in such 
words as his design required, and promised great rewards to those who should 
perform any eminent and signal service, besides the gifts and honours which 
thev might nil expect in common from the state of Carthage, he raised their 
minds to such a point of courage and impatience, that they all with one voice 
cried out, that he should lead thern against the enemy without delay. The 
general applauded their good disposition, and dismissed the assembly ; having 
exhorted them to retire betimes to their repose, and hold themselves in readi- 
ness to execute the orders of their leaders. He then called together the chief 
anion 0- the officers; assigned to each his several post; acquainted them with 
the time and signal of engaging; and directed them to attend in the appointed 
places, with their respective companies, by break of day. 

These orders being carefully observed, the. general, at break of day, led out 
his army, and fell upon the works in different quarters. But the Romans, who 
for some time had expected this attempt, and bad negleeted no precaution, 
were now ready with their succours wherever they were most required, and 
vigorously opposed the enemy. _ The engagement soon became general, and 
was maintained on both sides with the greatest obstinacy. For the numbers 
from the city amounted to twenty thousand men : on the part of the Romans: 
they were greater. And as the soldiers fought without regarding any order, 
every one in the place to which his inclination led him, the battle wasj on that 
account, more fierce arid terrible. For man with man, and rank with rank, 
engaged with all the fury and jealous emulation that are found in single com- 
bats. But the clamour was far the loudest round the works; and the dispute 
most close and obstinate. For those whose task it was to ruin and destroy 
them, and those who, on the other side, were posted there for their defence, 
maintained the fight together with so much steadiness and ardour, that while 
the one still laboured to advance, the other still refusing to give ground, it 
happened, in the end, that both were alike destroyed in the places where they 
had began the combat. But there were some among them, who, with flaming 
torches in their hands, invaded the machines with so much force and fury, 
that the Romans, unable to repel their efforts, were reduced to great extre- 
v mity. But the Cartuaginian general, perceiving that his troops were destroyed 
in heaps, and that he had not yet been able to accomplish his design, com- 
manded the trumpets to sound the signal of retreat, and called off the soldiers 
from the engagement. Thus the Romans preserved their works entire, even 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 37 

in the very moment when they were upon the point of being utterly destroyed. 
After this action, Annibal, leaving the harbour in the night, sailed out to 
sea with all the fleet, undiscovered bj r the enemy, and joined Ad herbal, who 
lay at Drepanum. This town is distant from Lilybaeiim about one hundred 
and twenty stadia : and both on account of its commodious situation, as well 
as for the excellence of the harbour, had always been considered by the Car- 
thaginians as a place of the last importance, and was guarded by them with 
the greatest care. 

At Carthage, the people were impatient to be informed, from time to time, 
of all that passed at Lilybaeum, but knew not any method by which their 
wishes could be satisfied: for the besieged were closely confined within their 
walls, and the port as closely guarded by the Romans. But a certain man of 
rank among them, Annibal, surnamed the Rhodian, engaged to sail into the 
harbour, and when be had seen the condition of the city, to return again to 
Carthage, with an account of all that they desired to know. His offer was 
received with joy, though the success was greatly doubted. But Annibal, 
having equipped a vessel of his own that was proper for his purpose, sailed 
and cast anchor near one of the islands which He opposite to Lilybaeum ; and, 
on the morrow, taking the advantage of a brisk and favourable wind, steered 
his course through the midst of all the enemy, who stood astonished at his 
boldness, gained the harbour, and prepared to return again on the followine- 
day. The consul, more effectually to guard the entrance of the port, got 
ready in the night ten of his swiftest ships ; and himself, with all the forces, 
stood attentive to the motions of the Rhodian. The ten ships were stationed 
on both sides of the harbour's mouth, as near to it as the shallows would per- 
mit; their oars being suspended in the air, and ready to bear them in an in- 
stant down upon the Carthaginian vessel. But the Rhodian, steering out of 
the port, in the sight of ail, insulting and embarassing the enemy both by his 
boldness and agility in sailing, not only escaped unhurt through the midst of 
the Roman ships, which seemed to stand with design to let him pass, but 
when he had gained a little distance, he turned about again, and, resting 
upon his oars, challenged the enemy to engage him; and when none dared to 
advance, by reason of the lightness and celerity of his vessel, he at last reticed, 
having, in one single galley, insulted and defied the whole Roman fleet. After- 
this time, he went and returned continually, as often as occasion required, and 
rendered no small service both to the Carthaginians and the besieged. For, as 
the first were, by this contrivance, punctually informed of all that was necessary 
to be known, so the latter-were encouraged still to sustain the siege : while the 
Romans, on the other hand, were much disheartened. The Rhodian was en- 
couraged chiefly in, this bold attempt, by his perfect knowledge of the coast, 
which taught him in what manner he might best avoid the banks of sand that 
lay at the entrance of the harbour. - For this purpose, having firstgained the 
open sea, he from thence held on his course as if he had sailed from Italv, 
taking care to keep a certain tower, that stood upon the shore, in a line so 
direct and even with his prow, that it covered from his view the other towers, 
which looked towards the coast of Afric. And this, indeed, is the only route 
by which a vessel sailing before the wind can gain the port in safety. 

The example of the Rhodian was in a short time followed by many others, 
who, like him, were well acquainted with the proper use of sailing. The Ro- 
mans, therefore, who were greatly incommoded by this proceeding* endea- 
voured to prevent it for the time to come, by choking «p the mouth of the 
harbour. But this was a task too difficult to be completed, tor, as the sea 
was very deep, the materials that were thrown into it would neither rest nor 
hold together, but were presently dissolved and washed away bv the tides and 
torrents, even before they had gained the bottom. In one place, however, 
more shallow than the rest, they at last threw up a mole, after much pains and 
labour. A Carthaginian galley, sailing out of the poit by night, struck upon 



38 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



it, and was taken. As this vessel was built upon the most perfect model, the 
Romans, having equipped it with a select body of men, resolved to employ it 
in observing those that -jhonld hereafter steer towards the harbour, and above 
the rest, the Rhodian. It happened that in a short time afterwards he came in 
eight. He entered the port the night t>efore, and was now returning back 
again in open day. The Roman galley pursued with eagerness,, and attended 
closely to all his motions. The Rhodian soon knew the vessel, and fearing 
for the event, began to exert his utmost efforts to escape by flight. But 
finding that the enemy gained ground upon him, he was at last forced to re- 
turn, and try the fortune of a battle. The Romans, who were far superior 
both in strength and number of their men, obtained an easy victory : and 
feeing now masters of this ship likewise," they fitted it with all things neces- 
sary ; and from this time effectually secured against the Carthaginians the 
entrance of the port. 

The besieged were now employed without remission in repairing the 
breaches of their walls ; but had thrown away all hopes of being able to 
destroy the works of the enemy : and when on a sudden a strong wind arose, 
and blew with so much violence, that it shook the Roman galleries, and 
threw down the towers that were built upon them for their defenoe. Some of 
the Greek mercenaries, having reflected within themselves, that this con- 
juncture was highly favourable for ruining all the works at once, communi- 
cated their sentiments to the general, who readily, approved them, and gave 
immediate orders for the attack. The young men sallied out in separate 
bauds, and set fire to three different quarters. As the buildings, being old, 
were easily inflammable ; and were now so loosened by the wind, that both 
the machines and towers were shifted from their place ; the fire soon spread 
with great rapidity and force. The Romans were struck \vith consternation, 
and knew not in what manner they might best resist the impending ruin. 
Terrified by an attack so unexpected, and blinded by the smoke and darkness, 
and sparks of fire, that rolled continually towards them, they neither saw nor 
comprehended any thing that passed : so that great numbers fell, without 
being aide even to come near the fire. The more the Romans were incom- 
moded, the greater also were the advantages of the enemy. For, while the 
wind still blew against the faces of the former whatever could annoy or hurt 
their sight, the latter, who saw clear before them, were able to direct their 
aim with certainty, both against the machines and combatants ; the wind also 
driving forwards every thing that was thrown, and giving greater strength and 
efficacy to the stroke. In the end, the destruction was so complete, that the 
towers were all consumed to their foundations, and the heads of the battering 
rams melted in the fire. After this great loss, the Romans laid aside all 
thoughts of being able to reduce the place by their works : and having thrown 
up an entrenchment round the city, and fortified their camp also with a wall, 
they committed the event to time. The Lilybaeans, on the other part, re- 
paired their breaches ; and resolved to expect with patience the determination 
•of the siege. 

As soon as they heard at Rome the news of this misfortune, and that the 
greater part of their naval forces had been destroyed, either in defending the 
works against the enemy, or in the former business of the siege, they imme- 
diately raised new levies, which amounted to ten thousand men, and sent 
them away to Sicily. When they arrived in the camp, the consul P. Claudius 
assembled all the tribunes, and represented to them, that they ought to seize 
the present moment, and sail away immediately to Drepanum : "where 
Adherbal, continued he, lies unprepared, and suspecting nothing ; is unac- 
quainted with the arrival of these new levies; and persuaded that our losses in 
the siege have disabled us from sendiag out a fleet to sea." As this design 
was readily approved, he ordered the sailors immediately to embark ; both 
those that were in the camp before, and those who had lately landed ; and 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 39 



added to them some of the bravest soldiers from the legions, who were tempted 
by the shortness of the voyage, and the prospect of assured success, to make a 
voluntary offer of their service in the expedition. When all his preparations 
were completed, about midnight he began the voyage, undiscovered by the 
enemy, and, keeping the island on his right, sailed in close order along the 
shore. As soon as it was morning-, and the foremost ships had arrived in sight 
of Drepanum, Adherbal, who had no expectation of this accident, was at 
first under great surprise. ' But when he had viewed them more attentively, 
and perceived that they were the Roman fleet, he resolved to exert his utmost 
efforts, rather than submit to be invested in the place. Having assembled, 
therefore, all the naval forces upon the shore, and called the mercenaries 
from the city, he shewed them in a short harangue, with how great ease they 
might obtain the victory, if they had' courage to engage the Roman fleet; 
and represented to them, on the other hand, all the miseries of a siege, to 
which, if they now declined the combat, they might inevitably be exposed. 
They all cried out at once, and demanded to be led against the enemy with- 
out delay. Adherbal commended their alacrity, and ordered them immedi- 
ately to go on board, to observe the motions of the, ship, and to follow close 
behind, in the course which they should see him take. He then sailed away 
the first, and steered his vessel along the rocks which lay opposite to that side 
of the harbour by which the enemy designed to enter. 

When the consul saw that the Carthaginians were so far from being struck 
by his arrival, and surrendering to him as he had before expected, that on the 
contrary they were making all things ready for the combat, he ordered all his 
vessels to turn about again, when some of them were already within the har- 
bour, others within the entrance, and the rest making sail that way. The 
ships that had gained the port, as they had directed their course back again, 
fell against those that were now just entering, broke their oars, and occa- 
sioned great disorder. As fast however as they returned, the officers ranged 
them all in aline along the shore, with the prows turned towards the enemy* 
The consul Publius, who at first had followed in the rear, was now carried out 
to sea, and took his station in the left wing of the fleet. But Adherbal, 
having passed this wing with five of the largest vessels, and gained the open 
sea, turned his prow towards the enemy. The rest of his ships, as fast as 
they came up, received orders to extend themselves in the same single line. 
As soon as they were all ranged in front, he gave the signal to engage, and 
advanced against the Romans, , who still stood ciose along the shore, in order 
to receive their ships as they sailed back again from the harbour. But to 
this situation was chiefly owing the loss which they afterwards sustained. 
When the fleets were joined, the contest was for sometime equal ; being 
maintained on either side by the choicest of the legionary troops. But by 
degrees the Carthaginians drew the victory to their side, by the help of many 
favourable circumstances in which they were superior to the Romans during 
the whole engagement. Their vessels were light, and swift in sailing : their 
rowers skilful and experienced : and lastly, they derived no small advantage 
from having ranged their fleet in battle on the side of the open sea. When- 
ever they were closely pressed, as thev had full room to retreat, so were they 
able also by their swiftness to transport themselves at once out of the reach of 
danger. If the enemy advanced too far in the ^pursuit, they then turned 
suddenly upon them, aud making their attack with vigour and agility, now 
upon the sides, and sometimes upon the stern, sunk many of, the Roman 
vessels, which, being unwieldiy bj r their bulk, and encumbered with unskilful 
rowers, performed all their motions heavily, and without success. When any 
of their vessels seemed ready to be mastered by the enemy, they advanced 
securely through the open sea, and, by ranging some fresh gallies in' the stern 
of those that were engaged, rescued their friends from danger. But on the 
part of the Romans, every circumstance w r as contrary to these. When, 



40 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



pressed, they had no room to retreat : for every vessel that retired before the 
enemy, either stuck fast upon the sands, or was dashed against the shore. As 
their ships were also heavy, and their rowers destitute of skill, they were quite 
deprived of the advantage, the greatest that is known in naval battles, of 
sailing through the squadron of the enemy, and attacking in stern the ships 
that were already engaged with others. Nor could they, on the other hand, 
send any succours, or support any of their own vessels behind, as the distance 
was so narrow between them and the land. Such were the disadvantages 
under which the Romans laboured through the whole engagement. Many 
of their vessels therefore were broken against the shore ; and many stuck 
fast upon the sands. The consul, with about thirty only that stood with him 
upon the left, withdrew from the engagement, and directed his flight along 
the coast. The remaining ships, in number ninety-three, fell into the hands 
of the Carthaginians, together with all the men. ; a small number only ex- 
cepted, who forced their vessels along the shore, and escaped the danger. 
- Thus ended the engagement : from whence the Carthaginian general reaped 
among his countrymen all the applause and honour that were due to his 
brave and skilful conduct : while the Romans, on the contrary, pursued with 
curses and invectives the consul Publius, whose rash imprudence had brought 
such heavy losses upon his country, and, after his return to Rome, condemned 
him by a public sentence to the payment of a heavy fine. 

The Romans, notwithstanding this defeat, were so fixed in their design to 
conquer, that they continued all their preparations for the war with the same 
ardour as before ; and when the election of their magistrates was past, sent 
L.Junius, one of the consuls, into Sicily, with a convoy of sixty ships, to 
■■carry corn and other necessary stores to the army that invested Lilybaeum. 
Junius arriving at. Messana, and having there received some vessels that came 
to join him, both from the camp and from the other parts of the island, sailed 
soon afterwards for Syracuse. His whole fleet now consisted of a hundred 
and twenty ships of war, besides eight hundred transports. Having given the 
half of these, together with a small part of the former, to the quaestors, he 
ordered them to sail with the provisions to the camp: while himself staid 
behind at Syracuse, to receive the ships that were not able to attend him from 
Messana, and to collect the corn which the allies from the inland parts of 
Sicily were obliged to furnish. 

About the same time, Adherbal, when he had sent to Carthage the pri- 
soners and all the vessels that were taken in the last engagement, joined 
thirty of his own ships to seventy others that were under the command of 
Cartbalo, and gave orders to that general to go and fall suddenly upon the 
Roman fleet which lay at anchor in the port of Lilybaeum, to bring away as 
many of their ships as he could get into his hands, and to burn the rest.. 
Carthalo, having received this commission, steered his course towards the har- 
bour; and entering it before break of day, he set fire to one part of the fleet, 
and made himself master of the rest. This accident occasioned no small dis- 
order in the Roman camp. For while the soldiers ran together with loud 
cries from every quarter, to succour and save their fleet, Imilco, who com- 
manded in the town, perceiving what was done, sallied out upon them with 
the mercenaries. Thus were they surrounded by danger on every side, and 
their consternation became complete. 

The Carthaginian general, having taken one part of the vessels, and de- 
stroyed the rest, the whole amounting to no very considerable number, steered 
his course from Lilybaeum towards Heraclea, with design to intercept the fleet 
that was sailing to the camp from Syracuse. Elated by his past success, he 
no sooner was informed by the scouts, whom he had sent before, that the Ro- 
man fleet, composed of a great number of ships of every kind, was arrived 
almost in sight, tbfen he advanced in haste to meet them. The Romans, hav- 
ing received notice likewise of his approach, from the frigates that sailed at 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 41 



the head of all their squadrons, and thinking it unsafe, in their present circum- 
stances, to venture on a battle, directed their course towards a little town that 
owned their jurisdiction : where, though there was indeed no harbour, certain 
creeks, that were enclosed on every side by a kind of promontories, which ran 
out into the sea, afforded a convenient shelter for their fleet. Having- here 
disembarked their forces, and disposed in order some catapults and balistae, 
which the town supplied, they waited the arrival of the enemy. The Cartha- 
ginians, as soon as they approached, made haste to begin the combat, being 
persuaded that the Romans, upon the first attack, would abandon all their 
vessels, and take refuge in the town. But when their expectations were so 
far from being answered, that, on the contrary, they found a vigorous and 
stout resistance, and as the place was also, in all respects, disadvantageous 
to them,- they were at last obliged to retire from the engagement, carrying 
with them a small number of the transports only ; and, sailing to the mouth of 
a certain river that was near, they cast anchor there, and resolved to wait for 
the departure of the Roman fleet. 

The consul Junius, having now transacted his affairs at Syracuse, doubled 
the promontory Pachynus, and was steering his course to Lilybaeum, ignorant 
of all that had happened to the quaestors. The Carthaginian general, being 
informed by his scouts of their approach, sailed out to sea with the greatest 
haste, designing to engage them before they could be joined by the other fleet. 
The consul saw that the enemy approached fast towards him, and that their 
fleet was very numerous. Being unwilling, therefore, to venture on a battle 
against so great a force, and not able on the other hand to fly, because they 
were so near, he cast anchor upon a rough and dangerous part of the coast ; 
and resolved to suffer every thing that might there befal him, rather than de- 
liver up his ships and his forces to the enemy^ The Carthaginians, not daring 
to risk a combat in places so unsafe, cast anchor also near a certain pro- 
montory, which lay between the Roman fleets, and from thence observed 
their motions. 

About this time a most dreadful tempest was just ready to break upon the 
sea. The Carthaginian pilots, who, from their long experience, and their 
knowledge of the coasts, were able to foresee such accidents before they hap- 
pened, advised the commander to double the cape Pachynus without delay, 
and shelter himself from the impending storm. The general wisely yielded 
to this advise; and having passed the promontory, though not without the 
greatest pains and difficulty, cast anchor in a place of safety. But when the 
storm came on, the Roman fleets, being quite destitute of shelter, and far 
removed from any harbour, were both so miserably wrecked and broken, that 
the account almost exceeds belief. For so complete was the destruction, that 
scarce a single plank remained entire. This accident gave new life and hopes 
to the Carthaginians : for the whole naval strength of Rome, which had al- 
ready been greatly weakened by repeated losses, was now all at once de- 
stroyed. The Romans, indeed, were still superior in their armies. But, on 
the other hand, the Carthaginians were sole masters of the sea ; and their 
affairs by land were by no means desperate. 

This great misfortune raised a general grief and consternation, both at 
Rome, and amongst the troops that invested Lilybaeum. The siege, how- 
ever, of this city was still pressed as closely as before ; while all the necessary 
stores were carefully supplied by the allies, and sent by land into the camp. 
The consul Junius, who had escaped the storm, returned to the camp full of 
grief, and resolved to repair, if possible, by some signal and important action, 
the loss that he had sustained by sea. With this design, having conceived 
some hopes of taking Eryx by surprise, he so well improved the slight occa- 
sion that was offered, that he became master both of the city, and of the 
temple of Venus that was near it. The mountain eryx is situated on that 
gpart of the Sicilian coast which looks towards Italy, between Drepanum and 
TO*,. 1. NO. 3. «•■ 



42 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



Pauovmus ; but lies nearest the former of these cities, and is most difficult of 

Mi 

em] 

_jty, .. 

acknowledged to be far superior to all the other temples of the island. Below 
the summit lies the town ; the ascent to which is long and difficult. The 
consul having placed some troops upon the tor , and on the road that led to 
Dre oanuin, designed to act chiefly on the defensive, and was pursuaded, 
that by guarding carefully these two pos'ts, he should be able to keep pos- 
session both of the town and all the mountain. . 

CHAP. V. 

After these transactions, the Carthaginians appointed Arnilcar, surnamed 
Barcas, to be their general in chief; and gave to him also the command of 
all the fleet. This was now the eighteenth year of the war. Arnilcar, having 
drawn together the naval forces, sailed away to plunder the coast of Italy. 
When he had wasted all the lands of the Brutii and the Locrians, he then 
steered his course with the whole fleet to Sicily ; and encamped in a Certain 
place upon the coast, between Eryx and Panormus, whose situation was in 
all respects so advantageous, that an army no where could be lodged with 
more couveniency or security. It was a rough and craggy mouutain, rising 
from the plain to a considerable height, whose top was more than a hundred 
stadia in circumference. The lands beneath the summit were rich in hus- 
bandry and pasture ; refreshments by wholesome breezes from the sea ; and 
not infested by any noxious beast. On every side stood precipices, not easy 
to be surmounted : and the space between them was so strait and narrow, 
that no great force was required to guard it. There was besides an eminence 
upon the very top of the mountain, from whence, as from a watch-tower, 
every thing might be discerned that was transacted in the plain below. The 
harbour that was near it was deep and spacious, and lay commodious for all 
vessels that were sailing towards Italy from Drepanum or Lilybaeum. There 
were three wa} r s only of approaching this mountain ; two on the side of the 
land, and the other towards the sea. In this post it was, that Arnilcar had 
the boldness to encamp : throwing himself into the very middle of his enemies; 
having no confederated city near him ; nor any hppes of succour beyond his 
own army. Yet even in this situation, he contrived to engage the Romans 
in many desperate contests, and distressed them by continual alarms. Some- 
times he sailed out with his fleet, and wasted all the coast of Italy as far as 
Curaae. And afterwards, while the Romans lay encamped within five stadia 
of his. army, in the district of Panormus, he waged against them, during the 
course of three whole years, an alm@st infinite variety of battles, which can- 
not particularly be described. For as in the public games, when two cham- 
pions of distinguished bravery and strength contend together for the prize, 
the strokes on either side fall so close and frequent, that neither the spec- 
tators, nor the combatants themselves, are able precisely to remark the direc- 
tion, scope, and force, of every single blow, though it be no hard thing to 
form a judgment upon the whole of the emulation, spirit, strength, and skill, 
of those who are thus engaged ; so in the present instance, it would neither 
be an easy nor a useful task to recount the manner, or the aim, of all the van 
rious snares, contrivances, attacks, surprises, which both sides practised every 
day ; and from which, if known, the reader could never obtain so just an 
apprehension of the characters and conduct of the two commanders, as from 
surveying the whole together, and attending to the final issue of the contest. 
In general, every stratagem which history has recorded, every invitation which 
circumstances could suggest, or necessity require, every attempt to which the 
most impetuous and daring spirit could excite them, were all severally em- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 43 



braced and carried into practice. But no action passed that was decisive. 
For as. the forces on both sides were equal, as their camps were strongly for- 
tified, and at the same time separated from each other by a moderate distance; 
hence it happened, that they were every day engaged in partial combats, 
without performing any thing that was complete or general. Great numbers 
fell in these engagements : but when either side were too closely pressed, they 
presently retired to their entrenchments ; and from thence sallied out again 
upon the enemy. 

But fortune, like an experienced judge of combats, removed these cham- 
pions not long afterwards into a narrower ground, and engaged them in a 
closer and more desperate fight. For, while the Romans guarded Eryx in 
the manner before-mentioned, by posting some troops upon the summit, and 
others at the foot of the mountain, Amilcar found means to gain possession of 
the city that lay between. The Romans on the top, being thus besieged, 
maintained their post, and encountered, with a most amazing fortitude, the 
dangers to which they were now exposed. On the other hand, the courage 
and firm resistance of the Carthaginiaais were such as scarcely wiit obtain be- 
lief. For it is not easy to conceive, by what means they were able to sustain 
the efforts of the enemy, exposed as they were to their attacks both from 
above and from beneath, and having no way by which they could receive 
supplies, except one single passage which lay open to them from the sea. 
Yet notwithstanding these great difficulties, all the methods, both of art and 
violence, which especially belongs to sieges, were practised in their turn by 
either party. And when they had exhausted the whole variety of attacks and 
combats, and been pressed by every kind of distress and misery, they did not 
at last decline the contest through weariness or weakness, as Fabius has af- 
firmed ; but both sides still remained, unyielding and unconquered, till the 
war was brought by other means to a conclusion, two years after. Such was 
the condition of the armies, in the neighbourhood of Eryx. 

If we stop now to make reflection upon the conduct and the various efforts 
of these two republics, we may properly enough compare them with those 
generous and valiant birds, which, when they have fought so long together 
that they are quite disabled from making any farther use of their wings in the 
engagement, yet retaining still their courage, and exchanging mutual wounds, 
they at last unite by a kind of instinct in a closer combat, and maintain the 
fight together with their beaks, till the one or other of them falls beneath hia 
adversary's stroke. In the same manner, the Carthaginians and the Roman:*, ex- 
hausted by continual expense, and weakened by the miseries and losses which 
the war had brought upon them, were now reduced on both sides to the last 
extremity. But the Romans still maintained their firmness ; and, though 
they had, for five years past, abandoned all attempts upon the sea, partly by 
reason of the heavy losses which they had there sustained ; and partly also, be- 
cause they were persuaded that their armies upon land would alone be able to 
give a favourable issue to the war ; yet, when they found that all their ex- 
pectations were likely to be frustrated, by the vigorous and intrepid conduct 
of Amilcar, they resolved, for the third time, to make trial of a naval arma- 
ment ; conceiving it to be now the only kind of force, which, if conducted 
with dexterity and prudence, would end the war upon such conditions as their 
interest and their hopes required ; nor were they at all deceived in the event. 
They had, twice before, as we have said, been forced to abandon all attempts 
upon the sea; once, by the shipwreck of their fleets; and, afterwards, by the 
loss which they sustained in the fight of Drepanum : but, having now once 
more resumed the same design, and gained the victory in one naval battle, they 
deprived the Carthaginian troops that were in Eryx of the means of receiving 
any farther supplies or succours from the sea, and thus gave a full determina- 
tion to the war. This resolution was wholly the effect of that strong and ar- 
dent zeal with which the Romans then were animated : for the treasury af- 



44 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

forded not supplies that were sufficient to the undertaking ; but the generous 
sentiments and spirit of the chief among the citizens, and their earnest love 
of the republic, enabled them to carry it into execution : for each particular 
man, or two or three together in proportion to their wealth, engaged to pro- 
vide a quinquereme, completely titted and equipped, on condition only of 
being reimbursed, in case that the design should be attended with success. 
By this method they brought together a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes, 
which were all built upon the model of that vessel that was taken from the 
Rhodian. With this new armament, the consul C. Lutatius, in the beginning; 
of the summer, sailed out to sea ; and, appearing suddenly upon the coast of 
Sicily, gained possession of the ports and bays of Drepanum and Lilybaeum, 
without resistance : for the enemy had sailed back to Carthage with their fleet 
some time before. The consul advanced his works against the town of Dre- 
panum, and began to press the siege with vigour ; but, being at the same time 
sensible, that the Carthaginian fleet would soon return, and keeping always 
in his mind the chief design and purpose of the expedition, which was to end 
the war at once by a naval victory, he suffered no moment to be lost, but em- 
ployed the sailors in such constant tasks and exercises, as might best con- 
duce to that design ; and, by training them in all the parts of naval discip- 
line, he rendered them, in a short time, hardy and expert, and completely 
prepared for action. 

The Carthaginians heard, with greatastonishment, that the Romans again ap- 
peared at sea. They immediately got ready their fleet ; and, being desirous 
to supply, in the amplest manner, the wants of the troops that were at Eryx, 
they filled their vessels with provisions and other stores, and sent them away 
under the command of Hanno, who sailed and cast anchor at the island Hiera. 
His intention was, to arrive at Eryx undiscovered by the Romans ; and, when 
he had eased his ships of their heavy lading, and taken on board a sufficient 
number of their choicest troops, together with Amilcar, to sail back and^engage 
the enemy. But the Roman consul, informed of the motions of his fleet,, and 
penetrating also into the views of Hanno, selected all the bravest of the le- 
gions, and sailed to iEgusa, an island that lay opposite to Lilybaeum. He 
there harangued his forces, as the time required, and acquainted the pilots, 
that he should next day offer battle to the Carthaginians. But, when the 
morning came, observing that the wind blew fresh and favourable to the ene- 
my, but contrary to the course which himself wfts obliged to steer, and that 
the sea was rough and turbulent, he was for some time in doubt what resolu- 
tion he should take : but when he had reflected within himself, that if he 
should now engage, notwithstanding all the roughness of the season, the con- 
test would only be with Hanno and the naval forces, and with ships that were 
heavy^and encumbered; but that if, by waiting till the sea was calm, he should 
surfer the enemy to pass and join the camp, he must then be forced to en- 
counter with troops selected from the army, with ships which would be light and 
easy in their motions, and, above all the rest, with the bold and daring spirit of 
Amilcar, who was now become very terrible to the Romans, he at last resolved 
to seize the occasion, and to venture on a battle. As the enemy were sailing full 
before the wind, he made haste to get out to sea. The rowers, strong and dex- 
terous, broke with ease the force of the wind and waves ; and the vessels soon 
were ranged in a single line, with their prows turned towards the enemy. 
The Carthaginians, being thus intercepted in their course, take down their 
eails, and, after mutual exhortations, begin the combat. As the condition of 
the several fleets was now in all points different from what it had been in the 
former battle, it was reasonable to expect that the eventwould be also different. 
Tbe Roman fleet was built in a more skilful manner than before : their ves- 
ssels were not encumbered with any heavy furniture, except such only as was 
necessary for the fight. The rowers had been exercised with so much dili- 
gence and care, that they were able to perform the greatest service : and> in. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 45 



the last place, their soldiers, being all selected from the choicest of the legions, 
were men who knew not how to retreat or yield. But, on the side of the Car- 
thaginians, all things bore a different face. Their ships were burdened with 
heavy lading, which rendered them unfit for action. Their sailors were un- 
practised in their art, and such as had been hastily thrown together for the pre- 
sent voyage; and their troops were new-raised levies, not yet acquainted with the 
terrors or the toils of war: for, so strongly were they a*sured that the Romans 
would never appear again upon the sea, that they hud for some time past ne- 
glected all their naval forces. From these causes, then, it happened, that they 
were in every part defeated, even in the first encounter. Fifty of these ships 
were sunk, and seventy taken by the Romans, with all the men. But the 
wind, as if engaged to favour them, turning suddenly about, in the very mc~> 
ment of their danger, filled all their sails, and carried the rest of the fleet safe 
back to Hiera. The consul steered his course to Lilybaeum, where his first 
care was to dispose of the captive ships and men, — a task which gave him no 
small trouble, for the number of the latter amounted to near ten thousand. 

This defeat, however great and unexpected, abated nothing of the former 
zeal and ardour of the Carthaginians : but they saw themselves at once de- 
prived of all the means by which they could hope to carry on the war. As the 
enemy were masters of the sea, it was now no longer in their power to send 
supplies to the troops in Sicily : so that, being forced, if we may so express it, 
to betray and abandon these, they had, in truth, neither general nor army left, 
on which they could at ail depend. They sent, therefore, to Arnilcar, and left 
to his discretion the care and management of the whole. The conduct of 
Amilcar in these circumstances was such as well became an expert and wise 
commander. While any prospect of success remained, or any reasonable 
ground of hope, he boldly attempted everything,, how full soever of hazard 
and danger, that could distress the enemy ; and rested all his hopes of victory 
upon the strength and vigour of his arms, even more than any general that had 
lived before him. But when the face of affairs was changed, and all probable 
resources cut off and lost, he resolved no longer to expose his troops to danger ; 
but, wisely yielding to the necessity of the times, sent ambassadors to the Ro- 
mans to treat of peace : for the part of a consummate general is not only to 
know when to conquer, but when also to renounce all hopes of victory. 

The consul, knowing that the Romaus were, on their part, also weary of a 
war which had so greatly exhausted the strength of the republic, embraced 
the offer with little difficulty; and a treaty was soon after concluded in the 
following terms. 

" There shall be peace between the Carthaginians and the Romans, with 
the approbation of the Roman people, upon these conditions. The Cartha- 
ginians shall relinquish evejy part of Sicily. They shall not make war upon 
Hiero, nor give any disturbance to the Syracusans, or their allies. They shall 
restore, witiiout ransom, all the Roman prisoners, and pay a tribute of two 
thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver, within the course of twenty 
years." 

When the conditions were sent to Rome, the people at first refused to con- 
firm the treaty, and deputed ten commissioners to examine into the state of 
-affairs in person. When these arrived in Sicily, they made no considerable 
alteration in what had been agreed, but only added to the tribute a thou- 
sand talents more; shortened the time allotted for the payment of it ; and de- 
manded also that the Carthaginians should retire from all the islands that 
lay between Sicily and Italy. 

Such was the end of the war of Sicily between the Carthaginians and the 
Romans, when it had continued for the course of twenty-four years, without 
any intermission. A war, the longest in its duration, the least interrupted in 
its progress, and, upon the whole, the most considerable of any that we fiud in 
history. For not to mention again the various combats which have been al- 



46 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



ready recounted, in one naval battle only, which happened in this war, five 
hundred quinqueremes were engaged together in action; and, in a second, 
scarce fewer than seven hundred. The Romans, in the course of the war, lost 
seven hundred quinqueremes, if we reckon those that were destroyed by tem- 
pests; the Carthaginians about five hundred. And now let those who have 
been accustomed to contemplate with surprise the naval preparations and en- 
gagements of Antigonus, Demetrius, and Ptolomy, let them, I say, consider, 
whether the present war be not a subject far more worthy of their admiration 
and regard. For, if we carefully reflect upon the difference between these 
quinqueremes and the trireme vessels that were made use of by the Persians, 
in their expeditions against the Greeks, and afterwards by the Lacedemonians 
and Athenians, in all their naval combats, it will clearly appear, that no state 
or people ever brought so great a force upon the sea, as those that were en- 
gaged in the war before us. From this view of tilings we may also be con- 
vinced, that it was by no means an effect of chance or rashness, as the Greeks 
foolishly imagine, that the Romans had afterwards the boldness to attempt, as 
well as the power to reach, the conquest of the whole known world; but, on 
the contrary, that having first been trained in a course of great and important 
actions, and disciplined for such an undertaking, they built their project npon, 
very solid grounds, and such as gave the fairest prospect of success. 

It will, perhaps, be asked, from whence it happens, that the Romans, in all 
the present greatness of their power and extent of territory to which they 
have advanced their empire by the conquest of the world, are yet made to 
equip so many ships, or send such powerful fleets upon the sea, as in former 
times? I shall endeavour to give a clear solution of this difficulty, when I 
come to treat of the constitution of the Roman government; a subject which 
I design to examine in its full extent, and which will well deserve the closest 
attention of the reader. Foiy besides that the matter in itself is curious, it has 
also hitherto been but little known, through the fault of those who have at- 
tempted to write concerning it : for, while some of them were themselves, 
entirely unacquainted with every part of this inquiry, others have pursued 
it in a manner so perplexed and intricate, that no kind of satisfaction or ad- 
vantage can be expected from their labours. 

In the present war we may remark, that the same ardent zeal, the same 
designs, the same generous perseverance, and the passion for dominion, animat- 
ed alike both republics. The Roman soldiers, indeed, in all points of bravery 
and spirit, exceeded those of Carthage. But, on the other hand, the Carthagi- 
nian general, both in conduct and courage, was far superior to any of those 
commanders that were sent against him. This general was Amilcar, surnamed 
Barcas, the father of Annibal, who afterwards waged war with Rome. 

Soon after the conclusion of the peace, both nations were involved in the 
same misfortunes, and forced to employ their arms to quiet some domestic 
troubles. These were raised against the Romans by the Falisci, who were 
reduced, however, in the course of a few days only, and their chief city taken. 
Rut the Carthaginians were engaged in a war of much greater moment, 
against their mercenaries, 'and against the Africans and Numidians, who joined 
in the revolt. A war, which, in the progress of it, filled them with the greatest 
terrors and alarms, and threatened even the entire subversion of their state. 

It will not be improper or un useful to rest awhile upon the subject of this 
war, and to recount, in few words, the chief transactions of it. The task, for 
many reasons, well deserves our pains. For first, we may from hence be fully 
informed of the nature, circumstances, and whole conduct of that kind of war 
which ■•> usually called inexpiable. We shall likewise learn from the misfor- 
tunes which now happened to the Carthaginians, what foresight and precau- 
tion should be used, and what dangers apprehended, by those who employ 
mercenary troops: and also, how great the difference is between a mixed 
assembly, made up of barbarous and foreign nations, and an army composed 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 47 



of these who had been educated in the discipline, and trained under the laws 
and customs of their country. In the last place, the transactions of these 
times may serve to lead us to the true causes of that war, which Annibal 
made afterwards upon the Romans: and enable us to fix, with some assurance, 
what has been hitherto a matter of much dispute and doubt ; not only among 
historians, but even among the parties also that were themselves encaged 
in the war. 

CHAP. VI. 

As soon as 'the treaty was concluded, Amilcar led the army from Eryx to 
Lilybaeum ; and there laying down his command,, left it to the care of Gesco 
the governor of the city, to send the forces back to Carthage. Gesco, havino 
some kind of foresight and apprehension of what might happen, conducted 
the affair with great prudence and precaution. He embarked the soldiers in 
small divisions, and sent them away at different times ; that the Carthaginians 
might be able to pay them their arrears as they arrived, and dismiss them to 
their several countries, before the others joined them. This was Gesco's de-* 
sign. But the Carthaginians, finding that their treasury was much exhausted 
by the late expenses of the war, and persuading themselves that if the mer- 
cenaries were to be drawn together and entertained for some time in Carthage, 
they might be prevailed on to abate some part of the stipend that had been 
promised them, admitted them all within the walls as fast as they arrived, 
and gave them quarters in the city. But when many tumults and disorders 
began to grow among them, and to break out both by night and day, beim* 
now in apprehension of some dismal consequences from the iicentiousness and 
insolence of such a multitude, they were forced to entreat their officers to 
conduct them to a certain town called Sicca, giving to each a piece of gold 
for defraying their present wants ; and to keep them there, till every thino* 
was ready for the payment of their stipends, and the rest of the forces also 
arrived from Sicily. The soldiers readily agreed to this proposal of removing, 
but designed to leave their families and baggage behind them at Carthage, as 
they had hitherto done ; especially as they expected to return shortly back 
again to receive their pay. But the Carthaginians," fearing that some amono- 
them, detained by the caresses of their wives and children, whom a lon°- ab- 
sence had now endeared to them, might altogether refuse to quit the city 
and that others, invited by the same tender motives, would make frequent 
occasions to return, and renew the late disorders, obliged them, in soite of all 
their wishes and inclinations to the contrary, to carry with them their families 
and ail their goods. The troops being arrived at Sicca, began to live ac- 
cording to their own discretion, without 'any controul or rule. They were 
now fallen at once into a state of ease and inactivity, from a course of long 
fatigue and hardship : a state which ought by no means ever to be permitted 
among mercenary soldiers ; and which is often of itself the principal cause 
of seditions. 

During this time of leisure, some among them began to compute together 
the arrears that were pretended to be due ; accumulating various articles 
without any shew of reason, and enlarging the sum beyond its just amount. 
Others called to mind the rewards which the generals Lad promi&ed to their 
services, in times of extraordinary difficulty and clanger. Upon the whole, 
their expectations were raised to syich a height, that when the rest of the forces 
had joined them, and Hanuo, who presided over the ^affairs of Afric, being 
arrived at Sicca, instead of giving satisfaction to their hopt-s, began to enlarge 
upon the bad co iditioii of the re mbJic, burdened as he said by heavy taxes, 
and an uncommon sca.-city of ail things, and requested them to a ate some 
part even of that vvhich was acknowledged to be due, immediately the whole 
army fell into discontent and mutiny. Meetings and cabals were formed, and 



4B GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



assemblies held continuallj T ; sometimes of the troops apart, according to their 
several tribes and countries; and sometimes of all together in a body : while, 
from the various and discordant mixture of different languages and nations, 
every place was rilled with confusion, noise, and tumult. 

If the Carthaginians, in filling their armies, as their constant custom 
was, with mercenaries drawn together from different countries, designed 
nothing more than to prevent conspiracies, and render the authority of their 
generals more absolute and effectual, they may seem perhaps in this respect 
to have judged not unreasonably ; for troops of this sort cannot easily unite 
together in factious counsels. But on the other hand, this practice must be 
allowed to be highly impolitic and rash, if we consider how difficult and 
desperate a task it is to instruct, convince, or soften the minds of an army so 
composed, when once, their passions are inflamed, when hatred and resentment 
have taken root among them, and a sedition is actually begun. Under these 
circumstances, they are no longer men, but wild beasts of prey. Their 
fury will not be confined within the ordinary bounds of human wickedness or 
violence ; but breaks out into effects the most terrible and monstrous that are 
to be found in nature. This was now experienced by the Carthaginians. 
Their army was composed of Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians ; of some from the 
Balearic islands ; of spurious Greeks, the greater part of whom were fugitives 
and slaves ; but chiefly of Africans. To assemble all these together, and 
harangue them with any good effect, was a thing impracticable ; unless the 
general had been acquainted with all their different languages: and to address 
them separately by interpreters, repeating still the same thing four or five 
times over, seemed a task as difficult as the other, and not more likely to 
succeed. It remained, therefore, to engage their officers to employ such en- 
treaties and arguments among them as the occasion required. And this was 
the method that was now pursued by Hanno ; but it happened, that some of 
these understood not what was said : while others, seeming to consent to, and 
approve of, the instructions that were given them, repeated all things differently 
to the soldiers; some through ignorance, and some from malice: so that sus- 
picion, doubt, distrust, and discord, reigned through all. They suspected, 
likewise, that it was not by accident, but with deliberate design, that the 
Carthaginians had deputed to them a man who was not present at any of their 
Services in Sicily ; instead of sending any of those generals, who had been eye- 
-witnesses of their exploits, and had promised them the rewards which they 
now demanded. At last, being fully inflamed against the Carthaginians, 
despising the authority of Hanno, and distrusting severally their own officers, 
they began their march towards the city with all their forces, amounting to 
more than twenty thousand men ; and encamped at Tunis, which was distant 
from Carthage about a hundred and twenty stadia. 

The Carthaginians were sensible of their imprudence, when it was now too 
late. They had been guilty of one great error, in drawing together to one 
place so large a body of foreign soldiers ; while the forces that they were able 
to raise at home were such as could not be greatly depended on, in case of 
any difficult emergency. But it was still more rash and inconsiderate, to 
oblige them to take along with them their wives and children, and all theiv 
goods; for these might have served as hostages, by the help of which the 
Carthaginians might have made the troops at all times tractable and com- 
pliant, and pursued in full security such measures as their interest required. 

In consequence of these mistakes, they now were thrown into so great 
consternation, upon the near approach of these enraged mercenaries, that they 
submitted to try every expedient that was likely to soften their resentment, 
They ordered all kinds of provisions to be conveyed to their camp in great- 
abundance, and there to be disposed of, at such prices as the soldiers were 
pleased to fix. They sent continual deputations to them from the senate, 
promising to eonsent to all their demands, as far as their power would reach: 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

but as this denoted the extreme apprehension and dismay with which the 
Carthaginians were sev.ed ; so it served only to increase the insolence of the 




:opi 

wo>:d, were able to sttu.d against them in the field. No sooner, therefore, 
were the stipends settled upon their own conditions, than they made a new de- 
mand ef some allowance for the horses which they had lost in battle. This 
being likewise consented to, they next insisted, thai; their appointment for pro- 
visions, which was now run out into a long arrear, should be adjusted accord- 
ing to the highest price that corn had borne during any part of the war. In a 
word, some new pretences were every day suggested by the seditious that were 
among them, till their demands upon the whole were such as it was not pos- 
sible for the republic to discharge. The Carthaginians, however, engaged' to 
satisfy them to the utmost of their abilities, and at last prevailed to have the 
dispute referred to one of the generals under whom they had served in 
Sicily. 

Amilcar Barcas, who was one of these, was by no means agreeable to the 
troops : for, as he never bad been joined in any of the deputations to them, 
and had also shewn such willingness and haste to lay down his command, they 
considered him as in part the cause that so little respect had been paid to 
their demands. But Gesco was a man whom they all regarded with esteem 
and favour. He also had borne command in Sicily ; and had, upon all occa- 
sions, seemed attentive to their interests, but more particularly so, when he 
was entrusted with the care of embarking them for Carthage. To his decision, 
therefore, they readily consented to refer the whole. 

Gesco, being furnished with such sums of money as was necessary, sailed 
away to Tunis. As soon as he arrived, he called together lirst the officers, and 
afterwards the soldiers, by their several nations; and, having reproved them for 
the past, enlarged upon the state and circumstances of the present times, and, 
above all things, recommended to them a better conduct for the time to come, 
conjuring them to look more favourably upon the Carthaginians, under whose 
pay they had so long borne arms. He next applied himself to distribute 
among the troops, according to their several countries, the stipends that were 
due. 

There was among them a certain Campanian, a fugitive slave, named Spen-» 
dius, who was noted both for an uncommon strength of body, and for a soi- 
ritin war that was fearless and enterprising even to rashness. This man, being 
apprehensive of falling again into his master's hands, and of beingj put to 
death in torture, according to the Roman laws, employed his utmost efforts,, 
both by words and actions, to prevent all treaty with the Carthaginians. 
There was also an African, whose name was Matho, who was indeed of free 
condition, and had served regularly in the army ; but, having been the 
chief incendiary in the late commotions, and fearing lest the punishment even 
of those disorders which others had committed should fall most heavily upon 
himself, he entered eagerly into ail the views of Spendius, and resolved to 
pursue the same design. Having, therefore, assembled the Africans apart, 
he endeavoured to convince them, that, as so&n as the rest of the troops were 
satisfied, and dismissed to their respective countries, they alone would be ex- 
posed to all the vengeance of the Carthaginians, who would not fail to punish 
their revolt, in a manner that should strike a terror into all the states of A trie. 
These suggestions increased the rage with which they were before inflamed ; 
and, because Gesco only discharged the stipends that were owing, but reserved 
the allowance for their corn and horses to a distant time, on this c'ight pre- 
tence the soldiers ran together tumultuously in a body. Spendius and Matho 
harangued the assembly, in terms full of the bitterest accusations against the 
Carthaginians. These were greedily received, and attended to with pleasure ; 

VOL. 1. MO. 3. & 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



but if any other persons advanced to speak, the multitude, without waiting till 
they were informed whether their sentiments were contrary to, or the same 
with those of Spendius, instantly fell upon them, and destroyed them with 
stones. A great number, as well of officers as private men, lost their lives in 
this manner. The single word which they all in common understood was, 
Kill : for this was now become their constant practice, especially in their af- 
ternoon assemblies, when they were inflamed with wine. At those times, as 
soon as any one began to call out Kill, the attack was made so suddenly, 
and with so much fury from every quarter, that it was not possible for any to 
escape who had fallen within their reach. This fury having in a short time 
silenced all debate, Spendius and Matho were declared generals. 

Amidst all the madness and disorder which had now taken possession of the 
camp, Gesco, preferring the safety of his country to every other considera- 
tion, and fearing lest the savage fury, with which these mercenaries were in- 
flamed, should bring entire destruction and ruin upon Carthage, never ceased 
to expose himself to danger, but tried every remedy which care and vigilance 
could suggest ; sometimes addressing himself to the officers apart, and some- 
times calling together the soldiers of each several nation, and exhorting them 
to return again to their duty. But it happened, that when the Africans, in 
one of these assemblies, were bold and importunate in their clamours for the 
allowance for provisions, which they had not yet received, Gesco, in order to 
cluck the.ir violence, bid them go and demand it of their general Matho. This 
answer inflamed their minds to such a height of fury, that, not admitting the 
least delay, they ran to lay hands upon the money that had been brought 
from Carthage, and afterwards seized on Gesco and his company. Spendius 
and Matho employed all their arts to feed and keep up the rage of the sol- 
diers, being persuaded, that if they could once be drawn to commit some vio- 
lent and desperate action,' a war must necessarily follow. The attempt suc- 
ceeded ; they seized the money into their hands, plundered the Carthaginians 
of their effects and equipage, and, having ignominiously loaded Gesco and his 
companions with chains, threw them into prison, and from this time declared 
open war against the Carthaginians, in defiance of all the laws of justice and 
J-eligion, and of the established rights of mankind. 

Such were the causes, and such the beginning of the war, against the foreign 
mercenaries, which is usually called the African war. 

When Matho bad thus far acoumplished his design, he sent ambassadors to 
all the cities of Afric, inviting tiiem to join in this attempt, and lend their 
assistance towards the recovery of their common .liberty. The greater part of 
these readily embraced the occasion, and raised large supplies, both of troops 
and stores. The army then divided itself into two separate bodies, and 
marched to lay siege to Utico and Hippo, two cities that had refused to join 
in the revolt. 

The Carthaginians were* deeply affected by this state of their affairs, which 
seemed to be almost desperate. What their own territory produced was, in- 
deed, at all times sufficient for the common occasions of the people; but all 
the public necessities had constantly been supplied by stores and contributions 
drawn from the African cities ; and their battles were fought by foreign troops. 
But now these resources not only failed, but were turned against them to their 
destruction. The misery too was more severely felt, because it had happened so 
contrary to all their hopes. Wearied and exhausted by the length and close con- 
tinuance of the war in Sicily, they flattered themselves that, after the conclusion 
of the peace, they should be able to enjoy some little repose and ease ; but the 
event proved different: a war was ready to receive them, far greater and more 
terrible than the other. In the first, the only contest was for Sicily, against the 
Romans : the latter jvas civil and domestic war, in which their country, lives, 
and liberties, were all in danger. Besides this, they had no store of arms, nor 
any naval force : for their fleets Jaad been all destroyed in the late eu- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB7US. 51 



gagement. They had no method of procuring' supplies ; no revenues to sup- 
port an array ; nor so much as one single ally or friend, from whom they could 
expect assistance. Now, were they sensible how much more civil dissensions ' 
are to be dreaded than a war maintained in a foreign country against a foreign 
enemy. But these distresses were in a great measure owing to themselves. 
For, (taring the late war, they had treated all the Africans with extreme seve- 
rity, being persuaded that the necessities of times would justify their conduct. 
Upon this pretence they exacted through the country one half of all the an- 
nual produce, and imposed a tribute on the cities double to what was paid 
before the war. No favour nor remission was ever shewn to any, how poor or 
indigent soever. Among the governors of provinces, such as were of a mild 
and gentle disposition were held in no esteem at Carthage; but those were 
most caressed and honoured who collected the amplest stores and practised the 
greatest cruelty upon the country. Hanno was one of these. A people so 
oppressed wanted no persuasion to excite them to revolt: a single message was 
sufficient. The very women, who had often quietly beheld their husbands 
and their children dragged to prison when they were unable to discharge their 
tribute, now met together in every city ; and having solemnly engaged them- 
selves not to conceal any part of their effects, they brought together all their 
ornaments, and threw them into the common treasure ; by which means 
Spendius and Matho were furnished with supplies in such abundance that 
they not only paid the soldiers their arrears, as had been promised them in the 
beginning of the revolt, but were able also from that time to defray all the 
necessary expenses of the war. So true it is, that in affairs of government it 
is the part of prudence not to confine our views to the exigences only of the 
present time, but rather to look- forwards to the future. 

The Carthaginians, though beset by so many evils, made haste to draw to- 
gether new troops of mercenaries, and appointed Hanno to be their general 
who, some time before, had been successful in reducing Hecatompylus, to- 
gether with the adjacent ports of Afric, to the Carthaginian yoke. They 
armed likewise all the citizens that were of sufficient age, trained and disci- 
plined the cavalry of the city, and refitted what was left them of their fleet 
some triremes, a few vessels of fifty oars,, and the largest of their boats. 

Spendius and Matho, being joined by all the Africans to the amount of 
seventy thousand, had divided their forces, and were now laving sie«e to 
Utica and Hippo. They held also a strong camp at Tunis: so that the Car- 
thaginians were cut off from all communication with exterior Afric. For 
Carthage is situated within -a gulph, upon a long tract of land, which bears 
the form of a peninsula, being almost every way surrounded, partly by the 
sea, and partly by a lake. The isthmus, which connects it with the rest of 
Afric, is about twenty-!! ve stadia in its breadth. At a moderate distance 
from the isthmus, and on that side which is bounded by the sea, stands Utica* 
on the other side, upon the lake, is Tunis. The mercenaries, havinu- o; !Uie( j 
possession of these two posts, and thus blocked up the Carthaginians within 
their walls, made frequent excursions both by night and day, even to the very 
gates, and filled the city with continual terror and alarms. 

Hanno completed all the necessary preparations with diligence and dex- 
terity. This, indeed, was his peculiar talent : but his abilities in the field 
were wholly contemptible and mean. He wanted penetration to observe the 
proper opportunities of action; and his whole conduct shewed him to be des- 
titute both of skill and spirit; For, though upon his first march to Utica to 
relieve the siege, he obtained great advantages against the enemv, who were 
seized with terror at the number of his elephants, which were not fewer than a 
hundred ; yet so far was he from improving his success, as he might have done 
so as to gain a complete and decisive victory, that, on the contrary, he en- 
dangered even the safety of those whom he came to succour. He had or- 
dered catapults and all the train of military engines to be brought to hiin out 



GENERAL' HISTORY OF POLYBIUS'. 

of the city, and sitting down at no great distance from the besiegers, be resolved 
to attack their camp. The elephants advanced with so much violence that 
they soon broke through the entrenchments ; and the mercenaries, unable to 
sustain the shock, tied from the camp with the utmost precipitation. A great 
part of them were killed by the beasts; the rest escaped to an adjoining bill 
that was rough and craggy and covered with woods, and relied upon the 
strength of the place for their security. Hanno, who had been always used to 
fight against the Africans and Numidians, whose custom it is, whenever they 
are routed, to continue their flight for two or three days together, till they are 
quite removed from the place of action, Hanno, I say, imagining that the war 
was ended, and all danger past, abandoned at once all care both of the soldiers 
and the camp, and, retiring into the city, began to spend his time in hixury 
and ease. But these troops, who saved themselves upon the hill, had been 
trained under the discipline of the bold Amilcar : and, during their campaigns 
in Sicily, had been accustomed to retreat before the enemy, even many times 
in the same day, and return again as often to the charge. When they there* 
fore saw that the general was gone, into the city, and that the soldiers, through 
confidence from their late victory, neglected to guard the camp, and were 
dispersed up and down without any care or caution, they suddenly returned, 
and marching in close order, forced their way through the entrenchments, 
killing a great number of the Carthaginians, and constraining the rest to save 
themselves by hasty and ignominious flight. They became masters also of the 
baggage, and of all the military machines which Hanno had ordered to be 
brought out of the city, and which were now by that means lost. But this 
was not the only' instance of this general's want of sense ; for, in a few days 
after, when the two armies lay encamped very near each other in the neigh- 
bourhood of Gorza, though he had twice an opportunity of forcing the enemy 
to an engagement, and twice also of attacking them by surprise, yet so 
absurd and foolish was his conduct, that he suffered all those occasions to escape 
him. 

At last theCarthaginians, seeing that their affairs were so ill conducted, made 
choice of Amilcar Barcas for their general, and entrusted to him the care of 
the war. - The army consisted of seventy elephants ; of such bodies of merce» 
jiari.es as they have been able to draw together; of some deserters from the 
enemy; and of the cavalry and infantry of the city; which amounted to about 
ten thousand men. Amilcar, by the very first action which he performed, 
struck the enemy with inconceivable dismay and terror, and forced them to 
raise the siege of ' Utiea. It was an action equal to the greatness of bis past 
exploits, and such as fully answered the expectations which his country hnd 
conceived of him. The manner of it was as follows : — 

The extremity of the isthmus, which joins Carthage to the rest of Afric, is 
secured by a chain of rough and craggy hills, over which there are roads made 
by art, which give access to the-other side. Upon these hills Matho had taken 
care to place a guard in every part that was commodious for the purpose. 
Every other passage from Carthage to the country was obstructed by the 
IVJacar, a deep and rapid river that was scarcely formidable in any part, and 
which had only one single bridge across it. The mercenaries had built a 
town upon the bridge, and guarded it with the greatest care, so that it was not 
possible not only for any army but even for a single man to pass without dis- 
covery. Amilcar, having carefully considered all these obstacles, and em- 
ployed his thoughts on every probable method of surmounting them, at last 
put in practice the following expedient. Having observed, that as often as 
certain winds began to blow, the mouth of the river was always filled with 
sand, so as to afford a firm and easy passage over it, he made all things ready 
for his design, and waited for the time, without disclosing to any one his in- 
tention. The winds blew accordingly, and Amilcar, beginning his march by 
night with all possible secrecy, appeared on the other side of the river before. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.. S5 



break of day; to the great astonishment botJi of the enemy and of those that 
were besieged in Utica. He then continued his march along the plain, to 
attack the forces that were starioned at the bridge. 

When Spendius saw what had happened, he made haste to meet die enemy, 
at the head of ten thousand men, from the town upon the bridge. About 
fifteen thousand in ore marched at the same time from the camp before Utica, 
to support the first. As soon as they were joined, they mutually exhorted 
each other, and advanced to the fight ; imagining that it would be easy to sur- 
round the Carthaginian army, and enclose them as in a snare. Amilcar was 
marching with the elephants in front : behind these were the light-armed 
troops : and, last of all, bis heavy forces. But when he marked the impe- 
tuosity with which the enemy advanced against him, he suddenly inverted his 
whole disposition ; commanding the troops that were in front, to wheel off and 
fall behind, and those that were behind, to advance and form the front. The 
mercenaries, imagining that this motion was the tftect of fear, and that the 
Carthaginians already were preparing to retreat, quitted their ranks, and ram 
on bri*kly to the charge. But no sooner had the cavalry faced about again, 
and come forwards to cover and support the sest of the forces that were stand- 
ing in perfect order, than the Africans, astonished by a motion which they had 
not looked for, turned their backs and fletl; and feib back upon their own 
forces in great disorder. Many were destroyed in that confusion ; but the 
greater part were* trodden down in heaps by the Carthaginian cavalry and 
elephants. Upon, the whole, about six thousand of them were killed, and, 
two thousand taken. The rest escaped, some to the camp before Utica, aud 
some to the town upon the bridge. 

Amilcar, having thus gained the victory, pursued the enemy to the town; 
which they abandoned on his first approach, and retired to .Tunis. He after- 
wards marched his army through the country ; drawing many cities to sub- 
mission, and reducing many, by force.? and by this, success he restored the 
courage, and raised the drooping spirits of his countrymen. 

ButMatho, who was at this time employed in the siege nf Hippo, advised 
Spendius, and Autaritus, the general of the Gauis, to follow closely after the 
Carthaginians, and attend to all their motions : taking care only to avoid tlie 
plains, by reason of the cavalry and elephants: and keeping the route along 
the sides of the mountains, to wait their opportunity of fading upon the 
enemy, whenever they should be engaged in any difHculths. He sent like- 
wise to the cities of Afric and Numidia, to solicit new supplies; and conjure 
them not to let pass the present occasion, so favourable for recovering their 
present liberty. Spendius, taking with him six thousand men horn all the 
different nations that were in Tunis, together with the Gauls, vho now- 
amounted to two :housand only, the rest having deserted to the Romans 
during the siege of Eryx, followed the advice of Matho, and marched along 
the sides of the hills and mountains, waiting stili upon the motions of the Car- 
thaginian army. It happened that Amilcar lay encamped in a certain plain, 
surrounded on every side with mountains, when the expected succours also 
arrived from Afric and Numidia, and joined the army of the rebels. This 
threw the Carthaginians into. the greatest consternation. The Africans had 
fixed their camp before them; Spendius, with his forces, lay on one side; 
and the Numidiahs were in their rear. The danger wat> so threatening, that 
there seemed to be no way left to escape it. 

But while things were in this situation, a certain Numidian prince, named 
Naravasus, a man of noble and generous disposition, and one whose inclina- 
tions had always led him to favour the Carthaginians, on account of former 
Connections between his family and that people, and who was now the more 
confirmed in those sentiments, by what he had heard of" the abilities and fame 
of Amilcar Barcas, considered this as the proper time for settling an entire 
and perfect union between himself aud the republic. He went, therefore, t» 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



the Carthaginian camp, attended by about an hundred horsemen ; and ad- 
vancing close to the entrenchments, stood boldly there, making signals with 
Iris hand. Amilcar, surprised at the appearance, sent one to inquire his bu- 
siness. He answered, that he desired a conference with the general. And 
when Amilcar seemed still doubtful and irresolute* as if suspecting some ill 
design, Naravasus, delivering his horse and javelins to some of the attendants, 
entered unarmed into the camp ; with such an air of confidence and intrepi- 
dity, as struck the Carthaginians with astonishment and awe. They conducted 
him, however, to the general, to whom he declared, " that he was attached by 
inclination to all the Carthaginians, but more particularly solicitous to obtain. 
Amilcar' s friendship : that he was, therefore, come to enter into a treaty with 
him ; to assist in all his undertakings ; and to share, in all his counsels, with- 
out deceit and fraud. " The candour and sincerity that appeared in this dis- 
course, together with the confidence with which the young man had at first 
approached the camp, gave so much joy and satisfaction to Amilcar, that he 
not only consented to admit him as a partner in all his counsels and designs, 
hut promised also with an oath to give him his daughter in marriage, if he 
continued firm in his alliance with the Carthaginians. The agreement being 
thus concluded, Naravasus brought over to the camp the Numidians that were, 
Tinder his command, amounting to two thousand men. 

As soon as Amiicar had received this reinforcement, he drew out his army 
in order of battle. Spendius likewise, being joined by the Africans, descended 
into the plain, and advanced to engage the enemy. The tight was obstinate : 
hut the Carthaginians at last prevailed. The elephants performed great ser- 
vice in the action : and Naravasus signalized himself above all in the army. 
About ten thousand of the enemy were kilied r and four thousand takeu. 
Spendius and Autaritus saved themselves by flight. When the action was 
ended, as many of the prisoners as were willing, to serve among the Cartha- 
-giuian> were received into the army ; and Amiicar, having ordered the rest to 
be brought before him, informed them, that they should now be pardoned for 
all that was past, and be permitted to depart to what place soever their several 
inclinations led them ; but that if ever again they were found in arms against 
the Carthaginians, they must then expect to be treated with the last severity. 

About this time, the mercenaries that were garrisoned in Sardinia, being en- 
couraged by the example of Spendius and Matho, revolted from their duty ; 
and having shut up ^neir general Bostar in the citadel, destroyed him and all 
his countrymen. The Carthaginians sent Hauno to reduce them with an 
army. But these troops also joined the party of the rebels : and Hanno, 
having fallen alive into their hands, was immediately nailed to across. They 
afterwards put to death all the Carthaginians that were in the place, by new 
*nd unusual tortures. And having seized upon the principal towns, they 
maintained themselves by force in the possession of the island. But some 
time afterwards, when they had engaged in some disputes against the people 
•of the country, the latter drove them from the island, and forced them to fly 
to Italy for refuge. In this maimer was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians : 
an island famous for its size, fertility, and number of inhabitants ; and so fully 
celebrated on these accounts by many writers, that it is not necessary to re- 
peat in this place what has already been observed and confessed by others. 

Matho, Spendius, and Autaritus, jealous of the effects of Ami tear's gentle 
treatment of the prisoners, and fearing lest the soldiers, seduced by that shew 
of clemency, should run to embrace the pardon that was offered, resolved to 
engage the multitude in some horrid and inhuman action, which might render 
their minds quit furious and implacable towards the Carthaginians. For thia 
purpose, having called the troops together, they introduced among them a 
courier, as bringing letters from Sardinia. The contents of these were, to 
advise them to look more carefully after Gesco and his companions, whom they 
iaad seized at Tunis ; for that there ware some person* in the camp, who were 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. G& 



conserting measures with the Carthaginians to set them free. Spendius im- 
mediately laid hold on this occasion to .harangue the assembly. He conjured 
them to give no credit to the affected lenity of Amilcar : that his intention was 
not so much to save the prisoners whom be had taken, as to seduce by that 
shew of mercy the whole army into his power, that he might afterwards in- 
clude them all in one common punishment. He exhorted them to guard 
Gesco with all imaginable care: that the escape of a man so eminent, and of 
such abilities in war, would not only make them appear contemptible to the 
enemy, but might also prove the entire ruin of their' affairs ; since if he once 
should rind himself at liberty, he would not fail to turn against them, and be- 
come their most formidable enemy. He had scarcely ended, when a second 
courier entered, as ii sent from Tunis, with letters of the same advice and 
import. Upon this, Autaritus rose up to speak. He observed to them, that 
they could now have no view of safety, but in rejecting every thing that, 
locked towards an accommodation with the Carthaginians : that in proportion, 
as any were suspended in their thoughts by the hopes of pardon, they must 
of course become less sincere and steady in the cause in which they were en- 
gaged. Head\ised them to place their only confidence in those whose senti- 
ments were most severe and bitter against the Carthaginians; and to consider 
all besides as enemies and traitors. In conclusion, he urged it as his opinion, 
that Gesco, and the rest that were prisoners with him, should presently be. 
put to death in torture : and that the same treatment should be shewn to all 
the Carthaginians, who should from that time fall in their hands. 

Of all the chiefs Autaritus was able to make the greatest impression in these 
assemblies, because he had learnt to speak in the Punic language ; which the 
long continuance of the war had rendered so familiar to the soldiers, that they 
used it for the most part on all occasions of common intercourse and civility. 
His opinion, therefore, wa? received with general acclamations, and assented to 
with eagerness. Yet most of every nation, moved by the remembrance of the 
kindnesses which they had received from Gesco, came forwards in the as- 
sembly, and began to beg, that at least the torture might be spared. As 
they spoke together, and each in the language of his country, they were not 
presently understood. But no sooner was it declared, that they were plead- 
ing against the punishment, and one of the assembly had called out', kill, 
kill them all, than they were instantly overwhelmed with stones by the furious 
multitude, and their bodies carried off by their companions, as if they had 
been slaughtered by some savage beasts. Spendius and the soldiers then took 
Gesco, together with the rest of the Carthaginian prisoners, in number about 
seven hundred ; and having conducted them to a little distance without the 
camp, cut off their hands, beginning first with Gesco : the same whom they 
had proclaimed not long before to be their benefactor and their friend, and 
chosen as the judge of all, their wrongs and differences. They afterwards 
tore away the scalps from the head of these unhappy men ; and having broken 
and miserably mangled all their limbs, cast them still breathing into a pit 
together. 

The news of this horrible transaction affected the Carthaginians with the 
deepest grief. They ordered their generals, Hanno and Amilcar, to take some 
speedy and effectual vengeance upon the murderers of their countrymen. 
They likewise sent some heralds to those impious wretches, desiring leave to 
remove their bodies. But the rebels returned for answer, that they should 
from that time send neither herald nor ambassador to their camp, on pain of 
their being punished with the same cruel death. They also made a law for 
the time to come, by which it was resolved, that all the Carthaginians that 
were taken should lose their lives in torture, and their allies have first. their 
hands cut off, and be then sent back in that condition to the camp. And this 
was punctually observed and executed.. 

Whoever makes reflection upom these horrid cruelties will easily be con- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



3tPBCarWSSTCT3B 



winced, that if the human body is sometime;, invaded by certain corrupt and 
ulcerous humours which resist all remedy, the minds of men are also not less 
liable to some disorders that prove as obstinate and fatal. And as in the for- 
mer case, the very medicines which are designed to effect a cure, often serve 
only to inflame and irritate the parts to which they are applied, and even 
quicken the progress of the evil; yet, on the other hand, if the disease be 
totally neglected, the corruption soon spreads itself through a|J the neigh- 
bouring; parts, infecting every thing within its reach, till the whole body "be- 
comes unsound : just so it happens in the mind, whenever it is tainted with 
those dark a-ud malignant passions, which render men more impious and savage 
even than the beasts themselves. If you offer to men in this condition the 
softening remedies of clemency and pardon, they presently suspect it to be 
mere fraud and artifice ; their diffidence grows stronger, and their aversion to 
you is more deeply rooted than before. But if you resist their violence, and 
oppose revenge to cruelty, there is then no crime too horrible, no attempt too 
monstrous, for them to engage in. They exult and glory in their .impieties, 
and by degrees divest themselves of every sentkaeiat and passion that dis- 
tinguish hmnan nature. It is not to be doubted, but that these disorders are 
-chiefly owing to a bad education, and impure manners ; though there are 
many other causes, which may sometimes assist to bring them on : among 
which none is so iikely to be effectual, as the insolence and rapaciousness of 
public governors. The truth of those remarks is evident from all that now 
passed among the mercenaries; and more particularly, from the conduct of 
their chief commanders. 

Amilcar, being now in the highest degree incensed against the enemv, and 
finning himstll too weak to encounter with their unbounded rage and madness, 
invited Ilanno to come and join him ; hoping, by means of their united forces, 
to put a speedy end to the war ; and, being persuaded that nothing less than 
the entire extirpation of these wretches could bring the affair to any effectual 
conclusion, he ordered all those that should fall within the reach of the sword 
in battle to be instantly destroyed ; and such as were at any time brought pri- 
soners, to be cast alive to the elephants. The Carthaginians were now be- 
ginning to flatter themselves with better hopes, when, on a sudden, their whole 
prospect was fatally reversed. The generals were no sooner joined, than ihey 
were found to differ from each other in all their sentiments : and to suchaheight 
■was tins dissenfion raised between them, that they not only neglected every 
fair occasion of doing hurt to the enemy, but even exposed their own troops to 
frequent attacks and losses, by their mutual jealousies and contests. The Car- 
thaginians, therefore, were forced to send orders, that one of them should cpjit 
the army, but left it to the troops to make the choice. It happened also about 
the same time, that the convoys that were sailing to the army from Emporia, a 
place from whence they usually drew their largest supplies of corn and other 
necessaries, were all sunk in the ocean by the storm. Sardinia likewise, which 
in times of danger or necessity had always furnished liberally to their wants, 
was now revolted from them. But the severest stroke of all was the loss of 
Utica and Hippo : for, among all the African cities, these two alone had re- 
mained unshaken in their duty ; not only in the beginning of the present war, 
but during the time also of Agathocles, and when the Romans invaded Afric, 
and had, on all occasions, served and supported the republic with singular af- 
fection and fidelity. Yet now, they not only embraced the party of the rebels, 
without any kind of pretext or excuse, but shewed even an uncommon zeal 
and activity in the cause, expressing, at the same time, the most implacable 
enmity and hatred against the Carthaginians. They seized the troops that had 
been sent among them for their defence, which were not fewer than five hun- 
dred men, and put them all to death, together with their commanders, and cast 
them without the walls. Nor would they even grant permission for their bo- 
dies to be buried, though this was requested by the Carthaginians. This 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. . 57- 



sit nation of affairs so much raised the Ropes of Spen'dius and Matho,that they 
now resolved to lay siege to Carthage. 

Imilcar being joined by Annibal, who was sent to command in the room of 
Haaoo, whom the army had displaced when the differences betwen the chiefs 
were referred to their decision, marched his troops through the country, en* 
deavouring to cat oft' all supplies from the enemy. In the execution of this 
design, Nafavasus and his cavalry were of great service to him, as indeed 
they were upon ali occasions of the war. Such, then, was the, state of the 
armies in the field. 

But the Carthaginians, being thus on every side closely invested by their' 
enemies, were forced to have recourse to the states that were in alliance with 
them. Hiero, whose attention was fixed upon the war, had all along com- 
plied with every thing that was requested of him ; but at this time especially 
he applied himself to serve them with all imaginable zeal, as judging that his 
interest required him, in order to preserve his own dominions and his alliance 
with the Romans, to assist in saving th^Cfllrthaginians from destruction, lest 
the conquerors should become too powerful to be controuled in any future pro- 
jects. In this he was certainly guided by the dictates of good sense and pru- 
dence ; for these conjunctures are by no means to be slighted ; nor ought we 
ever to permit any growing power to raise itself to such a degree of strength, 
as to be able to tear from us, without resistance, even our natural and undis- 
puted rights. 

The Romans also punctually observed the terms of the late treaty which 
they had made with Carthage, and espoused their interests with zeal. At first, 
indeed, an accident had happened, which threatened to embroil anew the two 
republics. Some persons, sailing from the ports of Italy to Afric, had con- 
veyed supplies to the camp of the mercenaries. The Carthaginians seized on 
these, who were in number about five hundred, and threw them into prison* 
The Romans were greatly offended attfois proceeding ; but, as the men were 
all immediately released again upon the first demand, they were so much 
pleased and softened by that compliance, that they not only sent back all the 
Carthaginian prisoners that were left from the Sicilian war, but from that time 
chearfully assisted the republic with every office of humanity and friendship. 
They gave permisson to their merchants to export all kinds of necessaries to 
Carthage, at the same time prohibiting them from carrying any to the enemy. 
They refused to invade Sardinia, though invited to it by the mercenaries that had 
revolted there ; and when the inhabitants of Utica offered to put them in pos- 
session of that city, they rejected the proposal, and adhered religiously to their 
treaty. By the help of all these succours^ the Carthaginians were enabled to 
sustain the siege, while Spendius and Matho were themselves no less besieged: 
for Amiloar had intercepted ali provisions from their camp, and at last re- 
duced them to such extremity that they were forced to raise the siege. 

Some time afterwards, these generals, having drawn together, the bravest of 
their forces, to the number of fifty thousand, among whom was Zarxas, an Af- 
rican, with the troops under his command, resumed their first design, of follow- 
ing A mi icar closely in all his marches, and attending closely to the motions of 
his army. Their chief care was, to avoid the plains, ffom apprehensions of the 
elephants and cavalry, and to possess themselves, before the enemy, of all the 
mountainous denies and narrow passes. In acts of courage and enterprising 
boldness, they shewed themselves to be in no point inferior to the Carthagi- 
nians ; but their want of skill was often fatal to them. Upon this occasion, the 
difference was clearly seen between a conduct that was built upon the rules of 
military science, and an irregular and unskilful method of making war : for 
Amilcar would sometimes contrive to separate smajl bodies from their army, 
and, like an artful chess-player; inclosing them on every side, by that means 
destroy them. Sometimes, .when his motions seemed to promise a general en- 
voi.. 1. NO. 3. 11 



53 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



garment, be drew them into ambuscades of which they had no suspicion. In 
a Word, he was ever ready to attack them, both bv night and day, when they 
least expected bis approach. Great numbers of them were thus destroyed ; 
and as many of them as were taken alive were thrown to the elephants. At 
last, coming upon them by surprise, he fixed rbk camp near them, in a place 
that was very proper for his own forces, but incommodious to the rebels. In 
this situation, not dariag to risk a battle, nor able to escape, by reason of the 
entrenchments which Amilcar had extended round them, they were reduced to 
so great extremity by famine, that they were forced to feed upon each other ; 
as if the Deity had designed to inflict a punishment upon them, that might be 
equal in its horror and impiety to the crimes which they had committed against 
their fellow creatures. But, if they wanted courage to venture on an engage- 
ment, in which they were sure of being defeated, and exposed to a cruel 
punishment if taken, they were much less able to entertain any thoughts of 
treatv-or accommodation, when they reflected upon their past transactions. 
Their only hopes were in the succours which they expected would arrive from 
Tunis ; for with this hope their chief continued still to flatter them. Under 
this assurance, they submitted yet for some time longer to practise this hor- 
rible barbarity against each other; but when they had impiously devoured all 
their prisoners and slaves, and no succours were arrived, the multitude grew 
impatient of their misery, and began to threaten their chiefs. Spendius, there- 
fore, with Autaritus and Zarxas, resolved to go themselves to the enemy, and 
treat of peace. Having first dispatched a herald, and obtained a safe conduct, 
they went accordingly to the Carthaginian camp, and concluded a treaty with 
Amilcar, uptfn these conditions: " That the Carthaginians should choose from 
among the enemy ten persons, whomsoever they thought proper ; and that the 
rest should be dismissed, each with his single garment." Amilcar then said, 
that, in consequence of that treaty, he made choice of those that were present. 
Thus the Carthaginians got into their power Spendius and Autaritus, and the 
rest of their officers of greatest eminence. 

The Africans, who were ignorant of the terms of the treaty, no sooner found 
that their chiefs were made prisoners, than they ran tumultously to arms, 
in order to resent the supposed treachery : but Amilcar surrounding them 
with elephants, utterly destroyed them all, to the amount of more than forty 
thousand men. The place where this action happened was called, the Saw ; 
because its figure somewhat resembled that instrument. By this victory, 
Amilcar raised the hopes of his countrymen a second time, when they had al- 
most begun to despair of safety. He then marched through the country, with 
Annibal and Naravasus ; and, having received the Africans, who were ready 
every whereto submit, and recovered most of the principal towns to their party, 
they next advanced to lay siege to Tunis, into which Matho had retired, with 

all his forces. .... 

Annibal fixed his camp before the city, on that side of it which looked 
towards Carthage; while Amilcar posted himself on the opposite side. They 
then took Spendius, and the rest of the prisoners, and, carrying them near the 
walls, crucified them there, in sight of the enemy. But Matho, perceiving- 
that Annibal, elated by the past success, was remiss and negligent in his post, 
sallied out upon him, and, attacking the entrenchments, killed a great num- 
ber of the Carthaginians, and forced the rest to fly out of the camp. All the 
"baggage was lost, and Annibal himself taken prisoner. This last was im- 
mediately conducted to the cross of Spendius, and fixed alive upon it, after he 
had first been forced to suffer the most cruel torments. They killed also 
thirty of the noblest Carthaginians round Spendjus's body ; as if fortune had 
taken unusual pains to afford alternately, 1o either party, the means of re- 
taliating upon the other by the most inhuman methods of revenge. 

The distance of the two camps prevented Amilcar from being informed in 
time of what had happened : nor was he able, when he knew it, to send any 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 59 



succours, by reason of the difficulties of the way that lay between. He there- 
fore immediately decamped, and, marching along the Macar, sat down near 
the mouth of that nver. . . 

The Carthaginians had just begun to recover new life, and were entertaining 
better hopes, when this unhappy affair threw them again into no smah de- 
fection and amazement. They did not, however, neglect the care of their 
safety ; but choosing thirty of their senators, they sent them away to Amilcar, 
together with Hanno, the former general, and all the citizens that were left ot 
ao°e to bear arms : so that this was considered as their last and only effort, 
fhev earnestly recommended it to the senators, to use all their power to re- 
concile the generals, and to engage them to regard only the exigences of the 
republic, and act together with such harmony as the state of affairs required. 
After many conferences and debates, this was at last effected. Hanno and 
Amilcar were constrained to agree in sentiments, and yielded up their dif- 
ferences to the public good. From this time all things went prosperously for 
the Carthaginians, who gained continually some advantage over the enemy, in 
a variety of little combats, ambuscades, and pursuits, both in the neighbour- 
hood of Leptis, and in other places ; till Matho, finding himself so greatly 
harassed and distressed, was determined to engage in a decisive action. 1 he 
Carthaginians, on their side, shewed no less eagerness. Both parties, there- 
fore, summoned all their allies, recalled their garrisons from the towns, and 
resolved to risk the whole upon a single battle. When all things were ready, 
the generals, by agreement, drew out their forces, and the tight began. 1 he 
victory was on the side of the Carthaginians. The greatest part of the Afri- 
cans were killed in the action ; the rest escaped to a certain city that was near, 
but surrendered themselves in a short time after. Matho was taken prisoner 
All the parts of Afric soon submitted to the conquerors, except the cities ot 
Utica and Hippo, which alone were forced to disclaim all thoughts of peace, be- 
cause their past behaviour had left them no hopes of pardon. Of such im- 
portance is it, in dissentions of this kind, to observe a moderate conduct, and 
abstain from all such excesses as are too great for mercy. But no sooner had 
Hanno invested one of them, and Amilcar the other, than they were forced to 
surrender at discretion. Thus the war, which had threatened entire destruc- 
tion to the Carthaginians, was now ended in reducing all the parts of Alnc 
to their former obedience, and in punishing the authors of it : tor the youth 
of the city, after they had led the prisoners in triumph, inflicted upon Matho 
and the rest every kind of indignity arid torture that invention could con- 

"Such was the conclusion of the war between the Carthaginians and their 
mercenaries, after a continuance of three years, and about four months,— 
a war, by far the most impious and bloody of any that we find in history. 

About this time the Romans, invited, as we have already mentioned, by the 
mercenaries that had revolted in Sardinia, resolved to take possession of that 
island • and when the Carthaginians began to shew their resentment of this 
proceeding, and were preparing to oppose by force the rebels that had thus 
robbed them of their rights, the Romans presently declared war against them; 
pretending that their preparations were not so much designed against the 
people of Sardinia as against themselves. , The Carthaginians, who had been 
fust before delivered, when they least expected it, from a most dreadful war, 
and were by no means able, in their present circumstances, to contend against 
the Romans, yielded to the necessity of the times, and not only gave up Sar- 
dinia, but consented also to pay twelve hundred talents, rather than be in* 
volved in a war, which they were too weak at that time to sustain. 



6o GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIITS. 



BOOK THE SECOND. 
AP. I. 



We shewed, in the preceding' book, at what time it was that the Romans, after 
they had fully settled the affairs of Italy, began first to extend their views 
abroad; the manner in which they passed over into Sicily; and the reasons 
that hiduci*d them to declare war against the Carthaginians, in order to drive 
them from that island. We took notice also of the time in -which they em- 
ployed a naval armament; and recounted all that happened to the two repub- 
lics in the progress of the war ; in the end of which the Carthaginians were 
forced to abandon Sicily, and leave to the Romans the sovereignty and posses- 
sion of all the island, those parts alone excepted which belonged to Hiero. 
We next related in what manner the Carthaginian mercenaries revolted from 
their duty, and kindled that which was called the African war. We saw to 
how monstrous a height their impieties were raised, with all the natural ex- 
cesses and dreadful circumstances that attended them ; till the Carthaginians 
became at last superior to their enemies. We now go on to ^ive a concise and 
general abstract of the chief events which followed these transactions, agree- 
ably to our first design. 

As soon as the Carthaginians had quieted their domestic troubles, they sent 
Amilcar Barcas with an army into Spain. Amilcar, taking with him Annibal 
his son, who was then about nine years old, passed the Straits between the pil- 
lars of Hercules, and in the course of almost nine years, which he spent in that 
country, greatly extended the dominions of that republic; reducing many 
different nations to the Carthaginian yoke, some by persuasion, and some by 
force; and at last ended his life in a manner worthy of his former great ex- 
ploits; For, being engaged in battle with a certain people distinguished by 
their bravery and strength, and who had brought a very numerous army 
against him into the field, he fell nobly in the action, after he had shewn 
amaxing proofs of hardiness and courage. The Carthaginians made choice of 
Asdrubal to succeed him, who was general of the triremes, and nearly allied 
in blood to Amilcar. 

About this time it was that the Romans prepared to invade lllyria, and for 
the first time sent their armies into those parts of Europe. An event which 
must be carefully considered and attended to by those who are inclined to 
enter into our design, and comprehend, in its whole extent, the gradual pro- 
gress and advancement of this empire. This expedition, then, owed its birth 
to the cause which I am going to relate. 

Agron, king of lllyria, the son of Pleuratus, whose forces, both by land and 
sea, were greater than those of any of his predecessors, was gained with large 
sums of money by Demetrius the father of Philip, to send relief to the My- 
dionians, who were besieged by the i&tolians. For when the jEtolians had 
employed in vain all the methods of persuasion, to prevail upon this people to 
unite themselves to their republic, they resolved to subdue them to their laws 
by force. Having therefore drawn together a numerous army, they invested 
the city, and pressed it closely, employing against it ail kinds of machines, 
and every method of attack. 

When the place, reduced to great extremity, was every day expected to sur- 
render, the praetor of , the iEtoIians, reflecting that the time was also drawing 
near, in which the magistrates were usually elected, and that his place must 
soon be yielded to a successor, called together an assembly of the people, and 
represented to them, that as he had all along sustained the chief fatigue and 
burden of the siege, it was highly reasonable that he alone should possess the 
right of distributing the spoil, and the honour of having his name inscribed 
upon the trophies, whenever the city should be taken. But as this motion 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 61 

was opposed by many, and especially by those who bad any bopes of gaining 
the praetorsbip for themselves, who insisted that no judgment sbould be given 
before the event, but the whole be reserved entire, until they should, see upon 
whom Fortune intended to bestow that honour : it was at last resolved, that if 
the new magistrate should take the city, the distribution of the spoil, and the 
inscription of the trophies, should be adjudged to him in conjunction with the 
praetor of the former year. 

When the affair was thus determined, and the very following day was ap- 
pointed for the new praetor to be elected and to enter into his office, according 
to the custom of the JEtolians: a hundred barks, having on board five thousand 
Illyrians, arrived in the night, and cast anchor as near the city as was possible. 
At break of day, the troops were di » mbarked in great haste and silence : and 
having ranged themselves in order of battle, after the manner of their country, 
they marched, divided into cohorts, towards the camp of the enemy. The 
iEtc.Hans were thrown at first into some kind of consternation, by an attempt 
so bold and hardy, and which they had not in the least expected. But that 
spirit of arrogance and haughty fierceness, by which this people had been long 
distinguished, and their confidence in the strength and number of their forces, 
soon took place, and in some degree dispelled their fears. They drew up the 
greater part of the cavalry, together with the heavy armed troops, upon the 
plain before their camp ; and having, at the same time, possessed themselves 
of certain eminences that stood commodious for the action, they posted the 
vest of the cavalry upon them, with the light armed forces. But these being 
first attacked, were not able to stand against the numbers and close order of 
the enemy, who dispersed them with little difficulty, and forced the cavalry 
also to retreat back to the heavy armed troops. The Illyrians then came 
pouring down with violence from the eminences upon the troops that were 
drawn up in battle upon the plain; and being at the same time assisted by the 
Mydionians from the town, they made their attack with such success, that the 
JEtoiians were completely routed. Many of them were killed in the action, 
and a greater number taken, together with all their arms and baggage. When 
the Illyrians had thus happily executed the Orders of their king, they loaded 
their vessels with the spoils, and steered their course back again towards their 
own country. 

The Merjioiiians, having obtained their safety, in a manner so strange and 
unexpected, called together an assembly of the people, and, among other pub- 
lic resolutions, made also a decree concerning the inscription of the trophies, 
in which, following the example of the JEtolians, they adjudged it in common 
to the praetor that was then in office, and to those who should afterwards be 
elected to it ; as if.Fortune had designed to give a most conspicuous proof of 
her power in all human affairs, by thus enabling the Medionians to retort upon 
their enemies the very act and manner of. disgrace, which but a little time be- 
.fore had been decreed against themselves. What happened now to thfe JEto- 
lians may serve also to instruct us, never to deliberate upon the future as if it 
were already arrived, nor build any ceitain expectations on events, which, per- 
haps, may take a very contrary turn from what at first they seem to promise; 
but, in all human ari'divs, and especially in those that relate to war, to leave 
always some room to fortune, and to accidents which cannot be foreseen. 

When the fleet was returned t,o Illyria, and had given an account to the 
king of their success, Agron, being overjoved that his troops had 'given check 
to the insolence and haughty spirit of the ^Etolians,. indulged himself in feasts 
a.-d- banquets to so great excess, that he was seized with a pleurisy, of which 
he died in a few days after. His wife, Teuta, took possession of the king- 
dom, and governed it, with the assistance of her friend. This queen, who, in 
her disposition, was a perfect woman, dazzled with the splendour of the late 
...success, and utterly regardless of the states around her, at first permitted pri- 
vate men among her subjects to fit-out sliips for piracy ; and afterwards, having 



62 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

drawn together a very considerable fleet, with an army not inferior to that 
which was employed in the former expedition, she gave commission to her ge- 
nerals, to exercise hostilities upon every nation without reserve. Their first 
descent was made upon the coast of Elis and Messe'fiia : which were, indeed, 
at all limes more exposed to insults from the Illyriahs, than any other coun- 
tries. For as their coast was of great extent, and their principal towns also 
situated far within the land, it was easy for the enemy to overrun and lay 
waste the country, before any effectual succours could be sent to their relief. 
At this time it happened that the lllyrians had one day advanced as far as 
to Phoenice, a town of Epirus, in search of provisions : and finding there a 
body of Gallic troops, in number about eight hundred, whom the E pi rots had 
retained in their service, they immediate^ began to concert measures with 
them for surprising the town. The Gauls soon consented to the project : and 
the lllyrians, having landed their troops, and being joined by the soldiers of the 
garrison, made themselves masters of the place upon the first assault. 

As soon as the Epirots received the news of what had happened, they drew 
together an army with great diligence ; and marching towards Phoenice, they 
there encamped, having in their front the river that runs before the town ; and, 
for their great safety, they removed the planks of the bridge that were upon it. 
Being afterwards informed, that Scerdilaidas was advancing by land against 
them, at the head of five thousand lllyrians, and that he designed to take his 
route along the passes of Antigonia, they sent away one part of their army to 
secure that city : while the rest lay quiet in their post ; indulging themselves 
in full security in the plenty of the country, and neglecting even to place the 
necessary guards about the camp. The lllyrians, having heard of the division 
•which the enemy had made of their forces, and of the negligence that now 
rei°-ned among them, began their march by night, and laying planks across 
the bridpe, passed the river without resistance : and having possessed them- 
selves of a strong and advantageous post, they continued there till break of 
day. In the morning both armies drew up their forces in order of battle, in 
sight of the town. The Epirots were defeated iu the engagement ; many of 
them bein »' killed, and a great number taken prisoners. The rest directed 
their flight towards Atintania, and escaped. 

The Epirots, after this ill success, finding themselves too weak to repel the 
enemy, and recover what they had lost, implored assistance from the iEtolians 
and Achaeans ; who, in compassion to the desperate state of their affairs, 
raised an army for their relief, and marched towards Helicranum. The ll- 
lyrians that had seized Phoenice, being now joined by the troops that were 
brought by Scerdilaidas, came also to the same place, intending to offer battle 
to the enemv. But as the ground was not commodious for their design, and 
because they had about this time also received letters from the queen, pressing 
them to return with all possible diligence, to reduce some towns that had re- 
volted to the Dardanians, they wasted all the province, and afterwards con- 
sented to make peace with the Epirots ; restoring their city to them for a sum 
of money, aud releasing all the inhabitants that were free. And having sent 
the slaves on board their vessels, together with the rest of their booty, they 
sailed away to Illyria : while Scerdilaidas, with the troops that were under his 
command, took his route back again through the passes of Antigonia. The 
success of this invasion struck no small terror into all the Greeks that inha- 
bited the coast. For when they saw that the strongest and most powerful 
town of all Epirus had fallen so suddenly into the hands of the enemy, they 
no lone;er trembled for their lands and country only, as in former times ; but 
began to fear, that there would now be no security either for themselves or any 
of their cities. 

The Epirots, thus rescued from destruction when they had scarcely any 
hopes of safety left, were so far from shewing any, resentment of the injuries 
which they had suffered, and so forgetful likewise of what they owed to their 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYJBIUS. 6s 

deliverers, that they sent ambassadors to Teuta, and in conjunction with the 
Acarnanians, entered into an alliance with her. And from this time they con- 
stantly supported and assisted the Illyrians, in opposition to all the interests of 
the Achaeans and JEtolians: affording, by this declared ingratitude towards 
their friends and benefactors, a no less signal instance of their want of sense 
and judgment, than that which had appeared in their former conduct. 
Whenever we fall into any of those calamities which are naturally incident 
to mankind, and from which no care or foresight could have saved us, the 
fault is justly charged upon fortune, or an enemy. But when Our sufferings 
are purely the result of our own indiscreet and foolish conduct, the blame can 
only be imputed to ourselves. And as the strokes of fortune usually excite 
the pity of mankind, who seem willing to partake in our distresses, and are 
ready to lend us their assistance ; 60 on the other hand, an open and deliberate 
folly cannot fail to draw after it the censure and reproaches of all who view it 
in its proper light. And this was plainly the treatment, which the E pi rots at 
this time merited in the eyes of Greece. For, in the first place, the common 
and well-known character of the Gauls might have rendered them more cau- 
tious of intrusting any of that nation with the defence of a noble city, whose 
wealth anddlourishing condition must continually tempt them by strong in- 
citements to revolt. But this body of troops especially were men, whose 
temper and designs deserved to have been watched with more than ordinary 
care. For they not only had been driven from their country by the people of 
their own nation, on account of some acts of violence, which they had com- 
mitted against their kindred and common tribes ; but when the Carthagi- 
nians, who were at that time pressed by the war of Sicily, had received about 
three thousand of them into then; pay, and stationed them in Agrigentufu, 
they took occasion, from some disseutions that arose between the soldiers, and 
their chief commanders on the subject of their pay, to pillage their very city, 
which they had been engaged to protect and guard from insult. Being after- 
wards in garrison at Eyiix, while the Romans were besieging it, they formed 
a project lor delivering up the town and inhabitants to the enemy : and when 
the treason was discovered, they^went over in a body to the Roman camp. 
Yet among these also, they not long afterwards betrayed their trust ; and 
plundered the temple of Erycinian Venus. As soon, therefore, as the war 
was ended, the Romans having seen such proofs of their abandoned profli- 
gacy, stripped them of their arms, and putting them on board some vessels, 
banished them all out of Italy. These were the troops, to whom the Epirots 
now r committed the defence of their government and country ; and trusted 
the most flourishing of all their cities to their care : so that in justice, them- 
selves alone must be considered as the chief and only cause of the misfortunes 
that ensued. A conduct so repugnant to all sense and reason deserved not to 
pass without some reflection ; and it may serve hereafter as a caution to all 
states, never to admit too strong a garrison within their cities, especially if it 
be composed of strangers and barbarians. 

The Illyrians had in former times very frequently molested vessels that were 
sailing from the ports of Italy. But while they held possession of Phoeniee, 
they sent out large detachments from their fleet, and made depredations every 
where upon the Roman merchants: killing great numbers of them, and car- 
rying many into slavery. The Romans nad hitherto paid no great regard to 
the complaints that had been offered on this subject. But at tkis time these 
complaints were brought in such numbers to the senate, that they resolved to 
send Caius and Lucius Coruncanius ambassadors to Teuta, to demand some 
clear account of these transactions. 

The queen, w r hen she saw the beauty and immense quantity of the spoils 
which her fleet had brought back from Phoeniee, the most opulent town of 
all Epirus, had been struck with admiration; and was the more confirmed in 
her intentious, of continuing that kind of war against the states ol* Greece. 



64 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



But somq domestic commotions gave a stop to the present execution of t: at 
design; and forced her to employ her whole attention, to bring back the 
rebels to their duty. The greater part of these being soon reduced, she was 
now laying siege to Issa ; the only town of her dominions that still refused to 
submit to her authority. 

To this place came the Roman ambassadors ; -and, haying gained a time of 
audience, they recounted all the injuries which their people had received 
from the Illyrians. The queen assumed high airs of disdain and fierceness, 
during the whole time of their discourse. And when it was ended, she re- 
plied ; that she would take care that her state in general should afford no 
matter of complaint hereafter to the Romans ; but that it was not the custom 
in Illyna, for their kings to restrain their private subjects from endeavouring 
to enrich themselves upon the sea. The youngest of the ambassadors was 
unable to bear this haughtiness : and with a freedom, which could not have ' 
been condemned if it had been more in season, he answered, " but among the 
Romans, O queen, it is one of their best and noblest customs, to exact public- 
reparation for private wrongs; and at all times to redress 'the complaints of 
their subjects: and we shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to 
force you shortly to reform the kingly customs of Illyna." The queen re- 
ceived this answer like a true woman ; with much absurd passion and resent- 
ment : which carried her to such excess, that she ordered the ambassadors to 
be pursued as they were returning home, and, in defiance of the laws of na- 
tions, killed the person who had spoken those words. The Romans, being 
greatly enraged by so daring and flagitious an affront, immediately levy troops, 
get ready a fleet, and make all the necessary preparations for- war. 

In the beginning of the spring, the Illyrians, having drawn together a 
greater number of vessels ,than before, sailed away to invade the coasts of 
Greece. One part of the fleet steered their course to Corey; a ; while the rest 
cast anchor in the port of Epidamtius, on pretence to take in water and pro- 
visions. But their true intention was, to make themselves masters of the 
town. The Epidamnians received them without suspicion, and neglected all 
precaution. A party entered, dressed in an under garment only, and carry- 
ing pitchers in their hands, as if they came for water. But they had swords 
concealed within the pitchers ; with which they attacked and killed the 
guards that were posted at the gate, and took possession of it. And being at 
the same time joined, as it 'had been concerted, by a large body offerees 
from the ships, they made themselves master of a great part of the walls 
without much difficulty. But the Epidamnians, though taken by surprise, 
when they were in no apprehension of an enemy, resisted with such bravery 
and vigour, that after a long and obstinate dispute, they at last forced the Il- 
lyrians to retire from the town. Thus they recovered by their valour, what 
their negligence had almost lost : and was instructed by this accident, to use 
greater care and circumspection in all future times. 

The Illyrians, being thus repulsed, made haste to get out to sea : and 
having overtaken the rest of the fleet, they sail together to "Corcyra, disem- 
bark their troops, and lay siege to the city. The - C-oreyreans were under no. 
small consternation : and finding themselves too weak to encounter with so 
great a force, they sent to the JEtolians and Achaeans. imploring their "assist- 
ance. The inhabitants of Apollonia and Epidamnus likewise deputed mes- 
sengers to the same states : conjuring them to interpose with some speedy andt 
effectual succours, ond not permit the Illyrians to dispossess them of tbtir 
towns and natural country. The Achaeans and Jitolians consented readily 
to this request. And having in a few days equipped, at their joint charge, 
ten ships of war that belonged to the Achaeans, they steered their course to- 
wards Corcyra, hoping to raiee the siege. But the Illyrians, having received 
seven ships of war from the Acarnanians, in consequence of their ailiai.ee with 
them, sailed out and engaged the enemy near the island Paxus. The fight 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 65 



was equal between the Acarnaiiians, and that part of the Achaean fleet that 
was engaged against them ; nor was there any harm sustained, except that, 
some were wounded on their side. But the Illyrians, having tied their vessels 
four and four together, came on to the engagement with much seeming ne- 
gligence, and even presented their flank to the enemy, as if to aid them in 
their attack, and render it more effectual. . But no sooner were they grappled 
close, and the beaks of the Achaean ships had rixed them fast to the sides of 
the vessels that were thus bound together, than the Illyrians entered along the 
decks of the enemy, overpowered them by the number of their soldiers, took 
four of their quadriremes, and sunk one quinquereme to the bottom. In this 
latter perished Marcus the Carynian, whose whole life had been distinguished 
by a zealous and close attachment to all the interests of the Achaean com- 
monwealth. When those that were engaged against the Acarnanians saw 
what happened to the rest, they immediately prepared to fly, trusting to the . 
celerity of their ships : and having the advantage of a fresh and favourable 
wind, they sailed back again to their own country, and escaped without any 
loss. The Illyrians were much elated by this victory, and received no farther 
interruption in the sie^e. But the Corcyreans, being quite disheartened by 
the ill state of their affairs, and despairing of all means of safety, sustained 
the siege but a short time afterwards, and then, submitting to the enemy, re- 
ceived a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The Illyrians 
then steered away to sea, and returning again to Epidainnus, prepared to lay 
siege to that city. 

About this time, one of the Roman consuls, Caius Fulvius, set out to pro- 
secute the war, with a fleet of two hundred ships : while his colleague Aulus 
Postumius began to march at the head of the land forces. The former of 
these had resolved to sail in all haste to Corcyra ; flattering himself that he 
might perhaps arrive before the siege was ended. And though he was dis- 
appointed in that hope, yet he chose still to hold on his course : not only for 
the sake of getting more perfect information concerning all that had hap- 
pened there, but also that he might make trial of the reality and importance 
of some advices, which had been sent to Rome by Demetrius : who, finding 
that Teuta had conceived some jealously at his conduct, and dreading the 
effects of her resentment, had privately oifered to the Romans, to deliver 
Corcyra into their hands, with every thing besides that was within the reach 
of his authority. The Corcyreans saw with pleasure the arrival of the fleet, 
and with the consent of Demetrius delivered up the garrison to the Romans, 
and put themselves under their protection : as judging this to be the only 
measure, by which they could hereafter be secure against the lawless attacks 
and insults of the Illyrians. The Romans then sailed away to Apollonia, 
taking Demetrius with them, by whose advice they were chiefly guided during 
the rest of the war. The other consul, having embarked the troops at Brun- 
.disium, arrived also about the same time at Apollonia. His army consisted of 
twenty thousand foot, and two thousand horse. The inhabitants received 
them without any difficulty, and submitted themselves entirely to their discre- 
tion. But the consuls, on the news that Epidamnus was invested, immediately 
hastened their inarch that way. The Illyrians, being informed of their ap- 
proach, raised the siege in disorder, and fled. The Romans, having thus received 
the Epidamnians also into their protection, advanced farther into Illyria, and 
reduced the Ardyaeans. They now were met by deputations from many dif- 
ferent towns and districts. Among these were the Atintauians and Parthi- 
nians, who offered to receive their laws. The Romans admitted them all to 
terms of friendship and alliance; and continued their march to Issa, which 
was besieged by the Illyrians. And having raised the siege, and taken the 
inhabitants under their protection, they then sailed along the coast, and took 
many towns by storm. But in the attack of one of these, called Nutria, they 
lost not only a great number of their soldiers, but some tribunes also, and a 
vol. l. mo. h. i 



66 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



quaestor-. They took likewise twenty boats, that were returning with plunder 
collected in the country. Apart of the army that was employed in the siege 
of Issa, having declared for the interests of Demetrius, retired to Pharos, and 
were permitted to be safe. The rest fled in disorder, and escaped to Arbon. 
The queen herself, with very few attendants, got safe to RizOn : a little 
town of considerable strength, which stood at a distance from the sea, upon a 
river of the same name. 

The Romans, after this success, by which they had greatly enlarged the 
dominions of Demetrius, having prevailed on many cities of Illyria to receive 
him as their master, took their route back again to Epidamnus, with the fleet 
' and armv. Fulvius then returned to Rome, and carried with him the greater 
part of all the forces. But Posthumius, having drawn together forty vessels, 
and raised some troops among the neighbouring towns, resolved to pass the 
winter there ; that he might be ready, in case of danger, to repress all com- 
motions that might arise among the Ardyaeans, and the rest of the people 
who had submitted, and put themselves under the protection of the Romans. 

But in the beginning of the spring, ambassadors arrived at Rome from 
Teuta, and agreed to a peac£ upon these conditions : " that the queen should 
pay a certain tribute, and abandon all Illyria, a few places only excepted: 
and, which was of the greatest importance to all the states of Greece, that she 
should never after that time sail beyond Lissus with more than two frigates, 
and those unarmed." / 

The treaty being thus concluded, Postumius sent ambassadors to the 
Aehaeans and JEtolians-; to acquaint them with the causes of the war, the 
progress and circumstances of it, and the terms of the 'peace which they had 
made. The ambassadors were received with great respect and favour by the 
two republics : and from thence they sailed away to Corey ra. The Greeks 
were delivered by this treaty out of no small terror ; for the Illyrians were the 
common enemies of all. 

Such was the first expedition of the Romans into Illyria, an/l the neigh- 
bouring part, of Europe ; which gave birth also to the first correspondence, in 
the way of embassy, between that republic and the states of Greece. From 
this beginning, they took occasion to depute, within a short time afterwards, 
another embassy to Corinth, and to Athens. And it was on that occasion, 
that the Corinthians first admitted the Rosians to be present at the 
Isthmian games. 

CHAP. II. 

During this time Asdrubal, for it "was here -that we left the affairs of Spain* 
conducted all things in his government with great dexterity and wisdom ; en- 
larging the power, and advancing the interests of his republic in that country, 
both by the whole course of his administration in it, and more particularly by 
building that city, which by some is called Carthage, and by others the New 
City ; whose situation with respect both to Spain and Afric rendered it a place 
of the greatest moment and importance. We shall take a proper occasion to 
describe more fully the advantages of this situation, and the use that may be 
made of it, in governing the affairs of those two countries. The Romans 
could not behold so sudden an increase of power without the greatest appre- 
hensions. They saw the necessity of turning their thoughts to Spain: and 
resolved to raise themselves' from that state of indolence and inactivity, which 
had as it were shut their eyes, and prevented them from paying a due atten- 
tion to the progress of their enemies. At this time, however, being themselves 
in almost daily expectation of an invasion from the Gauls, they neither dared 
to declare war against the Carthaginians, nor demand any hard conditions 
from them: but chose rather to have recourse to' mild and gentle measures; 
till their arms had freed them from the apprehension of an enemy, whose 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. #7 

situation in their very neighbourhood not only rendered their sovereignty in 
Italy precarious, but even threatened to deprive them of their natural and 
proper country. They sent, therefore, to Asdrubai, and concluded a treaty 
with him, by which no mention being made of the rest of Spain, it only was 
agreed, that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army. This 
being settled, the Romans immediately turned their arms against the Gauls. 

It will by no means be, an useless task, nor foreign to the design of this in- 
troduction, to give here a short account of this people, from the time of their 
first settlement in Italy. For besides that the subject itself is curious, and 
such as well deserves the pains of being particularly considered, it is also a 
point of the last importance, that we should in this place previously be ac- 
quainted with it : in order to gain a right conception, what the country was, 
into which Annibal afterwards led his army, and what the forces, by whose 
assistance lie attempted to subvert the Roman empire. We shall first describe 
the nature of the country, and its situation with respect to the other parts of 
Italy : that when we have thus acquired a knowledge of the places, we maybe 
able more easily to comprehend, whatever was great and worthy of our notice, 
in the transactions that happened in them. 

The whole of Italy resembles a triangle in its figure. The eastern side is 
bounded by the Ionian sea and Adriatic gulph : the south and west, by the 
Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas. The third side, towards the north, is terminated * 
by the chain of mountains called the Alps ; which, beginning near JVIassilia, 
and the places above the Sardinian sea, extend without any interruption to a 
very little distance of the inmost extremity of the Adriatic, and are considered 
as the base of the triangle. At the foot of those mountains, on the southern 
side, lie those plains, of which we are now to speak : which, both in their fer- 
tility and wide extent, are far superior to any other parts of Europe, that have 
yet been discovered. These plains form also the figure of a triangle ; the top of 
which is made by the junction of the Alps and Apennines, a little above Mas- 
silia. The northern side is bounded by the Alps, to the length of two 
thousand and two hundred stadia: the southern, by the Apennines, to the 
extent of three thousand and six hundred. The coast of the Adriatic forms 
the base of this figure : and contains in length, from Sena to the inmost part 
of the gulph, almost two thousand and five hundred stadia. So that the 
whole plains together include a space oT near ten thousand stadia in cir- 
cumference. 

The fertility of this country is greater than can be well expressed. They 
have grain of all kinds in such abundance, that even in our times a Sicilian 
bushel of wheat is sold there for four oboli ; and of barley, for two. For a 
firkin of wine, they exchange an equal measure of barley. Panic also, and 
millet, are found among them in so great plenty, that nothing can exceed it. 
Their' forests, which at certain distances are spread over all the country, afford 
so large a quantity of acorns, that though great numbers of swine are con- 
stantly consumed by the inhabitants of Italy, as well in the uses of private 
families, as for the supply of their armies, yet are they chiefly furnished with 
them from these plains. Such, in a word, is the cheapness and the plenty of 
all common necessaries, that when travellers stop to take refreshment in their 
inns, instead of settling by agreement the price of any particular provisions, 
they only fix a certain rate for every person. This rarely exceeds the fourth 
part of an obolus ; and for this small expense, they are supplied in full abun- 
dance with all things that are requisite. The numbers of the people, by 
whom these plains are filled, the size and comeliness of their bodies, and their 
prowess in war, may be fully understood from those great actions, for which 
they are justly celebrated. Both sides of the Alps, as far as the ascent is easy, 
are inhabited by different nations. On that side, which looks towards the 
north and the river Rhone, dwell those that are called the Transalpine Gauls. 
Ou the other side, the Taurisci, and Agones^ and other various tribes. The 



6S GENERAL HISTORY" OF POLYBIITS. 

Transalpine Gauls derived their origin from the same common stock with the 
rest: and obtained that appellation from their situation only; because they 
fixed thems^h'es beyond the Alps. The tops of these mountains, on account 
of the steernes.-* of the ascent, and the perpetual snows with which they are 
covered, have hitherto remained without inhabitants. From the place where 
the Apennine mountains first begin, a little above Massilia, and from their 
i unction with the Alps, the country on the side of the Tyrrhenian sea quite 
down to Pisae, the first town of Tyrrhenia to the west, and that also on the 
side towards the plains, as far as to the confines of the Arretinians, was all in- 
habited by the Ligurians. Adjoining to these were the Tyrrhenians ; and 
nest to them the Umbrians, situated on both sides of the mountains. In 
this place, the Appennine, at the distance of about five hundred stadia from 
the Adriatic, leaves these plains ; and turning suddenly to the right, direct* 
its course towards the Sicilian sea, dividing the rest of Italy in the middle : so 
that what remains to complete the southern side of this triangle is formed by 
the plains themselves ; which are continued, from the point where the Ap- 
pennine turns away, quite down to Sena, a town upon the Adriatic coast. 

The river Po, celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus, takes 
its source among the Alpine mountains, near the Tipper point of the triangle 
which we have now described, and first bends its stream towards the south, 
till it has gained the plains. Afterwards flowing eastward, it runs to empty 
itself by two mouths into the Adriatic gulph. It divides these plains into two 
unequal parts ; the largest of which is that which lies extended between the 
Adriatic and Alps. In the quantity of its waters, it far exceeds the rest of the 
rivers of Italy. For all the streams, that descend from the Alps and Appen- 
nines, are discharged into the channel of the Po. About the time especially 
when the dog star first appears, and the melted snows flow down in great 
abundance from these mountains, the fullness of its stream is remarkably 
great and beautiful. This river is navigable from the mouth which is called 
Olane to the distance of two thousand stadia within the land. From its 
first sources, it flows in one single channel as far as to the country of the Tri- 
gobala : and there, breaking into a double stream, runs> as we have said, to 
discharge itself by two mouths into the sea. The first of these is called 
Parloa, the other Olane : the last of which affords a safe and commodious 
port for ships, not inferior to any upon the Adriatic coast. This river is called 
Bodencus by the natives of the county. 

There is no need to add to our description of this river the many sad and 
tragical fables with which the Greeks have filled their histories ; of the fall 
of Phaeton; the tears of the Poplars; and that race of black men, who live 
upon the river, and are said till to wear the habit of mourning, in memory of 
Phaeton's death. A close discussion of such stories would very ill suit with 
the design of this introduction. But perhaps we shall take some fairer occa- 
sion in another place, to consider them in as full a manner as the subject may 
require : if it be only for the sake of the shewing some proofs of" the inaccuracy 
of Timaeus, with regard to the places which we have been describing. 

These plains were formerly inhabited by the Tyrrhenians ; who gained great 
fame by their exploits, in the country round Capua and Nola, which at that 
was tailed the Phlegraean "Fields. Whatever, therefore, we read in history, 
concerning the antient dynasties and fortunes of this people, must be all re- 
fer ed, not to the country which they possess at present, but to the plains just 
mentioned ; whose fertility and wide extent afforded them the means of be- 
coming great and powerful. But the Gauls, who often visited this country 
for the sake of commerce, and had seen its beauty with a jealous eye, found 
occasion, from some slight pretence, to fall suddenly upon the Tyrrhenians 
with a powerful army, wheu they were in no expectation of an enemy; and 
having driven them from their native seats, they took possession of all 
the country that was round the Po. The first part of it, which lay 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 6q 



nearest to the sources of the river, was seized on by the Laians and Le- 
beeians. Next to these were the Tnsubrians, a great and powerful nation : 
and alter them, the Cenomans. Below ail these, and nearest to the Adriatic, 
were the Venetians; a very antient people, whose dress and manners greatly 
resembled those of the Gaols, though they used a different language. This 
is that nation of whom the tragic poets have recorded so many monstrous 
fables. On the other side of the Po, the first in order, and the nearest to the 
Apennines, were the Ahanes ; and nest to these, the Boii. Between the Boii 
and the Adriatic were the Lingonian Gauls; and lower down upon the coast, 
the Senoues. 

These were the principal nations that were seated in that tract of country 
which we have now described. Their manner of lfe Was extremely plain and 
simple. They had no walied towns; nor any kind of furniture in their ham- 
lets. The ground was their constant bed: and flesh their chief food. Their 
soie employment was agriculture and war. All other sciences and arts were 
utterly unknown among them. Their wealth consisted in gold and cattle : 
because these aione were at all times most easily removed from place to place, 
as occasion might require. But that which engaged their greatest care was 
to procure a numerous train of followers, all ready to support their interests, and 
execut their commands. For every one among them was strong and formi- 
dable, in proportion only to the number of these dependents. 

From the time of their first settlement in these plains, the Gauls not only 
maintained themselves in safe possession of the country, from whence they had 
driven the Tyrrhenians, but by the terror of their arms forced many of the 
neighbouring nations also to receive their yoke. Some time afterwards, 
having defeated the Romans and their allies in a set engagement, and pursued 
them, during a flight of three-days' continuance, to the very gates of Rome, 
they icide themselves masters of all the city, the capital alone excepted. But 
when they heard that the Venetians, taking occasion from their absence, 
had entered their territories with an army, they consented to a treaty with 
them, am! return j d back again to their own country. They were after- 
wards for some time engaged in domestic wars. Some of the people also that 
lived among the Alps, envying them the possession of a country that was so 
much better than their own, turned their arms against them, and made fre- 
quent incursions upon their territory. During this time the Romans had full 
leisure to recover, by degrees, their wasted strength ; and to reduce the Latins, 
who had a second time revolted. 

Thirty years after the time when Rome was taken, the Gauls advanced with 
a powerful army as far as Alba. The Romans, being thus attacked when they 
had no apprehension of war, and not having time to draw together the troops 
of their allies, were afraid to take the field. But twelve years afterwards, 
when they were again invaded by as great a force, having received timely 
'notice of the design, and being joined by their' confederates, they marched out 
against the enemy with great alacrity and confidence, designing to engage in 
a decisive battle. But the Gauls were struck with terror at their approach : 
and as their army was distracted also by dissensions, they retreated, or rather 
fled, with great precipitation, back again to their country ; and remained quiet 
during the course of thirteen years. And having then remarked the great 
increase and progress of the Roman power, they consented to a league 
of peace. 

During thirty 5'ears, they firmly adhered to the Conditions of this treaty ; 
but, being then threatened with a war from the Transalpine Gauls, and ap- 
prehending that theconsequeuces of it might prove fatal to them, they pre- 
vailed upon those nations, partly by large presents, and partly also by pleading 
their descent from one common stock, to desist from their designs, and to join 
their forces with them against the Romans. They march together through 
Tyrrhenia, and, being assisted also by the people of that country, ravage the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF FOLYBIUS. 



Roman borders, and return safely back again with the spoil. But no sooner 
were they arrived in their own country, than some disputes arose among them 
concerning the division of the plunder, which were carried to so great excess, 
that they lost the most considerable part, not only of the booty, but of their 
army likewise. Such disorders are upon these occasions very frequent among 
the Gauls, especially" when they are filled with feasting, and their senses lost 
in wine. 

Four years afterwards, the Gauls, in conjunction with the Samnites, engaged 
the Romans in battle, in the country of the Camertines, and killed great num- 
ber^ of them. The Romans, incensed by this defeat, drew together all their 
forces ; and, having met the enemy, within a few days after the former action, 
in the district of Senti hates, they destroyed the greatest part of their army, 
and forced the rest to fly homewards in disorder. About ten years after- 
wards, they returned again with a very great force, and laid siege to Arretiiim. 
The Romans attempted to raise the siege, but were defeated in an engage- 
ment before the city, and the consul Lucius killed. M. Curius, who suc- 
ceeded him in office, sent to treat with the enemy concerning the redemption 
of the prisoners ; but the Gauls, in defiance of the laws of nations, killed the. 
messengers. The Romans, being greatly enraged by an action so perfidious, 
raise a numerous army, and march immediately into Gaul. The Senonjss 
advanced aga'mst them, but are defeated in a set engagement. The greater 
part of them were destroyed in the action ; and the Romans, having forced the 
rest to leave their habitations, seized the country into their hands. This was 
the part of Gaul to winch they, for the first tune, sent a colony, and built a 
city, which was called Sena, from the name of the former inhabitants. We 
have already spoken of the situation of this piace, which stands upon the 
Adriatic coast, in the extremity of those plaaius that are watered by the Po. 

The extirpation of the Senones alarmed the Boian Gauls with apprehensions 
of being next involved in tbe same destruction. r I hey therefore drew together 
■all their forces; and, having prevailed on the Tyrrhenians also to assist them, 
they marched out and engaged the Romans, near the lake called Vadimon : 
but the greater part of the Tyrrhenians were killed in the action ; and a 
small number only of the Boiaus saved themselves by flight. Notwithstand- 
ing this ill success, they joined their forces again together in the following 
year, armed all the youth that were of sufficient age, and ventured on a second 
battle. But '.heir defeat was so entire, that, in spite of all their obstinacy and 
reluctance, they were forced to sue for peace, and accept conditions from the 
Romans. These transactions happened three years before Pyrrhus invaded 
Italy, and five years before the memorable overthrow of the Gauls at Delphi: 
for fortune,- about this time, seemed to have infected all the Gallic nations 
with a spirit of war, which. proved every where fatal to them. 

The Romans derived two advantages, of very great importance, from these 
wars : for, first, as they had so' often been defeated by the Gauls, they had 
nothing left, either to apprehend or suffer, more dreadful than that which they 
had before experienced : so that, in all their contests against Pyrrhus, they 
performed the part of skilful and well practised combatants. The other ad- 
vantage was, that, having given a timely check to the ambition and the rest- 
less spirit of the Gauls, they had afterwards full leisure to join all their forces, 
and employ the whole strength of the republic, first against Pyrrhus, when he 
invaded their dominions, and afterwards against the Carthaginians, in the war 
of Sicily. 

During forty-five years after their last defeat, the Gauls punctually observed 
the conditions of tiie peace, and gave no disturbance to the Romans: but 
when those who had beheld the past calamities had, in the course of time, 
left the world, the race of young men that succeeded in their place, being hot 
and violent in their disposition, unused to hardships, and unpractised in misfor- 
tunes, began, as it naturally happens in such circumstances, to sow the seeds 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 71 



of fresh commotions. They took up matter of offence against the Romans 
upon the slightest pretexts, and engaged the Gauls that lived beyond the 
Alps to assist them with their forces. But as this design had been concerted 
privately by the chiefs alone, without the approbation or the knowledge of the 
multitude, the Transalpine Gauls no sooner were advanced as far as Arimi- 
num with their army, than the people amongst the Boian's, having conceived a 
jealousy of their intentions, rose tumuhtuously against their chiefs, killed their 
two kings, Galatus and Ates, and opposed the march of the strangers, engag- 
ing them in a set battle, in which great slaughter ensued on both sides. The 
Romans, alarmed by the first account of this invasion, had ordered the legions 
to take the held : but when they heard that the Gauls had thus defeated and 
destroyed each other, they returned back again with their forces. « 

Five years after this event, in the consulship of M. Lepidus, the lands of 
Piceuum, from whence the Seuories had been before driven out, were divided 
among the Romans by lot, in consequence of a law proposed by Flaminius, m 
favour of the people. But this measure, as it proved afterwards one of the 
■ chief causes of the corruption of the Roman manners, was also the occasion of 
the wars that now followed with the Gauls : for all that people in general, and 
especially the Boians, who lay nearest to the Roman borders, conceived great' 
jealousy from this proceeding ; which seemed plainly to declare, that the 
design of the Romans was not so much to extend their conquests, and reduce 
them to pay obedience to their laws, as utterly to exterminate and destroy 
them. The Boians, therefore, and the Iusubriaiis, the most numerous and 
powerful ^of all these nations, agreed to unite their forces, and sent ambassadors^ 
also to the Gauls who lived upon the Alps, and along the Rhone. These 
were called Gaesatae ; because their custom was, to serve in armies for a certain, 
hire: for this is what the name imports. The ambassadors gave large sums 
of gold to the two kings, Concolitanus and Aneroestus, in order to gain them 
to their party, and excite them to a war against the Romans. Tney set before 
their eyes the wealth and flourishing condition of that empire, and the immense 
treasures which must accrue from the conquest of so great and powerful a 
people. They promised; that themselves would bear an equal part in all the 
dangers of the war. They reminded them of those great exploits, which their 
ancestors had performed against the same people ; that they not only had 
defeated them in battle, but had taken Rome itself upon the first assault, and 
obtained all the riches of the place ; and thai, when they had kept possession 
of the city during seven whole months, in mere grace and favour they restored 
it to the Romans, and returned back again to their country safe and unhurt, 
and loaded with spoil of every kind. This' discourse excited in the minds of 
all the chiefs so great an eagerness and impatience for the war, that they soon 
drew together an army, which, in the number of the troops, as well as from the 
bravery and distinguished characters of the men who served among them, far 
exceeded any that ever had been known in former times to march from this 
part of Gaul. 

The Romans, having been informed in part of these preparations, and partly 
conjecturing what would happen, were seized with no small consternation. 
They used all diligence in raising troops, rilled their magazines with provi- 
' sions, and other necessary stores ; and often led their forces to the frontiers of 
their country, as if the Gauls already were arrived, when they had not even-yet 
begun their march. 

In the mean while, these commotions afforded full time and leisure to the 
Carthaginians to extend their conquests, and secure the acquisitions which 
they had gained in Spain : for the Romans were forced, as we have said, to 
neglect that country, till they had reduced an enemy who alarmed them 
with the apprehensions of a nearer danger, and hung close upon their very bor- 
ders. They, therefore, were content with having set bounds to the progress 
of the Carthaginians, by the treaty that was made with Asdrubal ; and, as the. 



?2 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU& 

circumstances of the times -required, turned their whole thought and care upon 
the present war. 

It was now eight years after the division of the Picenian lands, when the 
Gaesatae passed the Alps, with a numerous army, completely furnished and 
equipped, and advanced along the Po. They were joined by the Boians and 
Insubrians, who persisted firmly iu their first design. But the Venetians and 
Cenomans, having been gained by some ambassadors that were deputed to 
them, had made an alliance with the Romans. The Gauls, k therefore, were 
obliged to leave a part of their forces behind them in the country, to keep 
those nations under due restraint, while the rest contiuued their rout towards 
Tyrrhenia. Their numbers were, fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand 
horse and chariots. 

As soon as the Romans were informed that the Gauls were passed the Alps, 
they sent away the consul L. iEmilius, with an army, to Ariminuui, to oppose 
the entrance of the enemy on that side. One of the praetors was sent to com- 
mand in Tyrrhenia : for C. Attilius, the other consul, had sailed with some 
forees to Sardinia, some time before. The people were all under the greatest 
consternation, and dreaded every thing that was terrible and fatal. ]Sor were 
these fears unreasonable. What they had formerly suffered from the Gauls 
was always present to their minds. In apprehension of the same misfortune, 
they make haste to draw together their troops, and raise new levies, send no- 
tice to their allies to be in readiness to join them, and other public enrolments, 
to be made of all the men in their dominions that were of age to bear arms. 
They resolved that the armies of the consuls should be composed of the. 
choicest and most, considerable part of all their forces. Their magazines were 
filled with corn, and furnished with all kinds of military stores, in much 
greater abundance than had been ever known before. All manner of supplies, 
were readily sent in from every quarter : for the alarm had spread through all 
the states of Italy, and filled all the inhabitants with terror. They no longer 
considered themselves as allies that were invited to sustain the Roman cause, 
or thought that this invasion wasdesigned against the power of that republic 
only; but rather regarded the Gauls as their common enemies, whose ap- 
proach portended the last destruction to themselves, their towns, and all their 
territories. They complied, therefore, with the greatest chearfulness, with 
every thing that was desired or exae'ed from them. 

But we shall here pause a-while, to give a more minute detail of the strength 
and preparations of the Romans, and of the number of their troops : for from 
hence we shall be able to discern with truth, what was the condition of this 
republic when Aunibal had the boldness to invade it ; and what the forces 
which that general not only dared to encounter in the field, but also gained 
such eminent advantages against them, as threw the Romans into very des-. 
perate circumstances. 

The armies that were under the command of the consuls consisted of four 
Roman legions, each of which contained five thousand and two hundred foot, 
and two thousand horse. The Sabines and Tyrrhenians had raised, for the 
present exigency, above fifty thousaud foot, and four thousand horse, which 
were stationed upon the frontiers of Tyrrhenia, under the conduct of a praetor. 
Twenty thousand Umbrians and Sarsinates came also from the Appenines ; 
together with an equal number of Cenomans and Venetians. These were 
posted upon the Gallic borders, with desigu to make incursions into the terri- 
tory of the Boians, and constrain that people to return again, and defend their 
own country. Such were the forces that were disposed upon the frontiers. 
They had also drawn together an army in the neighbourhood of Rome, to 
cover the city from surprise, and to be held in readiness against all accidents. 
It consisted of twenty thousand Roman foot, and fifteen hundred horse, be- 
sides thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse, from the allies. The num- 
ber* that were severally enrolled in the public registers were as follows* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 73' 

Among the Latins, eighty thousand foot, and seven thousand horse. Among 
the Samnites, seventy thousand foot, and seven thousand horse. The Iapy- 
ginians and Mesapyginians sent the names of fifty thousand foot, and sixteen 
thousand horse ; the Lucanians, thirty thousand foot, and three thousand 
horse. The Marsians, Maruci mans, Ferentinians, brought twenty thousand 
foot, and four thousand horse. In Sicily, and at Tarentum, there were also 
two legions, each of which contained four thousand and two hundred horse. 
The numbers of the Romans and Campanians, enrolled together, were two 
hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty-three thousand horse. Thus the. 
armies that were disposed abroad, upon the several frontiers, consisted of near 
a hundred and fifty thousand foot, with about seven thousand horse ; and the 
entire numbers of those that were capable of bearing arms, both among the 
Romans and their allies, were seven hundred thousand foot, and seventy thou- 
sand horse. Such were the forces of the republic, when Annibal had the 
boldness to penetrate into the very heart of Italy, with an army which scarcely 
equalled twenty thousand men. But this is a point, which we shall be able to 
shew in a clearer light in the subsequent parts of this history. 

The Gauls having entered Tyrrhenta, wasted all the country without resist- 
ance ; and at last directed their march towards Rome : but when they had 
advanced as far as Clusium, which is about three days' journey from the city, 
they were informed that the army, which had at first been posted upon the 
frontiers of Tyrrhenia, was following close behind, and ready to overtake 
them. They therefore directed their route back again in haste, with a design 
to meet and engage them. The two armies arrived in sight about the time of 
sunset, and encamped at a moderate distance from each other. But when 
night tame on, the Gauls, having lighted all their fires, and left the cavalry 
behind them in the camp, with orders, that when they had just shewn themselves 
to the enemy in the morning, they should immediately pursue the route which 
they were going to take, retreated unperceived to Faesula, and there en- 
camped, designing to receive their horse as they came up, and to fall sud- 
denly from thence upon the Romans. As soon as it was day, the Romans, per- 
ceiving that the cavalry alone was left in sight, persuaded themselves that the 
Gauls had already fled ; and began to follow in all haste along the road by 
which the horse now retreated. But as soon as they approached the main 
body of the enemy, the Gauls suddenly appeared and fell upon them. The 
action was, for some time, warm and obstinate ; but the Gauls, superior both 
in bravery and numbers, at last obtained the victory. Six thousand Romans 
were destroyed in the place, the rest escaped by flight. The greater part of 
these, having gained a neighbouring eminence, seated themselves upon it. 
The Gauls at first designed to attack them immediately in this post ; but 
as they had been much exhausted and fatigued by the march which they had 
made the night before, and were impatient to take some refreshment and re- 
pose, they placed a part of their cavalry only round the hill, and resolved to 
force it in the morning, in case that the Romans should then refuse to surrender 
»t discretion. 

It happened that Lucius iEmilius, who was at first encamped on the side of 
the Adriatic sea, but had hastened his march from thence, upon the news that 
the Gauls had taken their route through Tyrrhenia, and were advanced almost 
to Rome, arrived now most fortunately in the very moment when his assistance 
was chiefly wanted, and fixed his camp at a small distance only from the 
enemy. The Romans that had saved themselves upon the hill, having per- 
ceived his fires, and guessing the occasion of them, resumed their courage, 
and sent some men, unarmed, in the night, through a forest, to acquaint the 
consul with what had happened to them. iEmilius, finding that there was no 
time left to deliberate, immediately began his inarch towards the hill, at the 
head of all the cavalry, having commanded all the tribunes to follow with the 

VOX*. 1. NO. 2. K. 



74 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



infantry at the break of day. The Gauls, on their part, also perceived the 
fires, and, conjecturing that the enemy was near, called together a council of 
their chiefs. In this assembly Aneroestus, one of the kings, observed to them, 
" that as they had gained so immense a booty, both in slaves and cattle, and 
spoil of every kind, it seemed to be by no means prudent to venture on a 
battle, which must expose them to the danger of being stripped of all ; that 
they rather should resolve to return again directly to their country, while there 
was yet time to retreat with safety ; and that, when they had lightened the 
army of its treasure', they might again take to the field, if it should then be 
thought expedient, and renew the war, against the. Romans." These senti- 
ments were readily embraced by all. They decamped, therefore, before break 
of day, and took their route back again through Tyrrhenia, marching along 
the coast. The consul Lucius, though he had increased his army with 1 the 
troops that were saved upon the hill, was unwilling to venture on a set en- 
gagement, and rather chose to follow close upon the enemy, with design to 
seize such opportunities as chance should offer for attacking them with some 
advantage, and recovering part of the booty. *_ \ 

At this very time, Atilius, the other consul, returning from Sardinia, had 
disembarked his troops at Pisae, and was marching towards Rome, by a rout 
directly opposite to that which the Gauls had taken. The latter had now al- 
most reached the town of Telamon, upon the coast of Tyrrhenia, when some 
of their foragers were met by the foremost of the Roman troops ; and being 
carried prisoners to the consul, and examined by him, they informed him of all 
that had beeu transacted, and of the approaeh of both the armies ; that the 
Gauls were extremely near, and iEmilius following close behind them. The 
consul was surprised at an event so strange, and greatly overjoyed to find 
that he had fallen thus happily upon the enemy, and inclosed them between 
the two armies. He commanded the tribunes to draw up the troops in battle, 
to extend their front as much as the nature of the ground would suffer, with- 
out disturbing the order of their march, and to move slowly towards the enemy. 
And having observed an eminence that overlooked the road, along which the 
Gauls must necessarily pass, he made haste, at the head of all the cavalry, to 
seize that post, in the hope that by being the first to begin the action he 
should secure to himself the chief honour of the victory. The Gauls, who as 
yet were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius, and imagined only that the other 
consul had stretched his march before them in the night, in order to possess 
himself of all the advantageous posts, detached their cavalry, together with a 
part of their light-armed troops, to force the Romans from the hill. But 
being soon acquainted with the truth, by one of the prisoners that were taken, 
they immediately ranged their infantry in order of battle ; and that their dis- 
position might be suited to the present exigency, they gave to their whole 
army a double front, that thus they might be able to sustain at once the attack 
of those that were coming upon them from behind, and of those whom they 
now likewise knew to be advancing in front against them. 

Though JEmilius had been before informed that these legions had arrived 
at Pisaefhe had conceived no kind of expectation that they were yet so near ; 
but being now assured of their approach by what passed upon the hill, he 
presently sent away his cavalry to the place to assist the combatants; and 
having also ranged his infantry in order of battle, after the usual manner, he 
advanced against the enemy. , 

Amono- the Gauls the Gaesatae, and after them the Insubnans, composed 
the front behind that was turned towards iEmilius. The Taurisci and the 
Boians formed the opposite front, and stood ready to receive the attack of 
Atilius and his legions. The chariots were placed in the extremity of either 
win°-. The plunder had been all removed to a neighbouring hill, and a de* 
tachment was left to guard it. The army, being thus formed in double front, 
was not only terrible to behold, but very proper also for action. The Boians 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



and Insubrians wore the breeches of their country, and were covered with light 
military vests. But the Gaesatae, who were both vain and fearless, being ap- 
prehensive that the bushes which grew upon the place might be entangled in 
their habits and obstruct their motion, threw away all covering, and, keepino* 
their arms only, presented themselves naked to the enemy. The fight was 
begun by the horse upon the hill, in the clear view of all the armies. For the 
numbers that were engaged were very great, the whole cavalry having run to- 
gether in promiscuous crowds from all sides to the combat. In this action, 
the consul Caius, while he advanced without sufficient caution too far among 
the enemy, lost his life, and his head was carried to the Gallic kings. The 
Romans, however, maintained the fight with so much firmness, that they 
gained at last a perfect victory, and kept entire possession of their post. 

The infantry now approached each other, offering to view a spectacle which 
must needs appear most strange and singular ; I do not say to those alone that 
were present at it, but to all who can at this time form in their minds a dis- 
tinct conception of the scene. For, certainly, an engagement between three 
different armies at once must strike with many circumstances which are wholly 
different from those of other combats, both in the appearance and in the course 
of action. Nor is it easy even now to determine, whether the advantages 
which the Gauls derived from this disposition of their forces were not greater 
than the danger to which they were exposed. For though they were attacked 
on both sides, yet, as their army was formed with a double front, they were 
not only able to oppose both enemies at once, but also mutually to protect 
and cover each other from anjr attack behind. But the chief advantage was, 
and which is, indeed peculiar to this kind of disposition, that there was no 
place or room for flight, nor any hopes of safety but in victory, 

The Romans were elated with no small joy when they saw that they had 
thus inclosed the enemy as in a snare. But, on the other hand, the appear- 
ance of the Gallic forces, and the unusual noise with which they advanced to 
action, struck them with great amazement. For besides their horns and 
trumpets, the number of which was almost infinite, the whole army broke 
together into such loud and continued cries, that the neighbouring places 
every where resounded, and seemed to join their voices with the shouts and 
clamour of the instruments and soldiers. The very looks and motions also of 
the Gauls who stood naked in the front, and were distinguished by their 
comeliness and strength, greatly increased their terror. In the foremost ranks 
the combatants were all adorned with chains of gold about their necks and 
hands. The Romans fixed their eyes with eagerness upon these ; and, if the 
appearance of the enemy disheartened them with fear, the prospect of so rich 
a spoil served only to inflame their courage. 

The light-armed force of the Romans advancing first, as their custom is, to 
the front of all the army, began the fight by discharging a close and formi- 
dable shower of darts and javelins. The Gauls that were in the ranks behind 
were in part secured against these weapons', by their breeches and their mili- 
tary vests ; but those who stood naked in the front were thrown into great 
disorder and confusion, by an attack which they had not at all expected, and 
which they knew not how to obviate or resist. For the Gallic buckler was too 
small to cover them ; and as their bodies were also naked, and of the largest 
size, the javelins that were thrown made their entrance more effectually and in 
great numbers. To turn the attack against these men was a thing impossible; 
by reason of the distance from whence they fought. Nor was it easy to force 
their way through so thick a storm of darts. In this perplexed and wretched 
situation, some of them, being reduced at last to a state of senseless rage and 
madness, threw themselves among the enemy, and rushed voluntary upon 
death,, while the rest fell back upon their friends, treading down the ranks 
feehind them, and exhibiting in their faces all the marks of consternation and 



?<5 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

extreme dismay. Thus the fierce and daring spirit of the Gaesatae was effec- 
tually checked and rendered useless, even in the first onset, by the Roman 
javelins. 

The Romans, having made the signal for their light-armed force to retire, 
moved forwards with the legions. Against these, the Insubrians, Boians, and 
Taurisci, succeeded to the fight, and sustained it with the greatest obstinacy. 
Though closely pressed, and most dreadfully wounded, yet still they main-, 
tained their ground, and resisted with amazing force. Nor were they in any 
point inferior to the Romans, except in the advantage of their weapons. For, 
■as the Gallic buckler was of a smaller size, so their swords likewise was formed 
to strike only with the edge,whereas theRoman swords were made both to push 
and strike. But when the horse came pouring down upon them from the hill, 
and attacked their flank, the victory was soon determined. The infantry were 
slaughtered in their ranks, while the cavalry precipitately fled. Forty thousand 
Gauls were slain, and ten thousand taken prisoners. Among the rest was Con- 
colitanus, oneof their kings. The other king, Aneroestus, escaped, with a 
few attendants, to a neighbouring place, and there killed himself, with his, 
companions. The consul, having collected together all the spoil, sent it away 
to Rome;, and restored the plunder to the people from whom it had been 
taken. He then led his army through Liguria into the Boian territory; and 
having satiated his soldiers with the plunder of the country, he returned to 
Rome within a few days afterwards, and hung up in the capitol the standards, 
bracelets, and golden collars. The rest of the spoil, together with the pri- 
soners, was reserved to adorn his triumph. Such was the fatal end of this in- 
vasion, which had threatened ruin and extreme destruction to all the states of 
Italy, and especially to the Romans. 

The Romans, elated by a victory so signal and complete, were persuaded 
that they should uow be able to drive the Gauls entirely out of their country 
round the Po. They made great preparations, and having raised a numerous 
army, sent it away under the command of the consuls, Quintus Fulvius and 
Titus Manlius. The Boians were terrified by their approach, and surren- 
dered at discretion. But by reason of the rains that fell afterwards in great 
abundance, and because a dreadful pestilence raged also in the Roman camp y 
the rest of the season passed over without any action. 

The consuls of the following year, P. Furius and C.Flaminius, led the army 
a second time into Gaul, through the country of the Anamares, who were 
situated at no great distance from Massilia; and having first gained that people 
to their alliance, they advanced into the territory of the Insubrians, near the 
place where the Addua falls into the Po. But because they had suffered 
■greatly from the enemy, both as they passed the river and while they were 
employed in their encampment, they were forced to remain for some time 
quiet without attempting any thing; and afterwards made a treaty with the 
Insubrians, by which they consented to leave the country. But when they 
had marched for some days round the borders of the province, they passed the 
river Clusius, and came into the district of the Ananes their allies: and having 
increased their army with the forces of the country, they again invaded the 
Insubrians, on the other side towards the Alps, and spread fire and devastation 
over all their lands and villages. When the Insubrians saw that the Romans 
were thus determined in their hatred, and not likely to be removed from their 
designs against them, they resolved to try the fortune of a general. engagement*. 
Having therefore brought together all their military ensigns, and among the 
rest, the golden standards from the temple of Minerva, which were called the 
Immoveable, and having raised an army of full fifty thousand men, and fur- 
nished it with every kind of necessary stores, they marched in terrible array, as 
if assured of victory, and encamped before the enemy. 

As the Romans were much inferior in their numbers, they at first designed. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 77 



to take the assistance of the Gallic troops that were with them iu% the camp. 
But when they had considered, on the other hand, that this peo.ple all were 
noted for their fraud and perfidy, and that the present contest w:*s against an 
enemy of the same race and nation, it seemed most prudent not lo trust them 
in so critical and dangerous a conjuncture. They forced them therefore to 
pass the river, and broke all the bridges, keeping their own army still on this 
" side. By this precaution, thuy not only were secure against aU treason from 
the Gaul's, but laid their own troops also under the necessity of sustaining the 
battle bravely to the last. For as they had now a river in thenr rear that was 
not fordable,' there were no hopes of safety for them but in vict ory. When this 
was done, they made the necessary disposition for the engagei cent. 

Upon this occasion the Romans used a very wise and ser fsible expedient, 
which was rirst suggested by the tribunes, who also instructed ail the army, and 
every soldier in particular, in the manner in which it should be practised. 
They had remarked in all their former combats, that the ( ^auls were always 
fierce, impetuous, and very formidable, in the first attack ; but that their 
swords were such as could make but one single stroke, by- the fovce of which 
they were so bent and twisted, that anless the soldiers e< mid have leisure to 
rest upon the ground, and with the assistance of their feet i ecover them to their 
former shape, the second stroke was wholly without effect-;. They took there- 
fore the pikes from the triarii, that were in the last line cf the army, and dis- 
tributed them among the cohorts of the first, with oruers that they should, 
begin the attack with these, and afterwards use their swords. They then 
advanced in order of battle against the front of the en* my. The Gauls, by- 
making their first stroke upon the pikes, rendered tht ;ir swords unfit for any 
farther use. The Romans then ran forwards with th< ;ir swords, and pressing 
close upon them, deprived them even of the power o ,.' attempting any second 
stroke. For, as the Gallic s.vords were only formed to give a falling blow, a cer- 
tain distance was always necessary for that purpose. Tvut the Romans, who were 
armed with swords that were sharpened at the point, were able to direct their 
thrusts against the breasts and the faces of the enen rv, and gave wound after 
wound without remission, so that the greater part of all this numerous army 
was at last destroj'ed upon the place. 

As the success in this engagement was chiefly to . be ascribed to the prudent 
foresight of the tribunes; so, on the other hand,, the conduct of the consul 
Flaminius seems to deserve some censure : for, by having ranged his troops in 
battle upon the very banks of the river, so" that t fc ere was no space left suf- 
ficientfor the cohorts to retreat, he deprived the Romans of one advantage, 
of which they make great u&e in all their combats . If the enemy had gained 
but the least ground upon them in the action, th a. whole army must have been 
pushed into the river. But the courage and de jterity of the Romans saved 
them from this disgrace, and carried the victor} r to their side, in the manner- 
which we have now described. They then ret: trued back to Rome, loaded 
with various spoils, and with rich booty of every • kind in great abundance. 

After this defeat, the Gauls sued for peace f and offered to submit to any" 
co rrsi derations ; but the consuls of the followi; jg year, M. Claudius and Gn. 
Cornelius, prevailed to have all thoughts of pf ;ace rejected. The Gauls, being 
thus disappointed in their hopes, resolved to r nake a last and desperate effort. 
They sent a second time to the Gaesatae ; ai id, having hired a body of their 
troops, to the amount of thirty thousand mer i. they kept themselves in readi- 
ness, and waited for the arrival of the Roma as. In the beginning of the spting, 
the consuls led an army into the Insubriar i territory, and encamped before 
Acerrae, which stood between the Alps ar ,d the river Po„ As they had se- 
cured, upon their first arrival, all the advan .tageous posts, the Gauls were un- 
able to throw any relief into the place : b az, in order to force the Romans 
to raise the siege, they sent a part of their army into the country ofthe Auanes, 
beyond the Po, a»d laid siege toti town tl iat was called Clastidium. As sooa 



7* GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU5. 

faassg " " ' t < ■ ! — ^— ^— iM^— 

as the Romans heard of this attempt, the consul Claudius, taking with him the 
cavalry, together with a part also of the legions, marched in all haste to suc- 
cour the besieged. The Gauls, being informed of their approach, raise the 
siege, and advance in order of battle against the enemy* When they came 
in sight, the Roman horse flew very briskly to the charge. The Gauls, for 
some time, sustained their fury; but, being afterwards surrounded by them, 
and attacked at once both in flank and rear, they were at last completely- 
routed by the cavalry alone, and forced to fly in great disorder. Many of them 
were pushed into the river, and perished in the stream ; but the greater part 
were destroyed by the enemy in the place. 

After this action, the Romans became masters of Aeerrae, and of all the 
stores that were laid up in it in very great quantity : for the Gauls had fled in 
haste to Mediolauum, the chief city of the lnsubrians. Cornelius followed af- 
ter them without delay, and presented himself before the town. The Gauls 
lay quiet, and attempted nothing : but when the Romans had begun their 
march back again towards Aeerrae, they then sallied out, and, falling suddenly 
upon their rear, killed a great number of them, and forced some to fly. But 
the consul, having ordered the advanced bodies of the army to return, encou-^ 
raged them to stand, and repel the efforts of the enemy. The fight now grew 
warm and obstinate: for the Gauls, emboldened by their first success, for some 
time maintained their ground with firmness. At last, however, they were en- 
tirely broken and defeated, and obliged to fly towards the mountains. Corne- 
lius pursued closely after them, plundered all the country, and took Medio- 
lanum by storm. After these great losses, the chiefs of the lnsubrians, des- 
pairing of any farther means of safety, submitted their country and- themselves 
to the Romans at discretion. 

Such was the end of the Gallic wars, which, if we regard only the daring 
spirit and undaunted bravery of the combatants, the forces that were brought 
into the field, the battles that were fought, and the numbers that fell in those 
engagements, must certainly appear as great and formidable as any that are 
known in history. But, o n the other hand, if we reflect upon the rashness with 
which these expeditions were projected, or the absurd and senseless conduct 
by which they severally were carried into execution, nothing will be found 
more trifling or contemptible : for the Gauls, I do not say most frequently, 
but even in every thing that they attempt, are hurried headlong by their pas- 
sions, and never submit to the rule of reason. From hence it happened, that 
in a short time they were dispossessed of all the plains that are watered by the 
Po, some few places only, ai L . the foot of the Alps, excepted. I thought it 
necessary, therefore, to give isome account of the conduct and fortunes of this 
people, from their first settlement in the country, to the time of their final ex- 
clusion from it. Such incide fat* very properly belong to history, and well de- 
serve to be transmitted to all fioture times : for, from these, posterity may learn 
what little cause there is to dread the rash and sudden expeditions of any of 
these barbarous tribes, and in 1 low short a time their forces may be dissipated, 
by those who are determined bravely to resist, and to struggle even to the 
latest hope, rather than be dep rived of their just and natural rights. lam 
persuaded, that what historians have recorded of the expedition of the Per- 
sians into Greece, and of the defeat of the Gauls at Delphi, has served greatly 
to confirm and animate the Gree ks, in the contests which they so often have 
sustained in defence of their comimon liberty : for, whoever revolves in his mind 
the wonderful transactions of those times, and considers the vastness of the 
preparations, the bravery of the armies, and the almost infinite number of the 
forces, which were all vanquished ; md dispersed, by the superior conduct of 
those troops who were able to oppc »se sense to violence, and skill to rashness, 
will easily be assured that no provisio not" arms or stores, no forces, however nu- 
merous, can strike so great a terror i jito men that are brave and resolute, asto 
force them to abandon all thoughts of safety", or ever part with the hope of 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUfc, 79 

being able to defend their country. With regard to the Gauls especially, 
their armies, even within these later times, have often spread the alarm 
amongst the states of Greece : and this was still a farther motive, by. which 
I was inclined to give a short account of the events that happened among this 
people, even from the earliest period of their history. We now return to the 
place from whence we made this digression. 



CHAP. III. 

The Carthaginian general Asdrubal, when he had now for eight years governed 
the affairs of Spain, and, in the course of his administration, greatly enlarged 
t he sway of his republic, not so much by force of arms, as by his address, and 
dexterous management of the princes of the country, was one night murdered 
in his tent by a certain Gaul, in resentment of some private injuries. Annibal 
was at this time young; yet, because in all his actions he had shewn great 
proofs of courage and capacity, the Carthaginians bestowed upon him the 
command of the army. He was no sooner invested with this charge, than it 
was clear, to all who observed his conduct, that his intention was to make war 
upon the Romans, as indeed it happened not long afterwards. From this 
time, therefore, suspicions, mutual jealousies, and complaints, began to break 
out between the two republics. The Carthaginians, stung by the disgrace 
and losses which they had sustained in Sicily, looked earnestly for some oc- 
casion to revenge themselves upon their enemies. The Romans, on the other 
hand, watched all their motions, suspected their designs, and kept themselves 
upon their guard against them. When such were the sentiments on both 
sides, it was manifest, to all men of judgment, that a war must soon ensue. 

About this time the war commenced in Greece, in which the Achaens, in 
conjunction with king Philip, and the rest of the allies, were engaged against 
the jEtolians. This was called the Social War. 

We have hitherto been employed in giving such an abstract of the chief 
transactions, both in Sicily and Afric, and of those events that were connected 
with them, as was agreeable to the design of these preliminary books. And 
thus we are arrived at that point of time, from whence we proposed to begin 
©ur history, — the commencement of the second war between the Carthagi- 
nians and the Romans, which is usually called the War of Annibal, and the 
Social War now mentioned. But, before we engage in the description of 
these wars, we shall give also some account of the affairs of Greece, which pre- 
ceded this period, that our introduction may be complete, and the way be 
opened to every part of the history that follows : for, as my design is not to 
write the annals of any particular country, to relate the affairs of Persia only 
or of Greece, as former historians have done, but to include, in one general 
history, all the known parts of the earth, — a design, in which I was encou- 
raged to engage by many circumstances that are peculiar to the present times, 
and which will be more fully explained hereafter, — it seems necessary that 
we first should take a short review of the past fortunes and condition of those 
states and countries that are chiefly celebrated in the world. 

With regard, indeed, to the people of Asia, and to these of Egypt, there is no 
need to look back beyond the times which we have j-nst now mentioned : for 
the events that happened among them in a former age have already been re- 
corded by many writers, and are sufficiently known to all. Nor have they suf- 
fered, in these later times, any change or revolution of so great importance 
as might make it necessary to recount any of those actions that preceded. 
But we shall trace from a period mo e remote the fortunes of the royai house 
of Macedon, and those of the Achaean epublic; the first 01 which, within the 
comse even of our own times, baa fallen to ruin ; and the latter grown to an 



nrou% 



amazing height of power, tnrou^h the consent and harmony ot its several 



so "GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

parts ; i'or, though great pains were formerly employed to engage the city of 
Peloponnesus into this confederacy, yet the labour was without effect. The 
interests, or the ambition of particular states still influenced all their actions ; 
and stifled their attention to the common liberty. But in these days, their 
union is so entire and perfect, that they are not only joined together in bonds 
of perfect friendship and alliance, but even make use of the same laws, the 
same weights, coins, and measures, the same magistrates, counssllors, and 
judges : so that the inhabitants of this whole tract of Greece seem in all 
respects to form but one single city, except only that they are,.i«t inclosed 
within the circuit of the same walls. In every other point, both through the 
whole republic, and iu every separate state, we find the most exact resemblance 
and conformity. 

Let us first inquire, then, by what means the name of Achaeans came to be 
so generally received in all the parts of Peloponnesus : since those to whom 
this appellation originally belonged were far from being superior to the rest, 
either in the number of their cities, the extent or wealth of their territory, or 
the courage of their people. For both the Spartans and Arcadians are far 
more numerous, as well as in possession of a much larger tract of country ; and 
in all the acts of valour and martial prowess, they are well known to be inferior 
to none of the states of Greece. From whence then has it happened, that not 
the people of these countries only, but all the rest of the inhabitants of Pe- 
loponnesus, are so well pleased to receive, not only their laws and form of 
government, but their very name also, from the Achaeans ? To ascribe all this 
to chance, is m a high degree absurd and foolish. It would become us rather 
to search out some cause ; since nothing happens without a cause, nor 
even among those events which seem to be most fortuitous. In my 
judgment, then, this cause is nothing else, than that equality and li 
berty, in a word that democratical species of government, which is found 
more just and perfect in its kind among the Achaeans, than in any other 
state. This republic was at first composed of a small part only of the 
inhabitants of Peloponnesus ; who voluntarily associated themselves into one 
body. But a greater number soon joined themselves to these; induced to 
it by persuasion, and the manifest advantages of such an union. And some, 
as opportunities arose, were forced into the confederacy : but were soon well 
satisfied with the violence, by which they had been compelled to embrace so 
excellent a form of government. For the new citizens were suffered to enjoy 
all the rights and privileges that were permitted to the old. Every thing 
was equal among them all. Thus, by employing the mean* that were of all 
things most effectual for their purpose, equality and gentleness, they soon 
arrived at the point which they had iu view. To this we -must ascribe the 
growth and strength of the confederacy ; and the flourishing condition which 
the people of Peloponnesus have from that time enjoyed. 

This form of government was of very antient date among the Achaeans. 
Of this there are many proofs : but it will be sufficient to mention only one or 
two. After those disorders which happened in the part of Italy that was called 
Great Greece, in which the Pythagoreans were consumed in fire, together 
with the house in which they were assembled, the whole country was thrown 
at once into a state of anarchy and wild confusion. For the chief men of 
everv city* had perished in that horrible destruction. The towns all were filled 
with tumult, slaughter, and the most dreadful outrages. Upon this occasion, 
though deputies were sent from almost all the states of Greece, to quiet their 
dissensions, and restore peace among them, the Achaeans were the only people 
upon whose assistance and advice they consented to rely. £Jor was this only 
the instance, in which they shewed their approbation of the institutions of this 
republic. For not long afterwards, they resolved to imitate the whole model 
of their government. In this design, the people of Croton, Sybaris, and 
Caulonia, associated themselves by mutut^agTeement into one confederacy 5 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

and built a temple for holding their common synods and assemblies, inscribing' 
it to Jupiter Homorius. They adopted likewise all the laws and customs of 
the Achaeans, and began to direct their whole administration by them. 
But Dionysius, the Syracusan tyrant, and their barbarous neighbours, who 
were very strong and powerful, in a short time forced them to desist from 
the design. 

When the Thebans, after the great and unexpected victory which they had 
obtained against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Leuctra, began, with 
the surprise of all, to lay claim to the sovereignty of Greece, various troubles 
and commotions arose among the people of the country ; and especially be- 
tween the two contending parties: for the one refused to submit as conquered, 
while the other persisted still to claim the victory. In these circumstances, 
they at last agreed to yield all the points that were in dispute between them, 
to the sole judgment and decision of the Achaeans. Nor was the preference 
obtained by any superiority of strength or power; for they were at that time 
the least of all the states of Greece ; but was confessedly bestowed upon 
that integrity and love of virtue, by which they were distinguished above all 
other people. 

At this time, therefore, they were powerful in inclination only, and not 
from any real strength. Their government had not yet been able to acquire 
any considerable increase, for want of a chief that waj capable of giving full 
accomplishment to their designs. For as often as any appeared among them, 
whose views and conduct were suspected to tend that way, they were imme- 
diately opposed in every enterprise, and checked in all their motions, either 
by the Lacedaemonians, or still more frequently by the kings of Macedon. 
But when they had at last found one, whose abilities were equal to the task, 
they then made known the inherent excellence and power of their republic, 
by carrying into execution that vast and glorious project, of uniting all the 
states of Peloponnesus to the body of their own confederacy. The first and 
chief author of this union was Aratus the Sicyonian. Philopoemen of Ma- 
galopolis, after many struggles, conducted it to its completion : and Lycortas, 
with others who pursued his measures, added to its last firmness anil stability. 
We shall take occasion to relate their several actions, with the time and man- 
ner in which they were performed, as fully and particularly as the design of 
this history may require. We shall, indeed, both now and at all times here- 
after, touch but lightly on the several parts of the administration of Aratus : 
because he has left behind him a very faithful and clear account of his own 
transactions. But in all that regards the rest, we shall enlarge more copiously, 
and survey their conduct with a nicer care. At present, in order to make this 
whole inquiry more easy to ourselves, as well as more intelligible to the reader, 
we shall look back to the time when the Achaeans, after they, had been 
broken into separate bodies by the kings of Macedon, hrst formed the resolu- 
tion of uniting again their several cities into one community. For from this 
beginning their republic gradually enlarged its bounds and power till it ar- 
rived at last at that state of perfect greatness, in which it has been seen to 
flourish in these latter times. 

It was in the hundred-twenty-fourth Olympiad, that the Patrians and 
Dymaeans associated themselves the first into this confederacy. In the same 
Olympiad, Ptolemy the son of Lagus, Lysimachns, Seleueus, and Ptolemy 
Ceraunus, all died. The state of the Achaeans before this time was, in a 
few words, as follows : — 

Tisamenes, the son of Orestes, being driven from Sparta upon the return 
of the Heraclidae, gained possession of Achaia by force, and was declared 
sovereign of the country. His descendants reigned after him" in natural suc- 
cession, down to Ogyges. But when the children of this prince had ceased 
to make the laws the rule of their administration, and began to govern all 

VOL. 1. NO. 3. , L 



m GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



things by their own arbitrary will, the Achaeans changed the constitution from 
monarchy to a commonwealth. In this state they continued afterwards, to 
the times of Alexander. And though different accidents might, in some 
conjunctures, introduce a temporary change in their affairs, yet, upon the 
whole, they still preserved the form of a genuine democracy. Their republic 
was composed of twelve cities ; all of which now exist, except Olenus and 
Hehce, which were swallowed by an inundation of the sea, not long before 
the battle of Leuctra. The names of the twelve were, Patrae, Dyme,- Pharae, 
Tritaea, Leontium, iEgira, Pellene, iEgium, Bura, Caryuia, Olenus, and 
Helice. But after the death of Alexander, this union was dissolved by va- 
rious contests and dissensions that were raised among them, chiefly through 
the arts of the kings of Macedon. Every city was now engaged in a separate 
inrerest, and no longer acted in concert with the whole. The effect of this 
discord was, that some of them received garrisons from Demetrius and Cas- 
sander, and afterwards from Antigonus Gonatas ; and some were seized by 
tyrants : for Antigonus gave both establishment and support to a great num- 
ber of these throughout all Greece. But in the hundred-twenty-fourth Olym- 
piad, as we have already mentioned they saw their error, and began to think 
of returning to their former state. This was the time, in which Pyrrhus, in- 
vaded Italy. Dyme, Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea, were at first the only cities 
that agreed to unite themselves again in one community : aud it is on that ac- 
count, that there is now no monument remaining of this new confederacy, 
About five years afterwards, the people of iEgium drove out the garrison, and 
joined their city to the league. Their example soon was followed by the 
Burians, who killed their tyrant; and afterwards by the Carynians also. For 
when Iseas, the tyrant of Carynia, saw that by the management of Marcus aud 
the Achaeans, the garrison was driven out of iEgium, and the tyrant of the 
Burians killed, and that their forces were preparing to invest this territory 
upon every side, he laid down his royalty, and, having obtained a promise of 
life and safety, associated this city to the confederacy. 

Some, perhaps, will he solicitous to know the motives, by which I have been 
led back to this early period. My design then was, first, that I might mark 
precisely the time and manner, in which this second confederacy commenced ; 
and what were the cities which laid the first foundation of that establishment, 
which has subsisted even to the present times : and in the second place, that 
the state and real circumstances of the facts themselves might declare the 
truth of what we have affirmed, concerning the genius and the spirit of the 
Achaean commonwealth. For from these it will be evident, that that equality 
and liberty, upon which the republic was founded, have been the chief causes 
of its great increase. To which we may also add, the constancy and unshaken 
resolution, with which they never cease to wage perpetual war against all those 
who, either by their own power, or with the assistance of the neighbouring 
kings, attempt to force their cities into slavery. Upon these principles, and 
by this conduct, they brought their work to, its desired perfection: using 
partly their own strength, and partly that of their allies. For all the assist- 
ance, which they received afterwards from these, was applied solely to pro- 
mote the grand purpose of their government. Aud even after those great ex- 
ploits, which they performed jointly with the Romans, they were not in the 
least ambitious of obtaining any private advantage to themselves ; nor ever 
claimed any other reward for all their service?, than the establishment of the 
common liberty, in the union of all the states of the Peloponnesus. The 
truth of these remarks will, 1 say, be confirmed beyond all doubt, by the re- 
cital of the facts. 

The cities, which we have just now mentioned, remained under this form 
of government during the course of twenty-five years: in which time, they 
elected annually two praetors, and a common secretary. But afterwards, they 
chose to place the whole administration in orfte single praetor. The first who 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 83 



obtained that honour, was Marcus of Carynia. Four years after this praetor- 
ship, Aratus the Sicyonian, though he was then no more than twenty years 
old, by his bravery and courage gave liberty to his countr)*, and joined it to 
the Achaean league : for he had always greatly admired the constitution of 
this republic. Eight years afterwards, being himself elected praetor of the 
Achaeans for the second time, he found means to take Acrocorinthus by sur- 
prise, in which Antigonus had then a garrison. By gaining this important 
place, he delivered all the people of Peloponnesus from no small apprehen- 
sions ; restored the Corinthians to their liberty ; and engaged them to become 
a part of the Achaean government. In the course of the same year, he made 
himself master of the city of Megara by some secret management, and joined 
it likewise to the confederacy. This was the year before the final defeat of the 
Carthaginians in Sicily ; which forced them to abandon all the island, and pay 
a tribute to the Romans. Thus Aratus in a short time greatly enlarged the 
growing power of the Achaeans : and ever afterwards, as long as he was em- 
ployed in the administration of their affairs, his conduct was uniform and 
constant, and never deviated from the points which he had at first in view : to 
drive the Macedonians out of Peloponnesus ; to destiny the tyrants every 
where ; and restore to the people all their natural rights\ and that common 
liberty which their ancestors had before enjoyed. 

During the life-lime of Antigonus Gonatas, it was a task of no small dif- 
ficulty to resist, on one hand, the intrigues and artful policy of that prince, 
and the rapaciousness and bold ambition of the iEtohans on the other. For 
these two powers had advanced so far together in their unjust attempts, that 
they even formed the project of a league for the entire destruction of the 
Achaeans. And Aratus, by his wisdom and indefatigable pains, effectually 
broke and frustrated the design. 

After the death of this prince, the Achaeans entered into a treaty of alliance 
with the jEtolians, and assisted them in the war against Demetrius. By this 
compliance, all past jealousies were removed: and their former enmity gave 
place to confidence and friendship. When Demetrius was also dead, after a 
reign often years only, and about the time in which the Romans first passed 
into lllyria, the Achaeans found this conjuncture to be highly favourable to 
them for advancing their designs. For all the tyrants of Peloponnesus were 
now disheartened, and diffident of their future safety. They had lost their 
master and their chief: the sovereign, by whom they were supported and 
maintained in pay. On the other hand Aratus urged them close : and shewed 
his resolution to abolish every tyranny. He promised great rewards and ho- 
nours to those who would voluntarily submit : and threatened ruin and ex- - 
treme punishment to all such as would refuse. By these means they were all 
engaged to divest themselves of the royal power; to restore liberty to their 
several cities ; and to unite them to the Achaean league. Lysiadas, the tyrant 
of Megalopolis, whose wise discernment taught him to foresee what would 
shortly happen, had resigned his dignity, and joined his country to the re- 
public, even in the life-time of Demetrius. His example was now followed 
by Aristomachus, the tyrant of Argos ; and by Xeno and Cleonymus, the 
tyrants of the Hermionians and Phliasians. 

The iEtolians, who were by nature rapacious and unjust, could not behold 
without envy this great increase of the Achaean power and strength. They 
began to flatter themselves with secret hopes of breaking the confederacy, 
and enriching themselves with the spoil. As they had formerly shared with 
Alexander the towns of Acarnania, and had afterwards formed the project of 
dividing also between Antigonus Gonatas and themselves the cities of Achaia, 
they were now pursuaded, that it would be no hard task to carry into execu* 
tion this last design. With this view, they resolved to concert the matter 
first in private with Antigonus, the guardian of young Philip, with Cleomenes, 
king of Lac«.daemon, and to demand assistance fioua thoie princes. They 



*4 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

knew that Antigonus, at this time, governed Macedon in full security ; and 
that he was the declared and open enemy of the Achaeans, because they had. 
taken Acrocorinthus from him by surprise. They imagined, therefore, that 
if they could once inspire the Lacedaemonians with the same hostile dispo- 
sition, and engage them into this design, the Achaeans, attacked at once on 
every side, as occasion should direct, must necessarily sink beneath the efforts 
of their united forces. In truth, the prospect of success seemed very fair and 
promising. But in concerting this project, one circumstance of great mo- 
ment was forgot. For it never once occurred to their reflection, that Aratus 
was the man, who was to oppose all their measures, and counteract their 
motions : a man, whose abilities were superior to every difficulty. And, in- 
deed so effectually did he oppose them, defeating all their counsels, and 
turnin ' their projects to theif own destruction, that this unjust and unpro- 
voked attack, instead of accomplishing any part of that which was intended 
from it served only to give new life and vigour to the Achaean commonwealth. 
We shall give a distinct and clear account of the manner in which the whole 
was then conducted. 

When Aratus saw that the iEtolians were restrained by shame, from de- 
claring themselves the open enemies of the Achaeans, from whom they had 
received <>reat services in the war against Demetrius ; yet that they were act- 
ing in private concert with the Lacedaemonians, and had suffered their jea- 
lousy, and their hatred of the Achaeans, to carry them to such excess, that 
when Cleomenes had taken by surprise Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, 
which were at that time not only in alliance with the iEtolians, but associated 
also to their government, they not only shewed no resentment of this insult, 
but even yielded to him the full possession of those cities; when he saw, that 
a nation, whose character it was to declare war upon the slightest pretexts, 
even against those from whom they had received no wrong, was now on a 
sudden so much changed, that they not only bore with patience an attack 
made upon them, in direct breach of treaties, but were even content to give 
up all their claim to three cities of importance, that by means of this new 
strength Cleomenes might be able to maintain the war against the Achaeans : 
when Aratus, 1 say, and the rest of the chief of the republic, had fully con- 
sidered all these circumstances, the result of their deliberations was, that they 
would not yet take arms avowedly against any power, but only hold themselves 
in readiness to oppose all attempts that should be made against them. This 
was their first determination. But some time afterwards, when Cleomenes 
had built the fortress, called Athenaeum, in the Megalopolitan territory, and 
began to act against them in a hostile manner without reserve, the Achaeans 
then called a general council, and it was there resolved, that war should be 
declared against the Lacedaemonians. 

Such was the beginning of that which is called the Cleomenic war. The 
Achaeans at first designed to employ their own proper forces only in defence 
of their state and country. For it seemed less honourable, to owe their safety 
to a foreign army : and they wetfe willing also to preserve the friendship of 
kina - Ptolemy ; to whom they were indebted for many favours; and who, on 
that account, might perhaps shew some resentment, if they now invited any 
other power to their assistance. But as the war began to advance fast upon 
them and was pressed with equal vigour and dexterity by Cleomenes, who 
had subverted the lawful constitution of his country, and established a tyranny 
in Sparta, Aratus having carefully weighed the danger, and made due reflec-. 
tion also 'upon the daring spirit, and malicious disposition of the iEtolians, 
erceived that it was necessary to have recourse in time to some expedient,, 
which might divert the fatal consequences that were in view. In this design, 
lie turned his eyes towards Antigonus, whom he knew to be a prince of perfect 
iudgment and experience ; at all times ready to make alliances, as occasion 
should require; and. punctual in observing them, when made. But he re- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 85 

membered also, that kings naturally bear neither enmity nor friendship to- 
wards any ; but are in both determined by the rule of interest alone. Here- 
solved, therefore, to explain at large to Antigonus the dangers that would 
probably arise, even against himself, from the present situation of affairs in 
Greece ; and endeavour, by that means, to draw him to his party, and engage 
him to join his forces with the Achaeans. It was requisite, however, that he 
should keep his resolution for some time secret. For he knew, that if he 
should be once discovered, Cleomenes and the iEtolians would employ every 
art to defeat this purpose. He was apprehensive also, that it might too much 
depress the courage of his countrymen, if he should seem to despair of saving 
the republic by its own genuine forces : and more especially, if he should now 
apply for succour to the Macedonians, whom they always had regarded as 
tihejr enemies' J n the conduct, therefore, of this whole design, he was forced 
to employ the greatest secrecy and caution : and both to speak and act in a, 
maimer very opposite to his real sentiments. And from hence it happens^ 
that many circumstances, which relate to this transaction, are omitted in his 
memoirs. 

When he" saw, then, that the Megalopolitans were the first and greatest 
sufferers in the war, both because their country lay nearest to Lacedaemon, 
and because the Achaeans were themselves too much embarrassed to send the 
succours to them that were necessary ; when he considered also, that this 
people were already favourably disposed towards the house of Macedon, on 
account of some good offices which they had received from Philip the son of 
Amintas ; he made no doubt, but that as soon as the war should became too 
heavy for their strength, they should immediately have recourse to Aritigouus. 
and the Macedonians. He sent, therefore, for Nicophanes and Cercidas ; two 
Megalopolitans, who had formerly been connected with his family by the ties 
of hospitality ; a '.id who by their abilities were very capable of promoting his 
design. To these he privately disclosed his project : and, through their means, 
soon afterwards engaged the Megalopolitans to send some deputies to the 
Achaean states, requesting their permission to invite Antigonus to their assist- 
ance. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves appointed for the embassy ; 
and their instructions were, to proceed without delay to the court of Macedon, 
iu case that the Achatans should approve of the design. 

The Achaeans yielded their consent :, and the deputies hegan their journey 
without delay, and were admitted to a conference with the Icing. With se- 
epect to their own particular country, they spoke in few words only what the 
occasion seemed barely to require. But they enlarged more eopious.lv upon 
the general situation of affairs in Greece ; according to the instructions which 
they had received from Aratus. They explained the views of the iEtolians 
and Cleomenes ; shewed the tendency of their designs ; and warned the king 
of the fatal consequences that were likely to result from this confederacy. 
For though the Achaeans only were most imminently threatened, yet the 
danger must at last extend even to Antigonus himself.. It was clear to every 
judgment, that the Achaeans could not long maintain their ground against 
the efforts of two so powerful enemies. Nor was it less clear and evident, that 
Cleomenes and the iE-tol^ns would never be contented with the conquest of 
the Achaeans only. For such was the disposition of the iEtolians, that the 
bounds not only of Peloponnesus, but even of Greece itself, would be thought 
too narrow for their rapaciousness and wild ambition. And though the whole 
design and purpose of Cleomenes seemed at present to aim at nothing more 
than the supreme command in Peloponnesus, yet when this should be once 
obtained, there was no room to doubt, but that he would immediately enlarge 
his views, and endeavour to seize the sovereignty of the rest of Greece; at 
which he never could arrive, but by the ruin of the Macedonian monarchy. 
They, therefore, advised the king, to turn his thoughts upon the future : and 
to consider with himself, whether it would not be far more suited to his in- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

terests, to join his forces with the Achaeans and Boeotians, and contend with 
Cleomenes in Peloponnesus for the supreme command of Greece, than by 
neglecting at this time to save a great and powerful nation, to be forced at last 
to maintain a war in the very heart of Thessaly, and defend his own proper 
kingdom, against the united forces of the iEtolians and Boeotians, the La- 
cedaemonians and Achaeans. They farther added, that if the iEtolians, 
softened by the remembrance of the services which they had received from the 
Achaeans in the war against Demetrius, should forbear to take arms against 
them, that they would themselves stand singly against the efforts of Cleo-< 
menes, and should want no foreign succours, unless the fortune of the war 
should prove in all points contrary to their hopes. But in case that the suc- 
cess should fail to answer their endeavours, or the ^tolians declare themselves 
their enemies, they then earnestly besought Antigonus, that he would inteiv 
pose without delay, and give safety to the states of Peloponnesus, while there 
was yet time to save them. With regard to any terms of caution and security, 
they assured the king, that Aratus would take care to find such expedients 
as should fully satisfy all parties : and that he would send him notice also of 
the time, in which it would be seasonable for him to begin his march to their 
assistance. 

Antigonus was convinced that this kind of reasoning was perfectly just 
and solid: and began to apply his whole attention to the affairs that were- 
before him. He sent letters to the Megalopolitans, assuring them that he was* 
ready to assist them with his forces, in case that the Achaeans should approve 
of the design. 

When Tsicophanes and Cercidas were returned, and had delivered the let- 
tersj and made report of the favourable inclinations of the king, the Megalo- 
politans, being greatly pleased with their success, sent in all haste to the 
council of the Achaeans, and pressed them to invite Antigonus, without delay, 
and leave to him the whole conduct of the war. Aratus, likewise, when he 
had heard in private from Nicophanes of the disposition which the king had 
shewn, with respect both to the Achaeans and himself, was beyond measure 
filled with joy. He now perceived that he had not bestowed his pains upon 
a vain and fruitless project ; and that Antigonus was by no means so entirely 
alienated from him as the iEtolians had believed. He judged it also to be a 
most happy circumstance, that the Megalopolitans, in referring to Antigonus 
the care of their affairs, had resolved to use the mediation of the Achaean 
states. For his first wish was, that there might be no want at all of foreign 
succours. But, if necessity should force them to have recourse to any such 
assistance, he rather chose that the application should be made by all the 
states of Achaia than by himself. For there seemed to be some cause to fear, 
that if Antigonus, when he had first subdued the Lacedaemonians and Cleo- 
menes, should engage in any ill designs against the republic of the Achaeans, 
the blame should all be imputed to him alone ; since all men would consider 
such a conduct as the effect of a just resentment, for the injury that had been 
done to the Macedonians by Aratus in taking Acrocorinthus from them. 
When the Megalopolitans, therefore, had shewn the letters in the council of 
the Achaeans, and conjured them to their assistance without delay, and when 
the people began to declare aloud their readiness to comply with this request, 
Aratus came forwards in the assembly and spoke largely in praise of the zeal 
and good inclination of Antigonus, and commended also the disposition of the 
people. But he exhorted them, in the most earnest and pathetic manner, " to 
employ, in the first place, their utmost efforts, and endeavour, by every expe- 
dient, to defend their cities and their country, by their own genuine forces ; 
that both their honour and their interest required it from them ; and in case 
that fortune should fail to give success to their endeavours, that it would then 
be early enough to implore the assistance of their friends, when they had been 
first forced to abandon all hopes of safety from themselves." 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 87 

9 . ' " ' "" * " 

These sentiments were applauded by the whole assembly. They resolved, 
therefore, to adhere to this opinion, and sustain the war alone. But some 
time afterwards, when king- Ptolomy, being persuaded that the Lacedaemo- 
nians would be able to assist him more effectually than the Achaeans in the 
designs which he had formed against the kings of Macedon, had rejected the 
alliance of the Achaeans, and engaged to furnish Cleomenes with such sup- 
plies as might enable him to carry on the war against Antigonus ; .when 
the Achaeans had been surprised by Cleomenes upon their march, and suf- 
fered great loss near Lycaeum ; when they had also been a second time de- 
feated in the Laodician plains near Megalopolis, in which action Leusiadas 
was slain ; and lastly, when they had suffered a complete aad dreadful over- 
throw in a general engagement, at a place called Hecatombaeum, in the Dy- 
mean territory; their affairs were then so desperate, that, without any new 
delay, they, with one voice, agreeed to invite Antigonus to their assistance* 
Aratus sent his own son to the king, to settle the terms of their agreement. 
But there was one point, which caused no small embarrassment. It was not 
probable, that Antigonus would march to their relief, unless Acrocorinthus 
should be first restored; and the city of Corinth likewise yielded to him for 
his place of arms. But the Achaeans would not venture to surrender Corinth, 
without the consent of the inhabitants. Some little delay was therefore made 
in their deliberations, till an expedient could be found, and such sureties of- 
fered as might satisfy the king. 

In the mean time, Cleomenes, having spread great terror every where by 
those victories that have now been mentioned, advanced at leisure through the 
country, drawing the cities to submission, some by gentle means, and some by 
force. In this manner he gained Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneum, Argos, Philius, 
Cleone, Epidaurus, Hermioua, Troezen, and lastly Corinth; and then went 
and encamped before Sicyon. Happily these rapid conquests freed the 
Achaeans from that great difficulty which had obstructed all their measures. 
For no sooner had the inhabitants of Corinth commanded all the Achaeans to 
leave the city, and sent a deputation to Cleomenes to invite him to take pos- 
session of it, than Aratus, having now obtained a fair and honest pretext, sur- 
rendered Acrocorinthus to Antigonus. Thus he wiped away at once all re- 
membrance of his former offence against the house of Macedon, gave a strong 
assurance of the sincerity of his intentions, with regard to the present treaty, 
and furnished the Macedonians with a x commodious place of arms for the 
approaching- war. 



CHAP. IV. 

As soon as Cleomenes heard that the Achaeans had concluded a treaty with 
Antigonus, he marched from before Sicyon, and encamped upon the isthmus. 
He cast up an entrenchment round all the space that lay between Acroco- 
rinthus and the Onian mountains, and persuaded himself that he was now se- 
cure of obtaining the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. 

Antigonus had long ago Completed all his preparations, and waited only for 
the proper time of action, as Aratus has advised. But when he saw the rapid 
progress of Cleomenes, he began to apprehend that tins prince would soon ad- 
vance and attack him even in the very heart of Thessaly. He sent word, there- 
fore, to the Achaeans, that they should be punctual in the execution of the 
measures that had been concerted, and himself began to march with the army 
towards the isthmus through Euboea. For the iLolians, among other expe- 
dients which they contrived to prevent Antigonus from lending any assistance 
to the Achaeans, sent him notice, that his army should have no passage 
through Thermopylae, and in case he should attempt to march that way, that 
they would oppose him by force of arms. 



m GENERAL HISTORY OF PQLY-BIUS. 



While Antigonus and Cleomenes lay in opposite camps upon the isthmus, 
the one watching his opportunity to pass into Peloponnesus, the other ready to 
oppose his entrance, the Achaeans, though much weakened by their losses, 
still maintained their courage, and resolved to pursue the war with vigour.!. 
And when Aristotle, a citizen of Argos, had formed a party in the place against 
Cleomenes, they immediately sent away Timoxenus with a body offerees, who. 
made themselves masters of the city. This happy accident gave instantly a 
new face to their affairs. For so effectually did it depress the ardour of Cleo- 
menes, and damp the courage of his army, that though this general was pos- 
sessed of all the advantageous posts aud furnished with supplies of every kind, 
in greater abundance than Antigonus, though he was far more b&ld and enter- 
prising than that prince, and more strongly animated by the love of glory, yet 
no sooner did he receive the news that Argos was taken by the Achaeans, than 
he at once abandoned all his conquests, and rather fled than retreated home- 
wards, as if he had feared that the enemy would soon surround him on every 
side. In this way he found means to enter Argos, and for some time had hopes 
of recovering the city, but was at last repulsed : for, as the Achaeans main- 
tained their post with courage, so the inhabitants especially resisted with a 
more than common force and obstinacy, as if the)'- designed to make atonement 
for their past offence, in having embraced his party. When this attempt had 
failed, he coutined his route through Mantinea, and returned again to Sparta." 

Antigonus now entered Peloponnesus without resistance; took possession of 
Acroeorinthus ; and advanced with great celerity to Argos ; from whence, 
when he had first bestowed high commendations upon the courage of the in- 
habitants, and settled the affairs of the city, be continued his march towards 
Arcadia. He drove out the garrisons from all the forts that had been built by 
Cleomenes, in the territory of the JEgians and Belminates, and filled them, 
with the troops of Megalopolis. He went afterwards to iEgium, and was pre- 
sent in the council of the Achaean states. He there shewed at large the mo- 
tives of his conduct, proposed his sentiments with regard to the future opera- 
tions of the war, and was declared the general in chief of the allies. 

After some time spent in winter quarters, in the neighbourhood of S icy on 
and Corinth, as the spring now advanced, he again began his march with the 
forces, and arrived in three days before Tegea ; and, being joined there by the 
Achaeans, he immediately invested the town. The siege was pushed by the 
Macedonians with so much vigour, as well by mining as by the other methods 
of attack, that the inhabitants, in a short time, lost all hopes, and submitted 
at discretion. Antigonus, having secured the place by a sufficient garrison, 
advanced in haste towards Laconia. When he had approached the frontiers, 
he engaged the Lacedaemonians, who were then encamped, in some slight 
skirmishes, hoping to draw on a general battle ; but, having received notice 
by his spies that the garrison of Orchomenus had retired from the place and 
joined Cleomenes, he immediately decamped^ and, directing his march that 
way, took the town in the first assault. He next laid siege to Mantinea, which 
was struck with terror, aud surrendered. Marching from thence, he gained 
Heraea and Telphussa, which were yielded voluntarily to him by the inhabit- 
ants ; and afterwards, as the summer was now past, returned again to JEgium, 
to be present at the council of the states. He sent away the Macedonians to 
tnlce their winter quarters in their own country, while himself staid behind at 
iEgium, to deliberate with the Achaeans on the measures that were proper to 
be pursued. 

When Cleomenes saw that the Macedonians were dismissed, and that An- 
tigonus was left in iEgium with only the merecenary troops ; that he was distant 
full three days' journey from Megalopolis ; that this city, on account of its 
great extent, and the small number of the inhabitants, could not be easily 
guarded against an enemy j that, at this time especially, it actually was 
guarded with less attention than before, because Antigonus was near ; and that 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. «9 

the greater part of the citizens who were of age to bear arms had been already 
lost, in the engagements near Lycaeum, and the Laodician plain's, he found 
means, with the assistance of someMessenian exiles, who at that time resided 
in the place, to enter the city privately by night. But when day appeared, 
the inhabitants maintained their ground with so much bravery, that he found 
himself in the greatest danger, not only of being forced back again with loss, 
but of suffering an entire defeat, as it had happened to him about three mouths 
before, when he made the same attempt, and entered the city in the part that 
was called Colaeum. At this time, however, as his forces were very nume- 
rous, and had seized on all the advantageous posts, he at last accomplished, 
Iris design, drove out the Megalopolitaus, and made himself master of the 
place, which he immediately pillaged and destroyed, with so much bitterness 
of rage and fur}', as left no hope that it ever could be inhabited. This severe 
treatment seems to have flowed from no other cause than the great resentment 
of Cleomenes, who was enraged to find that, among all the Megalopolitans 
and Stymphalians, not one could be prevailed upon, at this juncture, to em- 
brace his interests, and betray the liberties of his fellow-citizens. Amoi g the 
Clitorians, indeed, a generous people, and passionately fond of f-eedom, there 
was found a single traitor, named Thearces, whose baseness seemed to cast 
some infamy upon his country : but the Clitorians, on that account, very rea- 
sonably deny that hederived his birth from them, and declare him to have been 
the spurious and deserted offspring of a soldier from Orchomenus. 

In composing this part of my history, as I have chiefly followed Aratu9 
for my guide, and drawn my materials from him, and, as many persons are in- 
clined to prefer Phylarchus, who gives a very different account of these trans- 
actions, 1 think it necessary to bestow, in this place, some little observation, 
upon the talents and capacity of this historian, that his relations, which, in- 
deed, are fabulous and false, may no longer possess that credit which ought 
only to be paid to those that are genuine and true. 

This writer then, through every part of his performance, has shewn abun- 
dant proofs of haste, inaccuracy, and want of judgment and discernment. But 
it is not my design to enter into a critical examination of them all. I shall, at 
present, consider his accounts of those transactions only which fall within the 
period of the Cleomenic war : and these, indeed, will be sufficient, not only 
to explain his sentiments, and the temper with which he wrote, but to shew 
also in what degree he was possessed of those abilities that are requisite for 
such an undertaking. 

In order to expose the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, aud of 
Aratus and the Achaeans, he relates that the Mantineans, after they had been 
conquered by them, were punished in a manner the most severe ; and that the 
largest and most antient city of all Arcadia was condemned to struggle with 
such calamities as filled the Greeks with astonishment and horror, and 
melted them into tears. He then endeavours to move his readers to compas- 
sion, and force them even to feel the sufferings which he relates, setting in 
view before them the companies of unhappy women, joined together in em- 
braces, striking their bare bosoms, aud tearing their dishevelled Irair ; and de- 
scribing the lamentations, and the tears of husbands and their wives, who, to- 
gether with their children aud their aged parents, were dragged awav in pro- 
miscuous crowds to blavery. Thus it is, that, in every part of his work, his 
chief pains and art are constantly employed in painting scenes of misery and 
horror. But surely there is uo need to use many words to explode a kind of 
writing so mean and womanish. Let us consider rather, what is the genuine 
and proper character, and what the peculiar use of history. 

An historian, then, instead of endeavouring, like the writers of tragedy, to 
•trike the reader with admiration or with terror, — instead of dressing rip pro- 
bable speeches, and enumerating all the circumstances that might possibly 

TOL. 1. NO. 3; M 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU&. 



have followed after every accident, should be satisfied with giving a bare rela- 
tion of such facts and discourses as really happened, though, perhaps, they 
may coutain nothing great or elevated : for the nature and design of tragedy 
are verv different from those of history. The business of the former is, to 
strike and captivate the minds of the hearers for the present moment, by such 
representations as are barely probable: whereas history professes to give lessons 
of improvement even to future times, by relating such discourses and events a» 
are strictly true. In the one, therefore, the probable, though false, may be 
sufficient to conduct us to the end in view, which is amusement and delight 1 
but the other, whose proper work is to convey instruction, must be always 

built on truth. ^■'' 1 ""' l ".'t ', 

In recounting all these dismal accidents, Phylarchus is tor the most parr 
Silent also with respect to the cause and motives by which they were occasioned r 
and yet, unless we are previously informed of these, it is not possible to know 
whether the case can reasonably lay claim either to our indignation or pity. It 
is, for instance, a lamentable spectacle, to see a free man whipped with rods ; 
but when this is the proper punishment of his crimes, it must be allowed to 
have happened justly to him : and whenever it is done for the sake of discip^ 
line and reformation, we even applaud those persons who inflict it. To take 
away the life of a citizen is considered as a most horrid crime, and such as 
calls for the severest vengeance ; yet a man may openly destroy an adulterer 
or a robber, without any fear of being punished for it : and those who rescue 
their country from a traitor or a tyrant are even thought worthy of the 
createst honours. It is manifest, therefore, that, in order to pass a perfect 
judgment on any action, instead of barely contemplating the act itself, we. 
should examine the causes that produced it, together with the intention and 
the views of those by whom it was done : for, agreeably to the difference 
that is found in these, the action will be likewise different. 

With reo-ard to the fact which occasioned these reflections, the truth is as 
follows. The Mantineans, without any provocation* or excuse, had deserted 
the Achaen confederacy, and delivered up their country and themselves, first 
to the j&tolians, and afterwards to Cleomenes, and were joined by him to the 
Lacedaemonian state. In these circumstances, about four years before the ar- 
rival of Antigonus, they were conquered by the Aehaeans, with the assistance 
of a party that Aratus had gained within the city : but so far were they from 
being exposed at this time to any severe or cruel treatment in resentment of 
their offence, that, on the contrary, all Greece talked loudly of the sudden 
change which seemed to have been effected in the disposition of these people 
towards each other : for, when Aratus had made himself master of the city, he 
gtrictly forbad his soldiers to touch any of the goods of the inhabitants ; and, 
having afterwards called the people together, he exhorted them to resume 
their courage, and remain satisfied in their present state : for that, as long as 
they would consider themselves as a part of the Achaen government, they might 
live in perfect freedom and security. An indulgence so unexpected, and which 
go far exceeded all their hopes, changed at once the. inclinations of the Man- 
tineans. They no longer remembered the friends whom they had lost in 
battle or the dangers to which themselves had been exposed ; but embraced 
the Aehaeans, who so lately were their enemies, admitted them to their houses 
and their feasts, and strove to express their joy by every act of hospitality and 
kindness. And this, indeed, was highly reasonable: for certainly no people 
ever fell into the hands of a more merciful and more generous enemy, or es- 
caped, with so little difficulty, from those calamities that are esteemed the 
Greatest in human life, — a happiness, which they entirely owed to the feu« 
Bianitv of Aratus and the Aehaeans. 

Sorne tim« afterwards, this people, being disturbed by some intestine tu- 
mults, and apprehensive also of some danger from the Lacedaemonians and 
jgfetolians, requested from the Aehaeans a garrison for their security. The 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 91 

m § i | BJHBgB " * » i- ii. i .. » m i . . . .■ ■ ii,. x« . i. ii » ihi ■■■iimii n —iii» iiiii» . ~- 'i ■■ i 1 1 "n'li ff" ' h i ' r i 

Achaeans chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens, who all left their 
country and their fortunes, and went and resided in Mantinea, to watch over 
the liberties and safety of that city. They added also to them a body of two hun- 
dred mercenaries : but the Mantmeans, not long afterwards taking' occasion, 
from some new dissentions which broke out among them, called in the Lace- 
daemonians, delivered their city to them, > and killed all the Achaeans that were 
in the place, — a perfidy more horrible and impious than can be well expressed : 
for, though they had resolved to disclaim the friendship of the Achaeans, and 
forget all the favours which they had received from their republic, yet they 
ought at least to have sent home unhurt those troops which they had before 
admitted as their allies ; since, by the laws of nations, this indulgence is always 
granted even to an enemy. But the Mantineans resolved to violate these laws, 
insult the common rights of mankind, and perpetrate an inexpiable crime, that, 
by such a conduct, they might be able more strongly to assure Cleomenes of 
their zeal and close attachment to his cause. This action surely might, in 
justiee, draw after it the heaviest resentment. To embrue their hands in the 
blood of those by whom themselves, when they had fallen into their power not 
long before, were dismissed with pardon, and who, at this very moment, were 
employed in defending the liberties and safety of their city, — what, let me 
ask, would have been the proper punishment for such a crime ? It will, perhaps, 
be said, that, as soon as they were conquered, they should have been sold tor 
slaves, together with their wives ancl children. But this is no more than what 
is usually permitted by the laws of war, even against those who have not been 
guilty of any uncommon wickedness. The Mantineans, therefore, deserved 
to be treated in some more^igorous manner: and if they had even been in- 
volved in all that wretchedness which is described at large by Piiilarchus, it 
would have been so far from exciting the Greeks to sympathy and compassion, 
that, on the contrary, they must have applauded those who took care not to 
leave so great a crime unpunished. And, in truth, the whole which they suf- 
fered was, that their goods were pillaged, and the citizens exposed to sale. It 
is clear, that Philarchus, in order to surprise and strike the reader, has in- 
vented not only a mere heap of falsehoods, but such falsehoods too as bearnot 
any shew of probability ; while, through an excess of ignorance, he makes no 
mention of a fact that was coincident with that which he relates, and which 
ir.' jht very properly have been connected with it : for when the Achaeans,, 
at this very time, had taken the town of Tegea by storm, they used none of 
the same seventy towards the inhabitants. Yet, if the sufferings of the Man- 
tinians had been the bare effect of a cruel disposition in their enemies, it 
seems reasonable to suppose the people of Tegea would have been treated also. 
with rigour. But as the Mantineans alone were punished with severity, it is 
manifest, beyond all doubt, that the conduct of the Achaeans must of neces-» 
sity be ascribed to some other cause. 

In another place he relates, that Aristomachus, a man of an illustrious fa- 
mily, descended from a line of tyrants, and who was himself tyrant of Argos, 
having fallen alive into the hands of Antigonus and the Achaeans, was con- 
ducted to Cenchrae, ancl there put to death in tortures the most merciless 
and cruel that ever was inflicted upon man. And then, after his usual man- 
ner, he goes on to describe the loud and moving lamentations of the unhappy 
sufferer, which were heard at midnight through all the neighbourhood ; that 
some were struck with horror, while some doubted of the fact ; and that others, 
inflamed with indignation, ran in crowds towards the house from whence the 
cries proceeded. But let us pass over these scenes of terror and amazement, 
" which have already been suffieientby exposed. In my judgment, then, though 
Aristomachus had been guilty of no other offence against the Achaeans, the 
whole tenor of his life, and the wicked tyranny which he had exercised upon 
his country, might very deservedly have drawn upon hini the severest punish- 
ment. Yet Philarchus, with design to throw a greater splendour on his cha- 



ga GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

vacter, and more effectually to raise the indignation of the reader, declares, 
not only that he was himself a tyrant, but that he was descended also from a 
race of tyrants ; an accusation in itself the heaviest that can be well conceived; 7 
for the very name of tyrant includes the full extent of wickedness, and im- 
plies the commission of every kind of crime which man can perpetrate. But, 
in truth, if he had been forced to suffer the most cruel punishmeut, as this, 
historian relates, he never could have made by it a due atonement for the trans- 
actions of one single day, the day when Aratus entered Argos with a body of 
Achaeans, and gloriously exerted all his efforts to restore liberty to the city, 
but was forced at last to retire, because his party within the walls were re-' 
strained from joining him, through apprehension of the tyrant : for Aristoma- 
chus, on pretence that the inhabitants were secretly engaged in the design, 
and had favoured the entrance of the Achaeans, seized eighty of the chief 
among the citizens, and caused them to be put to death in torture, even be- 
fore the eyes of their friends and families. 

I forbear to relate the whole of his flagitious life, with the crimes which his 
ancestors before him had committed. The task would be too tedious. If at 
last then he was forced to suffer in some degree that cruel treatment which he 
had practised against others, this surely cannot be esteemed too severe or 
shocking. It should rather raise our indignation, if such a man had died, 
without being first exposed to any kind of vengeance or calamity. ]S T 6r ought 
it to be censured as an instance of injustice in Antigonus and Aratus, that 
when they had barely taken him in war, they put him to death in torture ; 
since, if they had treated him with the same severity even during the time of 
peace, the action must have been applauded by aimen of sense. 

But if, besides his other crimes, he was guilty likewise of the worst ingra- 
titude and pe.lidy towards the Achaeans, what punishment will he then be 
thought to have deserved ? Yet this was in truth the fact. For, when the 
death of Demetrius had left him naked and defenceless, so that he was con- 
strained to lay down his sovereignty* he found, beyond all his hopes, a safe 
and honourable refuge in the generous clemency of the Achaeans : who not 
only covered him from the punishment that was due to his past tyranny, but 
received them into their republic, and even yielded to him the greatest honours 
of the state : for he was raised to be their general and praetor. But no sooner 
had he conceived some hopes of recovering again his former fortune by the 
assistance of Cleomenes, than he forgot at once all the kindness that had been 
shewn towards him ; separated his country from the confederacy ; and joined 
himself to the enemy, at the- very time when the Achaeans were in greatest 
want of his assistance. After such a baseness, instead of being put to a cruel 
death by night at Cenchreae, as Phylarchus relates, he should rather have 
been led through all the towns of Peloponnesus, exposed to every kind of 
torture and indignity, and afterwards have been deprived of life. But in 
truth, this man, after all his wickedness, was only thrown into the sea, for 
some crimes that he committed during his stay at Cenchreae. 

Th'::» historian seems to have "been persuaded, that acts of violence or in- 
justice were those which chiefly merited his attention. Hence it is that he 
exaggerates, and relates in the fullest and most pathetic manner, the sufferings 
of the Mantineans ; but makes no mention of that glorious firmness, which ap- 
peared in the conduct of the Megalojiolitans at this conjuncture. As if 
history should be rather employed in describing bad actions, than those that 
are laudable and virtuous : or that the reader would find less matter of in- 
struction, in such examples as deserved to be admired and imitated, than in 
those which are fit only to be detested and avoided. In his account of the 
taking of Megalopolis, he relates, that Cleomenes not only preserved the town 
from being pillaged, but sent letters also to the Megalopolitans, who had re- 
tired to Messene, and offered to restore their city to them, on, condition only 
that they would embrace his interests. And this is done, with design to extol 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. M 



the magnanimity of Cleomenes, and his moderation towards his enemies. He 
then adds, that the Megalopolitans refused to hear the letters to the end, and 
were hardly restrained from stoning the messengers who brought them. But 
here his relation is concluded. With respect to all that should afterwards 
have followed, he is entirely silent: neglecting the most fair occasion, of per- 
forming that which is indeed the peculiar work of history : 1 mean, the task 
of recording a great and noble instance of uncommon constancy and resolu- 
tion, and of recommending it to our praise and imitation. For, if every 
public testimony, by which we declare our affection and steady zeal for the 
interests of our allies, be esteemed a thing highly laudable and virtuous ; if 
those, who can see their country wasted, or choose to sustain the miseries of a 
siege, rather than desert their friends, be thought worthy not, only of ap- 
plause, but of the greatest rewards and honours ; what then must be our opi- 
nion of the Megalopohtans ? how admirable their conduct ; and how great 
their character ! They saw their lands laid waste and pillaged by Cleomenes ; 
and themselves constrained to abandon all their territory, for their attachment 
to the interests of the Achaeans. Yet when beyond all hope they might have 
been again restored to their city and former fortunes, they chose still to be 
deprived of their estates, their sepulchres, temples, country; the dearest and 
moot valuable possessions, of all that belong to man; rather than betray that 
faith by which they had bound themselves to their allies. Can any thing be. 
conceived more great and generous than such a resolution ? Or could any 
action better have deseived the attention of an historian; or have been more 
proper and effectual to excite his readers punctually to observe all treaties, 
and to concur with their allies, in all things that may strengthen their con- 
federacy, and fix their government upon solid grounds ? But Phylarchus 
passes over the whole in silence : blind to merit the most illustrious ; and 
through want of judgment unable to discern what actions best deserved 
his notice. 

In another place he affirms, that the Lacedaemonians gained a booty of six 
thousand talents from the spoils of Megalopolis : and that two thousand of 
them were, by the customary distribution, allotted to Cleomenes. It must 
surely seem a matter of -surprise, that this writer should thus be found to want 
even that common knowledge, concerning the wealth and abilities of the 
Greeks, with which every historian should especially be acquainted. For, not 
to speak of those calamitous times, itvwhich the fortunes of this people were 
continually wasted by their wars against the kings of Macedon, and 1 by civiL 
wars among themselves ^ I may venture to declare, that even in the present 
age, when they live together in perfect peace and union, and possess all things 
in the greatest plenty, the sale of all the. effects and riches of the whole pro- 
vince of Peloponnesus, the inhabitants alone excepted, would by no means 
be sufficient to produce so large a sum. That this is no vain surmise, but an 
opinion founded upon truth and reason, will most evidently appear, if we con- 
sider only the following fact, which is well established in history, and suf- 
ficiently known to all. When the Athenians, in conjunction with the Tbe- 
bans, designed to attack the Lacedaemonians, and had raised an army often 
thousand men, with a fleet of a hundred triremes; in order to defray the 
expense of the war, it was resolved to impose a tribute, proportioned to the 
estate of every citizen. For this purpose, when an estimate had been made 
of all the wealth and goods, the houses and lands of Attica, the whole was 
found to amount to no more than five thousand, seven hundred, and fifty 
talents. From hence then we ma}- very reasonably collect the truth of what I 
have affirmed concerning the people of Peleponnesus. 

But with regard to the spoils of Megalopolis, we uever can suppose with any 
shew of probability, that they exceeded, even at the highest valuation, three 
hundred talents : since it is acknowledged, that the greater part, as well of the 
slaves as free citizen^ escaped to Messeue. With respect to this opinion, 



©4 GENERAL HISTOKY OF POLYBIUS. 



'B-Hf.WUMU.BI -JW f ^-""^ M MMBSiB: iB WUWM B ra jj M >WE8 



likewise, the following instance must be allowed to lie decisive. The Man- 
tineans, both in wealth and numbers, are confessed even hy Phylarchus him- 
self to be inferior to none of the people of Arcadia. Yet when their city was 
surrendered after' a siege, so that not a single person could escape, nor any 
part of their effects be easily concealed, the whole value of the plunder, with 
the inhabitants themselves included, amounted to no greater sum than that 
which I have mentioned. 

What he afterwards relates is still more wonderful, That ten days before 
the action, a messenger came from Ptolemy, to acquaint Cleomenes that the 
king would no longer furnish money for the war, but advised him to make 
peace with Antigonus ; and that Cleomenes, when he had received this mes- 
sage, resolved immediately to force the enemy to a battle, before the troops 
should be informed of what had happened ; because he was by no means i be 
from his own revenues to support and pay the army. Yet if Cleomenes had sd 
lately gained six thousand talents, he surpassed even Ptolemy himself in 
wealth. And if he hvi !>o^esii: d three hundred only, he might still have 
sustained the war against Antigonus, without any difficulty or distress. To 
affirm, therefore, that Cleomenes was master of so great riches, and at the 
same time ''to declare, that he depended entirely on king Ptolemy for the ne- 
cessary charges of the war, is a fault so gross that it betrays the greatest want 
of judgment and capacity, Absurdities of the same kind with those that have 
been mentioned are every where to be found in this historian : not in his ac- 
counts of these times only, but in every part of his performance. But these s 
which I have here examined, will be sufficient for the present purpose. 

CHAP. V. 

After the reduction of Megalopolis, and while Antigonus lay in winter quar- 
ters in the city of Argos, Cleomenes, having drawn his troops together io 
the beginning of the spring, and encouraged them as the occasion required, 
immediately began his march, and threw himself into the midst oi' the Argian 
territory, with design to lay waste and plunder it. This step was thought by 
tuany to be much too bold and hazardous : because the entrance to the coun- 
try lay through passes that were very strong and difficult. But others, of a 
better judgment, were pursuaded that the attempt was both wise and safe. 
For Cleomenes was in the first place well assured, that as the Macedonian 
forces were now dismissed, his march into the province would be perfectly 
secure from danger. He considered also, that when the inhabitants of Argos 
should behold the country wasted to their very walls, they would not fail to 
express their discontent by loud clamours against Antigonus: that, if this 
prince, unable to withstand the reproaches of the multitude, should draw out 
nis troops and venture on a battle, the Lacedemonians might be sure to gain 
an easy victory : and on the other hand, if Antigonus should remain unmoved 
and still keep himself behind the walls, he hoped at least that the attempt 
itself would serve to check the spirits of the enemy, and raise the courage of 
his own troops ; and that afterwards he might retreat with safety. The event 
fully answered his expectations. The people, enraged to see their country 
ruined, ran together in crowds, threw out better invectives against the king. 
But Antigonus supported ail their insults with such steadiness as was worthy 
©fa general and a prince : and being determined not to suffer any motives to 
prevail against the dictates of sense and reason, he remained quiet within the 
city. Cleomenes, therefore;, pursuing his design, wasted all the country: 
and having struck the enemy with no small terror, and greatly animated his 
own troops against future dangers of the war, he returned back to Sparta 
without any loss. 

On the approach of summer, when the Macedonians and Achaeans had 
again taken the field, Antigonus began his march with all the forces, and di* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYJ3IUS. g$ 



rected his route towards Laconia. His army was composed of a phalanx of 
Macedonians, which consisted of* ten thousand men ; of three thousand Mace- 
donian Peltastae, and three hundred horse ; one thousand Agrianians ; as 
many Gauls; of other mercenaries, three thousand foot and three hundred 
horse; the came number of Achaeans, all select men ; with a thousand Me- 
galopolitans, armed after the Macedonian manner, and commanded by Cer- 
cidas, a citizen of Megalopolis. Among the allies, the Boeotians sent two 
thousand foot, and two hundred horse ; the Epirots, one thousand foot, and 
fifty horse ; and the Acarnanians, the same number. Besides these, there 
were sixteen hundred Illyrians, under the command of Demetrius Pharos. 
So that the whole army consisted of about twenty-eight thousand foot, and 
twelve hundred horse. 

CJeomenes, in expectation that the enemy would advance towards him, se- 
cured the other passages by placing guards, cutting down trees, aud casting 
up entrenchments, and then went and encamped near the place called SelasisT 
with all his forces, which amounted to twenty thousuid men. For he had 
rightly judged, that this was the side by which Antigonus would attempt to 
force his entrance. This pass was formed by two mountains, Eva and Olym- 
pus. Between them runs the river Oenus ; along the banks of which lies the 
road to Sparta. Cleomeues, having thrown up an entrenchment before these 
mountains, stationed the allies upon mount Eva, under the command of his 
brother Euclidas ; while himself took post upon Olympus, with the Lacedae- 
monians, aud one part of the mercenaries. The rest of the mercenaries, to- 
gether with the cavalry, were disposed in the plain below, on both sides of the 
road, along the river. 

When Antigonus arrived, and had seen the strength of the posts in which 
the enemy were lodged, and that Cleomeues had assigned to every part of his 
army the station that was most commodious for it, with so true a skill and 
judgment, that the whole, being equally prepared both for attack and defence 
seemed not uulike to a company of gladiators, all standing iu their proper 
attitudes, and ready to engage : in a word, when lie had seen, not only that 
the troops were disposed in the most advantageous manner to receive an 
enemy, but that the camp also was so strong on every side, that it could hot 
be attacked without great danger, he resolved to remain for some time quiet, 
and not yetattempt to draw the enemy to a battle. He fixed his camp, there- 
fore, at a moderate distance from them, having the river Gorgylus in his front. 

In this situation he remained for some days, examining, with great atten- 
tion, the nature and situation of the several po^ts, as well as the strength, 
temper, and condition of the armies. Sometimes, by making a shew of bavin"" 
some design, he alarmed the expectations of the enemy, and made them at- 
tentive to his motions. But he soon found that all his arts and stratagems 
were useless. For such. was the care and vigilance of CJeomenes, who was 
still upon his guard wherever the danger seemed to threaten, that every part 
of the camp was secure from insult. At last these generals, whom nature 
seemed to have formed alike both in sentiments and courage, agreed b\r joint 
consent to make the experiment of a decisive action. 

To the forces that were stationed upon mount Eva, Antigonus opposed the 
Macedonians, who were armed with brazen bucklers, and the Illyrians, ranged 
together in alternate cohorts, and commanded by Alexander the son of Ac- 
metus, and by Demetrius of Pharos. The second line was composed of the 
Acarnanians and Cretans, who were followed by two thousand Acheans, as a 
body of reserve. The cavalry, under the command of Alexander, was ranged 
along the river, opposite to the cavalry of the enemy, and was supported by a 
thousand Achaean foot, and the same number of Megalopolitans. The king 
himself, with the Macedonians and the mercenaries, conducted the attack 
against Cleomeues npon mount Olympus. The mercenaries composed the 
first time, and after them followed the Macedonians, formed in the double 
phalanx, one part of which was ranged behind the other ; for the narrowness 



9$ GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBItTS. 



of the ground would admit no other disposition. The Illyrians, who had 
passed the river in the night, and stood in order, covered from the sight of the 
enemy, at the foot of mount Eva, were commanded to march up the mountain 
and begin the attack, as soon as they should see an ensign of linen raised upon 
mount Olympus: and the signal for the cavalry and the Megalopolitans was 
to be a vest of purple hoisted near the king. 

When the time of the attack was come, the necessary orders distributed 
among the troops, and the signal given to the Illyrians, they immediately all 
shewed themselves, and marched up the mountain to charge the enemy. But 
the light-armed forces that were placed among the cavalry of Cleomenes, hav- 
ing observed that the Achaeans, as they were labouring to gain the summit of 
the hill, were not covered or supported from behind, advanced and fell sud- 
denly upon their rear. And thus these troops, having Euclidas above theni 
ready to attack their front, and being at the same time pressed by the merce-> 
naries behind, who ran forwards to the charge with great force and fury, were- 
thrown into extreme danger. Philopoemen of Megalopolis, perceiving what had 
happened, and being well aware of the Consequences of it, communicated his 
apprehensions to the generals. And when these paid ho regard to his advice, 
because he was at that time extremely young, and had borne no command in 
the army, he called aloud to his countrymen to follow him, and threw himself 
briskly on the cavalry of the enemy. 

The mercenaries that were engaged with the rear, hearing the noise, and 
seeing what had happened, immediately left the charge, and hastened back 
again to their former post, to support and assist their cavalry. By this means 
the Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest of the troops that were marching up 
the mountain, being freed from the obstacle that had embarrassed and retarded 
them, advanced boldly against the enemy. So that the success, which after-* 
wards was gained on this side against Euclidas, was entirely to be ascribed to 
the discernment and wise conduct of Philopoemen. And it is reported, that 
when the battle was ended, Antigonus, dissembling his knowledge of the truth, 
demanded of Alexander, who commanded the cavalry, why he had begun the 
combat before the signal was made for it : and that when Alexander denied 
that he had done it, and said, that a young man, a Megalopolitan, had given 
the charge in opposition to his orders, the king replied, " That young man, 
then, by seizing the proper time for action, performed the part of a prudent and 
experienced general, and you, the general, the part of an ignorant young man." 

With regard to Euclidas, he totally neglected the advantages which his 
situation gave him ; for when he saw the enemy ascending the hill towards- 
him, he should, in prudence have advanced, and met them on the way, should 
have fallen upon them and disturbed their ranks, and afterwards have retired 
again to the top of the hill. And thus, when he had first spread disorder 
through the ranks, and taken from them that superiority, which was peculiar 
to their arms, and to the manner in which they were ranged in battle, he might 
theu, with the advantage of his post, have gained an easy victory against them. 

But so far was he from pursuing any of these measures, that on the contrary 
his troops stood still in their first station, as if assured of conquest; and 
•eeuied to have been persuaded, that if the enemy were permitted to gain the 
summit, this would only serve to render their flight back agah\more preci- 
pitate and fatal. But the event proved different from their expectations: for 
as the enemy advanced against them in close order, their ranks being all 
entire, Euclidas, for want of sufficient room behind for his army to retire or 
«hange their place, was thrown into the greatest difficulties, and forced to- 
maintain the tight upon the very edge of the hill. In this situation, his troops 
could not long stand against the heavy arms and unbroken disposition of the 
enemy : but, as the Illyrians still pressed forwards, they still gave gro,und 
before them, and were at last constrained to take their flight along the steep 
and craggy sides of the mountain. Their disorder was then complete, and 
a general route ensued. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 97 

During this time, the cavalry on both sides were engaged. The Achaeans, 
whose liberty was especially the subject of the contest, ail exerted their bravest 
efforts ; but Philopoernen signalized himself above the rest; and when his 
horse was killed under him in the action, he continued still to fight on foot, 
till he had received a wound which passed through both his thighs. 

The two kings began the combat upon mount Olympus, with the light- 
armed troops and mercenaries, which amounted on either side to about five 
thousand men. The action, which was sometimes general, and sometimes 
maintained in parties, was remarkably warm and vigorous. For as the troops 
remembered that they stood beneath the eyes of their respective sovereigns, 
and in full sight of both the armies, rank with rank, and man with man, all 
sustaiued the fight with the utmost bravery and spirit. But when Cleomenes 
perceived, that his brother was entirely routed, and that the cavalry in the 
plain began to give ground likewise, being apprehensive that the enemy would, 
soon attack him from every quarter, he resolved to level all his works, and 
draw out his forces in fronton one side of the camp. The trumpets on both 
sides gave the signal for the light-armed troops to retire from the space that 
was between the armies. The phalanxes come forwards with loud cries, turn 
their spears, and advance to the charge. The dispute was long and obstinate. 
Sometimes the Macedonians were repulsed by the bravery and vigour of the 
Lacedaemonians ; and sometimes these gave ground, unable to stand against 
the shock of the Macedonian phalanx. At last the troops of Antigonus, 
crowding close together the points of all their spears, and advancing against 
the enemy with all that weight and violence which are peculiar to the double 
phalanx, forced them out of their entrenchments. 

The whole army fled in disorder, and a general slaughter ensued. But 
Cleomenes, with a few horsemen that attended him, escaped to Sparta, and 
from thence, as soon as night came on, went down to Guthium, and finding 
there some vessels, which, by his orders,had been long kept in readiness against 
all accidents, he presently embarked, together with his friends, and sailed 
away to Alexandria. 

Antigonus made himself master of Sparta upon his first approach. He 
treated the inhabitants with the greatest generosity and clemency, and restored 
to them their antient government. But some days afterwards, having received 
information that the Illyrians had entered Macedon, and were plundering the 
country, he left the city, and directed his march back again with all his forces. 
So contrary are the events of things tb all human foresight, even in affairs of 
the greatest moment; for if Cleomenes had declined a battle but for a few 
days only, or if after his retreat he had remained at Sparta in expectation of 
Some favourable accident, he might still have held possession of his kingdom. 

Antigonus, arriving at Tegea, restored the city to its former state. Two 
days afterwards he came to Argos, and was present at the Nemean games ; and 
when he had there received both from the Achaean republic in general, and 
from every particular city, such applause and honours as might serve to render 
his name illustrious to all posterity, he continued his march in haste towards 
Macedon, surprised the Illyrians in the country, engaged them in battle, and 
gave them an entire defeat. But the cries and shouts, which he made with 
more than usual vehemence, to animate his soldiers during the time of the 
action, were followed by a great discharge of blood, which threw hirn into a 
great disorder that was fatal to him in a short time after. Thus were the 
Greeks deprived of a prince upon whom they had built the highest expecta- 
tions; not so much on account of his skill in war, as because he had shewn 
himself in all his conduct to be a man of strict integrity, and a true friend to 
virtue. At his death he left the kingdom to Philip the son of Demetrius. 

As these transactions are connected with the period from whence I am to 
begin my history, I judged it to be proper, or rather necessary, in pursuing 
my first design, to relate them copiously and distinctly, that it might be f.ora 

VOL. I. NO. IV. N 



98 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

thence discerned what was at that time the condition of the Macedonians and 
the Greeks. Abont the same time, Ptolemy also died of some disease, and 
Ptolemy Philopator succeeded to his kingdom. Seleucas, the son of Seleuca* 
Callinicus, who was also named Pegon, being likewise dead, his brother An- 
tiochus reigned in Syria. For it is remarkable, that as those who first ob- 
tained these kingdoms after Alexander, I mean Seleucas Ptolemy, andLysima- 
chus, all left the world in the hundred-twenty-fourth olympiad, so the princes 
iust now mentioned died altogether likewise in the hundred-thirty-ninth. 

Thus then have we finished the foundation of our history, and shewn, in 
the course of this introduction, at what time, in what manner, and upon what 
pretences, the Romans, after they had subdued the several parts of Italy, began 
first to extend their views abroad, and even contended with the Carthaginian* 
for the empire of the sea; and have also fully explained the condition and 
former fortunes of the Greeks, Macedonians, and Carthaginians. As we are 
now, therefore, arrived at the point which we had first in view, the commence- 
ment of the social war in Greece, of the war of Annibal against the Romans, 
and of that between the kings of Asia for the sovereignty of Coele-syria, we 
shall here close this book, having brought to conclusion the transactions which 
immediately preceded these wars, and seen the deaths of all the princes who 
conducted them. 



ROOK THE THIRD, 

CHAP. I. 

It was mentioned in the first of the two preceding books, that we had fixed 
the beginning of our history at the commencement of the social war; the war 
•f Annibal; and that between Antiochus and Ptolemy, for the sovereignty of 
Coele-syria. in the same book, we took occasion also to explain the reasons 
that inclined us to look back to an earlier age, and to relate, in the way of 
introduction, the chief of those transactions which preceded this period. We 
now go on to give a clear and distinct description of these wars, together with 
the causes, to which they owed both their rise and greatness; but shall first 
premise a short account of the design and subject of our work. 

The chief intention then of this history is to shew at what time, in what 
manner, and from what causes, the whole known world became subject to the 
Roman power. And since this great event had a known beginning, and it 
allowed to have been completed likewise in a determinate course of time, it 
will be useful first to recapitulate all the chief transactions which passed be- 
tween the commencement of it and its completion. From this method the 
reader will be able to acquire at once a right conception of all that we have 
undertaken to describe. For in the study of history, as in every other kind of 
science, as a general view of the whole enables the mind to form a truer judg- 
ment on the several parts ; so, on the other hand, a distinct survey of all the 
parts is also no less necessary for the right comprehension of the whole. We 
have already sufficiently explained the general form and purpose of our work, 
and shewn the bounds of its extent. With regard to the several parts, the 
first in order are the wars just mentioned ; the last, the subversion of the Ma- 
cedonian empire; and these together include a period of fifty-three years, 
which, in the number of great and wonderful events that were then produced, 
far surpasses any equal portion of time before it. In relating those transac- 
tions we shall observe the following order, beginning at the hundred-fortieth, 
olympiad. 

Having first explained the causes of the war between the Carthaginians and 
the Romans, which is most frequently called the war of Annibal, we shall 
shew in what manner this general entered Italy, and gave so great a shock t» 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 99 



the empire of the Romans, that they began to fear that they should soon be 
dispossessed even of their proper country and seat of government; while their 
enemies, elate with a success, which had exceeded all their hopes, were per- 
suaded that Rome itself must fall, as soon as they should once appear before 
it. We shall then speak of the alliance that was made by Philip with the 
Carthaginians, as soon as he had ended his war with the ./Etolians, and settled 
the affairs of Greece. Next will follow the disputes between Antiochus and 
Ptolemy Philopator, and the war that ensued between them for the sovereignty 
of Coele-syria : together with the war which Prusias and the Rhodians made 
upon the people of Byzantium ; with design to force them to desist from 
exacting certain- duties, which they were accustomed to demand from all 
vessels that sailed into the Pontus. In this place we shall pause awhile to 
take a view of the form and constitution of the Roman government : and in 
the course of our inquiry shall endeavour to demonstrate, that the peculiar 
temperament and spirit of their republic supplied the chief and most effectual 
means by which this people were enabled, not only to acquire the sovereignty 
of Italy and Sicily, and to reduce the Gauls and Spaniards to their yoke, but 
to subdue the Carthaginians also : and when they had completed this great 
conquest, to form the project of obtaining universal empire. We shall add, 
likewise, a short digression concerning the fate of Hiero's kingdom of Sicily : 
and afterwards go on to speak of those commotions that were raised in Egypt, 
after the death of Ptolemy, by Philip and Antiochus: the wicked arts by 
which those princes attempted to share between themselves the dominions of 
the infant king ; and the manner in which the former of them invaded Egypt, 
Samos, and Caria ; and the latter, Coele-syria and Phoeniee. We then shall 
make a general recapitulation of all that was transacted by the Carthaginians 
and the Romans in Spain, Sicily, and Afric; and from thence shall again re- 
move the history to Greece, whteh now became the scene of new disorders. 
And having first run through the naval battles of Attalus and the Rhodians 
against king Philip, we 6hall next describe the war that followed between the 
Romans and this prince, together with the causes, circumstances, and con- 
clusion of it. After these events, we* shall relate in what manner the iEto- 
lians, urged by their resentment, called Antiochus from Asia, and gave occa- 
sion to the war between the Achaeans and the Romans. And having explained 
the causes of that war, and seen the entrance of Antiochus into Europe, we 
shall then shew the manner in which he fled back again from Greece; and 
afterwards, when he had suffered an entire defeat, was forced to abandon all 
the country on this side of mount Taurus. Next will follow, the victories by 
which the Romans gave an effectual check to the insolence of the Gauls, se- 
cured to themselves the sovereignty of the citerior Asia; and delivered the 
people of that country from the dread of being exposed to the violence and 
Ravage fury of those barbarians. We shall then give some account of the mis- 
fortunes, in which the jEtolians and Cephallenians were involved, and of 
the war which Eumenes sustained against Prusias and the Gauls of Greece, 
together with that of Ariarathes against Pharnaces. And after some dis- 
course concerning the union and form of government, of the confederate cities 
of Peloponnesus, which will be attended also with some remarks upon the 
growth and flourishing condition of the republic of the Rhodians, we shall, in 
the last place, take a short review of all that has been before related ; and 
conclude the whole with the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes into Egypt, 
and the war with Perseus, which was followed by the entire subversion of 
the Macedonian empire. 

In the course of these events, we shall be able clearly to discern by 
what kind of conduct the Romans gradually enlarged the limits of their power, 
till they had gained the sovereignty of the world. Now, if the bare con- 
templation of good and ill success could of itself enable us to form a right 
judgment on the conduct either of states or private men, we should here 



100 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

close our history, agreeably to our first design : for the period of fifty- 
three years, which contains the whole progress and advancement of the 
Roman greatness, is here concluded ; and from this time, as all were 
ready to acknowledge, nothing more remained than to receive laws from 
this republic, and yi dd an absolute submission to its sway. But the view 
only of the manner in which wars are terminated can never lead us into a 
complete and perfect knowledge, either of the conquerors, or the con- 
quered nations; since, in many instances, the most eminent and signal 
victories, through an injudicious use and application of them, have proved 
fatal and pernicious ; as, on the other hand, the heaviest ills of fortune, 
when supported with constancy and courage, are frequently converted 
into great advantage. On this account it will be useful likewise to re- 
view the policy which the Romans afterwards observed, in governing the 
counts ies that were thus subdued; and to consider also what were the 
sentiments of the conquered states, with respect to the conduct of their 
masters ; at the same time describing the various characters and inclina- 
tions of particular men, and laying open their tempers and designs^- as 
well in private life, as in the affairs of government. From these in- 
quiries the people of the present times will be enabled to discern, how 
far their interest requires them to continue still in their dependence on 
the Romans ; and posterity may also fully understand the whole civil 
policy of this great republic, and pass a right judgment on its defects and 
excellences. And from hence, indeed, will arise the chief advantages 
that are to be expected from this history, with regard both to the present 
and to future times : for it ought never to be supposed, either by those 
who preside in states, or those who are williug to decide with truth con- 
cerning the manner in which they are administered, that the sole end of 
making war is victory. No wise man ever attacked his neighbours for 
the sake only of returning superior from the field. The design of na- 
vigation is not barely to be transported from place to place ; nor is any 
art or science practised with a view simply to acquire a knowledge in it. 
In all human actions there is still some end proposed, either of pleasure, 
honour, or advantage, consequent to our pains and labour. To render, 
therefore, this history complete and perfect, it will be necessary to lay 
open and explain the circumstances and condition of each several people, 
from the time when the contest was decided which gave to the Romans 
the sovereignty of the world, to the rise of new commotions and disorders. 
And as these too were of great importance, and attended with many un- 
common incidents, and as I was myself engaged in the execution of some 
of them, in the conduct and contrivance of others, and was an eye-wit- 
ness of almost all, I shall undertake the task of relating them at large, 
and begin as it were another history. The chief of these transactions 
were the expeditions of the Romans against the Celtiberians and Vac- 
caeans ; the war which the Carthaginians made against Massanissa, a 
sovereign prince of Afric; and that between Attalus and Prusias in Asia. 
We shall also see the manner in which Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, 
was driven from his dominions by Orofernes, assisted by Demetrius, and 
again, by his own address, recovered his paternal rights. We" shall see 
Demetrius, the son of Seleucus, after he had reigned twelve years in 
Syria, deprived of his kingdom and his life, by the conspiracy of the other 
kings. About the same time, the Romans absolved those Greeks that 
were accused of having secretly excited the war of Perseus, and per- 
mitted them to return to their own country ; and, not long afterwards, 
the same Romans made war again upon the Carthaginians ; at the first 
intending to force them to remove the seat of their republic, but after- 
wards with design to exterminate both their name and government, for 
reasons which I shall there endeavour to explain: and, lastly, when the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. - 101 



Macedonians had about this time broken their alliance with the Romans, 
and the Lacedaemonians were also separated from the Peloponnesian 
league, the ill fate of Greece received at once both its beginning and 
full accomplishment, in the loss of the common liberty. 

Such is the design of this work, which, with the favourable aid of for- 
tune, I hope to carry to its destined end. But if my expectation should 
be frustrated, either through the shortness of my lite, or the infirmities 
that are incident to mankind, yet I am persuaded that a subject so cu- 
rious and important cannot fail to excite the attention of many able 
writers, who will esteem it a task well worthy of their pains to finish 
what I shall leave imperfect. 

As we have thus enumerated all the chief events of which we intend 
to treat, and given the reader a just conception both of the general plan 
of our work, and of its several parts, it is now time to remember what we have 
proposed, and to enter upon the beginning of our subject. 

Among the writers that have transmitted to us the history of Annibal, there 
are some who assign two causes of the second war between the Carthaginians 
and the Romans. The first, they say, was the siege of Saguntum ; and the 
other, the passage of the Carthaginians over the river Iberus, in direct breach 
of treaties. Now, that these two incidents were the beginning of the war I 
shall readily allow, but by no means that they were the causes of it. It might 
with equal reason be affirmed, that the first irruptiou of Alexander into Asia 
was the cause of his war against the Persians ; and the arrival of Antiochus 
with an army at Demetrius, the cause of that war which followed with the 
Romans. Vet nothing can be more absurd or false : for it is certain that 
Alexander, and indeed his father Philip, had, long before this time, formed 
the project of an expedition into Persia, and made great preparations for it: 
and the JEtoliaus likewise were no less fixed in their design to excite a war 
against the Romans, before Antiochus ean.e into Greece. Such mistakes arise 
from not remembering that a distinction should be always made between the 
cause and pretext, and the beginning of a war ; and that the first of these are 
in order always antecedent t« the latter. To speak justly, the beginning is 
the first step towards the execution of any project, after it has been deter- 
mined. The cause is previous to all determination. It is something that 
first suggests the project to the mind, that inclines us to examine it, to de- 
liberate, determine, and at last to carry >it into execution. I will endeavour 
more clearly to explain my meaning by the following exam], le. The causes 
of the war against the Persians are obvious, and easy to be understood. The 
first was, the retreat of the GreeKs under the command of Xenophon ; who, in 
their return from the upper provinces of Asia, traversed the whole country of 
their enemies, without being encountered by any force that was able to stand 
before them. The other was, the irruption of Agesilaus, king of Sparta, into 
Asia, where he found no strength sufficient to obstruct his progress, though, 
indeed, the troubles that were then raised in Greece constrained him to aban- 
don his designs, and return back again without performing any action of im- 
portance : for Philip, having resolved these things in his mind, and compared" 
the softness and effeminacy of the Asiatics with his own skill in war, and with 
the bravery of the Macedonian soldiers, and being invited also by the richness 
of the prize that was before him, had no sooner fully gamed the favour of the 
states of Greece, than he resolved to turn his arms against the Persians, and 
began, with eagerness, to make all the preparations that were necessary for this 
design; at the same time declaring, thjtt his purpose was to avenge the injuries 
which the Greeks had received from Persia. It is clear, therefore, that the 
things first mentioned were the causes of the Persian war, as the last was the 
pretext ; and that the fi^st entrance of Alexander into Asia was the beginning 
of it. In the same manner also, the resentment of the iEtolians must be con- 



102 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

__. i ■ i ii 1 1 1, ■■———. ■ i 

sidered as the cause of the war between Autiochus and the Romans : for this 
people s as we have already mentioned, being persuaded that the Romans, at 
the time of the conclusion of their war with Philip, had treated them in many 
points with great contempt and scorn, invited Antiochus into Greece, and re- 
solved to attempt and suffer every thing, rather than leave their indignation 
unappeased. The pretext by which Autiochus and the iEtolians endeavoured 
to engage the several cities into their design, and which, indeed, was founded 
neither on truth nor reason, was to restore liberty to Greece ; and the begin- 
ning of the war was the arrival of Antiochus at Demetrias. 

In making these reflections, it is not so much my intention to pass a censure 
upon those historians as to instruct the political reader in a point which ought 
at all times to be viewed with great attention : for a statesman that knows not 
how to trace the origin of events, and discern the different sources from whence 
they take their rise, may be compared with a physician who neglects to inform 
himself of the causes of those distempers which he is called in to cure. The 
services of both are alike useless and contemptible : and, as the latter must be 
wholly unacquainted with the proper means of restoriug the body to it* lost 
health and vigour, so neither can it be supposed that the former should ever be 
able to have recourse to the necessary remedies, in the disorders that are in* 
cident,to states, Our pains, therefore, cai^ never be better employed, than in 
searching out the causes of events : for the most trifling incidents frequently 
give birth to matters of the greatest moment and importance ; and it is easier 
likewise, upon all occasions, to check or remedy an evil in its commencement, 
than when it has made some progress. 

According to the Roman historian Fabius, it was the insatiable ambition of 
Ajdrubal, and his love of power, which, together with the injury that was done 
to the Saguntines, were the causes of the war : for Asdrubal, says this writer, 
when he had first spread his conquest over a considerable part of Spain, re- 
turned to Carthage, and there formed the project of subverting the laws and 
liberty of his country, and of changing the government into a monarchy. 
But when the chief among the citizens had penetrated into his design, and 
were beginning to concert the proper measures to oppose it, he went back 
again to Spain, and, during the remainder of his life, governed the country by 
his own single will, and paid no regard to the senate of Carthage. He then 
adds, that Annibal, who from his infancy had been instructed in all the coun- 
sels of this general, and had carefully observed his conduct as a right pattern 
for himself, was no sooner invested with the supreme command in Spain, than 
he resolved to pursue in all things the same scheme of government ; that, 
agreeably to this determination, he made war upon the Romans, consulting in 
it his own inclinations only, and not the interests of his country ; that the Car- 
thaginians were averse to the war ; and that not one citizen of rank in the whole 
republic approved of his attacking the Saguntines. In the last place, he re- 
lates, that, as soon as Saguntum was destroyed, the Romans sent some depu- 
ties to Carthage, to require that Annibal should be surrendered into their 
bunds, and to declare war, in case that this demandshould be refused. Let us 
then ask this writer, could the Carthaginians, if they were in truth dissatisfied 
with that which Annibal had done, ever hope to find an occasion more fa- 
vourable to all their sentiments, or any expedient more just and advantageous, 
than what was now proposed ; since, by yielding to the demands of the Ro- 
mans, and delivering up the author of the injury, they might at once have re- 
moved, in a specious manner, the man who was known to be an enemy to 
their state, secured their country from invasion, turned aside the dangers of the 
war that threatened them, and, in a word, by a single decree only of the 
senate, might have taken an effectual and sufficient vengeance for all that had 
now been transacted ? This is a question to which the Roman historian can 
make no reply: for so far were the Carthaginians from pursuing any of these 
measures, that, on the contrary, they maintained the war under the sole di- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 102 

rection and care of Annibal, during the course of seventeen years, nor ever 
were inclined to bring it to a conclusion, till all hopes of success were lost, and 
the safety of their country rendered almost desperate. 

With regard to my design, in passing this censure on Fabius and hi* 
writings, I was not led to it by any apprehension that his accounts would 
otherwise gain credit with the reader: for his inaccuracy and want of judg- 
ment are every where so discernible, that they need not be particularly 
pointed out. But I was willing to caution those who take his works into their 
hands, that they should consider always the facts themselves, rather than the 
character of the writer: for there are some whose prejudices so strongly favour 
him, because he was a senator of Rome, and lived in the times of which he 
writes, that they admit, without any kind of doubt or hesitation, every thing 
which he relates. For my own part, as I did not think that his authority 
should be entirely disregarded, so neither can I allow it to have sufficient 
weight to decide in any point, unless it be supported also by the credibility 
of the facts. But it is time to finish this digression. 

Among the true causes, then, of the second war between the Carthaginians 
and the Romans, the resentment and indignation of Amilcar Barcas, the father 
of Annibal, may justly be considered as one. Notwithstanding the ill success 
of this general in Sicily, his spirit remained unconquered, when he reflected 
that he had preserved the forces that were under his command at Eryx still 
entire ; and that all of them were animated by the same disposition as himself. 
After the last defeat of the Carthaginians by sea, which obliged them to sue 
for peace, he yielded, indeed, to the necessities of the times, but retained a 
strong desire of revenge, and only waited for an occasion to declare it ; and, in 
all probability, his management would very suddenly have produced another 
war, if the disorders in which his country was then involved by the rebellion 
of the mercenaries, had not engaged his whole attention. 

No sooner were these troubles ended, than the Romans agaiu declared war; 
and the Carthaginians, emboldened by the justice of their cause, seemed at 
first determined to accept it, as we mentioned in the former books, which the 
reader will rind to be so necessary an introduction to this work, that, without 
their assistance, he will scarcely be able fully to comprehend either what I now 
write, or what hereafter may come to Be related. But as their enemies paid 
no regard to this justice, the Carthaginians were forced to comply with what 
the times demanded ; and, rather than submit to any hazard in the present 
circumstauees, consented, though with great reluctance, to yield up Sardinia 
to the Romans, and to pay twelve kundred talents above the sum that had 
been before exacted from them. 

These concessions are to be looked upon as the second, and, indeed, the 
principal cause of the war that followed : for Amilcar, observing that his own 
resentment was strengthened by an equal degree of indignation in his fellow- 
citizens, had no sooner finished the destruction of the mercenaries, and se- 
cured the tranquillity of Carthage, than he applied all his thoughts to Spain, 
as the place from whence he might best procure the necessary supplies for an 
expedition against the Romans ; and the great success which he met with in 
that country may be considered as the third cause of the war ; because nothing 
but the strength and the resources which the Carthaginians drew from thence 
could have inspired them with confidence to undertake it. 

It might be shewn, by many arguments, that Amilcar was the first author 
and contriver of the second Punic war, though he died ten years before the 
commencement of it : but what 1 am going to relate will sufficiently prove it 
beyond all doubt. At the time when Annibal, after his defeat in Afric and 
departure from his country, was entertained at the court of Antiochus, the 
Romans, having discovered the designs of the jEtolians, sent ambassadors to 
that prince, to sound his dispositions and intentions. The ambassadors, per- 
ceiving that he inclined to the iEtolians, and was disposed to enter heartily in- 



104 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



to the war, endeavoured to inspire him with a jealousy of Annibal ; and, to that 
end, shewed a more than common respect to the Carthaginians. Their de- 
signs succeeded ; the king became doubtful of his truth, and his doubts grew 
stronger every day. At last, when they had one day found an opportunity of 
explaining their mutual disconteut, Annibal, after he had in vain employed 
many arguments and protestations of his sincerity, went on to acquaint him 
that, when his father was offering sacrifice to Jupiter, just before his departure 
into Spain, he stood near him at the altar, being then but nine years old ; 
and that, when the libations and other rites were ended, Amilcar, having' 
commanded the rest that were about the altar to retire, called him to him, 
caressed, and asked him if he would attend him to the army ; to which, when 
he cheerfully consented, and even requesled that he might go, with that sort 
of eagerness which belongs to children, his father led him to the altar, and 
commanded him to touch the victims, and to swear that he never would be a 
friend to the Romans. You may, therefore, continued he, rest assured, that, 
when yon are forming any design against the Romans, I shall encourage and 
assist you with sincerity and zeal : but whenever you incline to terms of treaty 
or alliance with them, from that time let me advise you, not to seek for the 
evidence of information, but to mistrust me, and watch me carefully: for I 
shall still look out for every occasion of working mischief to that people. This 
discourse, which was delivered with that kind of passion which truth inspires, , 
effectually removed all suspicion from the mind of Antiochus. 

This, it must be acknowledged, is a manifest instance of Amilcar's hatred 
of the Romans, and of the projects which he at that time meditated ; but the 
events that followed are a still clearer confirmation of both; for what can more 
strongly denote the violence as well as certainty of this disposition in Amilcar, 
than the conduct of the son-in-law Asdrubal, and Anmbal his son, whom he 
had incited by his counsels and example to the most inveterate enmity against 
the same people that can be well conceived ? The first, indeed, died before he 
was able fully todiscover his intentions to the world ; but the other found the 
times more favourable to his purpose, and gave abundant proofs of his here- 
ditary hatred in the strongest and most public manner. From hence we may 
learn how necessary it is, that those who are intrusted with the administration 
of government should make it one of of the first objects of their care- to be well 
acquainted with the secret disposition and designs of any people with whom 
they conclude a peace, or make a new alliance ; and observe whether their 
consent be yielded to the circumstances of the times, or whether it proceed 
from a perfect and sincere submission, that they may be always upon their 
guard against those who are influenced by the first motive, as men that wait 
only for a more seasonable opportunity of acting ; and, on the other hand, 
that they may repose an entire confidence in the others, esteem them their 
true friends and subjects, and employ them in any service that shall occur. 

Such were the causes of the war of Annibal : let us now attend to the begin- 
ning of it. 

It was not without great reluctance and concern, that the Carthaginians had 
been forced to abandon Sicily. But the loss of Sardinia afterwards, together 
with the payment of a new and heavy tribute, added a still sharper sting to 
their resentment. No sooner, therefore, had they reduced beneath their 
power the most considerable part of Spain, than they listened, with the utmost 
eagerness, to every matter of complaint against the Romans. When Asdrubal 
was dead, who had governed the affairs of Spain after Amilcar, they for some 
time delayed to appoint his successor, till they could know the sentiments of 
the army. But when the news arrived that the troops had with one consent 
made choice of Annibal for their general, they called together an assembly of 
the people, and with one voice also confirmed the election. As soon as Anni- 
bal was invested with this dignity, he began his march to subdue the Olcades ; 
- and having encamped before Althaea, the strongest of their cities, he pressed 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 10* 



the siege with so much vigour, that he soon made himself master of the place. 
The neighbouring towns were struck with terror, and submitted. Annibal 
sold them for money, and, having by that means gained great stores of wealth, 
he returned to his winter quarters at New Carthage. His treatment of those 
that were under his command was, in every instance, great and generous ; 
and, by the punctual payment of the military stipends, as well as by the pro- 
mise also of large rewards for the time to come, he obtained the favour and es- 
teem of all the troops, and filled them with the warmest hopes. 

When the summer returned, having led his forces into the territory of the 
Vaccaeans, he made himself master of Elmantica in the first assault. He took 
also the city of Arbucale by storm, but rot till it had first sustained a siege, in 
which he often was reduced to great extremity : for the place was of large ex- 
tent ; and the inhabitants likewise, who were very numerous, defended them- 
selves with the greatest biavery. After this success, he Was surprised at once, 
when he least expected it, by a danger that seemed likely to prove fatal to 
him. The Carpesians, the strongest and most r owerful people of the country, 
had drawn together all their forces, to intercept him in his return. They were 
joined by many also of the neighbouring nations", who had been animated to 
this attempt by the Elmanticans and Olcades, that had saved themselves by 
flight after the destruction of their cities. If the Carthaginians ,ad been 
forced to engage in a set battle against so great a force, their defeat must have 
been inevitable and Complete.' But Annibal, like a prudent and experienced 
general, retreated behind the -Tag us ; and, having the river in his front,, re- 
solved to expect the barbarians there, and to dispute their passage. By the help 
of this advantage, and with the assistance also of his elephants, which were 
about forty in number, the success was such as exceeded even his hopes. The 
enemy came down with the greatest eagerness and haste, and plunged into the 
river in many parts at once ; but no sooner had they gained the other side 
than they were met and trodden down in heaps by the elephants that ranged 
along the bank. Great numbers of them also were destroyed in their passage 
over, by the Carthaginian cavalry, who were able more effectually to contend 
with the violence of the stream, and who fought also with no small advantage 
against the foot that stood below them. Annibal then passed the river, 
charged the enemy, and gave them ah entire defeat, though their numbers 
amouuted to more than a hundred thousand men. After this signal victory, 
there was not any people left on that side, of the Iberus, except only the Sa- 
guntines, that were able to oppose the progress of the Carthaginians, or to ap- 
pear against them in the field. But Annibal, remembering carefully the 
counsels and the plan of conduct which his father Amilcar had recommended 
to him, delayed for some time longer to attack Saguntum, being determined 
not to give the Romans any plausible pretence for declaring war, till he had 
first secured his other conquests, and settled the country in such a state as was 
most proper for his design. 

During this time the Saguntines, in apprehension of what soon afterwards 
ensued, sent frequent messengers to Rome, to inform the senate of the rapid 
progress and success of Annibal. The Romans had long neglected these 
advices : at last, however, they resolved to send some deputies into Spain, to 
inspect the truth. Annibal, having reduced the several nations against whom 
he had at that time turned his arms, was again come back, to take his 
winter quarters at New Carthage, which was the capital city, and seat of 
government of the Carthaginians, in that part of Spain which was sub- 
ject to their power. He there found the Roman deputies, and admitted them 
to an audience. They adjured him by the gods not to offer any violence to 
the Saguntines, the allies of Rome, and to remain on that side of the Iberus, 
agreeably to the treaty made with Asdrubal. Annibal, who was at that time 
young, and eager in his appetite for war, animated by his late success, and 
incited also by a long and habitual hatred of the Romans, replied as if he had, 

VOL. 1. NO. 4, » 



105 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

been a friend to the Saguntines, and complained to the ambassadors that the 
Romans, taking occasion, from some disorders that had happened in the place 
not long before, and which were submitted to their decision, had, by an arbi- 
trary sentence, condemned some of the magistrates to die. This injustice 
called aloud, he said, for his resentment ; since the Carthaginians always had 
considered it as one of the most sacred customs of their country, to redress and 
avenge the injured. At the same time he sent to Carthage, to know what 
measures he should take with respect to the Saguntines, who, through confi- 
dence in their alliance with the Romans, had offered violence, as he said, to 
some of the neighbouring people, that were under the protection of the repub* 
lie. It is easy to remark, that, in the whole of the proceeding, he was hurried 
headlong by his passions, and not led by reason. Instead, therefore, of acknow- 
ledging the true motives of his conduct, he was forced to have recourse to ab- 
surd pretences, as it usually happens to men who are prevented by their pre- 
judices from giving a fair attention to what is just and right. How much bet- 
ter would it have been, to have demanded of the Romans, that they should re- 
store Sardinia, and yield back the tribute, which, without any shew of justice, 
they had extorted from the Carthaginians in the times of their distress ? But 
now, by being wholly silent concerning that which might have been con- 
sidered as a reasonable pretence for taking arms, and urging only those 
false and frivolous motives which respected the Saguntines, he seemed, in 
the opinion of every one, to enter into the war, not only in opposition to 
sound sense and reason, but in express violation also of all the laws of justice. 

The ambassadors, perceiving clearly that a war must follow, sailed imme- 
diately away to Carthage, in order to repeat again, before the senate, the same 
remonstrances which they had now made to Annibal. But they had no kind of 
apprehension that Italy would become the seat of the war ; but expected rather 
that all hostilities would be confined to Spain ; and designed to use Saguntuna 
as their place of arms. Under this persuasion, the Roman senate, conceiving 
that the war would be long and difficult, and far removed from their own 
country, resolved, in the first place, to quiet those disorders that had now hap-* 
penedin Illyria. 

For Demetrius of Pharos, forgetting all the favours which had been heaped 
tipon him by the Romans, and even beginning to think meanly of their power, 
when he observed the consternation into which the Gauls had thrown them, 
and which was now renewed again by the preparations that were made by An- 
nibal, from this time resolved to place "all his hopes in the royal house of 
Macedon, to whose alliance and protection he had some kind of claim, because 
he had joined his forces with Antigonus, in the war against Cleomenes. Fixed 
in this design, he began to plunder and destroy the Roman cities in Illyria ; 
and, sailing with fifty armed frigates beyond Lyssus, in contempt of treaties, 
ravaged many of the Cyclade islands. As the house of Macedon was at this 
time strong and flourishing, the Romans conceived it to be highly necessary 
that they should secure against all danger those provinces that were situated 
to the east of Italy ; and were persuaded that it would then be early enough 
to oppose the motions of the Carthaginians, when they had first recovered the 
lllyrians from their folly, and chastised the ingratitude and rashness of Deme- 
trius. But the event proved contrary to their hopes : for Annibal prevented 
them by his diligence. Having made himself master of Saguntum, he re- 
moved the scene of war into the very heart of Italy, and brought it even to the 
gates of Rome, 

CHAP. II. 

In the beginning of the spring, in the first year of the hundred fortieth Olym- 
piad, the Romans, pursuing the design that has now been mentioned, sent 
L. jErailius with an army into Illyria. At the same time Annibal began his 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 107 

ti m f mmm mmmmm ^s— „ , 1 1 1 , . ' -'■ ■ 1 — fc. 

march from New Carthage towards Saguntum. This city is situated at the 
distance of about seven stadia from the sea, upon the foot of those mountains 
which form the frontiers of Iberia and Celtiberia. The country round it is 
distinguished by its richness and fertility, above all the other parts of Spain. 
Annibal, having encamped before the place, began to push the siege with the 
closest vigour. He saw that from this conquest many advantages would arise, 
of the greatest moment with respect to the future execution of his designs : 
for, first, as the Romans would then lose all hope of making Spain the theatre 
of the war, so by this success he was sure to strike a general terror into all the 
country, which would both render those that had submitted to the power of 
Carthage more tractable and steady in their duty, and make the rest, who 
were yet unconquered, more cautious of attempting any thing against him. 
He considered likewise, that there would then no enemy be left behind him, 
to harass or retard his march ; that the treasures of the city would procure, in 
the greatest plenty, such supplies as were necessary for the war; that the 
troops, by the taste of plunder, would be animated to a higher degree of ar- 
dour and alacrity ; and, in the last place, that the spoils, which he designed 
to send to Carthage, would secure to him the favour of his citizens at home. 
Urged by the hope of these advantages, he employed his utmost efforts in the 
6iege, making himself an example to the army, and sharing with them in every 
labour and in every duty, sometimes encouraging the troops by words, and 
sometimes throwing himself the first into the greatest dangers. At last, when 
for eight months' continuance he had experienced every kind of fatigue and 
hardship, he took the place by storm, and gained an immense booty, in money, 
slaves, and valuable goods. He reserved the money, as he had at first pro- 
posed, to assist him in the execution of his designs, distributed the slaves 
among his soldiers, in such proportion as was suited to each man's services, and 
sent the rest of the spoil to Carthage. The consequence was such as he had 
foreseen, and fully answered all his expectations. The soldiers encountered 
dauger with greater eagerness than before ; the Carthaginians readily complied 
with every thing that was demanded of them ; and from the treasure which 
he had gained he drew many great advantages in the progress of the war. 

As soon as Demetrius was informed of the preparations of the Romans, he 
placed a strong garrison in Dimalus, and furnished it with all the necessary 
stores. In the rest of the cities he caused all the chief inhabitants that were 
averse to his interest to be put to death, and placed the government in others, 
of whose fidelity he was well assured : and having selected, from the bravest 
of all his subjects, a body of six thousand men, he stationed them under his own 
command, in Pharos. 

When the Roman consul, arriving in the country, perceived that the Illyrians 
had reposed their greatest confidence in the strength of Dimalus, and in the 
stores with which it was supplied, and that they esteemed it to be even im- 
pregnable, he resolved, in order to strike the enemy with terror, to make his 
first attempt upon that city. Having called together therefore all the officers, 
and exhorted each man severally to be strenuous in his duty, he advanced his 
works against the place in many parts at once, and pressed the siege with so 
much vigour, that after six days he took the town by storm. The rest of the 
cities, on every side, were filled with consternation, and sent in haste, and sub- 
mitted to the Romans. The consul received them all, upon such conditions 
as he judged convenient, and immediately sailed away to attack Demetrius in 
Pharos. But when he heard that the city was strongly fortified, and defended 
also by a numerous garrison, who were all chosen troops, and that large sup- 
plies had been laid up in it, as well of provisions as of all the necessary stores 
of war, he begaa to apprehend that a regular siege might engage him in a work 
of long continuance, and be attended with no small difficulty. He resolved, 
therefore, while the occasion favoured him, to employ the following stratagem. 
Having landed the greatest part of his troops by night upon the island, with 



103 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



orders to conceal themselves in the woods and other covered places, as soou as 
day appeared, he came sailing, in open view, with Only twenty ships, into the 
'harbour that lay nearest to the city. Demetrius saw their approach, and, 
despising the srnallness of their numbers, led out some troops towards the 
harbour, to oppose their landing. As the fight by degrees grew warm and 
obstinate, fresh forces still arrived from the city to support the former, till at 
last the whole garrison was engaged. At this time the Romans that had 
landed in the night, having advanced through secret roads, appeared in sight, 
and, seizing a strong eminence that stood between the city and the harbour, 
they posted themselves upon it, and cut off the return of the Illyrians to the 
city. Demetrius, perceiving what had happened, no longer endeavoured to 
prevent the enemy from landing ; but, having collected all his troops together, 
and exhorted them to perform their duty, he marched towards the eminence in 
order of battle. When the Romans saw that the Illyrians moved towards 
them with great alacrity and in perfect order, they advanced on their part like- 
wise, and charged them with unusual fury. At the same time, the troops 
also that had just now landed fell upon the rear. The Illyrians, being thus 
attacked On every side, were soon thrown into disorder and confusion, so that 
a general route ensued. A small nnmber of them fted towards the city ; but 
the rest escaped through private roads, and concealed themselves in different 
parts of the island. Demetrius, having retreated to some vessels that had 
been provided by him against all accidents, and which lay at anchor in a pri- 
vate place, sailed away by night, and, by a surprising kind of fortune, arrived, 
without any accident, at the court of Philip, and there passed the remainder 
of his life. He was a man of a brave and daring spirit ; but his courage was 
fierce and violent, and never conducted by the rule of reason. The manner, 
therefore, of his death was perfectly agreeable to this character, and to his 
former life : for, in endeavouring to take Messene, hy the command of Philip, 
he was hurried on so far by his impetuosity and want of temper, that he 
perished in the action, as we shall relate more fully in its proper place. 

The consul, after this success, entered Pharos without resistance, and razed 
it to the ground ; and, having made himself master of the other parts of II- 
lyria, and settled the state of all the province agreeably to his first design, the 
summer being now ended, he returned to Rome, entered the city in triumph, 
and was received with all the acclamations and applause that were due to 
the great skill and courage which he had shewn in the discharge of his com** 
mission), 

CHAP. HI. 

When the Romans received the news that Saguntum was taken, they by no 
means made it any part of their deliberations, whether they should enter into 
a war with Carthage, though some writers affirm the contrary, and have even 
transmitted to us the speeches that were made, on either side, in the course of 
the debate. But nothing can be more absurd and groundless than this con- 
ceit : for the Romans had, in fact, declared war a year before against the Car- 
thaginians, in case that any violence should be ottered to the Saguntines. How 
then can they at this time be supposed, when Saguntum was actually taken 
and destroyed, to have been at all divided in their sentiments, with respect to 
war or peace ? What those historians afterwards relate, is no less destitute of 
all support from truth or probability : ** That the Romans were struck with 
the greatest constevnat on, and brought their sons of twelve years old into 
the senate, and communicated to them all the public counsels ; and that these 
children observed the strictest secrecy with regard to what had passed, and 
concealed it even from their nearest friends." As if this people, besides the 
other peculiar benefits which they have received from fortune, were possessed 
also of the privilege of becoming wise from the very moment of their birth* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

But there is no need to employ many words to relate these idle stories, suited 
only to the taste and judgement of the vulgar, among whom they first took 
their rise, and which disgrace the name of history. 

As soon then as the Romans were informed of the destruction of Saguntum, 
they admitted no delay, but sent away their ambassadors, to propose two 
things to the Carthaginians : the first of which carried with it a diminution of 
their honour, as well as some injury to their state ; and the other involved them 
at once in an affair of the greatest difficulty and danger. For their orders 
were, to demand that Annibal and the rest of the chief commanders should 
be delivered to the Romans; and, in case that this should be refused, instantly 
to declare war. When the ambassadors arrived at Carthage, they addressed 
the senate, agreeably to these instructions. The Carthaginians received the 
alternative with no small pain, and appointed the ablest member of their body 
to defend the late transactions. This person, it: discharging his commission, 
passed over in silence the treaty that was made with Asdrubal, as if no such 
treaty had ever been made ; or if there had, that it by no means could be 
thought to bind the senate, because it never had received their approbation or 
consent. Upon this head he appealed to the example of the Romans them- 
selves, and reminded them, that in the time of the Sicilian war, a treaty 
which Lutatius had concluded with the Carthaginians was afterwards 
declared by the Roman people to be void, as having been made without their 
knowledge and authority. But that which was chiefly urged was, the treaty 
. that was fully settled between the two republics, at the end of the war in 
Sicily, in which no mention was made of Spain. It was, indeed, declared, 
that no injury should be offered to the allies of either people; but the Cartha- 
ginians shewed, that the Saguntines were not at that time in alliance with the 
Romans. On this point, therefore, they rested their whole defence, and re- 
curred again and again to the words of the treaty. But the Romans 
altogether refused to enter into this debate. They said, that if Sagun- 
tum had still remained entire, such discussions might, perhaps, have been ad- 
mitted, and the contest cleared by words. But as that city had been actually 
stormed and pillaged in contempt of treaties, it was now incumbent on them, 
either to remove the charge of having directed or connived at this injustice, by 
delivering up to punishment the authors of it ; or, on the ot*'er hand, by refus- 
ing to comply with this demand, to avow, without reserve, that they were 
sharers in the guilt, and ready to await the consequences of it. 

It may, perhaps, be useful to those who are at any time engaged in delibera- 
tions of a like nature and importance, to take a closer view of the true state 
and merits of this congest. With this design, and in order to free the reader 
from those perplexities in which the mistakes and prejudices of other his- 
torians will be likely to entangle him, we shall here set before his view the 
several treaties that had ever been concluded between the two republics, from 
the earliest times. 

The first was of the age of Lucius Junius Brutus, and Marcus Horatius, who 
were created the first consuls, after the expulsion of the kings, and who conse- 
crated the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This was twenty-eight years before 
Xerxes invaded Greece. I have given the sense of it with all the skill and 
accuracy of which I am master ; for the language that was used in those times 
is so different from that which is now spoken among the Romans, that fre- 
quently the best interpreters, even after the closest application, are unable to 
explain it. 

" Between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians and their 
allies, there shall be peace and alliance upon these conditions. Neither the 
Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless com- 
pelled by bad weather or an enemy. And in case that they are forced beyond 
it, they shali not be allowed to take or purchase any thing, except what is 
barely necessary for refitting their vessels, or for sacrifice : and they shall de- 



1 10 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

— mmemamm. — ■— — — amm n mii m . imm— lu i- m -i n ....^i iiiii iii m m 1 1 mm — mmmm in— —a— hui ii m 

part within five days. The merchants that shall offer any goods to sale in 
Sardinia, or any part of Afric, shall pay no customs, but only the usual fees to 
the scribe and crier; and the public faith shall be a security to the merchant, 
for whatever he shall sell in the presence of these officers. If any of the Ro- 
mans land in that part of Sicily which belongs to the Carthaginians, they shall 
suffer no wrong or violence in any thing. The Carthaginians shall not suffer 
any injury to the Ardeates, Antiates, Laurentines, Circaeans, Tarracinians, or 
any other people of the Latins, that have submitted to the Roman jurisdiction. 
Nor shall they possess themselves of any city of the Latins that is not subject 
to the Romans. If any one of these be taken, it shall be delivered to the 
Romans in its entire state. The Carthaginians shall not build any fortress in 
the Latin territory ; and if they land there in a hostile manner they shall de- 
part before night." 

This Fair Promontory stands on the north side of Carthage ; and their de- 
sign, as I imagine, in not permitting the Romans to sail forwards to the south 
of it, was, that they might conceal from them the knowledge of the country 
that lay round Byzacium and the Little Syrtis, which, on account of its un- 
common richness and fertility, was called two markets. But in case that 
they are forced beyond it by rough weather, or an enemy, they then engage, 
indeed, to supply them with whatever may be wanted for refitting their 
vessels, or for sacrifice, but allow nothing to be taken beyond what is barely 
necessary, and enjoin them to depart within five days. But Carthage, and 
the other parts of Afric that stand on this side the Fair Promontory, together 
with Sardinia likewise, and as much of Sicily as belonged to the Carthagi- 
nians, are left open to the Roman merchants ; and the public faith is pledged 
for their security and eqnitable treatment. 

It is to be observed, that the Carthaginians here speak of Afric and Sardinia, 
as being entirely subject to their jurisdiction. But with regard to Sicily, the 
conditions of the treaty are expressly limited to those parts of the island only 
which are said to belong to Carthage. The Romans observe, on their part 
also, the same manner of expressi6n, in speaking of the Latin territory : and 
no mention is made of the rest of Italy, which they had not at that time 
subdued. 

There was afterwards another treaty, in^whicb the Carthaginians,united the 
Tyrians and the Uticeans ; and to the Fair Promontory before mentioned they 
now added Mastia and Tarseium, beyond which it was not permitted to the 
Romans to f-iil in search of plunder, or to build any city. These are the^ 
words of the treaty. 

" Between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, 
L T ticeans, and their allies, there shall be peace and alliance upon these con- 
ditions. The Romans shall not sail in search of plunder, nor carry on any 
traffic, nor build any city, beyond the Fair Promontory, Mestia, and Tar- 
seium. If the Carthaginians take any city of the Latins, not belonging to 
the Roman jurisdiction, ffiey may reserve to themselves the prisoners, with the 
rest of the booty, but shall restore the city, if any of the Carthaginians gain any 
captives from a people that is allied, by a written treaty, with the Romans, 
though they are not the subjects of their empire, they shall not bring them into 
the Roman ports; in case they so do, the Romans shall be allowed to claim, and 
set them free. The same condition shall be observed also by the Romans ; 
and when they land in search of water, or provisions, upon any country that is 
subject to the Carthaginians, they shall be supplied with what is necessary* 
and then depart, without offering any offence to the allies and friends of Car- 
thage. The breach of these conditions shall not be resented as a private in- 
jury, but be prosecuted as the public cause of either people. The Roman* 
shall not carry on any trade, or build any city, in Sardinia or in Afric; nor 
shall they even visit those countries, unless for the sake of getting provisions, 
or refitting their ships. Ifthjey are driven upon them by a storm, they shall 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. Ill 

depart within five days. In those parts of Sicily which belong to the Car- 
thaginians, and in the city of Carthage, the Romans may expose their goods 
to sale, and do every thing that is permitted to the citizens of the republic. 
The same indulgence shall be yielded to the Carthaginians at Rome." 

In this second treaty, as in the former, the Carthaginians assert their entire 
right to Afric and Sardinia, and forbid the entrance of the Romans there o» 
any pretence. But in speaking of Sicily, they mention only so much of the 
island as had submitted to the power of Carthage. The Romans use also the 
same manner of expression, in that part of the treaty which regards the country 
of the Latins: where they stipulate, that the Carthaginians shall offer no in- 
jury to the Antiates, Ardeates, Tarracinians, and Circeans. These were the 
people who inhabited the maritime towns of Latium, 

About the time when Pyrrhus invaded Italy, before the Carthaginians were 
engaged in the war of Sicily, a third treaty was concluded, in which the con- 
ditions of the former two were all confirmed, together with this addition. 

" If the Carthaginians or the Romans enter into any treaty with king 
Pyrrhus, this condition shall be inserted : that it shall be allowed to either 
people to send assistance to the other, if their country be invaded. That to 
whomsoever such assistance shall be sent, tlie Carthaginians shall be obliged 
to furnish vessels, both for the passage and return : but the pay of the troops 
shall be discharged by those in whose service they are employed. The Car- 
thaginians shall assist the Romans by sea, if it be necessary ; but the naval 
forces shall not be compelled to disembark against their own consent." 

The first of these treaties was confirmed by oath, in the following manner. 
The Carthaginians swore by the gods of their country, and the Romans by a 
stone, agreeably to an antient custom, and by 7 Mars Enyalius. The ceremony 
of swearing by 7 a stone was thus performed. The person that was appointed 
to this office, having first solemnly 7 attested the public faith for the due observ- 
ance of the treaty, tpok in his hands a stone, and pronounced the following 
words. " If I swear truly, may the gods be propitious to me; but if I think 
or act any thing that is contrary 7 to my oath, then let the rest enjoy 7 in safety 
their country 7 , laws, possessions, household gods, and sepulchres, and let me 
alone be cast out from the society, as this stone is now cast away." At the 
same time he threw away the stone. 

These treaties are still preserved on tables of brass, in the department of 
the sediles in the capitol. That Philinus never saw them, is not to be won- 
dered at, since, even in our times, many of" the oldest men, both Carthagi- 
nians and Romans, who are thought to have made the closest search into the 
antiquities and history of their several countries, are ignorant that any such 
treaties now exist. But it seems a matter of just surprise, that this historian 
should venture to assert a fact which is so clearlv falsified and refuted by these 
genuine records; nor is it easy to conceive upon what grounds he has done it. 
For in the second book of his work he affirms, that the Romans were, by an 
express convention, excluded from every part of Sicily, as the Carthaginians 
were from Italy ; and that the first descent of the Romans upon the island was 
made in violation of their oaths, and in direct breach of what had been thus 
stipulated ; yet it is certain, that no traces of any such convention can any 
where be found. 

These mistakes were slightly mentioned in our preliminary books; but it 
was necessary, in this place, to enter into a more minute examination of them, 
because they have hitherto derived great weight from the authority of the 
writer, and misled many from the truth. If we reflect, indeed, on the design 
and purpose of that first expedition into Sicily, that it was to take the Mamer- 
tines under their protection, to defend a people, who, in seizing Rhegium and 
Messana, had been guilty of an act of flagrant perfidy ; it must be acknow- 
ledged, that it will not altogether be an easy task to excuse or justify the 



Its GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

W " ■ IIIIIII W l l ll WH II.il ■« »M«MM»»M«»M««M»«»«'«««l«^ '^ 

Romans ; but to affirm, that this descent was made in violation of any treaty, 
is an instance of the greatest ignorance. 

When the war of Sicily was ended, another treaty was concluded in the fol- 
lowing terms* 

" The Carthaginians shall abandon Sicily, with all the islands that lie be- 
tween Sicily and Italy. The allies of both republics shall be safe from vio- 
lence. It shall not be permitted to either people to exercise any act of power, 
build any fortress, or levy soldiers, in the territory of the other; nor shall the 
allies of one be received into any alliance with the other. The Carthaginians 
shall pay immediately one thousand talents, and two thousand two hundred 
more in the course often years ; and they shall restore the Roman prisoners 
without ransom." 

At the end of the African war, when the Romans had again declared war 
against Carthage, some new conditions were added to this treaty, by which the 
Carthaginians consented " to give up Sardinia, and to pay another sum of' 
twelve hundred talents." 

The last treaty, or convention, was that made by Asdrubal in Spain ; by 
which it stipulated, " that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with 
an army." 

These are the several treaties that ever were concluded between the Cartha- 
ginians and the Romans, to the time of Annibal. It is easy to remark from 
these, that the first invasion of Sicily by the Romans was by no means made in 
violation of those engagements which they had sworn to observe ; but, on the 
other hand, when they declared war a second time against the Carthaginians, 
and forced them to yield up Sardinia, and to pay a heavier tribute, it must be 
owned, that they had no cause at all, nor any colour of justice, for such proceed- 
ing, but basely took advantage of the distresses in which the republic was then 
involved : for, with regard to that which is sometimes urged in their defence, 
that, in the time of the African war, some Roman merchants were injuriously 
treated by the Carthaginians, we have seen, particularly in the former book, 
that the Carthaginians, upon the complaint, released all these that had been 
detained in their ports ; and that the Romans, in acknowledgment of the favour 
that had been shewn them by this compliance, immediately sent home, without 
any ransom, all the Carthaginian prisoners. 

Since this, then, is the true state of things on both sides, it remains that we 
_ at last enquire, whether the war must, fn justice, be imputed to the Carthagi- 
nians or the Romans. We have already seen the reasons which the former 
urged in vindication of their conduct. Let us now consider those that have 
been advanced in opposition to them ', not, indeed, by the Romans of that 
age, who were so greatly enraged at the destruction of Saguntum, that they 
could not even attend to any reasons ; but by those of later times. It is said, 
then, that the treaty made with Asdrubal was by no means to be disregarded, 
as the Carthaginians had the boldness to affirm ; since it did not rest upon any 
such reserved condition as was found in the treaty of Lutatius, which ended 
with these express terms : " These conditions shall be firm and binding, in 
case that they be ratified by the Roman people ;" but was fully and finally 
concluded by the authority of Asdrubal. And by this treaty it was stipulated, 
" that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army." It is also 
urged that,Jby the treaty which put an end to the war of Sicily, it was provided, 
" that no injury should be offered to the allies of either people :" that this was 
not to be understood, as the Carthaginians laboured to explain it, concerning 
those alone who were at that time in alliance with them ; for, in that case, some- 
thing of this kind would have been added: " No new alliance shall be made 
by either people; or, " the allies which either people may hereafter make, 
shall not be included in the terms of the present treaty :" but, that, as no cau- 
tiou was inserted, it was manifest that the security thus mentioned in the treaty 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 113 



related not to those alone who were at that time in the alliance of either people, 
but to all that should afterwards be admitted to it. And, in truth, this way of 
reasoning seems to be perfectly just and solid : for it is not to be conceived 
that these two republics would have consented to any treaty that should deprive 
them of the power of receiving into their alliance such nations as occasions 
might present, or of defending thein, when received, from every kind of injury. 
In a word, their whole intention may be thus explained. With respect to the 
people that were then in alliance with them, it is provided, that they shall be 
secure from violence ; and that those who had embraced the protection of either 
state should not be admitted as allies of the other : and, with regard to t.ie 
allies that might afterwards be received, they seem to have been clearly enough 
designed in the following caution : " It shall not be permitted to either people 
to levy soldiers, or to exercise any act of power in the territories, or the allied 
provinces, of the other. On both sides, all shall be safe, and free from in- 

Now the people of Saguntum, many years before the time of Annibal, had 
placed their city under the protection of the Romans. Of tins there is un- 
doubted evidence, in a fact that was acknowledged even by the Carthaginians 
themselves : for when their government was disturbed by some intestine tu- 
mults, the Saguntines, instead of haying recourse to the Carthaginians, who 
were at that time settled in their neighbourhood, and had obtained great power 
in Spain, referred all their contests to the sole decision of the Romans, and 
with the help of their authority restored order to their state. 

On the whole then, it may fairly be concluded, that if the destruction of 
Saguntum was the cause of the war, it was unjustly entered into by the Cartha- 
ginians ; that it was contrary to the treaty of Lutatius, which provided that 
no injury should be offered to the allies of either people ; and a manifest vio- 
lation also of the convention made with Asdrubal ; in which it was stipulated 
that the Carthaginians should not pass the Iberus with an army. But, on the 
other hand, if the Carthaginians engaged in the war because they had been 
forced to yield up Sardinia, and pay a second tribute ; if they only seized the 
favourable occasion of avenging all the insults and the losses which their ene* 
mies, taking advantage also of the times, had brought upon them, it must 
then be owned that their conduct may well be vindicated, upon the principles 
of reason and justice. 

Among the undiscerning part of my readers, many, perhaps, will think that 
I am too minute and tedious in these inquiries. It is true, indeed, that a dis- 
tinct and close survey of past events, though it might yield some entertainment 
to the curious, wouid, however, be of little use, if mankind were able of them- 
selves, without the assistance of example, to repel effectually every stroke of - 
fortune, and obviate the evils tiiat are incidentto life. But such is human na- 
ture, that this can by no means be affirmed, either of public societies, or of 
single men ; since the most fair and flourishing condition is so subject to decay 
and change, that we can build no lasting expectations on it. And it is on this 
account that the knowledge of past transactions ought to be esteemed not a 
mere amusement only, but rather an instructive and a necessary study : for, 
unless we have made due reflection upon the conduct of men in former times 4 
how shall we learn the arts of gaining allies and friends, when any danger 
threatens our country or ourselves ? If we meditate any conquest, or form 
any project of importance, how shall we be able, without this knowledge, to 
make choice of proper instruments for the execution of our designs? Or, in 
case that we are satisfied with our present st?>te and fortunes, how shall we 
support ourselves by such lasting strength and credit as may at ail times guard 
our interests from every thing that would undermine and shake them ? For 
those among whom we live, like actors on a stage, appear before us under such a 
dress as may best suit with the .present times, and with the characters which 
VOL. I. K.O. 4. P 



114 GENERAL -HISTORY OF POLYgtUS. 

they assume. To these their words and actions are all accommodated, so that> 
it is hardly possible to penetrate into their real sentiments, or draw out the truth, 
to light, from the darkness under which it is industriously concealed. But? 
iu the accounts of former ages, the facts themselves disclose to us the real 
views, and genuine disposition of the actors. And from hence we are enabled 
to discern, in various circumstances, from whom -we reasonably expect good 
©ffices, favour, assistance, or the contrary ; and to know, with perfect certainty, 
what kind of persons may be induced to compassionate our distresses, defend, 
our cause with zeal, and join us in avenging any injuries to which we may- 
have been exposed : a knowledge surely of the greatest use and benefit, both 
in the administration of public affairs, and in the conduct also of private life. 
But, in order to gain this end, it aviII be necessary that both the author and 
the reader, instead of being satisfied with the bare relation of events, would 
carefully consider all that passed both before and after, as well as at the time 
of each transaction : for if we take from history the motives to which every 
action owed its birth ; the manner in which it was carried into execution ; the 
end that was proposed ; and .-whether the event was answerable or not to the 
first desip-n, what remains may afford, perhaps, some transient amusement to 
the mind, but is not capable of yielding any sound instruction, or lasting ser- 

'tice. 

If any one should think that few persons will be inclined either to buy, of 
vead this history, on account of the number and the bulk of the books which 
it contains, let him consider that it is much less difficult, both to purchase and 
to read through forty books, which give a close and uninterrupted relation of 
the affairs of Italy, Sicily, and Afric, from the time of Pyrrhus, at which the 
history of Timeus is concluded, to the destruction of Carthage ; and o-f all 
the o-reat events that happened in the other parts of the world, from the flight 
of Cleomenes the Spartan, to the battle between the Achaeans and the Ro- 
tnans, near the isthumus, than either to procure or read all the separate and 
particular histories of these transactions : for, besides that they exceed hi 
bulk the size of this work, it is certain also that no real knowledge or improve- 
ment can be expected from them: for they not only differ from each other 
in their accounts of facts, but, in general, take no notice of many great events' 
that were coincident with those which they relate, and from which, if all of 
them were ranged together, and comprehended under one single view, the 
"mind would be enabled to form a far more perfect judgment of the truth than 
it can ever gain from a distinct and separate survey of each. We may alsa 
add, that, by the very nature of their works, these writers are debarred from 
those inquiries which are of the first and chief importance : for the most use- 
ful part of history, as we have already mentioned, is the knowledge of w^at 
passed before and after every great event, and especially of the causes that, 
^produced it. Thus, for instance, the war of Philip gave occasion to that of 
Antiochus ; that of Annibal, to the war with Philip ; and the war of Sicily to,, 
that of Annibal ; and between these wars, a great variety of incidents inter- 
vened, which, though different perhaps in their first aim and purpose, were at 
last all inclined together towards the same sjngle end. Now this may all be 
fully understood from general history, but by no means from the accounts of 
single wars, as that of Perseus, for instance, or of Philip. It might with 
equal reason be supposed, that the bare description of particular battles, as 
they are found in these historians, would be sufficient to convey a perfect 
knowledge of the disposition and entire economy of a whole war. But as this 
can never be expected from them, it is manifest that a work like mine must be 
judged in all points to excel particular histories, as much as solid instruction 
is to be preferred to an empty tale. We return from this digression. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 115 



chap. m. 

When the Carthaginians had ended their discourse, the Romans made no re- 
ply to the arguments which they had urged in their defence. But the oldest 
of the ambassadors, shewing his bosom to the senate, told them, that in it were 
contained both peace and war ; and they might choose whichever of the two 
best pleased them. The king of the Carthaginians answered, that he might 
draw out that which was roost agreeable to himself. And when the ambassa- 
dor replied that it should be war, the senate, with almost one voice, cried out* 
that they accepted it ; after which the assembly separated. 

Annibal was at this time in winter quarters at New Carthage. He first sent 
home the Spaniards to their several cities, in the hope that, by this indul- 
gence, he should fix them in his interests, and oblige them to his service for 
the time to come. He afterwards gave instructions to his brother Asdrubal, 
for governing the country in his absence, and defending it against the Ro- 
xnans. His last care was, in what manner he might effectually provide for the 
quiet and security of Afric. For this purpose he put in practise a very sen- 
sible and wise expedient ; making a body of African troops pass over into 
Spain, and another body of Spaniards into Afric ; and thus connecting both, 
those countries in the bonds of a reciprocal fidelity. The troops of Spain that 
were sent into Afric were the Thersitae, Mastians, some Spaniards of the 
mountains, and the Olcades. Their numbers amounted in the whole to twelve 
hundred horse, and thirteen thousand, eight hundred, and fifty foot. To 
these were added also eight hundred and seventy Baleares, — a people whose 
name, as well as that of the island which they inhabit, is derived from their 
custom of using a sling in battle. These troops were all distributed through 
the parts of Afric called Metagonia, a small number only excepted, who were 
sent to Carthage. Four thousand Metagonitans were stationed also in that 
city, as well to serve as hostages, as to assist in the defence of the place. 

With Asdrubal, in Spain, he left fifty quinqueremes,, two quadriremes, and 
'five triremes. Thirty-two of the quinquiremes, and the five triremes, were 
completely equipped. To these he added likewise a body of forces, both 
horse and foot. The cavalry consisted of four hundred and fifty Libyphoe- 
nieiaus and Africans ; three hundred Lorgitae ; and, a mixed body of eighteen 
hundred, composed of Numidians, Massylians, Macians, Massaesylians, and 
Maurusians, whose country lay towards. the oceiin. The infantry was composed 
of eleven thousand, eight hundred, and fifty Africans ; three hundred Ligu- 
rian*, and five hundred Baleares ; together with twenty one elephants. If I, 
have given here a more precise and accurate detail of all that was now trans-, 
acted by Annibal in Spain, than could perhaps have been expected even from 
one who himself had borne some part in the conduct of those affairs, I must 
desire the reader not to think it strange, nor to rank me among those writer* 
who cover their own fictions under such a dress as may seem most nearly to 
resemble the form of truth ; for I found at Lacinium a table of brass, on which 
all these circumstances were engraved, by the orders of Annibal himself, 
when he was in Italy ; and as this seemed to be a monument of the first au- 
thority, I have closely copied it in my relation. 

Annibal, having thus provided in the fullest manner for the security both 
of Spain and Afric, now waited only for the arrival of those messengers that 
were expected to return to him from the Gauls ; for lie had endeavoured to 
inform himself, with all the exactness that was possible, of. the fertility of the 
country that lay beneath the Alps, and along the Fo ; of the number and- 
courage of the people ; and, above all, whether they still retained any resent- 
ment against the Romans from their former, wars, of which we have already 
jiren some account, that the reader might more fully, cemprehend the things 



116 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIlTS. 



which we are now going to relate. His chief expectations of success in his 
intended enterprise were built indeed upon the assistance which he hoped to 
find among the Gauls : for it seemed scarcety possible to maintain the war in 
Italy against the Romans, unless these nations could be engaged to join him. 
with their forces, after he had first surmounted the difficulties of the country 
that lay between. He sent, therefore, with the greatest care, to all the chiefs 
that lived among the Alps, and to those likewise who possessed the country on 
this side of them ; and endeavoured, by every kind of promise, to tempt their 
hopes, and draw them to his party. At last, when his messengers were re- 
turned, and had informed him that the Gauls were perfectly disposed to favour 
his design, and even expected his approach with eagerness ; and that the pas- 
sage across the Alps, though likely to be attended with great pains and dif- 
ficulty, was such, however, as, in the end, might be surmounted, as the spring 
advanced, he drew out all his forces from their winter quarters. The news 
also, which he had just before received from Carthage, had greatly raised his 
hopes, and given him full assurance of the approbation of his fellow citizens. 
He now, therefore, openly declared his intentions to the army, and exhorted 
them to make war against the Romans. He informed them of the manner in 
which this people had demanded that himself, together with the other chiefs, 
should be delivered into their hands. He described the richness of the coun- 
try through which they were to pass, and acquainted them with the favourable 
disposition of the Gauls, and the promise which they had made to join him 
with their forces. When the multitude cried out that they would cheerfully 
attend him, he applauded their alacrity, fixed the day for their departure, and 
dismissed the assembly. 

These tilings, then, being all thus regulated during the time of winter, and 
the necessary measures taken for the security both of Spain and Afric, on the 
dav appointed Arinibal began his march, with ninety thousand foot, and twelve 
thousand horse. He passed the Iberus, and, with incredible rapidity, though 
not without many obstinate battles, and a great loss of men, reduced the na- 
tions that inhabited between that river and the Pyrenaean mountains,- — the 
Ilurgetes, Bargusians, iErenosians, and Andasinians. He gave to Hanno the 
care of the conquered countries, with a power to exercise an entire and ab- 
solute sovereignty over the Bargusians, because these especially were suspected 
of favouring the interests of the Romans. He left also with him a detachment 
from his army, of ten thousand foot, and a thousand horse, together with all 
the baggage of the troops that were designed to attend him into Italy. He 
sent back likewise an equal number of the Spanish forces to their several 
cities, being desirous not .only to secure to himself, by this indulgence, the 
favour of the people that were now dismissed, but to encourage also, by the 
hope of returning again to their native country, both the troops that were en- 
gaged to follow him in the present expedition, and those likewise that were 
left behind in Spain, in case that he should want their service in any future 
exigency. 

The army thus disincumbered of the heavy baggage, and consisting in the 
whole of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse, continued their march 
forwards, by the way of the Pyrenaean mountains, in order to pass the Rhone, 
being not so considerable in their numbers, as from the goodness of the 
troops : for they were all tried soldiers, men well disciplined, and inured to 
action by the continual engagements which they had sustained in Spain. 

But, in order to clear this part of our history from all obscurity, it will be 
necessary to trace out distinctly the country from whence Annibal began his 
maKch, the places through which he passed, and the way by which he first en- 
tered Italy. Nor will it be sufficient barely to insert the names of rivers and 
of cities, as some historians have done ; imagining that the recital of their 
names alone must at once convey a full conception of the places. With regard 
to those places, indeed, with which we have been before acquainted, the men- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 117 



tion of their names, as it recalls them to the memory, may, perhaps, be suf- 
ficient for the end that is proposed ; but, with respect to those of which we 
have no previous knowledge, it must be allowed, that no greater advantage can 
arise from the bare recital of tlieir names, than from the repetition of any 
other sounds that are void of sense and meaning, winch only strike the ear, but 
make no impression on the understanding: lor, unless the mind has something 
to which it can apply and fix itself, — something already conceived and under- 
stood, to which that which is heard may be referred, — it must, of necessity, be 
lost in doubt and ignorance. Since, therefore, we are to speak of things un- 
known, we shall endeavour to lead the reader to a right apprehension of 
them, by connecting them with those that are already known and familiar to 
him. 

The first, and most general notion, then, in which all mankind agree, and 
which even the vulgar apprehend, is that by which we conceive the heavens 
round us to be divided into the four quarters, of east, west, north, and south* 
The next step is, to consider the several parts of the earth, as lying beneath 
the one or the other of these divisions; and thus we are able to refer even the 
places which we have never seen or known to some settled and determinate 
conception. This being done with regard to the whole earth, it remains that 
we observe the same method of division, in speaking of that portion of it which 
we know to be inhabited. Now, this consists of three natural parts; the first 
of which is called Asia, the second Afric, and the last Europe : and these are 
bounded by the Tanais, the Nile, and- the Straits of the Pillars of Hercules. 
Between the Tanais and the Nile, lies Asia ; and its situation with respect to 
the heavens is beneath that space which is contained between the north-east 
and the south. Afric lies between the Nile and the Pillars of HerCules, un- 
der that part of the heavens which extends from the south to the south-west, 
and from thence, forwards to the west, which coincides with the Pillars of Her- 
cules. So that these two countries, taken together in a general view, possess 
all the space from east to west, on the southern side of the Mediterranean sea. 
Opposite to these, on the north side of the same sea, lies Europe, being ex- 
tended also, without any interruption, from east to west. The greatest and the 
most considerable part of it is that which falls beneath the north, and possesses 
all the space between the river Tanais and Narbo, which last place is situated 
towards the west, at a small distance only from Massilia, and those mouths by 
which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian sea. The Gauls are the 
people who possess the country from Narbo to thePyrenaean mountains, which 
extend, in one continued chain, from the Mediterranean sea to the ocean. The 
rest of Europe, from these mountains westward to the Pillars of Hercules, is 
bounded partly by the Mediterranean, and partly by the ocean, or exterior 
sea. The country which lies along the former, as far as to the Piliars of Her- 
cules, is called Spain : but that which it washed by the exterior, or ^reat sea, 
having been but lately discovered, has not yet obtained any settted name. It 
is possessed of a race of barbarous people, who are very numerous, and of 
whom we shall take occasion to speak more particularly in another place. 
But as it has never yet been known, with any certainty, whether ./Ethiopia, 
which is the place where Asia and Afric meet together, be a continent extend- 
ing forwards to the south, or whether it be surrounded by the sea; so those 
parts of Europe likewise that lie between Narbo and the Tanais towards the 
north have hitherto been quite concealed from our discoveries. In some future 
time, perhaps, our pains may lead us to a knowledge of those countries : but 
all that has hitherto been written or reported of them must be considered as 
mere fable and invention, and not the fruit of any real search, or genuine in- 
formation. 

This, I think, will be sufficient to give the reader some conception even of 
those places to which he is a stranger, as he may now be at>le always to refer 
them to the one or the other of these general divisions, marked out and ascer- 



lis GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU& 



tained by the position of the heavens, and may turn his mind towards them, as- 
often as they are named in this work, in the same manner as the eye directs. it& 
view to any object that is pointed out to its observation. We now resume our 
narrative. 

The Carthaginians were at this time possessed of all that part of Afric which- 
lies along the Mediterranean sea, from the Philaeuean altars, which are oppo- 
site to the greater Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules. This coast, in its full, 
extent, includes a space of more than sixteen thousand stadia. They had also 
passed the Straits, and subdued all Spain as far as to those rocks, which, on the 
side towards the Mediterranean sea, form the extreme point of the Pyreuaean 
mountains; trie boundary that divides Spain from Gaul. These rocks. are- 
distant from the Pillars of Hercules about eighteen thousand stadia. 

The distance from the same pillars to new Carthage, from whence Annibal 
began his inarch towards Italy, is three thousand stadia ; from that city to the. 
Iberus, two thousand six hundred ; from thence to Emporium, sixteen hun» 
dred ; and the same number afterwards to the passage of the Rhone. For the 
whole of this route has been accurately measured by the Romans, and distin- 
guished by distances, each of eight stadia. From the passage of the Rhone.,, 
if we take our course up the river, to the beginning of the Alps, we may count 
the distance to be fourteen hundred stadia ; and the road across those moun-» 
tains, till we arrive in the plains that art watered by the Po, twelve hundred 
more. Thus the route which Annibal now designed to take, from new Car*. 
thage into Italy, contained in its whole length about nine thousand stadia, 

He had already surmounted almost one half of this long march ; but the 
most, dangerous and difficult was yet to come. He was now preparing to lead 
bis army through the passes of the Pyranaean mountains, not without sooxe.. 
apprehension, that the Gauls might take advantage of the strength of those 
cjehies, and fall upon him in his inarch; when the Romans were informed by 
their ambassadors of all that had been debated and determined in the senate, 
of Carthage, and at the same time heard with great surprise, that Annibal, 
was already advanced beyond the Iberus. They resolved, therefore, that au 
army should immediately be raised and sent to Spain, under the command of 
Publius Cornelius ; and another, with Tiberius Sempronius, into Afric, And, 
while the consuls were employed in perfecting the levies, and making all the 
necessary preparations, they used their utmost diligence to complete the set- 
tlement of those colonies, which they had some time before resolved to send 
into Gaul. They made haste to inclose the town with walls ; and ordered the- 
eitizens that were to inhabit themi of whom six thousand were allotted to each 
colony, to be all present on the place within thirty days. The one of these 
new cities was built in this side of the Po, and called Plaeentia ; the other on 
the other side, and was named Cremona, 

But scarcely were the inhabitants arrived, when, the Boian Gauls, who had, 
long watched in secret for some favourable occasion to shake off their alliance 
with the Romans, being now encouraged b)' the near approach of the Cartha-? 
ginian army, resolved openly to revolt, shewing no regard to, the safety of their 
countrymen, whom they had given as hostages, at the conclusion of their 
last war against the Romans, which was described in the former book. 
And having prevailed with the Insubrians likewise, whose old resentment 
against the Romans was not yet extinguished, to assist them, with their 
forces, they wasted all the lands that, were allotted to these new colonies^ 
pursued the Romans, who fled before them, as far as Mutina, another of their 
colonies, and invested them closely in the place. There were arnong them 
three Romans of distinguished rank; who had been sent to inspect the distri-% 
buti.on of the lands. One of them, Caius Lutatius, was of consular, and the 
other two of praetorian dignity. These desired to have an interview with the 
enemy, to which the Boians readily consented. But as they were returning; 
from the conference, the Qauls treacherously seized and kept them prisoners "* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBttTS. U9 



imagining, that through their means they should recover their own hostages 
from the Romans. The praetor L. Mpnlius, who was posted with some 
troops upon the frontiers of the country, no sooner was informed of what had 
happened, than he advanced in haste towards the enemy ; but the Boians, 
having placed their army in ambuscade in a certain forest through which the 
Romans were to pass, as sobn as they appeared fell suddenly upon them from. 
every quarter, and killed many of them ; the rest fled at first with great pre- 
cipitation, but having gained the neighbouring hills they rallied again their 
•broken forces, and retreated with some kind of order, but in a manner that 
was scarcely honourable. The Gauls followed close behind, and blocked up 
these troops likewise in a village that was called Tanes, into which they had 
retired. 

As soon as it was known at Rome that their army was thus closely invested 
by the enemy, and the siege pressed with vigour, they sent away immediately 
to their relief, under the conduct of a praetor, the legions that had been raised 
for Publius, and gave orders that the consul should make new levies among' 
the allies. Such, then, in general, as we have described it both here and in 
the former parts of this work, was the state and condition of the Gauls, from 
their first settlement in the country to the time of Annibal's arrfva.1 in it. 

The Roman consuls, having severally completed all the necessary prepara- 
tions, sailed out to sea in the beginning of the spring, — Publius* with sixty- 
vessels, to go into Spain, and Tiberus, with a fleet of quinqueremes, to prose- 
cute the war in Afric. The Zealand eagerness that appeared in the conduct 
of the last of these, and the preparations which he made at Lilybaeum, draw- 
ing together troops and stores of every kind, and from every quarter, were sill 
*o great and formidable, that it seemed as if he meditated nothing less than to 
lay siege to Carthage itself upon his first arrival. 

Publius, steering his course along the Ligurian coast, arrived on the fifth 
day in the neighbourhood of Massilia ; and having anchored in the first mouth 
of the Rhone, which was called the Massilian mouth, he landed his forces 
there. He had heard that Annibai had already passed the Pyraenean moun- 
tains, but was persuaded, that he must still be at a considerable distance from 
him, as the country through which he was to march was extremely difficult, 
and the Gauls around him very numerous. But Annibai having with won- 
derful success gained some of the Gauls with presents, and reduced the rest 
by force, continued his route forwards, keeping the sea of Sardinia on his 
right, and was now arrived upon the banks of the Rhone. When the news 
■came that the enemy was. so near, Publius, being in part surprised at this 
celerity, which seemed, indeed, to exceed all belief, and partly desirous also 
to be informed exactly of the truth, sent away three hundred of the bravest of 
his horse to make discoveries, together with a body of Gallic mercenaries that 
belonged to the Massilians, who were to serye as guides, and to support tke 
cavalry also, if there should be occasion for it ; while himself, in the mean 
time, employed his care to recover the troops from the fatigue which they had 
suffered in the voyage, and consulted with the tribunes, concerning the posts 
that were most proper to be taken, and the place in which they might with 
best advantage meet and offer battle to the enemy. 

Annibai having now fixed his camp upon the Rhone, at the distance of about 
four days' journey from the sea, resolved to make his passage in that place, 
because the stream was narrow there, and confined within the proper channel 
of the river. By his gentle treatment of those that lived along the banks, he 
prevailed upon them to sell all their canoes and boats, the number of which 
was very great; for almost all the people that dwell near the Rhone are em- 
ployed in constant commerce upon the sea. They supplied him also with the 
wood that was proper for making the canoes; and in two days' time an incre- 
dible quantity of these vessels was finished by the army ; for the soldiers all 
attended to their task with the greatest eagerness, 8* if each, man had resolved 



120 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



to be indebted to no labour but his own for his passage across the river. Biit 
about this time, a very great army jnf barbarians appeared on the other side 
ready to oppose the Carthaginians in their landing. Annibal having "seen 
their numbers, and considered with himself, that as it was by no means pos- 
sible to pass the river in defiance of so great a force, so, on the other band , in 
case that he should long remain in his present post, he must be inclosed on 
every side by enemies, as soon as the third night came on, sent away a yart of 
his army under the care of Hanno, the son of king Bomilcar, with some of the 
natives of the country to serve as guides. These troops, when they had 
marched about two hundred stadia up the stream, at last rested in a place 
where a small island divided the river into two ; and having cut down tree* 
from a neighbouring forest, some of which they joined, and bound some to- 
gether with cords in a hasty manner, in a short time they completed a number 
of floats sufficient lor the present necessity, and passed the river upon them, 
without any resistance from the enemy: and having seized a strong and ad-, 
vantageous post, they remained uponjt during that whole day, reposing them- 
selves after the fatigue of their march, and making all things ready for the' 
ensuing combat, agreeably to the orders which they had received. The rest 
of the troops that were left with Annibal were in the like manner employed 
in taking such refreshment as was necessary, and completing ail their prepara-, 
tions. But the point of greatest difficulty was, to contrive a method for the 
safe passage of the elephants, which were thirty-seven in number ; and this, 
indeed, occasioned no small embarrassment and pain. . . 

On the fifth night after the arrival of the Carthaginians upon the Rhone, 
the detachment that had already passed it began their march before break of 
day, and advanced along the banks of the river towards the enemy ; at the 
same time Annibal having all his troops in readiness, disposed every thing for„ 
their immediate passage. The larger boats were filled with the heavy-armed 
horse ; and the infantry embarked in the canoes. The first were stationed 
higher up the stream, while the latter took their place below them ; that when 
the strength and violence of the current had first been broken by the heavier 
vessels, the passage of the rest might be more secure and easy. The horses 
were made to swim across, being towed along behind the boats. And as three 
or four were in this manner conducted together by a single soldier, who was 
placed for that purpose upon either side of the stern of every vessei, a con- 
siderable number of them were landed on. the other side, in the very first 
passage over. _ . - ... 

The barbarians, as soon as they perceived the disposition that was made, 
ran down from their camp in crowds, without observing any order, and were 
persuaded that they should be able with the greatest ease to prevent the Car- 
thaginians from landing. But Annibal, having now discerned the smoke on 
the other side, which the detachment from his army had been • directed to make 
as the signal of their near approach, ordered all the troops to get imniedjatly 
on board, and that those who were in the larger vessels should direct their" 
course against the stream, in such a manner as might most effectually break 
its Violence. His orders were executed in an instant. The troops, as they 
embarked, pursued their work with loud and eager emulation, animating each 
other by their cries, aud struggling with all their strength to surmount the 
violence of the stream, while the view of both the armies with which the banks 
on either side were covered, the cries of the Carthaginians from the shore 
calling after their companions and seeming as it were to divide their labour 
with them, the noise of the barbarions on the other side who demanded the 
combat with loud screams and shouts, formed altogether a scene of great asto- 
pishment and horror. At this time the troops that were led by Hanno ap- 
peared suddenly on the other side; and while one part of them set fire to the 
c,amp of the enemy, which was left without defence, the rest and the greater 
part made haste to fall upon the rear of those that were defending the passage 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLVBIUS* 121 



of the river. The barbarians were struck with terror at an event so strange 
and unexpected. Some ran in haste towards the camp, to stop the progress of 
the flames, while others were constrained to turn and defend themselves 
against the enemy. 

When Aunibal perceived that all things had conspired most favourably with 
his designs, as fast as the forces landed he drew them up in order and led them 
to the charge. The barbarians, who had begun the combat in disorder, and 
whose consternation was now completed by the sudden attack that was made 
•upon them from behind* were in a short time routed and forced to fly. 
The Carthaginian general, being thus in the same instant master of his pas- 
sage, and victorious against the enemy, gave immediate orders for passing the 
rest of the army over; and having in a short time brought all the troops to 
land, he encamped that night along the border of the river. 

On the following day, Annibal, having received the news that the Roman 
fleet had cast anchor near the mouth of the Rhone, sent away a body of five 
hundred Numidian horse to take a view or the situation of the enemy, and to 
discover their number and designs. He gave directions also for the passage of 
the elephants across the river : and having afterwards called together the 
troops, he introduced among them Magnus, a petty king, who had come to 
him from the country near the Po, and who now, with the help of an inter- 
preter, informed the assembly of all the resolutions which the Gauls had taken 
in their favour. This expedient was such, indeed, as could scarcely fail to 
raise the spirits of the army, and inspire them with confidence and courage: 
for, iti the first place, as the'„bare sight alone and presence of the Gauls, ex- 
horting them to proceed in their designs, and promising that they would bear 
an equal part in all the fortune of the war, was itself a circumstance of great 
force and moment ; so the assurance likewise that was now repeated by this 
people, that they would lead the army into Italy, by a way that was both short 
and safe, and through places that would yield a full supply to all their wants, 
seemed highly probable, and such as well deserved their credit. They spoke 
with great advantage also of the extent and richness of the country into which 
they were going to enter, and of the zeal and prompt alacrity of the people, 
upon whose assistance they designed chiefly to rely for maintaining the war 
against the Romans. 

The Gauls, after this discourse, retired, and Annibal himself came into the 
assembly. He began with reminding the soldiers of their past exploits; he 
desired them to remember, that though they had often been engaged in de- 
signs of the greatest difficulty as well as danger, they had never yet failed in 
any enterprise, because they had been always careful to repose a perfect con- 
fidence in the wisdom of their general, and paid an entire, submission to his 
will. He exhorted them to be still assured of the same success, and to be 
persuaded that they had already accomplished the most important part of 
their intended labour, since they had happily passed the Rhone, and seen with 
their own eyes the friendly disposition of their allies towards them, and their 
zeal for the war. With regard, therefore, to the particular measures that 
were now to be pursued, he conjured them to throw away all concern, and to 
rest securely upon his care and conduct, for the entire management of the 
whole. That they should be ready only to receive and execute his orders, to 
acquit themselves at all times like men of courage, and maintain the glory of 
their former actions. The multitude testified their applause by shouts,"and 
shewed the greatest ardour and alacrity. Annibal praised their zeal : and 
having recommended them all to the favour and protection of the gods, and 
directed them to make all things ready for their march on the following day, 
he dismissed the assembly. 

About this time, the Numidian horse that had been sent to make disco- 
veries returned to the camp; A great part of the detachment had been 
killed, and the rest were forced to fly. For no sooner had they gained a mo- 
VOL 1. NO. 4. q 



122 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



derate distance from the camp, than they were met by the detachment of the 
Roman cavalry, which Publius had sent away upon the same design. The 
engagement that ensued between them was so sharp and obstinate, that a 
hundred and forty Gauls and Romans fell on one side, and more than two 
hundred Numidians on the other. The Romans, in pursuit of those that fled, 
advanced even close to the entrenchments of the Carthaginians, and having 
taken a thorough view of all the camp, they returned again in haste, and 
informed the consul of the arrival of the enemy. Publius, having first sent the 
baggage to the ships, immediately decamped, and advanced with all the 
army along the banks of the river, with design to overtake the Carthaginians,' 
and to force them to a battle without delay. 

But early in the morning of the following day, Annibal, having posted hi* 
cavahy as a reserve on the side towards the sea, commanded the infantry to 
begin their march, whilst himself waited to receive the elephants, and the men 
that were with them on the other side of the river. The passage of the ele- 
phants was performed in the following manner: When they had made a suffi- 
cient number of floats, they joined two together, and fastened them strongly 
to the ground, upon the bank of the river. The breadth of both together was 
about fifty feet. To the extremity of these they fixed two more, which were 
extended over into the water; and to prevent the whole from being loosened 
and carried down the river by the rapidity of the current, they secured the 
side that was turned against the stream, by strong cables, fastened to the trees 
along the bank. Having in this manner finished a kind of bridge, which was 
extended to the length of about two hundred feet, they then added to it two 
other floats of a much larger size, which were very firmly joined together, but 
were fastened in so slight a manner to the rest, that they might at any time be 
separated from them with little difficulty. A great number of ropes were 
fixed to these last floats, by the help of which the boats that were designed to 
tow them over might hold them firm against the violence of the stream, and 
carry them in safety with the elephants to the other side. They then spread 
a quantity of earth over all the floats, that their colour and appearance might, 
as nearly as possible,, resemble the ground on shore. The elephants were 
usually very tractable upon land, and easy to be governed by their conductors, 
but were at all times under the greatest apprehension whenever they apr 
proached the water. Upon this occasion, therefore, they took two female ele- 
phants, and led them first along the floats; the rest readily followed. But 
no sooner were they arrived upon the farthest floats, than the ropes being cut 
which bound them to the rest, they were immediately towed away by the boats 
towards the other side. The elephants were seized with extreme dread; and 
moved from side to side in great fury and disorder. But when they saw that 
they were every way surrounded by the water, their very fears at last con- 
strained them to remain quiet in their place. In this manner two other float* 
being from time to time prepared and fitted to the rest, the greatest part of 
the elephants were carried safely over. There were some, indeed, that were 
so much disordered by their fears, that they threw themselves into the river in 
the midst of their passage. This accident was fatal to their conductors, who 
perished in the stream. But the beasts themselves, exerting all their strength 
and raising their large trunks above the surface of the river, were, by that 
means, enabled not only to breathe freely, but to discharge the waters also, as 
fast as they received them ; and having, by long struggling, surmounted 
likewise the rapidity of the stream, they at last gained the opposite bank in. 
safety. 

As soon as this work was finished, Annibal, making his rear guard of the 
elephants and cavalry, continued his march along the river, directing his route 
from the sea towards the east, as if he designed to pass in the middle parts of 
Europe. 

The Rhone has its sources above the Adriatic gulph, in those parts of the 
Alps that stand towards the north, and at first flows westward: but afterwards 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 12$ 

it bends its stream towards the south-west, and discharges itself into the Sar- 
dinian sea. This river runs chiefly through a valley, the northern side of 
which is inhabited by the Ardyan Gauls, the southern parts being all bounded 
by the Alps, which look towards the north. The plains round the Po, which 
we have already described at large, are separated also from this valley by the 
Alps, which, beginning ntar Massilia, are from thence extended even to the 
inmost extremity of the Adriatic gulph. And these were the mountains which 
Annibal was to pass, as he came forwards for the Rhone, to enter Italy. 

There are some historians, who, in the description which they have given us 
of these mountains, and of the march of Annibal across them, while their design 
is to strike the reader with a view of something wonderful and strange, are un- 
warily betrayed into two faults, the most contrary of any to the true character 
of history; for they relate such things as are manifestly false, and on many oc- 
casions also, are forced even to refute their own accounts. They speak of 
Annibal, as a general whose prudence and whose courage were such as never 
could be equalled; and yet at the same time they plainly prove him to have 
been of all men the most irrational and the most seaseless. As often too as 
they find it difficult to bring the fables which they have feigned to any pro- 
bable conclusion, they introduce the gods and demi-gods into a history, whose 
proper business is to treat of real facts. Thus they represent the Alps to be 
in every part so steep and broken, that not only the cavalry, the heavy infantry, 
and elephants, but even the light-armed foot, must in vaiu have attempted to 
surmount them. They described them also to be entirely destitute of all inha- 
bitants, so that unless some god or hero had appeared and pointed out the 
road to Annibal, he might still have wandered ignorant of his way till the 
whole army had been lost. 

Now, this account of things is both inconsistent with its-elf and false. For, 
must not Annibal have been esteemed the most imprudent and most rash of 
all commanders, if he had set out upon his march, at the head of so great an 
army, upon which he had also built the noblest expectations, without being 
first informed of the direction of his route, and the places through which he 
was to pass; in a word, without knowing into what kind of country he was 
going to enter, and what kind of people he was likely to encounter in the way ? 
and must it not be thought a still more high degree of folly, to have engaged 
thus blindly in an attempt which was so far from yielding any reasonable pros- 
pect of success, that, on the contrary, it was not even hi its nature practicable ? 
Yet these writers, while they lead him through a country of which he had re- 
ceived no previous knowledge, ascribe to him such a conduct, at a time when 
his army was entire, and his hopes all fair and flourishing, as no other general 
would ever have pursued, even in the most weak and desperate state. With 
regard also to that which they relate concerning the desert condition and in- 
superable roughness of the Alps, it must appear at once to be a most direct 
and notorious falsehood. For the Gauls that lived along the Rhone had often 
passed these mountains ; and even not long before the time of Annibal they 
had led a very numerous army over them, to join the Cisalpine Gauls in their 
wars against the Romans, as we shewed particularly in the former book. 

. The Alps themselves are inhabited also by a numerous people: but these 
historians, through the want of being acquainted with all these circumstances, 
are obliged to feign the appearance of some demi-god to direct the Cartha- 
ginians in their march: following in this the example of the tragic writers. 
For as these are forced to introduce a deity in the catastrophe of their pieces, 
because their fables are founded neither on truth nor sense ; so these historians 
likewise, when they have filled their first relations with circumstances that are 
both improbable and false, must of necessity have recourse to the gods and 
demi-gods, to clear the difficulties in which they have involved their storv. 
For if the beginning be contrary to truth and uature, the end also must be the 
"same. But notwithstanding all which these writers may pretend, it is certain 



124 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

that Annibal, in the conduct of this enterprise, had taken all his measures 
with the best judgment and precaution. For he had informed himself with 
great exactness of the nature of the country through which he was to pass : he 
was well assured of the goodness of it, and of the inveterate hatred which the 
people bore against the Romans. And that he might be able also to surmount 
the difficulties of the way, he chose for guides the natives of the country; men 
engaged with him in the same designs, and actuated by the same common 
hopes. With regard to myself, I may be allowed to speak of these things 
with some confidence; for I not only received my accounts from persons that 
lived in the times of which I am writiug, but have also passed the Alps, for 
the sake of gaining a more full and accurate knowledge of the truth. 



CHAP. V. 

On the third day after the Carthaginians had begun their march, the Ro- 
man consul Publius arrived at the place where they had passed the river. 
When he found that the enemy was gone, his surprise was very great, and not, 
indeed, without good reason ; for he had persuaded himself that they would 
by no means venture to pass .that way into Italy, amidst so many barbarous 
nations, noted for their fraud aud perfidy. But, as he saw, however, that they 
had made the attempt, he returned in haste to his ships, and ordered all the 
forces immediately to embark ; and having sent his brother into Spain, he 
steered his course back again to Italy, designing to march with the greatest 
diligence through Tyrrhenia, and so to reach the Alps before the Carthaginians 
should be able to have passsed those mountains. The latter, continuing their 
route forwards, arrived, after four days' inarch from the passage of the Rhone, 
at a place that was very fertile in corn, and possessed by a numerous people. It 
was called the Island ; because the Rhone and Isara, running on both sides of 
it, fall together below, and sharpen the land into a point. This place, both in 
its size and figure, resembles that part of Egypt which is called the Delta, with 
this difference only, that one of the sides of the latter is washed by the sea, 
which receives the rivers that inclose the other two, whereas the third side of 
the island is defended by a chain of very rough and lofty mountains, which, 
indeed, are almost inaccessible. It happened that at this time there were two 
brothers in arms against each other, contending for the sovereignty of the 
place. The eldest of them immediately had recourse to the Carthaginians, 
and implored their aid to secure to him the possession of his rights. Annibal 
embraced the occasion with no small joy, being well aware of the advantages 
that would result from it to himself. Having joined his forces, therefore, with 
the prince, he defeated and drove out the younger brother, and was well re- 
warded by the conqueror, for the assistance which he had given him : for he 
not only supplied the troops with corn and other necessaries, in large abun- 
dance, but exchanged likewise all their arms that were impaired and worn by 
use, for others that were sound and new. He furnished a great part of the 
soldiers also with new habits, and especially with shoes, which were of singular 
service to them in their march afterwards across the mountains. But the chief 
advantage was, that he attended with all his forces upon the rear of the Car- 
thaginian army, through the whole country of the Allobroges, which they 
could not otherwise have passed without great fear and caution, and secured 
their march from insult till they arrived at the foot of the Alps. 

When the army, after they had marched ten days along the Rhone, and had 
reached the distance of about eight hundred stadia from the place where they 
passed the river, were just now preparing to ascend the Alps, they found them- 
selves in a situation that seemed likely to prove fatal to them. The chiefs 
of the Allobroges had suffered them to pass the plains, without any interrup- 
tion or disturbance, being restrained in part by their apprehensions of the Car~ 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 12£ 



thaginian cavalry, and partly also by the dread of those barbarians that fol- 
lowed in the rear. But when the latter had returned back again to their coun- 
try, and Annibal with the foremost of his troops was now beginning to enter 
the difficult passes of the mountains, they drew together their forces in great 
numbers, and possessed themselves of all the posts that commanded the defiles 
through which the Carthaginians were obliged to pass. If this design had 
been conducted with due secrecy and caution, the whole army must have been 
destroyed without recourse ; but as they employed no pains to cover their in- 
tentions, the attempt, though it brought loss upon the Carthaginians, proved 
no less pernicious to themselves. 

For when Annibal perceived that the enemy had thus seized on all the ad-^ 
vantageous posts, heencamped at the foot of the mountains,and sent away some 
of the Gauls that served as guides in his army, to discover their disposition, 
conduct, and designs. When these returned, they acquainted him that, during 
the time of day, the barbarians remained constant in their stations, and kept 
a careful guard upon them, but retired, as soon as night came on, to a neigh- 
bouring town. The general, having formed his measures upon this intelli- 
gence, continued his march in open view, as far as to the entrance of the defiles, 
and encamped very near the enemy. And, when night came on, he orda:ed 
fires to be lighted, and the greater part of the army to remain in the camp ; 
while himself, having selected some of the bravest of the troops, and disin- 
cumbered them of every thing that might retard their march, advanced through 
the passes, and seized the posts which the enemy had now deserted. When 
day appeared, and the barbarians saw what had happened, they were forced to 
desist from their first design : but, having afterwards observed that the' ca- 
valry, and the beasts that conveyed the baggage, being crowded and pressed 
close together by the narrowness of the way, advanced very slowly forwards, 
and not without the greatest difficulty, they seized the occasion that appeared 
so favourable, and fell upon them as' they marched, in many parts at once. 
The destruction that ensued was very great, especially of the horses and beasts 
of burden. But the loss of these was rather owing to the badness of the 
ground on which they stood, than to any efforts of the enemy : (&»] as the* way 
was not only very rough and narrow, but was bounded also on every side by 
steep and craggy rocks, the beasts that were loaded with the baggage were 
overturned by every shock, and hurried headlong with their burdens down the 
precipices. This disorder was occasioned chiefly by the horses that were 
wounded: for these, being rendered senseless and ungovernable, not only 
fell against the beasts of burden that were hear them, but, forcing their way also 
through the ranks as they were labouring to advance, filled every thing with 
tumult, and bore down all that was within their reach. 

But Annibal, perceiving this disorder, and reflecting with himself that the 
ioss of the baggage alone must prove fatal to his army, though all the troops 
should escape with safety, advanced now in haste to their assistance, with the 
forces that had gained the hills in the night before ; and, rushing down with 
violence upon the enemy from those eminences, he killed great numbers of 
them, but not without an equal loss: for the cries and conflict of these new 
combatants greatly increased the former tumult of the march. At last, how- 
ever, the greater part of the Allobroges were slain, and the rest forced to fly. 
AnnibaLthen conducted through the passes, though not without the greatest 
pains and difficulty, what remained of the cavalry and beasts of burden : and, 
having afterwards assembled as many of the troops as he was able to draw to- 
gether after the disorder of the late action, he advanced against the town from 
whence the enemy had made their attack upon him. As the place was, in a 
manner, quite deserted by the people, who had all ^oneoutin search of booty, 
he became master of it upon Ins first approach ; and from thence drew many 
great advantages, with resptct both to the present and to fotir.euse: for be- 
sides the horses, beasts of burden, and prisoners which he gained, he found 



126 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

likewise in it so large a quantity of corn and cattle, that it. proved sufficient to 
support the army during two or three days' march. By this conquest also the 
people that lived along the sides of the mountains were struck with terror, and 
feared to engage in any new attempt against him. 

Annibal, having rested in this place during one whole day, again decamped, 
and continued his march to some distance forwards, without any accident. 
But, on the fourth day, he fell a second time into a danger, from which it was 
not easy to escape. The inhabitants of those parts of the mountains, having 
formed the design of surprising him by treachery, advanced to meet him, with 
green branches in their hands, and crowns upon their heads, which is the signal 
of peace among the barbarous nations, as the caduceus is among the Greeks. 
Annibal, being unwilling to trust too hastdy to these appearances, questioned 
them with great exactness concerning their intentions, and the purpose of their 
coming. They answered, that, having been informed that he had taken a 
neighbouriug town, and destroyed all those that had appeared in arms against 
him, they were come to assure him that they had no intention to do him any 
injury, and to request that he would offer none to them. They promised also, 
that they would leave some hostages in his hands, as a pledge of their sin- 
cerity. Annibal still was doubtful and irresolute, and apprehended some ill 
design ; but when he had reflected with himself, that his compliance with the 
terms which this people now proposed might serve, perhaps, to render them 
more mild and cautious ; and, on the other hand, that, in case he should reject 
them, they would not fail to act against him as open enemies, he at last re- 
solved to embrace their offers, and, in appearance at least, to consider them 
as friends. The barbarians brought their hostages, supplied the army liberally 
with cattle, and gave themselves up to the Carthaginians with so little reserve 
or caution, that Annibal was in a great degree induced to throw away all sus- 
picion, and even intrusted them with the charge of leading the army through 
the rest of the defiles. But when the Carthaginians, after two days' march 
under the conduct of those guides, were now engaged in passing through a 
valley, that was surrounded on every side by steep and insuperable precipices, 
suddenly this treacherous people appeared behind them in great numbers, and 
fell with fury upon the rear. In this situation the whole army must inevitably 
have been destroyed, if Annibal, who still retained some little doubt of their 
sincerity, had not placed, by a wise precaution, the baggage with the cavalry 
at the head of all the march, and the heavy infantry behind. These troops 
sustained the attack, and in part repelled the impending ruin. The loss, 
however, was very great, both of men, and horses, and beasts of burden : for 
the barbarians, advancing still along the summit of the mountains, as the Car- 
thaginians continued their march through the valley, both by slinging stones, 
and rolling down fragments of the rocks upon them, spread so great terror and 
disorder through the army, that Annibal, with one half of the troops, was forced 
to take his station for the night upon a naked and desart rock, to secure the 
cavalry and baggage, till they had all passed the valley. And this was at last 
accomplished ; but such was the roughness and difficulty of these defiles, that 
the whole night was scarcely sufficient for the work. 

On the following day, the enemy being now retired, the Carthaginian gene- 
ral joined the cavalry, and continued his march towards the summit of the 
Alps. From this time the barbarians never came to attack him in any very 
numerous body ; but some straggling parties of them appearing from time to 
time, in different places, and falling, as occasion served, sometimes upon the 
foremost troops, and sometimes on the rear, gave frequent interruption to his 
march, and carried away part of the baggage. The elephants were chiefly ser- 
viceable upon these occasions : for on which side soever they advanced, the 
enemy were struck with terror at the sight, and never ventured to approach. 
On the ninth day, having gained at last the summit of the mountains, he there 
fixed his camp, and rested durisg two whole days, that he might give some 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. far- 

ease and refreshment to the troops that had performed their inarch with safety, 
and that the others might also join him, who were not yet arrived. During 
this time, many of the wounded horses, and of the beasts that had thrown their 
burdens in the late disorders of the march, having followed the traces of the 
army, arrived unexpectedly in the camp. 

It was now near the time of winter. The mountains were already covered 
deep with snow ; and the whole army seemed to be under the greatest dejection 
and dismay, being not only exhausted by the miseries which they had suf- 
fered, but disheartened also by the view of those that were yet to come. 
Annibal, therefore, had recourse to the only expedient that remained, to raise 
their drooping courage. He assembled the troops together.; and, from the 
summit of the Alps, which, when considered with regard to Italy, appeared to 
stand as the citadel of all the country, pointed to their view the plains beneath 
that were watered by the Po ; and reminded them of the favourable disposi- 
tion of the Gauls towards them. He shewed them also the very ground upon 
which Rome itself was situated. By this prospect they were, in some degree, 
recovered from their fears. On the morrow, therefore, they decamped, and 
began to descend the mountains. There was now no enemy to oppose their 
passage, except some lurking parties only, which sometimes fell upon them by 
surprise, for the sake of plunder : but, by reason of the snows, and the badness 
of the ground, their loss was not much inferior to that which they had suffered 
in the ascent : for the way was not only very steep and narrow, but so entirely 
covered also by the snow, that the feet knew not where to tread with safety ;. 
and as often as they turned aside from the proper track, they were instantly 
hurried down some precipice. Vet the soldiers, to whom such accidents were 
now become familiar, sustained all this misery with an amazing firmness. At 
last they came to a place which neither the elephants, nor the hearts of bur- 
den, could in any manner pass : for the ground, which was before extremely 
steep and broken, to the length of a stadium and a half, had again very lately 
fallen away, and left the road so narrow, that it was quite impracticable. At 
thi* sight the troops again were seized with consternation, and even began to 
lose all hopes of safety. Annibal at first endeavoured to avoid this route, by 
changing the direction of his march, and making a circuit rouud it. Bnt he 
soon was forced to desist from that design : for the way on every side was 
utterly insuperable, through an accident of a singular kind, which is peculiar 
to the Alps. The snows of the former year, having remained unmelted upon 
the mountains, were now covered over by those that had fallen in the present 
winter. The latter being soft, and of no great depth, gave an easy admission 
to the feet ; but when these were trodden through, and the soldiers began 
to touch the snows that lay beneath, which were now become so firm that they 
would yield to no impression, their feet both fell at once from under them, as 
if they had beeu walking upon the edge of some high and slippery precipice. 
Aud this mischance drew after it a still worse accident: for when they strug- 
gled with their hands and knees to recover themselves from their fall, as the 
ground was every where extremely steep, they were then sure to slide away 
with greater violence and rapidity than before, carrying likewise with them 
whatever they had grasped for their support. The beasts also that were loaded 
with the baggage, having, by their endeavours to rise again when they had 
fallen, broken the surface of the lower snow, remained closely werlged in the 
pits which they had made ; and, by the weight of the burdens under which they 
lay, as well as from the unyielding firmness of the snows around them, were 
fixed immoveably in the place. 

When this attempt was thus found to be impracticable, Annibal returned 
again to the narrow road which he had quitted ; and, having removed the snow, 
he encamped at the entrance of it, and ordered the soldiers to make a firm and 
level way along the precipice itself: and this, with the expense of vast pains 
and labour, was at last effected ; so that, in one day's time, there was sufficient 



128 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBTUS. 



room for the horses and beasts of burden to descend. These were immediately 
conducted down ; and, having gained the plains, were sent away to pasture, 
in places where no snow had fallen. The Nnmidians were then commanded 
to enlarge the road, that the elephants might also pass ; but so laborious way 
the task, that, though fresh men still succeeded to those that were fatigued, 
it was not without great difficulty that they completed it, in three days' con- 
tinued toil ; after which these beasts came down the mountains, beiug almost 
exhausted and spent with famine : for the tops of the Alps, which are covered 
through all seasons with perpetual snows, produce neither tree nor pasture, 
though the middle parts, on both sides of them, abound with woods and 
forests, and are proper to be cultivated. Annibal then descended last^ with 
all the army; and thus on the third day gained the plains, having lost great 
numbers of.his soldiers in the march, as well in passing rivers, as in the en- 
gagements which he was obliged to sustain. Many of his men had also 
perished among the precipices of the Alps, and a far greater number of the 
horses and beasts of burden. And having thus at last completed his journey 
from New Carthage, in five months' time, fifteen days of which were employed 
in passing over the Alps, he now boldly entered the territory of the Insubrians^ 
aud the plains that are watered by the Po, though the whole of his infantry 
that was left amounted to no more than twelve thousand Africans, and eight 
thousand Spaniards ; and his cavalry to six thousand only, as we learn from an 
account that was engraven by his orders on a column near Lacinium. 

About the same time, the Roman consul Publius, having sent away his 
brother, as we before related, with the greater part of the army into Spain, 
exhorting him to prosecute the war with vigour against Asdrubal in that coun- 
try, landed at Pisae, with a small body of forces only. But having taken hi& 
route through Tyrrhenia, and increased his army with the legions that were 
then in action, under the conduct of the praetors, upon the frontiers of the 
Boian Gauls, he came and encamped also near the Po, with design to press the 
enemy, and force them to an engagement without delay. 

Thus then have we brought these generals together, and fixed the scene of 
the war in Italy. But, before we go on to recount the battles that ensued,, 
it maybe proper just to speak of certain matters, which may bethought, per- 
haps, to deserve a place in this part of our history : for, as we have often taken 
occasion, in the course of this work, to give a full description of various place* 
that occurred, both in Spain and Afric, many will be ready to inquire, from 
whence it happens, that we have made no mention of the Straits that are 
formed by the pillars of Hercules, and of the sea beyond, together with the 
properties and accidents that are peculiar to them ; of the British islands, with 
%he manner of making tin ; and of the gold and silver mines that are found 
in Spain ; especially since other writers, who have treated of these subject! 
in a very copious manner, differ greatly from each other in all that they re- 
port. 

It must, indeed, be acknowledged, that these things are by no means fo- 
reigh to the design of history : but I considered with myself, that a separate 
discussion of every one, as they occurred, would too much break the course 
of the narration, and divert the reader from those transactions which are the 
proper subject of this work : and, in the next place, that it would be far more 
useful likewise to take a view of all of them together, in some time and place 
Teserved expressly for that purpose ; in which we might be able to explain at 
large whatever has been known with truth concerning them. Let no one, 
therefore, think it strange, if, whenever any other subjects of the same kind 
present themselvesin the progress of our history, that we should forbear to enter 
into a particular examination of them. To expect that an historian should 
crowd his work in every part with these descriptions, is, indeed, a proof of a 
very vicious and uninformed judgment. Such readers may very properly be. 
compared with those men of liquorish palates, who taste eagerly of every dish 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 123 

Hue— ■. "T— » 



that is set before them ; and, amidst so great a variety of meats, not on;y lose 
the present relish of what they eat, but make their whole food pernicious to 
the body which it was designed to strengthen and sustain. In the same man- 
ner also, these mixed histories, as they afford no pure or genuine entertainment 
in the reading, so neither are they able to convey any sound and lasting nourish- 
ment to the mind. 

With regard to the reasons that induced me to reserve the full considera- 
tion of all these subjects for a professed and separate inquiry, there are many 
that might now be mentioned ; but the chief and most considerable of 
them is, that by much the greater part of historians, who have ever treated of 
the situationand the extreme partsof the habitable world, have fallen into num- 
berless mistakes, in almost all which they relate. It will be necessary, there- 
fore, to refute and rectify their accounts, not by some slight and eursoty remarks, 
but in a full and deliberate examination of them. We mubt be careful, how- 
ever, to remember, that their labours deserve, upon the whole, rather praise 
than censure ; and that their errors are a:! ways to be corrected in the gentlest 
manner ; since it is certain* that they would themselves retract and alter many 
passages in thtir works, if they were now alive. For, in former times, there 
were but few among the Greeks that made any attempts to extend their search, 
into those places which we call the boundary of the earth. The difficulties in 
their way were, indeed, almost insuperable. Many dangers were to be en- 
countered by sea, and more and greater upon land : and when any, either by 
choice or accident, had gained ah entrance into those countries, yet because 
some parts were destitute of ail inhabitants, and others possessed by a race of 
men, whose manners were uncultivated and wholly barbarous, it was scarcely 
possible that they should be able to examine with their own proper eyes even 
into a small part only of the things that deserved their notice. Nor could 
they, on the other hand, as they were strangers to the language of the natives* 
ever gain the information that was requisite, in those which they had oppor- 
tunity of seeing. And even these few that were able, in some degree, to sur- 
mount these difficulties, were all disposejl to enlarge their descriptions far be- 
yond the degrees of probability ; and, having neither sense nor candour to be 
satisfied with the plain and simple truth, invented strange aud incredible fic- 
tions of prodigies and monsters ; reporting many things which they had never 
seen, and many also that had not existence. Since, therefore, all these cir- 
cumstances concurred to render it not only difficult, but utterly impossible to 
gain any accurate and certain knowledge of those countries, we ought by no 
means to pass too severe a censure upon the old historians, for their mistakes 
or omissions in these matters ; but, on the contrary, should rather be persuaded 
that they deserved our acknowledgements and thanks, on account even of the 
little information which they have left behind them ; and that, amidst 
those numerous difficulties, they were able as it were to lay the foun- 
dation of more general discoveries. But in these times, since all Asia ha3 
been opened tu us by the arms of Alexander, and the olher parts of the world 
by the Roman victories, so tlmt every place and every country is now become 
accessible either by sea or land ; and since men of eminence in the world have 
shewn great eagerness and zeal in making these researches, employing in them 
all that leisure which they now enjoy from the business of war and the care of 
public affairs, it may with reason be expected that, by the help of these ad- 
vantages, we should at last be able to remove the obscurity in which these in- 
quiries have hitherto been involved. Aid this is the task which I shall under- 
take in its proper place; and shall endeavour to give those readers, whose taste 
is gratified by such descriptions, a clear and perfect insight into ail these sub- 
jects : for I have exposed myself, without reserve, both to great fatigue and. 
many dangers, in traversing all Afric, Spain, and Gaul, and in voyagijg also- 
•pon the exterior sea, by which these parts of the world are bounded, that 1 

vwl. I. xo. 4. R 



130 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 



might be able to correct with some assurance the mistakes of former writers, 
and lay open the knowledge of these countries to the Greeks. But we shall 
now leave this digression, and go on to the recital of the battles that were 
fought in Italy. 



CHAP. VI, 

The Carthaginians general having now entered Italy with the forces which we 
have already particularly mentioned, at first encatfiped at the bottom of the 
Alps, that he might give ease and refreshment to his troops. Indeed, the pre- 
sent condition of his army was miserable almost beyond expression :'for, be- 
sides the hardships which they had sustained from the difficulties of the' way, 
both in ascending and descending the mountains, the want of such provisions 
as were necessary, and the diseases also which their bodies had contracted from 
neglect and nastiness, had changed them into spectacles of horror, while the 
great part seemed voluntarily to sink beneath their sufferings, and even to 
reject all thoughts both of life and safety : for, in a march so long and difficult, 
it was utterly impossible to bring with them such supplies as might fully satisfy 
the wants of so numerous an army ; aud even those which they had brought 
were almost all lost among the precipices, with the beasts that carried them. 
This army, therefore, which,- when it passed the Rhone, consisted of thirty- 
eight thousand foot and eight thousand horse, was now reduced to half that 
number. The rest had perished among the mountains ; and those that were 
left alive were so much worn and altered by continued sufferings, that their 
appearance was scarcely human. 

The first care, therefore, to which AnnibaLnow gave his whole attention, 
was to raise the drooping spirits of the troops, and, by proper refreshment, to 
restore both the men and horses to their former state. When this was done, he 
invited the Taurinians, who lived near the foot of the Alps, and were at this- 
time engaged in war with the Insubrians, to enter into an alliance with him, 
*md to assist him with their forces ; and, when his offers were rejected by them[ 
"he marched and encamped before the strongest of their cities ; and, having- 
taken it after three days' siege, killed all that were found in arms against him 
in the place. By this severity, the neighbouring barbarians were "all struck 
with terror, and submitted at discretion. The rest of the Gauls that inhabited! 
these plains were impatient to take arms in favour of the Carthaginians, as they 
had at first designed ; but, because the legions that were sent from Rome had 
passed through inany of their states, and had avoided all the ambuscades thafc 
were prepared to intercept them, they were forced to remain quiet for the pre- 
sent, and some were even compelled to join the Romans. Annibal, therefore 
wisely judging that no time was to be lost, resolved to continue his'march for- 
wards without delay, and, by some action of importance, to fix the Confidence, 
of those that were disposed to embrace his party, and encouruge them to act 
without restraint, for the advancement of their common hopes. 

But, while he was preparing all things for the execution of this design, the 
report arrived that Publius, with his army, had already passed the Po, and was, 
uow at no great distance from him. At first, Annibal could scarcely give credit 
to the news. Not many days were past since he had left the Romans upon the 
banks of the Rhone ; and, as the passage by sea from Massilia to the Tyr- 
rhenian coast was both long and difficult, so the distance also from thence 
through Italy, to the bottom of the Alps, was very great, and the way by no 
means easy or commodious for an army. But, as the fact received fuller con- 
firmation, he was beyond measure surprised, both at the boldness of the at- 
tempt, and at the success likewise with which the consul had carried it into 
execution. Publius, on his part also, was not less astonished : for he had per- 
suaded himself either that Annibal would never venture to take his route across. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 131 



the Alps, with an army that was all composed of foreign troops ; or, if he did, 
that he must inevitably be lost in the attempt. But when he, heard that he 
had not ouly passed the mountains, hut was already laying siege to some of 
the towns of Italy, he was struck with admiration at" the daring and un- 
daunted spirit of this general. At Rome also the surprise was not at all more 
moderate: for, while the report that Saguntum was taken by the Cartha- 
ginians still sounded in their ears, and all their measures were suited to that 
event ; when they had sent away the consuls but just before, the one to make a 
diversion of the war in Afric, and the other to oppose the progress of the ene- 
my in Spain, on a sudden they are informed that Annibal is already arrived 
in Italy with his army. This wonderful celerity, as it almost exceeded all be- 
lief, so it rilled them also with the greatest apprehensions. They immediately 
send notice to Tiberius, who still lay at Lilybaeum, that the enemy had en- 
tered Italy. They directed him to desist from his first design, and return 
again to defend his country. The consul, having received these orders, sent 
back the fleet to Rome, and commanded the tribunes to draw together all the 
legionary forces with the greatest diligence ; and that, on a day which he pre- 
scribed, they should meet him at Ariminium, a town situated near the Adriatic 
coast, in the extremity of those plains that are watered by the Po. In a word, 
so contrary were the present accidents to all that had been expected or foreseen, 
that the consternation soon became general among the people, and held their 
minds in anxious suspense for the event. 

But Annibal and Publius, as they now approached each other, endeavoured 
severally to animate their troops, by all the motives which the present con- 
juncture suggested to them. Upon this occasion Annibal contrived the fol- 
lowing expedient. Having assembled together all the forces, he brought be- 
fore them the young prisoners, whom he had taken among those barbarians 
that had disturbed his march across the Alps. With a view to the design 
which he now put in practice, he had before given orders that these wretches 
should be treated with the last severity. They were loaded with heavy chains ; 
their bodies were emaciated with hunger, and mangled by blows and stripes; 
In this condition he now placed them in the midst of the assembly, and threw 
before them some suits of Gallic armour, such as their kings are accustomed 
to wear when they engage in single combat. He ordered some horses also to 
be set before them, and military habits that were very rich and splendid. He 
then demanded of the young men, which of them were willing to try their fate 
in arms against each other, on condition that the conqueror should possess 
those spoils that were before their eyes, while the vanquished would be released 
by death from all his miseries. The captives with one voice cried out, and 
testified the utmost eagerness to engage. Annibal then commanded that lots 
should be cast among them ; and that those two upon whom the lot should 
fall should take the arms that were before them, and begin the combat. When 
the prisoners heard these orders, they extended their hands towards the 
heavens ; and every one most fervently implored the gods that the lot to fight 
might be his own. And no sooner was their chance decided, than those whose, 
fortune it was to engage appeared filled with joy, while the rest were mourn- 
ful and dejected. When the combat also was determined, the captives that 
were by lot excluded from the trial pronounced him who had lost his life in 
the engagement to be in their sight not less happy than the conqueror ; since, 
by dying, he was released from all that wretchedness which they were still 
condemned to suffer. The same reflections arose also in the minds of the 
Carthaginian soldiers, who, from comparing the condition of theuead with the 
ill fate of those that were led back again to chains and torture, ueelaved the 
former to be happy, and gave their pity to the sufferings of the latter. 

When Annibal perceived that this "contrivance had produce;; in the minds 
of all the army the effect that was intended ftoui it, he came forwards in the 
assembly, and told the soldiers, " That he had offered that spectacle to their 



132 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

view, that, when they had discerned their own condition in the fate of tnose 
unhappy captives, they might more clearly judge what resolutions were most 
proper to be taken, and in what manner they might best form their conduct 
in the present circumstances ; that, in the combat which they had seen, and 
the prize proposed to the conqueror, was displayed a perfect image of that state 
into which they were themselves now brought by fortune ; that such was their 
situation, that they must either conquer, or be slain in battle, or else fall alive 
into the power of their enemies ; that by conquest they would obtain a prize, 
not of horses and military habits, but the whole wealth and riches of the Ro- 
man empire; and would thus become the happiest of mankind ; that, if they 
were to fall in battle, they could then only die, without being first exposed to 
any kind of misery, and contending, to their latest breath, for the most glo- 
rious of all victories. But, on the other hand, in case that they were con- 
quered, and the love of life should natter them with any hopes of being able 
to escape by flight ; or should they even consent upon any terms to live after 
their defeat, it was manifest, beyond all doubt, that nothing but the extremity 
of wretchedness could await them : for, surely there were none among them, 
who, when they had considered how vast a length of country they had tra- 
versed, what enemies had opposed them in their way, and what large and rapid 
rivers they were forced to pass, could be so wholly destitute of all sense and 
judgement as ever to be persuaded, that it was possible to regain their several 
countries. He conjured them, therefore, to throw away all such hopes ; and, in 
judging of their own state and fortune, to retain those sentiments which they 
had just now shewn with regard to the condition of the captives ; that, as in 
that case they declared both the man that conquered, and him who fell in the 
combat, to be happy, and pitied those that were reserved alive; so their busi- 
ness now was, to conquer if it were possible; and if not, to die; and on no 
account to entertain even the smalle&t expectation or thought of life, in case 
that they were conquered; that if they would heartily embrace these senti- 
ments, and curry this resolution with them into action, there was, indeed, no 
room to dou t, but that they would both live and conquer ; that no troops were 
ever known to be defeated, who had once been fixed in this determination, 
either by necessity or choice; but that, on the other hand, an army which, 
like the Romans, saw their country open to them on every side, and ready to 
receive all those that could escape by flight, must necessarily fall beneath the 
efforts of men whose only hopes were placed in victory." This harangue, to- 
gether with the spectacle that had passed before their eyes, fully inflamed 
the courage of the soldiers, and raised them into such a temper as Annibal 
had designed. He therefore applauded their disposition, and dismissed the 
assembly, with orders that they should make ail things ready for their march 
by break of day. 

Upon the same day likewise, the consul Publius, who had lately advanced 
beyond the Po, and designed to continue his march forwards, and to pass the 
Ticinus, sent away a sufficient number of his troops to lay a bridge across that 
river ; and, having in the mean time called together the rest of the army, he 
harangued them in the following manner. 

In the first part of his discourse he displayed, in many words, the dignity 
and splendour of the Roman empire ; and recalled to their minds .the glorious 
actions of their ancestors. Speaking afterwards on the subject of the present 
war, he told the soldiers, "That, even though they had yet never made any trial 
of the strength of those that were in arms against them, they might, however, 
be assured of victory, if they would remember only, that their enemies were 
the Carthaginians, — those very Carthaginians who had been so often vanquished 
by the Roman legions, and had submitted to the imposition of repeated tri- 
butes, and who now, by an attempt not less absurd than insolent, had dared 
to appear in arms against a people to whom they had paid such subjection as 
was not far removed from slavery. But since, in fact," continued he, " we so 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 133 

!atel}r have experienced that these enemies want courage even to stand before 
us in the Held, what must be our sentiments, if we judge with reason concern- 
ing the issue of the war? For when their cavalry was engaged with ours up- 
on the Rhone, they not only lost great numbers of their men, but the rest that 
were left alive fled before us in a manner the most dishonourable, even to their 
very camp. Their general also, and all his army, no sooner were informed of 
our approach, than they retired with such precipitation, that their retreat was 
rather to be called a flight. It was this fear alone, and not their choice or in- 
clination, that hurried them across the Alps. Behold, then," added he, 
" Annibal is indeed arrived in Italy, but his army is lost among the moun- 
tains ; and even the few that have escaped are so much wasted with fatigue, so 
worn and exhausted by the length and difficulties of their march, that both 
men and horses are alike disabled, and become unfit for all the services of 
war. To conquer such an enemy it must surely be sufficient to shew yourselves 
but once before them. But if any thing be still wanting to fix y6ur confi- 
dence, let my presence here among you be considered as a certain pledge of 
your success. For it never can be thought that I should thus have left the 
fleet, with the affairs of Spain that were entrusted to my care, and have run 
with so much diligence to join the army in this country, unless I had been first 
assured by the most solid reasons, not only that this measure was both wise 
and necessary in the present circumstances, but that I was hastening also to 
reap the fruits of an easy and undoubted victory." 

The authority of the speaker, as well as the truth that was contained in this 
discoure, raised in all the troops an impatience to be led against the enemy. 
Publius commended their alacrity, and exhorting them to hold themselves in 
readiness for action upon the earliest warning, he dismissed the assembly. 

On the following day both armies continued to advance along theTicinus, 
on that side of it which is nearest to the Alps; the Romans having the river on 
their left, and the Carthaginians upon their right. But on the second day, 
having received notice from their foragers that they were now at no great dis- 
tance from each other, they encamped severally in the place where they then 
were. On the third day, Annibal, having drawn out all his cavalry, marched 
through the plain to view the situation of the enemy. Publius, also, with his 
cavalry and light-armed troops, was advancing on the same design. As soon 
as they approached so near as to discern the dust that was raised on eithe side, 
they immediately ranged their forces in order of battle. The consul having 
placed his light-armed troops in front, together with the Gallic horse, drew 
up the rest in a line behind, and moved slowly towards the enemy. Annibal 
advanced to meet him, having thrown into his centre all the bridled and heavy- 
cavalry, and placed the Numidians on the wings, that they might be ready to 
surround the Romans. As the cavalry on both sides, as well as the generals 
themselves, shewed the greatest impatience to engage, the light-armed troops 
being apprehensive, that, as these bodies met, they should be borne down in- 
stantly in the shock, had scarcely thrown their first javelins when they retired 
with great precipitation through the intervals of their own squadrons that were 
behind them. The two bodies then advanced to action. The battle was 
fierce on both sides, and the success for some time doubtful ; for many of the 
combatants left their horses and maintained the figlit on foot with the greatest 
obstinacy. But after some time the Numidian cavalry, having taken a circuit 
round, and falling suddenly upon the light-armed forces that h;id saved them- 
selves in the rear, trampled them down in heaps, and from thence advanced 
to charge the hindmost of the squadrons that were engaged. The Romans, 
who had hitherto sustained the fight with such success, that, though they lost 
many of their men, they had yet destroyed a far greater number of the enemy, 
being thus attacked by the Numidians in their rear, were thrown at once into 
disorder, so that a general rout ensued. The greater part fled different ways -; 



134 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



but a small number of 1 hem, having formed themselves into a body round the 
person of the consul, retreated with him. 

Publius immediately decamped, and marched in haste through the plains, 
in order to repass the Po. For as the country round him was all flat and 
open, and the Carthaginians superior in their cavalry, and because himself also 
had received a dangerous wound in the late engagement, he thought it ne- 
cessary to remove the troops without delay into a place of safety on the other 
side of the river. Annibal for some tune stood in expectation that the Ro- 
mans wouid draw out their infantry and engage in a general battle. But when 
he found that they had left their camp, he immediately pursued as far as to 
the bridge upon the Po. The bridge had been broken by the Romans, and 
the greater part of the planks removed. But a body of six hundred men that 
had been left to secure that post, and who still remained upon the banks of 
the river, fell into the hands of + he Carthaginians. Annibal, being informed 
by these that the Romans had already gaiued a great distance from him, im- 
mediately gave a stop to the pursuit, and, directing his march up the stream, 
advanced along the river in search of a part that might cornmodiously admit a 
bridge to be thrown across it. After two days' march, having found a place 
that was proper for this design, he made a bridge of boats, and ordered As- 
drubal to conduct the army over the river, while himself, who first had passed 
it, gave audience to the ambassadors that now came to meet him from all the 
neighbouring country. For the Gauls on every side no sooner had received 
the news of the late victory, than they immediately threw away all restraint, 
and pursuing their design, entered into an alliance with the Carthaginians, and 
supplied their army both with men and stores. Annibal received all that 
came to join him with great marks of favour; and when the army had all 
passed the river, he advanced in haste along the banks, but by a way that was 
contrary to his former course, for he now directed his march down the stream, 
with design to overtake and engage the enemy yvithout delay. 

For Publius, after he had repassed the Po, went and encamped near Pla- 
centia, a colony of the Romans ; and being persuaded that he had now placed 
the troops in safety from all insult, he lay quiet in his post, and attended care- 
fully to the cure both of himself and of those that were wounded with him in 
the late engagement. After two days' march from the place where they had 
passed the Po, the Carthaginians arrived near the enemy ; and on the third 
clay they advanced in order and offered battle to the Romans. But as the 
consul remained still close in his entrenchments, they again retired, aud en- 
camped at the distance of about fifty stadia from him. 

At this time, the Gauls that had joined the Roman army, being persuaded 
that the Carthaginians had now the fairest prospect of success, resolved to 
attack the Romans by surprise ; and having secretly concerted their design, 
they waited in their tents for the time to carry it into execution. Supper was 
now ended in the camp, and the army all retired to their repose, when these 
men, having suffered the first part of the night to to pass /without any dis- 
turbance or commotion, at break of day took arms, being in number 
about two thousand foot and two hundred horse, and falling suddenly 
upon the legions that were nearest, killed and wounded great numbers of 
them ; and having cut off the heads of those that were slain, they car- 
ried them to the Carthaginian camp. On their arrival there, they were re- 
ceived by Annibal with great acknowledgments. He applauded their zeal and 
courage ; and having promised them also such rewards as were due to this im- 
portant service, he dismissed them to their several cities, to inform their coun- 
trymen of all that had been transacted, and to invite them to join their forces 
with the Carthaginians. He knew, indeed, that after this flagrant act of per- 
fidy against the Romans, they must of necessity be forced to embrace his 
party. They came accordingly in a short time afterwards, and brought also 






GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYRIUS. 135 



wit': them the Boian Gauls, who delivered to him the three Romans that had 
been sent to inspect the division of the lands, whom they had treacherously 
se: din the beginning' of the war, as we have before related. Annibal re- 
ceived them all in the most favourable manner, concluded an alliance with 
them, and made them his associates in the war : but he returned the prisoners 
again into their hands, advising them to keep them carefully, as the means 
whereby they might recover their own hostages from the Romans, as they had 
at first designed. 

The consul Publius was thrown by this transaction iuto no small anxiety 
and concern. And not doubting bftit that all the neighbouring Gauls, who 
before were very ill disposed towards the Romans, would immediately join the 
enemy, he thought it most prudent to retire and avoid the danger that must 
aribe from so general a revolt. With this design, about three hours after 
midnight, he decamped, and marched towards the riverTrebia, and the moun- 
tains that were near it ; being persuaded that the troops might there lie secure 
against all attacks, as the posts were very strong and advantageous, and the 
country also on every side possessed by their allies. As sricfti as Annibal was 
informed of this retreat, he immediately sent after them the lNumidian horse, 
and afterwards the other cavalry, and himself in a short time followed with 
the rest of the army. The Numidians, having entered the entrenchments, 
and finding them quite deserted, staid to set fire to the camp. This delay was 
highly advantageous to the Romans ; for if these troops had followed the pur- 
suit with diligence, as the march of the enemy lay through a flat and open 
country, great numbers of them must have been destroyed. But now, they 
had almost all safely passed the Trebia, before the cavalry were come up. A 
small part only of the rear, that still remained upon the banks, were either 
killed or taken prisoners by the Carthaginians. ^ 

The consul, when he had passed the river, posted his troops upon the nearest 
hills; and having thrown up an entrenchment round his camp, he resolved to 
wait for the arrival of Tiberius with the other army, and in the mean time care- 
fully to attend to the cure of his wound, that he might be able to bear a part: 
in the engagement, whenever it. should happen. Annibal also fixed his camp 
at the distance of about forty stadia from the Romans ; while the Gauls, who 
inhabited the neighbouring plains, being now bound firmly to his interests, and 
animated by the past success, supplied his troops with all the necessary stores 
in the greatest plenty, and shewed the utmost eagerness to share in ad the 
labours and in all the dangers of the war. 



CHAP. VII. 

When the people were informed at Rome of the action that happened be- 
tween the cavalry, they were at first surprised at an event that was so contrary 
to all their expectations. They found however many reasons which served to 
flatter them in the opinion, that this accident was by no means to be considered 
as an actual defeat : for some ascribed the blame to the rash precipitation of 
the consul ; others imputed the whole mischance to the wilful cowardice and 
misconduct of the Gauls : being led to this persuasion by the treachery which 
that people had just now committed in the camp. And even though the 
worst should be admitted, yet since their infantry remained entire, it seemed 
reasonable that their hopes also should be still the same, with regard to the 
issue of the whole. When Tiberius, therefore^ with his legions, passed through 
Rome, they made no doubt but that the sight alone of so brave an army must 
at once strike the enemy with terror, and give a speedy termination to the 
war. 

W T hen the troops were all met together at Ariminum, on the appointed day, 
agreeably to the oath which they had taken, the consul immediately pursued 



J3<5 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYRIUS. 

his march in haste, with design to join his colleague. Having fixed his camp 
near him, he gave orders for the refreshment of the army, which had suffered 
no small fatigue in their journey of forty days' continuance from Lilybaeum 
to Ariminum, and made all the necessary preparations for a battle, and in 
the meantime held frequent conferences with Publius, as well to inform him- 
self of all that had already been transacted, as to deliberate also with him 
concerning the measures that were now to be pursued. 

About this time Annibal became master of Clastidium, which was surren- 
dered to him by the treachery of the governor, a native of Brundnsium, who 
nad been placed there by the Romans; and having gotten into his hands the 
garrison and all the stores, he distributed the latter among ail his troops for 
their present use, and joined the prisoners to his army without offering them 
any injury. By this instance of his clemency he hoped that all the neigh- 
bouring people might be induced to lay aside their fears, since they would 
now perceive that they had no cause to despair of safety in case that they 
should hereafter fall into the hands of the Carthaginians. He rewarded the 
traitor also with ample presents; that the governors of other cities might be 
led to embrace his party. Not long afterwards, having received information 
that some of the Gauls that had lived between the river Trebia and the Po^ 
who had before concluded an alliauce with him, had now also entered into 
terms of treaty with the Romans, he sent away two thousand foot, and one 
thousand Numidian and Gallic horse, to plunder and lay waste their country. 
These orders were soon executed ; and the detachment was now returning 
with their booty, when the Gauls came running to the Roman camp, and 
implored assistance. Tiberius, who for some time had been impatient to be 
in action, seized the occasion, and immediately sent away the greatest part of 
his cavalry, together with a thousand light-armed foot. These troops, having 
passed the river, charged the Namidians and the Gauls that were loaded 
with plunder, and forced them to retreat in haste to their entrenchments. But 
when the guards that were posted before the Carthaginian camp advanced 
to the assistance of those that fled, the Romans were in their turn routed, and 
constrained to return back towards their camp. Tiberius then commanded all 
the cavalry to advance, together with the light-armed troops; and the enemy 
was again forced to fly. Annibal, who was at this time wholly unprepared for 
a general engagement, and who knew it to be the part of a wise and prudent 
general, not to hazard a decisive action without mature deliberation and de- 
sign, forced the troops to stand, as they fled towards the camp, and turn their 
faces to the enemy ; but at the same time ordered the trumpets to sound the 
signal of retreat, and forbade the soldiers either to pursue or renew the com- 
bat. The Romans,, when they had for some time waited in the field, returned 
back again to their camp ; having lost but a very inconsiderable part of their 
forces in the action, though they had destroyed great numbers of the enemy. 

Tiberius, being beyond measure elated by this success, was impatient to try 
the fortune of a general engagement. But though he had already resolved to 
embrace the advantage which the slow recovery of Publius gave him, and to 
govern all things by his own single authority and will; yet, being desirous also 
to gain, if it were possible, the approbation of his colleague, he communicated 
his intention to him. But Publius was fixed in different sentiments ; for he 
had considered with himself, that when the troops had first been trained and 
exercised during the time of winter, they would be able to perform much 
greater service in the following season, than any that could now be expected 
from them. He was likewise persuaded, that the natural levity apd perfidious 
disposition of the Gauls would soon lead them to revolt from their new allies., 
in case that the Carthaginians should be forced to remain long inactive. He 
pressed his colleague, therefore, with the greatest earnestness, that things 
might Still continue in their present state. Tiberius clearly understood the 
wisdom of these sentiments; but being hurried headlong by ambition, conjfi* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. HI 

dent of victory, and heated also with the vain and flattering expectation of 
being able to finish the war alone before Publius should be in a condition to 
assist him, or the new consuls, the time of whose election now drew near, 
arrive from Rome, to take upon them the command, he resolved, in opposition 
to all sense and prudence, to risk a general battle. And as he thus made 
choice of his own time for action, instead of that which the condition of 
affairs required, his conduct in all that followed was, of consequence, absurd, 
and such as could not fail to disappoint him in the end that was proposed. 

Annibal, on the other hand, having formed the same reflections in his 
mind as Publius had made, with regard to all the present circumstances, was 
led to the opposite determination, and resolved to engage the enemy with- 
out delay. He saw the advantages that would arise from employing the Gauls 
in action before their first ardour was abated. He judged it also to be a point 
of no small importance in his favour, that the Roman troops were all new 
raised levies, not jet inured to war, and that Publius was disabled by his 
wound from appearing in the field. But his chief and strongest reason was, that 
he might not suffer any moment of his time to be wasted in inaction. For, 
when a general has once brought his army into a foreign country, and engaged 
them in designs that aue beyond measure great and difficult, he must very 
shortly meet his ruin, unless he is able from time to time to renew the confi- 
dence and hopes of his allies, by a continual succession of exploits. Not 
doubting, therefore, but that the eager and impatient spirit of Tiberius would, 
soon afford the opportunity that was desired, he now began to make the ne- 
cessary preparations for a battle. 

He had before this time carefully observed the ground that lay between the 
camps. It was a smooth and naked plain; but the banks of the river that ran 
through it, which were of considerable height, and covered also with close 
.shrubs and bushes, suggested to him the design of placing an ambuscade to 
surprise the enemy. This stratagem was such, indeed, as might well be car- 
ried into execution, without any fear of a discovery. For though the Ro- 
mans were always prepared to expect this kind of fraud in woods and covered 
places, because the Gauls were accustomed to hide themselves in these, they 
had never any apprehension of it in a flat open country ; and yet, in fact, it is 
both more safe and easy to place an ambuscade in a pl,ain than in a wood. 
For as the troops are able to discern from their concealment every thing 
around them to a greater distance, so there are always to be found some little 
eminences that cover them effectually from the observation of the enemy. 
Any inconsiderable river, whose banks only rise to a modei'ate height, and 
even sometimes flags and rushes, or any kind of bushes, will serve to hide not 
only a body of foot, but even cavalry. The only caution to be observed is, to 
place their arms, whose brightness might betray them, upon the ground, and 
their helmets under them. 

Annibal, then, when he had first communicated his intention to his brother 
Mago and the rest of the officers in council, who all applauded the design, 
ordered Mago to attend him at the hour of supper, and gave to him the com- 
mand of a hundred foot, and as many horse, directing him to choose them, 
while it was yet day, from the bravest of the troops, and to bring them after > 
supper to his tent. Mago was at this time young, but full of martial ardour, 
and had been trained in war from his very infancy. When lie appeared with 
his men before the general's tent, Annibal, having first exhorted them to be 
strenuous in their duty, commanded each man to select, from his own proper, 
company, nine of the bravest soldiers, and that afterwards they should attend 
his orders in a certain part of the camp. Thus the whole number now 
amounted to one thousand foot, and as many hcrse. As soon as they were all 
assembled, Annibal, having furnished them with proper guides and instructed 
Mago in the time, in which he should appear and charge the enemy, sent them 
away by night to the place of the ambuscade, 

VOL. 1, NO. 4. S 



138 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1U& 

On the morrow, at break of day, he assembled the Numidian cavalry, who, 
'of all the army, were best able to sustain the fatigue and harship. And having 1 
promised great rewards to all that should perform any signal service in the 
battle, he ordered them to pass the river without delay, to approach the camp 
of the Romans, and endeavour bjr skirmishing to draw their army into motion. 
His intention was to surprise the enemy, when they were wholly unprepared 
for ail engagement, and before they had taken their first repast. He then 
called together all the officers; harangued them as the occasion required ; and 
directed them to give orders that the troops should take their usual meal, and 
prepare their arms and horses for the combat. 

When Tiberius saw that the Numidians were advancing towards the camp, 
he immediately sent against them all his cavalry, and after these, his light- 
armed foot, in number about six thousand men; and at last drew out the 
legions likewise from both the camps. Confident in the number of his troops, 
and elated also by the advantage which his cavalry had gained the day before s 
he seemed to be persuaded, that, in order to obtain the victory, it would be 
sufficient only to appear before the enemy. It was now deep winter ; the sn6w 
fell fast ; the cold was uncommonly severe ; and the Romans, both men and 
horses, had almost all left the camp before they had taken any repast. The 
soldiers, however, began their march with the greatest ardour and alacrity. 
But when they came to pass the Trebia, whose stream was now so swelled 
by the torrents that had descended in the night from the neighbouring hills, 
that the waters reached even to their breasts, it was not without the greatest 
pain and difficulty that they gained the other side. As the day also was now 
far advanced, they began to faint through cold and hunger. The Carthagi- 
nians, on the contrary, had taken their usual meal at leisure in their tents, had 
prepared their horses for the combat, and had rubbed their limbs with oil, 
and put on their armour, before a fire. 

Annibal, who stood waiting till the Romans should have passed the river, 
no sooner saw that they had gained the other side, than he immediately sent 
away the Baliaric slingers and the light-armed foot, in number about eight 
thousand, to support the Numidian cavalry, and himself then followed with 
8.11 the army. At the distance of eight stadia from the camp, he ranged in 
one single line his infantry, which was composed of Spaniards, Africans, and 
Gauls, and amounted in the whole to about twenty thousand men. His ca- 
valry, whose numbers, with the Gauls included, were above ten thousand, was 
placed, in two bodies, on the wings ; and the elephants, divided also into equal 
numbers, was posted, at some distance, before either wing. 

Tiberius, perceiving that his cavalry could gain no advantage against the 
Numidian horse, who, as their custom was, fled in one moment from the 
charge, and in the next returned again with the same force and vigour as 
before, gave the signal for their retreat. His infantry was composed of six- 
teen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand of their allies; which is just the 
amount of that which they esteem a perfect army, in the case of a general en- 
gagement, when both consuls are together in the field. He ranged them after 
the usual manner of the Romans; and having placed his cavalry, which were 
about four thousand, on the wings, he advanced with slow and haughty pace 
towards the enemy. 

The armies now approached each other, and the light armed forces began 
the combat. But even in the first onset the Romans manifestly laboured 
under many disadvantages, while every circumstance was favourable to the 
enemy. For the troops of the former that were now engaged, not only were 
exhausted by the cold and hunger which they had suffered ever since the 
morning, but had discharged the greatest part of their weapons also in their 
combat against the Numidian horse. And even those javelins that were left 
were now, from the continual rain that had fallen upon them, become unfit 
for any service. The cavalry also, and, indeed, all the army, were alike feeble 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 130 



and disheartened ; while the Carthaginians, on the contrary, fresh and vi- 
gorous, and prepared for action, flew briskly to the charge, and maintained 
the fight in every part with courage and success. 

As soon, therefore, as the light-armed troops retired on either side throug-h 
the intervals of their respective armies, and the heavy forces advanced to 
action, the Carthaginian cavalry, which was far superior to the Romans, both 
in numbers and in strength, advancing together from the wings, pressed the 
enemy with so much violence that they forced them instantly to retreat before 
them. When the infantry was thus uncovered, the Numidians and the light- 
armed forces of the Carthaginians, returning back again from the rear, and 
passing beyond the front of their own army, fell suddenly upon both flanks of 
the Romans, and spread among them so great tumult and disorder, that they 
were no longer able to defend themselves against those that were attacking 
them in front. In the centre of the armies, the foremost ranks, on either 
side, remained for a long time firm, and maintained the fight with equal 
courage and success. But when Mago and his troops, now rising from their 1 
ambuscade, fell furiously upon the rear of those legions that were fighting in 
the centre, then were the Romans every way distressed, and the disorder such 
as could receive no remedy. Their two wings, pressed by the elephants in 
front, and charged in flank by the light-armed foot, were in a short time 
turned to flight, pursued, and pushed together in crowds into the river. In 
their centre also, the hindmost of the legions, unable to sustain the fury of 
those troops that rose against them from the ambuscade, were in like manner 
broken and destroyed. The foremost ranks alone, urged by necessity to con- 
quer, forced their way beyond the Gauls, and a part also of the Africans that 
opposed them, and, with great slaugter, opened for themselves a passage 
through the midst of the Carthaginian army. But when they saw that both 
their wings were irrecoverably routed, and that the numbers of the Cartha- 
ginian cavalry, the river, and the rains which now fell strong and heavily, all 
combined together to render their own return back again to their camp im- 
practicable ; they formed themselves into close order, and continued their 
march with safety to Placentia. The number of .them was about ten thousand. 
The rest were trampled down in heaps upon the banks of the Trebia, undtr 
the feet of the horses and the elephants. A small part only that were able to 
escape, among whom w-ere many of the routed cavalry, joined these legions 
which we have just now mentioned, and retreated with them to Placentia. 
The Carthaginians, when they had pursued the enemy as far as to the river, 
were then forced to yield to the rigour of the season, and return back again to 
their camp. , Their victory afforded no small joy ; for though man}' of the 
Gauls were slam in the action, the loss of the Africans and the Spaniards was 
very inconsiderable. But the rains and snows, which had fallen continually 
during that wliole day, were so severe and fatal, that, of all the elephants, one 
only was preserved alive ; and great numbers also, both of men and horses, 
perished through the extremity of the cold. 

Tiberius, after this misfortune, being willing, as far as he was able, to con- 
ceal the knowledge of it from the people in Rome, sent word only , that he had 
fought a battle, and the badness of the season had robbed him of the victory. 
The Romans at first gave credit to this account ; but not long afterwards they 
were fully informed of all that had happened in the action, with the conse- 
quences also that had followed their defeat: that the Carthaginians had 
gained possession of their camp, and drawn all the Gauls to embrace their 
party; that the Roman legions had abandoned their entrenchments after the 
battle, and fled for safety to the neighbouring cities; and that they were de- 
prived of all supplies, except those that were sent to them from the sea, up 
the river Po. An event so contrary to all their expectations filled them with 
no small amazement. They immediately renewed their preparations for the 
war with greater vigour than before, and used their utmost diligence, to secure 



140 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



those parts of their dominions that were most exposed; sending troops into 
Silesia and Sardinia, and placing a garrison inTarentum, and in every other 
post that needed such defence. They also equipped a fleet of sixty quin- 
queremes. The consuls, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius, who were just now 
elected to their office, raised new levies among the allies, enrolled the Roman 
legions, and, having collected stores from every quarter, sent one part to Ari- 
minum, and the rest towards Tyrrhenia, the place? into which they had re- 
solved to lead their armies. They demanded succours also from king Hiero, 
who sent to their assistance five hundred Cretans, with a thousand heavy-* 
armed foot. In a word, every effort was exerted, and every measure prac- 
tised, which zeal and extreme diligence could suggest. For such is the dis- 
position and temper of the Romans, as well in public affairs as also in their 
private conduct; and whenever they have any real cause of fear, they are at 
that time themselves most greatly to be dreaded. 

During this time, Cnaeus Cornelius, who was left by his brother with the 
fleet, as we before related, steered away from the mouth of the Rhone, and, 
having landed his troops in Spain near Emporium, advanced along the coast, 
and reduced by force all the cities that refused to surrender to him, as far as to 
the Iberus ; but those that voluntarily submitted were treated by him with the 
greatest gentleness, and protected from every kind of injury. Having secured 
his conquests by sufficient garrisons, and received among his troops a great 
number of the Spaniards that had come to join him, he continued his march 
from thence into the inland parts of the country, and in his way gained many 
towns, some by persuasion and some by force. When he arrived near Cissa, 
a body of Carthaginians, that were posted in that province under the com- 
mand of Hanno, came and encamped before him, with design to stop his pro- 
gress. But Cornelius, having immediately ranged his troops in battle, 
gave them an entire defeat, and gained immense booty by his victory ; for the 
army that had marched with Annibal into Italy, had left all their baggage be- 
hind them in this place. He obtained the alliance also of all the people that 
lived on that side of the Iberus, and took prisoner the Carthaginian general 
Hanno, together with Andobalis, who was a soveregn prince in that part of 
Spain, and had always strenuously supported the interests of the Carthaginians. 
As soon as Asdrubal was informed of these transactions, he made haste to 
pass the Iberus with his army ; and having received notice, that the naval 
forces of the Romans, grown confident from the success which the legions had 
now gained by land, had relaxed their usual discipline, and neglected all 
precaution, he sent away a body of eight thousand foot, and a thousand horse, 
who, falling suddenly upon them, when they were dispersed on every side 
throughout the country, killed great numbers of them, and forced the rest to 
fly precipitately to their ship. He then retired again and repassed the Iberus; 
and having fixed his quarters for the winter in New Carthage, he employed 
all his care to secure the posts that were on that side of the river, and to com- 
plete all the necessaiy preparations for the war. Cornelius also, when he had 
first returned to the fleet, end punished, as the military laws required, all those 
whose negligence had been the cause of the late misfortune, sent away to 
Tarraco both the naval forces and the legions, to take their winter quarters to- 
gether in that city. And having made an equal distribution also of the 
plunder among all the troops, he gained to himself the favour of the army, 
and inspired them with the warmest hopes. Such was the condition of the 
affairs in Spain. 

CHAP. VIII. 

As the spring now came on, the consul Flaminius, with the forces that were 
under his command, directing his march through Tyrrhenia, passed beyond 
Arretium, and there encamped ; while Servilius, on the other hand, advanced 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 141 



towards A riminum, to oppose the entrance of the enemy on that side. Anni- 
bal had fixed his winter quarters in the Cisalpine Gaul. During his continu- 
ance there, the Romans that had fallen into his hands were all confined in pri- 
sons, and scarcely received the food that was necessary for life : but their allies 
were treated by him with the greatest gentleness. After some time, having" 
assembled these together, he told them, " that his intention was not to mike 
war upon any of them ; but, on the contrary, to engage in their defence 
against the Romans ; that their interest, therefore, if they would judge with 
reason, must lead them to embrace his friendship, since the sole purpose of 
his coming was, in the first place, to restore to all the inhabitants of Italy their 
antient freedom ; and to assist likewise every particular state to recover again 
those towns and territories, of which the Romans had deprived them." After 
this discourse, he dismissed them all to their several countries, without de- 
manding any ransom, imagining that, by this conduct, he should gain them 
to his party, and inspire their minds with an aversion to the Roman govern- 
ment ; or that those especially might be excited to revolt, whose ports and 
cities had been taken from them by the Romans. 

At the same time he practised also another artifice, which was truly Cartha- 
ginian. Having reflected with himfelf, that his connexion with the Gauls was- 
fresh and recent ; and fearing lest a people, so noted for their fickleness and 
fraud, should on a sudden change their sentiments, and form designs against 
his life, he procured some artificial suits of hair, adapted to the looks of per- 
sons of every age, and different sorts of habits that corresponded with them ; 
and, varying his dress continually, he lay so well concealed under this dis- 
guise, that not those alone who had seen him only in a transient view, but 
even his intimate acquaintance, could scarcely know him. 

But the Gauls, not willing that the war should any longer be protracted in 
their country, began to grow importunate and clamorous, and demanded to 
be led against the enemy. This zeal, as they pretended, all arose from the 
resentment which they had conceived against the Romans: but the real mo- 
tive was no other than the hope -of plunder. Annibal, however, resolved to 
gratify their impatience, and to begin his march without delay. As soon, 
therefore, as the spring advanced, having inquired of those y that were best ac- 
quainted with the country, he was informed that all the common roads were 
not only of considerable length, but well known also to the Romans ; but that, 
if he would venture to conduct the army over certain marshes, which would 
lead directly to Tyrrhenk, his march, though difficult indeed, would yet be 
short, and such also as must fully disappoint the expectation of the enemy. 
As the difficulty only served to flatter the disposition of this general, he re- 
solved that he would take his route that way. 

As soon as this design was known among the army, the soldiers were all 
seized with consternation ; and formed in their minds the most dreadful image 
of the pits and pools into which they seemed ready to be plunged. But Anni- 
bal, being well assured that the bottom of the marshes was firm and solid, 
began his march, placing in the van the Africans and Spaniards, with the most 
serviceable part of all his army, and mixing among them as much of the bag- 
gage only as might serve for their supply in the present journey : for, with re- 
gard to future use, he considered that if they should prove victorious, and 
hold the open country against the enemy, their necessities would all be fully 
satisfied ; and, in case that they were conquered, that they would then be in 
want of nothing. After these marched the Gauls ; and last of all the cavalry. 
The care of the rear was left by Annibal to his brother Mago, chiefly on ac- 
count of the effeminacy of the Gauls, and their known impatience of toil and 
hardship : for the orders given to Mago were, that he should press them closely 
from behind, and, as often as they appeared disheartened by the difficulties of 
the way, or shewed any inclination to return, should fall upon them with hi* 
cavalry, and by force constrain them to advance. 



142 - GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



The Africans and Spaniards pursued their way, without any immoderate 
pain or difficulty : for, besides that the ground was fresh, and not yet broken, 
they were all men that were inured to toil, and, by long use, become familiar 
with such kind of hardship. But when the soil had been disturbed by the 
passage of the foremost troops, and trodden through to a considerable depth, 
the Gauls that followed were unable to advance a step, without extreme 
fatigue and labour, which were the heavier also, and more severely felt, because 
they had never been accustomed to such sufferings. Nor was it possible for 
them to return, while the cavalry still pressed upon them from behind, and 
forced them to advance. Indeed, all the army suffered much, chiefly through 
want of sleep ; for, during four whole days, and three nights successively, they 
marched continually through water. But the Gauls were harassed beyond all 
the rest, and even quite exhausted by their miseries, The greater part of 
the beasts that were loaded with the baggage stuck in the mud and perished 
there ; but their mischance afforded some convenience to the troops, who threw 
themselves down in heaps together upon the bales that lay above* the water; 
and thus, during some part of the night at least, obtained a little sleep. Many 
of the horses also left their hoofs behind them in this dreadful journey. Even 
Annibal himself, who was carried upon the only elephant that was left alive, 
was saved with the greatest difficulty, having suffered, during all the march, 
great pain and anguish, from a disorder that had settled in his eyes ; and, as 
tlie time afforded neither leisure nor convenience for a cure, he was at last de» 
prived by it of the sight of one of them. 

Having now gained, however, almost beyond all expectation, the end of this- 
dangerous march, and hearing that Flaminius was still posted near Arreting 
he at first encamped upon the edge of the marches, that he might give some 
ease and refreshment to his troop j ; arid at the same time employed all his 
pains in searching into the designs and dispositions of the enemy, as well as 
the condition of the country that was before him. He was soon informed that 
the country was rich and fertile, and such as would afford a noble booty ; and 
that Flaminius was a man who was singularly formed by nature for gaining 
popular applause, and was immoderately ambitious of it ; that be .was- filled 
with a high conceit of his own abilities, but, in reality, was destituteofa.il 
those talents that are requisite in the affairs of war and real service. Annibal^ 
therefore, was persuaded, that if he could once advance beyond the camp of 
the Romans, and waste the country before their eyes,, Flaminius, provoked be- 
yond all patience, and dreading the reproaches of the multitude, would run 
with haste to revenge the insult ; would pursue all the motions of the Cartha- 
ginian army ; would flatter himself with the hope of finishing the war alone, 
before his col'legue could arrive ; and, in a word, that he would thus afford to 
his enemies the opportunities that were desired, of attacking him with some 
advantage. 

It is certain that these reflections were perfectly the result of wisdom and 
sound experience : for all men, even of moderate discernment, must acknow- 
ledge, that nothing is more useful, or of greater importance, in the conduet of 
a general, than to examine, with the nicest care, into the character and natural 
disposition of the opposite commauder : for, as in engagements of single men, 
or of rank with rank, the several combatants carefully survey the bodies of 
their 1 adversaries, in order to discern some part that may be open to their 
stroke ; in the same manner also it is necessary that a general in the field 
should endeavour to discover, in the chief that is sent against him, not what 
parts of his body are most vulnerable, but whether there be airy weakness in 
bis mind and character, through which he may be attacked with some advan- 
tage : for, among those that are placed at the head of armies, there are some 
who are so deeply immersed in sloth and indolence, that they lose all attention 
both to the safety of their country and their own. Others are immoderately 
fond of wine, so that their senses always are disordered by it, before they 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. U§ 

sleep. Others abandon themselves to the love of women, — a passion so in- 
fatuating 1 , that those whom it has once possessed will often sacrifice whole 
cities, and even their honour and their lives to the indulgence of it. Some again 
are cowards., which is esteemed no slight disgrace, even among private men ; 
but, in a general, this disposition is a public evil, and draws after it the most 
fatal consequences : for the troops under his command not only waste the time 
without attempting any thing, but, by their confidence in such a leader, are 
frequently betrayed into the greatest dangers. On the other hand, a preci- 
pitate rashness, a violence that rejects the rule of reason, pride, and vanity, and 
self-conceit, are all qualities, not more pernicious to the friends of those who 
possess them, than advantageous to the enemy : for men of this character are 
always ready to be taken in every snare ; every bait is sure to catch, and everj 
artifice to delude them. 

If a general, therefore, could be informed of all the weakness of his enemy, 
and would so regulate his designs as always to attack the opposite commander 
in the part in which he is most open to surprise, no power would long be able 
to withstand his efforts : for, as a vessel that has lost its pilot soon becomes an 
easy conquest, together with all the crew ; so likewise in the field, if the chief 
can once be taken by his foible, and led artfully to the snare that is most proper 
to intrap him, both himself, and all his army, must, in a short time, fall to- 
gether into the power of the enemy. This, therefore, was the address which 
Annibal now exerted against Flaminius ; and the success was such as fully 
answered even his strongest hopes. 

For no sooner had he decamped from the neighbourhood of Faesula, and, 
advancing beyond the Roman camp, began to plunder and lay waste the 
country, than Flaminius, who considered this proceeding as a designed con- 
tempt and insult, swelled with fury and resentment ; and when the destruction 
began to spread, and the smoke was seen to ascend from every quarter, he no 
longer could restrain his passion, but gave vent to it in bitter exclamations. In 
vain his officers represented to him, that it was by no means seasonable to pur- 
sue or engage the enemy ; that the strength and numbers of their cavalry re- 
quired that he should act with the greatest reserve and caution ; and that, on 
all accounts, it would be far more prudent to wait the arrival of the other con- 
sul, and employ together the united forces of both armies. Flaminius was 
deaf to these remonstrances; and even offended with those that made them. 
*'■ What," said he, " must be the sentiments of all our fellow-citizens at home, 
when they see the country wasted even to the very wails of Rome, while we 
still keep our posts behind the enemy, and remain idle in our camp ?" With 
these words he immediately began his march, disdaining to employ even 
the least care or foresight, with regard either to the time or place of action j 
aud solicitous for nothing but to overtake the enemy, as if the victory had been 
already in his hands : and, indeed, so strong was the assurance with which he 
had inspired the multitude, that those who followed the army for the sake of 
booty exceeded even the troops in number, and carried with them chains and 
fetters, and other implements of the same kind, hrVery great quantity. 

( In the mean while Annibal still advanced towards Rome, through Tyrrhe- 
nia, having on his left Cortona and the neighbouring mountains, and the lake 
of Thrasymene upon his right, burning and destroying every thing in his way, 
that he might the more provoke the impatience and resentment of the enemy. 
But when he saw that Flaminius now drew near, and the ground before him 
was very proper also for his design, he made all things ready for a battle. 

In the road through which the armies were to pass, there was a level valley 
inclosed on either side by a chain of lofty mountains. At the farthest end of 
it stood a hill, chat was rough, and difficult of approach. Near the ihtrance 
was a lake ; and between the lake and the foot of the mountain, a very narrow 
pass, which led into the valley. Annibal, entering along this defile, marched 
through the valley, and, having gained the hill that was at the farthest end, he. 



144 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 

I ■IMilil KiM ll l Mi m i I, ■ ■'.. i i«i ■ I I' . I ii '■' - ... " >— »— — ■# 

posted himself upon it, with the Africans and Spaniards. He then ordered 
the Baleares, and the light-armed troops, who had marched in the van of all 
the army, to take a circuit round, and range themselves along the back of the 
mountains that stood upon the right hand of the valley. The Gauls and 
cavalry were disposed in like manner, behind those that were on the opposite 
side. And these latter were extended to so great a length, that the farthest 
troops reached even to the narrow pass that was between the foot of the moun- 
tains and the lake, and which gave entrance into the valley. He posted some, 
troops also in ambuscade in different places through the valley; and, having 
completed his whole disposition in the night, he then lay quiet, and expected 
the approach of the enemy. 

Flaminius was following fast behind, being impatient to overtake the Car-* 
thaginians. Arriving late in the evening upon the lake, he encamped there for 
the night ; and, early on the following day, began his march into the valley. 
It happened that the morning was unusually dark and misty. When the 
greatest part of the Roman army had now entered along the valley, and the? 
foremost troops had almost reached the hill upon which Annibal was posted, 
this general then gave the signal to engage, sent notice to the troops that were 
in ambuscade, and fell with fury upon the Romans, from every side. The 
suddenness of the attack, the darkness in which all objects were concealed 
from view, the vigour and rapidity ef the enemy, who came pouring down in 
many parts at once from the hills above them, struck Flaminius and his officers 
with extreme amazement, and made even all defence impracticable. For so 
far were they from being able to give the necessary orders, that they neither 
knew nor comprehended any thing that passed. In the same single instant, 
they were charged at once in front, in flank, and in the rear. The greatest 
part, therefore, of the troops were destroyed in heaps, in the very order in 
which they marched, deprived even of the power of resisting, and betrayed a* 
it were to death by the folly of their general : for, while they yet stood de- 
liberating on the measures that were fit to be pursued, they fell beneath the 
strokes of their adversaries, without any notice or warning of their fate. In the 
midst of this disorder, Flaminius himself, vexed and tortured with despair and 
rage, was surrounded by certain Gauls, who put an end to his life. Fifteen 
thousand Romans were destroyed in this valley, without being able either to 
fight or to escape : for they esteem it the most aacred of all their institutions, 
on no account to fly, or ever to desert their ranks in battle. The rest that were 
inclosed in the narrow pass between the mountains and the lake lost their lives 
in a manner that was still more wretchedand deplorable. Hurried by despair, 
and pushed along in crowds before the enemy, they hoped to find their safety 
in the lake. But some, attempting to swim across it with their armour, were 
soon sunk and drowned. The rest and greatest part, having waded forwards 
till they were able to advance no farther, stood with their heads only above the* 
-water ; and, when the cavalry followed closely after them, and their destruc- 
tion seemed inevitable, they raised their hands, and, with every suppliant voice 
and gesture, begged for mercy. But all their prayers were vain and disre- 
garded. One part were slaughtered by the enemy ; and the rest, having urged 
each other to the attempt, with their own hands deprived themselves of life. 
About six thousand only of all the army, who had marched the first along the 
yalley, gave an entire defeat to the body that attacked their front. If these 
troops had returned again, and endeavoured to surround the Carthaginians, a 
relief so seasonable might have changed, perhaps, the whole fortune of the 
battle : but, being ignorant of all that was transacted, they still continued to 
advance, expecting to be met by some new party, till at last they had gained 
insensibly the summit of the hills. From thence, as the mist was now dis- 
persed, they saw the intire ruin of their army, and that the Carthaginians were 
completely masters of the field. Perceiving, therefore, that it was quite im- 
practicable to send any assistance to their routed forces, or in any manner t«? 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 1AM 



renew the fight, they formed themselves into close order, and retreated to a 
certain village in Tyrrhenia. But, when the battle was ended, Maharbal, 
having received orders from the general to pursue them with the Spaniards and 
the light-armed troops, invested them closely in the place. The Romans, 
being thus beset with various difficulties, and seeing noway left to escape, 
consented to deliver up their arms, and yield themselves prisoners, on con- 
dition only that they should be dismissed with safety. 

Such were the circumstances of the battle in Tyrrhenia, between the Car- 
thaginians and the Romans. As soon as the prisoners were conducted to the 
camp, Anmbal, having ordered them to be brought before him, as well those that 
had surrendered to Maharbal, as the rest also that were taken in the action, 
whose numbers amounted all together to more than fifteen thousand men, told 
the former, that Maharbal had no power to give any promise of safety, with- 
out his authority and consent. He then began to accuse and reproach the 
Romans, and at last commanded, that they should all be distributed among 
the ranks of his army, and be guarded carefully. But he dismissed the allies 
to their respective cities, without demanding any ransom, having first repeated 
to them the discourse which he before had made, " That his intention was not 
to make war against the people of Italy; but, on the coutrary, to restore them 
to their liberty ; of which they had been deprived by the Romans." He then 
gave the necessary orders for the refreshment of the troops; and paid the last 
honours to the chief among his officers that had fallen in the battle. These 
were about thirty in number ; and in the whole engagement he hHd lost no 
more than fifteen hundred men, the greater part of whom were Gauls. He 
afterwards deliberated with his brother and the rest of his fiends, concerning 
the measures that were next to be pursued. His past successes had already 
filled him with the strongest confidence, and flattered him with the hope of 
every thmy that was great and prosperous, with regard to the final issue of 
tire war. 



CHAR IX, 

WHEN the news of this defeat arrived at Rome, as the misfortune was much too 
great to be either softened or suppressed, the magistrates were forced to call to- 
gether an assembly of the people, and to acquaint them with the whole trans- 
action. But scarcely had the praetor from the rostre spoken these few words, 
*« We have been defeated in a great battle," than such was the consternation 
which immediately ensued, that those among the hearers who had been present 
in the action were, in a manner, forced to be persuaded that the calamity was 
far more dreadful than it had appeared to be even in the time of the engage- 
ment. For it was now so long a time since the Romans had either suffered a 
defeat, or heard mention of a battle lost, that even the sound itself was new and 
full of horror ; nor could they hear their loss so publicly avowed, without de- 
ploring the misfortune with a grief that was beyond all bounds. But the 
senate still retained their firmness; and, as their post required, deliberated 
with great attention on the measures that were necessary to be taken, and in 
what manner they might best avert the consequences of this fatal accident. 

About the time of the late engagement, Servilius, the other consul, who was 
posted near Ariminum, which stands towards the Adriatic sea, upon the con- 
fines which divide Gaul from the rest of Italy, at no great distance from the 
mouths of the Po, having heard that Annibal had entered 'Tyrrhenia, and en* 
camped near Flaminius, at first resolved to march immediately, with all his 
army, to support his colleague. But, because the legions were too heavy to 
perform the march with such expedition as was necessary, he sent away before 
four thousand of his cavalry, under the command of Caius Centenius, that thej 

VOL. I, NO, 4, • T 



140 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 

might be ready to assist the consul, in case that there should be occasion for 
it, before himself was to arrive. But Annibal, being informed of their ap- 
proach, ordered Maharbal to advance against them with the light-armed 
troops, and a part also of the cavalry ; who, falling upon them in their march, 
killed almost one half of the detachment in the very first onset. The rest fled 
in haste to a neighbouring hill; but were pursued and taken prisoners on the 
following day. The news of this misfortune arrived at Ro/ne within three 
days only after the account of the former battle, while the city was still in- 
flamed, and every mind strongly filled with the sense of their first calamity. 
And now, not the people only, but the senate themselves, were struck with 
consternation and amazement. The usual business of the year was all ne- 
glected ; the magistrates were no longer chosen as before ; every one turned his 
thoughts to find some remedy against the impending evils ; and the result of 
their deliberations was, that, in times so pressing, a dictator only could protect 
the state from the dangers which so nearly threatened it. 

In the mean while, Annibal, though he was now persuaded that the issue of 
the war would fully answer all his hopes, thought it not yet seasonable to 
advance nearer towards Rome ; but continued his route through Umbria and 
Piceuum, wasting the country without resistance, and, after ten days, arrived 
in the neighbourhood of Adria, having gained so immense a booty by the way, 
that the army could neither carry nor remove it. He had destroyed great 
numbers of the people also in his march : for so unalterable was his hatred of 
the Romans, and so deeply rooted in his mind, that he gave orders to his 
troops, that they should slay without distinction all those that were founded 
age to carry arms, in the same manner as when the towns are taken by 
storm. 

Having fixed his camp near Adria., in a country which produced all neces- 
saries in the greatest plenty, he first employed his care to provide such refresh* 
ment for the army as might recover them from their present miserable state : 
for, partly through the cold and nastiness, to which they had been exposed 
while they lay encamped in Gaul during the winter, and partly also from the 
fatigue which they had suffered in their march afterwards through the marshes, 
both the men and horses were now covered with a kind of leprous scurf; a 
disease which is usually the consequence of famine and continued hardships. 
Rut these rich and fertile plains soon supplied »oth the opportunity and the 
means of recovering the horses to their former vigour, and of restoring also the 
strength, and raising the spirits of the troops. He armed also his Africans af- 
ter the Roman manner, from the spoils that had been taken ; and now, for the 
first time, sent home messengers to Carthage, with an account of his success % 
for he had never before approached near the sea, from the time of his first 
entrance into Italy. The Carthaginians received the news with the greatest 
joy. They began to fix their whole attention upon the affairs of Spain and 
Italy, and resolved to employ every effort to support the war with vigour in 
those countries. 

The Romans named for dictator, Quintus Fabiup, a man of noble birth and 
great abilities, who gained, by his exploits, the surname of Maximus, which 
his descendants likewise have derived from him, and still enjoy. Each of the 
consuls is attended only by twelve lictors ; the dictator by twenty-four. The 
consuls are in many things restrained from acting, unless they have first ob- 
tained the approbation and concurrence of the senate. But the authority of 
the dictator is absolute, and uncontrouled ; and, from the time of his appoint- 
ment, except only that the tribunes still retain their office, all the magistrates 
in the state are instantly dissolved, But we shall treat more fully of these 
subjects in another place* At the same time also, Minucius was declared 
master of the horse. This officer is entirely subject to the dictator ; but, in 
the absence of the latter, he succeeds as it were to his place, aad become* the 
delegate of all his power. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 347 

' -— m < .' ! ; ■ ■ ; sesss sss ■ ■ »■' teg- as m 

Annibal changed his camp from time to time, but continued still to move 
along the Adriatic coast. He ordered the horses to be bathed with old wine, 
which was found in great abundance in the country; and soon healed the ul- 
cerous humours which had rendered them unfit for service. He recovered the 
soldiers also from their wounds ; and employed every care and remedy to re- 
store to all the troops their full strength and vigour. When this was done, he 
began his march; passed through the districts of Adria and Pretetia ; traversed 
all the country of the Marucinians and Frentanians ; from thence advanced 
into Apulia, plundering and destroying every thing in his way. Apulia is di- 
vided into three separate districts, the names of which are Daunia, Peucetia, 
and Messapia. Annibal, having entered the first of these, wasted the lands of 
Luceria, which was a Roman colony ; and afterwards, having fixed his camp 
near Hipponium, in the territory of the Argyripians, he from thence spread 
his troops over all the country, and ravaged it without resistance. 

About this time, Fabius, when he had first offered sacrifice to the gods, set 
out from Rome, attended by Minucius, and carrying with him four legions 
that were newly raised. When he arrived upon the confines of Daunia, and 
had joined the army that had marched into that province from Ariininum, he 
dismissed Servilius from his command, and sent him, well attended, bach to 
Rome, with orders, that if the Carthaginians should make any attempt upon 
the sea, he should be ready to observe their motions, and to act as occasion 
might require. He th<m advanced with all his forces, and encamped near a 
place called Mcs^ at the distance of about fifty stadia from the enemy. 

As'soon as Annibal was informed of their approach, he drew out all his army; 
and, in order to strike a terror into these new troops upon their first arrival, 
advanced near to the Roman camp, and stood for some time in order of battle. 
But when the Romans remained still close in their entrenchments, he returned 
back again to his camp : for Fabius was fixed in his determination, not to 
hazard any rash attempt, or on any account to try the fortune of a general 
battle; but, on the contrary, to employ his chief and only care to secure his 
troops from danger. At first, indeed, this conduct drew upon him no small 
reproach and censure; while every one considered him as a man that was cold 
and cowardly, and who feared te engage the enemy. But, after some short 
tir^e, the wisdom of his sentiments was clearly proved by-the eventj and all 
men then were ready to acknowledge, that the measures which he now pur- 
sued were by far the best and most judicious that could be taken in the present 
circumstances ; for the Carthaginian troops had all been exercised in one con- 
tinued course of war, even fvoin their earliest age. Their general aho, from 
his infancy, was trained in camps, among those very troops which he now com- 
manded. They had gained many signal victories in Spain ; and had defeated 
the Romans and their allies in two successive battles. But the point of the 
greatest moment was, that they had no resource or hope in any thing but vic- 
tory. On the part of the Romans, all circumstances were contrary to these ; 
so that their defeat must have been inevitable, if they had now risked a general 
battle. But Fabius wisely chose to have recourse to that one advantage, 
which belonged confessedly to the Romans ; and to regulate the whole con- 
duct of the war upon it. This advantage was, that they might still receive in- 
to their camp supplies both of men and stores, without any apprehension that 
the source from whence they derived them could ever be exhausted. 

From this time, therefore, he attended closely to the motions of the Car- 
thaginian army, following still at a moderate distance, and taking care to se- 
cure, before the enemy, all those posts which, from his acquaintance with the 
country, he knew to be most proper for his design : and, as he still received 
supplies in the greatest plenty, he never sent his troops abroad to forage, or 
suffered them to straggle from the camp ; but kept them always close together, 
and united in a body, attending carefully to every advantage which time and 
place suggested ; and by that mean* intercepted and destroyed many parties 



148 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

of the Carthaginian foragers, whom their contempt of the Romans frequently 
led away at too great a distance from their own entrenchments. Thus, while 
. he diminished by degrees the numbers of the enemy, he at the same time ex- 
ercised the strength of his own forces, and raised again their courage, which 
had been much depressed by the late defeats. Rut no persuasions could pre- 
vail on him to try the fortune of a general battle. This conduct was, in all points, 
very unpleasing to Minucius, who mixed his sentiments with those of the dis- 
contented multitude, charging the general with sloth and cowardice, and pro- 
claiming on his own part the utmost impatience to seek and engage the 
enemy. 

The Carthaginians, when they had ravaged all the places that have now 
been mentioned, passed the Apennine, and came into the country of the Sam- 
nites ; which, as it naturally was very rich and fertile, and had now for a long 
time flourished in continual peace, afforded every kind of necessaries in so 
great abundance, that not all the waste and consumption which they made 
were sufficient to exhaust it. They made incursions likewise upon the lands 
of Beneventum, a Roman colony, and took Telesia, a city that was strongly 
fortified willi walls, arid which yielded also a very great booty. The Romans 
still followed close behind, at the distance of one or two days' march ; but 
never approached so near as to afford the opportunity of a battle. 

When Anni'oal perceived that Fabius thus persisted to decline a general 
action, and yet refused to leave the field, he formed a bold and hardy project, 
and resolved to throw himself at once, with all his army, into the plains of 
Capua, near the place that was called Falernus ; being persuaded, either that 
the Romans must then be forced to venture on a battle, or that all mankind 
would see that he was confessedly the master of the open country ; and that 
the neighbouring towns would from thence be struck with terror, and hasten 
to embrace his party : for though the Romans had been now defeated in two 
successive battles, not one single city had revolted from them, to join the Car- 
thaginians ; but all remained unshaken in their duty, though many of them 
had, on that account, been exposed to the severest sufferings. Such was the 
dignity of the Roman republic ; and so great the awe and veneration in which 
it was held by the allies. 

It must be acknowledged that this design was very wise and reasonable : for 
the plains of Capua are distinguished, not only by their natural beauty and 
fertility above the rest of Italy, but by their happy situation also near the 
sea, which fills their markets, with the commerce of almost every part of the 
^habitable world. Their cities likewise are more celebrated for their beauty 
than any that are besides in Itaty. Along the coast stand Sinuessa, Cumae, 
"Dicaearchia, Neapoliis, and Nuceria;-in the inland parts, towards the north, 
Calenuvn and Teanum ; to the south and east, Damnum and Nola ; and near 
the middle of the country, Capua, the noblest and most splendid of them all. 
In a word, so delicious are these plains, that the mythologists may seem, per- 
haps, to be not altogether removed from truth, in that which they relate con- 
cerning them : for these are called also the Phlegraean fields, as well as some 
other parts of the earth, that are distinguished by their beauty and fertility : 
and even the gods themselves are reported to have contended together in 
former times for the sovereignty and possession of them. But, besides these 
great advantages, this country is by nature very strongly fortified, and difficult 
of all access: for as one part of it is bounded by the sea, the rest stands 
covered by a chain of lofty mountains, which admit no entrance, except only 
by the way of three very narrow passes ; of which one lies towards the country 
of the Samnites, another along mount Eribanus, and the third on the side of 
the Hirpinians. The Carthaginians, therefore, by encamping i» the very 
middle of these plains, were going, as it were, to stand upon a public and con- 
spicuous theatre, from whence they were sure to astonish all mankind, by the un- 
common boldness.of the attempt; and, if the Romany should still decline a battle, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLVBIUS. *49 



to make it manifest, that they had driven them from the stage, and remained 
without dispute the masters of the open county. 

With this design, Annibal, leaving now the territory of the Samnites, entered 
Campania by the pass of mount Eribanus ; and, having continued his march 
as far as to the Athurnus, which flows through the middle of the plains, and 
divides them into two nearly equal parts, he encamped on that side of it which 
was nearest towards Rome ; and from thence sent out his foragers, and wasted 
all the country without resistance. A design so bold and hazardous rilled the 
dictator with surprise ; but at the same time fixed him still more strongly in 
his first determination. But Minucius, and the rest of the Roman officers, 
being all now persuaded that the enemy were at last ensnared in a place in 
which they might be attacked with great advantage, advised, that no moment 
should be'lost ; that they should hasten to pursue the Carthaginians ; should 
offer battle to them in these' plains, and save the noblest part of Italy from 
ruin. Fabius, therefore, was forced to yield to their impatience ; and, cover- 
ing his real sentiments, began his march with the greatest haste, as if he had 
concurred with them in the same design. But when he' arrived in the neigh- 
bourhood ofFalernus, he only shewed his army upon the bottom of the hills, 
marching still on every side of the enemy as they advanced, that he might not 
be thought by the allies to have entirely left the field : but refused to descend 
into the plain, or risk the fortune of a general engagement, as well from the 
other reasons that have before been mentioned, as most especially, because the 
Carthaginians were far superior to him in their cavalry. 

But Annibal, having now wasted all the country and in vain endeavoured 
to draw the Romans to a battle, was again preparing to decamp, that he might 
be able to remove the booty, before it was consumed, into some place of safety, 
and there fix his quarters for the winter : for his intention was, that the troops 
not only should enjoy a present plenty, but be supplied continually with all 
kinds of necessaries, in great abundance, for the time to come. When 
Fabius perceived that the Carthaginians designed' to ioke their route 
back again, by the same way along which they had entered, and that the narrow- 
ness and difficulty of the road afforded the most favourable opportunity to fall 
upon them in their retrt.ttt, he sent away a body of four thousand men, with 
orders, that they should possess themselves of the defiles through which 
the enemy were to pass ; should attend, with the greatest care, to the proper 
lime of action, and lose none of those advantages which their situation could 
scarcely fail to threw into their power ; while himself, at the same time, took 
his post, with the greatest part of all the army, upon a neighbouring hill, 
which commanded the defiles. 

The Carthiuians, continuing their march forwards, came and encamped at 
the very foot of the hills. The Romans were persuaded that they should 
with ease recover all the booty ; and even began to hope, that, with the ad- 
vantage of the place, they might, perhaps, be able to give a full determination 
to the war. In this confidence, the dictator was now employing all his thoughts 
and care, in examining into the nature of the several posts, and in making such 
a disposition as was requisite, with regard both to the time and manner of the 
attack. The necessary measures were all fully regulated, and were to have 
been carried into execution on the following day. 

But Annibal, having conjectured, from all circumstances, what it was that 
the Romans, upon this occasion, would most probably attempt, contrived to 
defeat all their projects, and gave them neither time nor opportunity to ac- 
complish any part of that which had been thus concerted. Having assembled 
together all the pioneers and labourers of the army, who were under the com- 
mand of Asdrubal, he ordered them to provide as much dry wood, and other 
. combustible matter, as they were able to procure; to bind it together in bundles 
fit for torches ; and to choose out of all the plunder two thousand of the 
strongest oxen, and conduct them to a little distance without the camp. At 



I50 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

the same time he shewed to them a certain hill, which stood between the- 
eamp and those defiles through which he was to pass, and instructed them, 
that, as soon as they should have received orders, they should drive the oxen 
up the sides of the hill, with great speed and force, till they had gained the 
top. He then dismissed them, that they might all take their supper, and af- 
terwards a little sleep. But, about three hours after midnight, having called 
them again together, he ordered them to bind the torches to the horns of the 
oxen, to set them on fire, and drive the beasts by violence before them towards 
the summit of the hill. The light-armed troops were posted also behind the 
pioneers, to assist at first in driving the oxen forwards : but, as soon as the beasts 
should be engaged in a proper course of running, they were then commanded 
to spread themselves upon the right and left on both sides of them ; to pi*sh 
their way with speed, and with loud shouts ami noise ; to possess tbemselve* 
of all the eminences, and be prepared to attack the enemy, if any of them 
should be found upon the summit of the hill. At the same time Annibal 
himself, with all his army, advanced towards the passes, having in his van the 
heavy infantry ; the cavalry, followed by the booty, in the centre ; and the 
Gauls and the Spaniards in his rear. 

As soon as the Romans, who were posted in the entrance of the defiles, saw 
the light of the torches, imagining that Annibal was taking his route that way, 
they left immediately their first station, and hastened to ascend the hill. But 
when they approached the oxen, the sight of those strange fires filled them with 
doubt and consternation, and raised dreadful apprehensions in their mind of 
some danger far more terrible than the truth. The light-armed troops, a* 
they met together upon the summit of the hill, were engaged in some slight 
skirmishing: but the oxen falling in among them, soon separated the com- 
batants, and forced them to remain quiet in their place, expecting with im- 
patience the appearance of the day, that they might then be able to discern 
the real state of things around them. The dictator likewise, being m part 
surprised by what had happened, and suspecting that it covered some deceit ; . 
and partly also because he still persisted in his first determination, net rashly 
, to engage in a general battle, remained quiet in his entrenchments, and waited 
for the day. In the mean while, Annibal, perceiving that all things favoured 
his design, and that the Romans, who were appointed to guard the passes, had 
left their post, conducted his army through them, together with the booty* 
without any loss. And when day appeared, observing that his light-armed 
forces were exposed to some danger from the Romans that had gained the 
summit of the hill, he sent a body of Spaniards to their assistance, who engaged 
the enemy, killed about a thousand of them, and descended again in safety 
with the rest of the troops. 

The Carthaginian general, having thus happily led his army back a'-;ai» 
from the plains of Capua, encamped without fear of any insult, and ham now 
no other care than to consider in what place he should fix his quarters for the 
winter. This retreat spread a very great and general consternation through 
all the towns of Italy. The dictator also was loaded with the severest censure 
and reproach, as if nothing but the basest cowardice could have suffered the 
enemy to escape, when he had such advantages in his hands against them. 
But Fabius still remained unshaken in his purpose. Being forced, within 
some days afterwards, to return to Rome, in order to assist in celebrating cer- 
tain sacrifices, he delivered up the army to Minucius, and at the same time 
pressed him with the greatest earnestness to be much less solicitous to gain 
any advantage against the enemy, than to cover his owe troops from danger. 
But Minucius was so far from paying even the least attention to these intrea- 
ties, that, on the contrary, while the dictator was still speaking, his mind was 
wholly fixed on the design of fighting. Such was the Stftte of the war iu Italy, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUSV 151 

»<gr*«! M .jdwi *WMPwy««MW»MBwi w i MjiM nrT^^ MI|LI I I UULm 



CHAP. X. 

About the same time, Asdrubal, who governed the affairs of Spain, having 
ordered the thirty vessels that were left with him by his brother, to be refitted 
during the winter, and added to them ten more also completely furnished and 
equipped, as soon as the spring came on, ordered all the fleet, which consisted 
now of forty ships, to sail for New Carthage under the conduct ofAmilear, 
and to steer their course along the coast; while himself, having drawn--the 
forces from their winter quarters, began his march, keeping his route likewise 
close along the shore, that thus both armies might meet, and act together, 
near the Iberus. Cnaeus, having conjectured, without great difficulty, that 
this was the intention of the Carthaginians, at iirst resolved to begin his march 
by land, and to offer battle to their army. But when he had afterwards re- 
ceived a more exact account of the number of their troops, and the prepara- 
tions which they had made, he desisted from that design; and having equipped 
a fleet of thirty-five ships, and filled them with a body of select forces from the 
legions, he sailed from Tarraco, and, arriving on the second day near the mouth 
of the Iberus, cast anchor at the distance of eighty stadia from the enemy, and 
*ent away two light frigates that belonged to the Massiliaus, to make disco- 
veries. For this people were at all times ready to meet every difficulty, and 
to throw themselves the foremost into danger. And as their zeal and gene- 
rous attachment to the interest of the Romans have been often shewn in later 
times, so were they most especially conspicuous in the great services which 
they performed during the course of the present war. As soon as these vessels 
were returned, with an account that the Carthaginian fleet was stationed near 
the mouth of the river, Cnaeus immediately sailed away in haste, hoping to 
fall upon them by surprise, before they could receive any notice of his ap- 
proach. But Asdrubal had long before sent his scouts abroad; and being 
now informed that the enemy were advancing fast towards him, he ranged his 
army in battle upon the shore, and ordered all the naval forces to get imme- 
diately «n board: and when the Romans appeared in sight, he sailed out to 
meet them, and raised the signal to engage. But the Carthaginians, though 
they began the fight with vigour, sustained it for a very short time only. For 
the troops that stood in view along the shore were so far from animating 
them to any higher degree of alacrity and confidence, that, on the contrary, 
they only served to check their courage, and restrain their efforts, by affording 
the prospect of an easy and secure retreat. As soon, therefore, as'their ships 
were taken with their men, and four more disabled, their oars being broken, 
and their soldiers killed, the rest all fled with great precipitation, and having 
forced their vessels close in to land, saved themselves among the troops that 
stood upon the shore. The Romans pursued boldly after them, to the very 
shore ; and having bound fast behind the stern of their own vessels as many of 
the Carthaginian ships as could be set in motion, which were twenty-five in 
number, they sailed back again in triumph, and with no small joy. Having 
thus, in the very first onset, gained a victory which rendered them' the entire 
masters of the sea, and by that means wholly changed the face of affairs in 
Spain. 

As soon as the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, they immediately 
equipped another fleet of seventy ships ; for they judged it to be a point of 
the last importance, with regard to the -prosecution of the war, that they should 
still preserve their sovereignty upon the sea. This fleet, having first steered 
their course towards Sardinia, sailed from thence to Pisae, in the hope that 
they should there join Annibal, and be able to act in concert with him : but 
being informed that the Romans had sent against them a fleet of a hundred 
and twenty quinqueremes, they returned back again to Sardinia, and from 



15* GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

jfeaSBSBS ■ - I ' ■ i 1 1 . . . iM - 

thence to Carthage. Servilius for some time followed after them with the 
Roman fleet ; but when he found that they had gained a very great distance 
from him, he desisted from the pursuit, and anchored in the port of Lilybaeum, 
From thence having steered his course towards Cercina, which stands upon the 
coast of Afric, he forced the inhabitants to pay a sum of money to save their 
country from being plundered. In his return he made himself master also of 
the island of Cossyrus; and having placed a garrison in the little town that was 
in it, he then sailed back again to Lilybaeum, laid up the fleet in harbour, and 
returned not long afterwards to the army. 

When the news arrived at Rome of the victory that had been gained by 
Cnaeus against the Carthaginians, the senate began now to think. that it not 
only was expedient, but absolutely necessary, that they from this time should 
attend more closely to the affairs of Spain, and support the war in that country 
•with greater application and vigour than before. They resolved, therefore, 
that Publius Scipio, to whom this province was at first allotted, should sail 
away immediately with twenty ships to join his brother Cnaeus, and to act in 
concert with him ; for they were under no small apprehensions, that the Car- 
thaginians, in case that they could once obtain the conquest of this country, 
with all the wealth that might be drawn in great abundance from it, would in 
a short time become superior also upon the sea, and from thence be enabled 
more strongly to support the war in Italy, and to furnish Annibal from time to 
time with continued supplies both of men and stores. In order to avoid this ■■ 
danger, which, indeed, demanded their most serious care, they new sent Pub- 
lius into Spain. This general, even upon his first arrival, pursued such mea- 
sures as greatly advanced the interests, and enlarged the power, of the re- 
public. For before this time the Romans never had attempted to extend 
their views beyond the Iberus, but were fully satisfied with having gained the 
alliance of the people that lived on this side of it. But Publius now passed 
the river, and resolved to maintain the war on the other side. An accident at 
the same time happened which greatly favoured this design : the Romans, | 
when they had passed the Iberus without any resistance from the neighbouring 
people, who were struck with terror at theirapproach, encamped near a temple- 
that was consecrated to Venus, at the distance of about forty stadia from Sa- 
guntum ; in a post in which they not only were secure against all dangeF 
from the enemy, but were able also to receive supplies continually from their 
fleet, which, as the army advanced, had still sailed along the coast. In this. 
place the adventure happened to them, which I am going to relate. 

At the time when Annibal was preparing to march into Italy, he had taken 
hostages from all the towns in Spain, of whose fidelity he had any doubt, and ) 
ordered them t6 be kept together at Saguntum, both because this city was a 
place of strength, and because the government also of it was left by him in the 
hands of men in whom he had an entire and perfect confidence. The hostages | 
were, all of them the children of the most distinguished families, in the several : 
cities from whence they had been sent. There was a certain Spaniard, whose | 
name was Abilyx, of high rank and character in hiss country, and one who had 
always seemed to be attached more strongly even than any of his nation to all i 
the interests of the Carthaginians. This man, having carefully weighed all 
circumstances, and judging that the Romans now had the fairest prospect 
of success, formed the design of betraying his faith to his allies, and deliver- I 
in 0- up these hostages to the enemy : a project truly worthy of a Spaniard 
and barbarian. But he had persuaded himself that this declaration of his 
zeal in favour of the Romaus could not fail to raise him to a very high degree 
of credit and esteem among them, especially when joined to a service of so 
great importance, and rendered in so critical a season. 

He went therefore to Bostar, the Carthaginian general, who had been sent 
by Asdrubal to oppose the passage of the Romans over the Iberus, but not 
daring to risk a battle, had retired and fixed his camp near Saguntum, on the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYEIUS. v 15$ 

— mm ■ " i i. i M .il»..i MMMM » i , . — j >.i— . «, ,m.. , M i , w ,..,, 

side towards the sea. He was a man of a mild and harmless disposition ; easy and 
tractable in his nature, and not forward to suspect any ill designs Abilyx, 
beginning his discourse with the subject of the hostages, represented to him, 
" that as the Romans had now passed the river, the Carthaginians no longer 
would be able by the means of terror to keep the Spaniards under due re- 
straint ; that the times required that they rather should employ their pains to 
win the affections of the people, and fix them in their interest by favour : that 
as Saguntum might, perhaps, in a short time, fall into the power of the Ro- 
mans who were now encamped before it, if Bostar, seizing the occasion, would 
send back the hostages to their parents and respective cities, he would not 
only disappoint the expectations of the enemy, who were earnestly solicitous 
to become masters of them for this very purpose, but by his wise and timely 
care, in thus providing for the safety of these young men, would secure also 
the affection of the Spaniards to the Carthaginians; that if he would trust to 
him the conduct of this business, he would take care abundantly to magnify 
the merit of this kindness; and, as he led the hostages to the several cities, 
would raise, not only in the parents, but in all the people of the country 
likewise, the warmest sentiments of esteem and favour, by painting in the 
strongest colours the generosity of this proceeding. In the last place, he 
reminded him, that himself might also expect to be rewarded in the amplest 
manner ; and that every parent, when he had thus beyond all hope recovered 
what was dearest to him, would strive to exceed the rest in his acknowledg- 
ments, and load with favours the commanders to whose power he was in- 
debted for so great a happiness." By these, and many other arguments of 
the same kind, he prevailed on Bostar to approve of all that was proposed; 
and having fixed the day on which he was to be in readiness, with some at- 
tendants, to receive the, hostages, he then retired. 

As soon as night was come he went privately to the Roman camp, joined 
6onae Spaniards that were at that time in the army, and was carried by them to 
the geuerals ; and having, in a long discourse, represented to them the great 
alacrity and zeal with which the Spaniards would all concur to promote the 
interest of the Romans, if through their means the hostages should be re- 
stored, he at last engaged to deliver the young men into their hands. Publius 
received this offer with the greatest eagerness and joy, and dismissed him with 
the assurance of immense rewards, having first appointed the time and place in 
which he would himself attend his coming. Abilyx then returned again to- 
Bostar, with some friends whom he had chosen for the occasion, received the 
hostages, and leaving Saguntum in the night, on pretence of concealing his 
motions from the enemy, passed beyond the Roman camp and delivered them 
to the generals at the appointed place. He was received by Publius with all 
possible marks of honour, and was charged with the care of cpnductino- back 
the hostages to their respective cities. Some Romans also, that were most 
proper for the trust, were ordered to attend him. In every place throuph 
which they passed, the dismission of these young men was highly magnified 
by Abilyx, as a signal instance of the clemency and generous spirit of the 
Romans. On the other hand, he displayed in the strongest colours the jealous 
diffidence of the Carthaginians, and the severity with which they had always 
treated their allies. He urged his own example likewise, as an eneourage- 
ment to the revolt. By these persuasions many of the Spaniards were led to 
embrace the friendship of the Romans. With regard to Bostar, he was 
thought to have acted with such weakness as was by no means to be excused 
in a person of his age, and was afterwards involvul on that account in very 
great misfortunes. The Romans, pa the contrary, derived many advances 
from this accident, in the prosecution of the war. But as the time "for 
action was already passed, both armies now retired to their quarters for the 
winter. In this state we shall here leave the affairs of Spain, and return aaain 
to Italy. 5 

VOt, 1. NO. 4. V 



354 ' GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



CHAP. XI. 

Annibal, being informed by those whom he had sent to view the country, 
that the lands round Luceria and Geranium afforded great quantities of corn, 
and that the last of these two cities was a commodious place for laying up his 
stores, resolved to fix his quarters for the winter there. Passing therefore be- 
yond the mountain called Liburnus, he led his army to Gerunium, which was 
distant from Luceria about two hundred stadia. On his first approach he ed- 
deavoured by gentle means to draw the. citizens to his party, and even offered 
such engagements as might secure to them the full performance of his promises* 
But when this proposal was rejected he laid siege to the place, and, having in 
a short time made himself master of it, ordered all the inhabitants to be de- 
stroyed ; but he reserved the walls, together with the greater part of the 
houses still entire, designing to convert them into granaries for the winter. 
He then ordered the array to encamp before the town, and threw up an en-* 
trenchment round his camp. Prom this post he sent away two parts of all 
,the forces to gather in the corn ; with orders that each soldier should be 
obliged to bring a stated measure of it every day to the officers of his own 
company that were appointed to receive it. The remaining third part of the- 
troops were left to guard the camp, or disposed as occasion required, in proper 
posts to support the foragers. As the country was plain and open, the 
number of the foragers almost infinite, and the season likewise proper for the 
work, vast quantities of corn were collected every day. 

The Roman general Marcus, to whom Fabius had left the arm3 r when ht 
returned to Rome, for some time shifted his post from hill to hill, attending' 
to the motions of the Carthaginians, and flattering himself with the hope that 
be should at last find some occasion to fall upon them with advantage from 
those eminences. But when he heard that they were masters ofGeruniumj 
had foi'tified their camp before the town, and were employed in gathering: 
stores from all the country, he immediately left the mountains ; and, descend- 
. ing along the promontory that gave entrance to the plain, encamped near the 
foot of a hill that was called Callene, in the district ofLarium; and resolved^ 
without more delay, to bring the enemy to a battle. When Annibal was in- 
' formed that the Romans were so near, he sent one third part only of his troops 
to gather in the corn, and, advancing with the rest towards the enemy, fixed 
his camp upon a hill, at the distance of about sixteen stadia from Gerunium ; 
that he might restrain in some degree the ardour of the Romans, and be able 
also to support his foragers, as occasion should require. And when night came 
on, he ordered likewise a detachment of two thousand light-armed forces, to 
march and possess themselves of another neighbouring hill, which stood be- 
tween the camps, and commanded that of the Romans. But, as soon as day 
appeared, Minucius drew out also his light-armed troops, and sent them to 
dislodge the Carthaginians in their post. The dispute was sharp and obsti- 
nate ; but the Romans, having at last prevailed, remained masters of the hill, 
and came soon afterwards, with all their army, and encamped upon it. 

As the distance between the two camps was now so inconsiderable, Annibal 
at first kept together in a body the greatest part of all the army : but, after 
some days, he was forced to send abroad his detachments as before ; to lead 
. the cattle to their pasture, and to gather in the corn ; having resolved, agree- 
ably to his first design, not only to preserve entire the stores which he had al- 
ready gained, but to draw together also as large a quantity of corn as he 
might yet be able to procure ; that thus the troops, the beasts of burden, and 
especially the horses, might be supplied with "all provisions in the greatest 
plenty, during the time of winter; for his chief awid strongest; iaope* wer«' 
founded on the cavalry. 

• - ft • . 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLVBIUS. 155 



When Mirmeins saw that the greater part of the Carthaginian army was 
busied in this work, and dispersed on every side through all the country, he 
chose the time that was most proper for his purpose, and, leading out all his 
forces, approached close to the entrenchments of the enemy wilh the legionary 
troops, drawn up in order of battle, and, at the same time sent away, in separate 
divisions, his cavalry and light-armed forces, to fall upon the foragers, with 
orders that they should take none alive. Annibal was in no small degree em- 
banassed by this sudden accident : for, as the forces that remained with him 
in the camp were too few to be drawn out in battle against the legions ; so 
neither, on the other hand, was he able to send any assistance to the rest, 
that were dispersed about the country. Great numbers, therefore, of the fo- 
ragers were destroyed by the detachments that were stnt against them ; while 
the rest of the Roman forces that were ranged in order of battle arrived at last 
at such a height of insult, that they even began to tear away the palisade 
of the entrenchments, and almost besiege the Carthaginians in their camp. An- 
nibal, though thus reduced to a condition that seemed, indeed, to be next to 
desperate, struggled with all his force against the storm ; drove back the ene- 
my as they advanced ; and kept possession of his camp, though not without 
the greatest difficulty. But, after some time, when Asdrubal was come to his 
assistance, wit i four thousai d of the foragers who had fled together to the 
camp before Gerumum, he then resumed his courage, marched out of his en- 
trenchments, and, having ranged his forces in order of battle, at a little dis- 
tance from the camp, at last repelled the ruin that so nearly threatened him. 
The Romans returned back again to their camp, elate with their success, aud 
filled with the strongest hopes for the time to come : for many of the Cartha- 
ginians had fallen before the entrenchments ; and a much greater number of 
those that were spread through the country were destroyed by the parties that 
were sent against them. 

On the following day, Minucius went and took possession of the camp which 
the Carthaginians now had quitted ; for Annibal, as soon as the fight was 
ended, had resolved to return again to his first camp before Geranium ; being 
apprehensive that, if the Romans should march thither in the night, and finding 
the camp deserted, should take possession of it, they would, by -that means, 
become masters of his baggage, and all his stores. After this action, the Car- 
thaginians used great precaution, when they went abroad to forage ; while the 
Romans, on the contrary, were bold and confident, and exposed themselves to 
danger, without any caution or reserve. 

When the news of this success arrived at Rome, and was enlarged in the re- 
lation far beyond the bounds of truth, the people all were filled with the 
greatest joy. For, first, as the despair into which they had lately fallen, with 
respect to the final issue of the war, seemed now to have given place to better 
hopes ; so the terror likewise that had hitherto been spread among the legions, 
and the inaction in which they had still remained, were judged clearly to have 
sprung, not from any want of courage in the troops, but from the cold and 
cautious disposition of the general. From this time, therefore, Fabius was 
openly reproached by all, as a man who, through timidity, had suffered even 
the fairest occasions to escape him ; while Minucius, on the other hand, was 
raised so high, in the opinion of the citizens, by this exploit, that a resolution 
was taken in his favour, of which there was no example : for they declared 
him dictator likewise ; being persuaded that the war would thus be brought to 
a quick decision. Thus there were, at one time, two dictators, intrusted jointly 
with the conduct of a single war; a thing never known before among the 
Romans. 

As soon as Minucius was informed of the high applause and favour which 
his conduct had gained for him among the citizens, and of the dignity to which 
the people now had raised him, he became much more eager aud impetuous 
than before, and resolved to attempt every thing against the enemy. But Fa- 



156 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

i .■■■.—— «— n,.umui— i 'ill j> 

biusvvas not to be moved by any of these accidents ; but, on the contrary, 
persisted even with greater firmness in his first determination. When he re- 
turned, therefore, to the army, and saw that Minucius was elated beyond \all 
bounds ; that he haughtily opposed him in every sentiment ; and was urg- 
ing him perpetually to venture on a battle; he offered to his choice, that 
he should either take in turn the single and supreme command of all the 
army, or remove with one half of the troops to a separate camp, and there pur- 
sue such measures as he should judge convenient. Minucius eagerly em- 
braced the last proposal. The forces, therefore were divided into two equal 
bodies, and encamped apart, having the distance of about twelve stadia be- 
tween their camps. 

When Annibal was informed, as well by this division of the forces, as from 
the prisoners also that were taken, that some contention had been raised be- 
tween the generals ; and that it solely sprung from the ungovernable heat and 
■ambition of Minucius, he was so far from apprehending that this accident 
would, in any manner, prove pernicious to nis interests, that, on the contrary, he 
conceived tire hope of being able to draw great advantage from it. He re«- 
solved, therefore, from this time to observe, with the greatest care, the motions 
of Minucius ; to meet and restrain his ardour ; and to prevent him in all his 
efforts. Between his camp and that of Marcus, there stood an eminence, from 
whence those that should first gain possession of it might be able greatly to 
distress the enemy. Annibal resolved to seize this post ; and, not doubting 
but that the Romans, confident from their late success, would hasten to dis- 
lodge him from it, he employed the following stratagem. The country that 
was round the hill was a flat and naked plain ; but the ground, in many parts, 
was broken and unequal, and abounded with various kinds of pits. He sent 
away, therefore, in the night, a body of five hundred horse, and about five 
thousand foot, which were distributed in small divisions, of two and three hun- 
dred each, among the several cavities in which they best might lie concealed : 
and, that they might not be discovered in the morning by the Roman foragers, 
he ordered his light-armed troops to take possession of the eminence before 
break of day. Minucius, perceiving what had happened, applauded his good 
fortune, and immediately sent away the light-armed troops, with orders that 
they should charge the Carthaginians - with the greatest vigour, and exert all 
their efforts to drive them from their post. In a short time afterwards, he com- 
manded the cavalry also to advance ; and himself then followed with the le- 
gions. His disposition was the same as in the former battle. It was now clear 
day ; but, as the Romans directed their eyes, and whole attention, towards 
the combatants Upon the hill, the Carthaginian troops that were placed in the- 
ambuscade remained secure and unsuspected. Annibal sent fresh troops con- 
tin naily to the hill ; and himself, in a short time, followed with the cavalry, and 
all the army. The cavalry on both sides were soon engaged ; but, as the Car- 
thaginians were far superior in their numbers, the light-armed forces of the 
Romans, being also pressed in their first conflict, fled back precipitately 
towards their own legious, and threw them into great disorder. In this mo- 
ment, the signal was given by Annibal to the troops that were in ambuscade, 
who appeared on evefy side, and vigorously charged the Remans. And now, 
not the light-armed forces only, but the whole army, was in danger of being ir- 
recoverably lost. But Fabius, having from his camp observed the progress-of 
the action, and perceiving that a general and entire defeat must soon ensue» 
drew out all his forces, and advanced in haste to the assistance of his colleague. 
The Romans, though their ranks all were broken, now resumed their courage; 
and, as these troops approached, formed themselves again in order, and retired 
towards them for protection. But many of their light-armed forces had fallen 
in action ; and a much greater number of the legionaries and bravest soldiers. 
Annibal, not daring to renew the fight against troops that were fresh, and dis* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 157 

posed in perfect order, desisted from the pursuit, and returned back again to 
his camp. 

Ttie Romans, being thus rescued from destruction, were at last fully sen- 
sible, that the rashness of Minucius had engaged them in such measures as 
proved almost fatal to them ; and that they owed their safety, not at this time 
only, but on former occasions likewise, to the cautious management of 
Fabius. The people also at Rome were now forced to acknowledge, that a 
wise and steady conduct, regulated by sound skill and judgment in the art of 
war, is far to be preferred to all those rash and impetuous sallies, which result 
from mere personal bravery, and a vain desire ©f popular applause. From this 
time, therefore, the troops, made wise by theiv misfortunes, encamped ouce 
more together ; and resolved to leave to Fabius the whole conduct of the war, 
and punctually to receive and execute his orders. The Carthaginians drew a. 
line between the eminence and their camp; and, having thrown up an entrenclt- 
ment also round the top of the hill, and posted some troops upon it, they had 
now leisure to complete, in full security, the preparations that were necessary 
for the winter. 



CHAP. XII. 

When the time was come in which the Romans usually elected their chief 
magistrates, the people chose for consuls Lucius J5milius and Caius Teren- 
tius ; and the dictators resigned their office. iEmilius, having ordered the 
former consuls, Cn. Servilius, and M. Regulus, who had succeeded to that dig- 
nity, after the death of Flaminius,to take upon them the entire command of the 
army in the field, in quality of his lieutenants, remained still at Rome, to de- 
liberate with the senate on the measures that were fit to be pursued, and to 
raise new levies : and when he had enrolled the numbers that were necessary 
to complete the legions, he sent them to the army, with an express order to 
Servilius, that he should by no means venture on a general action, but should, 
from time to time, engage the Carthaginians in such sharp and frequent skir- 
mishes as might serve to exercise the strength, and raise the courage of his 
troops, and, by degrees, prepare them for a decisive battle : for it was now 
judged to have beeu the chief and only cause of all the losses which hitherto the 
Romans had sustained, that their battles had been fought by new-raised- levies, 
undisciplined, and without experience. At the game time also, the praetor 
L. Posthuniius was sent with a legion into Gaul, to make a diversion there, 
and force the Gauls that were with Annibal to return and defend their country. 
The fleet that had remained during the winter in the port of Lilybaeutn 
was brought back to Rome. The generals that were in Spain were supplied 
with every kind of stores; and, in a word, whatever preparations were judged 
necessary for the war were all completed with the greatest diligence and 
care. 

Servilius punctually observed the orders of the consul, and engaged only in 
some slight and separate skirmishes, which we shall not now particularly de- 
scribe : for, though many of these little combats were very sharp as well as fre- 
quent, and were conducted by the Roman generals with great skill and cou- 
rage, by reason of these orders, and from the circumstances also of the times, 
no action happened that was of great importance, or in any manner general or 
decisive. 

In these camps, opposite, and in sight of each other, both armies thus re- 
mained, during the whole winter, and the following spring. But, when the 
time of harvest drew near, Annibal, having left his camp before Gerunium, 
went and possessed himself of the citadel of Cannae, hoping that, by this means, 
he should at last-be able to force the enemy to a battle : for the Romans had 
brought together to this place all the corn and other stores, which they col- 



158 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



lected in the district of Canusium ; and from thence their army constantly 
was supplied with necessaries. The town had been destroyed some time be- 
fore ; but, as the citadel remained, and fell now into the hands of the Cartha- 
ginians, with all the stores, the Romans were thrown at once into the greatest 
difficulties : for they not only were deprived of their supplies, but such also 
was the situation of this post, that it commanded all the neighbouring country. 
The generals, therefore, sent messenger after messenger to Rome ; desiring ear- 
nestly to be informed, in what manner they should act in this conjuncture ; since 
it was now no longer possible to decline a battle, in case that they should ap- 
proach any nearer to the enemy : for the country was all wasted and consumed, 
and the allies were fixed in expectation, and waited with impatience for the 
event. The opinion of the senate was, that they should venture on a battle. , 
But they advised Servilius to delay it yet for some tirfie longer ; and gave or- 
ders, that the consuls shouldjeave the city, and hasten to the camp. For all 
men now had turned their eyes towards iEmilius, who, as well by reason of the 
constant probity of his life and manners, as on account also of the services 
which his country had received some time before, from his brave and skilful 
management of the war against the Illyrians, was judged most capable to sa- 
tisfy their fullest expectations, in this dangerous and critical conjuncture. It 
was ordered likewise, that the army should consist of eight leg-ions, — a thing 
never known before in any of their wars ; and that each legion should contain 
five thousand men, besides the allies : for the constant custom of the Romans, 
as we have already mentioned, was to raise four legions only ; and to allow to- 
each, four thousand foot, and two hundred horse. In case that they were 
pressed by great and unusual danger, they then increased the number to five 
thousand foot, and three hundred horse. The infantry of the allies was the 
same in number with that of the legions, but their cavalry three times as many. 
Of these forces, one half of the allies, and two legions, were allotted separately 
to each consul, who was then sent to prosecute the war apart, in his own 
proper province. Thus their battles had been always fought by a single con- 
sul, with two legions only, and an equal proportion of the allies. For it had 
very rarely happened, that all the forces were employed together in any single 
expedition. But now, their apprehensions were so great, that they resolved 
to send, not four, but eight legions at once into the field. They repjesented 
also to iFmilius, in the strongest terms, the happy consequences that must 
attend a victory ; and, on the qther hand, the ruin that could scarcely fail to 
follow his defeat ; and exhorted him to choose his time for action with such 
skill and judgment, as might give at once a final issue to the war, in a man- 
ner worthy of his own great character, and of the dignity of the Roman 
name. 

- As soon as the consuls arrived in the camp, they called the troops together ; 
informed them of the resolutions of the senate ; and employed all the exhort- 
ations that were suited to the present circumstances. iEmilius chiefly, who wag 
himself very deeply affected with the distresses of his country, addressed the 
soldiers in the most earnest and pathetic manner. He explained to them the 
causes of the late defeat ; and endeavoured to dissipate their fears, which the 
remembrance of them had impressed upon the minds of all the army. He told 
them, that it was easy to assign, not one, but many causes of the ill success that 
had attended them in all their combats ; but that, at this time, nothing but 
• the want of resolution could deprive them of the victory ; that hitherto, they 
had never been engaged with both consuls together at their head; that the 
. soldiers likewise were all new raised levies, unused to the sight of danger, and 
unpractised in the art of war ; and, which was still a circumstance of greater 
moment, that they were so far from being acquainted with the condition 
of the forces that opposed them, that, on the contrary, they were hurried to 
the fight, before they had even so much as seen the enemy. For the troops 
that were defeated near the river Trebia arrived one day from Sicily, and 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 159 



early on the next were drawn out in battle. And those that fell afterwards in 
the fight of Thrasynietfe had not only never seen their enemies before the 
combat, but were prevented by the mist, from seeing them even in the time 
of the engagement. " But now, Romans," continued he, " you see that all 
things bear a different face. You have now both consuls together at your 
head, ready to divide all danger with you. And even the consuls also of tlie 
former year have consented to remain, and to bear their part in the approach- 
ing battle. You are now acquainted with the numbers of the enemy, the 
manner in which their troops are armed, and their disposition in the field; 
and during the course of two whole years, scarce a single day has passed ia 
which you have uot tried your strength against them. Since, therefore, every 
circumstance is so different from those that were found in all your past en- 
gagements, the event must also be different. For how improbable, or rather 
now impossible a thing - must it be thought, that troops, which have returned 
so often with success from little combats against equal forces, should now 
fail, with more than double numbers, to obtain the victory in a general 
battle ? Since then, Romans, all things afford such strong assurances ©f 
success, nothing now is wanting, but that yourselves iu earnest resolve to 
conquer. But this surely is a point on which there is no need that I should 
much enlarge. If I were speaking indeed to mercenary soldiers, or to an 
army of allies, engaged in the defence of some neighbouring state, this kind 
of exhortation might perhaps be necessary. For the worst that can befal 
such troops is the danger to which they are exposed during the time of 
action ; since they have scarcely any thing*, either to apprehend, or hope, 
from the issue of it. But with you, who are prepared to fight, not for the 
defence of others, but for the safety of yourselves, your country, wives, and 
children, the consequences of the battle will be of far greater moment, than 
all the dangers that are now before you. Reflect but for a moment only ou 
those consequences ; and such reflection, if I judge right, will fully supply 
the place of the most pathetic exhortations. For who> is there among you, 
that is not fixed already in his choice, to conquer, if it be possible ; and if 
not, to die, rather than behold the things that are dearest to him exposed 
to insult and destruction ? Turn your views forward therefore to the event ; 
and consider on the one hand the advantages, and on the other, the dreadful 
ruin that may possibly ensue. Remember, Romans, that the battle is not to 
decide upon the fortune of these legions only, but on that of the whole 
.republic. For in case that you are now defeated, Rome can no longer stand 
against the enemy. Her whole strength and spirit, the fruits of all her 
hopes, are now bound together and collected in your single army. Let your 
efforts then be such, ns may fully answer all her expectations. Shew youi- 
selves the grateful children of your country; and make it manifest to all 
mankind, that the losses, which the Romans have hitherto sustained, are by 
no means to be ascribed to any superior force or courage in their enemies, 
but to the circumstances only of the times, and the want of experience in the 
troops that were engaged." After this harangue, iEmilius dismissed the 
assembly. 

On the following day, the consuls began their march, and advanced 
towards the enemy ; and on the second day, they encamped at the distance 
of about fifty stadia only from the Carthaginians. But as the country was 
all plain and open, and the enemy superior in their cavalry, iEiiiilius was 
persuaded that it would be still most prudent to decline a battle, till they 
had drawn the Carthaginians to some other other ground, in which the in- 
fantry might bear the chief part in the engagement. But Yarro, ignorant, 
and unskilful in war, was fixed in different sentiments ; and from hence arose 
ill humour and dissention between the generals, a thing the most pernicious 
that can happen in an army. The Roman custom was, that when both consuls 
•were together in the field, they should command alternately, day by day. 



160 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIlfS. 



Oa the next day, therefore, when Varro commanded in his turn, he ordered 
the army to decamp; and, unmoved by all the entreaties of his colleague, re- 
solved to approach yet nearer to the enemy. Annibal, informed of his design, 
advanced to meet him with his cavalry and the light-armed forces ; and falling 
suddenly upon the Romans as the}'- marched, threw them into great disorder. 
But the consul, having placed some of the heavy troops in front, to sustain 
the fury of the first attack, led afterwards to the charge his cavalry and light- 
armed foot, and inserted among them also some cohorts of the legions. This* 
precaution turned the victory entirely to his side against the enemy, who were 
destitute of the like support. But the night, which now came on, forced the; 
combatants on both sides to retire, when the issue of the actiou had proved in 
all points contrary to that which the Carthaginians had expected from it. 

On the following day, iEmilius, who still was earnest to decline a battle, 
but saw that it was now impossible to retreat with safety, encamped with two 
thirds of all the forces, along the Aufidus, the only river that flows through 
the Apennine. For this chain of mountains separates all the other streams 
of Italy ; of which, one part is discharged into the Adriatic, and the rest 
into the Tyrrhenian sea. But the Aufidus takes it sources on the side of the 
Tyrrhenian sea r passes through the Apennine, and falls at last into the 
Adriatic gulph. The remaining third part of the army was ordered by 
JEmilius to pass the river ; to advance up the stream ; and there to lie in- 
trenched, at the distance of about ten stadia from his own camp, and-not 
much farther from that of the enemy. His intention was to employ these 
forces, as well to cover and support his own foragers, as to harass those of the 
Carthaginians. 

But Annihal, perceiving that all things tended fast towards a general 
battle, thought it necessary that he should first endeavour to raise again the 
courage of his army, which seemed to have been in some degree depressed 
by the loss which they had sustained in the late engagement. He, therefore, 
assembled all the troops together, and having commanded them to cast their 
eyes upon the country round, " Tell me soldiers," said he, " if the gods 
had left it to your choice, could you have formed any greater wish, superior 
as yon are in cavalry to the enemy, than to contend with them upon such a 
ground, for a victory that must decide the war ?" The army all cried out, 
and the thing indeed was manifest, that they could not have desired any- 
greater advantage. " Pay your thanks then," continued he, " in the first 
place to the gods, who have secured the victory in your hands, by leading 
your enemies into such a country ; and afterwards, to me your general, who 
have forced them to the necessity of fighting. For, how great soever our 
advantages are against them, they have now no means left to decline a battle. 
For your part, there is surely little need that I should now exhort you to per- 
form your duty with bravery and spirit. Before you had ever tried your 
strength against the Romans, such discourses might perhaps be seasonable ; 
and in that persuasion, I endeavoured frequently to raise and animate your 
hopes, not by exhortation only, but by examples likewise. But now, since 
you have gained against them the most perfect victory in three successive 
battles, what words can I employ to excite any greater confidence than that 
which the remembrance. of your own actions must inspire ? By your former 
combats, you gained possession of the open country ; for such was the assu- 
rance which I had giv£n you ; and the event confirmed my promise. But 
now I offer to your hopes the towns and cities of your enemies, with all the 
treasures that they contain. Be victorious only in this single battle, and all 
Italy will be ready to receive your laws. Your labours and your toils will 
then all be ended. The wealth and power of the Romans will become your 
own, and render you the undisputed sovereigns of the world. Let us hasten 
then to action ; and, with the assistance of the gods, I will again make good 
toy promise to you." This harangue was received by all the army with the 



GENERAL HISTORY. OF POLYBIUS. I6l 



loudest acclamations. Annibal, having applauded their good disposition, dis- 
missed the assembly ; and went soon afterwards and encamped very near to 
the enemy, on that side of the river, upon which the greater camp of the 
Romans lay. 

On the following day, lie gave orders that the troops should take the neces- 
sary refreshment and repose, and malce all tilings ready for the combat. And 
on the third day, he drew out all his forces, and ranged them in order of 
battle in sight of the enemy, along the bank of the river. But iEmilius, 
sensible of the disadvantage of the ground, and' knowing also, that the want 
of provisions would soon force the Carthaginians to decamp, resolved not to 
move from his entrenchments, and made only such a disposition of his forces, 
as was necessary to secure both camps from insult. Annibal, therefore, when 
he had for some time kept the field, led the rest of his army back again to 
their entrenchments ; but sent away the Numidian horse, to fall upon the 
Romans of the little camp, who were employed in fetching water from the 
river. The boldness of these troops, who advanced even close to the entrench- 
ments, raised Yarro's indignation beyond all bounds. The soldiers also 
shewed the greatest eagerness and impatience to engage ; and could scarcely 
bear that the battle should any longer be deferred. For when men are once 
firmly in their determination, to force their way through the greatest dangers 
to the end which they have in view, every moment of delay is a burden that 
can hardly be supported. 

When it was known at Rome that the arnftres were encamped in sight, and, 
that frequent skirmishes happened every day between them, the whole city 
was filled with agitation and concern. For the people were still so much de- 
jected by the remembrance of the former losses, that they seemed now to ap-. 
prehend the worst that could befal them, and to anticipate in their minds 
all the fatal consequences of an entire defeat. The oracles of their sacred 
books were repeated in every mouth. Every temple, and every house, was 
tilled with prodigies and portents; which gave occasion to innumerable vows 
and prayers, and supplicatory sacrifices. For in times of danger or distress, 
the Romans take unwearied pains to appease the wrath of gods and men ; 
and think nothing sordid or dishonourable that is employed in that design. 

On the following day, when the command had fallen in turn to Varro, this 
general put all the troops in motion by break of day. He ordered those of 
the greater camp to pass the river, aud as they gained the other side, drew 
them up in order of battle ; joining also to them, in the same line, the troops 
of the little camp. Their faces were all turned towards the south. He placed 
the Roman cavalry on the right wing, close upon the river ; and next to these, 
the infantry, extended in one single line. But the cohorts .were drawn up 
behind each other in much closer order than was usual among, the Romans ; 
and their files so doubled, as to give to the whole line a greater depth. . The 
cavalry of the allies closed the line upon the lei't. And at some distance, in 
the front of all the army, stood the light armed troops. The whoje number, 
of the forces, with the allies included, were eighty thousand foot, dad some- 
what more than six thousand horse. '\ 

At the same time, Annibal, having first sent over the Balearic slinge-rs and 
the light-armed troops, to take their post in front, passed the river in two pjaces 
with the rest of the army, and ranged them in order of battle. The Spanish, 
and Gallic horse were posted on the left, close upon the bank of the riyer, 
and opposite to the Roman cavalry. Next to these, upon the same line, be 
placed first one-half of the heavy-armed Africans ; then the Gauls and §[% 
niards ; after these, the rest of the Africans , and closed his whole line upou 
the right, with the Numidian cavalry. When be had thus ranged all his 
forces in one single line, he advanced towards the enemy, being followed only 
by the Gauls and Spaniards of the centre. Thus he detached these troops 
from the line in which they had stood together with the rest ; and, as he ad- 

YOL. I. NO. 4. X - 



162 GENERAL HISTORY OF POtYBlUS. 



vanced, he formed them also in the figure of a crescent ; at the same time 
spreading wide their ranks, and leaving to this figure but a very inconsiderable 
depth. His intention was to begin the action with the Gauls and Spaniards, 
and to support it afterwards by the Africans. The Africans were armed after 
the Roman manner, from the spoils that had been taken in the former battles- 
The Gauls and Spaniards wore the same kind of buckler, but their swords 
were different. For those of the latter were formed, as well to push with as 
to strike ; whereas the Gauls could only use their swords to make a falling 
stroke, and at a certain distance. These troops were ranged together m al- 
ternate cohorts ; and as the Gauls were naked, and the Spaniards all clothed 
-with vests of linen bordered with purple, after the fashion of the country, 
their appearance was both strange and terrible. The Carthaginian cavalry 
amounted in the whole to about ten thousand ; and the number of their in- 
fantry was somewhat more than forty thousand, with the Gauls included. 
The right of the Roman army was conducted by iEmilius, the left by Varro, 
and the centre by Regulus and Servilius, the consuls of the former year. On 
the side of the Carthaginians, Asdrubal had the care of the left, Hanno of 
the right, and Annibal himself, with his brother Ma go, commanded in the- 
centre. Both armies were alike secure from being incommoded by the rising 
sun ; for the one was turned towards the south, as we have already mentioned* 
and the other towards the north. 

The action was begun by the light-armed troops that were posted before 
the armies. In the first conflict, the success was on both sides equal ; but 
when the Spanish and Gallic cavalry, advancing from the left wing of th®- 
Carthaginians, approached near the Romans, the contest that ensued between- 
them was then indeed most warm and vehement ; and such as resembled ra- 
ther the combats of barbarians, than a battle fought by disciplined and ex- 
perienced troops. For, instead of falling back, and returning again oftea 
to the charge, as the custom was in such engagements, they were now scarcely 
joined, when, leaping from their horses, each man seized his enemy. But 
after some time, the victory turned wholly to the side of the Carthaginians. 
The greater part of the Romans were destroyed in the place, after a most- 
brave and obstinate contention ; and the rest, being closely followed as they 
fled slong the river, were all slaughtered likewise, without being able t(x 
obtain any mercy. 

About the time when this combat was decided, the light-armed troops ont 
both sides retired back again to their respective armies, and the heavy infantry 
advanced to action. The Gauls and Spaniards stood for some time firms 
against the enemy. But b^ing at last forced to yield to the weight of the 
Roman legions, they retreated backwards, and thus opened the figure of the 
crescent, in which they had been formed. The Romans followed with ala- 
crity and eagerness ; and without much difficulty forced their way through 
the ranks of the enemy, which were loose and thin ; whereas themselves, oq 
the contrary, had drawn away many cohorts from the wings to strengthen' 
their centre, in which at this time all the stress of the battle lay. For the 
action vvas not begun by the whole line at once, but singly by the centre,, 
because the Gauls and Spaniards, as they formed themselves into the figure 
of a crescent, had advanced far beyond the wings of their own army, and 
6fi°ei;ed only the convex of the crescent to the enemy. The Romans, there* 
ford, still pushing forwards through the middle of these ranks, which still 
ga,ve way before them, were at last so far advanced within its centre, that they 
fcaw on either side the heavy-armed Africans stand ready to inclose them, 
£ior did these troops long neglect the occasion, which of itself most clearly 
pointed out the measures that were now proper to be taken. For turning 
suddenly, the one part of them from the right to the left, and the other 
from the left to the right, they fell with fury upon both flanks of the Romans {, 
and thus the event happened which Annibal had chiefly in view. For this 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 163 



general had foreseen, that the Romans, in pursuing- the Gauls and Spaniards, 
must at last inevitably be inclosed between the Africans. By this means they 
were now forced to break their phalanx, and to defend themselves, either 
singly, or in separate parties, against the enemies that wore attacking thera 
in flank. 

jEmilius, who at first was posted on the right, and had escaped from the 
general slaughter of the Roman cavalry, perceiving that the fortune of the 
battle was now to be decided by the infantry alone, and being earnestly soli- 
citous that his actions should in no respect fall short of those assurances 
which he had given when he harangued the army, drove his horse into the 
very middle of the combatants, killing and dispersing every thing in his way, 
and employing all his efforts to animate the soldiers that were near him. 
Annibal did the same on his part ; for he had remained still in the centre 
from the beginning of the engagement. 

The Numidians of the right wing had charged the cavalry of the allies 
upon the left. And though, by reason of their peculiar way of fighting, no 
great loss was sustained on either side, yet as they still from time to time re- 
turned again to the attack, they by that means held those troops so constantly 
employed, that they had no leisure to assist the rest. But when the cavalry 
of the left, that was led by Asdrubal, and which now had finished the destruc- 
tion of almost all the Roman cavalry that fled along the river, came round 
and joined the Numidians, the cavalry of the allies were at once seized with 
terror, and, not waiting to receive the charge, immediately turned their backs 
and fled. Upon this occasion, Asdrubal bethought himself of an expedient, 
which indeed denoted his great prudence, and his skill in war. Observing 
that the Numidians were considerable in their numbers, and knowing also 
that these troops were then most terrible, whenever they were engaged against 
a flying enemy, he ordered them to pursue those that fled, and at the same 
time led his own cavalry to the assistance of the African infantry. He fell 
upon the Roman legions in the rear, and, having divided his cavalry into little 
troops, sent them into the midst of the action, in many different parts at 
once. By this wise measure, he gave new strength and courage to the 
Africans; while the Romans on the contrary began to lose all hope. It was 
at this time that iEmilius fell, oppressed with wounds ; and that life, which 
had on all occasions been devoted to the service of his country, was now lo*t 
iu its defence. The Romans, though surrounded thus on every side, turned 
their faces to the enemy, and resisted yet for some time longer.' But as the 
troops on the outside fell, their body by degrees was more and more dimi- 
nished ; till at last they were pressed together within a very narrow space, and 
were all destroyed. Among them fell Regulus and Servilius, the consuls of 
the former year ; both eminent for their virtue, and whose behaviour in the 
action was such as shewed them to be worthy of the name of Romans. 

During the time of all this slaughter, the Numidians, pursuing the cavalry 
of the left, who fled before them, killed the greatest part, and threw many 
from their horses. A small number only escaped safe to Yenusia, among 
whom was Varro, that base and worthless consul, whose government proved 
so pernicious to his country. 

Such was the battle of CaunsB, in which both sides long contended for the 
victory with the greatest bravery. Of this the action itself affords the clearest 
proof. For of six thousand horse, which was the whole cavalry of the Roman 
army, seventy only fled with Yarro to Venusia; and three hundred more of 
the allies escaped to different cities. Of the infantry, ten thousand men 
indeed were taken prisoners, but these had no part in the action. And about 
three thousand also found means to escape to some of the cities that were near. 
But the rest, to the amount of seventy thousand men, all died with honour in 
the field of battle. 

The Carthaginians upon this occasion, as in all the former battle^ were 



164 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBTU& 

indebted chiefly for their victories 'to the numbers of their cavalry. And 
from hence succeeding ages may be able clearly to perceive, that in time of 
war it is far more advantageous to have a great superiority of cavalry, with 
no more than half the infantry, than an army that is in all parts equal to the 
enemy. On the side of Annibal were slain four thousand Gauls, fifteen 
hundred Africans and Spaniards, with about two hundred horse. 

The Romans that were faken prisoners had no part in the action, as we 
have just now mentioned ; for iEmilius had left behind him in the camp ten 
thousand of the infantry ; having considpred with himself, that if the Car- 
thaginians should draw out all their forces to the battle, these troops might 
fall upon their camp during the time of the engagement, and make them- 
selves masters of the baggage ; and on the other hand, if Annibal, in appre- 
hension of this danger, should send a detachment from his army to guard , 
the camp, that the numbers of the enemy would then be lessened in the 
field. They were taken prisoners in the following manner. As soon as the 
action was begun, they advanced to force the entrenchments, which Annibal 
howtrer had left strongly guarded. The Carthaginians stood for some time 
firm, and repelled the efforts of the enemy ; but were at last so pressed, that 
they were scarcely able any longer to maintain their post. But when the 
battle was now in every part completely ended, Annibal, having brought 
gome troops to their assistance, drove back the Romans, and invested them 
in their own camp. Two thousand of them were killed, and the rest made 
prisoners. About two hundred also of the routed cavalry, who had saved 
themselves in some of the fortresses of the country, were invested by the 
Numidians, in the posts into which they had retired, and were brought away 
prisoners to the camp. 

The immediate consequences of this victory were such as both sides had 
expected from it. The Carthaginians became at once the masters of the 
whole sea coast, and of that part of Italy which was called Great Greece, 
The Tarentines surrendered without delay. The Argyripians, with some of 
the cities also of Campania, sent offers of submission. And, in a word, all 
the neighbouring people began now to turn their eyes towards the Cartha- 
ginians ; who on their part were persuaded, that they should take even Rome 
itself upon their first approach. The Remans, on the other hand, not only 
renounced all hopes of being able any longer to retain the sovereignty of 
Italy, but were filled also with the greatest apprehensions with regard even 
to the safety of themselves, and their own proper country ; expecting that 
the Carthaginians would instantly arrive to finish their destruction. And as 
if fate itself had taken unusual pains to fill up the measure of their misfor- 
tunes, and had joined with their enemies against them, it happened, that not 
many days after this defeat, while the consternation still was fresh, the news: 
came to Rome, that the praetor that was sent into Gaul had fallen into an 
ambuscade, and was destroyed with all his army. 

In the midst however of these calamities, the senate had recourse to every 
measure that was practicable in order to preserve their country. They ha-» 
yanfued the people, and raised their drooping courage ; they provided all 
things that were necessary for the security of the city, and pursued their de- 
liberations with the greatest firmness ; as it appeared indeed not long after- 
wards in the event. For though the Romans were now plainly conquered 
And" depressed, and forced to yield to their enemies the whole honour of the 
war, yet, through the prudence of their counsels, and the inherent excellence 
of their government, they not only drove the Carthaginians out of Italy, and 
again recovered the sovereignty of that country, but within a short time af- 
terwards reduced beneath their yoke even the whole habitable world. Upon 
this account, having now finished the relation of all that passed hi Italy and 
Spain, during the hundred-fortieth olympiad, as soon as I shall have gone 
through the affairs of Greece, that were transacted likewise within the course 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. l§§ 



of the same period, I shall then treat expressly of the form and constitution of 
the Roman republic : for, as the subject is itself by no means foreign to the 
nature or design of history ; so I am persuaded also, that those especially who 
are employed in the affairs of government will find in it many things that may 
be highly useful, both in establishing and reforming states. 



BOOK THE FOURTH. 

CHAP. I. 

We showed, in the preceding booh, what were the causes of the second war 
between the Carthaginians and Romans, and what the manner in which An- 
nibal entered Italy ; and recounted also the several combats that ensued, to 
the battle that was fought at last near the city of Cannse, upon the river Au- 
fidus. We now go on to. describe the affairs of Greece that were transacted 
during the same period, and in the course of the hundred-fortieth olympiad ; 
but shall first, in a few words, remind the reader of the things that were men- 
tioned by us on the subject of this country in the second of our introductory 
books, and more especially of that which we there related concerning the for- 
tunes and condition of the Achaean republic ; because this state, within the 
compass of our own times, and of those which immediately preceded, has, 
grown to a very amazing height of strength and greatness. 

Beginning, then, from Tisaraenes, one of the children of Orestes, we re- 
marked, that the descendants of that prince reigned after him in Achaia, in di- 
rect succession down to Ogyges. That afterwards, the Achoeans changed their 
government to a democracy, which was instituted with great skill and wisdom ; 
and that tin's establishment was broken by the arts of the k'w.v of Macedon, 
and the people all dispersed into separate and independent towns and vil- 
lages. We then showed the time and manner in which they began again 
to unite together ; and what were the cities which associated themselves the 
first into the new confederacy. We also explained at large the measures 
that were employed, and the motives that were used, to draw the other cities^ 
to this union : and to engage, by degrees, the whole people of Peloponnesus 
to embrace the same common appellation, the same laws, and the sama 
single government. After this general view of the design, we then related 
in their order, though in few words,- the chief transactions that succeeded, 
t^ the final overthrow and flight of Cleomenes, king of Lacedzemon. And 
having thus given a summary account, in the way of an introduction to our 
history, of the events that happened in the world to the time in which 
Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus, all died together, we then promised to 
go on to the commencement of our history, and to begin with those trans- 
actions that were the next in order to the deaths of those three princes, and 
to the events which we had last related. 

i This period seemed to be, on many accounts, the best that I could choose 
for the beginning of my work. For first, as the memoirs of Aratus are 
here concluded, that which I shall now relate concerning the affairs of Greece 
may be considered as a regular and close continuation of his history. In 
the next place, the times which now succeed, and which fall within the 
limits of this work, are in part the very times in which we ourselves have 
lived, and partly those of our immediate ancestors. And from hence it hap- 
pens, that the things which I have undertaken to describe are either those 
which I myself have seen, or such as I have received from men that were eye- 
witnesses of them. For, in case that I had gone back to a more early period, 
and borrowed my accounts from the report of pessons who themselves had only 
heard them before from others, as it would scarcely have been possible that 
I should myself be able to discern the true state of the things that were then 



156 . GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU& 

transacted; so neither could I have written anything concerning them with 
sufficient confidence. Another, and indeed the strongest motive, by which 
I was inclined to choose this sera, was, that, about this time, fortune had en- 
tirely changed the lace of things in all the countries of the world at once. 
For it was now that Philip, the son of Demetrius, before he had arrived at 
perfect age, took possession of the Macedonian kingdom ; and that Achseus, 
who was sent to govern the country on this side of mount Taurus, resumed 
the rank and power of a sovereign prince. At the same time it happened that 
Antiochus, surnamed the Great, who was also extremely young, was raised 
to the throne of Syria, in the place of his brother Seleucus, who had died not 
long before ; that Ariarathes obtained the sovereignty of Cappadocia ; and 
Ptolemy Philopator that of .Egypt ; that Lyeurgus was elected king of Lace- 
daemon ; and lastly, that Annibal was invested by the Carthaginians with the 
command of their armies, and the government of the affairs of Spain, as we 
have before related. 

Thus, then, as the supreme dominion had fallen, in every state, into the 
hands of new kings and masters, it was reasonable to expect that a change 
so general must give birth to new commotions ; for this naturally happens in 
such circumstances ; nor did it fail now to happen. The Carthaginians and 
the Romans were soon engaged in the war which we have already in part de- 
scribed. At the same time Antiochus and Ptolemy contended together for 
the sovereignty of Ccele-syria. And Philip also, in conjunction with the 
Achseans, turned his arms against the Lacedsemonians and iEtolians. The 
causes of this last war were those which I am now going to relate. 

The iEtolians had been long dissatisfied, that they were forced to lire in 
peace, and at their own expense ; accustomed, as they had always been, to 
subsist upon the plunder of their neighbours, and slaves by nature to an 
tincontrolied and restless appetite, which both multiplied their wants, and 
«rged them on to rapine, as the only means by which they could be grati- 
fied ; so that they lived the life of wild beasts of prey, invading every thing 
within their reach, and making no distinction between friends and enemies. 
During the life-time, however, of Antigonus, their apprehensions of the 
Macedonians kept them quiet. But no sooner was this prince dead, than, 
despising the tender age of Philip who succeeded, they began earnestly to 
seek for some pretence upon which they might enter Poloponnesus with an 
army. For this province had, in former times, been the usual scene of all 
their violence and rapine, so they were persuaded that their strength in arms 
was far superior also to that of the Achasans. While they were revolving this 
project in their minds, chance itself conspired with their design, -and sup- 
plied the following means to carry it into execution. 

A certain young man, named Dorimachus, full o$the fire and eager spirit 
of his country, a native of Trichonion, and the son of that Nicostratus who, 
in defiance of the laws of nations, attacked the Beeotions by surprise, when 
they were met together in their general assembly, was about this time sent, 
in the name of the republic, to Phigaloa, a city of Peloponnesus, which stood 
upon the confines of Messenia, and was associated to the iLtolian govern- 
ment ; to secure, as it was then pretended, the city and neighbouring dis- 
trict. But the true design of his commission was, that he should carefully 
attend to all that passed in Pelopennesus. During the time of his con- 
tinuance in this city, being pressed by the importunity of some pirates, who 
resorted to him, and not able to support them with the means of any law- 
ful plunder, because the general peace was still subsisting, which Antigonus 
had established throughout all Greece, he at last permitted them to steal 
away the cattle of the Messenians, who were at time the allies and friends 
of his own republic. These men at first confined their robberies to the ex- 
treme borders of the province, and to the herds of cattle that were found in 
pasture there. But, in a short time afterwards, their insolence was raised to 
to great a height that they advanced far within jthe country, and forced' 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. i6f 



their entrance into the houses likewise ; making* their attack by night, when 
the people were under no suspicion, or fear of danger. The Messenians, in- 
censed by these proceedings, deputed some persons to Dorimachus, to de- 
mand redress. Dorimachus, who was by no means willing to condemn a 
practice which not only enriched the men that were acting under his autho- 
rity, but brought great advantage also to himself, who received a due propor- 
tion of all the booty that was taken, for some time paid no regard to these 
remonstrances. But, when the outrages were still continued, and the depu- 
tations also became more frequent than before, he at last declared that he 
would go in person to Messen°, and there render public justice to those that 
had any cause of complaint against the iEtolians. But when he arrived in 
that city, and the men that had been injured appeared before him, he treated 
some of them with the sharpest scorn ; others with rough disdain and haughti- 
ness ; and some with threateniugs and reproaches. And even in the very time 
of his continuance there, the same band of robbers, approaching close to the 
neighbourhood of the city, forced their way, with the help of ladders, into a 
house that was called the Farm of Chiron ; killed all those that opposed their 
entrance, and, having bound the rest in chains, carried them away, together 
with the cattle and the goods. 

The Ephori of Messene, who before were very greatty incensed, not only 
by the robberies that had been committed in their country, but still more 
also by the presence of Dorimachus, being now persuaded that the grossest in- 
sult had been added to their wrongs, summoned him to appear before the 
magistrates. In this assembly, it was urged by Sciron, a man whose probity 
had placed him in high esteem among the citizens, and who was one of the 
ephori of the present year, that Dorimachus should not be permitted to leave 
the city till the plunder had been first restored, and the authors likewise of 
all the murders that had been committed delivered up tu public punish- 
ment. The whole assembly seemed ready to assent to the justice of this pro- 
posal ; when Dorimachus, rising full of rage, declared, " that they were fools 
to think that this affront was offered to himself alone, and not rather to the 
whole republic of the iEtolians ; that what they had now attempted was a. 
thing so monstrous, that they could not, in reason, but expect that it must, 
soon be followed by such heavy vengeance as would be felt through all theur 
country." 

There was, at this time, in Messene, a man of base condition, named Ba- 
byrtis, who was strongly attached to all the interests of Dorimachus, and 
who so perfectly resembled him both in voice and features, that, if he had at 
any time been dressed in his cap and habit, he might easily have been mis- 
taken for him; and this Dorimachus well knew. As he continued, therefore, 
to insult the assembly with the same haughty language, Sciron, being unable 
to restrain his passion, it last cried out, " Tbinkest thou then, Babyrtus, 
that we shall pay the least regard either to thee or thy insolent threateniugs ?" 
Dorimachus then was silent ; and, being forced to yield to the necessity that 
pressed him, suffered the Messenians to exact full reparation for all their 
wrongs. But he returned back again to iEtolia so deeply wounded by this 
abuse, that, without any other kind of cause or pretext, he immediately em- 
ployed ail his pains to excite the war which afterwards was made against 
the Messenians. 

Ariston was, at this time, praetor of the iEtolians. But because he was 
vmable, through some bodily infirmities, to support the fatigue of arms, and was 
also very nearly allied in blood to Dorimachus and Scopas, he left chiefly to 
the care of the last of these the whole administration of the government. 
Dorimachus would not venture to propose in public to the iEtolians that war 
should be declared against the Messenians. For as there was no pretext for 
it that was worthy to be mentioned, it was manifest that all men would con- 
fcider such proceeding as the mere effect of his own resentment, on account of" 



36s GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



the affront he had received from Sciron. Resolving therefore to pursue a dif- 
ferent method, he endeavoured secretly to prevail on Scopas to approve of 
Bis design, and to concert measures with him for attacking the Messenians.. 
He represented to him that, by reason of the the tender age of Philip, who 
was now no more than seventeen years old, they were perfectly secure on the 
side of Macedon ; that the Lacedaemonians, in their sentiments, were far from 
being inclined to favour the Messenians ; and that, as the Eleans were hound 
t>y friendship and alliance to the JEtolians, their entrance into the Messenian 
territory would, on that account, be both safe and easy. He set also be- 
fore his view, what was likely indeed to be of the greatest weight in tqe mind 
<>f an iEtolian, the rich and valuable booty which they could scarcely fail to 
acquire from this invasion ; since the country was wholly unprepared to re- 
ceive an enemy, and was also the, only part of Peloponnesus that had remained 
onpillaged during the time of the Cleomenic war. He added likewise, that 
cinch an expedition would raise them high in the esteeauand favour of the 
JEtolians ; that, if the Achseans should attempt to oppose their passage 

-through their territory, they could have no reason to complain if force should 
be repelled by force ; and if, on the other hand, they remained inactive, there 
would then be nothing that could obstruct their progress ; and, in the last 
place, that even with regard to the Messenians, some pretence might be also 
<found for taking arms against them, since they had long ago embraced such 
•measures as were repugnant to the interests of the iEtolian government,. 

' whea they engaged themselves by treaty to assist the Macedonians and 
'Achseans. 

These arguments and motives, with others of the same kind and purpose, 
made so deep and forcible, an impression on the minds of Scopas and his 

- ;friends, that, not waiting to consult the general assembly of the iEtoliansy 
not communicating their intentions to the apocleti, or paying the least regard 
to any other of the forms which their government, upon such occasions, re- 
quired to be observed, following only the dictates of an impetuous passion, 
and guided by their own private judgement, they resolved to make war upon 
the Messenians, the Epirots, Achseans, Acarnanians, and the Macedonians. 
They immediately sent out some pirates upon the sea, who forced a, vessel 
which they met near the island Cythera, and which belonged to the king of 
Macedon, to return back with them to /Etolia, add there exposed to salt the 
shio, the passengers, and all the crew. After this exploit they equipped 
.some Cephalienian barks, and, sailing along the shore of Epirus, pillaged 
all the coast. They attempted also to take Thyreum, a town of Acarnania, 
by surprise. And having, at the same time, sent some troops, through private 
roads, into Peloponnesus, they made themselves masters of a fortress called 
Clarium, which stood in the very middle of the Megalopolitan territory. In 
this place, they exposed their plunder to public sale ; designing also to use 
the fortress as their citadel, from whence they might make incursions into alt 
the neighbouring country. But within some days afterwards it was attacked 
and stormed by Timoxenus, the praetor of the Achseans, assisted by Taurion, 
the Macedonian general, who was left by Antigonus in Peleponnesus, to 
watch over the interests of the kings of Macedon in that country. For 
though Antigonus was possessed of Corinth, which was yielded to him in the 

"beginning of the Cleomenic war, yet afterwards, when he had taken Orcho- 
menus by storm, instead of restoring it again to the Achseans, he chose to 
retain that town likewise as his own ; being willing, as I suppose, not only to 
be master of the entrance into Peloponnesus, but to be able also to controul 
the inland parts of the province as occasion should require. With this design 
he had placed a garrison in Orchomenus, and supplied it with all the neces- 
sary stores for war. 

Dorimachus and Scopas, having waited till the time was come in which 
Tiuaoxenus, the praetor of the Achseans, was just ready to resign his office, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 169 



and when Aratus, who was appointed praetor of the following year, had not 
yet entered upon the duties of his post, assembled all the vEtolians together 
at Rlnum ; and having provided the transports that were necessary, and 
equipped also the vessels of the Cephallenians, they embarked their forces, 
and passing over into Peloponnesus, began their march towards Messenia, 
through the territory of the Patroeans, the Pharaeans, and Tritaeans ; pre- 
tending still as they advanced, that they had no design to commit hostilities 
against any of the Achaean states. But the troops, unable to restrain their 
natural appetite, plundered and destroyed every thing within their reach. 
And when they arrived at last near Phigalea, they from thence fell suddenly 
and without reserve upon the lands of the Messenians ; unmoved by the 
alliance which had so long subsisted between this people and their own re- 
public, and regardless also of all the common rights of men. For so strong 
was their rapaciousness, that every other consideration was forced to fall before 
it. They wasted the country therefore at their leisure, and found no resist- 
ance ; for the Messenians dared not to appear in arms against them. 



CHAP. II. 

It was now the time, in which the Achaeans usually held a general council 
of the states, according to their laws. As soon therefore as they were assem- 
bled together at .Egium, the Patraeans and Pjiaraeans recounted all the 
wrongs and violence which they had received from the iEtolians as they passed 
through their territories. There were present also some deputies from the 
Messenians, who implored the assistance of the republic against an enemy that 
had thus attacked them in contempt of the most sacred treaties. The in- 
juries which the former had sustained did not fail to excite a proper indig- 
nation in the whole assembly, as the sufferings of the latter raised their pity. 
But that which appeared most insolent and monstrous was, that the jEto- 
lians, in violation of the treaties which even then subsisted between the two 
republics, had dared to take their passage through Achaia with an army, 
without any leave obtained, without deigning even in any manner to excuse 
or justify the action. Incensed therefore by all these circumstances, they re- 
solved that some assistance should be sent to the Messenians ; that the praetor 
should assemble the Achaeans together in arms ; and that the measures which 
should afterwards be directed, when the troops were thus assembled, should 
all be ratified and legal. 

Timoxenus, whose proctorship was not yet fully expired, and who had no 
great confidence in the Achaeans, because they had lately much neglected 
all their military exercise, resolved that he would bear no part in this intended 
expedition, and refused to draw together the troops. For, from the time 
when Cleomenes received his last defeat, the people of Peloponnesus, ex- 
hausted by past miseries, and persuaded also, that the peace which they now 
enjoyed would be of long continuance, had by degrees lost all attention to 
the affairs of war. But Aratus, being enraged to see the daring insolence of 
the ..Etolians, and sharpened likewise by the old resentment which he long 
had entertained against that people, entered upon the business with much 
greater warmth ; resolved to arm the Achaeans without delay ; and was im- ' 
patient to begin his march against the enemy. Having received, therefore, 
from Timoxenus, the puolic seal, five days before his own administration was 
legally to begin, he sent orders to the cities, that those who were of proper 
age should immediately appear in arms at Megalopolis. 

But before we proceed, it may perhaps be useful to inform the reader, in 
few words, what was the peculiar character of this magistrate : especial \y be- 
cause there was a certain singularity in his disposition, which well deserves to 
be remarked. 

VOL. 1. NO. 4. Y 



i?0 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



In general, then, Aratus was possessed of all those talents, which are re- 
quired to make a consummate leader of a state. His eloquence was persua- 
sive ; his reasoning and discernment just ; and his measures conducted always 
with due secrecy and caution. In the art of softening civil tumults and dis- 
sensions, in all the methods of gaining friends, and of fixing the affections 
of allies, he was excelled by none. Nor was he less to be admired, both 
on account of his dexterity in contriving snares and stratagems, to deceive 
and surprise the enemy, and for the boldness likewise and unwearied pains 
with which he carried them into execution. His abilities, indeed, in this 
respect, though shown in many other signal instances, cannot fail to appear 
in the most illustrious light, to those that will examine, with attention, the 
manner in which he made himself master of Sicyon and Mantinea ; the mea- 
sures which he employed to drive the iEtolians from Pellene ; and, above all, 
the secret management, by which he gained Acrocorinthus by surprise. But 
this same Aratus, when placed at the head of an army in the field, Jiad nei- 
ther capacity to form, nor courage to carry into execution, any projects; 
nor was he able to support the sight of danger. From hence it happened, 
that every part of Peloponnesus was filled with trophies, to record the battles 
that were gained against him : for at these times, he afforded always a most 
easv conquest to his enemies. Thus that variety, which is found from nature 
in the bodies of mankind, appears to be still greater in their minds. Nor is 
it in those things alone, which are different from each other, that men are 
seen to possess abilities very proper for the one, and ill adapted to the other ; 
but even in those of similar kind, the same man shall in some discover great 
wisdom and discernment, and be found to want the talents that are requisite 
for others ; on some occasions shall be brave and enterprising, but cold and 
cowardly upon others. These things are not paradoxes : but, on the con- 
trary, are known to happen every day ; and are clearly understood by those,, 
who view the affairs of men with due attention. There are some, who, in 
following the diversions of the field, encounter boldly with the fiercest beast, 
but basely lose all spirit, when they stand against an enemy in arms. Some 
again in battle acquit themselves with vigour and dexterity, in the way of 
single combat : but when they are formed together into ranks with others, 
they are found to possess neither force nor courage. The shock of the Thes- 
salian cavalry, advancing in close order to the charge, is such as can scarcely 
be sustained. Yet these same troops, as ofteu as they are forced to break 
their ranks, and engage man with man as place and circumstances may re- 
quire, lose all their spirit and activity. The iEtolians are in both respects 
just contrary to these. The Cretans have at all times shown no small dex- 
terity and skill, both upon land and sea, in forming ambuscades : in pursu- 
ing all the little arts of robbery and pillage; in concerting an attack by night ; 
and, in a word, in all things that are conducted by surprise, and in separate 
parties. But when they are drawn up in battle, and constrained to face the 
enemy in a set engagement, their hearts shrink back at once at the sight of 
danger. The Achseans, on the contrary, and the Macedonian troops, are 
serviceable on!y in regular and stated combats. But these examples are suf- 
ficient for my present purpose, and may serve as a caution to the reader not 
to call in question my veracity or judgement, if at any time I should be found 
hereafter ascribing to the same men opposite qualities, even in things of a 
like nature and resemblance. 

When the Achseans, in obedience to the decree that had been made, were 
all met in arms at Megalopolis, for from thence we began this last digression, 
the Messenian deputies appeared again before the assembly, and conjured 
them to revenge the wrongs which they had sustained. They desired like- 
wise, and with no small earnestness, that they might be received into the ge- 
neral alliance, and be enrolled among the other states. But the chiefs of the 
Achseans refused to yield to this request; declaring, that they had no power 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 171 

a 



^ — ■ ■ ' == —r 

to admit any new confederates, without the consent of Philip, and the rest 
of the allies. For that joint confederacy was still subsisting, which had. been 
solemnly made and ratified in the time of the Cleomenic war, between the 
Achteans, and 'E pi rots, the Phocoeans, Macedonians, Boeotians, Acarnamans, 
and Thessalians. They engaged, however, to assist them with their forces, 
on condition that those Messenians, who then were present, would leave their 
sons as hostages in Lacedaemon ; that no peace might be concluded with the 
iEtolians, without the knowledge and consent of the Achaeans. The Lace- 
daemonians, who had also raised some forces, as being included in the general 
confederacy, advanced as far as to the borders of the Megalopolitan territory, 
and there encamped ; designing rather to expect the event, and observe the 
motions of the rest that were in arms, than to discharge their office as 
allies. 

Aratus, having thus far accomplished his designs in favour of the Messe- 
nians, sent some messengers to the /Etolians, to inform them of the decree 
that had been made, and to command them instantly to leave the Messeniart 
territory, and not to enter Achaia, on pain of being opposed as enemies. 
When Scopas and Dorimachus had received the message, and heard likewise 
that the Achaeans were already met together in arms, they judged that, in the 
present circumstances, it would be far most prudent to yield obedience to 
this order. Having therefore dispatched some couriers to Cyllene and to 
Ariston the jEtolian prietor, requesting him to order all the transports that 
were then upon the coast to sail awa) r in haste to the island Phlias, in two 
days afterwards they began their march, carrying with them all the booty, 
and directed their route towards Elea. For the JEtolians had been always 
careful to preserve a close alliance with the Eleans ; that through their means 
they might obtain a secure and easy passage into Peloponnesus, as often as 
they were inclined to invade that province. Aratus, having remained two 
days at Megalopolis, and suffering himself too easily to be persuaded, that 
the JStolians had in earnest resolved to leave the country, dismissed the Lace- 
daemonians, and the greater part of the Achaeans also, to their respective 
cities : and keeping only three thousand foot, and three hundred horse, toge- 
ther with the forces that were under the command of Taurion, he began his 
inarch towards Patrae, with design to follow the iEtolians at a moderate dis* 
tance, during their retreat. When Dorimachus was informed that Aratus 
was marching close behind, and attending to his motions, being partly ap- 
prehensive that the Achaeans might fall upon him when he was just ready to 
embark, and take advantage of the disorder which would then be spread 
among the troops, and partly desirous also to obtain some fair occasion to ex- 
cite a war, he gave orders that the plunder should immediately be conveyed 
tinder a sufficient guard to Rhium, as if he had designed to embark from 
thence ; and himself at first followed with all the forces, to support the convoy. 
But after some time, he suddenly turned about, and directed bis march back 
again towards Olympia. And being informed that Taurion and Aratus, with 
the forces just now mentioned, were at this time in the neighbourhood of Clitor, 
and judging also, that it would be scarcely possible to embark his troops at 
Rhium without the hazard of a battle, he resolved to meet and engage the 
Achaeans, while their forces not only were so inconsiderable in their numbers, 
but were void of all apprehension likewise of any such attempt. For he had 
considered with himself, that in case he should be able to defeat and disperse 
these troops, he might then waste the country at his leisure, and embark in 
full security before Aratus could take the measures that were necessary for 
assembling the Achaeans again together : or on the other hand, if this magis- 
trate should be struck with terror, and refuse to venture on a battle, that h?s 
retreat would then be both safe and easy, and might be made also at the time 
which himself should judge to be the most convenient. With these sentiments. 



17* GENEKAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



lie continued his march forwards, and encamped near Methydrium, in the 
Megalopolitan territory. * ; 

The Achaean generals, when they received the news that the iEtolians were 
advancing fast towards them, showed in all their conduct so entire a want of 
skill and judgement, that no folly ever could exceed it. Leaving the neigh- 
bourhood of Clitor, they went and encamped near Caphyae. And when the 
iEtolians, marching from Methydrium, had passed just beyond Oichomeuus, 
they led out their forces, and ranged them in order of battle in the plain of 
Caphyae, having in their front the river which ran through the plain. Before 
the river, there were many trenches also of considerable depth, and not easy to 
be passed. The iEtolians, when they had viewed these obstacles which lay 
between them and the enemy, and saw likewise that the Achseans showed no 
small alacrity and impatience to engage, not daring to attack them in their 
post, as they had at first designed, marched away in close order towards the 
hills; designing to retreat to Oligyrtus ; .and thinking it sufficient, if they 
could now be able to retire, without being forced to risk a battle. The fore- 
most of their troops were already arrived upon the eminences, and the cavalry 
also, which closed the rear of all the army as they marched through the plain, 
had almost gained the hill called Propus, when Aratus sent away his cavalry 
and light-armed forces under the conduct of Epistratus, with orders that they 
should attack the rear, and endeavour to draw the enemy into action. But 
if this general had resolved to venture on a battle, instead of falling upon the 
rear of the iEtolians, when the whole army had already passed the plain, he 
rather should have charged the foremost of their troops, as soon as they began 
to enter it. For then, as the action would have passed upon a fiat and level 
ground, the iEtolians must have laboured under many difficulties, on account 
both of their arms, and of the disposition also of their troops, while the 
Achaeans, on the contrary, who were armed, and ranged in battle, after a 
different manner, might have exerted all the force that was peculiar to them, 
and have fought with manifest advantage. But now, having first neglected 
both the place and time of action that were most suitable for themselves, they 
resolved to begin the fight, when both were favourable to the enemy. The 
issue therefore of the battle was such as might be well expected to result from, 
so absurd a conduct. As soon as the light-armed forces had begun to skirmish 
with the rear, the vEtolian cavalry, keeping still their ranks, pushed on their 
way towards the hill that was before them, in order to join their infantry.. 
Aratus, not discerning the true intention of this sudden haste, nor considering" 
what it was that was likely now to follow, but being persuaded that these troops 
already fled before him, sent away some of his heavy infantry to support the 
light-armed forces : and then turning all the army upon one of the wings, he 
advanced with the greatest speed towards the enemy. The iEtolian cavalry, 
having gained the extremity of the plain, took their post close upon the foot 
of the hills, and drew together the infantry on both sides round them ; re- 
calling also those that were upon their march, who ran back with great alacrity' 
to their assistance. And when their numbers were sufficient for the combat, 
they advanced with fury, and in the closest order, against the foremost ranks 
of the Achaean cavalry, and light-armed troops. The action was for some 
time warm and obstinate. But as the iEtolians were superior in their numbers, 
and had begun the attack from higher ground, the Achaeans were at last com- 
pelled to fly. The heavy forces that "had been sent to support these troops, 
and who now arrived, in the same loose and broken order in which they had 
marched, being in part unable to discern the truth of what had happened, and 
partly because they were pressed by those that were retreating, were them- 
selves also forced to turn their backs, and accompany the others in theh* 
flight. And from hence it happened, that, though five hundred only of the 
Achaeans were at first defeated in the action, yet those that now fled together 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 173 

were above two thousand. The iEtoliaus seized the advantage, and pursued 
the enemy with the greatest ardour, and with loud shouts and cries. The 
Achseans, imagining that the main body of their infantry still kept the ad- 
vantageous ground in which they had left them in the beginning of the action, 
at first retired towards that place ; so that their flight for some time appeared 
to be no dishonourable means of safety. But when they saw that these troops 
also, having left their post, were advancing fast towards them, but in a long 
and broken train, one part immediately fled different ways towards the neigh- 
bouring cities ; while the rest, disordered and confused, fell against this very 
infantry as they approached, and spread such consternation among all the 
troops, that the route then became complete, without any efforts of the enemy. 
The cities, as we have said, afforded to many of them a secure retreat, especially 
Orchomenus and Caphya?, which were near. Without this advantage, the 
whole army would have been in the greatest danger of being all shamefully 
destroyed upon the place. 

Such was the end of the battle that was fought near Caypba?. The Mega- 
lopolitans, who had called together all their forces by sound of trumpet, 
as so6n as they heard that the iEtoliaus were encamped near Wethydrium, 
arrived in the plain, on the very day following the action. But, instead of 
finding their friends alive, and joining their forces with them against the ene- 
my, they had now nothing left, but to pay the last solemn duties to their 
bodies. Having collected together, therefore, the remains of these unhappy 
raen, they buried them in the plain, with all due honours. 

The Jitolians, when they had thus, beyond all expectation, gained the vic- 
tory by their cavalry alone, and light-armed forces, continued their route 
through the middle of Peloponnesus. And having, in their march, attempted 
to take by storm the city of Pellene, and plundered likewise all the Si- 
cyonian territory, they at last retired along the way of the isthmus. 

Such were the transactions, which afforded both the cause and the pretext 
also of that which was called the Social War: and the beginning of it may be 
fixed from that decree which was made soon afterwards at Corinth, upon the 
motion and advice of Philip, in a general assembly of the allies. 



CHAP. III. 

When the Aehceans, within a short time after the last action, were met to- 
gether to hold the usual council of the states, all the people in general, and 
every one apart, seemed greatly incensed against Aratus ; whose conduct 
was considered as the only cause of the misfortunes that had happened to 
them. Those, therefore, who led the faction that opposed the interests of 
this praetor, seized the occasion, to inflame the multitude still more against 
him; and charged him with such heads of accusation as were, indeed, too 
clear to be refuted. For first*, it was a manifest offence, that, before his 
own administration was begun, and while the supreme command was vested 
in another, he had forwardly engaged in such kind of enterprizes, in which, 
as himself well knew, he had before so often failed. A second, and a 
greater fault, was, that he had sent the Acheeans back again to their respec- 
tive cities, while the iEtolians still remained in the very heart of Pelopou-* 
nesus : though it was clear, from every thing that had been transacted, that 
Dorimaehus and Scopas had resolved to employ their utmost power to create 
disorders, and excite a war. They reproached him, likewise, with having 
ventured on a battle, when he was pressed by no necessity, and with forces 
that were so inconsiderable in their numbers : when,- on the contrary, he 
might have retired with safety to the neighbouring cities ; and, when he had 
first drawn again together the troops that were dismissed, might have 
marched to engage the enemy, if it should then have been judged expedient, 



174 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

In the last place, it was urged against him, as a fault which merited not the 
least indulgence, that, when he had resolved to risk a general battle, he 
showed so entire a want of skill and judgment in the conduct of it ; and 
that, instead of taking advantage of the plain, and making a proper use 
of his heavy infantry, lie", on the contrary, began the combat at the very foot 
of the hills, and with his light-armed ferces only; though these were cir- 
cumstances, which, of all others, were the most commodious for the enemy, 
and the best adapted to their arms and disposition. 

But, notwithstanding all the weight and importance of the charge, when 
Aratus stood up to speak, and reminded the people of the many former services 
which his country had received from his administration ; when he began to 
answer to the facts of which he was accused ;- affirming, that he was not 
the cause of the defeat ; and conjuring them to excuse any omissions or mis- 
takes, which had, perhaps, escaped him during the time of the action ; and, 
in general, to survey things, not with sharpness and severity, but with candour 
and indulgence ; the whole assembly made, at once, a generous effort in his- 
favour, and, by a sudden change of sentiments, turned all their indignation 
■upon the leaders of the faction that had formed the charge against him, afrd 
submitted to his sole advice and conduct the measures that were afterwards to 
be pursued. These things all belong to the hundred-thirty-ninth olympiad. 
We now go on to the transactions of that which followed. 

In this assembly, the Achaeans resolved, that some deputies should be 
sent, without delay, to the Epirots, Boeotians, Phocaeans, Acarnanians, and 
to Philip ; to inform them of the manner in which the iEtolians had twice 
entered Achaia with an army, in direct breach of treaties; to demand the 
succours, which, by the terms of the alliance, they were severally engaged 
to furnish ; and to desire that the Messenians also might be admitted into the 
confederacy. They ordered, likewise, that the praetor should draw together 
an array of five thousand foot, and five hundred horse, and march to the 
assistance of the Messenians, in case that their country should be again invaded : 
and that he should also regulate, with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians, 
the number of the troops, both infantry and cavalry, which they should seve- 
rally be obliged to furnish for the common service. " With such firmness did 
the Achaeans support their loss ; and resolved on no account to abandon the 
Messenians, or relinquish their first design. The deputies made haste to 
discharge their commission to the several states ; the praetor levied troops 
among the Achseans, agreeably to the degree ; and the Lacedaemonians and 
Messenians consented each to raise two thousand and five hundred foot, and 
two hundred and fifty horse. Thus the whole army was to consist often thou- 
sand foot, and a thousand horse. 

The iEtolians, on the other hand, as soon as they were assembled in their 
general council, formed the project of entering into a treaty of peace with the 
Lacedaemonians, the Messenians, and the rest of the allies ; designing, by this 
wicked and pernicious measure, to separate them from the Achaean?. At the 
same time they also made the following decree. " That they would remain 
in peace with the Achseans, on condition that they would depart from their 
alliance with the Messenians ; and, if this should be refused, that they would 
immediately declare war against them : l * a proceeding surely the most ab- 
surd that can be well conceived. To be at the same time the allies both of 
the Messenians and Achaeans, and yet to threaten the Achaeans with a war, in 
case that they received the Messenians into their alliance ; and, on the other 
hand, to engage that they would remain in friendship with them, if they would 
regard that people as their enemies. But from hence it happened, that, by 
thus forming projects that were in the highest degree both senseless and im- 
practicable, they left to their injustice not the least colour or support from 
reason. 

As soon as the Epiriots and king Philip had received the deputation from 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. Wl 



the Achaeans, they readily consented that the Messenians should be ad- 
mitted into the confederacy. But, with regard to the iEtolians, though at 
first, indeed, they were filled with some resentment on account of the late 
transactions, yet, because such proceedings were perfectly consistent with 
the manners and habitual practice of this people, as their surprise from. 
what had happened was of short continuance, so their indignation also soon, 
subsided, and they resolved that they would still remain in peace. So much 
more easily are men disposed to pardon a long and continued course of 
wickedness and violence, than any new and unexpected instance of injustice. 
For it was now grown to be the common custom of the iEtolians, to pillage 
continually all the parts of Greece, and to make war upon every state, 
without any previous declaration of it. Nor would they, at any time, submit 
to offer the least excuse or vindication of their conduct ; but even laughed 
at those who demanded from them any reasonable account, either of their past 
transactions, or of their future projects and designs. The Lacedaemonians, 
who so lately had received their liberty from the generous efforts of the 
Achccans and Antigonus, and who ought to have been restrained by that con- 
sideration, from pursuing any measures that were repugnant to the interests, 
of the Macedonians and of Philip, sent now in private to the iEtolians, and 
concluded with them a secret treaty of friendship and alliance. 

While the Achoeans were employed in drawing together their forces, and 
in regulating all things that related to the succours which the Lacedaemo- 
nians and Messenians had engaged to furnish, Scerdilaidas and Demetrius 
of Pharos, departing from Illyria with a fleet of ninety frigates, sailed be- 
yond Lissus, in direct violation of the treaty which had been concluded with 
the Romans. They first steered their course together to Pylus, and en- 
deavoured to take the city by storm, but were repulsed in the attempt. De- 
metrius then took with him fifty of the vessels ; and, sailing round the Cy- 
clade islands, he plundered some of them, and exacted large sums of money 
from the rest : while Scerdilaidas, with the forty frigates that were left, di- 
recting his course back again towards Illyria, cast anchor at Naupactus; 
trusting to the friendship of Amynas, king of the Athamanians, to whom he 
was allied in blood. And having, through the intervention of Agelaus, con- 
cluded a treaty also with the iEtolians, he engaged to join his forces with 
. them against the Achrjeans, on condition that he should receive an equal share 
of all the booty. Dorimachus, Scopas, and Agelaus, consented to the terms 
that were proposed ; and having, about the same time, conceived somes hopes 
Qf gaining the city of Cynaethea by surprise, they drew together all the iEto- 
lian forces, and, being joined also by the Ulyrians, began their march towards 
Achaia. 

In the mean time Ariston, the praetor of the iEtolians, remained quiet at 
home ; and, as if he had been ignorant of all that was transacted, declared 
aloud, that they had no design to make war against the Acheeans, but that 
the peace still subsisted between the two republics ; acting, in this respect, a 
most weak and childish part. For what can be more vain and senseless, than 
to hope to conceal the truth under the disguise of words, when it is shown in 
• the fullest light by the evidence of facts ? 

Dorimachus, passing through the Achaean territory, appeared suddenly 
before Cynaethea. This city, which was situated in Arcadia, had, for a 
long time, been distracted by intestine tumults ; which were carried to so 
great excess, that many of the citizens lost their lives in those disorders, and 
many were driven into banishment. They seized, in turn, upon the fortunes 
of each other, and made new divisions of their lands. At last, the faction 
that had embraced the interests of the Achtcans, having prevailed against 
the rent of the inhabitants, kept entire possession of the city, and received 
some troops for. their defence, together with a governor also, from Achaia. 
While things were in this condition, and not long before the arrival of the 



176 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



iEtoliaus, those that had been forced to fly sent a deputation to the rest, who 
remained masters of the city, requesting them to consent to terms of recon- 
ciliation with them, and to suffer them to return. The citizens, moved by 
their intreaties, sent some deputies to the Aeheean states, that the agreement 
might be made with the knowledge and consent of that republic. The 
Achseans readily approved of the design ; being persuaded that they should 
thus be able to retain both parties in their interests for the time to come. For, 
as the inhabitants that were masters of the city were already, in' all points, de- 
voted to them; so those likewise, who were now to be restored, could scarcely 
fail of being always sensible that they were indebted to the Achaeans for 
their safety and return. The Cynsetheans, therefore, dismissed the garrison 
and governor from the city, and brought back the exiles, who were in num- 
ber about three hundred ; having first exacted such assurances oT their fidelity 
as are esteemed the strongest and most sacred among mankind. But no 
sooner were these men admitted than, without even waiting till some pretext 
or occasion should arise, from whence they might renew the past contentions, 
they at once engaged in the black design of betraying their benefactors and 
their country. I am even inclined to think that, in the very moment when 
they touched the sacred victims, and made a mutual exchange of oaths and 
solemn promises, they were then revolving in their minds that impious pro- 
ject by which they had resolved so soon to insult the gods, and abuse the con- 
fidence of their fellow-citizens. For scarcely had they regained their former 
state, and were again associattd in the government, when they concerted mea- 
sures with the iEtolians for delivering the place into their hands ; nor scrupled 
to involve, in one common ruin, both those to whom themselves were just 
before indebted for their safety ; and that very citj^ also in whose lap they had 
been nourished. This treason was contrived and carried into execution in the 
following manner. 

Among the exiles, there were some that were of the number of those ma- 
gistrates who were called polemarchs ; whose office it was to shut the gates 
of the city ; to keep the keys in their own custody till they were again set 
open, and to guard the entrance also of the gates by day. The iEtolians 
had prepared their ladders, and stood in readiness to begin the attack. And 
when these polemarchs, having killed all those that were stationed with 
them upon the guard, had thrown the gate open to receive them, one part 
entered that way into the city, while the rest, with the assistance of their 
ladders, gained possession of the walls. The inhabitants were all seized with 
consternation, and knew not to what measures they should have recourse. 
For, as it was not possible to fix themselves in a body to the gate, because the 
danger threatened equally from the walls, so neither were they able, on the 
other hand, to employ their efforts against those that were entering along the 
walls, while the rest advanced with no less ardour through the gate. The 
/Etolians, therefore, were in a short time masters of the place. But, amidst all the 
violence and disorder that ensued, they performed one act of great and exemp- 
lary justice : for the traitors, by whoseassistar.ee they had been received into 
the city, were the first marked out for slaughter, and their goods first pillaged* 
The rest of the inhabitants were forced afterwards to undergo the same cruel 
treatment. The iEtolians then spread themselves through all the houses, and 
penetrated even to the foundations of them in search of plunder; destroying 
also many of the citizens in torture, whom they suspected to have concealed any 
portion of their wealth or valuable goods. 

Having thus fully satiated all their cruelty, they left a garrison in the place, 
and directed their march towards Lussi. And when they arrived at the temple 
of Diana, which stood between Clitor and Cynsethea, and was esteemed in- 
violable among the Greeks, they began to force away the sacred cattle, and to 
pillage every thing that was within their "reach. But the Lussiates, having 
wisely offered to them a part of the sacred furniture,, restrained their impious 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 177 

purpose, and engaged them to desist from any greater violence. They con- 
tinued their route, therefore, and came and encamped before Clitor. In the 
mean while, Aratus, having 6ent to Philip to solicit some assistance, made haste 
to draw together all the Achtean forces ; and demanded also from the Lace- 
daemonians and Messenians the troops which they had severally engaged to 
furnish. 

The iEtolians, when they had first in vain endeavoured to prevail on the 
Clitorians to join their party, and renounce the alliance of the Achaeans, made 
their approaches against the town, and attempted to scale the walls. But the 
inhabitants maintained their ground with so much bravery and firmness, that 
they soon were forced to abandon the design, and retreated back again towards 
Cynaetha ; plundering the country as they went, and carrying with. them also 
the sacred cattle which they before had left untouched. They at first de- 
signed to leave Cynsefha to the Eleans ; and when this people refused the 
offer, they resolved that they would keep it in their own possession, and ap- 
pointed Euripides to be the governor. But, in a short time afterwards, being 
alarmed by the report that some troops were just ready to arrive from Mace- 
don, they set fire to the city and then retired, and directed their march towards 
Rhium ; designing to embark their forces there, and to return back again to 
iEtolia. 

The Macedonian general Taurion, being informed of all the motions of the 
iEtolians, and of the outrages which they had committed at Cynaetha, and 
bearing also that Demetrius of Pharos had now brought back his fleet from 
the Cyclade islands to the port of Cenchrese, sent some messengers to that 
prince, inviting him to join the Achaeans ; to transport his vessels across the 
isthmus ; and to fall upon the JEtolians in their return. Demetrius, who 
had gained a very rich booty in his expedition, though he was forced at last 
to fly with some disgrace before the Rhodians, who had sent out a fleet 
against him, consented readily to this proposal, on condition that Taurion 
should defray the charge of transporting the vessels over. But when he had 
passed the isthmus, he found that the iEtolians had completed their return 
two days before. Having pillaged, therefore, some few places that stoo4 most 
exposed along their coast, he then steered his course back to Corinth. 

The Lacedaemonians perfidiously withheld the succours, which, by the 
stated regulation, they were bound to furnish, and sent only some incon- 
siderable troops of horse, with a small body of infantry, that thus they might 
appear not wholly to have slighted their engagements. Aratus also, ""with the 
Achaean forces, displayed rather, upon this occasion, the caution of a poli- 
tician, than the courage of a general: for so entirely was his mind possessed 
with the remembrance of the late defeat, that he remained still quiet, and at- 
tempted nothing. Scopas, therefore, and Dorimachus, accomplished, at their 
leisure, all that they had designed, and returned also back again with safety ; 
though their retreat was made through passes so strait and difficult, that a 
trumpet only might have been sufficient to gain a victory against them. 

With regard to the inhabitants of Cynaetha, whose misfortunes we have just 
now mentioned, it is certain, that no people ever were esteemed so justly to 
deserve that cruel treatment to which they were exposed. And since the Ar- 
cadians in general have been always celebrated for their virtue throughout all 
Greece ; and have obtained the highest fame, as well by their humane and hos- 
pitable disposition, as from their piety also towards the gods, and their vene- 
ration of all things sacred, it may, perhaps, be useful to enquire, from whence • 
it could arise, that the people of this single city, though-, confessed to be Ar- 
cadians, should, on the contrary, be noted for the savage roughness of their 
lives and manners, and distinguished by their wickedness and cruelty above 
all the Greeks. In my judgment, then, this difference has happpened from 
no other cause than that the Cynaetheuns were the first and only people 
among the Arcadians who threw away that institution, which their ancestor* 

VOL, 1. NO. 4. Z 



178 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS 



had established with the greatest wisdom, and with a nice regard to the natu- 
ral genius and peculiar disposition of the people of the country ; I mean the 
discipline and esercise of music; of that genuine and perfect music, which is 
useful, indeed, in eYery state, but absolutely necessary to the people of Ar- 
cadia. For we ought by no means to adopt the sentiment that is thrown out 
by Ephorus, m the preface to his history, and which, indeed, is very unworthy 
ot that writer; that music was invented to deceive and delude mankind." 
Korean* be supposed that the Lacedaemonians, and the antient Cretans 

2Ka2&3 IP A Y !°!? e S ood r T? lh Whe °' in the P Iace ^ trumpets, the^ 
SJSfthA •" 80u ? d .°f fl flute8 > f nd h™ony ofv,r Se , to animate their sol- 
diers in the time of battle; or that the first Arcadians acted without stron- 
necessity, who, though their lives and manners, in all other pointwve r3 
and austere, incorporated this art into the very essence of their ffovernmemfi 
and obliged not their children only, but the young men likewise^ Uhey Tad 
gained.the age o thirty years, to persist in the constant study and practice of 
it. L^or all men know that Arcadia is almost the only country in which the 
cnildren , even from their most tender age, are taught to sing in meagre the 
songs and hymns that are composed in honour of their godsend ZrZ and 
that afterwards, when they have learned the music of Timotheus and PhiW 
mis, they assemble once in every year in the public theatres, at the feat of 
Baccnus, and there dance with emulation to the sound of flutes- and cele- 
brate according to their proper age, the children those that aiV called thZ 
puerile, and the young men, the manly games. And, even in then- nri vat t 
feasts and meetings, they are never known°to employ any K bands ofmusc 
for tneir entertainment ; but each man is himself obliged to sinSurp For 
though tney may, without shame or censure, disown all knovvle^e of every 
other science, they dare not, on the one hand, dissemble or deny that °1 ev are 
skilled m music since the laws require that every one should* 1 e in tutted 
in it : nor can they, on the other hand, refuse to give some proof, of theh skill 
when asked because such refusal would be esteemed di^onourable They 
are taught also to perform m order all the military steps and motions to X 
sound of instruments ; and this is likewise practised eve^y year iu the theatres 
at the public charge, and ,n sight of all the citizens. ? theatres, 

Now to me it is clearly evident, that the antients by no means introducpd 

!£^:&s sfeffsJS *^=: 3 

the greatest part of all i&£g|££ For m" w"n b^Ta vl fiSJ/T^ 
some degree assimilated to "the climate in fbie .the S -'ro-1? if ,'" 
ascribed to any other cause that, in the several „a tio 1. Jf the'^U di Iliad 
and separated from each other, we behold so »ide a difference in comnl«ff 
features, manners, and customs The A r ,„^;.,.» n, , nce,n complexion, 
and soften that disposition wS "^^^Zt^ T^ ^i™^ 
the customs above described, appointed f^quenl - fes f L ^ h T> ^Z 

both sexes were required to celebrate wXi- ■ tl t *%?* ^f sacnhces > *»«<* 
boys with virgin^ and in B^^^M^^t^^t^ 

all these arts, though both Lira rind S,^ ° f &****> ^™g slighted 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 179 

Ihey sent an embassy to Lacedsemon, after the time of a dreadful slaughter 
which had been made among them. For, in every city of Arcadia, through 
which their deputies were obliged to pass, they were commanded by the pub- 
lic crier, instantly to be gone. The Mautineans also expressed even still more 
strongly their abhorrence of them : for, as soon as they were departed, 
they made a solemn purification of the place, and carried victims in proces- 
sion round the city, and through all their territory. 

This, then, may Insufficient to exempt the general customs of Arcadia from 
all censure ; and, at the same time, to remind the people of that province, that 
music was at first established in their government, not for the sake of vain 
pleasure and amusement, but for such solid purposes as should engage them 
never to desert the practice of it. The Cyneetheans also may perhaps draw some 
advantages from these reflections; and, if the Deity should hereafter bless them 
with better sentiments, may turn their minds towards such discipline, as may 
soften and improve their manners, and especially to music ; by whieh means 
alone they caa ever hope to be divested of that brutal fierceness, by which thejr 
have been so long distinguished. But we shall here leave this people, and 
return again to the place from whence we began our digression. 

The .Etolians, after those exploits in Peloponnesus, which have been de- 
scribed, were just now returned again in safety to their country, when Philip 
arrived at Corinth with an army to assist the Acheeans. Perceiving that the 
enemy was gone, he dispatched his couriers to all the cities of the alliance, de- 
siring that some persons might be sent to Corinth, to deliberate with him on 
the measures that were proper to be taken for the common service ; and him- 
self, in the mean while, began his march towards Tegea ; having received no- 
tice that the people of Lacedsemon were distracted by intestine tumults, and 
that much slaughter had been committed in the city. For the Lacedsemo- 
nians, who had been long accustomed to submit to kingly government, and to 
pay an unrestrained obedience to their chiefs, having now lately gained their 
liberty by the favour cf Antigonus, and finding no monarch at their head, were 
broken into factions, and all claimed alike an equal share in the administra- 
tion of the state. Among the ephori there were two, who made at first an 
open declaration of their sentiments ; and three, that entered without reserve 
into all the interests of the /Etolians ; imagining, that Philip, on account of his 
tender age, would be yet unable to controulthe affairs of Peloponnesus. But, 
when these last perceived that the vEtolians had left the country much sooner 
than their hopes had promised, and that Philip also was arrived from Maeedon 
before they had expected his approach, they began to apprehend that Adi- 
mantus, one of the former two, to whom thy had opened their intentions, and 
in vain endeavoured to draw him to their party, would not fail to carry to the 
^ing a full discovery of all that had been transacted. Having, therefore, se- 
cretly engaged some young men in their design, they published a decree, that 
"all who were of sufficient age should meet in arms at the temple of Minerva, 
to defend the city against the Macedonians. An order so strange and unex- 
pected soon drew the people together in crowds towards the temple. Adi- 
mantus, being deeply grieved at these proceedings, hastened to gain the head 
of all the assembly, and began to address the people in the Following manner. 
" When the iEtolians,". said he, " our declared and open enemies, had drawn 
their forces to the very borders of our country, it was then the time to publish 
these decrees, and to assemble the youth in arms ; and not when the Macedo- 
nians, our allies and friends, to whom we owe our liberties and safety, are ad- 
vancing with their king towards us." But, as he was proceeding in this 
harangue, some -of the young mev, who had been appointed to tne task, fell 
upon him with their swords. They then killed also Sthenelaus, Alcaineues, 
Thyester, Bionidas, with many others of the citizens. But Polyphonte?, 
and some few besides, having in time foreseen the danger, escaped safe t« 
Philip. 



ISO GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



After this transaction, the ephori, who were now sole masters of the govern- 
ment, sent some deputies to Philip, to accuse the citizens that were slain, as 
having been themselves the authors of the tumult : to request the king not to 
advance any nearer to them, till the commotion that remained from the late 
sedition had first subsided ; and in the last place to assure him,, that, with re- 
gard to the Macedonians, they were ready in all points to perform their duty, 
as justice or as friendship should require. The deputies feaving met the king 
near the mountain called Parthenius, discharged their commission to him, 
agreeably to these instructions. When they had ended, Philip ordered them 
to return immediately back to Sparta, and acquaint the ephori, that he de- 
signed to continue his march forwards, and to encamp near Tegea ; and that 
they should send to him to that place, without delay, some persons of sum- 
cient weight, to deliberate with him on the measures that were proper to be 
pursued in this conjuncture. The ephori, as soon as they had received these 
orders, deputed to the king ten citizens, of whom Omias was the chief; who, 
when they arrived at Tegea, and were admitted into the royal council, began 
also with accusing Adhnantus and his friends, as having been the authors of 
the late disorders. They promised that they would observe most faithfully 
the terms of the alliance ; and that among all the ttates that seemed most 
closely attached by friendship to the king, the Lacedaemonians should yield to 
none in the sincerity attd zeal with which they would at all times strive to ad~ 
Vance his interests. After these assurances, with others of' the same kind and 
purpose, th-e-4e-puties retired. 

The members of the council were divided in their sentiments- For some, 
'who were well acquainted with the secret of the late transactions, and who' 
knew that Adimantus and the rest had lest their lives, on account only of their 
attachment to the Macedonians, and that the Lacedaemonians already had re- 
solved to join the iEtolians, advised the king to have recourse to some exem- 
plary vengeance ; and, in a word, to punish this people with the same severity, 
as that with which Alexander punished the inhabitants of Thebes,, soon after 
he had taken possession of his kingdom. Others, who were of greater age, 
declared that such treatment woltid too far exceed the offence. They thought, 
however, that it was highly reasonable, that the men, who had been the cause 
of the late disorders, should be forced to bear some censure; that they stlould 
be divested of their offices, and the government be left to those, who were 
known to be well disposed towards the king. 

When tlrey had ail delivered their opinion, the king hiraself replied in the 
following manner ; if, indeed, we can at all suppose that such an answer was 
his own : for it is scarcely credible that a youth of seventeen years should be 
able to decide with such true judgement, in matters of so great importance. 
But when we are writing history, we are forced always to ascribe every final 
decision that is made "in such debates, to those who are possessed of the su- 
preme administration and command ; leaA'ing it however to the reader to sup- 
pose, that the reasons upon which such decisions are supported were at first 
suggested by the persons that are near the prince ; and especially by those 
who are masters of his private confidence. In the present instance, it seems 
most probable, that Aratus furnished the opinion which was now delivered by 
the king. 

He said then, " that in the case of those disorders and acts of violence that 
were at any time committed by the allies- among themselves, his duty might 
perhaps require him so far to interpose, as to acquaint them with his senti- 
ments, and endeavour to compose their breaches, and correct all that was 
amiss, by exhortations or by letters : but that such offences only, as were 
crimes against the general confederacy, required a general and a public pu- 
nishment; and that too from all the allies in common. That as the Lacedaemo- 
nians had been guilty of no open violation of the laws of this confederacy, but 
•n the contrary had engaged by the most solemn promises, that they would faith-* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBICJS. 181 

fully perform the conditions of it, it seemed to be by no means just or reason- 
able, that any kind of severity should be shewn towards them. He added 
likewise, that it could scarcely fail to draw upon himself the censure of man- 
kind, it' now, from so slight a cause, he should resolve to act with rigour 
against this people, whom his father not long before had treated with the ut- 
most gentleness, even after he had conquered them as enemies." 

As soon, then, as it was decided, that no farther inquiry should be made 
concerning the late transactions, the king sent Petraeus, one of his friends, 
together with Omias, to Lacedaeraon, to exhort the people still to adhere to 
the interest of the Macedonians, and to confirm anew the alliance by a mu- 
tual exchange of oaths. He then decamped, and returned again to Corinth ; 
having shown, in this generous treatment of the Lacedaemonians, such a 
specimen of his mind and inclinations as tilled the allies with the fairest 
hopes. 



CHAP. IV. 

The king, being now met at Corinth by the deputies from the confederate 
states, held a general council, to deliberate on the measures that were proper 
to be taken against the JEtolians. The Boeotians accused them of having 
plundered the temple of Itonian Minerva during the time of peace. The 
Phoeaeans, that they had armed some forces, with design to possess them- 
selves of A'mbrysus and Daulis. The Epirots, that they had wasted all their' 
province. And the Acarnanians, that they had attempted to take Thyreum 
by surprise. The Achaeans also related at large in what manner they had 
gained possession of Clarium, in the Megalopolitan territory ; wasted all the 
lands of the Patraeans and Pharaeans ; sacked the city of Cynoctha ; pillaged 
the temple of Diana at Lussi ; laid siege to Clitor ; made an attack by sea 
upon Pylus ; and by land likewise, being assisted by the Illyrians, had at- 
tempted to storm the city of Megalopolis, when it was just now beginning t& 
be tilled again with people, in order to reduce it to its late desolate state. 

When the council had heard all these complaints, it was, with one voice, 
agreed that war should be declared against the iEtolians. They made, there- 
fore, a decree, in which, having first recited the several accusations just now 
mentioned, they declared, " that they would immediately employ ail their 
force, in favour of the allies, to recover every city and every province which 
the jEtolians had usurped, from the time of the death of Demetrius, the 
father of Philip. That those who had been compelled by the necessity of 
times and circumstances to associate themselves with the iEtolian republic 
should be reinstated in their own proper government ; should possess their 
towns and territories free from garrisons, and discharged from tribute ; should 
enjoy their liberty entire, and be governed by r the customs of their ancestors ; 
and, in the last place, that the power and laws of the Amphictyons should 
be again restored, together with the temple likewise, and all the jurisdiction 
of which the iEtoliaus had deprived them." This decree was made in the 
hrst year of the hundred-fortieth olympiad, and from hence began the social 
war. A war founded altogether upon justice; and such as was indeed the 
fair and necessary consequence of the past disorders. 

The council then sent some deputies to all the allies, that the decree might 
be confirmed in every state, in a general assembly of the. people, and war be 
declared against the iEtoliaus iu every separate province. At the same time 
Philip informed the iEtolians also by a letter, that if there was any thing that 
could be urged in answer to the accusations with which they had been 
charged, they might now appear before the council, and enter upon their 
defence ; but that it was the very height of folly to persuade themselves that, 
because they had robbed and pillaged all the parts of Greece before. hostilities 



182 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



had been declared by any decree of their republic, the states must, therefore, 
quietly submit to the injustice ; or, in case that they prepared to punish it-, 
be considered as the authors of the war. 

The chiefs of the iEiolians, having received the letter, appointed at first a 
certain day upon which they promised that they would meet the king at 
Rhium I imagining that Philip would refuse to come. But when they heard 
that he was arrived, they sent a courier to acquaint him, that as the general 
council of the jEtolians was not yet assembled, they had no power of them- 
selves to enter into any deliberations in things which concerned the whole 
republic. 

The Achseans, as soon as they were met together at JEgium, "at the usual 
time of holding their assemblies, with, one voice confirmed the decree, and 
made public proclamation of war against the iEtolians. The king, who was 
present in the council, made a long discourse ; which the Achseans received 
with the preatest marks of favour, and renewed with him all the obligations 
of fidelity and friendships which they had made in former times to any of hiss 
ancestors. 

About this time also, the vEtolians, being assembled to elect their, magis- 
trates, made choice of Scopas to be their praetor ; the very man who was the 
cause of all the late disorders. What shall we say of this proceeding ? Not 
to declare war by any public decree, and yet to assemble the people together 
in arms, to invade and pillage every neighbouring state ; and, instead of pu- 
nishing the authors of this violence, to receive them with rewards and honours, 
and to advance them to the highest magistracies. Such a conduct must surely 
be considered as a most consummate piece of wickedness ; and such as cannot 
be expressed in auy softer language. The following examples may serve 
more clearly to explain the nature of this baseness. Whe Phcebidas had, by 
treachery, seized the citadel of Thebes that was called Cadmea, the Lace- 
daemonians punished, indeed the author of that dishonourable action, but suf- 
fered the garrison still to keep possession of the citadel ; and pretended that 
they had made full satisfaction for the injustice, by chastising him who had 
contrived the perfidy : whereas it was clear to all that the Thebans could be 
neither safe nor free unless the garrison also was withdrawn. The same people 
likewise, after a general peace had been concluded by Antalcidas, declared, 
by the voice of the public crier, that they restored to liberty all the states of 
Greece/ and left them to be governed by their own proper laws ; when, at 
the same time, they refused to remove the magistrates who presided, under 
their appointment, in every city. And afterwards, when they had subdued 
the Mantineans, their allies and friends, and forced them to dissolve their 
government, they pretended that they had done them no kind of wrong, since 
they had only taken them from one city to settle them in many. But surely 
it is no less a proof of folly than of wickedness for any people to conceive 
that, because themselves have wilfully shut their eyes, all mankind besides 
must be therefore blind. And indeed this conduct proved the source of such 
great calamities both to the Lacedaemonians and iEtolians, that those who are 
wise will on no account he ever led to imitate it, either in their private affair 
or in the public government of states. 

The king, when he had regulated all things with thu Achseans, retired 
back again to Macedon with his army, and began to make the necessary pre- 
parations for the war. The decree that had now been made had raised him 
high in the esteem not only of the allies but of all the people of Greece, who 
were filled with the noblest expectations from the proofs which he had already 
shown of gentleness and moderation, and of such true greatness as was worthy 
of a king. 

These things were all transacted at the time in which Annibal, having 
subdued the ether parts of Spain that were beyond the Ib,erus, was preparing 
to besiege Saguntum. Now, if the motions and first progress of this general 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 18* 



had, in any maimer, been connected with the affairs of Greece, we should have 
joined and interwoven the history of the latter in its due place and order, with 
the relation which we gave of the former in the preceding- book. But, because 
the wars that now broke out in Italy, in Greece, and Asia, had each a beginning 
distinct and peculiar to themselves, though they all were terminated in one 
common end, it seemed most proper that we should give also a distinct and 
separate account of each, till we arrived at the time in which they were blended 
first together, and began to move in one direction towards the same single 
point. By this method we shall be able to explain with greater clearness, 
not only the commencements of these wars, but all the circumstances also 
that belonged to their first connexion ; the time, and manner of which, to- 
gether with the causes of it, have already been in part remarked ; and shall 
afterwards unite them all in one common history. This connexion first was 
made in the third year of the hundred-fortieth olympiad, soon after the con- 
clusion of the social war. From the end of this war, therefore, we shall in- 
clude, as we have said, in one geueral history, all the events that followed ; 
intermixing them together in their proper place and order. But, before that 
period, we shall treat of every one distinctly m r taking care, however, still to 
remiud the reader which, among those transactions that are described in the 
preceding book, were coincident with the events which we are now going to 
relate. For thus the whole narration will be rendered easy and intelligible ; 
and the importance also of the subjects will appear with more advantage, and 
will strike the mind with a greater force. 

The king, during the time of winter, which he passed in Macedon, levied 
troops with the greatest diligence.; and made also the preparations that 
were necessary to secure his kingdom against the attempts of those bar- 
barians who lived upon the borders of it. He afterwards went to hold a pri- 
vate conference with Scerdilaidas. And, having trusted himself boldly in 
his hands, and pressed him to join in the alliance, and become a confederate 
in the war, he prevailed without much difficulty; partly by engaging to assist 
him in reducing certain places in Il'yria, and partly also by enumerating all 
those subjects of complaint which it was no hard task to find against the 
iEtolians : for the wrongs and injuries that are committed by public states 
differ in no respect from those that are done by private men, except only ia 
their number and importance. It may also be remarked, that societies of 
thieves and robbers are usually broken by no other means than because the 
persons of whom they are composed fail to render justice to each other, and 
are false to their own mutual engagements. And this it was that happened 
now to'the IEtolians. They had promised to allot to Scerdilaidas a certain 
part of all the plunder, if he would join his forces with them to invade Achaia. 
But when this was done, and they had sacked the city of Cynaetha, and car- 
ried away great numbers both of slaves and cattle, they excluded him even 
from the smallest share in the division of the booty. As his mind, therefore, 
was already filled with a sense of this injustice, no sooner had Philip slightly 
mentioned the wrongs which he had received, than he entered readily into 
all that was proposed, and consented to join in the confederacy upon these 
conditions : that twenty talents should be paid to him every year ; and that, 
on his part, he should arm thirty frigates, and carry on the war by sea against 
the JEtolians. 

While the king was thus employed, the deputies that were sent to all the 
allies came first to Acarnania, and discharged their commission there. The 
Acarnanians, honest and ingenuous, confirmed immediately the decree, and 
declared war against the iEtolians without any hesitation or reserve. And 
yet, of all the states of Greece, tins people might, most reasonably, have been 
excused, if they had sought preteuces For delay ; had been slow in making 
any declaration of their sentiments ; and, in a word, had altogether feared to 
draw upon themselves the vengeance of their neighbours: ior, as they were 



184 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



closely joined to the confines of the iEtoIiau territory, so their country likewise 
was open and defenceless, and an easy prey to every enemy. And, which 
•was still of more, considerable moment, the hatred also which they had shown 
against the JEtolians had involved them, not long before this time, in very 
great calamities. But men that are brave and generous will force all con- 
siderations to fall before their duty. And so strongly was this virtue rooted 
in the Acarnanians, that, though their state was extremely weak and feeble, 
they had scarcely in any times been known to swerve from the practice of it. 
In every conjuncture, therefore, that is dangerous and difficult, an alliance 
with this people ought by no means to be slighted, but should rather be 
embraced with eagerness ; since, among all the Greeks, there are none who 
have shown a warmer love of liberty, or a more unalterable steadiness in all 
their conduct. 

The Epirots, on the contrary, when they had received the deputies, con- 
firmed, indeed, the decree, but refused to make any declaration of war against 
the uEtolians, till Philip should have first declared it. At the same time they 
assured the deputies that were then present from iEtolia, that they .would still 
remain in peace. And thus they acted both a double and dishonourable 
part. An embassy was sent also to king Ptolemy, to request him not to assist 
the iEolians with any kind of supplies or money for the war, in opposition to 
Philip and the allies. 

But the Messenians, for whose sake chiefly the confederacy was formed, re- 
fused to bear any part in the war, unless the city of Phigalea, which stood 
upon the borders of their province, should first be separated from the iEtolian 
government. This resolution, to which the ephori of the Messenians, Oenis, 
and Nicippus, with some others of the oligarchical leaders, had forced the 
people to consent, was, in my judgment, the most senseless and absurd that 
could be taken in the present circumstances. It is true, indeed, that the ca- 
lamities of war are such as may well, be dreaded ; but not in so great a degree 
as that, rather than engage in it, we should submit with tameuess to bear every 
injury. For, to what purpose do we so highly prize an equality in govern- 
ment, "the liberty of speaking all our sentiments, and the glorious name of 
freedom, if nothing is to be preferred to peace ? Must we then approve of 
the conduct of the Thebans, who, in the time of the wars against the Medes, 
which threatened the destruction of all the states of Greece, separated them- 
selves from the common danger, and were led by their fears to embrace those 
measures which proved afterwards so fatal to them ? Or, can we applaud the 
sentiments of their poet, Pindar, who, in flattery to the judgement «of his 
country, advises all the citizens to place their only hopes of safety in repose ; 
and to seek, as he expresses it, 

f The radiant splendors of majestic Peace ?" 

For these sentiments, that appeared so plausible and specious, were found, in. 
the event, to be not less pernicious than dishonourable. In a word, as no 
acquisition is more to be esteemed than peace, when it leaves us in possession 
of our honour and lawful rights ; so, on the other hand, whenever it is joined 
with loss of freedom, or with infamy, nothing can be more detestable or 
fatal. 

Now the Messenians, whose counsels all were governed by a faction of a 
few, had always been misled by motives which respected only the private in- 
terests of the oligarchy, and had courted peace with much too great an 
earnestness. For though, in consequence of this attention to their ease, they 
had escaped the storms that seemed to threaten them in many difficult con- 
junctures, yet, on the other hand, while they persisted still unalterably in 
this conduct, the danger, which they ought chiefly to have dreaded, gained 
insensibly so great strength against them, that their country was at last forced 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 183 

to struggle with the worst calamities ; which might, indeed, have all been 
obviated, if they had been careful only to pursue the measures that were ne- 
cessary, with regard to the people that were situated nearest to them, and who 
were the most powerful likewise of all the states of Peloponnesus, or rather 
of all Greece ; 1 mean the Lacedtemoninns and Arcadians : the former of 
whom had shown an implacable enmity against them, even from their first set- 
tlement in the country, without being able to provoke them to any gene;ous 
efforts of resentment ; while the latter guarded all their interests with care, 
and treated them with favour and affection, which. they neglected to cherish 
or maintain. From hence it happened, that while these two states were en- 
gaged in war, either against each other, or with any more distant enemies, the 
.Messenmns, favoured by the times, passed their lives in full security and re- 
pose. But when the Lacedaemonians were at last wholly unincumbered from 
all other wars, and had leisure to employ their strength against them ; being- 
then unable of themselves to resist an enemy whose force was far superior to 
their own, and having neglected also to gain in time such firm and honest 
friends, as might have stood together with them under every danger, they 
were forced either to submit to the very vilest servitude, or to abandon their 
habitations and their country, together with their wives and children. And 
to this miserable alternative have they often been reduced, even within the 
times that are not far distant from the present. For my own part, it is my 
earnest wish, that the agreement which now subsists among the states of Pe- 
loponnesus may still continue to acquire new strength ; and that they may 
never want the advice which I am going to offer. But, if the bonds of this 
confederacy should ever be again dissolved, I am fully assured, that there ife 
no other way by which the Messenians and Arcadians can hope long to re-* 
main in the possession of their country, than by embracing the sentiments of 
Epaminondas, and maintaining still, in every conjuncture, the closest union, 
both of interests and counsels, without dissimulation or reserve. It may add, 
perhaps, some weight to my opinion, if we consider what was, in this respect, 
the conduct of these two states in antient times, Now, among many other 
things that might be mentioned, it is reported by Callisthenes, that the Mes- 
senians, in the time of Aristomenes, erected a column near the altar of Lycaean 
Jupiter, and inscribed upon it the following verses : 

" At last stern Justice seals the tyrant's doom^ 
Led by the gorls, Messenia's injur'dland 

Soon found the traitor through his dark disguise : 
Vain was his hope to shun Heav'n's vfengeful hand, 

Or veil his perj'ry from Jove's piercing eyes. 
All hail, the sov'reign king! the lord of fate! 
Ever propitious provej and bless Arcadia's state." 

From this inscription, in which they thus implore the gods to protect Ar- 
cadia, we may judge that the Messenians were willing to acknowledge, tha£ 
they regarded this province as their second country, after they had lost their 
own. And, indeed, they had good reason so to regard it ! for when they were 
driven from their country, in the time of those wars in which they were engaged 
under the conduct of Aristomenes, the Arcadians not only yielded to tnem 
the protection of their state, and admitted them to the rights of citizens, but 
gave their daughters also, by a public decree, to the young Messenians that 
were of age to marry. And, having made inquiry likewise into the guilt of 
their own king Aristocrates, who had basely deserted the Messenians in the 
combat that was called the Battle of the Trenches, they destroyed the traitor, 
and extirpated also all his race. But, without looking back to an age so far 
removed, that which happened about the time in which Megalopolis and 
Messene began to be inhabited, may serve fully to confirm the point which 1 
am labouring to establish. After the battle of Muntinea, in which the death 

VOt, I. NO, 4. • 2 A 



186 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



of Epaminoudas left the victory doubtful, the Lacedaemonians employed all 
their efforts to ex* hide the people of Messenia from the general treaty ; having 
flattered themselves with secret hopes, that they should soon become the mas- 
ters of that province. But the Megalopolitans, with all the states that were 
confederates with the Arcadians, supported the Messeni axis with so much 
steadiness and zeal, that they were received by the allies, and included in 
the peace ; while the Lacedaemonians alone, of all the Greeks, were them- 
selves excluded from it. This, then, may be sufficient to show the truth of 
ail that I have now advanced. And from hence the Messenians and Arca- 
dians may be taught to remember always the misfortunes that have been 
brought upon their country by the Lacedaemonians, in former times; and to 
remain so firmly joined together iii the bonds of mutual confidence and friend- 
ship, that they never may be moved, either by the dread of an enemy, or by 
any unreasonable love of peace, to desert each other in the time of danger. 
But we shall now return from this digression. 

The Lacedaemonians acted, upon this occasion, in a maimer not unsuitable 
to their usual conduct ; for they dismissed the deputies that were sent to 
them from the allies, without any answer. Such was the consequence of their 
late wicked and absurd proceedings, which had involved them in so great 
doubt and difficulty, that they knew not to what measures they ought now to 
have recourse. So true it is, that rash and desperate projects most frequently 
reduce men, in the end, to an utter incapacity, either to think or act. 

But not long afterwards, when new ephori were elected in the city, the fac- 
tion that had been the cause of the late disorders, and of the slaughter that- 
•was then committed, sent to the iEtoliaus, and desired that some person might 
be deputed to them in the name of the republic. The .ZEtolians consented 
readily to this request ; and, when their deputy, who was named Machatas, 
arrived soon afterwards at Lacedaemon, the men, by whose advice be had been 
sent, pressed the ephori that he might be allowed to speak in an assembly of 
the people. They demanded likewise, that some kings should be elected 
without delay, as the laws required ; and the empire of the Heraclidse no 
longer lie dissolved. The ephori, who were in every point displeased with the 
proceeding, but were too weak to resist the violence of those that drove it on ; 
and who apprehended also, that, in case they should refuse to comply with 
these demands, the young man might be engaged in some attempt against 
them, consented to allow an assembly of the people to Machatas : but, with 
regard to the proposal for restoring kingly government, they said, that they 
wou-ld deliberate together concerning it, at some future time. 

When the people were assembled, Machatas pressed them 5 in a long dis- 
course, to join their arras with the iEtolians. He boldly charged the Mace- 
donians with many accusations that were vain and groundless ; and, on the other 
hand, bestowed such praises on his own republic as were not less absurd 
than false. As soon as he had ended, the debates that followed were long and 
vehement. For some, supporting all that had been urged in favour of the 
JEtolvans, advised the assembly to accept the alliance that was offered : while 
others laboured, not less warmly, to dissuade it. After some time, however, 
u'hen the oldest men rose up to speak, and reminded the people, on the one 
hand, of the many favours that had been heaped upon them by Antigonus and 
the Macedonians, and, on the other hand, recounted all the injuries which they 
had received from Timseus and Charixenns ; when the iEtolians, with a nu- 
merous army, wasted all their country, led their people into slavery, and even 
attempted to take Sparta by surprise and force, having brought back the exiles 
to assist in the design ; the whole assembly was at once prevailed on to em- 
brace the sentiments that were most contrary to the iEtolians, and to remain 
firm in their alliance with the Macedonians and with Philip. Machatas, there- 
fore, returned back again to his country, without having obtained, the end of 
his commission. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 187 



But those who had been the authors of the former tumult resolved that 
things should not long remain in their present state. Having gained, there- 
fore, some of the young men of the city to their party, they formed a second 
attempt, which was, indeed, most horrible and impious. There was a certain 
sacrifice, of old institution in the country, in honour of Minerva; at which 
the custom was, that all the youth of the city should appear in arms, and walk 
in procession to the temple ; while the ephori stood waiting round the shrine, 
ready to perform the sacred offices. At the time, then, of this solemn festival, 
some of the young men that were armed to attend the ceremony fell suddenly 
upon the magistrates, as they were busied in the sacrifice, and slew them. 
Yet such was the sanctity of this temple, that it had afforded always an in- 
violable refuge even to men that were condemned to die. But so little was it 
now respected by these daring and inhuman wretches, that they made no 
scruple to pollute the venerable place with the blood of all the ephori, and to 
kill them even at the very altar, and round the bacred table of the goddess. 
Afterwards, that they might fully accomplish all their purpose, they killed also 
Gyridas, with others of the oldest men. And, having forced the rest, that 
were averse to their designs, to retire from the city, they chose new epl.ori 
from thei rown faction, and immediately concluded an alliance with the Mto- 
lians. The cause of all this violence was partly their hatred of the Achseans ; 
partly their ingratitude towards the Macedonians; and in part, likewise, their 
senseless disregard of all mankind. To which we may also add, what, indeed, 
was of the greatest weight, the affection which they still retained for Cleo- 
menes, and the constant expectation which they cherished, that this prin.c^ 
would return to them again in safety. Thus it is that men who are ac- 
quainted with the arts of life, and whose manners are gentle and engaging, 
not only win the esteem and affection of mankind when they, are present with 
them ; but, even in the time of long and distant absence, leave behind them' 
such strong sparks of inclination and desire, as are not easily extinguished. 
For, not to mention other circumstances, during three whole years which now 
had passed since Cleomenes was forced to desert his kingdom, the Lacedae- 
monians, though in other points their state was still administered according 
to the antient laws, had shown not even the least desire to appoint other 
kings* But no sooner had the news of his death arrived at Sparta, than both 
the people and the ephori resolved that some should be elected without delay. 
The ephori, therefore, who belonged, as we have said, to the faction that Lad 
caused the late disorders, and concluded an alliance with the iEtolians, made 
choice of one who had a clear and uncontested right to bear the office. This 
was Agesipolis, who had not yet arrived, indeed, at perfect age, but was the 
son ef Agesipolis, whose father Cleombrotus, when Leonidas was driven from 
Sparta, had succeeded to the kingdom, as being the next in blood to that 
prince. At the same time they named, as tutor to the king, Cleomenes, who 
was the son also of Cleombrotus, and brother of Agesipplis. But with regard 
to the other royal house, though there were now two sons remaining from a 
daughter of Hippomedon, by Archidamus the son of Eudamidas ; and 
though Hippomedon himself was still alive, who was the son of Agesila'us, and 
grandson of Eudamidas ; and though there were many others also that were 
allied in a more remote degree to the branches of this family ; yet all their 
claims were disregarded, and Lycurgus was advanced to be the other king ; 
among whose ancestors there w^as nwie that ever had possessed the regal dignity. 
But, by giving only a single talent to each of the ephori, he became at once a 
descendant from the race of Hercules, and a king of Sparta. So easy often- 
times is the purchase even of the greatest honours. But from hence it hap- 
ened, that not their children, or remote posterity, b'ut themselves who had 
made the choice, were the first that felt the punishment that was due to their 
imprudence. 

Machatas, being informed of all that had been done in Sparta, returned 



188 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

back again to that city, and pressecl the ephori and the kings to begin the 
war without delay against the Achseans. He represented to them, that this 
■was the only measure by which they could hope effectually to break all con- 
tention, and defeat the attempts of those who, both in Lacedaemon and in 
iEtolia likewise, were still labouring to obstruct the alliance. And having 
thus, without great difficulty, accomplished his design, and engaged these 
foolish magistrates to approve of all that was proposed, he went back again 
to his own country. Lycurgus then drew together a body of troops, and 
having added to them also some of the forces of the city, he fell suddenly 
upon the Argian territory, before the people, who were persuaded that the 
peace still subsisted, had taken any measures for their security or defence. 
He made himself master, therefore, in the very first assault, of Polichna, 
Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta. He endeavoured also to take by storm 
Glympes and Zarax, but was repulsed in the attempt. ^After these exploits 
the Lacedaemonians made public proclamation of the war. The Eleans also 
were prevailed on by Machatas, who repeated to them the same discourse 
which he had made at Lacedaemon, to turn their arms against the Achaeans. 
And thus the /Etolians, finding that all things had conspired with their de- 
signs, entered upon the war with alacrity and confidence ; while the Achaeans, 
on the contrary, were dejected and distressed. For Philip, upon whom their 
chief strength and hopes were founded, had not yet completed all his prepa- 
rations. The Epirots still formed pretences for delay ; the Messenians re- 
mained inactive ; and, lastly, the iEtolians, being thus favoured by the sense- 
less conduct of the Lacedaemonians and Eleans, had already, as it were, in- 
closed them upon every side with war. 

The praetorship of Aratus was just now ready to expire, and his son Aratus 
was appointed to succeed him. The iEtolian praetor, Scopes, had performed 
about half the course of his administration. For the iEtolians were accus- 
tomed to elect their magistrates immediately after the time of the autumnal 
equinox; and the Achaeans at the rising of the Pleiades. As soon then as 
the younger Aratus had entered upon the duties of his office, the spring, 
being pow advanced, alt things every where began at once to hasten into 
action. For it was now that Annibal was preparing to besiege Saguntum, 
and that the Romans sent an army into Illyria, to chastise Demetrius ; that 
Antiochus, having gained possession, by the treachery of Theodotus, of 
Tyre and Ptolemais, resolved to usurp the sovereignty of Coele-syria ; and 
that Ptolemy? on the other hand, drew together all his forces to oppose him. 
At the same time Lycurgus, following in his conduct the example of Cleo- 
menes, laid siege to Athenaeum in the Megalopolitan territory. The 
Achaeans collected a numerous body of mercenary troops, both infantry and 
cavalry, to secure their country from the war that was ready to surround 
them ; and Philip also began his march from Macedon, at the head of ten 
thousand Macedonians heavy-armed, five, thousand Peltastae, and eight hun-j 
dred horse. And lastly, while all these great and important armaments were 
thus ready to be carried into action, the Rhodians likewise began their war 
upon the people of Byzantium, from the causes which I am now going to 
relate. 



CHAP. V. 

Byzantium, of all the cities in the world, is the most happy in its situation 
witfy respect to the sea ; being not only secure on that side from all enemies, 
but possessed also of the means of obtaining every kind of necessaries in the 
geatest plenty. But with respect to the land, there is scarely any place that 
has so little claim to these advantages. With regard to the sea, the Byzan- 
tines, standing close upon the entrance of the Pontus 3 command so abspr? 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 189 

lutely all that passage; that it is not possible for any merchant to sail through 
it, or return, without their permission ; and from hence they are the masters 
of all those commodities which are drawn in various kinds from the countries 
that lie round this sea, to satisfy the wants or the conveniences of other men. 
For among the things that are necessary for use, they supply the Greeks with 
leather, and with great numbers of very serviceable slave*. And with regard 
to these that are esteemed conveniences, they send honey and wax, with all 
kinds of seasoned and salted meats; taking from us in exchange our own 
superfluous commodities, oil, and every sort of wine. They sometimes also 
furnish us with corn, and sometimes receive it from vis, as the wants of either 
may require. IVow it is certain that the Greeks must either be excluded 
wholly from this commerce, or be deprived at least of all its chief advantages, 
if ever the Byzantines should engage in any iil designs against them, and be 
joined in friendship with the barbarous people of Galatia, or rather with those 
of Thrace ; or even indeed if they should ever be disposed to leave the 
country. For as well by reason of the extreme narrowness of the passage, as 
from the numbers also of those barbarians that are settled round it, we never 
should be able to gain an entrance through it into the Pontus. Though the 
Byzantines, therefore, are themselves possessed of the first and best advan- 
tages of this happy situation, which enables them to make both an easy and 
a profitable exchange of their superfluous commodities, and to procure in 
return, without pain or danger, whatever their own lands fail to furnish; yet 
since, through their means chiefly, other countries also are enabled, as we 
have said, to obtain many things that are of the greatest use ; it seems reason- 
able that they should be regarded always by the Greeks as common bene- 
factors, and receive not only favour and acknowledgements, but assistance 
likewise to repel all attempts that may be made against them by their bar- 
barous neighbours. 

But as this city is placed a little beyond the limits of those countries which 
are most usually frequented by us ; and because the nature and peculiar ex- 
cellence of its situation have hitherto, upon that account, remained almost 
unknown ; it may, perhaps, be useful to explain at large the causes to which 
it is indebted for those great advantages which it enjoys. For since all men 
are not able to obtain the opportunity which is first to be desired, of viewing 
with their eyes the things that are singular and worthy of their observation in 
any distant country, 1 could wish, however, that at least they might be taught 
to gain some right conception of them, and even to form such an image of 
them in their minds as should bear a near resemblance to Ihe truth. 

That then which is called the Pontus contains in its circumference almost 
twenty-two thousand stadia. It has two mouths, diametrically opposite to 
each other ; one, which opens into the Propontis ; and the other on the side 
of the Palus Maeotis, whose circumference includes about eight thousand 
stadia. These beds receive the waters of many large rivers, which flow into 
them from Asia; and of others likewise, more in number, and more consi- 
derable in their size, that come from Europe. The Maeotis, being filled by 
these., discharges them again, through the mouth last mentioned, into the 
Pontus, and from thence they still pass forwards through the other mouth 
into the Prooontus. The mouth on the side of the Maeotis is called the 
Cimmerian Bosphorus. It contains about sixty stadia in length, and about 
thirty in its breadth ; and is, in every part, of a very inconsiderable depth. 
The mouth of t/)e Pontus, on the opposite side, is called the Thracian Bos- 
phorus ; and includes in length a hundred and twenty stadia ; but the breadth 
of it is unequal. This aiouth, beginning on the side of the Propontis, at 
that space which lies between Chalcedon and Byzantium, whose breadth is 
about fourteen stadia, from tkence extends towards the Pontus, and is ended 
at a place called Hieron ; in which Juson, at his return from Colchis, is said 
first to have offered sacrifice to the twelve gods. This place though it be 



1.90 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



g* M B KMW mUg-^t- lTBg?^' XX3£XZ&!Z3£lL Z3S^S£'^^SS a^nK^B!VS SBSt!!^ BI . t 9' !'^fl^ ;i - 



■situated in Asia, is not far removed from Europe ; being distant about twelve 
stadia only from the temple of Serapis, which stands opposite to it upon 
the coast of Thrace. 

There are two causes, to which it must be ascribed, that the Maeotis and the 
Pontus discharge their waters in continual flow from their respective beds. 
The first, which is obvious and clear to all, is, that when many rivers fall into 
a bed, whose limits are fixed and circumscribed, if no opening should be 
found through which they may be again discharged, the waters, as they are 
more and more increased, must still rise to a greater height, till at last they 
overflow their bounds, and run to fill a larger space than that into which 
they were at first received ; but, on the other hand, if there be any free and 
open passage through which they may be allowed to flow, then all that is su- 
perfluous and redundant will, of necessity, be discharged that way. The 
other cause is the great quantity of earth and various matter, which the rivers 
briug down with them after heavy rains. For from hence large banks are 
formed, which press and elevate" the waters, and force them in like manner 
to direct their course forwards through the mouths that are open to receive 
them. And as these banks are formed continually, and the rivers also continue 
still to enter, in regular and constant flow, the efflux of the waters must be 
constant likewise, without any stop or intermission. 

These then are the true causes, from whence the waters of the Pontus are 
continually flowing from their beds ; causes, not derived from the report of 
merchants, but founded upon fact and nature; which afford indeed, in all 
inquiries, the surest and most convincing evidence. But since we have ad- 
vanced so far in this digression, instead of being satisfied with that hasty ne- 
gligence, with which those who hitherto have treated of these subjects must 
almost all be charged, let us endeavour rather, not only to describe with ac- 
curacy the effects that are produced, but to add such a demonstration also of 
the causes from whence they severally arise, as may leave nothing doubtful or 
obscure. For in the present times, in which all parts of the earth are become, 
accessible either by land or sea, we ought by no means to have recourse, in 
things that are unknown, to the fabulous reports of poets and mythologists, 
and thus vainly labour to establish dark and disputable points, by a kind of 
testimony, which, as Heraclitus has remarked, deserves no credit ; but should 
be careful rather to rest the whole authority of that which we relate upon 
such facts alone as are drawn from the actual view and real knowledge of the 
places, which we at any time may take occasion to describe. 

I say, then, that both the Palus Maeotis and the Pontus have, for a long 
time past, received great quantities of earth and matter, which are still 
heaped together; and by which, in the course of time, their beds must be 
entirely filled, unless some change should happen in the places, or the 
rivers cease to bring down these impediments. For since-time is infinite, 
but the limits of these beds circumscribed and fixed; it is manifest, that 
any such accession, how small soever, if it be constant only and never discon- 
tinued, must in the end be sufficient for this purpose. Nor is it possible, in- 
deed, that it should ever happen otherwise in nature, but that when any- 
thing, which itself is finite, continues still, in the course of infinite suc- 
cession, to receive any new supply, or to Suffer, any constant diminution, 
it must in the end arrive at its fullest possible increase, or, on the other hand, 
be wasted and destroyed; even though the addition, or the loss, should be 
made by the least conceivable degrees. But since it is not any small and in- 
considerable portion, but on the contrary, a very great quantity of matter, 
that is poured continually into these two beds, the consequence, of which we 
are speaking, must be considered, not as a remote event, but rather as one 
that is likely very soon to happen. I might almost say that it has already 
happened. sFor the Maeotis is indeed so nearly filled, that in most parts of it. 
the water scarcely exceeds the depth of fifteea or of twenty feet : so that large 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 191 



vessels cannot pass securely through it without a pilot. We may also 
add. that the Mieotis, as all writers have declared, was antiently a sea, and 
flowed intermingled with the Pontus, whereas at this time it is known to be 
a sweet nnd stagnant lake ; the waters of the Pontus being still forced back- 
wards, and excluded from it, by the banks of sand; while the rivers continue 
stdl to enter, and possess all the space. 

The same event must happen likewise in the Pontus. And indeed this 
also has in part already happened : though, by reason of the largeness of the 
bed, there are few that have yet perceived it. But a slight degree of attention 
will even now clearly show the truth of this opinion. For the Ister, which flow& 
from Europe, and dischargesitself into the Pontus by many mouths, has already, 
with the sand and other matter which itbringsdownwith it, formed a bank which 
is called by the seamen Stethe, of almost a thousand stadia in its length, and at 
the distance of one day's course from land ; against which the vessels that 
pass through the Pontus, as they are sailing in mid-sea, often strike unwarily 
in the night. The cause to which it must be ascribed, that this bank, in- 
stead of being settled near the shore, is pushed forward to so great a distance 
from it, is plainly this which follows. As long as the rivers retain so much of 
their impetuosity and force as is sufficient to surmount the resistance of the 
sea, and to make it yield its place, so long likewise, the sand, and every 
thing besides that is brought down with them, must still be driven forwards, 
and not suffered either to stop or to subside. But when the violence and ra- 
pidity of the current are once checked and broken by the depth and quantity 
of the opposing waters, then the heavy earth, which before was wafted in the 
stream, is by its own nature sunk towards the bottom, and settled there. 
And from hence it happens, that those banks o-f sand, which are formed by 
large and rapid rivers, are thrown together either at a distance from the 
shore, or in some deep water near it : while those, on the contrary, that are 
brought down by small and gentle streams, lie close to the very entrance of 
the mouths, from whence they are discharged. This remark may be con- 
firmed, by that which is known to happen after the fall of strong and violent 
rains. For at those times, even the smallest rivers, having been once enabled 
to surmount the resistance of the waters at their entrance, force their way far 
into the sea, and still drive the sands before them, to a greater or more mo- 
derate distance, in proportion to their respective strength and foree. 

With regard to that which we have affirmed, of the size and vast extent of 
that bank which was just now mentioned, as well as of the great quantities hi 
general both of stones, of wood, and of earth, which are conveyed continually 
into the Pontus by these rivers, there is no man surely so weak in judgment^. 
as to entertain any kind of doubt concerning the possibility of the facts. For 
we see that torrents, even not the most considerable in strength or violence,. 
open deep trenches for their passage, and force their way even through the 
midst of mountains, carrying with them every kind of "matter, earth, and 
stones ; and so covering and filling up the countries over which they pass* 
that they are scarcely known to be the same, having assumed a face far dif- 
ferent from their own. It cannot therefore be thought incredible or strange, 
that rivers of the largest size, and which also flow continually, should pro- 
duce the effects which we have above described ; and roll together such vast 
quantities of matter, as must in the end entirely fill the Pontus. For I speak 
not of it, as an event that is barely probable, but as of one that cannot fail 
to happen ; of which this circumstance may also serve as a kind of antecedent 
proof. As much as the waters of the Meeotis are now sweeter than the Pontus, 
so much sweeter also is the latter than the waters of our sea. Now, from 
hence we may conclude, that when the time, in which the Mseotis was com? 
pletely tilled, and that which may be requisite for filling up the Pontus, 
shall stand in the same proportion to each other as the different greatness of 
their respective beds, the. latter- likewise will then become a fresh and stand- 



im GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



ing lake, as the former is now known to be. But this indeed will happen so 
jnuch sooner also in the Pontus, as the rivers which it receives are more in 
number tlian those that fall into the Mseotis, and of larger size. 

This then may be sufficient to satisfy the doubts of those who are unwilling' 
to believe, that the Pontus is now continually receiving a large increase of 
matter within its bed: and that in the course of time it must be entirely 
filled, and this great sea become a lake and stagnant marsh. From these 
reflections we m^iy also learn to be secure against all the monstrous fictions 
and lying wonders which usually are reported to us by those that sail upon, 
the sea ; and no longer he compelled through ignorance to swallow greedily 
like children every senseless tale : but, having now some traces of the truth 
impressed upon our minds, may be able to form always some certain judge- 
inent, by which we may distinguish fact from falsehood. We now return 
to describe the situation of Byzantium, from whence we made this digression,, 
The strait, which joins the Pontus with the Propontis, contains in length 
a hundred and twenty stadia, as we have already mentioned'. The extreme 
limits of it are, on the one side towards the Pontus, a place called Hieron ; 
and on the other, towards the Propontis, that space that lies between By- 
zantium and Chalcedon. Between these two boundaries there is a promon- 
tory called Hermseum, which advances far into the sea. It stands on the side 
of Europe, in the most narrow part of all the strait: for the distance of it 
from the coast of Asia does not exceed five stadia. It was in this place that 
Darius is reported to have laid a bridge across the sea, in his expedition 
against the Scythians. Now the water, coming from the Pontus, at first 
flows on in the same uniform and unbroken course, because the coast on 
either side is smooth and equal. But as it approaches near Hermaeum, being 
now inclosed, as we have said, in the most narrow part of all the strait, and 
driven with violence against this promontory, it is suddenly struck back and 
forced over to the opposite shore of Asia ; from thence it again returns to the 
side of Europe, and breaks against the Hestisean promontories. From these 
again it is once more hurried back to Asia, to the place called Bos, where Io- 
is fabled by the poets to have first touched the land when she passed this 
strait. And lastly, falling back again from Bos, it directs its course towards 
Byzantium, and there breaking into eddies a small part of it winds itself into 
a pool, which is called^ the Horn, while the rest and greater part flows away 
away towards Chalcedon, upon the opposite shore, which, however, it in vain 
attempts to reach ; for as the strait is, in this part, of a greater breadth, and 
because the strength also of the current has already been so often broken, 
jt is now no longer able to flow, and to return in short and sharp angles as 
before, but falling away obliquely from Chalcedon, takes its course forwards 
along the middle of the strait. 

Now from thence it happens, that Byzantium, in point of situation, pos°» 
sesses great advantages of which Chalcedon is entirely destitute ; though, 
when we only take a view of these two cities, the}^ appear to be in this 
respect alike and equal. But the truth is, that a vessel sailing towards 
Chalcedon, cannot gain the port without the greatest difficulty ; while, on the 
other hand, the current itself will waft us, even whether we will or not, into the 
harbour of Byzantium. For thus when any vessels attempt to pass from 
Chalcedon to Byzantium, as the current will not suffer them to cross the 
Strait in a direct and even line, they first steer obliquely towards Bos and 
Chrysopolis, which last city was in former times possessed by the Athenians, 
who, by the advice of Alcibiades, first exacted there a certain impost from 
all vessels that sailed into the Pontus ; and from thence, committing them- 
selves at once to the current of the water, they are conveyed without any pain 
or difficulty to Byzantium. Nor is the navigation less favourable and com- 
modious, on the other side also of this city ; for whether we are sailing from 
the Hellespont towards Byzantium before a (southern wind, by taking our 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 193 

. u. \» w i 1 1 1 i I. i ii i • m am "■*-* 

route along the shore of Europe, we perform the voyage with ease : or whe- 
ther, oh the contrary, we are carried by a northern gale from Byzantium to- 
wards tire Hellespont, keeping still our course along the same coast of Eu- 
rope, we enter without any clanger the strait of Propontis, between Sestus 
and Abydns, and may also return again with safety, in the same manner as 
before. But the people of Chalcedon are so far from being possessed of these 
advantpges, that, on the contrary, they can never steer their course along their 
own proper coast, because the shore is full of bays and promontories, aud the 
land of Cyzicus especially runs far out into the sea. In sailing therefore 
from the Hellespont towards Chaloedon, they are forced to keep close along 
the shore of Europe, till they arrive very near Byzantium : and from thence 
they first turn away, and direct their course across the strait, to gain their own 
harbour-, which is indeed no easy task, by reason of the currents which have 
before been mentioned. And thus again, when they design to sail front 
Chalcedon to the Hellespont, taking still their course along the shore of 
Europe, they are at no time able to steer directly over from their own port to 
the coast of Thrace : since, besides the current that obstructs their passage, 
they are also forced to struggle against those winds, which alike are contrary 
to the course that they would wish to take. For either they are driven by the 
«outh too far towards the Pontus, or, on the other hand, are turned from the 
direction of their route by the northern wind which blows against them Irma 
that sea. Nor is it possible to sail from Chalcedon to Byzantium, or to return 
back again from the coast of Thrace, without being met by the one or other 
of these winds. Such then, as we have now remarked, are the advantages 
which the Byzantines derive from the situation of their city, with respect to 
the sea. We shall next consider also the disadvantages to which the same 
•ituation has exposed them, on the side towards the land. 

As their country theH is every way surrounded and inclosed, even from the 
Pontus to the iEgean sea, by the barbarous tribes of Thrace, they are from 
thence involved in a very difficult as well as constant war. Nor is it possible, 
by any force which they can raise, that they should ever free themselves en- 
tirely from these enemies. For when they have conquered one, three other 
states, more powerful than the first, stand ready to invade their country. 
And even though they should submit to enter into treaties, and pay heavy 
tributes, they still are left in the same condition as before. For the conces- 
sions that are made to any single power never fail to raise against them many 
enemies in the room of one. Thus are they worn and wasted by a war, Irorn 
which, they never can get free : and which, on the other hand, they are scarcely 
able to sustain. For what danger is so close and pressiug as a faithless neigh- 
bour ? or what war uacre terrible, than that which is practised by barba- 
rians ? From hence it happens, that this people, besides tlwt they are 
doomed to struggle against those calamities which are the usual consequence 
of war, are also exposed continually to that kind of torment, which Tantalus, 
among the poets, is feigned to suffer. For when they have employed great 
pains to cultivate their lands, which are by nature also very fertile, and the 
rich fruits stand ready to repay their labours ; on a sudden these barbarians, 
pouring down upon the country, destroy one part and carry away the rest; 
and only leave to the Byzantines, after all their cost and tod, the pain of be- 
holding their best harvests wasted, while their beauty also adds an aggravation 
to the grief, aud renders the sense of their calamity more sharp and unsup- 
portable. 

The Byzantines, however, amidst all the distress of these wars, the very con- 
tinuance of which had rendered them, perhaps, in some degree more easy to be 
borne, never changed their conduct with respect to the states of Greece. But 
afterwards, when the Gauls, that were led by Comontorius, arrived also in their 
country, and began to turn their arms against them, they weir then reduced 
»t once to very great extremities. These Gauls were a part of that numerous 

VWL. 1. No. 5. 2 M 



1*94 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUF, 



army which had left their native seats under the command of Brennus. But 
liavino 1 happily escaped the general slaughter that was made of their compa- 
nions in the neighbourhood of Delphi, and arriving near the Hellespont, they 
were so much charmed with the beauty of the country that lay round Byzarr 
tium, that they resolved to settle there, and not pass over into Asia. And 
having in a short time subdued the neighbouring inhabitants of Thrace, and 
fixed their seat of government at Tyle, they seemed to threaten Byzantium 
■with the last destruction. The Byzantines, therefore, in the first incursions 
that were made by Comontorius upon their country, paid sometimes three 
and five thousand, and sometimes even ten thousand pieces of gold, to save 
their lands from being plundered. And afterwards they submitted to pay a 
yearly tribute of fourscore talents, which was continued to the time of Ca- 
varus, who was the last of all their kings. For the Gauls were then conquered 
by the Thracians in their turn, and the whole race extirpated. 

During this time, the Byzantines, unable to support the burden of these 
heavy tributes, implored assistance from the states of Greece. And when the 
greater part of these entirely slighted their solicitations, they were forced at 
last, through mere necessity, to exact a certain impost from all vessels that sailed 
into the Pontus. But the merchants, beginning soon to feel the loss and in- 
convenience that arose to them from this proceeding, exclaimed aloud against 
the injustice of it, and all joined to blame the Rhodians for permitting it : for 
these were at that time the most powerful people upon the sea. From hence 
arose the war, which we are now going to describe. For the Rhodians, being 
excited partly by their own particular loss, and partly by the loss which their 
neighbours were forced also to sustain, having secured to themselves the as- 
sistance of their allies, sent ambassadors to Byzantium, and demanded that 
this impost should be abolished. But the Byzantines paid no regard to the 
demand ; but, on the contraiy,. adhered to the opinion of Hecatondorus and 
Olympiodorus, who were then the first in the administration of the city, and 
who maintained, in a public conference with the ambassadors, that what they 
had done was just and reasonable. The ambassadors were forced therefore 
to return, without having obtained the end of their commission; and the 
llhodians immediately declared war against the Byzantines. They sent some 
deputies also to king Prusias, whom they knew to be inflamed by an old re- 
sentment against the people of Byzantium, and pressed him to join his forces 
with them in the war. The Byzantines made on their part all the necessary 
preparations, and sent to demand assistance also from Attalus and Achaeus. 
The first of these was heartily disposed to support their interests ; but because 
he was now confined within the limits of his own hereditary kingdom by, the 
victories of Achaeus, his power was small and inconsiderable. But Achaeus, 
•who was at this time master of the countries that were on this side of mouut 
Taurus, and who lately had assumed the regal title, promised to assist them 
•with all his forces ; and by this assurance struck no small terror into Prusias 
and the Rhodians, while, on the other hand, he raised the courage of the 
Bvzantines, and filled them with the fairest expectations of success. 

"This prince Achaeus was nearly allied in blood to Antiochus, who at this 
time reigned in Syria, and had gained for himself the sovereignty of all those 
countries that were just now mentioned, in the following manner. 

When Sileucus, the father of Antiochus, was dead, and the kingdom had 
devolved upon the eldest of his sons, who was also called Seleucus, Achaeus 
being allied, as we have said, to the royal house, attended the young king in 
the expedition which he made into the provinces on this side of mountTaurus, 
about two years before the times of which we are speaking, For scarcely was 
he seated upon the throne, when he received the news that Attalus had pos- 
sessed himself by force of all this country. He resolved therefore to attempt 
without delay to recover again his paternal rights. But when he had passed 
the mountains with a numerous army, he was there treacherously killed by 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. ic 5 

m ■ m i ii ■'■■ m _j ag 

[Nicanor, and a certain Gaul whose name was Apatuvius. Achaeus, having, 
as his duty then required, revenged this murder by the death of both the trai- 
tors, and taken upon himself the command of all the forces, with the entire 
administration of the war, displayed so much true greatness, as well as wis- 
dom, in his conduct, that, though all circumstances highly favoured him, and 
the troops themselves conspired together with the times, to place the diadem 
upon his head, he persisted to refuse that honour ; and reserved the country 
for Antiochus, the youngest of the children of Sileucus; for whose sake also 
he still went on to extend his conquests, and to regain the places that were 
lost. But when the success began at last to exceed his greatest hopes ; when 
he had not only subdued the country by his arms, but shut up Attalus him* 
self in Pergamus, being then no longer able to maintain his steadiness upon 
the height to which he was thus raised by fortune, he fell aside at once from 
virtue, and, having usurped the diadem and royal name, from that time wa» 
regarded as the greatest and most formidable prince, of all that were on this 
side of mount Taurus. Upon his assistance, therefore, the Byzantines, with 
good reason, built their strongest hopes, and entered with confidence into the 
war against Prusias and the Rhodians. 

With regard to Prusias, he had long before this time accused the people of 
Byzantium, of having treated him with contempt and scorn. For when they 
bad decreed some statues in his honour, instead of taking care to erect them 
with all the usual rites of consecration, they, on the contrary, made afterward* 
a jest of their own decree, and suffered it to lie neglected and forgotten. He 
was also much dissatisfied with the pains which they had employed to procure a 
peace between Attalus and Achseus, which must have proved in all point* 
hurtful to his interests. Another cause of his resentment was, that the By- 
zantines had deputed some persons from their city, to join with Attalus in 
the celebration of the games that were sacred to Minerva; but had sent none 
to him, when he held the solemn feast of the Soterai. Incensed therefore by a 
passion which had long been working in his mind, he seized with joy the oc- 
casion that was offered, and resolved, in concert with the ambassadors, that 
while the Rhodians pressed the Byzantines upon the sea, himself would carry 
on the war by land against them. Such were the causes and such the com- 
mencement of the war between the Rhodians and Byzantines. 

The Byzantines, encouraged, as we have said, by the hope of that assistance 
which they expected from Achseus, at first performed their part with great 
alacrity and spirit. They sent to invite Ti bites back from Macedon, imagin- 
ing, that through his means they should be able to excite some disorders in 
Bithynia, and involve Prusias in the same dangers and alarm's' as those with 
which they were threatened by him. For this prince, having begun the war 
with all that vigour which his resentment had inspired, had already taken 
Hieron, which stood at the very entrance of the strait, and which the Byzan- 
tines, on account of its happy situation, had purchased not long before at a 
great expense, that from hence they might be able to protect the merchants 
that traded into the Pontus and secure the importation of their slaves, together 
with the other traffic also of that sea. He made himself master also of that 
part of Mysia, on the side of Asia, which, for a course of many years had be- 
longed to the Byzantines. At the same time the Rhodians, having equipped 
six vessels of their own, and received four more from their allies, steered their 
course towards the Hellespont. And when they had stationed nine of the 
ships near Sestus, to intercept the vessels that should attempt to pass into the 
Pontus, Xenophantes, who commanded all the fleet, sailed forward in the 
tenth, and approached near Byzantium, with design to try whether the By- 
zantines might be inclined by the sight of danger to desist from their fir&t 
design. But perceiving that his expectations were in no way answered, he 
returned and joined the other ships, and with the whole fleet sailed back 
again to Rhodes. In the mean while the Byzantines pressed Achaeus to join 



1 9 <5 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBItT& 

in— ■■■■inn i - - in inn mi i -— ..1111111 mm— MM— jMMtwt . 

them with his forces, and sent some persons into Macedon, to bring away 
Tibites, who was the uncle of Prusias, and was judged, on that account, to., 
hold as fair a claim as the king himself to the sovereignty of Bithynia. 
; But when the Rhodians remarked the firmness with which the Byzantines 
had resolved to carry on the war, they had recourse to a very wise expedient, 
bv which they at last accomplished all their purpose. V They saw that thi» 
o-reat confidence, which the Byzantines had assumed, was founded only on the 
succours which they expected from Achseus. They knew likewise, that An- 
dromachus, the father of this prince, had for some time been detained a pri- 
soner at Alexandria, and that Achseus was very anxious for his safety. They 
formed, therefore, the design of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, to desire 
that Andromachus might be released. They had, indeed, before this time, 
slightly urged the same request. But now they pressed it with the greatest 
earnestness, imagining, that when Achaens should be indebted to them for a 
service so considerable,, he must be forced ingratitude to consent to every 
thing that they should afterwards demand. When the ambassadors arrived^ 
they found thatPtolemy was willing still to detain Andromachus, from whom he 
expected to draw great advantage, in the conjunctures that were likely to arisei 
For some disputes were now subsisting between Antiochus and himself. The' 
power of Achseufv. likewise, who lately had declared himself an independent 
sovereign, was such as could not fail to bring considerable weight, in eertuirl 
matters of importance. And this prisoner not only was the father of Achseusj 
but the brother also of Leodiee, the wife of Seleucus. But, on the other hand, 
as the king was strongly inclined to gratify the Rhodians in all their wishes* 
and to favour all their interests, he at last consented to deliver A ndromachusf 
into their hands, that they might restore him to his son. They restored him 
accordingly without delay ; and having decreed also certain honours te» 
Achseus, they at once deprived the people of Byzantium of their strongest- 
hope. Tibites also died, as he was returning back from Macedon. This 
fatal accident, with that which had already happened, entirely disconcerted 
all the measures and damped the ardour of the Byzantines. But Prusias, on 
the contrary, conceived new hopes, and maintained the war against them,upon 
the coast of Asia, with great vigour and success; while the Thracians, also, 
whom he had engaged into his service, pressed them so closely on the side of 
Europe, that they dared not even to appear without their gates. Perceivings 
therefore, that all their expectations were destroyed and lost, and being ha- 
rassed thus by their enemies on every side, they began now only to censider 
by what means they might at last be disengaged from the war with honour. 

Happily about this time Cavarus, king of the Gauls, came to Byzantium^ 
And as he wished with no small earnestness that these disputes might be' 
accommodated, he employed his pains with such success, that both Prusias 
and the Byzantines consented to the terms that were proposed. When the' 
Rhodians were informed of the zeal which Cavarus had shewn to procure 
a peace, and that Prusias had submitted to his mediation, they were willing ori> 
their part also to put an end to the war ; on condition, however, that they 
should be suffered to accomplish their first desigu. They deputed, therefore, 
Aridices, as their ambassador to Byzantium, and at the same time sent Pole* 
modes with three triremes, to offer, as we express it, the spear or the ca-> 
duceus, to the choice of the Byzantines. But on their first arrival the peace 
was instantly concluded ; Coton, the son of Calligiton, being at this time 
hieromnemon of Byzantium. With respect to the Rhodians, the terms were 
simply these : " The Byzantines shall exact no impost from the vessels that 
pass into the Pontus. Upon this condition the Rhodians and their allies will 
remain at peace with the people of Byzantium." With Prusias the treaty 
was concluded in the words that follow : " There shall be perpetual peace 
and friendship between Prusias and the Byzantines. The Byzantines shall 
»©t commit hostilities of any kind against Prusias,, not Primas agaia*t the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUSfc m 



Byzantines. Prusias shall restore to the Byzantines, without any rausom, all 
the lands and fortresses, the people and the prisoners, that have been taken or 
subdued. He shall restore the vessels also that were taken in the beginning: 
of the war, together with the arms that were found in any of the fortresses; 
and all the timber, tiles, and marble, that were carried away from Hieron, or 
from the country round it." For Prusias, dreading the arrival of Tibites, had 
removed from all the fortresses whatever was fit for any use. It was added, 
in the last place, " that Prusias should compel the Bythinians to restore all 
that had been taken from the men who were employed to cultivate the land* 
in that part of Mysia which belonged to the Byzantines." Such was the be- 
ginning, and such the end, of the war of Prusias and the Rhodians, against 
the people of Byzantium. 

After these transactions, the Cnossians deputed some ambassadors to the 
Rhodians, and requested that they would send to them the fleet that was uim 
der the command of Polemocles, together with three open boats. But when 
these vessels arrived upon the coast of Crete, the Eleuthernffians, suspecting 
that some mischief was designed against them, because one of their citizens 
had been killed by Polemocles, to gratify the Cnoss'ians, at first expostulated 
with the Rhodians concerning this proceeding, and afterwards declared war 
against them. Not long before this time, the Lyttians also were involved in 
the worst calamities of war ; and, indeed, the whole isle of Crete had been 
lately made the scene of very great disorders, which were occasioned in thefol-; 
lowing manner. 

The Cnossians and Gortynians, having joined together their forces, ha<i 
made themselves masters of all the places in the island, Lyttus alone 
excepted. And when this single city still refused to submit, they resolved 
to conquer it by force, and to punish the inhabitants with the last destruction ; 
that thus they might strike a terror into the rest of Crete. At first, then, all 
the people of the islaud were engaged in this design, and turned their arms 
against the Lyttians : but, after some time, jealousies and discontent having: 
sprung, as it often happens, among the Cretans, from small and inconsiderable 
causes, grew at last to an open and declared dissention, and broke the force 
of this confederacy. For the Polyrrhenians, the Ceretae, the Lasnpseaus, the 
Orians, and the Arcadians, separated themselves, witli one consent, from their 
alliance with the Cnossians, and resolved to support the Lyttians. Among 
the Gortynians also, while the oldest men adhered still firmly to the Cnos- 
sians, the young men, on the other hand, contended, with equal warmth, in 
favour of the Lyttians. The Cnossians, being greatly alarmed by this sud- 
den revolt of all their chief allies, called in to their assistance a thousand mer- 
cenary soldiers from iEtolia. As soon as these arrived, the oldest men among 
the Gortynians, having first gained possession of the citadel, and received into 
it the Cnossians and iEtolians, killed or drove out all the young men, and 
delivered their city to the Cnossians. And, not long afterwards, when 
the Lyttians had led out all their forces, to make incursions upon the terri- 
tories of their enemies, the Cnossians, having received notice of their absence, 
marched in haste, and possessed themselves of Lyttus, when it was destitute of 
all defence. And, having sent the women and the children away to Cnossus, 
they set fire to the city, pillaged, and razed it to the ground. The Lyttians, 
returning from their expedition, and, perceiving what had happened, were so 
struck with consternation and despair, that not one among them had the cou- 
rage to set his foot within the city. But when they had all marched round 
\t, deploring, with loud groans and lamentations, the ruin of their country, 
and their own unhappy fate, they again turned back, and retired for refuge 
to the Lampaeans. They were received by these with all marks of friendship 
and affection : and being thus, in one day's time, from citizens become 
strangers, without laws or city, they continued afterwards to carry on the 



19S GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



iffltlOJilu* 



war against the Cnossians, in conjunction with the rest of the allies. Thus 
in a manner most astonishing and strange, Lyttus, a colony from Lacedsemon' 
the most antient city of the island, and whose people, descended from the 
Spartan race," were confessed to be the bravest of all that were produced m 
Crete, was at once sunk and lost iu irrecoverable ruin. 

The Polyrrhenians, the Lampseans, and the rest of the allies, havin- con- 
sidered that the ^tolians, from whom the Cnossians had received thei^ mer- 
cenary forces, were at this time engaged in war against the Achats and king 
Philip, sent some deputies to these, to desire that they would enter into an 
alliance with them, and send some troops to their assistance. To this request 
both .Philip and the Achaeans readily consented ; and, having received them 
into the general confederacy, they sent soon afterwards to their assistance 
four hundred Illynans, under the command of Plater, two hundred Achats, 
and a hundred Phocasans. The Polyrrhenians, having obtained these suc- 
cours were now able to maintain the war with so great vigour, that they soon 
forced the Eleutherajeans, the Cydoniata?, and the Apteraaans, to keep close 
behind their walls ; and, at last, compelled them to join their party, and de- 
sert the alliance of the Cnossians. After this success, they sent in return, to 
Philip and the Achseans, five hundred Cretans; as the Cnossians also, not 
long before, had sent a thousand of their troops to the ^tolians, to assist them 
S*f? Ii!" i ^ ar ln r which the y were engaged. The young men likewise, 
that had been driven from Gortyna, having gained possession of the port of 
Fhsestia, and afterwards of their own harbour also, maintained their posts 
with the greatest intrepidity ; and from thence carried on the war, without re- 
mission, against the old Gortynians that were masters of the city. Such wa* 
the condition of affairs in Crete. 

About this time also, Mithridates began that war against the Sinopeans,, 
which was, indeed, the source and first occasion of all those great calamities 
that afterwards befel this people. Upon this occasion they sent an embassy 
to Khodes, to solicit some assistance. The Rhodians, having made choice of 
three among their own citizens, delivered to them a hundred and forty thou- 
sand drachmae ; that, from thence, the Sinopeans might be furnished with the 
stores that were necessary for the war. From this sum they were supplied 
with ten thousand casks of wine ; three hundred pounds of twisted hair, and 
one hundred pounds of strings, all prepared for use ; a thousand suits of ar- 
mour ; three thousand pieces of coined gold; and four catapults, with some 
engineers. The ambassadors having received these stores, returned again in 
haste to Sinope : for the Sinopeans were now filled with the greatest appre- 
hensions ; and were persuaded that Mithridates would at once invest them 
both by land and sea. They hastened, therefore, to make such a disposition 
ot their lorces, as might secure the city, on both sides, against the danger of a 
•lege. ° 

Sinope is situated on a peninsula, which extends into the sea, upon the 
right side of the Pontus, as we sail towards the Phasis. It stands upon the 
isthmus of the peninsula ; and covers the whole extremity of the land, in the 
part which is connected with the continent of Asia, and which contains about 
two stadia only in its breadth. The peninsula itself, as it falls down towards 
the coast, is all flat and open ; but the borders of it that are nearest to the sea 
are rough, unequal, and very difficult of access. The Sinopeans, therefore, 
being apprehensive that Mithridates would invest them on the side of Asia, 
and, at the same time, land some forces from the sea upon the opposite side, 
and possess himself of the open plain, together with all the posts that might 
command the city, began to fortify the circuit of the coast ; driving sharp 
stakes into Ihe ground, and throwing up intrenchments, in every partin which 
the enemy could attempt to land ; and distributing their machines and troop* 
into all the advantageous posts. And, indeed, as this peninsula is of verjr 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 199 

moderate extent, a small body of forces may at all times be sufficient for its 
defence. But we shall here leave the Sinopeans, and return again to the 
Social War. 



CHAP. VI. 

PHiLtP, beginning' his march from Macedon with all his forces, advanced 
towards Thessaly and Epirus, with design to enter that way into jEtolia. At 
the same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having conceived some hopes 
of being able to take JEgira by surprise, drew together a body of twelve hun- 
dred jEtolians to Oenanthia, a city of jEtolia, which stood opposite to the 
before-mentioned city : and, having prepared some vessels for their transport, 
they waited for the proper time to pass the gulf, and cany their purpose into 
execution. For a certain soldier, who had deserted the service of the jEtolians. 
and, for some time past, resided in iEgira, having remarked that the guards, 
who were posted at the gate which opened on the side of iEgium, were often 
drunk with wine, and remiss in all their duty, had frequently importuned 
Dorimachus, whom he knew to be singularly formed for conducting all such 
enterprises, to take advantage of this negligence, and to enter by surprise 
into the city. iEgira is situated in Peloponnesus, near the gulf of Corinth, 
between Sycion and iEgium, upon hills that are rough and difficult of access. 
It looks towards Parnassus, and the country that is extended round that moun- 
tain, on the opposite side of the gulf; and is distant from the sea about seven 
stadia. When the proper time was come, Dorimachus, having embarked his 
forces, sailed away by night, and cast anchor in the river that ran near the 
city : and from thence, accompanied by Alexander, and by Archidamus the 
son of Pantaleon, he directed his march towards jEgira, by the way that leads 
from yEgium. At the same time the deserter also, who had formed the pro- 
ject, took with him twenty of the bravest soldiers ; and having, by some pri- 
vate roads with which he was acquainted, gained the summit of the hills be- 
fore the rest, he entered the city through an aqueduct, and, finding all the 
guards buried fast in sleep, killed them even in their beds, broke the bars of 
the gates with hatchets, and set them open to the enemy. The yEtolians en- 
tered in crowds together, exulting in their success ; and began to act as if the 
victory had already been their own. But this rash confidence proved after- 
wards the very cause of safety to the people of /Egira, and of destruction to 
themselves ; who were foolishly persuaded that, in order to be masters of a 
city, it was sufficient only to be within the gates. Under this belief, when 
they had kept together in a body for some little time, in the public place, 
as tire day began now to appear, they were no longer able to restrain their ap- 
petite, but spread themselves through all the city in search of plunder, and 
forced their way into the houses, to sack and pillage them. Those, therefore, 
of the citizens, who saw the enemy in their houses, before they had any notice 
of their approach, were struck with consternation, and fled in haste out of the 
city, not doubting but that the vEtoliaus were already masters of the place. 
But the rest, to whom the danger had not reached, being alarmed in time by 
the distant noise, ran together for their defence, and all took their way 
towards the citadel : and, as their numbers grew continually, so their courage 
also and their confidence increased ; while, on the other hand, the body of the 
iEtolians, from which many, as we have said, had fallen away, and dispersed 
themselves on every side in search of plunder, became more and more disor- 
dered and diminished. When Dorimachus, therefore, perceived the danger 
to which he was now exposed, having again collected all the troops together, 
he led them on towards the citadel ; in the hope that, by one bold and vigor- 
ous effort, he should strike the enemy with terror, and force them instantly 
to retreat. But the JEgirates, having encouraged each other by mutual 



fOO GEKERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

■exhortations, sustained the charge with the greatest bravery ; and, as the cita- 
del was not fortified by any wall, man with man, every one was engaged in 
'<lose and single fight. The contest, therefore, was, for some time, such as 
might be expected from /he condition of the combatants. For, as the one 
^were stuggling in the last defence of their children and their country, so the 
others had no way to escape with safety but by victory. At last, however, 
the jEtoliaus were constrained to fly ; and the iEgirates, taking care to seize 
the very moment in which they first began to yield, pressed upon them with 
«uch force and fury, that the greater part were thrown down in heaps together 
«t the gate, and were trodden under foot, in the haste and consternation of 
their flight. Alexander was killed in the action, and Archidamus stifled 
among the crowds that pressed to gain their passage through the gate. The 
rest either fell in that disorder, or were hurried down the precipices, and there 
lost their lives. A small number only gained their ships, and were saved in a 
Manner the most dishonourable ; having thrown away their arms, and carrying 
nothing back but disappointment and despair. Thus the citizens ofiEgira, 
hy their courage and intrepid firmness, recovered again their country, which, 
through their negligence, they had almost lost. 

About the same time, Euripidas), who had been sent by the jEtolians to com- 
mand the forces of the Eleans, made incursions upon the lands of Dyme, 
Pharse, and Tritaea ; and, having gained a very great booty, was preparing to 
return back again to Elis ; when Micus, a Dymsean, who was also the lieu- 
tenant of the Achaean praetor, drew together the troops of all those provinces', 
-with design t© pursue the enemy, and harass them in their retreat. But , as 
he advanced without sufficient caution, he fell into an ambuscade, in which 
forty of his men were killed, and two hundred taken prisoners. Euripidas, 
«late with this success, again led out his forces within some days afterwards, 
and made himself master of a fort called Ticbos ; which was situated near the 
promontory Araxus, in the Dymaean territory ; and, as fables relate, was built 
in antient times by Hercules, who used it as his citadel and place of arms in 
his wars against the Eleans. 

The Dymaeans, the Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, having suffered 80 considerable 
« defeat, and dreading likewise that they should now be exposed to greater 
danger, since this fort had fallen into the possession of the enemy, at first sent 
■couriers to inform the Achaean praetor of what had happened, and to request 
some succours ; and afterwards they deputed to him some ambassadors, to 
urge the same demand. But Aratus not only was unable to procure at this" 
time any foreign troops, because the Achaeans had neglected to discharge the 
stipends that were owing to their mercenaries, from the time of the war against 
'Cleomenes, but was, in general, wholly unskilled to form the measures that 
were necessary iu such conjunctures ; and, in a word, betrayed the greatest 
•want of courage and activity, in all things that related to the affairs of war* 
From hence it happened, that Lycurgus possessed himself of Athenaeum, in 
the Megalopolitau territory ; and Euripidas, besides his late success, took also 
Gorgon, a fortress situated in the district of Telphussa. 

When the Dymaeans, therefore, the Pharaeans, and Tritseans, perceived that 
«o assistance was to be expected from the praetor, they resolved that they 
-would withdraw their share from the common contributions that were raised 
among the Achaean states, and maintain, at their own expense, three hundred 
foot, and fifty horse, td cover their lands from the incursions of the enemy. 
But, though this measure was, perhaps, both wise and proper, with respect 
to their own particular safety and advantage, it is certain that nothing could 
be more pernicious to the common interests of the republic. For by this con- 
duct they gave, not only the example, but furnished also a ready method and 
pretence to all that should, at any time, be inclined to break the general con- 
federacy, and dissolve the union of the states. Yet it cannot be denied that, 
i» justice, the biame must chiefly be imputed to Aratus ; whose delays and 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. S<H 



negligence still frustrated the hopes of those who depended on him for assist- 
ance. For, though all men, in the time of danger, most willingly adhere to 
their allies, as long as an) 7 succours are to be expected from them ; yet, on 
the other hand, when they find that they are deserted by those very friends up- 
on whom they had fixed their hopes, they are then forced to have recourse to 
themselves for safety, and to employ such remedies as are within their power* 
The Tritaeans, therefore, and the rest, may, with good reason, be excused, for 
having raised some forces at their own expense, when none could be obtained 
from the Achaeans ; but, on the other hand, they are greatly to be blamed 
that they refused any longer to contribute their proper share towards defraying 
the common wants of the republic. It was just, indeed, and necessary, that 
they shoald pay a due regard to their own immediate safety. But it was also 
no less reasonable, that they should discharge, as the occasion then required, 
lieirduty to the states. And this was rather to be expected from them, not 
only because, by the laws of the confederacy, they were sure of being agaiu 
repaid whatever they should advance for the common service, but because, 
they had alsj borne the first and greatest part in establishing this form of 
government in Achaia. Such was the state of affairs in Peloponnesus. 

In the mean while, Philip, having advanced through Thessaly into Epirus, 
and being joined thereby all the forces of the Epirots, together with three 
hundred slingers from Achaia, and the same number of Cretans also that were 
sent to him by the Polyrrhenians, coutinued his march through the province, 
and arrived upon the confines of the Ambraciau territory. If, at this time ? 
he had passed forwards without delay, and fallen suddenly with so great ati 
army upon the inmost parts of vEtolia, he might at once have put an end to 
the war. But, having resolved, at the request of the Epirots, to lay siege 
first to Ambracus^ he, by that mean, gave full leisure to the vEtoliaus to draw 
together their forces, and to form the measures that were necessary for their 
defence. For the Epirots, regarding rather their own particular advantage 
than the common interest of the allies, and being desirous to get Ambracus 
into their hands, had pressed the king with the greatest earnestness, that he 
would endeavour to reduce that place. Their intention was, to recover Am- 
bracia from the iEtolians. But this conquest could never be obtained but by 
first gaining Ambracus, and making their attacks from thence against the 
city. For the place called Ambracus. was a fortress of considerable strength, 
situated in the middle of a marsh, and secured by a wall and out-works. It 

Was only to be approached by one narrow causeway, and commanded entirely 
both the city of Ambracia and all the adjoining country. Philip, therefore, 
yielded to their request, and, having fixed his Camp near Ambracus, began to 
make the necessary preparations for the siege. 

But, while he was employed in this design, Scopas, having drawu together 
all the iEtolian forces, directed his route through Thessaly, and made in- 
cursions into Macedon. And when he had ravaged all the open country in the 
district of Pieria, and had gained a very great booty, he Contiuued his march, 
from thence to Dium ; and, finding the place deserted by the inhabitants, 

'he threw down the walls and all the houses, and ra^ed the Gymnasium to the 
ground. He set fire also to the porticoes that stood round the temple ; 

' destroyed the sacred offerings that were designed either as ornaments of the 
place, or for the use of those who came to celebrate the public festivals; 
and broke all the images of the kings. And having thus, in the very beginning 
of the war, declared himself the enemy of the gods as well as men, he then re- 
turned back again to his country ; and, instead of being looked upon with 
horror on account of these impieties, was, on the contrary, received by the 
.Etolians with honours and applause, and regarded as a man, who, by his 
brave and vigorous conduct, was able to perform the greatest services to the 
republic. For himself, by his discourses, had so highly raised the confidence 
of all the people, that they were filled with new and eager hopes ; and begaa 

VOL. I. NO. 5, 2 C 



202 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

to be assured that, after these exploits, no enemy would dare so much as to* 
approach the iEtolians ; and that themselves might, on the contrary, hereafter 
pillage, without resistance, not Peloponnesus Only, as they had done in former " 
times, but even Thessaly arid Macedon. 

When Philip was informed of all the outrages that had been committed in 
his kingdom, he perceived that he was justly punished for having yielded t<y 
the folly and ambitious spirit of the Epirots. He continued, however, still 
to press the siege of Arhbracus. But when he had raised causeways in the 
marsh, and completed all the necessary works, the farces that were in the 
place Were struck with terror, and surrendered to him after forty days. The 
king dismissed the garrison, which consisted of five hundred JEtolians, uport 
terms of safety ; and gratified the Epirots in their wishes, by leaving the fortress 
in their hands. He then decamped, and continued his march in haste along 
Charada, with design to pass the Ambracian gulf, in that part which was 
the narrowest, and which lay near the temple of the Acarnanians, called 
.Actium. For this gulf, which flows from the sea of Sicily, is less than 
five stadia in its breadth, at its first entrance between Acarriania and 
Epirus. But, advancing farther within the land, it spreads afterwards to the 
breadth of a hundred stadia, and extends, in length to about three hundred 
from the sea. It divides Epirus from Acarriania, leaving the first on the 
side towards the north, and the latter on the south. Philip then passed the- 
gulf, in the place which we have mentioned, and continued his route through- 
Acarnania.' And having increased his army with two thousand Acarnaniaa 
foot, and two hundred horse, be came and encamped before Phcetise, a city/ 
of iEtolia, arid pressed the siege with so much force and vigour, that, after 
two days, the garrison, being struck with terror, surrendered upon conditions^ 
and were dismissed with safety. On the following night, five hundred iEto- 
lians, ignorant of what had happened, began their march towards the place* 
But Philip, having received timely notice of their approach, posted some 
troops in ambuscade, and killed the greater part as they advanced.. The rest 
were taken prisoners, a very small number only excepted, who saved them- 
selves by flight. He then distributed among the troops an allowance of corn 
for thirty days from the stores that had been found in Phoetne • j and, continu- 
ing his march afterwards towards Stratus, he encamped upon the river Ache* 
lous, at the distance often stadia from the city, and from thence, sending out 
detachments from his army, wasted the whole country at his leisure, and fouri<J 
no resistance. 

\ The Achseans, who were ait this time scarcely able to support the burden of 
the war, no sooner were informed that Philip was so near, than they deputed? 
, to him some ambassadors, ta request that he would advance immediately to 
their assistance. The ambassadors, when they had joined the king in the 
neighbourhood of Stratus,, discharged their commission to him, agreeably to 
their instructions ; and, having represented also to him how vast a booty might 
be gained if he would now invade Elea, they pressed him to transport 
bis forces over to Rhium, and to fall suddenly from thence upon that pro-* 
vinee. 

The king, when they had ended, gave orders that they should not yet de* 
part, and said that he would deliberate with his friends concerning that which 
they na< A proposed ; but at the same time he decamped, and began his march- 
towards Metropolis and Conope, The inhabitants of Metropolis all left their 
houses upon his approach,, arid retired into the citadel.- Philip, therefore* 
havin°- first set fire to the city, advanced forward to Conope. But when he 
approached the river that ran near the town, and which was distant from it 
about twenty stadia, a body of jEtolian cavalry appeared ready to dispute his* 
passage; being persuaded that they should either entirely stop the Macedo- 
nians fvom advancing ? or that the attempt would be attended with con* 
siderable loss. But Philip, perceiving their design, gave orders that &« 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 20$ 



peltastee should first pass the river in separate divisions, closing- all their 
ranks, and forming that figure which is called the tortoise. When this 
was done, and the first cohort had now gained the opposite side, the ca- 
valry advanced against them and began the combat. But as the Macedo- 
nians still stood firm, covering themselves with their shields in every part ; 
and when the second and third divisions, having passed the river also in 
the same close order, came forwards to support the first, the ./Etolians, 
perceiving that they fatigued themselves in vain, retreated back again towards 
the city ; and from that time these haughty troops were forced to remain 
quite behind their walls. 

The king then passed the river with the rest of the forces ; and, having 
wasted all the country without resistance, he arrived near Ithoria, a fortress 
that was strongly fortified both by art and nature, and which commanded the 
road along which the Macedonians were obliged to pass. The iEtolians that 
were left to guard it fled from their post, as the king approached ; and Philip, 
being thus master of the place, immediately razed it to the ground, He gave 
orders also to the foragers, that they should, in like manner, destroy all 
the fortresses that were scattered through the country. Having then gained 
the end of these defiles, he continued his march slowly forwards, that the 
army might have leisure to collect the booty. And when the troops were 
loaded with supplies of every kind, in great abundance, he directed his route 
towards the Achaean Oeniadse. But having, in his way, encamped near 
Pseanium, he resolved first to make himself master of that city. He repeated, 
therefore, his attacks against it without any intermission ; and, in a 
short time, took the p^ace by storm. Pteanium was a city not very con- 
siderable in its size : for it was less than seven stadia in its circuit. But, with 
regard to the houses, walls, and towers, it scarcely was inferior to any of the 
cities of that country. The king, having razed the walls to the ground, de- 
molished likewise all the houses, and gave orders, that the timber and the 
tiles should be floated, with the greatest care, across the river to Oeniada?* 
The ^Etolians at first resolved to hold possession of the citadel of this last 
city, which was strongly fortified with walls and other works. But as the kino- 
approached they were struck with terror, and retired. Philip, havino 1 thus 
gained this city also, continued his march, and encamped before a fortress in 
the Calydonian district, called Elaeus ; which was not only very strong bv na- 
ture, but was fortified also with a wall, and filled with all the necessary stores 
of war, which Attalus had sent to the ^Eolians not long before. But the 
Macedonians, in a short time, took the place by storm ; and when they had 
wasted all the Calydouian territory, they returned back again to Oeuiadsfi. 
The king, having then remarked that this city was situated with very greut 
advantage, as well for other purposes as because it afforded also an easy pas- 
cage into Peloponnesus, resolved to inclose it with a wall. For Oeniadse is 
situated upon the coast, near the entrance of the gulf of Corinth, in the very 
extremity of those confines which divide the provinces of Arcarnania and 
iEtolia. Opposite to it, on the side of Peloponnesus, stands Dyme, with the 
country that lies round Araxus ; and the distance between Oeniada? and this 
promontory is so small, that it does not exceed a hundred stadia. Philip, 
therefore, having carefully considered all these circumstances, began first to 
fortify the citadel; and afterwards having raised a wall round the docks and 
harbour, he resolved to join these also to the citadel, employing in the work 
all those materials which he had brought with him from Pseanium. But, be- 
fore he had completed this design, he received the news, that the Dardania'ns, 
imagining that his intention was to advance forwards into Peloponnesus, had 
drawn together a numerous army, and were preparing to make incursions into 
Macedon. Judging it, therefore, to be necessary that he shouid provide, 
without delay, for the security of his own proper kingdom, he now sent back 
the ambassadors of the Adrians; having first assured them, that, as soon a* 



204 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



he had repelled this danger, he would lay aside every other project, and em- 
ploy all his power to assist their state. He then decamped, and returned 
back again in haste along the same way by which he had arrived. As he was 
preparing to pass the Ambracian gulf, which separates Acarnania from Epi- 
rus, he was met by Demetrius of Pharos, who had been defeated in Illyria by 
the Romans, and had escaped in a single frigate, as we related in the former 
book. The king received him favourably, and directed him to sail on to Co- 
rinth, and from thence to go, through Thessaly, into Macedon ; while himself 
passed the gulf, and continued his march in haste through Epirus. But no 
sooner was he arrived at Pella than the Dardanians, having received notice 
from some deserters of his near approach, were struck with terror, and dismissed 
their army, though they had then advauced very near to the borders of the 
kingdom. Philip, being informed of their retreat, sent home likewise all the 
Macedonian troops to gather in their harvest ; and himself went into Thessaly, 
■with design to pass the rest of the summer at Larissa. 

At this time it was, that iEmiiius returned with conquest from Illyria, and 
entered Rome in triumph. About the same time Annibal, having taken Sa 1 - 
guntum by storm, sent his army into winter quarters. The Romans also, 
when they had received the news that Sagunturn was destroyed, deputed some 
ambassadors to Carthage, to demand that Annibal should be delivered to 
them ; and at the same time chose for consuls Publius Cornelius and Tiberius 
Sempronius, and began to make the necessary preparations for a war. We 
have already given, in the preceding book, a particular and distinct account 
of these transactions ; and now mention them again, for the sake only of re- 
calling to the reader's view, agreeable to the method which we promised still 
to observe, the chief events that were coincident with those which are now 
related. 



CHAP. VII. 

Thus then was ended the first year of the hundred-fortieth olympiad ; and 
as this also was the time in which the iEtolians usually elected their chief 
magistrates, they now chose Dorimachus for their praetor. As soon as he 
was invested with this dignity, he assembled the troops in arms, and making an 
incursion into the upper parts of Epirus, plundered and destroyed the country 
with a more than common rage and fury ; being much less solicitous to gain 
any advantage to himself, than to work the greatest mischief that was possible 
to the Epirots. Arriving at Dodona, he set fire to the porticoes of the temple, 
destroyed the votive offerings, and levelled the walls of the sacred edifice with 
the ground. Thus the iEtolians disdained to be confined within the ordinary 
limits either of peace or war; pursuing still, in both conjunctures, their own 
rash and violent designs ; and showing not even the least regard either to the 
laws of nations, or to the established rights and customs of mankind. After 
this exploit, Dorimachus returned back again to iEtolia. 

The winter was now approaching fast, and no person had expected that the 
Macedonians would, at this time, take the field, when Philip, advancing from 
Larissa, with three thousand chalcaspides, two thousand peltasta?, three hun- 
dred Cretans, and four hundred of the royal cavalry, passed from Thessaly 
into Euboea, and from thence to Cynus, and, continuing afterwards his route 
through Bneotia and the Megarisian district, arrived at Corinth in the very 
depth of winter; having performed his march with so much secrecy and dili- 
gence, that the people, of Peloponnesus were all ignorant of his approach. 
He immediately shut the gates of Corinth, and placed guards upon the roads; 
and sent to invite the elder Aratus to come to him from Sicyon. He wrote 
letters also to the praetor of the Achaeans, and to the several cities, to appoint 
the place and time in which he expected to be joined by the troops of the 



GENERAL HISTORY O F POLYBIUS. JOS 

republic. He then marched away from Corinth, and encamped near Dioscu- 
rium, in the Phiiasian territory. . ■ , , 

About the same time Euripidas, who knew not that the king had entered 
Peloponnesus, began his march from Psophis, with two cohorts of Eleans, 
some bodies of pirates, and some mercenary troops, amounting, in the whole, 
to two thousand and two hundred men, together witli two hundred horse and, 
advanced by the way of Pheneum and Stymphalus towards bicyon, with .de- 
sign to waste the country. And having, on that very night m which Philip 
had encamped near Dioscorium, parsed beyond the aimyot the king, he was 
ready just to enter the Sicyonian territory on the following day But some 
Cretan soldiers, who had left their ranks, and wandered far into the country 
in search of forage, fell in among the Eleans as they marched. Euripidas, 
being informed by these that the enemy was near, changed immediately the 
direction of his route, and, not communicating to any person Ins knowledge ot 
this accident, marched back again in haste by the way along which he had 
advanced ; in the hope that he might be able agam to pass beyond the Mace- 
donians, and to possess himself,the first of certain mountainous defiles, that 
were on the other side of the Stymphalian district. 1 he king, who on. his 
part, was wholly ignorant of the arrival of these troops pursued his first de- 
sign, and continued his march forwards in the morning, by the way °fbtym- 
phal us, towards Caphya : for this was the city in which he had desired that 
the Actons would Ve* together in arms. But when the advanced guards, 
of the Macedonian army was just now ready to ascend the hill called Apeau- 
rus, which was distant from Stymphalus about ten stadia, it happened that the 
foremost troops of the Eleans arrived also upon the same ascent Eunpidas, 
who, from the intelligence which he had received before, knew what the lorces 
were that now appeared in sight, made haste to avoid the impending Danger 
and, taking with him seme few horsemen only, fled through private roads to 
Psophis. The Eleans, being thus deserted by their chief, were struck with 
consternation, and for some time stopped their march, not knowing which way 
they should turn, or what measures werethe best to take. For their officers 
were at first persuaded, that these were some A chaan forces that had been 
drawn together to defend the country. This mistake was ^^^fy 
by the sjlht of the chalcaspides, whom they supposed to be the troops of 
Megalopolis. For, in the battle against Cleomenes that was fought .near 
Selasia, the Megalopolitans had all made use of brazen bucklers ; having re- 
ceived their arms on that occasion from Antigonus. 1 hey retreated, therefore, 
keeping their ranks entire, towards the neighbouring hills; »|fi|!J#J- 
dined to think that they were not mistaken in their hopes. But when the 
Macedonians, as they continued to advance, approached more nearly to their 
view, they then soon discerned the truth, and, throwing away their arms be 
2n to run with great precipitation. But twelve hundred of them were taken 
f,r oner^ andti^e rest either were destroyed by the Macedonian soldiers or 
lost their lives among the precipices. About a hundred only escaped by 
flight Philip sent away the spoils and prisoners to Corinth ; and pursued his 
route, as he had at first designed. The people of Pe oponnesus were all 
struck with wonder at an event so strange and unexpected by them r for they 
now first received the news together, both of the arnval of the king, and also 

° ^Macedonians continued their route through Arcadia ; and, having suf- 
fered great fatigue and hardship, as they passed the mountain called Ol.gyr- 
tus, which was at this time covered deep with snow, they arrived in the,nght of 
the third day at Caphya. The king, when he had rested here du"ng^vhole 
days, for the refreshment of the troops, and being joined also by the . j ounge 
Aratus,with the Achaan forces, so that the whole army now consisted ot 
ten thousand men, again marched forwards, through ft* Clitona*!, district, 



SOS GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

towards Psophis, carrying with him all the machines and ladders that were 
found in any of the cities through which he passed. 

PsophU is a city of very high antiquity in Arcadia, being acknowledged to 
liave been first built in anient times by the Azaues. With regard to th'p whole 
of I eloponnesus, it is situated near the middle of the countrv. But with 
respect to the single province of Arcadia, it stands upon the extreme borders 
of it toward the west, and is on that side closely joined to the confines of Elea 
It commands with great advantage the whole territory of the Eleans, and was 
at this time associated to their republic. Philip, arriving near this place in 
three days march from Gaphyae, encamped upon the hills that stood opposite 
to the city, and which afforded a safe and commodious view both of the place 
itself and of all the neighbouring country. But when he had seen from 
Jience the advantageous situation and uncommon strength of the city he was 
for some time in doubt what resolution he should take. For Psophis on the 
side towards the west, is secured by a rapid and impetuous torrent', which 
descends from the neighbouring hills, and in a short time forms for itself a 
channel very large and deep, which is not fordable in any place, durine the 
g-reatest part of \ne winter season. On the eastern side flows the Ervman- 
thus, a great and rapid river, the subject of many well known fables. And 
this river likewise receives the torrent just now mentioned, which falls into it 
on the side towards the south. Thus three sides of the city are completely 
covered by these waters, and guarded against all access. On the fourth side 
towards the north, stands a hill well fortified and inclosed with walls, and 
which serves indeed as a citadel to the city, being perfectly adapted both M 
nature and by art for sustaining the efforts of an enemy, the city itself wis 
also secured by walls of an unusual height, completely built, and fortified with 
care; and was defended by a garrison of Eleans. Euripidas was also in the 
place, having saved himself in it after his flight. 

When Philip had considered all these circumstances, he was in part inclined 
to abandon toe design which he had formed, to take the city either by storm 
or siege. But, on the other hand, he was no less earnest to persist in the at- 
tempt, when he had again reflected upon the manner in which the place was 
situated. 1- or, as much as the Arcadians and Achaean* were incommoded by 
I ^Pj ^ !>ieSS 1 d ? loSe Up ° n the vei T confines of their country, and furl 
nished the Eleans with the power to carry on the war against them with vigour 
and security so much on the other hand would they be advantaged byit°ifit 
snould now be taken ; since it would not only serve to cover their own lands 
from insult but might be used also as a place of arms, from whence thev 
mignt on their part make incursions into the Elean territory. The kimr I 
therefore, having at last resolved to persist in his design, gave orders that the 
troops should take their iisual repast, and hold themselves in readiness by 
break of nay And when the morning came, he passed the Erymanthus, upon 
tne bridge that was across it, without any resistance from the enemy, who 
were surprised at the attempt, and wholly unprepared against it. He then ad- 
vanced towards the city in bold and terrible array. Euripidas and the rest 
were struck with doubt and consternation. For they at first had been per- 
suaded, that the Macedonians wpuld neither attack "by storm a city of so con- 
siderable strength, nor yet venture, on the other, hand, to engage in a W 
and regular siege, ,n so severe a season. They were therefore thrown into 
great perplexity, and began to fear that some persons in the city had entered 
into , a secret correspondence with the king. But when no proofs appeared to 
confirm this apprehension, the greater part ran in haste to defend the walls 
wnile the mercenaries also that belonged to the Eleans advanced through a 
gate that was above the enemy, with design to fall upon them by surprise. 
The king, having ordered the ladders to be fixed against the walls in three 
different parte at once, and divided the Macedonians also into three separate 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 207 



bodies, gave the signal for the attack. The troops then advanced together, 
and began to scale the city on every side. The besieged for some time main- , 
tamed their ground with courage, and threw down many of the soldiers from 
the ladders. But as their store of darts and other weapons, provided only for 
the present exigency, soon began to fail ; and when they also found that the 
Macedonians were so far from being deterred by this resistance, that, on the 
contrarv, no sooner was one man tumbled from the ladders, than the next that 
followed succeeded without any hesitation to his place ; they at last turned 
their backs, and fled for safety to the citadel, while the Macedonians entered 
by the walls. At the same time also, the Cretan troops attacked the Eieais 
mercenaries with such vigour and success, that they forced them soon to throw 
away their arms, and to fly in great disorder ; and, having pursued them to 
the very gate from whence they had made their sally, they entered it together 
with them. Thus the city was taken at once in every part. The Psophi- 
diaus, with their wives and children, fled all into the citadel, together with 
Euripidas, and the rest that were able to escape. The Macedonians, being 
thus become the entire masters of the city, pillaged all the goods, and took 
possession of the houses. But those that had retired into the citadel, being 
destitute of all supplies, resolved to prevent a worse misfortune, by submit-* 
ing to the king. Having therefore dispatched a herald, and obtained per- ' 
mission to make a deputation to him, they sent their chief magistrates, to- 
gether with Euripidas, by whose means a treaty was concluded, in which full 
safety was allowed to all, both citizens and strangers. The deputies, then 
returned, having received orders from the king that they should all stilfc 
remain within the citadel till the army had left the city, lest the soldiers, for- 
getful of their duty, should be tempted by the hopes of plunder to insult and 
pillage them. 

The king, being forced by the snow, which about this time began to fall, t* 
remain for some days in Psophis, assembled together the Achseans, and pointed 
out to them the strength and commodious situation of the place, and the ad- 
vantages that might be drawn from it in the progress of the war. He spoke 
largely also of the affection and warm esteem which he had conceived for their 
republic; and added, that he would now give this city to them ; and that ir&- 
all future times he should be ready to employ his utmost power to gratify 
their wishes, and seize every occasion to advance their interests.. After this 
discourse, which was received by Aratus and the Acha-ans with great acknow- 
ledgments, he dismissed the assembly, and began his march towards Lasion. 
The Psophidians then left the citadel, and again took possession of their 
houses; and Euripidas went away to Corinth, and from thence iuto iEtolia. 
The Achaean chiefs that were present in the place left the care of the citadel 
to Proslaus of Sicyon, with a sufficient garrison, and appointed Pythias of 
Pellene to be governor of the city. In this manner was ended the siege of 
Psophis, 

The Eleans that were in garrison at Lasion, having been informed of all the 
circumstances of this conquest, no sooner heard that the Macedonians were 
advancing fast towards them, than they immediately left the place ; and 
Philip, being thus become master of it upon his first approach, gave this city- 
also to the Achseaus, as a farther testimony of his regard for their republic* 
He restored Stratus likewise, from whence the Eleans in like manner had 
retired, to the people of Thelphussa, from whom it had before been taken. 
He then decamped, and arriving at Olympia after live days' march, offered 
sacrifice to the deity of the place, and feasted the chief officers of his army. 
And when he had allowed three days for the refreshment also of the troops, 
he advanced farther into the Elean territory, and having encamped near the 
place called Artemisium, and from thence sent out detachments from his army 
to collect the plunder of the country, he afterwards returned again to Dios- 
«rarruBi. 



208 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 

While the Macedonians were employed in ravaging the country, many of 
the Eleans fell into their hands, but a much greater number fled for safety 
to the neighbouring towns, and to places that were not easy to be forced. 
For Elea far exceeds all the other parts of Peloponnesus, both in the number 
of inhabitants and in the natural riches also which are there produced. For 
there are many among this people who are so fixed in the enjoyment of a 
country life, and so satisfied with the abundance of which they are possessed, 
that in the course even of two or three generations they are never known to 
visit the capital of the province. This affection for the country is chiefly 
nourished by that high regard, which, by the constitution of their govern- 
ment, is shewn to those that are settled in it. For justice is administered 
amongst them in every district, and great pains employed that they may al- 
ways be supplied with all things that are necessary to life. The motive that 
inclined their legislators first to invent such laws, and to give such attention to 
their safety, seems partly to have been that the province was itself of very wide 
extent, but principally, because the inhabitants lived in antient times a kind 
of holy life, when their country, on account of the olympic games that were 
celebrated in it, was regarded by the Greeks as sacred and inviolable, and the 
people all enjoyed a full repose, secure from danger and exempted from the 
miseries of war. But afterwards, indeed, when the Arcadians attempted to 
take Lasion from them, with the lands that lay round Pisa, the Eleans were 
then forced to have recourse to arms, and to change their former way of life. 
And since that time they have not even made the least attempt to restore 
their country to those privileges of which they had been so long possessed, 
but have still remained in the condition into which they were thrown by that 
invasion. But certainly, in this respect, they have been far from shewing a 
due regard to their own future interests. For, since peace is that blessing 
which we all implore the gods to give U6; since it is that for whose sake wb 
bear to be exposed to every danger ; since, in a word, among all the things 
that are esteemed good by men, there is none more generally acknowledged 
to deserve that name ; it surely must be allowed to be a high degree of folly in 
the conduct of the Eleans, to refuse an acquisition of such value and import- 
ance, which they not only might obtain from the states of Greece upon fair 
and honourable terms, but might hold possession of it also to all future 
times. Some, perhaps, may think, that if this people should again return 
to their former life, they must be exposed to the attempts of every enemy 
that should be inclined to violate treaties, and to fall by surprise upon their 
country. But as this would rarely happen, so the Greeks also would all join 
together to revenge the insult. And with regard to any private robberies, 
they might at all times be effectually secured against them ; since, by the 
help of that abundance which the continuance of peace would of necessity 
bestow, they might with ease maintain some troops of mercenaries, to be em- 
ployed as occasion should require. But now, from having dreaded dangers 
that were never likely to arrive, they expose their goods to constant pillage, 
and their country to perpetual war. 1 could wish, therefore, that these re- 
flections might raise in the Eleans an attention to their proper interests, since 
they never will find a time more favourable than the present, to recover again 
an acknowledged confirmation of their rights, from all the states of Greece. 

But though these immunities have been long since lost, the people, how- 
ever, as we observed before, still retain some traces of their antient manners, 
and especially of their attachment to a country life. Upon the arrival, there- 
fore, of Philip, in the province, great numbers of them were taken prisoners 
by the Macedonians, and greater still escaped by flight. There was a fortress 
called Thalamse, into which the chief part of the people had retired, together 
with their goods and cattle. The country round it was only to be entered by 
certain close defiles ; and the place itself, besides that it was difficult of all 
access, was" also judged to be impregnable. But the king, being informed of 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 209 



the numbers that had fled together to this fortress, resolved to attempt and 
hazard every thing, rather than leave his work imperfect. He ordered the 
mercenaries, therefore, first to take possession of the posts that commanded 
the entrance of the passes. And, having left behind him in the camp his 
baggage, with the greater part of all his army, he then marched through the 
defiles, with the peltasta? and the light-armed troops, and arrived in sight of 
the fortress, without resistance. The Eleans, who were wholly unprepared 
to sustain a siege, and unpractised likewise in all the art of war, and who, at 
this time, had among them great numbers of the very meanest of the people, 
were struck with terror at his approach, and immediately surrendered. Among 
the prisoners were two hundred mercenaries, which Amphidamus, the praetor 
of the Eleans, had drawn together from different countries, and had brought 
them with him to this place. The king, having gaiued a very great quantity 
of valuable goods, with more than five thousand slaves, and cattle that 
scarcely could be numbered, returned again to his camp : and from thence, 
because the troops were so encumbered with their booty, that they were wholly 
unfit to engage in any new attempt, he directed his route back to Olympia, 
and there encamped. 



CHAP. VIII. 

About this time Apelles, who, among those that were appointed by Antigo- 
nus to be the guardians of young Philip, was possessed of the greatest sway 
in all the counsels of the king, formed the base design of reducing the 
'Achteans to the same vile condition as that to which the people of Thessaly 
are subject. For, though the Thessaiians were still governed, in appearance, 
by their own peculiar laws, and seemed, on that account, to be distinguished 
from the Macedonians, yet, in reality, there was no difference between them : 
for both weretKjually obliged to yield strict obedience to the royal orders, and 
to submit, without reluctance, to all that was imposed. This man, then, 
having regulated this project in his mind, began first to try the tempers of the 
Acha'ans that were now present in the army. He gave permission to the 
Macedonians to dispossess them of their quarters, and defraud them of their 
booty : and, afterwards, he ordered them to be scourged, upon the slightest 
pretexts ; and, when any of their companions interposed to save them, or 
showed any resentment of this treatment, himself conducted them to prison. 
By these means he was persuaded that the Achseans might insensibly be led to 
an entire and blind submission ; and think nothing cruel or severe, which, at 
any time, they should be forced to suffer by order of the king. And yet he 
had seen, not long before, when he was present in the army of Antigonus, that 
this very people exposed themselves to every danger, and seemed ready to en- 
counter every hardship with the greatest firmness, rather than fall into sub- 
jection to Cleomeues. But some young Achseans, having run together in a 
body, went and disclosed to Aratus the whole of this design. Aratus, wisely 
judging that it was necessary to defeat such evils in their first commence- 
ment, ran in haste to Philip. The king, when he had heard him, ordered the 
young men to lay aside their fears; assuring them, that nothing of this kind 
should hereafter happen ; and, at the same time, he strictly forbade Apelles 
to exact any thing from the Achseans, without the knowledge and conseat of 
their own prsetor. In this manner Philip, by his humane and gentle treat- 
ment of those that were with him in the camp, as well as by his courage like- 
wise, and activity in the field, not only gained the affection of the soldiers, 
but the favour also and esteem of all the people of Peloponnesus. And, 
indeed, we cau scarcely find a prince more admirably formed by nature, with 
all those talents that are requisite for enlarging conquests, and sustaining the 
weight of empire. For he was possessed of a ready and clear discernment ; a 
vol. 1. no. 5. 2d 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



happy memory ; a gracefulness that was peculiar to all his actions ; with such 
a dignity of aspect as declared the monarch, and inspired respect and awe. 
His activity also in the held was never wearied, and his courage never daunted. 
By what means afterwards these noble qualities were all destroyed, and from 
whence it happened that this prince, from a mild and gentle monarch, became 
at last a merciless and brutal tyrant, cannot be explained in a few words only. 
We shall take some occasion,, therefore, more favourable than the present, to, 
examine closely into the causes that produced so wonderful a change. 

Philip having now decamped, continued his route from Olympia towards 
PharEea, and from thence advanced to Telphussa, and afterwards to Hersea. 
In this place he sold his booty, and laid a bridge across the river AlpheUs^ 
with design to pass that way into Triphylia. About the same time Dori- 
machus, the JEtolian praetor, being pressed by the Eleans to save their coun* 
try from destruction, sent to their assistance six hundred vEtolians under the 
command of Phylidas. When this general, arriving in Elea, had joined his 
troops with the forces that were at that time in the service of the Eleans, five 
hundred mercenaries, a thousand soldiers of the country, and a body of Ta* 
rentiues, he from thence directed his march also towards Triphylia. This 
country, which derives its name from Triphylus, a native of Arcadia, is a part 
of Peloponnesus, lying near the sea, between the provinces of Messenia and 
Elea. It looks upon the sea of Afric ; and is situated in the extremity ©f 
all Greece, on the side of the south-west. The towns which it contains are, 
Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typansea, Pyrgus, vEpyum, Bolax, SfeylJa- 
gium, and Phrixa. The Eleans, having forced these towns to submit to their 
republic, added to them, not long afterwards, Aliphira likewise; which stood? 
within the limits of Arcadia, and at first was subject to the Megalopolitans. 
But Aliiadas, the tyrant of Megalopolis, in return for some personal advantages* 
surrendered it to the Eleans. 

Phylidas, having entered this country with his army, sent away the Eleana 
to Lepreum, and the mercenaries to Aliphira; while himself with the iEto- 
liana, remaining in the neighbourhood of Typansea, attended to the motions - 
of the Macedonians. Philip, being now disincnmbered of his booty, passed 
the Alpheus, which flows close along the city of HeraE-a, and directed his route 
to Aliphira. This city is built upon a hill, which is, on every side, steep and 
craggy ; and more than ten stadia in its height. Upon the summit stands the 
citadel, and a brazen statue also of Minerva, of a very uncommon size as welt 
as beauty. With what design it first was wrought, and at whose expense; 
the place from whence it came, and the person by whom it was here fixed and 
dedicated, are things that even the inhabitants of the country are not able to 
explain with certainty. But all acknowledge it to have been the work of So« 
stratus and Hecatodorus ; and regard it as one of the most finished pieces that 
ever were produced by those great artists. 

The king, having waited for a day that was serene and bright, commanded 
the men, whose task it was to carry the ladders, to advance first from different 
parts, with the mercenaries in front to cover them. The Macedonians, divided, 
also into separate bodies, followed close behind ; and were ordered, with the 
rest, to ascend the hill, as seon as the sun should begin to shine. The troop* 
advanced accordingly with great alacrity and vigour ; ^vvhile the Aliphireans 
ran together in crowds to every side, from whence they saw the Macedonian* 
ready to approach. At the same time the king, with a select body of soldiers-, 
having climbed up certain precipices, ascended unperceived to the suburbs of 
the citadel. The signal was uow given for the assault ; the ladders raised 
against the walls ; and the troops began, in every part, to scale the city. But 
the king, having first gained possession of the suburbs, which were left without 
defence, immediately set fire to them. When those, therefore, that were ems- 
ployed in defending the walls against the enemy, saw what had happened, they 
%*ere seized with consternation • and began to fear, that if the citadel should, be 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 211 

< ftwi— <Ma— ^— «m— »— « » <» »a»i i nn i ■■ ggBSSSS SSSSSSS " i — " ■— — —' ■ ■! ■ "W "*"" * ! — yj"' 

lost, there would be then left to them no resource. They abandoned, there- 
fore, all their posfs, and fled into the citadel ; and thus the Macedonians be- 
came masters of the city, almost without resistance. Not long afterwards, a 
deputation was sent also from the citadel to the king, and the place delivered 
into his hands, on condition only that the people should be safe. 

This conquest struck no small terror into all the people of Triphylia ; and 
forced thern to consult together, by what measures they might best preserve 
their country. About the same time also, Phylidas led away his troops from 
Typanaea, and retired to Lepreum, plundering all the province as he passed. 
For this was the reward which the allies of the /Etolians seldom failed to re- 
ceive ; being either deserted by them in the time of their most pressing need, 
or else pillaged, and betrayed, and forced to suffer from their confederates 
and friends, such cruel treatment as could scarcely be expected even from a 
Conquering enemy. As soon, therefore, as the king approached, the inhabit- 
ants of Typanaea, and of Hypana, surrendered their cities to him. The 
Phial ians also, being informed of all that had happened in Triphylia, and hav- 
ing been long desirous to shake oft* their alliance with the iEtolians, ran 
together in arms, and took possession of the place in which the polemarchs 
were accustomed to assemble. There were, at this time, some iEtolian pi- 
rates in Phialia, who had fixed their residence in the city, that from thence 
they might be able to make incursions upon the lands of the Messenians. 
These men, upon the first appearance of tins commotion, had resolved to take 
arms, and reduce the inhabitants by force. But when they saw that the 
people all ran together in crowds, and were preparing to make a vigorous 
resistance, they abandoned their design ; and, having obtained -conditions for 
their safety, retired from the place, carrying with them all their baggage. 
The Phialians, then, sent some deputies to Philip, and invited him to take 
possession of their city. 

During the time of this transaction, the inhabitants of Lepreum also, hav- 
ing possessed themselves of a certain part of the city, commanded the Eleans, 
the iEtolians, and the Lacedcemonians, who had likewise joined them, to retire 
both from the citadel and city. This demand, however, was at first entirely 
slighted. Phylidas still kept his post ; and was persuaded that he should be 
able to deter the Lepreates from attempting any thing against him. But 
when he heard that Taurion, with one part of the Macedonian forces, nad al- 
ready gained possession of Phialia, and that the king himself was advancing 
towards Lepreum with the rest, he began at once to lose all hope, while the 
Lepreates, on the contrary, assumed new confidence. And though there 
were at this time in the place a thousand Eleans, with a thousand pirates and 
iEtolians ; five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians ; and 
though the enemy were masters of their citadel, yet so admirable was the 
spirit, and such the glorious constancy of this people, that they resolved on 
wo account to yield to these invaders, or throw away the hope of being able to 
defend their country. Wheu Phylidas, therefore, saw their firmness, and 
heard also that the Macedonians were just ready to approach, he at last left 
the city, together with the Lacedaemonians and Eleans. The Cretan*, that 
had joined the troops of Sparta, returned back again to their own country, 
through Messenia ; while Phylidas, with the other forces, directed his route 
towards Samicum. The Lepreates, having thus recovered the entire possession 
-of their country, sent some deputies to Philip, and surrendered their city tp 
him. 

As soon as the king was informed of these transactions, he sent the chief part 
of his army away to Lepreum, while himself with the peltasta* and the light- 
armed troops pursued the enemy, and, falling upon them in their retreat, 
made himself master of all their baggage. But Phylidas, having marched 
with the greatest haste, escaped safe to Samicum. Philip, therefore, en- 
camped before the place ; and, when the rest rf his forces had advanced from 



212 ' GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

Lepreumto join him, began to make such preparations as threatened the in- 
habitants with the- prospect of a siege. But the JEtolians and Eleans, being- 
■wholly unprepared to sustain a siege, and having nothing but their hands only 
to defend them, were struck with terror, and offered to surrender upon terms 
of safety ; and, having obtained permission to leave the city with their arms, 
they retreated to Elea. After this success, the neighbouring cities all sent 
their deputies to the king, and submitted to him at discretion. These were, 
Phrixa, Styllagium, Epyum, Bolax, Pyrgus, and Epitalium. Philip, having 
thus, in the course of six days only, reduced the whole province of Triphylia, 
returned again toLepreum. And when he had first exhorted the inhabitants 
to remain steady in their duty, and had placed a garrison in the citadel, he 
inarched away to Hei*sea with all his forces, leaving to Ladicus, an Acarnanian, 
the government of Triphylia. Arriving at Hersea, he there divided the booty 
among his soldiers ; and, having taken again the baggage, which he had left 
behind him hi this place, he continued his route from thence to Megalopolis, 
though it was now the depth of winter. 

While Philip was employed in reducing the cities of Triphylia, Chilon, a 
citizen of Lacedsemon, who thought that his birth had given him the fairest 
title to the sovereignty of Sparta, being enraged that the ephori had slighted 
his pretensions, and bestowed that dignity upon Lycurgus, resolved to raise 
some disorders in the state. He flattered himself that, by following only the 
example of Cleomenes, and tempting the hopes and ambition of the multitude 
with the prospect of a new division of lands, he should at once draw all the 
people to his party. Having communicated, his intention, therefore, to his 
friends, and engaged about two hundred of them to share in the danger with 
him, he made haste to carry his project into execution. As Lycurgus, and the 
ephori, who had raised him to the kingdom, were the chief objects to his desigu, 
it, was necessary that these should be first removed. He took the occasion, 
therefore, when the ephori were at supper, and, falling upon them by surprise, 
killed them at their table. Thus that punishment befel them, which was, in 
justice, due to their late transactions : for, whether we consider the hand by 
which they fell, or the cause that drew this vengeance down upon them, they 
may well be thought to have merited their fate. 

As soon as this work was finished, Chilon ran in haste towards the house of 
Lycurgus : but, though this magistrate was then at home, he found means, 
with the assistance of some friends and neighbours, to retire unperceived, and 
escaped through private roads to the town that was called Pellene of Tripolis. 
Chilon, having thus failed in the chief and most important part of his intended 
enterprise, began to lose all hope : but, as there was now no room left to re- 
treat, he advanced into the forum, killing all his enemies, and calling aloud 
to his friends to join him ; inviting the people also to his party, by those 
hopes and promises that were just now mentioned. But when the citizens 
were so far from showing even the least regard to his pretension*, that, on 
the contrary, they began to run together in parties to oppose him, he secretly 
withdrew, and, passing through Laconia, fled nnattended into the Achaean 
iterritory. The Lacedsemonians being, at this time,, also terrified by the near 
approach of Philip, removed all their stores from the open country, and aban- 
doned likewise the fortress of Athenseum, in the Magalopolitan territory, hav- 
ing- first razed it to the ground. 

Thus this people, who, from the first establishment of their state, under the 
laws of the wise Lycurgus, had enjoyed the fairest form of government, and 
flourished in great strength and power, to the time of the battle of Leuctra, 
began, after that period, gradually to decline from their former fortune, and 
* «to fall into contempt and ruin : and, having long been torn by intestine tu- 
mults and commotions, their peace being still disturbed by Agrarian laws, 
and their citizens driven into banishment, they at last were forced to bow to a 
succession of severe and haughty tyrants, to the time of Nabis, and to yield to 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 213 



all the miseries of the very vilest servitude; those who, in antient times, had 
been unable to support even the name of slaver}'. Cut there are many who 
have written very copious accounts of the former condition of this people, and 
of all their various fortunes ; and, with regard to the changes that have hap- 
pened to them since Cleomenes first subverted the legal constitution of the 
state, we shall take occasion to relate, in the progress of this history, all 
those that were of chiefest note, and which best deserve to be remarked. 

Philip now decamped from Megalopolis, and, taking his route through 
Tegea, arrived at Argos, and passed the rest of the winter in that city ; having 
obtained, among all the Greeks, the highest admiration and esteem, as well 
from his manners and whole deportment, as by those great actions also which 
he had now performed in war, beyond all that could be expected from a 
prince of such tender age. 

During this time A pelies, who had not yet desisted from his project, was 
revolving in his mind the measures by which he might best be able to reduce 
the Achaeaus by degrees beneath the Macedonian yoke. As he saw that Ara- 
tus and his son were likely to prove the greatest obstacles in the way of this 
design, and that Philip was inclined to pay no small regard to these two ma- 
gistrates, especially to the eldest of them, not only because he had stood in 
high esteem and favour with Antigonus, and was a man of great authority 
among the Achaeans, but chiefly on account of his ready talents and profound 
discernment in all the affairs of government, he judged it to be, in the first 
place, necessary that he should frame some contrivance by which he might de- 
stroy their credit with the king. With this view, having made inquiry after 
those Achaeans who opposed Aratus in the government, he invited them to 
come to him from their several cities, and spared no kind of pains or flattery 
that might win their favour, and fix them in his interests. He then introduced 
them all to Philip; having first instructed each of them to insinuate to the 
king, that, as long as he was guided by the counsels of Aratus, he must be 
forced, in all things that related to the Achaeans, closely to observe the terms 
of the alliance ; but that, on the contrary, if he woidd submit his interests to 
the care of these new friends, he might soon, with their assistance, become the 
master of Peloponnesus, and govern the people by his own single will. When 
Apelles had thus far advanced in his design, his next care was to obtain, if it 
were possible, that one of this faction should be elected praetor of the Achaeans; 
bv which means Aratus would entirely be excluded from the administration 
©f the state. As the time, therefore, of the election now drew near, he pressed 
the king to go himself to iEgium, on pretence of marching that way into 
Elea. Philip yielded his consent, and Apelles, who was likewise present, 
partly by the force of threatenings, and partly by solicitation, prevailed, at 
last, though not without great difficulty, and gained the point which he had 
in view. For Eperatus, a citizen of Pharae, was elected praetor ; and Ti- 
moxenus, supported by the interest of Aratus, was repulsed. 

From JEgium the king began his march, and passing through Patrae and 
Dyrue, arrived at Tichos, a fortress situated upon the extreme borders of the 
Dymoean territory, and which had been taken by Euripidas not long' -before, 
as we have already mentioned. The king, having resolved to employ his ut- 
most power to recover again this place for the Dymaeans, ejpeamped before it 
with all his forces. But the Eleans that were posted in it were struck with 
terror, and surrendered. This fortress was of no great size, being not more 
than a stadium and half in its circumference. But the strength of it was con- 
siderable ; for the height of the walls was full thirty cubits. Philip restored 
the place to the Dymaeans, and from thence made incursions into the Elean 
territory : and, having wasted all the country, and gained a very great booty, 
he led his army back again to Dyme. 

But Apelles, having thus far accomplished his design, and obtained a 
praetor of his own election, began now to renew his attacks against Aratus, in 



-214 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



order wholly to remove him from the confidence of the king. For this pur- 
pose, he had recourse to a calumny, which was thus contrived. When Am- 
phidamus, the Elean general, who had been taken prisoner with the rest that 
had retired to Thalamas, was conducted to Olympia, he employed the me- 
diation of some friends, to procure admission for him to the king : and when 
he had gained a time of audience, he displayed in a long discourse the high 
authority and credit in which he stood among the Eieans, and assured the 
king, that he could easily engage that people to enter into an alliance with 
him. Philip, being prevailed on by these promises, immediately released 
Amphidamus, and sent him to the Eieans, with orders to assure them, that if 
they would embrace his friendship, he would restore to thern all their pri- 
soners, without any ransom, and secure their province against all incur- 
sions ; and that they should still live in perfect freedom, without garrison or 
tribute, and enjoy their own form of government. But, how generous soever 
and inviting these conditions might appear, the Eieans remained unmoved, 
and rejected all that was proposed. 

Apelies seized on this refusal as a proper ground for the calumny which he 
aiow contrived, and carried to the king. He told him, that it might now be 
seen how false were those professions of zeal and friendship, with which Ara- 
ius and his son had hitherto deceived him ; that, in their hearts, they were 
far from being disposed to favour his pretensions, or promote the interests of 
the Macedonians ; that the aversion which the Eieans had now shown towards 
him was solely to be imputed to their arts and management ; that when Am- 
phidamus was sent from Olympia to Elis by the king, they had employed in 
secret all their pains to convince him, that it was by no means for the advan- 
tage of the people of Peloponnesus, that Philip should become the master of 
the Eieans ; and that from hence alone had sprung that haughtiness, and 
fierce disdain, with which this people had rejected alt his offers, and had re- 
solved to adhere to their alliance with the iEtolians, and still sustain the war 
against the Macedonians. 

Philip, whin he had heard this accusation, ordered Aratus and his son to 
he called before him. Apelies then repeated in their presence all the charge, 
urging it against them with a bold and threatening confidence. And as the 
Icing still kept silence, he added, that since they had shown themselves so 
thankless and ungrateful, and had so ill repaid the many favours which they 
liad received from Philip, this prince had now resolved to call together the 
Achaean states, and, when he had explained to them the motives of his 
conduct, jto return again to Macedon. But the eldest Aratus, beginning 
now to speak, besought the king, that he would by no means judge with 
passion, or give a hasty credit to the things which he had heard, without some 
previous examination and inquiry: that in every charge especially, that wag 
directed against any of his allies^ or friends, it was proper first to weigh the 
evidence with the nicest and most scrupulous care: that such a conduct 
was not only worthy of a prince, but of the last importance also, with re- 
spect to his own interests and advantage. He desired, therefore, that those 
who had heard these matters, of which Apelies had accused them, might 
be called to the presence of the king: that Apelies should also attend, with 
the person fn 14 whom he had received his information : and, in a word, that, 
before any complaint was made to the Achaean states, every method should 
be tried, by which it was possible to gain a knowledge of the truth. Philip 
approved of this advice ; and, having promised to pursue it, he then dis- 
missed them. 

Some days afterwards had passer], and Apelies had not produced the 
proofs that were desired, when an accident fell out, which proved of great 
advantage to Aratus. While Philip was employed in plundering the country 
of the Eieans, this people, having conceived some suspicion of Amphidamus, 
resolved to seize, aud send him as a prisoner into jEtolia. But Atnphi- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 21 9 



damus gained early notice of their design, and fled at first to Olympia. 
And being there informed that the king was gone to Dyme, to distribute the 
booty anions; his troops, he made haste to join him in the city. As soon as 
Aratus heard, that this general had escaped from Elis, and was arrived at 
Dyme, being conscious of his own innocence, he ran to Philip with great 
alacrity aud joy, and requested that Amphidamus might immediately be 
called before him : that no one better knew the grounds of the charge that 
had been brought against him, than the man who had been a partner in the 
secret : and that, on the other hand, it clearly was his interest to disclose the 
truth; since he had now been forced to leave his country on account of his 
attachment to the king, and had no hopes of safety but in his protection. The 
king consented to this request ; and having ordered Amphidamus to be ex- 
amined in his presence, he found that the accusation was in all points false. 
From this time, therefore, his affection for Aratus every day increased, and. 
his attachment to him became stronger than before ; while Apelles on the 
contrary sunk low in his esteem. But his mind had been now so long pos-- 
sessed with prejudice in favour of this minister, that it forced him still to 
overlook, upon 103113- occasions, the errors of his conduct. 

in the mean while Apelles, not being in any degree deterred by what 
had happened from persisting still in the same designs, made his next attack 
against Taurion, who was intrusted with the cares of the affairs of Pelopon- 
nesus. He charged him, however, with no kind of crime ; but on the con- 
trary spoke largely in his praise ; and represented to the king, what great 
•ervices might be expected from a man of such abilities, if he were present 
jn the camp. But his intention was, to bestow this charge upon some person 
of his own appointment. For this is one of those new methods, contrived 
by men of bad designs, — to destroy the fortunes of their neighbours, not by 1 
detraction, but by praise. An artifice, replete with malignant rancour, and 
the basest treachery ; invented first in the courts of princes, to be the instru- 
ment of jealousy aud sordid avarice; arid employed solely to promote the pur- 
poses of those who strive to rise upon the ruins of another. He seized every 
occasion also that was offered to censure. Alexander, the captain of the guards ; 
having resolved to fill this post likewise with another of his own election : 
aud, in a word, .to change, if possible, the whole disposition which Antigonus 
had made. For Antigonus, not only while he lived, had governed Macedon 
and the young prince himself with the greatest prudeice, but left behind him 
also at his death such wise provisions as seemed most proper to secure the 
future ease and safety of the kingdom. He explained to the Macedonians 
in his will, the measures which himself had followed in the affairs of govern-? 
ment ; and prescribed the plan of the administration for the time to come; 
naming the persons also, to whom he left the conduct of the state, and. 
allotting severally to each his proper post ; that he might cut off at once all 
pretence for jealousy, and remove every incitement to sedition. By these 
directions, Apelles was appointed guardian to the prince ; Leontius, general 
of the infantry ; Megaleas, the chief secretary ; Alexander, captain of the 
guards ; and Taurion, the commander, to preside in Peloponnesus. Among 
these, Leontius aud Megaleas were already on all sides devoted to Apelles, 
The great object therefore of his present care was to remove Taurion and 
Alexander from their posts; by which means the whole administration of the 
government would fall into his own hands entire, or into the hands of those 
who possessed his confidence. And this design inust soon have bseu aceom-, 
plished, if he had not raised against himself an enemy in Aratus. Eut that 
Wrong policy defeated all his measures ; and drew after it the puuishment 
that was justly due to his imprudence and insatiable ambition: so that 
within a short time afterwards, he was himself involved in those calamities 
which he had prepared for others. In what manner this misfortune hap- 
pened to him, we shall at present forbear to mention, having brought this 



m6 - GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

book to its conclusion. But in that which follows, we shall take occasion to 
give a clear account of this event, with all the circumstances that attended it, 
Philip, after these transactions which we have now related, returned to 
Argos, to pass the winter there together with his friends, and sent the 
forces back to Macedon. 



BOOK THE FIFTH. 

CHAP. I. 

THE year of the prsetorship of the younger Aratus was just now ended with 
the rising of the Pleiades ; for in this manner the Achseans computed the 
course of time. This magistrate, therefore, resigned his office, and was suc- 
ceeded by Eperatus. Dorimachus was prsetor of the ^Etolians. About the 
same time time Annibal, as the summer now approached, having declared, 
without reserve, his intention to make war against the Romans, led his forces 
from New Carthage, passed the Iberus, and continued his march towards 
Italy ; while the Romans sent, on their part, Tiberius Sempronius with ai> 
army into Afric, and Publius Cornelius into Spain. At the same time 
also, Ptolemy and Antiochus, who both claimed the^sovereignty ©f Ccelesyria, 
having lost all hope of being able to settle their pretensions by embassies or 
treaties, prepared to end the dispute by arms. 

Philip, begin'ning now to be in want both of provisions and of money to sup- 
port his troops, desired the Achaean magistrates to give orders for assembling 
the council of the states. But when these were met together at iEgium, ac- 
cording to the laws of the republic, the king, perceiving that Aratus, stung 
with the disgrace which he had received in the late election, through the bad 
practices of Apelles, was inclined rather to oppose than advance his serviee, 
and that, on the other hand, Eperatus was by nature destitute of all those 
talents that are requisite for the conduct of affairs, and was also held in great 
contempt by all, was then fully sensible of the folly of those measures which 
Apelles and Leontius had engaged him to pursue, and resolved to re- 
cover again the confidence and favour of Aratus. He prevailed, therefore, 
with the magistrates to remove the assembly of the states to Sicyon ; and, hav- 
ing there addressed himself in private both to the elder and the younger 
Aratus, and charged Apelles with the blame of all that had been transacted* 
he pressed them to resume their former sentiments. To this request they 
both readily consented; and the king, through their pains and influence, 
obtained afterwards from the assembly the full accomplishment of all that he 
desired. For, by the decree that now was made, the states engaged to 
pay to him fifty talents, on the day when he should first begin his march ; 
to furnish three months' stipend for the troops, with ten thousand measures of 
•corn ; and to pay also seventeen talents monthly, during his stay in Pelopon- 
nesus. After these resolutions, the assembly separated, and the Achseans re- 
turned again to their several cities. 

The king, when he had drawn all the troops together from their winter 
quarters, and had held a consultation with his friends, resolved now to carry 
on the war by sea. For, as by this method he might himself be able to fair 
suddenly upon his enemies from every side ; so these, on the other hand, must 
wholly lose the power of sending any assistance to each other ; separated, as 
they were, in remote and distant provinces, and alarmed by apprehensions for 
their own particular safety, against an enemy to whose motions they would 
then be strangers, and whose descent upon their country might. be made with 
no less celerity than secrecy : for the people against whom he was now engaged 
were the iEtolians, the Lacedaemonians, and the Eleans. Being fixed, there- 
fore, in this design, he drew together to Lechseuta all the vessels that be- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBTUS. 217 



longed to the Achaeaus, together with his own ; and gave orders that the sol- 
diers should be employed continually in the exercise of the oar. The Mace- 
donians submitted to the task with the greatest promptness and alacrity. For 
these troops, whose courage in the field stands firm against every danger, are 
not less useful and intrepid upon the sea, whenever occasion demands their 
service. Active also, and inured to the perpetual toil of digging trenches, 
and of fortifying camps, they reject no kind of military labour ; but are, on 
the contrary, as Hesiod writes of the iEacidae, " more pleased with battles 
than with feasts/' 

v But while Philip and the Macedonians were thus busy in completing all the 
naval preparations, Apelles, perceiving that the king was no longer governed, 
by him as before, and being unable to support the loss of his authority, 
formed secretly an engagement with Leontius and Megaleas, by which it was 
agreed, that these two, still remaining near the king, should be ready, as oc- 
casion served, to frustrate all his counsels, and obstruct his measures ; and 
that himself, in the mean while, would go to Chalcis, and take care to stop all 
supplies that were expected to come that way. When this wicked project was 
thus concerted, Apelles, having by some false pretences obtained permission 
* to depart, went accordingly to Chalcis, and there, with the help of that autho- 
rity which had grown from his former credit with the king, he so well per- 
formed his part in this base and treacherous engagement, that Philip was ^t 
last reduced to an entire want of necessaries, and forced even to set his plate 
in pawn, in order to procure a subsistence from it. 

As soon as the fleet was ready, and the troops all perfect in their exercise;, 
the king, having first distributed some corn and money among his army, 
sailed out to sea, and arrived in two days at Patrae. The forces that were 
with hi ui were six thousand Macedonians, and twelve hundred mercenaries. 
About the same time Dorimaehus, the iEtolian -praetor, sent away rive hun- 
dred Neocretans, under the command of Agelaus and Scopas, to the assist- 
ance of the Eleans. The Eleans also, being apprehensive that Philip would 
attempt to besiege Cyllene, drew together some troops of mercenaries, trained 
the forces of the country, and fortified the place with care. Philip, therefore, 
having been informed of all these preparations, resolved to leave in Dyme the 
Achaean mercenaries with the Cretans ; some Gallic horse, and two thousand 
men, selected from the infantry of the Achaeans; as well to support himself, 
if there should be occasion for it, as to cover and secure the country against 
the attempts of the Eleans. And having sent his orders to the Messenians, the 
Epirots, Acarnanians, and to Scerdi!aidas,that they should complete the equip- 
ment of their vessels, and join him at Cephallenia, he then sailed away from 
Patrae to that island at the time appointed, and cast anchor near a little town 
called PrOni. But because the country round it was close and difficult* and 
the place not easy to be invested, he continued his course forwards to Palees, 
and perceiving that this part of the island was full of corn, and promised a 
plentiful subsistence to his army, he disembarked all his forces, and tliere en- 
camped. And having drawn his ships to land, and thrown up an intrench- 
ment round them, he sent away the troops to gather in the corn, while himself 
surveyed the city from every £ide, in order to discover in whut manner he 
might best advance his works, and plant his machines against it ; design- 
ing, when the allies had joined him, to use his utmost efforts to become 
masters of the place. For by this conquest, as the iEtolians would, On the 
one hand, be deprived of a place that was of great importance to them, since 
their custom was to make descents from hence in Cephallenian vessels upon 
the coast of Peloponnesus, Acarnania, and Epirus ; so, on the other hand, 
the king and his allies, when they had gained this post, might fall with great 
advantage upon the country of their enemies. For Cephallenia lies oppo- 
site to the Corinthian gulf, extending towards the sea of Sicily. It joins closely 
upon the north and western coasts of Peloponnesus, being nearest to Elea, and 
yfoi. u no. 5. 2 E 



21 3 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



looks also towards the south and western sides of Epirus, Acarrlania, and 
JEtoHa. The king, therefore, perceiving that the island was situated with so> 
o-reat advantage, as well for assembling the allies, and covering all their lands 
from insult, as for invading also the provinces of the enemy, was impatient to 
attemnt the conquest of it. And because Palsea was almost every way secured 
by precipices, or the sea, and w r as only to be approached by a small and 
narrow plain that looked towards Zacynthus, he resolved to advance his works 
upon that side only, and to fix there the whole business of the siege.. 

While Philip was thus employed in forming the measures that were neces-* 
sary for the attack, be was joined by fifteen vessels sent by Scerdilaidas, whi> 
was prevented from sending any greater number by some commotions that 
had happened in Illyria among the chiefs of the country.. The Epirots also 
coined 'him, together with the Acarnanians and Messenians. For as Phi galea 
how was taken from the JStolians, the Messeuians had no longer any pretence 
for refusing their assistance in the war. 

When all things were ready for the siege, and the balistee and the catapult* 
disposed in every place from whence they might with best sueeess repel the 
efforts of the enemy, the king, having exhorted the Maeedonians to be stre- 
nuous in their duty, ordered them to approach the walls, and to open a mine 
under cover of the machines. The Macedonians pursued their task with so 
o-reat diligence and ardour that the walls were in a short time undermined 13® 
the length of about five hundred feet. Philip then .approached the city, and 
pressed the inhabitants to accept conditions from him. And when his offere 
were rejected, he set fire to the timber that supported that part of the wall 
which was undermined. The wall immediately fell down, and the peltastse, 
who were commanded by Leontius, feeing divided into cohorts, were ordered 
to force their way through the breach, and to storm the city. But this ge~ 
neral, rementber'mg the engagement into which he had entered with Apelles, 
though three voung soldiers had already passed the breach, stepped them 
from advancing, and would not suffer the city to be taken. And as he had 
before corrupted also the chief among the officers, and himself at this time 
likewise, instead of leading on the troops with vigour to the charge, appeared 
struck with consternation, and spread his fears into the rest, the Macedonians- 
were at last repulsed, thotrgh they might without much difficulty have made 
themselves masters of the place. The king, when he pereived the cowardice 
of the generals, and that many of the soldiers also were disabled by their 
wounds, was forced to raise the siege, aud to deliberate with his friends con~ 
cerning the measures that were next to be pursued. 

About this time Lycurgus entered the province of Messenia with an army, 
while Dorimachus, with one half of the iEtolian forces, made an incursion also 
into Thessaly, being persuaded that by this diversion they should draw away 
the Macedonians from Palsea. The Acarnanians and Messenisns, alarmed by 
the approach of the enemy towards them, sent some deputies to the king, and 
jntreated them to raise the siege. The Acarnanians pressed him to remove the 
war at once into iEtolia, and thus, by wasting all the country, which was mm 
left without defence, to constrain Dorimachus to return again, before he had 
entered Macedon. The Messenians, on the other hand, importuned him with 
no less earnestness to march to the assistance of their country; representing te> 
him, that as the Etesian winds had now begun to blow, he might pass in one 
day's sailing from Cephallenia to Messenia, and fall upon Lycurgus before he 
could receive any notice of his approach. This was the advice which waa 
ur^ed by Gorgus, the chief of the Messenian deputies. Leont'ms also, pur- 
suing still his first design, supported it with all his strength, being well assured 
that no measures could more effectually obstruct the progress of the war. 
For it was easy, indeed, to transport the army to Messenia, but it was not pos- 
sible to return again till the season of these winds was passed. The Mace- 
donians, therefore, confined within the limits of that province* must have beea 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 219 



forced to waste the whale, summer in inaction ; while the iEtolians, on the 
other hand, might have plundered Thessaly and Epirus, and destroyed all the 
country at their leisure. So pernicious were the'eounsels which these men re- 
commended to the king. 

But Aratus, who was present, opposed this sentiment, and advised the king 
to advance into iEtolia, since, while Dorimachus was absent with the forces, it 
would be easy to run through all the province, and to plunder it without re- 
sistance. Philip, who before was much dissatisfied with Leontius, on account 
<of his ill conduct in the siege, and who began also to suspect some treachery, 
from the advice which this minister had so warmly urged with respect to the 
course that was now most proper to be taken, resolved to yield to the opinion 
of Aratus. He sent orders, therefore, to Eperaius, that he should draw to- 
gether the Achaeaa forces, and march to the assistance of the Messenians, 
while himself steered away from Cephallenia with the fleet, and after two days' 
-sailing arrived at Leucasin the night. From hence, having before made all 
things ready for his design, he passed his vessels over the neck of land called 
Dioryctus, into the Ambracian gulf, which, as we have already mentioned* 
flows from the sea of Sicily, and enters far into the inland parts of Acarnania. 
He then steered his course up the gulf, and arriving at Lirunaea before break 
of day, gave orders that the soldiers should take their usual repast, and leave 
behind them likewise all their heavy baggage, that they might not be incum- 
bered in their march. He called together also all the guides, and informed 
Jiimself with great exactness of the nature of the .country, and of the strength 
•and situation .of the neighbouring cities. 

In this place he was joined by Aristophantus, the praetor of the Acarnaniaus, 
with all the forces of the country. For the people of this province had long 
wished with the greatest earnestness for some occasion to revenge the insults 
which they had in former times received from the iEtolians. As soon, there- 
fore, as the king arrived, they all took arms; not those alone that weie 
obliged to it by the laws, but many also of the older men, whose age had 
exempted them from service. The Epirots, who had also been exposed to 
the sajae injurious treatment from the jEtolians, were, on their part, animated 
likewise with the same resentencing But because the arrival of the king was 
suddeu, and their country also of great extent, they wanted the leisure that 
was necessary for assembling together the forces of the province. With re- 
gard to the JEtolians, Dorimachus, as we have already mentioned, had taken 
with him one half of their troops, being persuaded that the rest would be 
sufficient to defend the country, in his absence, against all surprise. 

-The king, having left his baggage behind him with a proper ^,uard, began 
lus march from Limnsna in the evening, and when he had gained the distance 
of about sixty stadia, he ordered the troops to take their supper, and having 
allowed a short time for their repose, he again set forwards, and continuing his 
inarch all night, arrived before break of day upon the river Achelous, between 
Stratus and Conope. His intention was to fall suddenly upon the place 
called Thermum, before the inhabitants could be able to receive the news of 
their approach. Leontius clearly saw, that this design must inevitably be 
attended with success, and that all the efforts of the enemy would be vain and 
useless. "For besides that the arrival of the Macedonians was so quick aud 
unexpected, the iEtolians also, having never entertained the least suspicion 
that the king would throw himself with so great confidence into the very 
middle of a country that was strong and difficult, were wholly unprepared to 
resist a danger, of which they had conceived no apprehensions. Reflecting, 
therefore, upon these two circumstances, and being constant to the engage- 
ment into which he had entered with Apelles, he pressed the king to encamp 
upon the river Achelous, that the troops, who had marched all night, might 
enjoy some rest, and be recovered again from their fatigue. His intention 
was, that the JEtolians might from thence gain time to make the preparations 



220 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. ; 

that were necessary for their defence. But Aratus, on the other hand, well 
knowing how soon, in all such enterprises, the favourable moment might be, 
irrecoverably lost, and perceiving also that the purpose of Leontius was plainly 
to obstruct the progress of the war, urged the king to proceed without delay, 
and not suffer the occasion to escape. Philip, who was already much dis- 
pleased with the whole conduct of Leontius, approved of this advice, and,' 
having passed the river, continued his route in haste towards Thermum, 
burning and destroying the country as he marched. Leaving on the left 
hand Stratus, Thes'tia, and Agrinium, and on his right, Conope, Lysimachia, 
Tricheniura, and Phceteum; he arrived at a town called Metapa, which was 
situated in the entrance of those parts that led along the lake Trichonis, and 
■was distant from Thermum about sixty stadia. The JEtoliaus fled from the 
place upon his approach, and the king posted in it a body of five hundred 
men, as well to cover his entrance as to secure also his retreat back again 
through the passes. For the country that lay along the borders of the lake 
was rough and mountainous, and covered all with woods, so that the passage 
through it was extremely close and difficult. Philip entered the defiles; 
placing in his van the mercenaries, behind these the Illyrians, and after them 
the soldiers of the phalanx. The Cretans closed the rear. The Threciahs 
and the lighi-anned forces were disposed upon the right, and marched with 
equal pace, but at some distance from the main body. The left was covered 
by the lake, to the length of thirty stadia. Having gained the end of the 
defiles, they came to a village that was called Pamphia. The king, when he 
had posted a body of troops in this place also, continued his march forwards 
towards Thermum through a road that was not only steep and rough, but 
Surrounded on all sides likewise by lofty precipices, so that in many parts it 
was not to be passed, without great danger. The whole height also of the 
ascent was almost thirty stadia. But the Macedonians pursued their way 
with so great diligence and vigour that they soon gained the summit, and 
arrived at Thermum, while it was yet full day. The king fixed his camp 
near the city, and from thence sent away the troops to ravage ail the villages 
and neighbouring plains. They pillaged the houses of the city likewise, 
which were not only filled with corn, and every kind of necessaries, but with 
great quantities of rich and costly furniture. For as this was the place in 
which the jEtoliaSis celebrated every year their games and markets, and held 
also their assemblies for eleciing magistrates, they always laid up in it the most 
valuable of all their goods for the u?^ of these solemnities, and the more 
splendid reception of their guests. Thev were persuaded likewise that their 
riches could no where be deposited in a place of greater safety. For such was 
the strength and situation of this city, that it was considered as the citadel of 
all MtoYva. And, indeed, before this time no enemy had ever ventured to 
approach it. The long peace also which the country had enjoyed had afforded 
both the leisure and the means to heap together all that various wealth and 
plenty which now filled the houses that were round the temple, and all the 
neighbouring parts. 

The Macedonians, having gained an immense booty, in the evening re- 
posed themselves in tents. On the following day, they selected from the 
plunder whatever was of greatest value, and most easy to be removed ; and 
burned the rest in heaps before the camp. They took likewise all the arms 
that were fixed round the porticoes of the temple, and, reserving the most 
splendid of them as their prize, exchanged some others also for their own. 
The rest, which were in number more than fifteen thousand, were all con- 
sumed in fire. Thus far nothing had been done that was contrary to justice, 
or repugnant to the laws of war. But what censure must we pass on that 
which followed. Urged by the remembrance of those cruel ravages which 
the jEtolians had committed at Dium and Dodona, they now set tire to the 
porticoes of the temple, and destroyed the votive offerings ; among which 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 221 



there were some that were the work, of most exquisite art, and finished at a 
great expense. Nor were they satisfied with burning the root's only of the sa-» 
cred edifice, but even razed the temple to the ground. They threw down also 
all the statues, which were not fewer than two thousand ; breaking many of 
them in pieces, and sparing those alone that bore the names or the resem- 
blance of the gods. They then wrote upon the walls that celebrated verse 
which was one of the first productions of the da .Tiring genius of Samus, the 
son of Chrysogonus, who was the foster-brother of the king : 

" Rcaiembcr Dium : thence this shaft was sped. 1 ' 

The king himself, and those that were about him," promoted all this violence 
with a kind of frantic zeal and fury ; being persuaded, that it was no more 
than a just and suitable retaliation and revenge for those impieties which the 
JEtolians had before committed. But, in my judgement, their conduct up- 
on t!i : -; occasion in very greatly to be- blamed. Whether rny sentiments are 
jiur or not, may be judged from those examples which may be found in the 
same royal house of Macedon. When Autigonus, after he had defeated 
Ckomenes in battle, and forced him to leave his kingdom, became master of 
Sparta, so that the city and the vanquished citizens were wholly in his power, 
he was so far from treating them with any kind of rigour or severity, that, on . 
the contrary, he established them again in perfect freedom, and restored to 
them their laws and antient government; and when he had displayed his ge- 
nerosity and clemency, as well in many particular instances, as in the favour* 
also which he conferred in general upon their state, he returned back to Ma- 
cedon. From this conduct he was then called the benefactor, and, after his 
death, the preserver of that people ; and gained immortal fame and honour, 
not only among the .Lacedaemonians, but from all the states of Greece. 
That Philip also, who hist enlarged the bounds of the Macedonian empire, 
and spread wide the splendour of this house, when he had defeated the Athe- 
nians iu the fight of Chceronea, obtained much more by his humane and 
gentle conduct after the victory, than he had gained by his arms. For bjr 
these he subdued, indeed, the enemies that were in arms against him ; but. 
by his gentleness and moderation, he vanquished all the Athenians, and 
forced Athens itself to receive his laws. Instead of -.'-^king his resentment the- 
rule and measure of his conquests, he, on the contrary, pursued his victories 
no longer than till he had found a fair occasion to display his clemency 
and his love of virtue. He restored the prisoners, therefore, without 
any ransom ; allowed the rites of funeral to the soldiers that had fallen ia 
battle,; sent Autipater to Athens with their bones ; and gave habits also to the 
greater part of those that were released. And thus, by his wise and dex- 
terous conduct, he accomplished, with a small expense, the greatest purposes. 
For the haughty spirit of the Athenians was so perfectly subdued by this 
generous treatment, that, from enemies, they were changed at once into the 
most zealous and hearty friends, ready to favour all his interests, and to assist 
in all his designs. What again was 'Alexander's conduct upon a like occa-* 
siou ? Incensed as he was in so high a degree against the people of Thebes, 
that he ordered all the inhabitants to be sold for slaves, and the city to bt» 
levelled with the ground, yet so far was he from neglecting that duty which 
he owed the gods," that, on the contrary, he employed the greatest care that 
tio offence should be committed, even through accident, against the temples, 
or other consecrated places. At. the time of his expedition, likewise, into 
Asia, to revenge the atrocious insults which the Persians had committed 
against the states of Greece, he punished the people, indeed, with such seve- 
rity as their crimes demanded, but spared the places that were dedicated to 
the gods ; though the Persians, on the contrary, when they invaded Greece, 
had made all these the special objects of their rage. 



f$3 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

Such then was the conduct which Philip should have kept continually in 
view ; and have made it clear to all mankind, that he inherited not the kingdom 
only, but the generous disposition also, and heroic greatnesi of his ancestors. 
But though he, at all times, employed great pains that men should know that 
he was allied in blood to Alexander and to Philip, he never showed the least soli- 
citude to emulate their virtues. His reputation, therefore, as he advanced 
in age, was as different from, the fame which those princes had enjoyed, as his 
»ianne;\sand his life were different. This difference was clearly seen in the 
instance of his present conduct. Blinded by resentment, he thought it no 
crime to repay the devastations which the iEtolians had committed, with the 
like impious outrages, and thus to remedy one evil by another. In every 
place, and upon every occasion, he was eager to reproach Dorimachus and 
Scopas, with all the violence and honid sacrilege of which they had been 
guilty at Dium and Dodona ; but seemed never to have apprehended, that, 
while he was pursuing the same impious course, the same censure likewise 
must fall upon himself. For though, by the established laws of war, it is 
not only just, but necessary, to destroy citadels and cities, ships and har- 
bours, the fruits also of a country, with the inhabitants, in order to weaken 
the strength and power of our enemies, and to increase our own ; yet, on the 
other hand, when men extend their fury to those objects whose destruction 
neither can procure the least advantage to themselves, nor any way disable 
their opponents from carrying on the war against them ; when they burn es- 
pecially the temples of the gods, break all their statues, and destroy their or- 
naments, what must we say of such a conduct, but that it is the mere effect of 
an entire depravity of manners, the work of senseless rage and madness ? For 
the design of making war, among those at least that are of virtuous disposition, 
is by no means to exterminate the people from whom they have received an 
injury ; but to lead them only to a change of conduct, and to engage them to 
amend their faults ; not to involve the innocent and the guilty in the same 
perdition, but rather to exempt them both from ruin. To this we may also 
add, that it is the part of a tyrant only, who hates his subjects, and is hated by 
them, on account of his wicked actions, to exact by force and terror a reluct- 
ant and constrained obedience ; while a king, who is wise and moderate in his 
conduct, humane and generous in his manners, obtains the hearts of all his 
people, who regard hinw^ their friend and benefactor, and submit with cheer- 
fulness to his commands. 

But, in order to conceive, in the clearest manner, the whole extent of that 
mistake which Philip now committed, let us consider what would have been 
the sentiments of the JEtolians, in case that he had pursued a different con- 
duct ; and had neither burned the porticoes, broken the statues, nor de- 
stroyed any of the offerings that were round the temple. For my own part, I 
am persuaded that they must have regarded him as a most humane and virtuous 
prince. Conscious as they were of all those outrages which they had com- 
mitted at Dium and Dodona, and knowing also that Philip had, at this time, 
all things in his power, and that, in treating them with the last severity, he 
would have done no more, with regard to themselves at least, than what was 
just and reasonable, tiiey must surely have considered his moderation, in this 
respect, as a noble effort of a great and generous mind. In this view, 
while they condemned their own proceedings, they, on the other hand, would 
have bestowed on Philip -the highest admiration and applause ; whose virtue, 
So worthy of a king, had taught him, not only to preserve the duty which he 
owed the gods, but to set the bounds also to his own just resentment. And, 
indeed, to conquer enemies by generosity allone and justice is far more 
advantageous than any victory that is gained by arms. For the submission of 
men to these arises wholly from necessity and force; to the former it is free 
and voluntary. The conquest also, in the one case, is often very dearly pur- 
chased ; but, in the other, the offenders are prevailed upon to return again te a 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 223 



better conduct, without any expense or loss. And, what is still of greater mo- 
ment, the subjects must be allowed to claim the chief part of the success that 
is obtained by arms ; whereas the prince alone reaps all the glory of a victory 
that is gained by virtue. 

But some, perhaps, may think, that, as Philip was at this time extremely 
young, he ought not, in justice, to be charged with all the guilt of these trans- 
actions ; but that the blame should chiefly be imputed to those that were the 
nearest in his confidence, especially to Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos. 
Now, with regard to these, it is no hard task to judge, even though we were 
not present at their deliberations, which of the two it was that urged the king; 
to all this violence. For, besides that A rat us, in every action, was distinguished, 
by his caution and deliberate judgement, while Demetrius, on the contrary, 
was no less noted for his imprudence and precipitate rashness ; there happened, 
afterwards an instance not unlike the present, from which we shall be able to 
discern, beyond ail doubt, what must have been, upon such occasions, the 
sentiments and conduct of these two persons. But this must be reserved for 
its proper place. We now return from this- digression. 



CflAP. IL 

The king, taking with him everything that could be carried or removed, be- 
gan his march back again from Thermum, by the same way by which he had 
airived; placing at the head the booty, with the heavy-armed force*, and the 
Acarnanians, with the mercenaries, in the rear. He resolved to pass through 
the defiles with the quickest haste ; not doubting but that the vEtolians would 
take advantage of the difficulty of the way, and fall upon him in his retreat. 
And this, indeed, soon happened. The people had met together in arms, to 
the number of about three thousand men, under the command of Alexander 
of Trichonium. While the king remained upon the eminences, they kept 
themselves at a distance, and lay concealed in obscure and covered places.. 
But, as soon as the rear of his army had begun to move, they entered Ther- 
mum, and from thence advanced, and fell upon the hindmost troops. The 
mercenaries that composed the rear were thrown, by this attack, into no small 
confusion ; while the jEtolians, perceiving the disorder, and being emboldened 
by the advantage of the ground, pressed the charge with greater vigour than 
before. But Philip, having foreseen this accident, had taken care, as he de- 
scended, to post behind a certain hill a body of lllyrians, with some select 
men from the peltastae ; and these now falling suddenly upon the enemy, 
who had advanced beyond them, and were following the pursuit with eager- 
ness, killed a hundred and thirty of them, and took almost an equal number 
prisoners. The rest fled with great precipitation, and escaped through dif- 
ficult and unfrequented roads. After this success, the rear, setting fire to 
Pamphia as they marched, passed the defiles with safety, and joined the rest 
of the army, who were encamped near Metapa, expecting their arrival. The 
king razed this city to the ground, and the next day advanced to a town called 
Acra?. On the following day he again decamped, and, wasting all the coun- 
try as he passed, arrived near Conope, and rested there during one whole day. 
He then continued his march along the river Achelous, towards Stratus : 
and, having 1 passed the river, he for some time stopped his march, at a dis- 
tance that was beyond the reach of the darts, and offered the troops that were 
within the city the opportunity of a battle. For he had heard that three thou- 
sand yFtolian infantry, and four hundred horse, together with five hundred 
Cretans, had thrown themselves into the place. But when they all remained 
close behind the walls, he continued again his route towards Limneea, where 
his vessels lay. But scarcely had the hindmost troops passed beyond Stratus, 
when some of the ^Etoliau cavalry sallied out, and began to disturb the rear. 



224 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

These, at first, were but few in number ; but, as they soon were followed by a, 
part also of their infantry, and the Cretan forces, the battle then grew warm, 
and the troops that were in march were forced to face about to repel the 
enemy. The contest was for some time equal ; but, when the Illyrians were 
ordered also to return and support the troops that were engaged, the iEtolians, 
both infantry and cavalry, turned their backs, and fled together in great dis- 
order. The king followed closely, even to the very gates, and killed about a 
hundred of them. After this attempt, the iEtolians remained quiet within 
the city : while the rest pursued their march with safety, and joined the rest 
-of the army, and the vessels. 

The king, being now encamped at ease, made a solemn sacrifice of thanks 
to the gods for the success of his late enterprise, and invited his officers to a 
feast. For all men had considered it as an attempt of the greatest hazard, 
that he should thus throw himself into a country of such uncommon strength 
«nd difficulty,, and enter places into which no troops before had ever dared 
to penetrate. Yet Philip not only entered them without any loss, but accom-« 
plished likewise all that he designed, and had brought his army back again 
■with safety. His joy, therefore, was extreme ; and in this disposition he pre- 
pared to celebrate his banquet. 

But Leontius and Megaleas beheld this happy fortune with no small afflic- 
tion and concern. Faithful still to their engagement with Apelles, they had 
employed every art to obstruct the war, and frustrate all the counsels of the 
Icing. But so far were they from being able to accomplish their design, that,, 
on the contrary, this prince had now obtained the utmost of his wishes. They 
came, however, to. the banquet, but with hearts so tilled with heaviness, that 
<he king, with the rest that were present with him, began immediately t* 
jeuspect that they were strangers to the general joy. And indeed when in the 
•progress of the feast the guests all had drunk to great excess, and these also 
were compelled to fill their glasses with the rest, they at last threw aside the 
jtnask, and shewed their sentiments without disguise. For no soouer was the 
.banquet ended than their reason being disordered, and their senses lost in 
wine, they ran every way to seek Arabs. And having found him returning 
irpm the feast, after, many insults and reproaches they assaulted him with 
stones. A party soon was formed on either side, and the disorder began to 
spread through all the camp. The king, being alarmed by the noise, sent 
\some persons to inquire into the causes of it, and to compose the tumult. 
.Aratus related to them the fact as it had happened ; and appealed to the tes- 
timony of all that had been present, and then withdrew to his tent. Leontius 
also found some means to slide away unnoticed through the crowd. But 
.Megaleas and Crjuoji were conducted to the king; who, when he had heard 
the account of what had passed, reprimanded them with great severity. But 
<so far were they from being humbled by it to any degree of submission or 
-acknowledgement, that, on the contrary, they added an aggravation to their 
"fault, and told the king, that they never would desist from their design, till 
they had taken full vengeance upoa Aratus. The king, being greatly incensed 
<at this daring insolence, immediately condemned them to pay a iirfe of 
twenty talents, and commanded them to be led away to prison. And, on the 
following day, having ordered Aratus to be called, he exhorted bim to take 
eourage ; and assured him that the authors of this disorder should be punished 
. with due severity. *, 

When Leontius was informed of what had happened to Megaleas, he took 
with him a body of the peltastse. and went thus attended to the tent >of the 
king; being persuaded that he should easily intimidate this young prince, 
and force him to recal his orders. Being admitted, therefore, to his presence, 
he demanded, " who it was that had been so bold as to lay hands upon Me- 
. galeas? and by whose orders he was sent to prison ?" The king replied intre- 
pidly, "By mine." Leontius was^tbeu struck with terror ; and ? muttering 
to himself some threats, retired,. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 225 

Tlie king now sailed away with all t'.ie fleet, passed the gulf, and arrived 
in a short time at Leucas. And when he farad given orders to the poor officers 
to :u ike a distribution of the booty among the troops, he called together his 
friends to pass judgment on Megaleas. Aratus, who was present as the accuser, 
i ' > through the whole administration of Leontius and his friends. He charged 
them with some flagrant murders that were committed by their orders, a* v er 
Antigonus had retired from Greece. He laid open the engagement into 
which they had entered with A pedes ; with the manner also in which tbey 
had defeated the king's designs, when he attempted to take by storm the 
city oi'Palaea. In a word, he showed the guiit of these transactions with so 
much clearness, and supported all- that he affirmed by such convincing evi- 
dence, that Grinon and Megaleas, unable to refute the charge, were with one 
voice condemned. The firmer was still detained in prison ; but Leontius 
offered himself as surety, for the hue that was imposed upon Megaleas.' Such 
was tiie unexpected issue of the treacherous project into which these men had 
entered. They had persuaded themselves that it would be an easy tiling to 
remove Aratus by some violence ; and when the king was thus left destitute 
of friends, that they might afterwards pursue such measures as their own in~ 
tere*t should require. But the event proved opposite to all their hopes* 

Duiing this time, Lycurgus had been forced to abandon the Messenian 
tenitory, without performing any action of importance. But some time after- 
wards he again took the field, and made himself master of the city of Tegea* 
He attempted also to reduce the citadel, into which the inhabitants had all 
retired. But after some fruitless efforts he was constrained to raise the siege, 
and to return back again to Sparta. 

The Eleans made fflso an incursion into the Dymeean territory:- and having 
drawn into an ambuscade some cavalry that was sent against them, they de-» 
feattd them with little difficulty, killed many of the mercenaries, and, among- 
the forces of the country, took prisoners also Polymedes of iEgium, and 
Agesipolis and Megacles, citizens of Dyme. 

Oorimachus, as we before have mentioned, had advanced into Thessaly 
with the /Etolians ; being persuaded, that he not only might be aLle to ravage 
all the country without resistance, but should also draw away the king, by this 
diversion, from the siege of Paleea. But when he saw that Chryaogonus and 
Petneus had brought together an army to oppose him, he never dared to 
descend once into the plain, but continued his route elose along the sides of 
the mountains. And no sooner was he informed that the Macedonians had 
entered the jEtolian territory, th n he immediately abandoned Thessaly, and, 
returned in haste back again, with design to defend his country. But he 
was disappointed in that hope : for the enemy had left the province before he 
was able to arrive. 

Philip now sailed away from Leucas, and having wasted the cOast of the 
Hyantheans as he passed, arrived at Corinth with all the fleet, and cast an^ 
chor in the harbour of Lechaeum. He there disembarked his army; and when 
he had first sent letters to the confederate cities of Pe'opennesus, to appoint 
the day, in which their forces should be ready in arms, and join him at Tegea, 
he immediately began his march towards that city with the Macedonians, and, 
taking his route by the way of Argos, arrived there on the second day : and 
being joined by such of the Achfean forces as were then assembled in the 
city, he continued his march along the mountains, with design to fall upon 
the Lacedaemonian territory, before the people could receive any notice of hia 
approach. Passing, therefore, through those parts of the country that were 
chiefly destitute of all inhabitants, he appeared, after four days' march, upon 
the hills that stand opposite to Sparta; and from thence, leaving Menelaium 
on his right, he advanced forwards to Amyclte. The Lacedaemonians, when 
the/ beheld this army from the city, were struck with consternation and sur- 
prise. Their minds, indeed, had been alarmed not long before, by the news 
VOl. 1. NO. £. 2 F 



226 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

I. , » | , ,; ■ 

of the sack of Therm um, and of all the devastation which the Macedonians 
had committed in iEtolia : and the general rumour was, that Lycurgus 
would soon be sent to the assistance of the JEtolians. But they never had 
conceived the least suspicion, that the danger, in so short a time, could arrive 
close to Sparta, from a distance so considerable; especially, as the king was at 
this,time of an age, which was apt rather to inspire contempt than fear. As 
the event, therefore, was so contrary to all their expectation, it could not fail 
to strike them with the utmost terror. And, indeed, so greatly had the cou- 
vage and the activity of this prince surpassed all that his youth could promise, 
that his enemies in every place were filled with solicitude and anxious doubt* 
For marching, as we have already mentioned, from the middle of iEtolia, and 
having passed, in one night's time, the Arnbraeian gulf,. he arrived at Leucas ; 
and when he had staid two days, on the third sailed early in the morning ; 
and, wasting the coast of iEtolia as he rjassed, cast "anchor at Lechaeuai j and 
from thence marching forwards without delay, he gained, upon the seventh, 
day, the neighbourhood of Menelaium, ami the hills that overlooked the city 
of Sparta. So astonishing was this celerity, that those who themselves beheld 
it could scarcely give credit to their eyes. The Lacedaemonians, therefore,, 
were distracted with suspense and wonder, and knew not what measures were 
t ;e best to be pursued. 

The king, on the first day, fixed his eamp near Amyclse, which is distant 
from Lacedeemon about twenty stadia, The country round it is distinguished 
above all the other parts of Laconia by the excellence and rich variety of the 
trees and fruits with which it every where abounds* On the side of the city 
towards the sea stands a temple of Apollo, more sumptuous and magnificent 
than any in the province. On the next day, he decamped ; and, destroying 
the country as he passed, arrived at the place that was called the camp of 
Pyrrhus. On the following days, he wasted all' the neighbouring places, and 
came and encamped near Carni'um ; and from thence continuing his march to 
Asine, attempted to take the city. But, after some fruitless efforts, he again 
decamped, and ravaged all the ceantry, on the side towards the sea of Crete., 
as far as Tsenarium. From thence, taking his route back again, and leaving,, 
on his right hand, the port called Gythium, whieb is distant from Lacedsemon 
about thirty stadia, he encamped upon the frontiers of the Helian district, 
which is the largest and most beautiful of all the parts into which Laconia 
is divided. And having, from this place, sent his foragers abroad, he de- 
stroyed the fruits, and wasted aii the country round Acriee andLeueae ; and 
from thence extended his incursions even to Boea. 

The Messenians, as soon as they had received the orders ©f the king, that 
they should join him with their forces, showed no less diligence and zeal, than 
the rest of the allies j and having selected, among all the people of their pro- 
vince, two thousand of the bravest foot, with two hundred horse, they began 
their march towards Tegea. But, because the route was of a very consider-*- 
able length, it happened that Philip had left the city before they were able 
to arrive. For some time, therefore, they were in doubt what jesolution they 
should take. But when they had considered, that, as some suspicions had 
been before conceived against them, their delay upon this occasiou likewise 
might perhaps be imputed to a designed and wilful negligence, they, at last, 
continued their march through the Argian territory towards Laconia, in order 
to join the Macedonians. When they arrived near Glympes, a fortress that 
was situated upon the extreme borders of Laconia and of Argia, they there 
encamped ; but withont any kind of skill or caution. For they neither em-* 
ployed their pains to choose the most commodious ground, nor threw up any 
intrenchment round their camp; but, trusting to the favourable disposition of 
the people, reposed themselves in full security before the walls. But Lycur- 
gus being informed of their approach, took with him the mercenaries, and a 
part also of the Lacedaemonian forees, and beginning his march from Sparta r 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 227 

arrived at the place before break of day, and fell with great fury upon their 
camp. The Messenians, though they had shown before so little prudence in 
all their conduct, and especially in having marched from Tegea when their 
numbers were so few, and in opposition also to the advice of the wisest men 
among them, were careful, however, at this conjuncture, to have recourse to 
the only measures by which they could uow obtain their safety. For as soon 
as the enemy approached toward them, they immediately left all their bag- 
gage, and fled into the fortress. The baggage, therefore, with many of the 
horses, fell into the hands of the enemy. Eight soldiers also of the cavalry 
were killed. The rest all escaped with safety ; and retreated back agaui 
through Argia to their own country. Lycurgus, elate with this success, 
returned to Sparta, to complete the preparations for the war. And when he 
had held a consultation with his friends, he resolved that Philip should not be 
permitted to Jeave the country till he had first been forced to try the fortune 
of a battle. 

The king now decamped from the Helian district, and wasting the country 
on every side, arrived again, after four days' march, in the neighbourhood of 
Amyclae with all his army, about the middle of the day. Lycurgus, baying 
in concert with his friends and officers regulated all the plan of the intended 
battle, marched out of the city with two thousand men, and took possession 
of the posts round Menelaium. At the same time he ordered those that 
were left in the city carefully to observe the time, and, as soon as they should 
perceive his signal, to lead oat their troops from many parts at once, and 
range them in order of battle, with their front turned towards the Eurotas, 
and in the place in which that river flowed nearest to the city. Such was the 
disposition of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians. 

But lest the reader, from being unacquainted with the country of which we 
are speaking, should be lost ia error and uncertainty, we shall here point out 
the nature of the several places, with the manner in which they are situated : 
agreeably to the method which we have still observed in the course of this 
work ; comparing always, and bringing close together, the parts that are un- 
known, with those that are already known, and which have been before de- 
scribed- For since, in reading the recital of engagements both by land and 
sea, the want of having gained a perfect knowledge of the peculiar face and 
disposition of the scene of action often proves the occasion of great mistakes ; 
and because my design in all which 1 relate is not so much to show what ac- 
tions were performed, as the manner in which they severally were transacted ; 
I think it necessary to illustrate all great events, and especially those of war, 
by describing the places in which they happened, and distinguishing them 
by some precise awd accurate marks ; either by harbours, seas, and islands; 
or else again, by the temples, mountains, and countries that are near; but 
chiefly by their position with respect to the quarters of the heavens, be- 
cause this distinction is of all others the most commonly received and under- 
stood. For this, indeed, is the only method, as we have observed before, by 
which the reader ever can acquire a right conception of those countries to 
which he is a stranger. 

Sparta, then, if we consider it in its general figure and position, is a city in 
a circular form, standing in a plain. But the ground, in certain parts that are 
within the circuit of it, is rough and unequal, ai d rises high above the rest. 
Close before the city, on the side towards the east, flows the Lurotas; a river 
so large end deep that during the greatest part of the year it is not to be 
forded. Beyond this river, on the south-east of the city, are those hills upon 
which stand Menelaium. They are rough, and difficult of ascent, and of a 
mere than common height; and command entirely all the ground between the 
river and the city. For the river takes it course along the very border of the 
hills; and the whole space from thence to Sparta does not exceed a stadium 
and a half in breadth. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



Such was the defile through which Philip, as he returned, must be forced 
to pass, having on his left hand the city, with the Lacedaemonians ranged in 
battle and ready to engage ; and on his right, the river, and Lycurgus, with 
the troops that were posted upon the hills. But, besides these difficulties, the 
Lacedaemonians, in order more effectually to obstruct his passage, had stopped 
the course of the river, at some distance above the ground which we have men- 
tioned, and forced the waters to flow over all the space that lay between the city 
and tile hills, so that neither the cavalry nor infantry could march that way with 
safety. The Macedonians, therefore, had no means left for their retreat but 
to lead their army close along the very foot of the hills. But as they must 
then have marched with a very narrow and contracted front, it would scarcely 
have been possible to resist the efforts of the enemy. When Philip had con- 
sidered all these difficulties, and had held a consultation also with his generals, 
he judged it necessary that Lycurgus should be first dislodged fiom his posts 
Tipon the hills. Taking tvith him, therefore, the mercenaries, the peltastae, and 
the Illyrians, he passed the river, and advanced towards the enemy. When 
Lycurgus saw what the king designed, he exhorted his troops to perform their 
duty, and prepared them for the combat. At the same time, he gave the signal 
also to those that were in the city, who immediately drew out their forces and 
yauged them in order of battle before the walls, with the cavalry upon their 
right. Philip, as he approached nearer to Lycurgus, first sent the merce- 
naries against him, to begin the action. The Lacedaemonians, therefore, who 
■were superior in the advantage of their arms, and from the situation also of the 
ground upon which they stood, for some time maintained the fight with the. 
fairest prospect of success. 

But when Philip ordered the peltastae to advance and support the troops 
that were first engaged, while himself with the Illyrians prepared to, fall upon 
the enemy in their flank, the mercenaries, encouraged by this assistance, 
pressed the charge with greater vigour than before, while the Lacedaemonians, 
being struck with terror at the approach of the heavy-armed forces, turned 
their backs and fled. About a hundred of them were killed in the place, and 
more than that number taken prisoners. The rest escaped safe into the city. 
Lycurgus himself, with a small number of attendants, retreated through some 
private roads, and entered the city also in the night. Philip having posted 
the Illyrians upon the hills, from whence he had dislodged the enemy, re- 
turned again to join the rest of the army, with the peltastae and the light- 
armed troops. 

During this time thp phalanx had begun their march from Amyelae under 
the conduct of Aratus, and were now arrived near the city. The king, there- 
fore, passed (he river with the ligh(-armed forces, the peltasta;, and a body of 
cavalry, in order to sustain the attack of the Lacedaemonians, till the heavy 
armed troops, who continued their march along the sides of the hills, should 
liave passed through the defile with safety. The Lacedaemonians, advancing 
from the city, charged first the cavalry of the king. But, as the action soon 
became more general, and was sustained by the peltastae with the greatest 
bravery, the victory was again wholly turned to the side of Philip, who drove 
back the Lacedaemonian cavalry, and pursued them even to the gates. He 
then passed again the river, and, closing the rear of all the phalanxes,continued 
bis march forwards, without any loss. 

He had just now gained the end of the defile, when the night suddenly came 
on, and forced him to encamp, without advancing any farther. It happened, 
that the place which the guides were thus compelled, as it were by. accident, 
to mark out for the encampment was that very ground which an enemy would 
take by choice, if their intention was to pass beyond the city of Sparta, and to 
make incursions upon the Lacedaamonian territory. For it was situated at 
the extremity of this defile of which we have been speaking, in the road which 
leads to Lacedaemon, not only from Tegca, but from all the inland parts of 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 229 



Peloponnesus, and stood close upon the border of the river, at the distance of 
two stadia only from the city. The side that looked towards the river and the 
city was covered by steep and lofty precipices, which were almost inaccessible. 
And above these rocks was a level plain which abounded both with earth and 
water, and was also so disposed that an army might at all times enter it, or 
retire again with safety. In a word, whoever has once gained possession of this 
plain, with the precipices likewise that are round it, not only may remain se- 
cure against all attacks from the side of Sparta, but is the muster also of every 
thing that enters or returns through the defile. 

Philip, having here fixed his camp, in full security, on the following day 
sent his baggage away before, and then drew out all his forces in order of 
battle, upon the plain in sight of the city. And, when he had stood for some 
lime in that disposition, he then turned aside, and directed his route towards 
Tegea. Arriving at the place in which the battle had been fought between 
Antigonus and Cleomenes, he there encamped; and, on the following day, 
when he had first viewed all the neighbouring posts, and offered sacrifice to the 
gods upon the mountains Eva and Olympus, he strengthened the rear of his 
army, and continued his march forwards to Tegea, and, having there sold all 
his booty, he passed from thence through Argos, and arrived at Corinth. In 
this place he was met by some ambassadors from Rhodes and Chios, who came 
to mediate a peace. The king, dissembling his intentions, assured the am- 
bassadors that he had been always strongly inclined, and still was ready, to! 
put an end to the war, and dismissed them, with orders, that they should em- 
ploy all their power to lead the /Etolians into the same sentiments. He then 
went down to Lechamm, designing to sail from thence to Phocis, in order 
to carry into execution in that province some designs of great importance. 



CHAP. III. 

At this time, Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, being persuaded that they 
.should yet be able to intimidate the king, and by that means obliterate all 
their former crimes, dropped whispers of sedition among the peltastse and the 
soldiers of the guard, and represented to them, that while they alone of all 
the army were, at all times, the first exposed to danger for the common safety 
of the rest, they not only were defrauded of their autient privileges, but 
robbed also of that share in the division of the plunder, which, by long custom, 
they had a right to claim. The young men, inflamed by these discourses, 
ran together in a body, and began to pillage the houses of the most favoured 
courtiers, and even attempted to burst the doors, and to break through the 
roof of the apartments of the king. Iu a short time, therefore, the whole city 
was filled with uproar and with tumult. Philip, being informed of this dis- 
order, came running, in great haste, from Lechseum back to Corinth. And 
having assembled the Macedonians in the theatre, he endeavoured, both by 
admonition and by threatenings, to bring them to a sense of their misconduct. 
But, as the confusion still increased, some were of opinion, that the chief 
leaders of the tumult should be seized and put to death ; while others judged 
it to be far more prudent to quiet the commotion by gentle means, and that 
no resentment should be shewn on account of what had happened. The king, 
concealing his own sentiments, appeared to yield to this last advice, and, after 
some general exhortations, returned back again to Lechaeum. For, though 
he very well knew by whose contrivance the sedition had been raised, yet the 
times forced him to dissemble. After thi.? disorder, he was no longer able to 
carry into execution those designs which had invited him to Phocis. 

But Leontius, perceiving that all Ins projects still were frustrated, and hav- 
ing thrown away all hope of being ahle to succeed in any new attempt, was 
now forced to call Apelles to his assistance. He sent, therefore, repeated 



230 - GENERAL HISTORY OF PGLYBIUS. 



messengers, urging him to return from Chalcis, and informed him of all the 
danger and perplexity in which he had been involved, from baving'opposed 
the counsels of the king. Apelles, during bis abode in Chalcis, had raised his 
credit to a very high degree of insolence ; representing the king, upon all 
occasions, as a young man that was wholly governed by him; and who had 
devolved upon him all the royal power, with the entire administration of the 
state. The magistrates, therefore, and the other officers of Macedon and 
Thessaly, referred to him alone the censure of their conduct. And, in every 
city also of Greece, whenever any decrees were made, any honours paid, or 
presents offered, there was scarcely any mention made of Philip. Apelles ob- 
tained all, and governed all. The king had been, for a longtime past, in- 
formed of these proceedings. But, though he bore the insult with great un- 
easiness and pain, and was urged closely by Aratus to apply some remedy, he 
so well concealed his sentiments, that no person yet was able to discover what 
measures he had resolved to take. 

Apelles, being ignorant of all that was designed against him, and not doubt- 
ing but that, as soon as he should appear again in the presence of the king, 
all things should be administered by his directions as before, returned in haste 
from Chalcis to support his friends. As he came near to Corinth, Leontius, 
Ptolemy, and Megaleas, who commanded the peltastse, with the rest of the 
most distinguished bodies of the army, employed ail their pains to engage the 
troops to meet him at some distance from the city. Apelles, therefore, en- 
tered in a kind of triumph, attended by great numbers both of officers and 
soldiers ; and went directly towards the apartments of the king. But, as he 
was going to enter, agreeably to his former custom, a lictor, who had before 
received his orders, stopped him from advancing, and told him that the king 
was not then at leisure. Apelles stood, for some time, fixed in doubt and 
wouder, at a treatment so strange and unexpected, and afterwards retired in 
great disorder. The company that had attended in his train all fell away be- 
fore his face ; so that at last he was followed to his'house by his own servants 
only. Thus it is that all men, in the course even of one short moment, attain 
the highest elevation, and again are sunk in ruin. But this chiefly happens 
to those that are found in the courts of kings. For as the counters that are 
used in calculation are made sometimes equal to a talent, sometimes to a 
farthing, at the will of him who casts up the account ; so these men, likewise, 
are either rich and splendid, or destitute aud involved in wretchedness, as the 
nod of the prince decrees. Megaleas, perceiving that he had hoped in vain 
to be protected by the power of Apelles, against the danger which so nearly 
threatened him* resolved to save himself by flight. The king sometimes ad- 
mitted Apelles to his presence, and favoured him with some slight marks of 
honour; but excluded him from all his counsels; and from the banquets 
which he celebrated with his friends, after the business of the day. Within 
some days afterwards, he sailed to Phocis from Lecheeum, taking Apelles 
also with him. But he was forced to return again from Elatea, without being 
able to accomplish his designs. Megaleas seized the occasion of his absence, 
and fled to Athens ; leaving Leontius engaged for the twenty talents which 
he had been condemned to pay. And when the magistrates of Athens refused 
to receive him within their city, he retired to Thebes. 

The king embarked at Cirrha with his guards ; and, having landed in the 
port of Sicyon, went from thence into the city, and, paying no regard to the 
invitation of the magistrates, lodged himself in the house of Aratus, with 
whom he passed all his time, and sent Apelles back to Corinth. As soon as 
he was informed that Megaleas had fled, he ordered Taurion to march with 
the peltastae, who werw commanded by Leontius, into Triphylia ; on pretence 
that they were thereto be employed in some action of importance. But, as 
soon as they had left the city, he ordered Leontius to be led away to prison, 
on account of the fine for which he was engaged as surety for Megaleas. The 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 231 



peltastre, being- soon informed, by messengers that were sent to them from 
Leontius, of the clanger into which he had fallen, immediately deputed some 
of their body to the king, to desire that, if Leontius was charged with any- 
new offence, no judgement might be passed upon him before their return ; 
that otherwise, they should think themselves despised* and greatly injured : 
for such was the freedom with which the Macedonians always were accustomed 
to address their kings. They added also, that if nothing more was demanded 
ofhiin than to pay the twenty thousand talents for Megaleas, they would 
themselves discharge the debt by"' common contribution. But this eagerness 
which the soldiers showed to save Leontius served only to incense the king 
much more against him, and hastened the order for his death. 

About this time, the ambassadors of Rhodes and Chios returned from 
iEtolia, having settled a truce of thirty days. They assured the king, that 
the iEtolians were inclined to peace ; and that, if he would consent to meet 
their deputies at Rhium, on a day which they had named, he would find them 
heartily disposed to give a quick determination to the war. Philip consented 
to the truce ; and wrote also to the allies, that they should send to Patree some 
persons to deliberate with him concerning the conditions of the peace. He 
then embarked atLeeheeum ; and, after two days' sailing, arrived at Patrae. 
In this place he received some letters from Phocis, which had been written by 
Megaleas to the iEtolians ; exhorting them to persist in the war with confi- 
dence, and assuring them that Philip would soon be forced, by the want of 
necessaries, to abandon all his projects. There were added also many severe 
and injurious calumnies, with regard both to the conduct and the person of the, 
king. Philip, when he had seen these letters, was now fully sensible that 
Apelles was the chief contriver of all that had been done to obstruct his mea- 
sures. He gave orders, therefore, that he should immediately be seized, and 
sent away under a guard to Corinth, together with his son, and a young man 
his favourite. At the same time he ordered Alexander to go to Thebes, and to 
cite Megaleas before the magistrates for the payment of his fine. But wher* 
this was done, Megaleas, not waiting for the sentence, destroyed himself with 
his own hand.?. Within seven days afterwards Apelles also died, together 
with his son, and favourite. Such was the fate which at last befel these 
traitors ; a fate that was, in justice, due to all their past transactions, and es- 
pecially to their insolent attempts against Aratus. 

The iEtolians had wished, indeed, with earnestness, to be delivered from a 
war that pressed them closely on every side, and which had proved in alt 
points contrary to that which they had expected from it. For they had 
vainly hoped, that they should be able todcal with Philip as with a child that 
was destitute of knowledge and experience. But this prince, both in form- 
ing his designs, and in carrying them also into execution, had shown himself 
to be a perfect man ; while themselves, on the other hand, appeared con- 
temptible as children, as well in every single enterprise, as in the general 
conduct of the war. But, when they received the news of the sedition that 
was raised among the troops, and of the deaths of Apelles and Leontius, they 
began to be persuaded that such disorders might ensue as would create no 
small embarrassment to the king. Flattered, therefore, by this hope, they 
neglected to se?td their deputies to Rhium on the appointed day. The king 
seized with joy the occasion that was thrown into his hands for continuing the 
war ; both because he had the greatest hopes of a happy issue from it, and had 
also secretly resolved, before he arrived, that he would employ all his power 
to retard and obstruct the treaty. Instead, therefore, of advising the con- 
federates who had joined him to entertain any thoughts of peace, he, on the 
contrary, encouraged them still to pursue the war with vigour; and then sailed 
back again to Corinth. From thence he sent the Macedonians away through 
Thessaly, to pass the winter in their own country ; while himself embarked at 
Ceachroe, and, sailing round the coast of Attica, arrived through the Euripus 



932 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

at Demetrias. And there finding Ptolemy, who alone was left of those that 
had been engaged in the conspiracy with Leontius, he brought him to atrial 
before some Macedonian judges, by whose sentence he was condemned to- 
die. 

This was the time in which Annibal, having entered Italy, was encamped 
in sight of the Roman army, upon the banks of the river Po. Antiochus also, 
having subdued the greatest part of Ccele-syria, had just now dismissed hi* 
army to their winter quarters, About the same time Lycurgus, king of Lace- 
dsemo'n, was forced to fly into iEtolia to avoid the fury of the ephori. For 
these magistrates, deluded by a fale report, that he designed to raise some 
disorders in the government, had drawn together a numerous party, and 
tame to seize him in his house by night. Rut, as he had received timely 
warning of the danger, he found means to escape, with all his family. 

The winter was now far advanced, and Philip had retired to Macedou. 
Eperatus also, the Achaean praetor, was so sunk in credit and esteem, as well 
among the troops of the republic as the mercenaries, that no respec^was paid 
to his commands, nor any measures taken to secure the country against the 
incursions of the enemy. The general of the Eleans, Pyrrhias, having re- 
flected on these circumstances, took with him fourteen hundred iEtolians, 
the mercenaries of the Eleans, and the forces also of the province, amounting 
to one thousand foot, and two hundred horse ; so that the whole number of his 
forces was about three thousand men ; and made many depredations, with- 
out remission, upon the lands of the JDymseans, the Pharaeans, and Patrseans; 
and, having at last encamped upon a hill called Panachaicus, which stood 
above the city of Patrae, he ravaged all the country as far as *Egium and 
Rhium, The cities, being thus insulted and destroyed, and not able to obtain 
any effectual succours, began to withhold their contributions to the war. The 
•mercenaries, on the other hand, perceiving that the payment of their stipends 
■was, from time to time, neglected and delayed, refused to march to the as- 
sistance of the country. And thus, while both sides gratified alike their mu- 
tual discontent, the disorder was still increased, till the troops atlast all deserted 
from the service. Such were the effects of the incapacity and weakness of 
Eperatus. But, while all things were thus tending fast to ruin, his ad- 
ministration came at last to an end. At the approach of summer he resigned 
his office, and the Achseans made choice of the elder Aratus to be preetor. 
Such was the condition of affairs in Eui'ope. 



CHAP, iv. 

From these transactions, since we are now arrived at a suitable period with 
respect to time, as well as at a proper pause, likewise in the relation of 
affairs, we shall go on to describe what passed in Asia during the course of 
this same olympiad; beginning, as we at first designed, with the war in 
which Antiochus and Ptolemy were engaged together, for the sovereignty of 
Ccele-syria. For though this war, with respect both to the commencement 
and the progress of it, was coincident with that which we have last described, 
and was extended also beyond the time in winch we have now broken our 
narration, yet it seemed most proper that we should give, in this place, a dis- 
tinct relation of it, and separate it from the affairs of Greece. Nor will the 
reader find it difficult to apprehend the exact time in which all things se- 
verally were transacted ; since we have already taken care, in relating all that 
passed in Greece, to mention always the beginning and the end of the chief 
events that happened at the same time in Asia. But that our work might 
be, in every part, intelligible and clear, it seemed, as we have said, most proper 
that we^djould separate the affairs of these two countries, during the course only 
•f this olympiad. For ia .those , that follow we shall interweave together,; in 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 533 



joint order, all the great transactions that were coincident in time, and relate 
them as they happened, from year to year. 

As my design (indeed, the most important and extensive, if I may be al- 
lowed to say it, of all that have hitherto been formed,) is not to write the his- 
tory of any single country, but to include together all the fortunes and trans- 
actions of every people and of every nation in the habitable earth, it will, in 
a more ' especial manner, be incumbent on me to dispose and regulate the 
whole with such skill and care, as that the order and connection of all that I 
relate may be fully and distinctly understood, as well through the work in 
general, as also in its several parts. With this design, I shall now look back 
to the earlier parts of the reign of Autiochus and Ptolemy; and, beginning 
from some certain and established facts, from thence lead the reader to the 
war which I am going to describe. Nor is this care to be regarded as,a mat- 
ter of small importance : for, when the antients said that a work begun was 
half completed, their intention was to warn us that, in every undertaking, our 
greatest pains should be employed to make a good beginning. And, though 
this manner of expression may be thought by many to be raised beyond the 
truth, yet, in my judgment, it rather falls below it. For he may, boldly say, 
not only that a work begun is half completed, but also that the beginning- 
is connected closely even with the end. For how can we properly begin, un- 
less we have viewed our undertaking to its utmost bounds ; and known, from 
whence the work is to proceed, to what limits we design to extend it, and 
what also is the end proposed ? Or, how again shall we be able to give 
any summary account of all that the work contains, uuless we first com- 
pare the beginning with the end, and place before us, in one view, the 
commencement, order, connexion, and dependences, of those events of which 
we design to treat ? As the beginning, therefore, is thus closely joined, 
not only with the middle of the work, but also with the end, it ought at all 
times to engage the chief attention, both of those that write, and those also 
that read, a general history. And this is that which I shall myself endeavour 
to observe with the greatest care. 

I am not ignorant, indeed, that many others have boasted, like myself, that 
they have written a general history; and that their project is the greatest and 
the niost important of any that were ever offered to the world. Among these 
is Ephorus ; who was the first, and is, indeed, the only one, who seems to 
have been in truth engaged in such an undertaking. With regard to all the 
rest, I shall, at present, forbear to name them ; and will only say, that we 
have seen in our times some historians, who, when they have given a slight 
account, within the compass of a few pages only, of the war of Annibal 
against the Romans, have boldly called their work a general history ; and 
yet all men know, that at this time were accomplished many very signal and 
important actions, both in Spain and Afric, in Sicily and Italy ; and that this 
war, the most celebrated, and, if we except the first war of Sicily, the longest 
also in its continuance of any that we have ever known, drew the eyes of all 
mankind towards it, and filled their minds with anxious fear for the event. 
Yet these historians, when they have recorded fewer facts than even those 
paiuters, who, in some of the cities of Greece, are employed, from time to 
•time, to draw upon the walls a slight and general sketch of any actions that 
have happened, make no scruple to affirm, that they have included in their 
work the conduct and the various fortunes of the barbarians and the Greeks. 
But to say the truth, as on the one hand, nothing is so easy as to engage, by- 
words, in the most extensive undertakings : so, on the other, nothing is more 
difficult than to carry any great design effectually into execution. For the 
first lies within the powerof all who possess only a sufficient share of confi- 
dence ; but the latter is the portion of a few, and cjan scarcebjgfce accom- 
plished, even in the course of a long and labourious Life. Le^Rse reflec- 
tions, therefore, serve to moderate, in some degree, the arrogance of those 

YOL, I. NO. 5. 2 G 



534 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

I i Pwn-juwi-jummiMm-iB i i ,. n i '"""— ■ .' "■ 

writers, who so vainly extol their own productions. I now return again to the 
subject, from whence I was led into this digression. 

Ptolemy, who was surnamed Philopator, having, after the death of his fa- 
ther, destroyed his brother Magas, with all his friends, reigned alone iu 
jEgypt. As, by this exploit, ha had freed himself from the dread of any do- 
mestic tumults, so fortune also seemed to have secured him against all dan- 
ger from abroad. For Seleucus and Antigonus both were dead; and An- 
tiochus and Philip, who succeeded in their kingdoms, were still in their 
most tender age. Flattered, therefore, by this prospect of tranquillity and 
ease, he began to waste his time in one continual course of sports and plea- 
sures ; -secluding himself from every kind of business,, and not permitting 
either the nobles of his court, or those that were intrusted with the adminis- 
tration of the kingdoiuyever to approach him. With regard alsa to all the fo- 
reign provinces, the governors were left to pursue their own designs, without 
any inquiry or restraint. And yet these were the parts of their dominions 
which all former kings had, at all times, thought more worthy of their atten- 
tion, even than Egypt. For thu«, while they were masters of Cyprus, and of 
Coele-syria, they lay close upon the kings of Syria, both by land and sea. 
Possessed also of the most considerable cities, posts, and harbours along the 
coast, from Pamphylia towards the Hellespont, as far as Lysiraachia, they 
were always able to control- the powers of Asia, and the islands* And, evea 
with respect to Thrace and Macedon, they were still ready te attend to all 
commotions, and nepel every danger that might threaten them, while they 
""held a garrison in jEnos and Maronea, and in some cities also that were be- 
yond them„ By this wise policy, while their power was spread wide abroad, 
they reigned in full security in Egypt, which was covered against all attack* 
by the barrier of theis distant provinces. It was not without good reason, 
therefore, that they still watched over the condition of these countries with 
extreme attention. But Ptolemy rejected all this care ; and abandoned him- 
•elf at once to obscene amours and mad debauchery, without any intermis- 
sion or reserve. And from hence it happened, a* it might, indeed, be rea- 
sonably expected, that, within a short time afterwards, many designs were 
formed to deprive him both of his king-dom and his life. 

The first attempt was made against him by Cleomenes the Spartan. Thf* 
prince, during the life-time of Euergetes, who had entered into a close al- 
liance with him, remained satisfied and quiet j being persuaded that he 
•hould be able to obtain, at some convenient time, the assistance that was ne- 
cessary to recover again his paternal kingdom. But when that monarch had 
been some time dead,, and the affairs of Greece were in such condition that 
they seemed aloud- to demand Cleomenes ; when Antigonus was now also 
dead, the Aeheeans involved in war, and the Lacedaemonians, pursuing 
that very project which Cleomenes himself had formed, had joined their 
arms with the JEtolians against the Macedonians and Achseans ; he was im- 
patient to be gone from Alexandria, and urged his departure with the greatest 
earnestness. He at first desired to be dismissed, with some suitable supplie* 
of troops and stores. And when this request was wholly disregarded, he 
begged that himself, at least, might be permitted to leave the kingdom with 
his family ; since the times were now so favourable for obtaining again the 
sovereignty of which he had been deprived. The king being immersed in 
sloth and pleasure, paying no attention to any thing that was before him, and 
utterly regardless also of the future, still foolishly refused to hear the pe- 
titions ofCleomenes. ButSosibius, who was then the first in the administra- 
tion of the kingdom, assembled together his friends, to consider what was most 
proper to be done. In this council it was soon determined, that they would 
not sen^aack Cleomenes with a fleet and forces. For, besides that, from the 
timeinHftch Antigonus had died, they had entirely disregarded all the af- 
fairs abroad, and, on that account, considered the expense-that must attend 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 435 



this expedition as a thing unnecessary, they were apprehensive likewise, that, 
as there was new no general left that was equal to Cleomenes, this prince 
would soon be able to subdue all Greece, with little difficulty, and might 
then turn his arms, perhapg, against themselves, and become to Egypt a most 
dangerous and formidable enemy. And this, indeed, was rather to be 
dreadrd, because he had viewed the whole state of their affairs in the clearest 
light ; had conceived a high and just contempt of the conduct and manners of 
the king; and had also seen that many parts of their dominions were inde- 
pendent and far separated from the rest, and offered many favourable op- 
portunities for action to a dexterous enemy. For, at this time, there were 
many ships at Samos, and a considerable number also of troops at Ephesus. 
From these reasous they concluded, that it was by no means proper to furnish 
him with the supplies that were desired. On the other hand, if they should 
dismiss a man so great and eminent, after they had thus contemptuously 
slighted his request, it was manifest that he would from then.«e become their 
most implacable and sharpest enemy. It remained, therefore, that, in spite 
of his own desire and inclinations, he should be still detained at Alexandria. 
J>ut this design was at once, without deliberation, condemned by a\\. For 
they judged it would be much too dangerous to shut up a lion in the same 
fold with sheep. %>sibius, more than all the rest, was apprehensive of the ill 
...effects of such a measure, from the reasons which I am going to relate. 

At the time when the design was formed to destroy Magas and Berenice, 
'the persons who conducted it were distracted with no small solicitude ; chiefly, 
lest the bold and resolute spirit of the princess should baffle their attempts,, 
and defeat the whole conspiracy. In this apprehension they employed great 
pains to draw the courtiers to their party.; and promised large rewards to aH, 
in case that their project should be attended with success. Among the rest, 
Sosibius had recourse especially to Csieouaenes, whom he 'knew to be a man of 
deep sense and judgment, well versed in the: conduct of great affairs, and 
who at this time was soliciting some assistance from the king. Flattering 
him., therefore, with the hopes of obtaining all that he desired, he disclosed 
to him the secret of the who.le design. Cleomenes, perceiving that his mind 
was filled with doubt and apprehension, and that he dreaded more especially 
some resistance from the foreign troops, exhorted him to lay aside his fears; 
and promised that these mercenaries, instead of taking arms against him, 
should be even ready to assist him in his project, in ease that there should be 
occasion for it. And when Sosibius appeared surprised at this assurance, 
f \ Do you not see," continued he, ■" that there are three thousand men from 
Peloponnesus, and a thousand Cretans, who all, at the least nod which I shall 
make, will join to execute your orders? And when these troops are drawn 
together for your defence, what have you left to dread ? the soldiers of Syria 
and Caria ?" Sosibius heard 'this discourse with pleasure, and was greatly 
encouraged by it to persist in Ins design. But afterwards, when he saw the 
weakness and effeminacy of the king, the words that were now spoken by 
Cleomenes were for ever present to his mind ; and forced him to reflect con- 
tinually upon the encerpritiing disposition of this prince, and the favour in 
which he stood among the mercenaries. At this time, therefore, he resolved 
to engage his friends, and Ptolemy himself, to consent that Cleomenes should 
be seized, and shut up in close confinement. And this was soon effected, in 
the following manner. 

There was a certain Messenian named Nicagoras, who had received the 
rights of hospitality from the father of Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon ; 
and from thence some kind of intercourse, though slight and general, had beeu 
still preserved between the sou also and himself. But, when Archidamus, in 
order to avoid the vengeance of Cleomenes, was forced to fly from IjMjftita, and 
sought refuge in Messene, Nicagoras received him into his hou^Br»d sup- 
plied him with all necessaries; and, as they conversed together^ Rnually, 



236 GENERAL HISTOHY OF POLYBIUS. 



a mutual inclination to each other by degrees took place, which at last, was 
ripened into the most perfect confidence and friendship. When Cteornefies, 
therefore, some time afterwards, gave hopes that he would again be reconv- 
erted to Archidamus, and permit him to return, Nicagoras was employed at 
his own request to settle the conditions of the treaty. And when these were 
on both sides ratified, Archidamus set out to return to Sparta; and thought 
himself secure in the agreement, that had been thus negociated by his friend. 
But Cleomenes met him upon the road and killed him; but suffered Nica- 
goras, with the rest of the attendants, to escape. Nicagoras concealed his 
sentiments, and outwardly professed great obligations to Cleomenes, who had 
thus spared his life. But in his mind he bore a strong resentment of the ac- 
tion : because it seemed that through his means chiefly th§ king had fallen 
into the snare that proved so fatal to him. 

This man then, about the time of which we are speaking, arrived at Alex- 
dria, with some horses which he had brought to sell. As he came to land he 
saw Cleomenes, who was walking with Hippitas and Panteus, near the har- 
bour. Cleomenes saluted him with great affection, and inquired the busines$ 
of his voyage. And when Nicagoras told him that he had brought some horses, 
" I could wish," said he, " most heartily, that you had rather brought some cata- 
mites and dancers; for these are the amusement of the present king." I*\- 
cagoras then smiled, but made no reply. But some days afterwards, being 
admitted, upon the business of his horses, to the presence of Sosibius, in or- 
der to incense him against Cleomenes, he reported to him this discourse. And 
-when he observed he was heard with pleasure, he discovered all the grounds 
of his own aversion against that prince. When Sosibius found that he was in 
reality an enemy -to Cleomenes, he offered to him some considerable presents, 
and promising also more, prevailed upon him to write a letter, which should 
contain some charge against Cleomenes, and to leave it sealed with orders to a 
servant to deliver it within some days after his departure. Nicagoras entered 
readily into all the project, and sailed away from Alexandria. The letter was 
then delivered to Sosibius, who carried it, together with the servant, to the king. 
The servant declared that Nicagoras had left the letter, with orders that he 
should deliver it to Sosibius. The letter itself imported, that Cleomenes, if 
the king should still persist in refusing the supplies that were necessary for his 
return, had resolved soon to raise commotions in the kingdom. Sosibius, 
seizing the occasion, urged the king and all that were about hiuirto admit no 
delay, but instantly to prevent the treason by securing the person of Cleo- 
menes. And this accordingly was done. They allotted to him for his resi- 
dence a house of great extent, in which he was guarded carefully : so that he 
differed in no respect from other prisoners, except only that his prison was of 
a larger size, 

Cleomenes, when he had weighed all the circumstances of his present state^ 
and perceived that there was no room left for hope, was determined to attempt 
and hazard every thing, in order to regain his liberty: not so much in expecta- 
tion that he should be able to succeed in the design, since he was destitute of 
all the necessary means ; but rather because he had resolved to die a glorious 
death, without suffering any thing that might disgrace his former greatuess ; 
having fixed, as I suppose, his whole attention upon that noble sentiment of 
the poet, so flattering to men of elevated minds: 

Welcorae fate ! 
'Tis true I perish, yet I perish great : 
Yet in a mighty deed I shall expire ; 
Let future ages hear it, and admire *. 

HajaBK waited, therefore, till the king was gone from Alexandria to Cano- 

pus, Hk'ii spread a report among his guards that he should sown obtain his 

* Pope, Iliad 22. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBITJS. 237 



liberty. Upon this pretence he feasted all his family, and distributed among 
his soldiers also meat and wine, and crowns of flowers. The guards, not 
suspecting any kind of fraud, gave full indulgence to their appetites. And 
ivheu at last they had drank to great excess, Cleomenes, with his friends and 
servants, having poniards in their hands, passed through them unperceived, 
about the middle of the day. When they came into the street, they there 
met Ptolemy, who, in the absence of the king, was intrusted with the govern- 
ment of the city: and having struck a terror into his attendants, they pulled 
him from his chariot, and shut him up; and then called aloud to the people 
to resume their liberty. Bat when the multitude were all so struck with 
terror at the bolduess of the attempt, that none approached to join them, they 
trected their way towards the citadel, with design to force their entrance, and 
take the prisoners to their assistance. But the officers, in apprehension of this 
accident, had strongly barred the gates. Disappointed, therefore, in this hope 
likewise, they at last killed themselves with their own poniards: and then 
showed a courage that was truly Spartan. In this manner fell Cleomenes ; a 
prince whose manners were dexterous and insinuating, as his capacity in the 
administration of affairs was great : and who, to express his character in a 
word, was most admirably formed by nature both for a general and a kin«'. 
' M ithin a short time after this event, Theodotus the governor of Ccele-syria, 
an Etohan by his birth, resolved to enter into treaty with Antiochus, and to 
deliver to him the cities of his province. He was urged to this design partly 
by the contempt which he had conceived of Ptolemy, on account of his lazy 
and luxurious life; and partly also because he was persuaded that some ill de- 
signs had been formed against himself by the ministers of the court. For not 
long before, though he had performed many important services, as well on 
otner occasions, as more especially at the time in which Antiochus first invaded 
Ccele-syria, he not only had received no reward or favour, but on the contrary 
was ordered to return to Alexandria, and even found it difficult to escape with 
life. Antiochus received his offer with the greatest joy: and the agreement 
wafs m a short time fully regulated. But we shall now perform for this house, 
likewise, what we have done with respect to Ptolemy ; and looking back to 
the time in which Antiochus began to reign, shall from thence give a short 
account of the chief events to the commencement of the war which we are 
now preparing to describe. 

CHAP. V. 

Antiochus was the youngest son of Seleucus, surnamed Callinicus. As 
soon as his father was dead, and his elder brother had, in right of his birth, 
succeeded in the throne, he at first retired from the court, and fixed his resi- 
dence in the upper Asia. But some time afterwards, when his brother hav- 
ing passed mount Taurus with an army was deprived of his life by treachery, 
as we before related, he returned and took possession of the kingdom; leaving to 
Achseus the government of the country that was on this side of mount Taurus. 
At the same time also he intrusted to the care of Molon, and of Alexander, 
Molon's brother, all the upper provinces ; and appointed the first to be the 
governor of Media, and the other of Persis. 

But not long afterwards, these two, despising the king on account of hi* 
tender age, being incited also by the hope that Achseus might be engaged to 
enter with them into their design, but chiefly because they dreaded the cruel 
disposition, and the wicked arts of Hermias, who was then the first in the ad- 
ministration of affairs, resolved to throw off their allegiance, and employ all 
their power to engage the upper provinces to revolt. ^^ 

Hermias was, by birth, a Carian, and had been intrusted witbjBHfcipreme 
direction of the kingdom by Seleucus, the brother of Antiochudfl . Ki beset 



258 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

<©ut upon his expedition towards mount Taurus. Raised to this high post, 
he grew jealous of all besides thai* were in any manner distinguished in the 
t-ourt. And being by nature cruel, he sometimes aggravated little faults into 
crimes of moment, and punished them with the last severity. Sometimes, 
himself both forged the accusation and decided as the judge, without any re- 
morse or pity '. Above all the rest, he wished most earnestly for some occasion 
by which he might destroy Epigenes, who had led the forces back that had 
attended on Seleucus. For he knew that he was a man of eminent abilities, 
both in the cabinet and the field, and that his authority also among the troops 
was great. Having marked him, therefore, as the chief object of his fear and. 
hatred, he attended carefully to every accident that might furnish him with 
some pretersee against him. At this time, when the king had called together 
a council, to deliberate on the measures that were most proper to be taken 
agaiast the rebels, aud had commanded every man to speak his sentiments, 
Epigenes, who rose up the first, advised, that, in a matter of so near and 
great importance, no monaent should be lost: that the king himself should 
liasten in person to the place, and not suffer the occasion to escape : that, by 
tiis presence in the country with a sufficient force, either Molon must at once 
be forced to abandon his designs, or, in case that he still should have the 
"boldness to persist, the people would all join to seize, and deliver him a pri- 
soner to the king. He had scarcely ended, when Hermias, rising full of rage, 
declared, that Epigenes, for a long time past, had harboured secretly such 
•counsels in his heart, as were the most pernicious to the kingdom ; but, that 
now his sentiments had appeared without disguise, since he had thus urged 
the king to inarch in person into a country that was armed against him, with 
a. force too small for his security, and, in a word, to throw himself at once inta 
the power of the rebels. He then said no more ; but, being satisfied with 
having stamped this first bad impression of Epigenes, so that his words seemed 
rather the effect of an inconsiderate and hasty peevishness, than of any settled 
liatred, he went on to deliver his own opinion; which was, that the king should 
liay aside all thoughts of marching against Molon, and rather turn his arms 
against the king of Egypt. For, being himself unskilled in the affairs of 
war, he feared to encounter with the dauger, which this expedition seemed 
to promise: and was persuaded, on the other hand, that Ptolemy, a prince 
immersed in sloth and pleasure, might be attacked with little hazard. Having 
thus struck a terror into all the members of the council, he gave to Xenon, 
snd to Theodotus, a native of Hermione, the conduct of the forces that were 
tvere ordered to be sent against the rebels. 

From this time also, he never ceased to press the king .continually, to enfer 
Coele-syria with an army: being persuaded, that if this young prince should 
be once inclosed on every side by war, perplexed with difficulties, and dis- 
tressed by danger, he would stand so much in need ©f his constant counsel 
and assistance, that he never would be able to entertain a thought of inquiring 
into any of his former faults, or make any attempt to divest him of that 
power of which he was then possessed. At last, therefore, haying forged a 
letter, which he pretended had been sent to him from Achseus, he carried it 
to the king. The import of it was, " that Ptolemy ha<| strongly urged 
Achseus to assume the royal diadem, and promised to assist him both with 
ships and money, in case that he would declare himself the sovereign of the 
■countries which he, at that time, governed : that, in fact, he already was the 
sovereign of them ; and, why then should he envy himself the name, and 
foolishly reject the crown which was thus placed upon his head by fortune ?" 
Antioehus gave full credit to this letter, and was now fixed in the design of 
invading Coele-syria without delay. 

Abo»|»^iis time, while the king was at Seleucia, near Zeugma, Laoditse, 
who \vm . Bfeigned to be his wife, arrived from Cappadocia, conducted by 
Diogn™ I She was the daughter of king Mithridates, and was a virgin. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 23£ 



Mithridates himself derived his descent from one of those seven Persians 
who killed the Magus ; and boasted also, that his kingdom, which stood upon 
the coast of the Euxine sea, was the same which had first been given to his 
ancestors by Darius. Antiochus, attended by a numerous train of courtiers, 
met the princess on her journey : and solemnized the nuptials with such, 
splendour and magnificence, as were worthy of a king. From thence he went 
down to Antiochia; and, having declared Laodice his queen, began to make 
all the necessary preparations for the war. 

During this "time, Molon, with the assistance of his brother Alexander, who 
engaged, without reserve, in the same design, drew to his party all the people 
of his government ; partly by the promise of great riches and rewards, and 
partly also by intimidating the chief men of the country, to whom he showed 
some letters of a severe and threatening strain, which he pretended to have 
been written by the king. He took care also to secure himself against all 
danger from the neighbouring provinces ;. having, by large presents, gained 
the favour of the governors. And, when his measures were all fully regulated, 
he began his march with a very numerous army, and advanced to meet the 
forces of the king. 

The generals Xenon andTheodotus were struck with terror at his approach, 
and retired into the cities. Molon, therefore, became at once the master of all 
the country round Apollonia, which abounded with supplies and stores of 
every kind in the greatest quantity. Before this success, his power, indeed, 
was greatly to be dreaded, on account of the riches and the wide extent of the 
country which he governed. For all the royal herds of horses are bred among; 
the Medes. Their cattle and their fruits are scarcely to be numbered. Nor 
is it easy to express the natural strength and greatness of tins province. 

For Media, which is situated near the midst of Asia, far surpasses every other 
province, as well in its extent, as in the height also, and the number of the 
mountains with which the country all is covered. It commands likewise many 
great and powerful nations, that are situated close upon the borders of it. 
On the side towards the east, are those desert plains that lie between 
Persis and Parrhasia; the passes that are called the Caspion gates; and 
the Tapyrian mountains, which are not far distant from the Hyrcanian sea. 

On the south it extends towards the borders of Mesopotamia, Apob. 
ionia, and Persia, and is covered by the mountain Zagrus, which rise* 
to a hundred stadia in its height, and whose summit, being parted into, 
many separate hills, forms deep declivities and spacious valleys, which are 
inhabited by the Cossaeans, the Corbrense, Carohians, and other barbarous, 
tribes, all celebrated for their prowess and dexterity in war. Towards the west 
it is closely joined to the people ealled the Atropatians, who themselves are 
not far distant from the nations that reside upon the borders of the Euxine 
sea. And lastly', this province, on the side towards the north, is bounded by 
the Elymfeans, Ariaraca?, Caddusians, and the Matianians, and command* 
those countries likewise that extend towards that part of the Pontus which U 
joined with the Mseotis. The province itself is broken into many parts, by- 
various chains of mountains, which cover it, at certain distances, from east to 
west, and the plains between are all rilled with vil'ages and cities. Molon, 
therefore, being master of a province so considerable, and which was indeed 
itself a kingdom, was before, as we have said, very greatly to be dreaded. But 
now, when the generals of the king had yielded to him all the open country, 
and this first success had inspired his troops with confidence, jus power ap- 
peared so great and formidable that all the people of Asia were struck with 
consternation, and began to lose all hope of being able to resist his arms. At 
first, therefore, he resolved to pass the Tigris, and to besiege Seleucia. But, 
being prevented in thi3 design, by Zeuxis, who had removed all theJMB|B thai: 
were upon the river, he retreated back again to a place that wafl Kit thv 



he* M t 



240 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



Camp, in the neighbourhood ofCtesiphon, and made the necessary prepara- 
tions to pass the winter there with his army. 

As soon as the king received the news that Molon had already made so 
quick a progress, and that his generals had retired before him, he resumed 
again his first design, and resolyed to suspend his expedition against Ptolemy, 
and to march without any new delay immediately against the rebels. But 
Hermias, persisting still in his former projects, gave to Xencetas, an Achsean, 
the supreme command of all the forces, and sent him against Molon. It was 
proper, he said, that generals should be employed to bring back rebellious 
subjects to their duty ; but that a king should only take the field against a 
king, when the contest was for glory and for empire. And as Antiochus was 
at this time wholly in his power, he immediately began his march to Apamea, 
assembled the troops together, and from thence advanced to Laodicea. From 
this city the king continued his route with all the army, and having passed the 
desart, entered a close and narrow valley, which lies between the Libanus and 
Antilibanus, and is called the vale of Marsyas. The narrowest part of the 
valley is covered by a lake and marshy ground, from whence are gathered 
aromatic reeds. The two sides of it are secured by two fortresses, the one of 
•which is called Bronchi, and the" other Gerrha, which leave but a very incon- 
siderable space between them. The king, having marched some days. along 
the valley, and, in his way, reduced the cities that were near, came, at last to 
Gerrha, and, finding that Theodotus theiEtolian, had posted a sufficient force 
in both the fortresses, had fortified with trenches and with pallisades the pass 
that led along the lake, and had placed some troops in every part that was 
commodious for it, he, at first, endeavoured to dislodge the enemy, and to force 
his passage. But, as all the posts were thus strongly fortified, he suffered 
great loss in the attempt, without being able to annoy the enemy. And, as 
Theodotus also was at this time firm in the interests of his master, he, at last, 
was forced to abandon the design. 

Antiochus, being thus repulsed, and not able to surmount the difficulties 
that were before him, at the same time also received the news that Xencetas 
bad suffered an entire defeat, and that all the upper provinces had submitted 
to the rebels. He resolved, therefore, to lay aside at once all further thoughts 
of the expedition in which he was now engaged, and to turn back again with- 
out delay to the assistance of his own proper kingdom. 

For Xenoetas being raised, as we have said, to the supreme command, and 
invested with a power to which his hopes had never dared to aspire, rejected 
with disdain the counsels of his friends, and pursued, in all his conduct, the dic- 
tates only of his own hasty and impetuous will. He led the army, however, to 
Seleucia, and being joined there by Diogenes and Pythiades, the first of whom 
was governor of the Susian province, and the other of the Red Sea, he ad- 
vanced with all his forces, and encamped in sight of the enemy, having the 
Tigris in his front. But being assured by many soldiers who swam over to 
him from the camp of Molon, that, if he would pass the river, the whole army 
of the rebels, who were jealous of their general's greatness, and in their hearts 
still preserved a strong affection for the king, would at once embrace his 
party, he resolved immediately to transport his forces to the other side ; and 
at first made a shew as if he had designed to lay a bridge across the river in a 
part that formed a kind of island. But as he was wholly destitute of all things 
that were proper for his purpose, this attempt gave no solicitude to Molon. 
But, afterwards, when he had drawn together all the boats that he was able to 
procure, he selected from the army the bravest of the forces, both infantry and 
cavalry, and leaving the care of the camp to Zeuxis and Pythiades, he marched 
downJyte stream to the distance of about eighty stadia from the place in which 
Molgj Bl encamped, passed the river without resistance, and encamped upon 
mtageous ground, which was almost every way surrounded by the 




GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 241 






river, and covered also in the other parts by pools and marshes that were not 
easy to be passed. As soon as Molon was informed of what had happened, he 
sent away his cavalry, in the hope that they would be able with little difficulty 
to intercept the forces as they passed the river, and obtain as easy victory over 
those that had already gained the land. But these troops,. an they approached, 
were themselves soon vancpiished, without any efforts of the enemy. For being 
wholly unacquainted with the ground, they were plunged at every step into 
pits and pools; and, being thus deprived of the power of resisting, were there 
all destroyed. Xenoetas, who was still persuaded that the rebels, upon his first 
approach, would run to embrace his party, continued his march afterwards 
along the river, and encamped very near the enemy. Molon, either by stra- 
tagem, or because he was apprehensive that the troops might indeed be in- 
clined to join Xenoetas, left his baggage behind him in the camp, and begin- 
ning his march by night, directed his route towards Media. Xenoetas, not 
doubting but that the retreat of Melon was the effect of fear and want of con- 
fidence in his troops, took possession of the camp from which the enemy had 
retired ; and brought over also all cavalry, together with the baggage, which 
he had left on the other side of the river under the command of Zeuxis. He 
then assembled the troops together and exhorted them boldly to expect a 
happy issue' from the war, since Molon had already fled. He ordered them to 
take their full repast, and to be ready at break of day to pursue the enemy. 
The soldiers, being thus filled with confidence, and finding all kinds of provi- 
sions in the camp, began to eat and drink without moderation or restraint, till 
they fell at last into that state of careless and insensible security which is the 
usual attendant of excess. 

But Molon, when he had gained a proper distance, ordered his troops to 
take their supper, and then returned again towards the camp ; and arriving 
about break of day, forced the entrenchments, and fell with fury upon the 
enemy while they were all dispersed and drowned in wine. Xenoetas, struck 
with consternation, and having in vain employed his efforts to raise the soldiers 
from their drunken sleep, threw himself into the middle of the combatants, 
and lost his life. The greatest part of the troops were destroyed sleeping in 
theb beds. The rest plunged into the river, and hoped to gain the camp that 
was on the other side. But of these the greater part were also lost. In a word, 
disorder, noise, and tumult, were spread through all the camp. Every mind 
was filled with horror and distraction. In this state the troops, as they turned 
their eyes towards the camp on the opposite shore, which stood in full view, 
, and at a very inconsiderable distance from them, forgot at once the strength 
. and rapid violence of the stream that was between. Blinded, therefore, by 
t their fears, and urged by the eager hopes of life, they leaped into the river ; 
and even threw into it their horses and their baggage, as if the stream, by 
some kind of providential care, would have assisted them in their distress, and 
wafted them to the opposite bank in safety. But how lamentable, and how 
full of horror was the scene! men struggling with the waters; horses also, and 
beasts of burden, floating down the stream ; with arms, dead carcasses, and 
every kind of baggage. 

Molon, being thus master of the eamp, passed the river without resistance, 
and gained possession also of the other camp, from which Xeuxis bad retired 
at his approach. After this success he advanced with all his army toSeleucia, 
and took it in the first assault; for Zeuxis still fled before him, together with 
Dioinedon, the governor of the city. From hence he marched through the 
country, and SHbdued, without any difficulty, all the upper provinces. Having 
made himself master of Babylon, with the country which extends along the 
borders of the Red Sea, became to Susa, and took this city also in the first 
nssault, but failed in his attempt to reduce the citadel, into whichjifrio^nes 
had thrown himself with a body of forces. Leaving, therefore, one^nt of his 
army to invest the place, he returned back again with the rest to Seleucia, 

VOL. 1. NO. 5. 2 H 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



upon the Tigris. And having carefully 'refreshed his troops, and encouraged 
them to pursue the war, he again took the field, and subdued all the country 
which lay along the Tigris, and was called Parapotamia, as far as to the city 
Europus, and all Mesopotamia likewise as far as Dura. 

The news of these rapid victories' forced Antiochus, as we have already said, 
to lay aside all thoughts of reducing Ccele-syria, and to turn his whole atten- 
tion upon the danger which so nearly threatened him. Reassembled, there- 
fore, a second council, and commanded every one to declare his sentiments 
with respect to the measures that were most proper to be taken to check the 
progress of the rebels. Epigenes again spoke the first-, and said, that before 
the enemy had gained such great advantages, his opinion was, that the king 
should march himself into the country without delay; and that he still per- 
sisted in the same advice. 

He had scarcely ended, when Hermias, giving now full scope to his resent- 
ment, vented his rage in severe reproaches, and charged Epigenes with many 
titter accusations, which were both absurd and false. He extolled the merits 
also of his own great services, and pressed the king, with the utmost earnest- 
ness, by no means to desist from his first design, or abandon, upon so slight a 
show of reason, the hopes which he had conceived of joining Ccele-syria to his 
empire. But this conduct gave no small offence to the whole assembly. An- 
tiochus himself was also much displeased, and employed all his power to quiet 
the contention, which he at last indeed effected, but not without great diffi- 
culty. The measures which Epigenes had advised were approved by all the 
council, as the wisest and most necessary in the present circumstances. It, 
therefore, was resolved, that all other business should give place, and that the 
king should employ all his force against the rebels without delay. 

As soon as the affair was thus decided, Hermias let fall at once all farther 
contest, and conformed himself to this opinion, together with the rest. And 
declaring also, that when a resolution was once taken, every man was obliged 
in duty to receive it without objection or excuse, he applied himself in earnest, 
and with the greatest diligence, to make all the necessary preparations for the 
war. But when the troops were drawn together to Apamea, and a sedition 
liad broken out among them, on account of some arrears that were owing to 
them from their pay, observing that the king was filled with consternation, and 
• seemed to fear this disorder, having happened at a time so critical, might be 
attended with some fatal consequences, he offered to discharge, at his own ex- 
pense, the allowance that was due, on condition only that Epigenes should be 
dismissed. For, he said, that as their mutual contests and resentment had 
been raised to such a height, it was greatly to be feared that their presence 
together in the army would soon prove the source of some new disorders, 
which might be fatal' in the conduct of the war. The king, who knew that 
Epigenes had gained a consummate skill in the art of war, and who wished 
especially, on that account, that he might attend him in his expedition, re- 
ceived this demand with great reluctance and concern. But being pressed 
and closely urged on every side, by the officers of his house, and by all his 
guards and servants, whom Hermias, b}^ his wicked artifices, had engaged in 
his designs, he was not long master of himself, but was forced to yield to what 
4 he times required; to consent to all that was proposed, and to send orders to 
Epigenes that he should remain at Apamea. The members of the council 
were all seized with terror. The troops, having obtained their wishes, returned 
again to their duty, and were disposed to advance all the interests of Hermias, 
who had thus procured the payment of their stipends. The Cyrrhestse alone, 
who were in number about six thousand men, persisted still in their revolt, 
and having' separated themselves from the rest of the army, for some time 
occasimed no small trouble. But they were at last defeated in a set engage- 
ment flph one of the generals of the king, who destroyed the greater part of 
them in the action, and forced the rest to surrender at discretion. Hermia* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 243 

having thus struck all the friends of the king with terror, and secured to him- 
Belfthe favour and affection of the army, began his march, together with the 
kin-, and about the same time also formed the following contrivance to destroy 
Epigenes, having engaged in his design Alexis, who commanded in the citadel 
of Apamea. A letter was written in the name of Molon to Epigenes, and was 
placed privately among his papers, by a servant whom they had gained by 
large promises to their party. Some time afterwards, Alexis came to Epi- 
genes, and demanded, whether he had not received some letters from the 
rebels. Epigenes, not without some shew of indignation, denied the charge. 
But Alexis, having replied that he would search, entered hastily into his 
apartments, found the letter, and upon that pretence immediately killed Epi- 
genes. The king was prevailed on to believe that he had merited his fate; 
and those that were about the court, though they had some suspicion of the 
treachery, were restrained to silence by their fears. 

The king now advanced towards the Euphrates, and being joined by the 
forces that were there, he continued his march from thence, and came to An- 
tiochia inMygdonia, about the beginning of the winter. And having rested 
during forty days, till the extreme severity of the cold was passed, he again 
decamped, and arrived at Liba, and there called together his council, to deli- 
berate on the route by which he should advance against the rebels, who were 
at that time in the neighbourhood of Babylon, and to consider also by what 
means the army might most commodiously be furnished with provisions mi 
their march. In this assembly it was urged by ITerrnias, that they should 
continue their route along the Tigris, by which means they would be covered 
not only by that river but by the Lycus also"" and the Caprus. Zeuxis, to 
whose view' the late lamentable fortune of Epigenes was present, for some time 
feared to declare his sentiments. But as the measure that was now proposed 
was sure to be attended with inevitable ruin, he at last ventured to advise, 
that they should pass the Tigris. He shewed, " that in general the route 
along the Tigris was very rough and difficult ; that after having advanced to a 
considerable' distance, and passed a desert also, which was not to be traversed 
in less than six days' march, they must at last arrive at a place that was called 
the Royal Camp; that if the enemy should first have gained possession of this 
post it would be impossible for them to advance beyond it: nor could they, 
on the other hand, return back again through the desert without the danger 
of being lost in tlveir retreat, through the waut of necessaries; whereas, on the' 
other hand, if the king would now pass the river, it was not to be doubted but 
that all the' Apollonians would seize at once the occasion of his presence, and 
! return again to their duty, since they were joined to Molon not by any afi'ec- 
ition but by necessity and fear; that as the country was rich and fertile, the 
S troops might from thence be furnished with provisions in the greatest plenty ; 
5 that Molon, being then cut oft' from his return to Media, and deprived of ihe 
■ subsistence likewise which he had hitherto received from all this province, must 
I of necessity be forced to venture, on a battle ; or in case he should decline it, 
that his troops would sooon revolt, and run to embrace the party of the king." 
This opinion was consented to by all. They divided the army, therefore, into 
three separate bodies ; passed the river in three different parts with all their 
baggage, and came to Dura, which was then besieged by one of the generals of 
Molon. 'But the siege was raised upon the first approach. They then conti- 
nued their march forwards without delay, and having on the 8th day passed 
beyond the Oricus arrived at Apollonia. 

When Molon was informed that Ahtiochus advanced fast towards him, dis- 
trusting on the one hand the fidelity of the people of Susiaha and of Babylon, 
who bad so lately been constrained to join his party* and dreading also, on the 
other hand, that' his return to Media might be soon cutoff, he re*olved*to lay a 
{bridge across the Tigris, to transport his army over, and possess himsOT, before 
.hus, of those mountains that stood upon the borders of the Apollonian 



S44 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



territory; being persuaded, that with the assistance of the Cyrtian slingers^ 
who were very numerous, he should be able to maintain that post against the 
king. The design was immedhiteiy carried into execution* He passed the 
river, and continued his march forwards with the greatest haste. But whea 
he had just reached the mountains, his light-armed troops that were sent be- 
fore were met by those of the king, who had also begun his march from Apol- 
lonia with all his army. These troops at first engaged together in some slight 
skirmishes; but as the main bodies now approached, they severally retired,, 
and encamped together with their respective armies, leaving the distance of 
about forty stadia between the camps. 

When night came on, Molon, having considered with himself how difficult 
and dangerous it was to lead an army of rebels against their sovereign, face to 
face, and in the, clear light of day, resolved to attack Antiochus in the night. 
He selected, therefore, all the bravest of his troops, and taking a circuit round, 
designed to choose some eminence, and to fall from thence upon the royal 
camp. But being informed that ten young soldiers had left him rn the march 
and gone to join the king, he was forced to desist from his design, and return 
back again to his own entrenchments, which he entered about break of day, 
and spread great disorder through all the camp. For the soldiers being thus 
suddenly awakened from their sleep were so terrified by the noise and tumult 
of his entry, that they began to fly with great precipitation from the camp, 
Molon employed all his pains to calm their apprehensions, and, as effectually 
as the time would then permit, quieted the disorder* 

As soon as day appeared, the king, having drawn out all his forces, ranged 
them in order of battle. Upon the right wing he placed first the cavalry that 
were armed with lances, under the command of Ardys, a general of consum- 
mate skill and bravery. Next to these were the Cretan troops ; then the 
tectosages ; after these, the Grecian mercenaries ; and last of all, in the same 
line, the phalanx. .Upon the left wing stood the cavalry, who were called the 
companions of the king. The elephants, which were ten in number, were 
stationed, at certain distances, in front of all the army. Some cohorts alsoy 
both of infantry and cavalry, were distributed into both the wings, with or- 
ders that they should surround the enemy, and fall upon their flank, as soon 
as the battle was begun. The king then. went round the array, and raised 
the courage of the troops by a short harangue, such as the time required. He 
gave the care of the left wing to Hermias and Zeuxis, and himself com- 
manded in the right. 

Molon drew out likewise alibis forces, and ranged them In order of battle, 
but not without the greatest difficulty : for the tumult and confusion that 
were raised in the night before had not yet subsided. At last, however, hav- 
iug observed the disposition of the enemy, he placed his cavalry also upon the 
wings ; and the peltaphori, the Gauls, and all his heavy»armed forces in the 
centre. The^archers, slingers, and all the rest of the light-armed troops, were 
thrown into the extremity ©f either wing ; and the chariots, armed with 
falchions, were disposed, at certain distances, in the front of all the army. 
The left wing was commanded by his brother Neolas, and himself led the 
right. 

The two armies now approached each other, and began the combat. The 
right wing of Molon remained firm to their engagements, and bravely sus- 
tained the charge of Zeuxis : but the left no sooner had beheld the presence 
of the king, than they joined themselves immediately to his party. This ac- 
cident, as it inspired the royal troops with double ardour, struck the rebels 
with consternation and despair. Molon, perceiving what had happened, and 
being already inclosed on every side, representing also to his mind the cruel 
torments which he must soon be forced to suffer, in case that he should fall 
alive into the power of the enemy, killed himself with his own hands. The 
rest of the chiefs likewise, who had joined in the revolt, retired all to their 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 24.3 



several houses, and embraced a voluntary death. Neolas, escaping- from the 
battle, fled into Persis, to Alexander the brother of Melon, And when he 
had first killed Molon's mother, together with his children, and prevailed on 
Alexander also to consent to die, he then pierced himself with his own sword, 
and fell upon their bodies. The king plundered the camp of the rebels; and 
ordered the body of Molon to be exposed upon a cross in the most conspicu- 
ous part of Media. This according!}' was done. The body was removed into 
the district of Callonitis, and was there fixed upon a cross, upon the ascent of 
the mountain Zagrus. He then reproached the troops with their rebellion, in 
a long and severe harangue ; but gave them afterwards his hand, in sign of 
pardon, and appointed some persons also to conduct them back again to 
Media, and tc quiet the disorders of the country ; while himself, returning to 
Seleucia, restored peace among the neighbouring provinces, and displayed, in 
all his conduct, not less gentleness than prudence. But Hermias, still inex- 
orable and severe, urged the guilt of the people of Seleucia ; imposed the pay- 
ment of a thousand talents upon the city ; drove into banishment "the magis- 
trates ; and dismembered, tortured, and destroyed great numbers of the in- 
habitants. The king exerted all his power to restrain this fury ; employing 
souk times intreaties and persuasions, and sometimes interposing his autho- 
rity. He lesssened also the fine that was at first demanded from the citizens, 
and exacted a hundred and fifty talents only, in full punishment of their of- 
fence. And thus, though not without great difficulty, he at last calmed 
their minds, and restored quiet to the city. When this was done, he ap- 
pointed Diogenes to be governor of Media, and Apoltodorus of Susiana ; and 
sent Tychou, the chief secretary, to command in the parts that bordered upon 
the Red Sea. Such was the end of the revolt of Molon, and of the disorders 
that were occasioned by it in the upper provinces. 

The king, elate with this success, and being willing also to restrain, for the 
time to come, the barbarous states that were contiguous to his kingdom, from 
assisting his rebellious subjects with supplies or troops, resolved now to turn 
his arms against Artabazanes, who governed the Atropatians, with some others 
of the neighbouring nations, and who, of all the princes of the country, was 
the most considerable in strength and power. Hermias, apprehending still 
the danger that must attend an expedition into these upper provinces, for 
some time stood averse to this design, and was eager to resume his former pro- 
ject of engaging in a war with Ptolemy. But when he heard that a son wau 
born to the king, he began to reflect within himself that, among those bar- 
barous nations some misfortune possibly might happen to Antiochus, and that 
many occasions would arise in which he might be deprived of life. He con- 
sented, therefore, to all that was proposed ; being persuaded, that if he could 
once be able to destroy the king, he should become the guardian of his son, 
and master of all the kingdom. When the affair was thus decided, An- 
tiochus began his march with all his forces, passed beyond the ZagruSj and en- 
tered the territory of Artabazanes, which lies close to Media, and is only se- 
parated from it by a chain of mountains. It extends towards those parts of 
the Pontus which arc above the river Phasis, and approaches also very near 
to the Hyrcanian sea. The country abounds with people who are robust and 
valiant, and especially with horses ; and produces likewise every kind of ne- 
cessaries that are required in war. This kingdom, having never been subdued 
by Alexander, had remained entire frcm the time of the destruction of the 
Persian empire. But Artabazanes, struck with terror at the Ittng's approach, 
and being also at this time very far advanced in age, yielded to the necessity 
that pressed him, and submitted, without reserve, to such conditions as were 
demanded by the king. 

About this time Apollophanes, who was physician to Antiochus, and who 
stood in a high degree of favour with him, observing that the insolence and 
the ambitious yiews of Hermias no longer were restrained within any bound*. 



S46 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



began to entertaiu some apprehensions with respect to the person of the king, 
and was still more alarmed by his fears for his own life and safety. He chose 
the time, therefore, that was most favourable to his purpose, and pressed An- 
tiochus to raise himself from his security ; to be upon his guard against the 
daring spirit of this minister ] and to obviate, in time, that lamentable fate 
in which his brother had so lately perished. He assured him that the danger 
was already very near ; and begged that he would pursue, without delay, such 
measures as might best secure both himself and all his friends. Antiochus, 
upon this discourse, acknowledged that he both feared and hated Hermias ; 
and thanked Apollophanes for his concern, and for the courage also which he 
had shown in speaking to him upon such a subject. • Apollophanes was over- 
joyed to find that he had formed so true' a judgment of the sentiments and 
disposition of the king. And when Antiochus desired him not to be content 
with words alone, but endeavour rather, in conjunction with himself, to find 
out some effectual remedy against the clanger, he assured him that he was 
ready to obey all his orders. Their design was- soon concerted. On pretence 
that the king was seized with a giddiness in his head, the servants of his 
chamber, with all the ordinary guards, were for some days removed, and his 
friends alone were admitted to his presence ; by which means there was full 
time and opportunity to communicate the secret to such persons as were 
proper to be trusted. When they had gained the number that was sufficient 
for their purpose, a* -task which, as Hermias was so generally detested, was -by- 
no means difficult, they prepared -to carry their project into execution. The 
physicians advised that the king should walk abroad as soon as it was day, to 
take the benefit of the cold morning air. At the appointed time, Hermias 
was ready to attend him, together with those friends that were engaged in 
the design. But the rest of the court were absent, not expecting that the 
king would appear abroad at so unusual an hour. When they were come to 
a certain solitary place, at some distance from the camp, tie king turned 
aside, as if to satisfy some necessary occasion, and they then stabbed. Hermias 
with their poignards. Thus fell this minister by a punisment that was far too 
gentle for his crimes. Antiochus, being thus delivered from his feats, im- 
mediately decamped, and directed his route back again to Syria. In every' 
place through which he passed, his actions all were celebrated by the people 
with the loudest praise ; and, above the rest, the fate which he had decreed to 
Hermias. About the same time also, the wife of Hermias was killed at 
Apamea, by the women of the city, and his children by the children. 

As soon as the king arrived at home, and had dismissed bis army to their 
winter quarters, he sent letters to Achaeus, filled with expostulations and re- 
proaches, on account of his having dared to place upon his head the royal 
diadem, and usurped the name of king. He assured him, likewise, that he 
was well acquainted with the measures which he had concerted with king 
Ptolemy, and that, in general, he was perfectly informed of those rebellious 
projects which he had designed against him. For while Antiochus was en- 
gaged in his expedition against Artabazanes, Acheeus, being persuaded 
either that the king would perish in the war, or that, before he could 
be able to return again from a country so remote, himself might enter 
Syria with an army, and, with the assistance of the Cyrrbestse, who had just 
before revolted, might force that kingdom to receive his yoke, began his 
march from Lydii with all his army ; and, when he arrived at Laodicea in 
Phrygia, he there first assumed the diadem, and wrote letters in the royal name 
to all the cities ; being encouraged chiefly in this design by a certain exile, 
whose name was Syniris. But, as he continued his march forwards, and was 
ready just to enter Lyconia, the troops, beginning to perceive that his inten- 
tion was to lead them against their natural prince, fell into discontent and 
mutiny. Achaeus, therefore, after this declaration of their sentiments, de- 
sisted from his project; and, in order to convince the army that he never had 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POEYBIU9. 24? 



led to enter Syria, he changed the direction of his march, and pillaged 
the province of Pisidia. And having thus, by the booty that was made, re- 
gained tlie confidence and favour of the troops, he returned back again to his 
own home. But Antiochus bad been full) informed of all that was designed 
against him. He sent, therefore, as we have said, continual messengers to 
Threaten and reproach Achseus ; and, in the mean while, employed his whole 
pains and diligence in completing all the necessary preparations for his war 
wii.li Ptolemy. 

As the" spring approached, having drawn together to Apamea all his forces, 
lie held there a consultation with his friends, to deliberate on the manner in 
which he best might enter Crcle-syria. Upon this occasion, when many 
long discourses had been made concerniiiir the nature of the country, the pre- 
parations that were necessary, and the advantage of employing a naval arma- 
ment, Apollophanes, whom we have lately mentioned, and who was a native 
of Selucia, cut short at once every opinion that had been proposed, and said 
" that it seemed to be in a high degree absurd, to show so great eagerness 
and haste 10 conquer Ccele-syria ; while, at the same time, Seleueia, the capi- 
tal of the kingdom, and their sacred seat of empire, was still suffered tore- 
main in the hands of Ptolemy ; that, besides the dishonour that was reflected 
upon the king, from suffering his chief city to be possessed by an Egyptian 
garrison, the place itself was such as would afford many very great advan- 
tages for the conduct of the war; that, while an enemy was master of it, it 
must prove a constant, obstacle in the way of all their enterprises ; since, 
whenever they should attempt to advance into a distant province, the danger 
which would constantly hang over their own kingdom from this city would. 
oblige them to employ not less pains and preparation to secvire the several 
posts at home, than those that would be requisite in their expedition against 
the enemy abroad ; but that, on the other hand, if they could once regain pos- 
ses-ion of this place, as their own kingdom would, by that means, be perfectly 
secured from insult ; so the happy situation also of the city might enable 
them to pursue, with great advantage, all their other projects, both by land 
and sea. :: These sentiments were approved by all the council. It was re- 
solved, therefore, to begin the war with attempting to take Seleueia ; which 
had been possessed by an Egyptian garrison from the time of Ptolemy 
Euergetes. For this prince, in resentment of the death of Berenice, had en- 
tered Syria with an army, and made himself master of this city. "When the 
affair was thus determined, the king order Diognetus to steer his course 
towards Seleueia with the fleet, while himself began his march from Apamea, 
and came and encamped near the circus, at the distance of five stadia from 
the city. He sent also Theodotus, the Hermioniau, into Coele-syria, with a 
sufficient body of forces to secure the passes, and to be ready to act on that 
side as occasion should require. 

The situation of Seleueia, with the country round it, is as follows. The 
city stands very near the sea, between Cilicia and Pheenice, at the foot of a 
mountain of an uncommon height, which is called Coryphaeus. This moun- 
tain, on the western side, is washed by the sea that divides Cyprus and Phee- 
nice; and, on the other side towards the east, it commands the country that 
lies round Antiochus and Seleueia. The city itself, being situated on the 
southern side of the mountain, and separated from it by a valley very deep and 
steep, winds away towards the sea, and is surrounded, on almost every side, 
by broken rocks and precipices. In the plain, between the city and the sea, 
are the markets and the suburbs, which are strongly fortified with walls. The 
city also is inclosed with walls of an uncommon strength and beauty, and is 
adorned with temples and other sumptuous edifices. On the side towards 
the sea, it can only be approached by a steep ascent of steps, which are cut 
close and deep into the rocks. Not far from the city i.s the mouth of the river 
Oronte* ; which takes its source near the Libanus and Antilibanus, and, 



• 48 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



passing through the plains of Amyca, flows on to Antiochia, and, having 
cleansed that city of all its filth, fails at last into the sea of Cyprus, near 
Seleucia. 

Antiochus, upon his first approach, endeavoured, by the assurance of very 
great rewards, to prevail on the chief governors to surrender the city to him. 
But when all his offers were rejected, he fecund means to gain some of the 
inferior officers to his party ; and, trusting to the assistance which these had 
promised, he resolved immediately to attack the city, on the side towards the 
sea, with the naval forces, and with the land army on the opposite side. He 
divided the troops, therefore, into three separate bodies, and, haviug encou- 
raged them, as the occasion required, and promised crowns and great rewards 
both to the officers and soldiers, he posted Zeuxb, with the forces that were 
under his command, against the gates which led to Antiochia, and Hermo- 
genes on the side that looked towards Dioscurium. Ardys and Diognefcus 
were commanded also to attack the port and suburbs. For the officers that 
were corrupted by the king had promised that, as soon as he should have 
forced the suburbs, they would deliver the city to him. The signal was now-, 
given for the attack, and the troops advanced from every part with vigour ; 
but chiefly those that were led by Ardys and Diognetus. For, on the other 
sides, the soldiers were forced to crawl to a considerable distance upon their 
bands and feet, and, at the same time, defend themselves against the enemy, 
before they could attempt to scale the walls. But, in the port and suburbs,, 
there was full room to advance, and to fix their ladders, even without re- 
sistance. While the forces, therefore, from the fleet scaled the port, Ardys 
having, at the same time, forced bis way into the suburbs, became master of 
them with little difficulty. For those that were within the city, being them- 
selves closely pressed on every side, were not able to send any assistance to the 
rest. When the king was thus master of the suburbs, the officers who had 
been gained over to his interests ran together to Leontius, the governor of 
the city, and urged him to send a deputation to Antiochus, and endeavour 
to obtain some fair conditions from him, before the city also should be stormed. 
Leontius, not suspecting any treachery, and being himself struck also with 
the consternation which these men now assumed^ sent and demanded from 
Antiochus a promise of life and safety for all that were within the city. The 
king consented that those who were of free condition should be safe. The 
number of them was about six thousand. He then entered the city, and not 
only spared the inhabitants that were free, but permitted those also that had 
fled from the city to Return ; and restored to them their possessions, with all 
their former rights. He secured also, by a sufficient garrison, the port and 
citadel. 



CHAP. VI. 

While Antiochus was thus employed, he received letters from Theodotus, 
who pressed him to advance into Ccele-syria without delay, and promised to 
deliver up the province to him. The king was for some time doubtful and 
irresolute, and knew not what measures were the best to be pursued. Theo- 
dotus, as we have already mentioned, was an iEtolian by his birth, and had 
performed great services for Ptolemy; but instead of being able to obtain 
any suitable reward, he on the contrary had almost lost his life. At the time 
therefore iu which Antiochus was engaged in his expedition against Molon, 
perceiving clearly that no favour was to be expected from king Ptolemy, and 
that the courtiers also had resolved to work his ruin, he prevailed on Panaetolus 
to secure the city of Tyre, while himself seized Ptolemais ; and now pressed 
Antiochus with the greatest earnestness to attempt the conquest of the pro- 
rince. The king, therefore, having at last resolved to suspend a while hi* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. U$ 

designs against Acineus, began his march towards Ccele-syria, by the same 
route which he before had taken ; passed through the Vale of Marsyas, and 
Encamped near the fortress Gerrha, which was situated in the extremity of the 
valley, upon the lake tliat covered the delile. But being informed that Ni- 
<?olaus, one of the generals of Ptolemy, had invested Theodotus iu Ptolemais, 
he advanced in haste wit!) the light armed troops, with design to raise the 
siege ; having left, behind him alt his heavy forces, and given orders to the 
generals to lay siege to Brochi, the other fortress, which stood also- upon the 
Jake, and served to guard the entrance of the defile. Nicolaus no sooner heard 
that the king approached, than he immediately retired ; and sent Lagoras a 
Cretan, and Doryuienes an iEtolian, to secure the passes that were near 
Berytus. But the king, upon his first approach, attacked and drove them 
from their post, and encamped near the passes. And having there received 
the rest of the troops as they came up, and encouraged them by such words 
•as his designs required, lie continued his march forwards, elate with his success 
And filled v,' it h the fairest hopes. About this time also Theodotus and Pan- 
setolus, with all their friends, advanced to join him, and were received with 
the greatest marks of favour. The king then took possession of Tyre and 
Ptolemais, with all the armaments and stores. Among these were forty ves- 
sels ; of which twenty, that were decked ships, completely fitted and equip* 
ped, carried each of .them at least four ranks of oars. Tlte rest were triremes, 
birernes, and single boats. The king left the care of all this fleet to Diog- 
netus ; and having been informed that Ptolemy had retired to Memphis, and 
Aihat the forces of the kingdom were drawn together at Pelusiura ■ that the 
sluices all were opened, and the sweet waters diverted from their course ; 
he desisted from his first design of marching to attack Pelusium, and leading 
Ills army round the country, drew the cities to submission, some by gentle 
means, and some by force. For those that were slightly fortified surrendered 
to him at his first approach. But others, which were strongly situated, and 
and well supplied with stores, remained firm against all persuasion, and forced 
him to encamp before them, and employ much time and pains to reduce them 
by a regular siege. 

During this time, Ptolemy, whose dominions, thus perfidiously attacked, 
demanded the earliest care, remained wholly insensible of all that was trans- 
ected, and showed not even the least desire to revenge the insult. Such was 
the weakness of this laz^ and luxurious prince.; and so great his disregard of 
every thing that related to the affairs of war. But, Sosihius and Agathocles, 
who were the first in the administration of the kingdom, agreed together, to 
pursue those measures, which were, indeed, the best that could be taken ia 
the present circumstances. For they resolved, that they would make all the 
necessary preparations for the war with the greatest diligence, and, in the 
mean while, send ambassadors to Antioehus to treat of peace : being persuaded* 
-that, by this contrivance, they should give a present check to the ardour of 
that prince, and confirm the opinion which he had conceived of Ptolemy, that 
he would, by no means, venture to take arms against him, but rather try to 
terminate the dispute by conferences, and with the assistance of his friends 
prevail upon him to retire again to Ceele-syria. When the project was thus 
concerted, and themselves also charged with the management and execution 
of it, they dispatched an embassy to Antioehus without delay. At tlie same 
time, they engaged the Uhodians also, and Byzantines, with the Cyzicemaus 
and ^Etolians, to send some deputies to mediate a peace. And, while these 
different embassies went and returned again between the kings, they had 
themselves full leisure to complete their preparations for the war. For having 
fixed their residence in Memphis, they there gave audience to the ambassa- 
dors, and received those especially that came to ihem from Antioehus with 
r great marks of favour, but sent, at the same, time, secret orders for drawing 
together to Alexandria all the mercenaries that were employed in any of the 

yoi. i. no. i. »! 



«50 ' GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



provinces abroad. They made new levies, also; and provided such supplies 
of corn and other stores as were sufficient, not only for the troops that were 
then assembled, but for all those likewise who should afterwards arrive to join 
them. They went down also, from time to time, in turn, to Alexandria ; 
that, by their presence, all things might be obtained that were in any manner 
necessary for the war. 

The care of providing proper arms, together with the choice and disposi- 
tion of the troops, was intrusted to Echeciates of Thessaly, Phoxidas a Me- 
litseau, Eurytochus a Magnesian, Socrates of Bceotia, and Cnopias a citizen 
of Alorus. For it happened, most fortunately indeed, at thus juncture, that 
these men were present in the country : who, from having served in the wars 
of Demetrius and Antigonus, had gained some knowledge of real service, 
and were acquainted with the manner of conducting an army in the held* 
They began, therefore to train all the troops anew, according to the rules of 
military science: distributing into separate bodies the soldiers of a different 
age or country, and giving to each the most useful kind of arms, in the room 
of those to which they had been before accustomed. They changed the form 
of the inrolments in which the troops were registered ; and having established 
new and different orders, more suitable to the present times, they taught, by 
continual exercise, every separate body, not only to be obedient to command, 
but also to perform with ease all the steps and motions that belonged to their 
respective arms. They appointed all general reviews, and spared no pains 
to encourage the troops with hopes, or to instruct them in their duty. In this 
task, they received no small assistance from Andromachus of Aspendus, and 
Polycrates of Argos, who had lately arriyed from Greece, and brought with 
them all the skill and martial ardour, for which the people of that country are 
so justly celebrated. fcThey were both distinguished likewise by the splendor 
of their families, and their wealth. Polycrates especially, not only derived 
liis birth from a very antient house, but was illustrious also from the glory 
which Mnasiadas, his lather, had acquired, by his victories in the public 
games. These men now exerted all their efforts to instruct and animate the 
troops: and, both by their harangues in public to the army, as well as by 
their private admonitions, they, by degrees, inspired them with full confidence 
and courage. 

Among the generals, every one was appointed to the charge which seemed 
most perfectly adapted to his talents and peculiar skill. Eurylochus, the 
Magnesian, commanded a body of three thousand men, who^ were called the 
royal yuard ; and Socrates of Bceotia, the peltastse, in number about two 
thousand. Phoxidas the Achcean, with Ptolemy the son of Thraseas, and 
Andromachus of Aspendus, exercised together in a body, the phalanx and 
the Grecian mercenaries. The phalanx, which consisted of twenty-five thou- 
pand men, was commanded by Ptolemy and Andromachus : and the merce- 
naries, who were about eight thousand" by Phoxidas. Seven hundred horse, 
which belonged also to the royal guard, "the cavalry from Afiic, and that 
which had been levied in the country, the whole amounting to about three 
thousa?id, weseboth exercised and commanded likewise by Polycrates. Eche- 
ciates also, the Thessalianj to whom the Grecian and all the foreign cavalry, 
to the number of' two thousand, was intrusted, had traiued and disciplined 
them with such perfect skill and judgment, that they peformed the greatest 
service afterwards in the battle. BuCamong all the rest, there was none that 
surpassed Cnopias of A lot us, in the management of the troops that were in- 
trusted to his care. These wes;e ten thousand Cretans; among whom were 
a thousand Neocretaus, commanded by Philo, a citizen of Cnossus. There 
were also among the troops, three thousand Africans, armed after the Mace- 
donian manner, and led by Ammoisius of Barce ; and a phalanx likewise of 
^Egyptians, composed of twenty thousand men, and commanded by-Sosibius. 
Tjjey had also a body of Gauls and Tbracians; among whom four thousand 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. , *5i 



were the established troops that had long been settled in the country'; and 
two thousand of them were lately raised. At the head of these was Dionysius, 
who was by birth a Thracian. Such were the numbers, and the different na« 
tjoiis, of which the army of Ptolemy was now composed. 

During this time, Antiochus contiuued to press the siege of Dura. But 
his efforts all were fruitless ; both because the place was by nature strongly 
fortified, and the garrison also reinforced, from time to time, by the care of 
Nicolaus. As the winter, therefore, now approached, he yielded to the am* 
bassadors of Ptolemy, consented to a truce of four months' continuance, and 
declared that he was even read}" to put an end to the whole dispute, upon con- 
ditions the most just and reasonable. This assurance was, however, very di£* 
ferent from his real sentiments. But he was now impatient to return, that his 
troops might =take their winter quarters in Seleucia. For it was now clear, be-* 
yond all doubt, that Achseus had formed designs against him, and was joined 
iu close connexion with king Ptolemy. He dismissed, therefore, the ambas- 
sadors, with orders, that the}? should hasten to return again, and meet him at 
Seleucia, bringing with them the last determination of their master. He then 
placed garrisons in all the proper posts, and having left the care of the pro- 
vince toTheodotus, began his march back towards Seleucia, and there sent 
his army into winter quarters. Nor was he, after this time, in the least solici- 
tous to exercise the troops: being persuaded, that the dispute would soon be 
brought to a decision without having recourse again to arms. For he flattered 
himself, thatas he already had subdued many parts of Ccele-syria and Phrenice* 
the rest would be yielded to him in a conference; and that Ptolemy, would 
never d;ire to risk a general battle. His ambassadors wei'e also fixed in the 
same opinion; being deceived by the civilities that were shown towards them 
by Sosibius. For this minister had detained them with him still at Memphis* 
and covered from their knowledge all the preparations that were at the same 
time made at Alexandria. By this artful management, when the ambassadors 
again returned, he was himself alike prepared either for peace or war. 

But Antiochus, as he had already subdued his enemies in the field, resolved* 
if possible, to show himself superior also in the conferences. When the am- 
bassadors therefore met him at Seleucia, and began to propose the condition* 
of the peace agreeably to their instructions from Sosibius, 'the king declared, 
that it was absurd to say, that he had offered any injury to Ptolemyj by en- 
tering Coale-syria with an army ; since he had endeavoured only to recover 
the possession of a countrj r , which belonged to him by a proper right. He 
showed, that Antigonus, who was surnamed Codes, had first subdued this 
province ; and that Seleucus afterwards obtained possession of it : that his 
own claim was founded upon these strong titles, too clear to be disputed ; and 
and that from thence it must be acknowledged, that the country belonged to 
him alone, and not to Ptolemy. That it was true, indeed, that Ptolemy had 
declared war against Antigonus; but that he had no design to join the pro- 
vince to his own dominions, but only to secure the sovereignty of it to Seleu- 
cus. Above all the rest, he urged the joint determination of the kings Lysi- 
machus, Cassauder, and Seleucus ; who, when they had defeated Antigonus 
in battle, resolved, with one consent, that all Syria should be yielded to 
Seleucus. 

In reply to all these reasons, the ambassadors on the other side insisted with 
no small earnestness, that the treason of Theodotus, and the invasion crf'Ccele- 
eyrla by Antiochus, were a gross and notorious insult, and an open viola, ion 
of the rights of Ptolemy. They said that Ptolemy the son ofLagushad 
fairly acquired the sovereignty of the province : and that the assistance, which 
he furnished to Seleucus in the war, was expressly sent upon these conditions; 
that Seleucus should possess all Asia, but that Ccele-syrmandPhcenice should 
be left to Ptolemy. 

Iu this manner was the contest long supported, in the course of many dep«« 



252 GENERAL -HISTORY OF POLYBIU& 

tations and debates, without any prospect of agreement. For as the confer*? 
ences all- were held by the friends alone of either party, there were none that 
could interpose between them, to moderate and restrain their warmth, when- 
ever they attempted to extend their claims beyond the bounds of j-astice. The 
business also of Achseus was found to be a matter even of greater difficulty 
than the rest. For it was strongly urged by Ptolemy, that he should be in-- 
dueled in the treaty. But Antiochus would scarcejy suffer it to be proposed; 
but exclaimed against it as a most intolerable inult that Ptolemy should pre- 
sume to interpose in favour of a traitor, or even so much as name a man, who* 
had rebelled against his natural prince. 

While each side thus endeavoured to maintain their ground, the spring at 
last came on, before the contest was in any point decided. Antiochus, there- 
fore, drew together all his forces, designing to attack Ccele-syria both by land' 
wea, and make himself master of the other parts of the province. At the samg 
time Ptolemy, having intrusted the conduct of the wa-r to Nicolaus, sent- - 
large supplies of stores to Gaza, and ordered his fleet to advance, together 
with a land army. When the troops arrived, the general in concert with Pe- 
ngen.es, who commanded the naval forces, and who was ready to comply with 
all his orders, began with great alacrity to make the necessary disposition for 
securing the country against the enemy.. The fleet was composed of thirty 
decked vessels, with more than four hundred ships of transport, Nicolaus 
himself was an vEtoliau i)y birth ; and was not inferior, either in courage or* 
experience, to any of the generals of Ptolemy. He sent away a part of hi* 
srmv to possess themselves of the defiles of Platanus ; while himself, encamp- 
ing with the rest near Porphyreon, resolved, with the assistance of the fleet 
which was stationed near him, to oppose on that side the entrance of the 
king. 

Antiochus, arriving now at Marathos, and beiug met there by the people 
of Aradus, who came to offer to him their assistance in the war, not ©nly re* 
ceived'tbem into his alliance, but quieted also some contentions which had 
been long maintained between the Aradians of the island, and those that lived 
upon the continent. He then entered Syria, along the mountain called Theo- 
prcsopon, and came to Berytus ; having taken Botrys in his march, and set 
fire to Calamus asd Trieres. And when he had sent away Nicarchus and 
Theodotus, to secure the passes that were near the river Lycus, he from 
thence continued his march forwards, and encamped upon the banks of the 
Damura ; being still followed by his fleet, which sailed along the coast as he 
advanced, under the command of Diognetus. From this place, being now 
joined again by Theodotus and Nicarchus, with the light armed troops, he 
advauced to take a view of those defiles that were possessed by Nicolau$ ; and 
having carefully observed the nature of the ground, as well as the strength 
and situation of the several posts, he then returned back again to hi* 
catnp. 

On the following day, having left behind him all his heavy forces under the 
-care ofNicarches, he advanced with the rest of the army to attack the enemy 
in these defiles. The place in which Nicolaus now was posted was a narrovr 
ground which lay between mount Libanus and the sea, and was covered also 1 
by an eminence, very rough and steep, and which left the passage along the 
shore extremely close and difficult. He had placed in every part that was 
commodious for it a numerous body of troops; and having thrown up also 
various works, he flattered himself that he should be able, without much dif«> 
Jiculty, to prevent the enemy from penetrating through the passes. 

Antiochus divided all his forces into three separate bodies, and gave one of 
them to Theodotus, with orders that he should dislodge the enemy from their 
posts at the foot of the mountain Libanus ; and that the second, which vvaa 
ltd bv Menedemus, at the same time should em ploy their utmost efforts to 
force their passage along the middle of the eminence. The last division wa* 



GENERAL HISTORY OV POLYBIUS, «5* 

posted close upon the shore under the command of Diodes, the governor of 
Parapobunia. The king himself, attended by his guards, took his station iu 
the middle ; that from thence he might be able to discern all that passed, 
and to send assistance as occasion should require. At the same time Diog- 
setus and Perigenes made all things ready for the engagement; having drawr* 
their fleets very near to shore, and formed them into such a disposition that 
th; y seemed to make one front from their respective armies* The signal now 
was made, and the battle at once begun both by land and sea. Upon the sea, 
because the strength and number of the combatants were nearly equal, the 
success was also equal. But by land Nieolaus, assisted by his situation, c.4 
first gained some advantage in the action ; but when Theodotus,: having forced 
the enemey from their posts along the foot of the mountain, fell afterwards* 
with violence upon them from the higher ground, they then fled with greaS 
precipitation. About two thousand of them were killed in the pursuit, and 
an equal number taken prisoners. The rest escaped to Sidon N Perigenes also, 
though he had hitherto maintained the fight upon the sea with the fairest pro- 
spect of success, no sooner saw that the army was completely routed than he 
was struek with consternation, and retreated likewise with the fleet towards th# 
•aroe place without any loss. 

Antiochus, taking with him all his forces, came and encamped before 8idon» 
But as the city was completely rilled with stores, and the mrmber of the inha- 
bitants who were now also joined by those that had fled from the late engage- 
ment very great, he made no attempt to take the place : but continued his 
march forwards towards Pbiloteria; and sent orders to Diognetus, that he 
should sail with the fleet to Tyre. Philoteria lies close upon the borders of 
that lake, into which the river Jordan enters; and from whence, flowing out. 
again, it passess through those plains in which the city of Scythopolis is situ- 
ated. The king, having obtained poossession of both these places, which were' 
surrendered to him upon conditions, was now filled with the fairest hopes with 
regard to the final issue of the war. For the country, that was subject to these 
cities, was such as would afford very large supplies, sufficient for all the army; 
and furnish them with every kind of .necessaries iu the greatest plenty. Hav- 
ing left in both a proper garrison, he then passed beyond the mountains, and 
Came to Atabyrium ; which was situated upon a hill of a globular form, whose- 
height was more than fifteen stadia. In order to become master of this city* 
he employed the following stratagem. Having engaged the inhabitants in as- 
skirmish, he directed his own troops to retreat, as if they had fled before them z. 
and when he had thus drawn the enemy to a considerable distance, facing sud- 
denly round again, and at the same time sending orders to some troops tha# 
were placed in ambuscade to rise and join in the attack, he killed great num- 
bers of them, and pursuing closely after those that fled, took advantage of 
their consternation, and entered the city with them without resistance. 

About this time, Ceraeas, one of the generals of Ptolemy, came and joined 
Antiochus; who received him with such high marks of honour that many other 
commanders also were soon afterwards induced to follow the example. Among 
these was Hippolochus of Thessaly ; who brought likewise with him a body 
of four hundred horse. 

The king, having secured Atabyrium by a garrison, began his march; and 
ns he advanced took Pella, Camus, and Gephrus. After this success all the 
ppople who inhabited the neighbouring places of Arabia urged each other to- | 
submit, and with one consent embraced his party. Having received, therefore, J. 
from them some provisions for his army, he again continued his march for- 
wards, full of joy and confidence, and passing through the district ofGladiatis* 
made himself master oi Abila, taking prisoners also the troops that were diawn 
together for its defence, under the command of Nicias, who was the kinsman 
and friend of Meneas. Gadara, which was esteemed to be the strongest of ail 
the cities that were in that part of the country, still remained to be subdued. 



? 54 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

But no sooner had the king encamped before it, and begun to advance hi& 
works, than the inhabitants were struck with terror, and surrendered. Beino- 
now informed, that the enemy had assembled in great numbers at Rabata- 
mana, a city of Arabia, and from thence made incursions upon the lands of 
those Arabians who had submitted to him, he immediately began his march 
in haste, and came and encamped near the hills, upon which the city was built.. 
And when he had surveyed it round on every side, and remarked that there 
were two places only by which it was possible to approach it, he there plautecl 
nis machines, and made the necessary disposition for the attack. The batteries 
on one side were commanded by Nicarchus, and on the other by Tbeodotus ; 
while the king attended alike to both with equal vigilance, and observed the 
zealous emulation of the generals. As the attack was made by both with the 
greatest vigour, and each contended to be the first in battering down the part 
against which his own machines were pointed, on a sudden, when it scarcely 
was expected, the wall on both sides fell. After this success they renewed 
their assaults against the place continually, with the utmost force and fury, 
both by night and day. As the numbers however of those that were within 
the city were very great, their efforts all were ineffectual. But after some 
time, being informed by one of the prisoners that were taken, of a certain 
subterraneous passage, from which the besieged were supplied with water, 
they filled the mouth of it with wood and stones and other such materials : and 
thus in a short time forced the inhabitants through want of water to surrender. 
The king left Nicarchus in the place with a. sufficient garrison : and sent 
away Hippolochus and Cerceas, with a body of five thousand infantry towards 
Samaria ; to cover the frontiers of the country from all insult, and to protect 
the people who had submitted to him. He then began his march to Ptole* 
Biais with all the army, designing to pass the winter in that city. 



CHAP. VII. 

In the course of the same summer, the Pednelissians being besieged by the 
Selgians, and reduced to great extremity, solicited some assistance from, 
Achseus; and having obtained a favourable answer, they sustained the siege 
with constancy, in the hope that in a short time they should be relieved. 
Achseus sent accordingly to their assistance Garsyeris, with six thousand in- 
fantry and five hundred horse. The Selgians, being informed of his approach, 
posted the greatest part of their troops in the defile called Climax, secured the 
approaches to Saporda, and broke up all the roads. Garsyeris, continuing still 
to advance, entered Milysa and encamped near Cretopolis. But when he 
found that the enemy had possessed themselves of all the passes, and stopped 
his farther progress, he employed the following stratagem : Having ordered his 
army to decamp, he directed his route back again, as if he had lost all hope of 
being able to succour the besieged. The Selgiaus, not suspecting anv baud, 
left their posts and retired, some of them to their camp and some into the *ity, 
for it was now the time of harvest. But Garsyeris, returning in a short time 
afterwards by quick and continued marches, seized the passes, which were left 
without defence, and having secured them all by sufficient guards, under the 
command of Phaylus, he advanced with the rest of his troops to Perga ; and 
from thence sent deputations to all the people of Pisidia and Pamphylia, ex- 
horting them to secure themselves in time against the growing power of the 
Selgiaus, to enter into an alliance with Achaeus, and to join their forces ^vith 
him to assist the Pednelissians. In the mean while the Selgians, being per- 
suaded that, by their knowledge of the country, they should soon be able to 
strike a terror into Phaylus, sent away 'a body of troops to dislodge him from 
his posts. But so far were they from being able to accomplish their design, 
that, on the contrary, they lost many of their mm* They desisted, therefore. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. S55. 



from this attempt, and returning again to the business of the siege, began to 
press the city more closely than before. 

About this time the Etenneans, who inhabited the mountainous parts of 
Pisidia beyond Sida, joined Garsyeris with eight thousand heavy-armed troops, 
and the people of Aspendus with four thousand. But, those of Sida refused to 
take any part in this confederacy ; partly because they were disposed to favour 
the interests of Antiochus ; but, chiefty, because they hated the Aspendians. 
Garsyeris, having increased his army by these new forces, advanced towards 
Pednelissuss; being persuaded that the Selgians, upon the first approach, 
would raise the siege. But, as he was wholly disappointed in this hope, he 
encamped at a moderate distance from them ; and, being desirous to relieve 
the Pedneiissians, who were now much pressed bj r famine, he ordered two 
thousand men, carrying each a measure of corn, to enter the city in the night ; 
but the Selgians, informed of their approach, fell upon thert in their march, 
killed the greater part of the detachment, and carried away the corn. After 
this success, they resolved, not only still to press the siege of the oity as before, 
but even to invest Garsyeris also in his camp. For in the affairs) of war, the 
Selgians are always very bold and enterprising, even to rashness. 

Leaving, therefore, behind them, the forces only that were necessary to 
guard their own entrenchments, they advanced with the rest of their army, and 
fell with fury upon the camp of the enemy, in many parts at once. Garsyeris, 
being thus suddenly beset with danger upon every side, and perceiving, that 
in many places his entrenchments were already forced, sent away all his ca- 
valry, through a certain passage that was left open by the» enemy. The Sel- 
gians, imagining that they had retreated from the camp through fear, and 
were hastening to escape by flight, made no attempt to intercept or stop 
them. But these troops, having taken a circuit round, fell suddenly on the 
enemy in their rear, with great force and fury. The infantry also, although, 
they were almost forced from the entrenchments, resumed again their courage, 
and returned boldly to the charge. The Selgians, being thus pressed on, 
every side, were at last constrained to fly. At the same time, the Pedne- 
iissians from the city attacked the troops that were left to guard the entrench- 
ments, and drove them from their camp. As they all fled different ways, not 
fewer than ten thousand of them were destroyed in the pursuit. Among those 
that were able to escape, the allies retired to their respective cities ; and the 
Selgians, directing their flight across the mountains, returned back again to 
their own country. 

Garsyeris immediately decamped, and pursued with the greatest haste, 
d-esiguing to pass through the defiles, and to appear in sight of Selga, before 
the inhabitants should be recovered from their consternation, or find time to 
take the measures that were necessary for their defence. He came accord- 
ingly, with all his army, and encamped near the city. The Selgians, dis- 
heartened by their late defeat, and not expecting any farther succours from 
their allies, who had also been involved in the same misfortune, began to ap- 
prehend, that both their country and themselves were now lost without re- 
source. Having called together, therefore, an assembly, they resolved to de- 
pute Garsyeris one of their citizens, whose name was Logbasis. This man had 
been the guest and intimate friend of that Antiochus who died in Thrace; and, 
having been intrusted by him at his death, with the charge of Laodice, who 
was afterwards married to Achaeus, he had educated her as his own proper 
daughter, with a true parental tenderness and care. The Selgians, therefore, 
were persuaded, that no one was more fit to be employed at this conjuncture. 
But Logbasis, when he had entered into private conference with Garsyeris, so 
far forgot his duty to his country, that instead of performing the service 
that was expected from him, he, on the contrary, pressed the general to 
send and call Achaeus without delay, and promised to betray the city tt 



mm GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



fhein. Garsyeris received this offer with the greatest joy, and immediately 
dispatched some messengers to inform Achfeus of the accident. And having 1 
consented to a truce with the Belgians, he found means to delay, from time 
to time, the conclusion of the treaty, inventing stiil new doubts and difficulties, 
with design to afford full leisure for Achseus to arrive, and that Log-basis 
might be able also to prepare, in concert with himself, the measures that were 
necessary f§r the execution of the project. 

During this time, as frequent deputations went and returned on either side*' 
it grew at last to be the common practice of the soldiers to go from the camp 
into the city to procure provisions; an indulgence which, in various instances, 
bad proved the cause of utter ruin and destruction. For my own part, indeed, 
I am inclined to believe that man, who is esteemed more dexterous and artful 
than any other animal, is in truth of all most open to surprise and fraud. 
How many camps and garrison, how many of the strongest cities have fallen a 
prey to this very kind of treachery ! Yet though the examples are thus fre- 
quent and notorious, we still, I know not how, are novices with respect to all 
such enterprises, through the want of paying a due attention to those misfor- 
tunes in which others, from their negligence have been involved. We employ 
great pains and cost to draw together money and stores to fortify our towns 
■with walls, and to fill our magazines with arms, in order to secure ourselves 
against all sudden accidents.; but totally neglect those means of safety which 
may be acquired with far greater ease, and which afford a sure resourse ia 
every dangerous conjuncture ; I mean that knowledge of all past transactions 
.which is supplied by history, and which always may be gained, with not less 
pleasure than advantage, even in the .shade of sale and honourable repose. 

Achfeus arrived at the expected time; and the Belgians, after they had 
been admitted to a conference with him, flattered themselves with the hope 
that they should be able to obtain the most favourable terms of peace. Log- 
basis, who from time to time had drawn together in small numbers to his 
bouse the soldiers that came into the city from the camp, now pressed the 
citizens to assemble all the people, to take advantage of the favourable dis- 
position of Achaeus, and to bring the treaty to its last conclusion. The Sel- 
( gians met together, therefore, in a general assembly ; and, as if they had been 
secure of bringing the affair to a speedy issue, permitted even the guards to 
retire from their several posts. At this time Logbasis, having given the signal 
to the enemy, ordered the soldiers that were with him to stand ready for the 
engagement, and armed himself also and his sons. Achfeus, taking with him 
one half of his forces, approached near the city ; while Garsyeris with the rest 
directed his march towards a temple of Jupiter called Cesbedium, which stood 
as a kind of citadel, and commanded all the city. But a certain shepherd, 
having perceived by accident what was done, informed the assembly of it. 
The fcoldiers ran in haste, one part towards Cesbedium and the rest to the other 
posts; and the people, inflamed with rage, to the house of Logbasis. And 
finding there a clear discovery of the treason, some of them climbed up to the 
roof, while others forced their entrance through the doors, and killed Logbasis 
and his sons, and all the rest that were with him in the house. They then 
proclaimed liberty to the slaves, and, having divided themselves into several 
bodies, took possession of all the advantageous posts. When Garsyeris saw- 
that Cesbedium was already secured against him, he desisted at once from his 
design. Achfeus, on the contrary, endeavoured to force his entrance through 
■the gates. But the Selgians advanced against him, killed seven hundred of 
his men, and at last constrained him to retire again with Garsyeris towards hi** 
camp. ,. But after this success, being apprehensive that seme disorders might 
happen in the city, and dreading also the dangers of a siege, they deputed 
some of their oldest- citizens, in the habits of submission, to Achfeus, who com- 
mented to a treaty with -them upon these conditions: " That they, should inw 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBlUS. 



mediately pay four hundred talents, and, after a certain time, three hundred 
more, and restore all their prisoners to the Pednelisslans." Thus the Selgians, 
by their bravery, saved their country from the rnin which the impious treachery 
of Logbasis had almost brought upon it, and displayed such courage as indeed 
was worthy of a free and generous people, descended from the stock of Sparta. 
Acboens, having reduced Milyas, with the greater part also of Pamphyiia, con- 
tinued his inarch to Sardes ; and from thence made perpettiRl incursions into 
the territories of Attalus, threatened Prusias with a war, and became very for- 
midable to all the states that were on this side of mount Taurus. 

During the time in which Aebaeus was employed in the siege of Sel^a, At-* 
taiv.r, diking with him a body of the Gauls called tectosages, advanced through 
the country to recover again the towns of jjEoIis, with the rest of the cities also 
that were near, which through terror had submitted to Aehseus. The greater 
part of these immediately surrendered, and were even pleased to be received 
under his protection. A small number only were reduced by force. Among 
the first were Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaaa. Temnus also and iEgea were 
struck with terror at his approach, and readily submitted. The Teians and 
the Colophonians sent some deputies to meet him, and surrendered their cities 
at discretion. He granted to them the same conditions hs before, and took 
fome hostages of their fidelity. But among all the rest the ambassadors from 
Smyrna were received with the greatest marks of favour,' because the people 
of that city had persisted always in a close attachment to his interests^ Front 
hence, continuing his march forwards, and passing the river Lycus, he tra- 
versed Mysia, struck with terror the garrison of Didyma and Carsa, and 
gained possession of bothjjthose fortresses, which were surrendered to him by 
Themistocles, whom Achreus had intrusted with the government of that part 
of the country. Having then wasted all the plain of Apia, he passed the 
mountain Pelecas, and came and encamped near the river Megistas. During 
bis stay in this place there happened to be an eclipse of the moon. The 
Gauls, who had long supported with the greatest pain the difficulty of at 
march, in which their wives and children followed them in chariots, regarded 
this event as an evil portent, and refused to advance any farther. Attalus, 
though he now no longer wanted the assistance of these troops, and had ex-* 
perienced likewise, that in all their marches they were still separated from the 
other forces, that they always encamped apart, and were 'at all times haughty 
and untractable, was thrown, however, by this accident, into great perplexity. 
For, as he dreaded, on the one hand, that they would join Aehseus, and fall, 
together with that prince, upon some part of his dominions, so, on the other 
band, he was no less apprehensive that he should draw upon himself the cen- 
sure of mankind, in case that he should surround them with the rest of his 
army, and thus destroy a body of men who had trusted themselves to his pro- 
tection, and under that security had followed him into Asia. At last, there-* 
fore, he resolved to seize the occasion of their present discontent, and promised 
that he would lead them to a place from whence they might again pass into 
Kurope ; that he would allot a country also to them sufficient for their settle- 
ment; and, for the time to come, be always ready to advance their interests, 
and comply with every just demand. He conducted them accordingly to the 
Hellespont; and having shewn great marks of favour to the inhabitants of 
Ilium, Lampsaehus, and Alexandria, who had all remained firm in their at- 
tachment to him, he then returned to Pergamus with his army. 



CHAP, VIII. 

Whes the spring approached, Antiochus and Ptolemy, having completed 
sdl their preparations, were now ready by a battle to decide the war. Ptolemy,.. 
therefore, began his march from Alexandria with seventy thousand foot, fiy& 
VOL. i. no. 5. 2 K 



258 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



thousand horse, and seventy-three elephants. Antioehus, being informed of" 
his approach, drew together also all his forces. His army was composed of five 
thousand light-armed troops, Daians, Carmanians, and Cilicians, under the 
command of Byttacus, a Macedonian, and twenty thousand men, selected 
from all parts of the kingdom, armed after the Macedonian manner, and led 
by Theodotus the jEtolian, who had deserted from the service of king Pto- 
lemy. The greater part of these wore silver bucklers. There was a phalanx 
also of twenty thousand men, commanded by Nicarchus and Theodotus the 
Hermionian ; two thousand Agrianians and Persians, armed with bows and 
slinks ; and with them a thousand Thracians, under the care of Menedemus, a 
citizen of Alabanda; five thousand Medes, Cissians, Caddasians, and Carma- 
nians, who rc-ceived their orders from Aspasianes, a Mede; ten thousand men 
from Arabia and the neighbouring countries, conducted byZabdiphilus; five 
thousand Grecian mercenaries, commanded by liippolochus of Thessaly ; i 
fifteen hundred Cretans, by Eurylochus ; : and a thousand Neocretans, by 
Zeles ofGortyna; a thousand Cardacians, and five hundred Lydian archers, 
under the conduct of Lysimachus, a Gaul. The number of the cavalry wa* 
about six thousand. Four thousand of them were commanded by Antipater, 
the brother of the king; and the rest by Themison. Thus the whole army of 
Antioehus consisted of seventy-two thousand foot, and six thousand horse,, 
with a hundred and two elephants. 

Ptolemy, advancing to Pelusium, and having waited there to receive the 
troops that were not yet come up, and to distribute provisions among his- 
army, again decamped, and,, passing through a dry and desert country, along 
mount Casius, and the place that was called the Pits, arrived at Gaza, And 
having allowed some time for the refreshment of his army, he continued hi* 
route "forwards by slow and gentle marches, and on the fifth day fixed his-' 
camp at the distance of fifty stadia from the city of Raphia, which is situated 
beyond Rhinocorura 7 and standa the nearest towards iEgypt of all the cities of 

Coele-syrJa. 

At the same time Antioehus als«> began his march, and* passing beyond 
Raphia, came and encamped, in the night, at the distance often stadia from 
the enemy. But,-within some days afterwards, being desirous to possess 
himself of some more advantageous posts, and at the same time to inspire 
his troops with confidence, he advanced so near to Ptolemy, that the armies 
were now separated from each other by the distance only of five stadia. Fre- 
quent engagements, therefore, happened every day, between the troops that 
went abroad to get water or provisions ; and many skirmishes, both of in- 
fantry and cavalry, in the space that was between the camps. 

Durino- this time Theodotus formed an attempt that was worthy, indeed, 
©f an iEtoiian, but which showed no small degree of courage and enterprising 
boldness. From his long acquaintance with the court of Ptolemy, he knew 
all the customs of the kiug, and the manner in which he lived. Attended* 
therefore, by no more than two companions, he went over to the camp of the 
enemy, a little before break of day. As the darkness screened his face from 
all discovery, so his, habit likewise passed unobserved ; because there were va- 
rious kinds of dresses in the camp. He advanced boldly, therefore, to the 
royal tent, which, in the late skirmishes, he had easily remarked, and entered 
it unnoticed by the guards. But he found not the person whom he sought * 
for this, indeed, was the tent of state, in which the king usually supped, and 
admitted his friends to an audience: but he slept in a different tent. Theo- 
dotus, therefore, when he had searched in vain in every corner, wounded two 
officers that were sleeping there, and killed Andreas, the physician of the 
king, and then returned again with safety; having received some slight dis- 
turbance only as he left the camp. And thus, as far as courage only was 
yequired, he fully accomplished his design But he failed through want of 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. £59 



prudence, in not having examined, with the necessary care, in what part of 
the camp the king was used to sleep. 

The two kings, when they had thus for five days remained in sight, resolved 
at last to engage in a decisive action. As soon, therefore, as Ptolemy began 
first to put his troops in motion, Antiochus also drew out all his forces, and 
Tanged them in order of battle. The phalanxes on the either side, with the 
rest of the troops likewise that were armed after the Macedonian manner, 
stood opposite to each other in the centre. The wings, on the part of 
Ptolemy, w-ere thus disposed. Upon the left stood Polycretes with the ca- 
valry that was under his command. _ Between him and the phalanx were first 
the Cretan forces ; after these the royal guards; then the peltastse, led by 
Socrates; and, in the last place, close joining to the phalanx, the Africans, 
armed alter the manner of the Macedonians. Upon the right wing stood 
Echecrates with his cavalry. Close to him, upon nis left, were placed first 
the Gauls and Thracians; next to these the Grecian mercenaries, under the 
command of Phoxidas; and, after them, the phalanx of Egyptians. Forty 
of the elephants were posted on the left wing, in which Ptolemy himself de- 
signed to engage ; and thirty-three upon the right, at some distance before 
the mercenary cavalry. 

Antiochus placed sixty of his elephants, under the command of Philip, who 
was his foster-brother, before the right wing, which he designed to lead himself 
to the charge against Ptolemy. Behind the elephants were two thousand 
horse, commanded by Antipater, and close to these two thousand more, which 
-were ranged in the figure called the forceps. Joining to the cavalry in front 
stood first the Cretans, then the Grecian mercenaries, and between these and 
the troops that were armed after the Macedonian maimer, the five thousand, 
men that were under the commend of Byttacus, a Macedonian. On the left 
wing stood Themison, with two thousand cavalry. Next to these were the 
Lydian and Cardacian archers; then the light armed tr.©ops of Menedemus, 
which amounted to about three thousand ; afterwards the Cissians, Medes, 
and Carmanians; and lastly, joining to the phalanx, the forces of Arabia, and 
the neighbouring countries. The remaining part of the elephants were posted 
also before this wing, under the command of Myiscus, one of the young ineu x 
that had been educated with the king. 

When the armies were thus ranged in order, and ready to engage, the two 
icings, attended by their officers and friends, advanced along the front of all 
the line, and endeavoured te inspire their troops with eoura»e ; especially the 
phalanxes, in which they had placed their greatest hopes. Upon this occasion 
Ptolemy was accompanied by his sister Ar&inoe, and by Sosibiusalso and 
Andromachus; Antiochus, by Theodotus and Niearchus ; for these, on both, 
sides, were the generals by whom the phalanxes were commanded. The mo- 
tives that ware urged to animate the troops were on either side the same : for, 
as these prinees had both been seated so lately upon the throne, and had them- 
selves performed no aetionsthat were worthy to be mentioned, they were forced 
to have recourse alike to the fame and great exploits of their respective an- 
cestors. But, above all the re6t, they promised also, on their own part, great 
rewards, as well to every officer apart, as in general to all the army ; and, 
iu a word, employed not exhortations only, but prayers also, and entreaties, 
to engage them to perform their duty with alacrity and vigour. 

In this manner, riding along from rank to rank, they observed all the troops 
in turn, sometimes by themselves, and sometimes by interpreters. But when 
Ptolemy, with his sister, came to the left wing of his army, and Antiochus, 
attended by his guards, had taken his station also upon his right, the signal 
was sounded to engage, and the elephants, approaching first, began the com- 
bat. Among those that belonged to Ptolemy, there were some that advanced 
boldly against their adversaries. It was then pleasing to behold the sol- 
diers engaged iu close combat from the towers, and pushing ayaiust each other 



gfO GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYEIUS. 

with their spears. But the beasts themselves afforded a far nobler spectacle 
as they rushed together, front to front, with the greatest force and fury. For 
this is the manner in which they fight. Twisting their trunks together, they 
strive each of them, with his utmost force, to maintain their own ground, aud 
to move their adversary from his place. And when the strongest of them has 
at last pushed aside the trunk of the other, and forced him to (urn his think, 
he then pierces him with his tusks, in the same manner as bulls in fighting- 
wound each other with their horns. But the greater part of the beasts that 
belonged to Ptolemy declined the combat : for this usually happens to the 
elephants of Afric ; winch are not able to support either the smell or ery of 
the Indian elephants. Or rather, perhaps, they are struck with terror at ihe 
view of their enormous size and strength ; since even betore they approach 
near together they frequently turfi their bucks and fly. And' this it was 
which at this time happened. As soon, therefore, as these animals, bei-jsg thu%r 
disordered by their fearu, had fallen against the ranks of their own army, ami 
forced the royal guards to break the line, Antiochus, seizing the occasion, and 
advancing round on the outside of the elephants, charged the cavalry which 
was commanded by Polycrates, in the extremity of the\left wing of Ptolemy. 
At the same time also, the Grecian mercenaries, who stood within the ele- 
phants, near the phalanx, advanced with fury against the peltastse, and routed 
them with little difficulty, because their ranks likewise were already broken- 
by the elephants. Thus the whole left wing of the army of Ptolemy was de- 
feated, and forced to fly, 

Echecrates, who commanded in the right, for seme time waited to observe 
what would be the event of the engagement upon the left. But when he saw 
that the dust was driven fast towards them, and that their elephants tied whoiiy 
from the combat, he ordered Pboxidas, who commanded the mercenaries of 
Greece, to advance against the troops that stood opposite to him in front; 
while himself, having directed his own cavalry, together with those, that were 
drawn up behind the elephants, to defile along the wing, till they had stretched 
beyond the elephants of the left wing of Antiochus, charged, the cavalry of 
that wing both in flank and rear, and soon caused a general route. Phoxidas 
also, with the troops that were under his command, at the same time forced 
the Arabians and the Medes to fly in great disorder. Thus Antiochus, who 
had gained the„victory upon his right, was completely vanquished on ids left. 
The phalanxes alone, being thus stripped of both their wings, remained en- 
tire iu the middle of the plain, and knew not what they should expect or 
fear, 

vV hile Antiochus was pursuing his victory upon the right, Ptolemy, who hadr 
retreated behind his phalanx, advancer] now into the centre, and showing him- 
sell to both armies, struck the enemy with terror, and inspired his own forces 
with alacrity and confidence. Andromachus, therefore, and Sosibius, levelling 
their spears, advanced without dday against the enemy. The troops of Syria, 
who were all select men, for some time sustained the charge. But those that 
were commanded by Nicarchus immediately turned their backs and fled. 
During tiiis time Antiochus, young and unskilled in war, and judging, from 
the victory which himself had gained, that the same good fortune had attend- 
ed also in. ever} 7 other part of the action, still pursued with eagerness the 
troops that had fled before him. But after some time, when one of the older 
generals had desired him to remark the dust that was driven towards Ids camp 
by the phalanx of the enemy, he then saw what had happened, and nui back 
in haste, attended by his guards, towards the place of battle. But as the 
troops were now completely routed, he was forced to retreat to Ranhia; being 
pe suaded that, as far as the success had depended on himself, he had gained 
a perfect victory ; and that the battle had been only lost through the want of 
spirit and base cowardice of his troops. Ptolemy, having thus obtained by his 
phalanx a complete and decisive victory, and killed ak-o, by his cavalry and 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 26 1 



mercenaries of the right wing, great numbers in the pursuit, returned back 
again to his camp ; and, on the following day, when he had first interred his 
soldiers that were slain, and spoiled the bodies of the enemy, he directed his 
march towards Raphia. Antiochus had at first designed to draw together all 
his troops, and to encamp without the walls of Raphia ; but as the greater part 
had fled for safety into the city, he was forced also himself to enter it. But 
early on the following day he directed his route towards Gaza with the remains 
of his army, and there encamped ; and from thence sent to obtain permission 
of Ptolemy to bury his men also that were slain. He had lost in the action 
scarcely fewer than ten thousand of his infantry, with more than three hundred 
horse. Above four thousand also were taken prisoners. Three of his ele- 
phants were killed in the engagement, and two died afterwards of their 
■wounds. On the part of Ptolemy were slain fifteen hundred foot, and seven 
'hundred horse. But seventeen of the* elephants were killed, and a greater 
number taken. Such was the end of the battle of Raphia between these two 
princes for the sovereignty of Ccele-syria. 

When Antiochus had discharged the last duties to his soldiers who had 
fallen in the action, he directed his route back again towards his own king-* 
dom. At the same time Ptolemy took possession of Raphia without resist- 
ance, with the rest also of the neighbouring cities; which all seemed to strive 
together which should be the first to return again to his dominion, and receive 
him as their master. For in such conjunctures all men indeed are ready to 
accommodate their resolutions to the present times. But the people espe- 
cially of Ccele-syria are more strongly led by nature to this compliance, than 
those of any other country. At this time, however, their conduct must in 
part be ascribed to that affection by which they were before inclined towards 
the kings of /E try pt. For the multitude, through all the province, had al- 
ways been accustomed to regard the princes of this family with sentiments of 
high respect and veneration. Ptolemy, therefore, was received among them 
with crowns, sacrifices, aitars, and eveiy other honour which flattery was able 
to invent, 

As soon as Antiochus arrived in safety at the city which was called by his 
own name, he sent Antipater his nephew, and Theodotus, ambassadors to 
Ptolemy to treat of peace. For he feared that if the enemy should now pur-' 
6ue their victory, his own subjects, disheartened by the late defeat, might per- 
haps revolt; and that Acha?us would be ready also to take advantage of the 
occasion which was so favourable for his design against him. Ptolemy never 
once reflected upon any of these circumstances ; but, satisfied with having 
thus gained a victory, which he scarcely bad the courage to expect, and finding 
himself again possessed of Ccele-syria, was so far from being averse to peace, 
that, on the contrary, he embraced it with immoderate haste; and fled again 
to that repose to which his indolence and habitual vices forcibly inclined him. 
As soon therefore as the ambassadors arrived, having first given vent to some 
slight expostulations and complaints, with respect to the attempt that had 
been formed against him by Antiochus, he immediately consented to a truce 
-for -a year, and sent away Sosibius to ratify the treaty. And when he had passed 
three months in Syria and Phosujce, and restored peace and order among all 
the cities, he left the government of the country to Andromachus of Aspendus, 
and returned back again with his sister, and his favourites, to Alexandria; having 
finished the war in a manner which occasioned no small surprise among the 
people of his kingdom, who were acquainted with his former course of life. 
Antiochus, as soon as the, treaty was concluded by Sosibius, resumed his first 
design, and began to make the necessary preparations for his war against 
Achaeus. Such was the state of affairs in Asia, 



1562 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



CHAP. IX. 

About this time an earthquake happened at Rhodes, which threw down their 
vast colossus, together with a great part of the" walls and naval arsenals. But 
the Rhodians, by their wise and dexterous management so well improved the 
accident, that instead of being destructive to them, it brought many great ad- 
vantages to that city. So different are the effects of prudence and activity 
from those of negligence and folly, as well in public affairs as in the business 
■also of private life. For through the latter of these qualities even happy 
events become pernicious; while the former, on the contrary, convert calami- 
ties into benefits. Thus the Rhodians, exaggerating all the horrors of the 
accident that had befallen them, and preserving still a grave and solemn 
dignity, both in the addresses that were made in public by their ambassadors, 
•and in their own particular deportment, induced the cities, and especially the 
Idngs, not only to send gifts of very great value, but even to esteem it a favour 
that their presents were accepted by them. From Hiero and Gelo they re- 
ceived seventy-five talents of silver, one part of which was paid immediately, 
and the rest in a sho/t time afterwards, to furnish oil for the games of Gymna- 
sium ; some silver Caldrons with their bases ; some cisterns for holding water, 
ten talents to defray the expense of sacrifices ; and ten more to increase the 
number of the citizens ; so that the whole amounted to near a hundred talents. 
"The same princes exempted also from all imposts the vessels that sailed from 
Rhodes; and gaye to them likewise fifty catapults, of the length of three 
■cubits. And yet after all this bounty, as if they had themselves received some 
favours from the JFLhodians they erected in the public place of their city a 
statue of the people of Rhodes in the act of receiving a crown from another 
statue, which represented the people of Syracuse. Ptolemy also engaged to 
furnish them with three hundred talents of silver ; a million measures of corn ; 
with timber to build ten quinquermes and ten triremes; some square pieces also 
of fir, the measure of which together was forty thousand cubits; a thousand 
talents of brass coin ; three thousand weight of hemp ; three thousand pieces 
of cloth for sails ; three thousand talents for replacing their colossus : a hunt- 
dred architects, and three hundred and fifty labourers ; with fourteen talents 
by the year for their subsistence ; twelve thousand measures of corn for their 
games and sacrifices; and twenty thousand for the subsistence of the ten 
triremes* The chief part of these presents was immediately sent to Rhodes ; 
together with a third part also of all the money. In' the same manner like- 
wise, Antigonus supplied them with ten thousand pieces of timber, that was 
proper to be cut into solid blocks, from eight to sixteen eubits ; five thousand 
planks, of seven cubits; three thousand weight of iron; a thousand also of 
pitch, with a thousand measures of tar ; and promised to add besides a 
hundred talents. His wife Chryseis sent, on her part, a hundred thou- 
sand measures of corn, and three thousand weight of lead. Seleucus 
also, the father of Actiochus, not content with having discharged from 
imposts the Rhodian vessels that sailed to any part of his dominions, 
gtive them also ten quinqueremes completely equipped ; two hundred thousand 
measures of corn ; ten thousand cubits of timber, and a thousand weight of 
hair and resin. The same generosity was also shown towards them by Prusias, 
Mithridates, and all the other princes who then reigned in Asia : Lysanas, 
Olympicus, and Limnfeus. And with regard to the cities, which assisted them 
as far#s their abilities would reach, they are scarcely to be numbered. If we 
look back therefore only to the time in which the Rhodians were first esta- 
blished in their city, we may think it perhaps a matter of surpii.se, that, in the 
course of so short a period they should have gained so considerable an increase, 
with respect both to the private riches of the citizens, and the public wealth 
also of the state.' But on the other hand, if we reflect upon the great advan- 
tages which they derive from the happy situation of their city, together with 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS.' " «6s 



those plentiful supplies (hat have flowed into it from abroad, we shall then 
And no cause of wonder; but rather be persuaded that the condition of this 
people might have been even still more full and flourishing - . 

In recounting thus minutely all the circumstances that attended this event, 
my design was first to show the uncommon zeal and earnestness with which 
the Rhodians struggled to restore their country to its former states a zeal, 
which indeed is highly worthy both of praise and imitation ; and in the next 
place, that it might from hence be seen how sparingly the princes of the pre- 
sent age dispense their bounty, and of how little value are the gifts which the 
states and cities now receive. For from these examples those princes may be 
taught not to boast of their munificence, when they haye bestowed perhaps a 
present of four or rive talents only ; nor expect that the Greeks should offer 
to them in return the same acknowledgements and honours as were decreed to 
the kings of former times. The cities also, on the other hand, when they have 
seen the immense value of the gifts that were once bestowed upon them may 
become more reserved and prudent, and not prostitute their best and noblest- 
honours in return for benefits of little worth, but endeavour rather to make so 
just a distribution of their favours as may preserve their own dignity undi- 
minished, and convince mankind that the Greeks are still superior to all other 
people. We now return again to the place in which we broke off our relation 
of the Social War. 

When the summer now was come, in which A getas was the praetor ofthcEto- 
lians, and Aratus of the A charms, Lycurgus, king of Sparta, was recalled 
again by the ephori, who had discovered, that the suspicious, through' which 
he had been forced to fly, were false. He returned, therefore, to the city; 
from /Etolia, and immediately concerted measures with Pyrrhics an JEtoUau, 
who was then the general of the Elean forces, for making an incursion into the 
Messeniau territory. Aratus, at his first entrance upon his office, had found 
that all the mercenary troops of the republic were broken and dispersed ; and 
that the cities no longer paid their contributions to the war ; for such were the 
effects, as we have before observed, of the unactive and unskilful conduct of 
Eperatus, the former prfetor. Having called together therefore the. Achaean 
states, and obtained, by his persuasions, such a decree as the circumstances of 
affairs required, he applied himself with vigour to remedy the pa-it disorders, 
and complete all the necessary preparations for the war. By this decree it- 
was resolved, that the Acheeans should receive into their pay a body of new 
mercenaries, consisting of eight thousand foot and five hundred horse ; that 
they should raise also in Achaia three thousand foot, and three hundred horse; 
that among these there should be five hundred foot of Megalopolis, armed 
•with brazen bucklers, and fifty horse, with an equal number of Argians ; and 
that three vessels also should sail towards Acte and the gulf of Argos, and. 
three be sent over to cover Patrse and Dyme, with the rest of the places that 
stood along that coast. 

While Aratus was thus employed, Pyrrhias and Lycurgus, having agreed 
together, that they should both, at the same time, begin their march, ad- 
vanced towards the borders of Messenia. Aratus, being informed of their dt.-. 
sign, took with him the mercenaries, and a part also of the Achaean forces, 
and came, to Megalopolis, to succour the Messenians. Lycurgus, having; 
gained by some secret practices a fortress of the Messenians, called Thalamae, 
continued his route from thence with the greatest haste, in order to join the 
Eleans. But Pyrrhias, on the other hand, who had begun his march from < 
Elis with a very small body of troops, was opposed upon the borders of Mes-, 
senia by the Cyparissians, and forced to return. Lycurgus, therefore, beiny- 
thus prevented from joining the Eleans, as he had at first designed, and not 
able, with his own forces, to attempt any action of importance, made some 
slight incursions only upon the neighbouring country, for the sake of gaining 
the supplies that were necessary for his troops, and then led his army back ugasu 



264 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



to Sparta. When the enemy had thus failed of their design, Aratus, in' order 
to defeat all such attempts for the time to come, prevailed on Taurion, and the 
people of Messenia, to draw together severally rive hundred foot and fifty 
horse, for the defence of the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Argians, and Te- 
geans, whose lands, lying close upon the borders of Laconia, were chiefly ex- 
posed to insult; whiie himself, with the Aehseans and the mercenaries, en- 
gaged to cover those parts of Achaieea that were situated on the side of iEtolia 
and Elea. He afterwards employed all his pains to calm the contests of 
the Megalopolitans, and to restore peace among them, as the Aehseans had 
directed in their late decree. For this people, whose state and city not long 
before had been subverted by Cleomenes, were wholly destitute of many 
things, and scantily supplied with all. They retained, indeed, the same high 
spirit as before ; but were utterly unable to discharge or satisfy, either then- 
own particular wants, or the public necessities of the state. Hence arose 
-contention, jealousy, and hot debates : for such are the effects which naturally 
spring, as well in public states as among private men, whenever they are pressed, 
by penury, and deprived of the resources that are necessary for carrying into 
execution their de?i<ms. Their first dispute related to the manner in which 
the city should be built. For some maintained, that it was necessary to con- 
tract the former circuit of the walls, that thus they might be able to finish 
what they should begin, and to defend the city also against an enemy. For 
it was judged to have been the only cause of their late misfortune, that their 
city was of very great extent, and the inhabitants in proportion few. They 
contended likewise, that those who were rich among the citizens should give 
tip a third part of their lands, in order to obtain some new inhabitants. 
Others, on the contrary, refused with equal warmth, either to relinquish their 
possessions, or consent that the circuit of the city should be lessened. But 
the chief and most important subject of their contests was a new body of laws, 
framed for their use by Prytanis, a peripatetic of distinguished eminence, 
who was sent to them for that purpose by Antigonus. Aratus employed alt 
the methods that seemed likely to be the most effectual for calming these dis- 
orders, and at last accomplished his design. Their dissentions were all com- 
posed; and the conditions of the agreement engraved upon a column, which 
was erected near the altar of Vesta at Omarium. He then went from Mega- 
lopolis, to be present in the council of the Achaean states ; having left the 
mercenaries to the care of Lycus, a citizen of Pharee ; who, on account of the 
contributions which his city had advanced for the uses of the war, stood the 
next in authority and command, after the Achaean praetor. 

The Eleans, dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, invited Euripidas, who was also ar» 
.Etolian, to be their general. ' Euripidas, having waited till the Aehseans were 
assembled together to hold their general council, began his march at the head 
of twothousand foot and sixty horse, and passing through the Pharean distric* 
wasted all the country as far as to the borders of the iEgian territory ; and when 
he had gained an immense booty, he retired towards Leontium. But Lycus, 
beino- iuformed of what had happened, marched away with diligence, and fall- 
ing suddenly upon the enemy in their retreat, he killed four hundred of them, 
and took two hundred prisoners; among whom were some officers of eminence, 
Physsias, Autanor, Clearchus, Androlochus, Evanoridas, Aristogitoti, Nicas- 
ippus, Aspasius. He became master also of their arms, and all their baggage. 
About the same time the commander of the Achaean fleet steered his course 
to MoWcria, and returned again with near a hundred slaves. From thence, " 
sailing "'towards' Chalcia, and being there attacked by some vessels of the 
enemy, he took two long barks with all their men. He took also a small fri- 
gate, completely equipped, near Rhiu.m, in iEtolia. This success, which hap- 
pened at the same time upon land and sea, spread so great a plenty, both of 
money and provisions, through the Achaean army, that the troops were now 
fully assured that their stipends would be regularly paid, and the cities als» 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. fi<S& 

began to hope, that they no longer should be loaded with contributions for the 
var. 

About the time of these transactions, Scerdilaidas, being incensed against 
king Philip, because some part of the sum, which this prince had engaged to 
. pay to him, remained undischarged, sent away a fleet of fifteen ships, de- 
signing to recover, by surprise and fraud, the money that was due. These vessels 
hist steered their course to Ltucas ; and being received into the port as friends, 
in consequence of the late alliance, they committed, indeed, through want 
and opportunity, no other hostilities in the place; but when Agathynus and 
Cassander, citizens of Corinth, came and cast anchor, as friends also, in the 
harbour, with four ships which belonged to Taurion, they immediately at- 
tacked them in direct breach of the alliance, and having taked both the cap- 
.tains and their vessels, sent them away to Scerdilaidas. After this exploit, 
they directed their course to Malea, pillaged many vessels in their way, and 
carried the merchants into slavery. 

As the season of the harvest now approached, and Taurion had neglected to 
secure by a sufficient force the frontiers of those cities, which have before been 
mentioned, Aratus drew together a select body of troops, to cover and support 
the Argiaus, who were employed in gathering in their corn. About the same 
time also, Euripidas began his march at the head of the Eleans, with design to 
ravage the lands of the Tritaeans. But when Lycus and Demodocus, who 
commanded the Achaean cavalry, were informed that these troops had quitted 
their own province, they assembled all the forces of the Patrseans, Dymseans, 
and Pharaeans, together with the mercenaries, and resolved to make incursions 
into the Elean territory. Advancing, therefore, as far as to the town called 
Phyxium, they sent away the cavalry and light-armed forces to waste the 
country, having, at the same time, concealed their heavy-armed troops in am- 
buscade, in the neighbourhood of the town. The Eleans ran together from 
every part to attack the pillagers; and, as these retired before them, they began, 
also to pursue with eagerness. But Lycus, with the troops that were placed 
in ambuscade, suddenly arose and charged the foremost of them. The Eleans* 
upon the first appearance of these heavy-armed forces, immediately turned 
their backs and fled. About two hundred of them were killed in the place, . 
and eighty taken prisoners ; while the Achseans retreated with their booty, 
without any loss. About this time, the commander also of the Achaean fleet made 
frequent descents upon iEtolia, in the neighbourhood of Calydon and Nau~ 
pactus; plundered all the coast, and twice defeated the troops that were sent 
against him. He took prisoner also Cleonicus, a citizen of Naupactus. But, 
because he had formerly been connected w ith the Achseans by the ties of hos- 
pitality, instead of being sold, together with the rest, he was dismissed, within. 
a short time afterwards, without any ransom. About the same time also, Agetas, 
,the JEtolian praetor, having assembled all the forces of the country, ravaged 
the whole provinces of Acarnania and Epirus ; and when he had accomplished 
all that, he had designed, he returned back again, and disinisssed the Mto- 
lians to their several cities. The Acarnanians, on the other hand, made an 
incursion into the neighbourhood of Stratus. But, because their troops wertf 
on a sudden seized with a panic terror, they were forced to return back agaiu 
with some disgrace, though not with any loss. For the inhabitants of Stratus, 
being apprehensive that their intention was to draw them into an ambuscade, 
feared to follow them in their retreat. 

About this time, a piece of feigned treachery was practised in Phancteus, 
in the following manner : Alexander, who was intrusted by. king Philip- with 
tile government of Phocis, formed the design of surprising the iEtclians, and 
employed for that purpose Jason, wh© commanded under him in Phanoteus. 
This officer, having sent some messengers to Agetas the iEtolian prsetor, en- 
gaged to surrender to him the citadel of the city. The agreement soon was 
settled, and counrmed also by the accustomed oaths. On the appointed day, 

YCL. I. no. 5. 2 E« 



«66 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. , 

Agetas advanced with his army in the night into the neighbourhood of Pha- 
nateus, and having selected a hundred of the bravest of his troops, he sent 
them away to take possession of the citadel, and concealed the rest at some 
distance without the walls. In the mean while, Alexander, with a sufficient 
body of troops, stood in readiness within the city, and as soon as Jason, agree- 
ably to his oath, had introduced the hundred JEtolians into the citadel, he 
shewed himself and fell upon them, so that they were forced immediately to 
surrender. Agetas, as soon as the day appeared, perceived what had hap- 
pened, and retreated back again with his forces, having been taken in a snare, 
not unlike to those which himself had often practised against others. 

About the same time also, Philip reduced Bilazora, the largest city of all 
Pseonia, and which commanded likewise those defiles that led from Dardania 
into Macedon. By this conquest, therefore, he was freed from all farther ap- 
prehensions, with regard to the people of that province. For as long as he 
should remain master of this city, it would be scarcely possible that they 
should make incursions into his kingdom. When he had secured the place 
by a sufficient garrison, he sent away Chrysogonus, to draw together with,, all 
diligence the forces of the upper Macedon; and himself, taking with h'mi the 
troops that were at Bott'ra and Amphaxis, began his march and came to Edesa, 
And being in this place joined by Chrysogonus, he advanced with all his army,, 
and having, on the sixth day, passed beyond Larissa, and continued his march 
all ni^htwith the greatest haste, he arrived near Meliteea about break of day, 
and began immediately to scale the city. The inhabitants, who were wholly 
' unprepared against this accident, were so struck with consternation, that they 
might soon have been reduced with little difficulty. But, because the ladders 
were too short, the king failed in the attempt. 

Among all the faults into which the leaders of an army are at any time be- 
trayed, there are none that more justly deserve our censure than that which 
was now committed. For how can those generals be excused, who, without 
having taken any due precaution, without measuring the walls and other 
place3 by which they design to approach a city, rush blindly on to the attack ? 
Or can those on the other hand be thought less worthy of reproach and blame, 
#ho, when they have informed themselves of the height and dimensions of 
those objects, leave to any persons, whom chance shall offer, the care of pre- 
paring the ladders, with all the other necessary instruments : those instru- 
fcnentg which, though they may indeed be framed by a moderate degree of 
sifiill, are yet of the utmost importance in their use? For in things of this 
kind, nothing that is necessary can be omitted without some loss. The neg- 
lect, indeed, how small soever, will immediately be followed by its punishment,. 
For either in the very time of the attack the bravest of the troops are lost ; or 
when they are forced to. desist from their design, and to retire before an exult- 
ing enemy, who despises their ineffectual efforts, they are then exposed to a 
still greater danger than before. The truth of this remark might be shewn 
from numberless examples. For amfong all th3t have failed in such attempts, 
the greater part have either perished in the place, or been involved in the 
greatest hazard and distress, while few, on the other hand, have been able to 
escape with safety. It must also be acknowledged, that such attempts, espe- 
cially when frustrated, draw after them distrust and hatred, and afford a stand- 
in°- and a public admonition, not to those only that are present, but to all 
who hear of the event, to secure themselves effectually against such enemies. 
Those, therefore, who are intrusted with the conduct of affairs, ought never' 
to engage in such designs, unless the means that are required for carrying 
them into execution have at first been regulated with the nicest care. With 
regard to the measure and construction of ladders and other instruments, ther$. 
is a method for it which is both easy and infallible. But we must now proceed 
ih our narration* ; and shall take, perhaps, at eome future time, occasion tjfr- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU&. m 

resume this subject, and explain the manner in which enterprises are to be 
conducted with the best assurance of success. 

The king, when he thus had failed in his design, went and encamped near 
the river Enipeus, and drew together, from Larissa, and the other cities, all 
the stores which he had collected during the preceding winter, in order to 
form the siege of Thebes in Phthiotis; for the chief design and purpose of 
his present expeditioa>was to render himself master of this place. The city 
of Thebes is situated near the sea, at the distance of three hundred stadia 
from Larissa, and commands hot!) Thessaly and Magnesia ; those parts espei 
cciallyofthe latter province which lie contiguous to Demetrias ; and in the, 
former the districts of Pharsalus and Phene. With this advantage, the i£to- 
lians, who were at this time in possession of the city, fell frequently with great 
success upon the neighbouring country, and occasioned no small loss to the 
people of Demetrias and Pharsalus, and even those of Larissa likewise ; for 
they often extended their incursions as far as to the plain Ainyricum. Philip, 
therefore, having resolved to employ his utmost efforts to become master of the 
place, brought together a hundred and fifty catapults, with twenty-five ina- 
chines for throwing stones, and having divided his army into three separate 
bodies, lodged himself in the nearest posts. The first division encamped near 
Scopium; the second in the neighbourhood of Helietropium ; and the last was 
seated upon a hill which overlooked the city. He fortified the space also that 
was between the camps with an entrenchment and a double palisade; and 
with towers of wood, placed at a distance of a hundred paces from each other,, 
and secured by a sufficient guard. And when he had collected together all 
the stores, and completed the preparations that were necessary, he ordered the 
machines to approach, and began his attack against the citadel. During the 
first three days the besieged resisted all his efforts with so great bravery and 
firmness that the works were not much advanced. But when the continual 
skirmishes and the darts that were discharged without any intermission had 
destroyed or wounded great numbers of the inhabitants, they then slackened 
in their ardour, and afforded leisure to the Macedonian miners to begin their 
work. But such was the difficulty of the ground, that after nine days' con«- 
tinued labour they were scarcely able to approach near the walls. As they 
persisted, however, in the task by turns, without any respite either by day or 
night, in the course of three days more they had undermined the wall to the 
length of two hundred paces, and placed props of timber under it. But these 
in a short time sank beneath the weight, so that the wall fell down, even be- 
fore the Macedonians had set fire to the wood. They then cleared away, with 
the greatest diligence, the ruins of the breach, and were just ready to advance 
±o the assault when the besieged were struck with terror and surrendered. Bythig 
conquest the king uotonly secured both Thessaly and Magnesia against the incur- 
sions of the JEtolians, and deprived that people of their accustomed booty; but 
at the same time also convinced the troops that if they had failed in the siege 
of Palaea, the treachery of Leomius had been alone the cause of their miscar- 
riage, and that he had justly punished him with death. Being thus become 
master of the place, he ordered the inhabitants to be sold for slaves; and hav- 
ing filled the city likewise with a colony from Macedon, he changed the name 
of it from Thebes to Philippi. ■ 

About this time some ambassadors arrived again from Rhodes, Chios, By- 
zantium, and from Ptolerrry, to mediate a peace. Philip, having repeated to 
them the answer which he had made before, that he was heartily disposed to 
embrace a peace, ordered them to go and inform themselves whether the sen. 
timents of the .Etolians were the same. But iu reality he was not in the least 
solicitous with respect to peace, but rather was inclined to pursue the course 
that was before him. Having received notice, therefore, that Seerdi»aidas 
infested the seas round Malea, and pillaged all the merchants, and thai some 
«vei> of his own vessels had been attacked in the port of Leucas, iu contempt 



26s GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



of treaties* he immediately equipped twelve decked ships, eight open barks, 
and thirty biremes, and steered his course through the Euripus. His intention 
was to surprise the lilyrians, and to give an early and effectual check to 
the insolence of those pirates, that he might then be able to resume with 
vigour the war against the iEtolians, which was stili the object of his chief at- 
tention, because he was at this time ignorant of all that had passed in Italy. 
For while he was employed in the siege of Thebes, the Romans were defeated 
in Tyrrhenia by Annibal. But the news of that battle had not yet arrived in 
Greece. 

The Illyrian barks had retired, however, from those seas, before the king 
was able to arrive. Having cast anchor, therefore, in the port of Cenchreae, 
and ordered that the decked ships should sail round Malea to iEgium and 
Patrse, he drew the rest, of his vessels over the isthmus, and commanded them 
to take their station in the harbour of Lecheeuni ; while himself went from 
thence to Argos, together with ins friends, to be present at the Nemeari 
games. 

As he was sitting there, to behold the combats, a courier arrived from Mace- 
don with the news that the Romans had been defeated in a great battle, and 
that Annibal was now master of all the open country. Philip immediately 
showed his letters to Demetrius of Pharos, but to none besides ; and cau- 
tioued him to be silent. Demetrius seized the occasion, and pressed the 
king to put an end at once to his war' against the iEtolians ; that he might be 
able to employ all his forces to reduce lllyria, and from thence to pass after- 
wards into Italy. He represented to him, " that the states of Greece, as they 
were now well pleased to comply with all that was imposed, would be ready 
likewise in all future times ro receive his laws, and pay an entire submission 
■to his will ; that the Acbaeans were, by inclination, strongly fixed in all his 
interests; and that the iEtolians, deterred by the misfortunes that had hap- 
pened to them in the present war, would fear to engage in any new designs 
against him; that his passing into Italy would, in effect, be the most im- 
portant step towards the conquest of the world ; that such an enterprise be- 
lonoed to none more properly than to himself; and that the time also for it was 
now most seasonable, in which the Romans had been defeated with so great a 
loss." This discourse did not fail to make a very quick and deep impression 
upon the king ; young as he then was, and fortunate in al This projects ; bold 
and enterprising in his nature ; and descended also from a house whose princes 
always had eonceiyed the hope of being able to acquire the sovereignty of the 
world. ; 

In a short time, therefore, though he had shown, as we have said, his letters 
only to Demetrius, he assembled together all his friends in council, and 
demanded their opinions with respect to a peace with the iEtolians. 
Aratus was by no means averse to peace ; for he thought that all things might 
be now accommodated with some advantage to themselves, because they were 
superior in war. The king, therefore, not expecting the return of those am- 
bassadors who had been employed to mediate a peace, deputed to the iEto- 
lians Cleonicus of ^aupactus, who, from the time in which he first was taken, 
J»ad still remained near the king, waiting for the assembly of the Achaean 
states. He then left Corinth, and advanced with his fleet and army towards 
jEgium. And when he arrived at Lasion, that he might not show too great an 
eagerness to put an end to the war, he attacked and stormed a fortress that 
was built upon the ruins of that city ; and threatened also to make an incur- 
sion into the Elean territory. But afterwards, when Cleonicus had returned 
twice or thrice, and the iEtolians were earnest to obtain a personal conference, 
he resolved to comply with their request ; and, having put a stop to all hos- 
tilities, sent couriers to the cities of the allies, desiring them tti depute seme 
persons to deliberate with him concerning the conditions of the peace. He 
then ^vent and encamped with his army near Panormus, a port of Pelopon- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



nesus, "which lies opposite to Naupactus, and there waited the arrival of the 
deputies. But before they were assembled he passed over to Zacynthus ; 
and, having regulated certain matters 'in that island which required his pre- 
sence, he returned back again to Panormus. 

When the deputies arrived, the king sent away Taurion and Aratus, with 
some others that were present; who, when they had joined the /Etolians at 
Naupactus, and had seen, in one short interview, that they were earnestly in- 
clined to peace, returned again without delay, and brought also with them 
some ambassadors from the iEtolians, who pressed the king to pass over to 
them with his army, that the conferences might be held face to face, and all 
disputes more easily be accommodated. Philip yielded to their solicitations ; 
and, having embarked his troops, sailed over to /Etolia, and encamped at the 
distance of twenty stadia from Naupactus. And, having thrown up an in- 
trenchment round his camp and vessels, he waited there till the conferences 
should begin. The /Etolians all met together, without their arms, at the dis- 
tance of two stadia onjy from the camp, and from thence sent their deputies 
to the conference. The king proposed to them, by the ambassadors of the 
allies, as the first condition of the peace, that they should keep on all sides 
what they then possessed. To this .the iEtolians readily consented. With 
regard to other points, there were afterwards frequent deputations and de- 
bates ; the greater part of which were of such smalt importance, that they need 
not be particularly mentioned. But the discourse which was made by Age- 
laus of Naupactus, in presence of the king and of the ambassadors of the al- 
lies, at the time of the tirst interview, was such as well deserves to be re- 
lated. 

He said then, " that it seemed to be a point of the greatest moment, that 
the states of Greece should now at last all resolve to lay aside their mutual wars 
and contests, and esteem it as the greatest happiness which the gods could 
■give, if they once could be induced to unite together in heart and sentiments ; 
and, taking each other by the hand, like men that are obliged to ford a dan- 
gerous stream, join all their strength to stand against the attacks of foreign 
enemies, and secure their cities and themselves from failing a prey to any 
barbarous people ; that though such a union might, perhaps, in all its parts',, 
and for any long continuance, be found impracticable, it was, however, highly 
necessary that, at least in this conjuncture, they should all stand firm in one 
agreement, and join in common measures for the common safety ; that, in or- 
der to be well assured of this necessity, they might only turn their eyes upon 
the greatness of those armaments that were at this time in the field, and the 
importance of the war in which the powers abroad were now engaged ; that all 
who were possessed of even a moderate portion of discernment in the affairs 
of policy must be able clearly to perceive, that the couquerors in this war, 
whether the Carthaginians or the Romans, would never rest contented with 
the sovereignty of Sicily and Italy, but go on to spread wide their victories, 
and extend their acquisitions beyond all just and reasonable bounds. He con- 
jured them, therefore, with the greatest earnestness, and Philip above all the 
rest, to secure themselves in time against the impending danger; that, with 
regard to Philip, this security might most effectually be obtained, if, instead 
of weakening, as he had hitherto done, the strength and forces of the Greeks, 
he rather would regard them all as the members of his own body, and attend 
to the safety of their provinces with no less vigilance and care, than if they 
were in truth the natural and proper parts of his own dominions ; that, by 
such a conduct, the Greeks would all be fixed unalterably in his interests, 
and ready to assist him in his projects ; and that, by this attachment to him, 
not less weighty than sincere, all strangers would effectually be deterred from 
forming any designs against his kingdom ; that if this prince, however, was 
(Bajger to be employed in action, Jet him turn his eyes towards the west, and 



470 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



observe what passed in Italy ; that, by a wise and diligent attention to ail that 
now should happen in that country, he might iind at last, perhaps, some lair 
■occrtMon for opening to himself the way to universal empire ; that the con- 
dition of the present times seemed greatly to encourage such a hope. He 
pressed him, therefore, to lay aside all farther thoughts of contest or dissen- 
tion among the Greeks ; and, above all things, to be careful not. to lose the 
power of making war upon them, or of concluding peace, whenever himself 
should choose. For if," continued-he, " this cloud, which is now seen hover- 
ing in the west, should at last settle and discharge itself upon the provinces of 
Greece, how greatly do I fear that an end will be put at once both to our 
"wars and treaties, and to all those childish contests in which we are 'nsiw so 
wantonly engaged ; and that all of us must then be forced to implore it as a 
blessing from the gods, that we may be permitted to enjoy the power of taking- 
arms against each other, and of laying them down again, as we shall judge it 
to be most expedient ; or, in a word, of settling any of our differences by our 
own decision." 

-" This discourse filled all the allies with a strong desire of peace. Philip, 
•especially, was deeply affected by those sentiments that were so perfectly 
adapted to his own designs, and to the temper in which Demetrius had already 
raised him. As soon, therefore, as they had settled the conditions, and rati- 
fied the treaty, they all returned again, with peace, to their respective coun- 
tries. These events all happened in the third year of the hundred-fortieth 
olympiad ; the defeat of the Romans in Tyrrhenia ; the battle between Ptolemy 
*tnd Antiochus for the sovereignty of Coele-syria ; and the conclusion of the 
war of Philip and the Achseans, against the JEtolians. This, therefore, was 
tfhe time, in which the affairs of Greece were now first connected with those of 
Italy and Afric. For, after this period, Philip and the states of Greece no 
longer regulated their designs, either with respect to war or peace, by the con- 
dition of their own country, but all turned their eyes to Italy, to find there the 
mark by which all their counsels were to be directed. The people of Asia 
likewise, and of the islands, soon followed the example: and from this time^ 
whenever they had any cause of dissention and complaint against Attalus or 
Philip, instead of imploring aid from Antiochus and Ptolemy, instead of 
paying any regard to the south and east, they, on the contrary, fixed their 
whole attention upon the west, and sometimes sent ambassadors to the Car- 
thaginians, and sometimes to the Romans. The Romans, on the other hand, 
deputed likewise an embassy into Greece. For as they well knew the bold 
'arid enterprising spirit of Philip, they were filled with no small apprehensions 
that this prince would take advantage also of the times, and add a new ero- 
'barrassment to the difficulties in which they already were involved. 

Thus then have we shown, agreeably to our first design, at what time, it* 
what manner, and from what causes, the affairs of Greece were first connected 
with those of Italy and Afric. As soon therefore as we shall have continued 
the transactions of the Grecian History to the time in which the Romans were 
defeated in the battie of Cannae, and at which we broke off our relation of the 
war in Italy, we shall then also close this book. 

As soon as the war was ended, the Achseans chose Timoxenus for their 
praetor, and, with the rest of the people of Peloponnesus, returning to their 
own proper laws and customs, and ordinary course of life, began to resume 
the care of their estates, to cultivate their lands, and to restore again the sa- 
crifices, public games, and all the other rights that were peculiar to their coun- 
try, and which, among the greater part, had almost sunk into oblivion, through 
the long continuance of those wars in which they had successively been en- 
gaged. For I know not whence it happens, that the people of Peloponnesus, 
who seem of all men most strongly inclined by nature to cultivate the soft arts 
of peace sod social, life, have less enjoyed those blessings, than almost any 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. S7i 

■ . i 



nation of the world, at least in antient times. They rather indeed have been, 
as the poet Euripides expresses it, 

" Vex'd with perpetual toils, and ceaseless war." 

The cause, however, to which this evil fortune must be ascribed, may be founa 
also in their nature. For being passionately fond of freedom, and eager to* 
retain the supreme command, they choose to have recourse continually tr» 
arms, rather than yield a step to any rival power. The Athenians, on the 
contrary, no sooner were delivered from their apprehensions of the Macedo- 
nians, than they began to be persuailed, that the freedom of their state was 
now securely fixed upon a firm and solid ground. Refusing therefore any- 
more to bear a part in the affairs of Greece, and submitting themselves with- 
out reserve to the guidance of Micyon and Euryclidas, they decreed immo- 
derate honours to all the kings, especially to Ptolemy :. and, through the 
iudiscretion of those magistrates^ consented, without restraint or shame, to- 
every sordid act of flattery, and carried their adulation to so great excess, tha£ 
it exceeded even all the bounds of decency. 

Not long after this time, Ptolemy was engaged in war against the people of 
his own kingdom. In arming the^Egyptians for the war against Antiochus, 
he had acted wisely indeed with respect to the present times ; but with regard 
to the future, this measure was attended with most pernicious consequences. 
For the people, elated by the victory which they had gained at Raphia, began 
to reject with haughtiness the orders of the king: and being persuaded that 
they had strength sufficient to regain their liberty, they now only waited for a 
chief, to go before them in the attempt which they already had concerted, and 
which not long afterwards was carried into execution. / 

Antiochus, having made great preparations during the winter, as soon as the 
summer approached passed beyond mount Taurus, entered into an alliance 
with king Attalus, and began his war against Acheeus. 

The /Etolians were at first well pleased that they had put an end to a war 
which had proved so contrary to all their hopes. They chose, therefore, for' 
tlieir praetor, Agelaus of Naupactus, by whose zeal and pains the peace had 
chiefly been concluded. Yet scarcely any time had passed when they fell 
again into discontent and murmurs, and threw out bitter reproaches against 
this magistrate ; who, by having made the peace not with any single people, 
but with all the states of Greece, had cut off at once all the means of plunder 
to which they had been accustomed, and" had left them destitute of every 
hope. But Agelaus supported their unjust complaints with so great firmness, 
that he restrained the madness of their inclinations, and forced them, even 
against their nature, to be quiet. 

King Philip, after the conclusion of the peace, returned by sea to Macedonj 
and being informed that Scerdilaidas, using still the same pretence, upon 
which he had before surprised some vessels at. Leucas, had now pillaged is 
little town of Pelagonia, called Pissseum ; and in .Dassaretis, had received 
upon terms of treaty the cities of Phaebatis, Antipatiia, Chrysondion, and 
Geruns ; and that he had ravaged a considerable part of Macedon, which lay 
upon the confines of these cities; he immediately began his march with it 
body of forces in order to recover again these places, and to give, if it was 
possible, an entire defeat to Scerdilaidas. For he judged it to be above alE 
things necessary, that he should first firmly settle the affairs -of Illyria, and by 
•that means obtain full leisure to pursue without restraint his other projects, 
and especially his expedition into |taly. For this design was so continually 
pressed upon him by Demetrius, that it not only filled his mind all day, but 
even by night became the subject of his dreams. This earnestness, however* 
with which Demetrius thus urged the king to transport his forces into Italy, 
by no means sprung from any deaire to advance the interests of Philip; though- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

this, perhaps, might be admitted as a third consideration in his mind. But 
as, on the one hand, he was himself inflamed with a strong and inveterate 
hatred against the Romans, so he was persuaded also, on the other hand, that 
if this project should be carried into execution he should be able to recover 
again the sovereign!}? which he lost in Pharos. Philip then advancing with 
his army, regained the cities that were just now mentioned : and having taken 
also in Dassaretis, Creonium and Geruns ; upon the lake Lychnidia, Enche- 
lariEe, Cerax, Station, and Boii ; in the district of the Caliccenians, Bantia ; and 
in that of the Pyssantines, Orgysus ; he then sent his army into winter quar- 
ters. This was the winter in which Annibal, having ravaged all the noblest 
parts of Italy, fixed his camp near Geranium in Daunia ; and in which the 
Romans also chose for consuls, Gains Terentius aud iEmilius. 

The king, while he remained in winter quarters, reflected with himself that 
in order more effectually to advance his projects, it would be necessary to pro- 
vide a naval armament, completely equipped ; not with design to carry on 
the war by sea against the Romans, which he could scarcely hope to do with 
any kind of advantage or success, but that he might be able to transport his 
forces from place to place, as occasion should demand, and fall upon the 
enemy before they could be informed of his approach. Aud as the vessels. 
that were at this time used among the Illyrians seemed most proper for thii 
purpose, he resolved to build upon that model a hundred barks ; and was the 
first indeed of all the kings of Macedon that ever had engaged in such an un- 
dertakings When the vessels were all finished and equipped, and the summer 
began also to approach, he drew together his forces ; and having employed a 
little time to instruct the Macedonians in the exercise* of the oar, hesailed out to* 
sea, about the time in which Antiochus passed beyond m©unt Taurus ; and. 
steering his course through the Euripus, and round the promontory Malea, 
he arrived near the islands Cephallenia and Leucas, and waited at anchor 
there, attending to the motions of the Roman fleet. And when he was in- 
formed that, some of their vessels, which had directed their course to Lilybteum, 
remained still at anchor at that port, he again sailed out to sea, and advanced 
with confidence as far as to the coast of Apollonia. But as he approached the 
mouth of the river Lous, which flows through that part of the country, a panic 
terror, not unlike to those which are sometimes seen in the armies upon land, 
Tan suddenly through all the fleet. For some barks that had sailed in the 
rear of all the rest, and had east anchor near the island Sason, at the entrance 
of the Ionian sea, came bj? night to Philip, and informed him that certain 
vessels, arriving from the Straits, had joined them near that island, and ac- 
quainted them that they had left at Rhegium some Roman quiiv-^Ofemes, 
which were sailing towards Apollonia, to assist Scerdilaidas. Ffiilip, theic-vv/j'i 
being apprehensive that this fleet was just ready to a ppear in sight, immediate-. 
ly weighed anchor, and directed his course back again with the greatest haste. 
And when he had continued his flight, both by night aud day, without any 
intermission, he arrived again on the second day at Cephallenia; and having, 
in some degree, resumed his courage, he cast anchor there, and pretended that 
tome affairs in Peloponnesus had forced him to return. 

But these fears were found sit last to be entirely false and groundless. It 
was true, indeed, that Scerdilaidas, having been informed that Philip had 
equipped a naval armament, and not doubting but that this prince would 
soon arrive by sea, and renew" the war against him, had implored some succours 
from the Romans ; who sent accordingly to his assistance ten vessels, from the- 
fleet which lay at Li.lybseum ; and these were the ships that had been seen at 
Rhegium. But if Philip, instead of being hurried into a rash and inconside- 
rate flight, had waited the arrival of these vessels, he. not only must have 
gained an easy victory against them, but might also have obtained a most fair 
occasion for reducing all Illyria. For the great progress and success of An- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. a?3 



nibal, with the battle which had been fought but just before at Cannae, en- 
gaged at this time all the attention of the Romans. But the king being 
struck, as we have said, by vain and senseless apprehensions, returned again 
with disgrace to Macedou, though not with any loss. 

About this time also, a very memorable exploit was performed by Prusias. 
The Gauls, who, on account of the high lame which they had gained in arms, 
had been brought by Attalus from Europe, to assist him in his war against 
Aehteus, having left the service of that prince in the manner which we before 
have mentioned, committed horrid -outrages and devastations in many of the 
cities of the Hellespont, and at last laid siege to Ilium. But the, people of 
Alexandria, in Tioas, sent against them four thousand men under the conduct 
nfThelttisteSj and forced them to raise the siege. And having intercepted 
likewise their provisions, and -"defeated them tfi every project, they at last eon- 
strained them to abandon all the province. Being thus driven from Troas, 
they then seized Arisba in the Abydenian district ; and from thence making 
their incursions, pillaged and insulted ai! the cities that were near. Prusias, 
therefore, led an army against them in the field, and engaged them in a set 
battle. The men were ail destroyed in the action, their wives and children 
slaughtered in the camp, and their baggage left a prey to the conquerors. By 
this great victory the cities of the Hellespont were at once delivered from their 
fears; and the barbarians of Europe also were. instructed for the time to come 
not rashly to engage in the design of passing into Asia. 

Such then was the condition of affairs in Asia, and in Greece. In Italy, 
after the defeat at Cannae, the greater part of the neighbouring people joined 
themselves to the Carthaginians, as we have" already mentioned. But as we 
have now completed our relation of those transactions that happened in the 
hundred-fortieth olympiad, we shall here close this book ; and in that which 
follows, after a short and summary review of the events that have already been 
related, we shall go, agreeably to our design and promise, to describe the 
form and constitution of the Roman government. 



BOOK THE SIXTH. 
EXTRACT THE FIRST*. 



The origin and natural revolutions of civil government. An analysis of the 

government of Rome. 



CHAP. I. 

***With regard, indeed, to those states of Greece which have been often 
raised to a high degree of strength and power, and again as frequently have 

* It is altogether uncertain at what time, and by whose labour or direction, these ex- 
tracts, from the sixth to the seventeenth hook, were selected fro rathe history. Casaubon , in- 
deed, judges it to have been the work of Marcus Brutus; upon the authority, as I sup- 
pose, of Plutarch and of Suidas. The first of these, speaking of the behaviour of Brutus 
on the day of the battle of Pharsalia, says, " that, when dinner was ended in the camp, 
while others either went to sleep, or were disquieting their minds with apprehensions con- 
cerning the approaching battle, he employed himself in writing till the evening, composing 
an epitome of Polybius." The words of Suidas are these : " Brutus wrote some letters, 
and an epitome of Polybius the historian." But an epitome, that is, an abridgement, 
is a work of a very different kind. The abridger of a history preserves the substance of it 
entire ; omitting such parts only as seem to be superfluous, or of small importa»ce. 
VOL. I. NO. 5. 2 M 



f74 .! GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

suffered an entire reverse of fortune, it would be no bard task eitheMo treat of 
the events that have happened among them in past times, or to speak with 
so.r»e assurance concerning those that must hereafter happen. For it is easy 
to recount transactions that are known, and obvious likewise, from an attentive 
view of former accidents, to derive a foresight of the future. But, with re- 
gard to the republic of the Romans, as the present c©ndition of the government, 
,on account of that variety of parts of which it is composed, cannot be explained 
■without great labour ; so, on the other hand, the want of being sufficiently 
acquainted both with the general institutions, aud particular conduct, that 
have prevailed among this people in former times, renders it not less difficult 
to pronounce concerning their future fortune. It will be necessary, there- 
fore, to employ the closest pains, in order to obtain a distinct and comprehen- 
sive knowledge of the advantages that are peculiar to the constitution of this 
state. 

Among those, then, who have treated of these matters in the way of science, 
the greatest part have distinguished civil government into three several kinds : 
royalty, aristocracy, and democracy. But, it may vesy reasonably be demand- 
He relates events in regular order, and in the due course of succession. He forms a cbain 7 
of smaller length, indeed, but composed of intermediate ar-d dependent links. He em- 
ploys also his- own stile and language ; or, if he adopts those of his author, it is commonly 
with some degree of variation, which renders them his own. Even in compiling what are 
called the heads of a- history, some connexion and consistency are still required; and such 
order of the parts as may carry with it the appearance of an entire body. Bat in these 
extracts no series of history is preserved. They are all single and separated portions ; se- 
parated from the body of the work, and not joined even by the smallest connexion one with 
another. That they remain also in the very words in which they were originally written 
is evident not only from the language throughout, which is so peculiar as to exclude all 
doubt, but more particularly from a single circumstance, which in this case is certain and 
decisive. Almost every one of these selected portions has, in the first sentence, one of those 
connecting paFticles which show that another period had gone before. These particles, 
\vhich add nothing to the sense, which bear a manifest relation to some former sentence, 
and which, by being retained, serve only to render the beginning of each passage imperfect 
and abrupt, are alone sufficient to demonstrate that the extract's, as they were selected 
arbitrarily, and with no reference to any certain plan, were copied also with the most 
minute exactness, and without disainuition or addition. If this then be the work designed 
by Plutarch and by Suidas, it must at least be acknowledged that they have spoken of it 
in very improper term". 

But Brutus composed abridgements likewise of the Books «f Fanuius, and of Cselius An- 
tipater, two Roman historians ; and Cicero mentions each of these works under the same 
title of an epitome. In one of his letters he says, " thaf he had copied his account of a 
certain fact, which Atticus had controverted with him, from Brutns's epitome of the books 
of Fanniiis ; and that, as Atticus had refuted him by demonstration, he would now refute 
Atticus by the authority of Brutus and of Fannius."' In another letter he desires, "that 
Atticus would send him Bfutas's epitome of the books of Cselius." And were these 
abridgements also "barely a transcript" 3 of separate and unconnected passages ? It is 
scarcely to be conceived that Brutus, if he ever had employed himself in a labour of this 
kind fcr the sake of his own improvement,-.would have suffered such collections to be 
p'ubli'shed with his name, and be dispersed among his friends ; or that Cicero particularly 
should hare been disposed to see or to consult a volume of mere extracts, when the entire 
histories both of Fannius and Caalihs, must undoubtedly ha?e had a place in his 

library. ■ 

It seems, then, that the opinion which ascribes the choice of these extracts to Brutus, 
not only is destitute of every kind of proof, but wants even the support of probability. 
Ot!-.er ronj.tftures might, perhaps, as easily be offered. Butnothing is more vain or trifling 
than to form conjectures, when the truth itself, if it could be known with certain iv, 
would be but of little value. By what person soever the choice was made, it is manifest 

' that it was made with very good 'judgment ; and that the. passages al! were copied with the 
most scrupulous fidelity. In t!. is state they now remain ; not to be considered as a his- 
tory ■ bit as genuine r.:iu authentic materials for a history of the times to which they be- 
16 <>•' Of rather, they are to he regarded as so many distinct end separate lessons of 
j.o'it'.ca!, military, and rtioral instruction. In this view they will be found to be truly 
V aiu»ble' : and the question, at what tinle, or by $vhom they were selected, like most othey 

^'questions "which are merely critical, is a matter of curiosity rather than ofuse. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 275 



ed of these writers, whether they speak of these as the only kinds, or simply; 
as the best. In either ease, indeed, they must be charged with error. For, 
first, that kind of government is undoubtedly to be esteemed the best, which 
is composed of all the three now mentioned. The proof of this is evident, 
from experience and from fact, as well as reason. Such, for example, was the 
system first invented by Lycurgus, and established by him in Sparta. Nor 
is it true, on, the other hand, that these are the only kinds. For many are the 
examples of monarchical and tyrannical governments, which are greatly dif- 
ferent from royalty ; though they appear indeed to bear some kind of resem- 
blance to it : which gives occasion to all raonarchs, to cover themselves, as well 
as they are able, under this disguise, and falsely to .assume the regal 7 name. 
There are likewise many oligarchical states, which seem to approach nearly in 
their form to aristocracies; though these are in truth very widely distant from 
them. The same observation may be made, with respect also to demo- 
cracies. The following illustration will serve mere ckarly to explain my 
meaning. 

It is not every government, which is conducted by a single sovereign, that 
is immediately to be termed a royalty; but that alone, which was at first be- 
stowed by the consent of those who are governed ; and which is administered 
according to right reason, rather than by force and terror. In the same manner, 
neither is every state to be called an aristocracy, which places the supreme 
direction of affairs in the hands of a few ; but that only, in which those who 
are most distinguished by their prudence and integrity are appointed by free 
choice to govern. Nor, lastly, is that to be esteemed a democracy, in which 
the whole multitude usurp the liberty of pursuing their own counsels and 
designs without controul. But when we see a peopl£, who, from the antient 
manners of their country, are accustomed to pay due worship to the gods, to 
revere their parents, to show respect to the aged, and to obey the laws; when, 
in the assemblies of citizensiike these, the resolutions of the greater part are 
made the rule of government ; then we behold the form of a just de- 
mocracy. •> - 
There are therefore six different kinds of government: three, which are in 
the mouths of all men, and which have now been mentioned ; and three more, 
that are allied to these by nature ; monarchy, oligarchy, and the government; 
of the multitude. Of all these, the first in order is monarchy ; which is 
established by the bare work of nature, without any preparation or design. 
From monarchy arises royalty ; when art has been applied to correct the vices 
of the former. * And when royalty has degenerated into its congenial evil, 
which is tyranny; the destruction of the iatter gives birth to aristocracy. 
This again being changed, according to the natural order of things, into oli- 
garchy ; the subjects, roused to vengeance by oppression, resist the injustice 
of their governors, and establish a democracy. And, in the last place, when 
the people themselves become haughty and nntractable, and reject all law ; 
to democracy succeeds, in the course of time, the government of the 
multitude. 

That this deduction is agreeable to truth, will be clear to every one, who 
considers with attention the commencement and first rise, as well as the 
changes, which nature has appropriated to each particular kind of government. 
And indeed there is no other way, but by observing what was the natural 
birth of every state, to judge with certainty concerning the progress of it to- 
wards perfection, and from thence to decline and ruin ; and to discern, at what 
time, in what manner, and into what different form it will at last be changed. 
Above all others, the Roman government may best be illustrated by sueh a 
method of inquiry : because this state, both in its first establishment, and sub- 
sequent increase, displays a close conformity with the settled laws, and regular 
course of nature. 

I am not ignorant indeed, that Plato, and some other philosophers, have 



276' GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



all eady treated with the greatest accuracy, of the several forms of government, 
and their alternate revolutions. But as there are but few, that are able to 
comprehend the length of their discourses, and the variety of matter which 
they contain ; I shall endeavour rather to give a summary account of those 
more obvious principles, which are adapted both to common apprehension, 
and to the purposes of civil history. And in case that any obscurity or delect 
should be found in the general view, the particular detail, which I shall after- 
wards subjoin, will afford ample compensation, by removing every dif- 
ficulty. - 

What then are the commencements, and what the original rise, of political 
societies ? When a deluge, a pestilential disease, a famine, or any other 
Similar cause, has brought destruction upon the human race, as tradition assures 
lis it has happened in former times, and as it is probable itwill again hereafter 
happen; and when all arts and institutions are extinguished also in the 
same calamity, from the few that are left alive another progeny of men 
springs up, who, being conscious of their' natural weakness, and attracted, like 
all other animals, to a union with their own kind, associate themselves toge- 
ther in a body. At this time, therefore, it is manifest, that he who is superior 
both in strength and courage must govern and conduct the rest. For that 
this is indeed the genuine work of nature is most clearly seen in. the examples 
of the several kinds of animals, which are led by natural instinct only, unim- 
proved by reason. Such are cocks, bulls, and boars, as well as other kinds; 
among all which, those that are confessedly the first in strength are placed at 
the head of all the herd. Such, therefore, is the original state of men, when 
they a-semble together in a manner not unlike to that of other animals, and 
'are led by those that are the bravest and the most powerful. And this state 
may properly be called a monarchy, in which the authority of those that govern 
is measured by their strength. But afterwards, when in these societies a com- 
mon education and mutual intercourse have produced new sentiments and 
habits, then first commences royalty; then first arise in the human mind the 
notions of honourable and base, of just and unjust. These sentiments, and 
this change of government, are formed in the following manner : 

From the union of the two sexes, to which all are naturally inclined, 
children are born. When any of these, therefore, being arrived at perfect, 
age, instead of yielding suitable returns of gratitude and assistance to those by 
whom they have been bred^on the contrary attempt to injure them, either by 
words or actions, it is manifest that those who behold the wrong, after having 
also seen the sufferings and the anxious care that were sustained by the pa- 
rents in the nourishment and education of these children must be greatly of- 
fended and displeased at such proceeding. For man, who, among all the 
various kinds of animals is alpne endowed with the faculty of reason, cannot, 
like the rest, pass over such actions with indifference; but will make reflec- 
tion on what he sees ; and, comparing likewise the future with the present, 
will not fail to express his indignation at this injurious treatment, to which, as 
he foresees, he also may at some time be exposed. Thus again, when any one, 
who has been succoured by another in the time of danger, instead of showing 
the like kindness to his benefactor, endeavours, at any time, to destroy or hurt 
him, it is certain, that all men must be shocked by such ingratitude, through 
sympathy with the resentment of their neighbour, mid from an apprehension 
also, that the case maybe their own. And from hence arises, in the mind of every 
man, a certain sense of the nature and force of duty, j,n which consists both 
the beginning and the end of justice. In the same manner, likewise, the man, 
who, in the defence of others, is seen to throw himself the foremost into every 
danger, and evin to sustain the fury of the fiercest animals, never fails to ob- 
-tain the loudest acclamations of applause and veneration from all the multi- 
tude; while he, who shews a different conduct, is pursued with censure and 
reproach. And thus it is, thatthe people begin to discern the nature of tilings 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 277 

honourable or base, and .in what consists the differ* nee between them ; and to 
perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are 
fit to be admired and imitated, and the lattc to be detested and avoided. 
When he, therefore,, who possesses the greatest power, and is placed at the 
head of all the rest, is found always to comply with the general sentiments, in 
supporting- fortitude and merit, and in distributing' to every one impartial jus- 
tice ; the people, no longer dreading his superior force, but paying a willing 
obedience to his wisdom, submit themselves to his authority, and, with one 
consent, maintain him in his government against all invaders, even to extreme 
old age. And thus the monarch, by insensible degrees, becomes a king ; 
when reason takes the rule, in the place of strength and violence. Such are'" 
the first perceptions among mankind of justice and injustice, of base and ho- 
nourable ; and such the origin and rise of genuine royalty. For the people not 
only confirm these leaders in the possession of the power to which they have 
.been raised, but preserve it to their children likewise ; being persuaded, that 
those who have received their birth and education from virtuous parents can- 
not hot resemble them in manners. And if, at any time, they are displeased 
at the conduct of these descendants, they then choose other magistrates and 
kings. But. having been taught to discern by past experience the difference 
between external faculties and the endowments of the mind, they now appoint 
to the supreme command, liot those that excel in bodily strength and vigour, 
but those who are distinguished by their wisdom and superior reason. 

In ajitient times, then, those who had been once judged worthy to be invested 
with the regal dignity, continued, during the remainder of their lives, in the 
undisturbed possession and axercise of government; fortifying all the advanta- 
geous posts; inclosing their towns with walls, and obtaining such an increase 
of territory as was necessary for the security or the plentiful subsistence of 
their subjects. And as they assumed no great distinction either in their dress 
or table, but lived a life that was conformable in every poiiafeto that of the 
other citizens, they raised against themselves no envy, nor afforded any matter 
of offence. But their descendants, having received the sovereignty in the 
course of hereditary succession, and finding that all things already were ob- 
tained that were convenient for defence, and that the abundance of all neces- 
saries exceeded the demands of nature, were soon hurried, by the wantonness 
of ease and plenty, into an open gratification of every passion. They then 
began to be persuaded that it was necessary that kings should be distinguished 
from their subjects by more splendid habits, and be served with more costly 
.and luxurious tables; and pursued also with lull career the indulgence of 
their amours, however lawless, without admitting any contradiction or con- 
troul. The first of these disorders soon excited envy and offence, and the lat- 
ter wrath and unrelenting hatred. And from hence the royalty being now 
converted into tyranny, the dissolution of it was begun by machinations 
formed against the persons of the sovereigns. These conspiracies were at first 
. contrived, not by men of obscure or low condition, but by those of noblest 
birth, and who were the most distinguished by their courage and exalted 
spirit: for such are at all times most impatient of the insolence of princes. 
But the people beiug not less offended also and enraged, having'oi.ce obtained 
such leaders, readily joined their forces in the same attempt. And thus the 
form of royalty and monarchy being utterly destroyed, an aristocracy grew up, 
and was established in its place. 

For the people, moved with present gratitude towards those who had de- 
livered them from tyranny, resolved to invest them with the government, and 
submitted themselves to their guidance and dominion. And these, being on 
their part also not less satisfied with the honour that was bestowed upon them, 
regarded the good of the community as the only rule of their administration, 
and employed their whole care and pains to promote the happiness of indivi- 
duals, as well as to advance the common interests of ail. But when again the 



W$ GENERAL HISTORY OF PGLYBIUS. 



children of these governors were raised in the course of succession likewise to 
the same authority, unpractised, as they had always been, in hardship or mis- 
fortune, and unexperienced also in that equality and liberty upon which the 
government was founded ; having been nurtured from' their birth in the pre- 
eminence and honours of their parents, they began, some of them to accumu- 
late inordinate wealth by fraud and violence, whiie others, allowing a fulj in- 
dulgence to their passions, abandoned themselves without restraint to riot and 
intemperance, adulteries and rapes. 

And thus the aristocracy being now changed into an oligarchy, the passions 
of the multitude were once ; more inflamed ; and .the same destruction followed 
that had before- fallen upon the kings, when they had degenerated into ty- 
rant*. For co sooner was there found a single citizen, who, being encouraged 
by the general discontent and hatred that such a conduct had occasioned, was 
bold enough, either by words or actions, to attempt any thing against the 
governors, than the people, with one consent, were ready to concur in the de- 
sign. And when they had killed, or driven into banishment their oppressors, 
not daring to establish royalty, on account of the misconduct of the former 
kings, and being deterred also by the mischiefs which they still more lately 
had experienced, from yielding the sovereignty to any certain number, they 
were then forced to have recourse to the single expedient that was left un- 
tried, and to place in themselves alone their confidence of safety. And, hav- 
ing assumed into their own hands the conduct and the trust of government, 
they thus framed a democracy upon the ruins of the oligarchy. 

During some time afterwards, and whiie any of those remained alive who 
had beheld the miseries that flowed from the former unequal government, the 
people were all well pleased to maintain this popular state; and thought that 
nothing was more valuable than equality and libertj^. But, after the course 
of one or two successions, as new men sprang up, even these enjoyments, being 
now become familiar to them,.begau, through long use and habit,- to be les- 
sened in their esteem, ahd to give place to the desire of pre-eminence and 
power. Above all the rest, those who had acquired the greatest wealth, being 
eager likewise to possess the sovereign rule, and not able to obtain it by their 
own strength and virtue, endeavoured to draw the people to their side; scat- 
tering among them, with profusion, all their riches, and employing every 
method of corruption ■; till, by degrees, they had taught therm to fix their 
whole attention, upon the gifts by which they were sustained, and rendered 
their avidity subservient to the views of their own wild ambition. And thus 
the frame of the democracy was dissolved ; and gave place to the rule of vio- 
lence and force. For when once the people are accustomed to be fed with- 
out any cost or labour, and to derive all the means of their subsistence from 
the wealth of other citizens ; if, at this time, some bold and enterprising leader 
should arise, whose povery has shut him out from all the honours of the state, 
then commences the government of the multitude ; who run together in tu- 
multuous assemblies, and are hurried into every kind of violence ; assassi- 
nations, banishments, and divisions of lands : till, being reduced at last to a 
state of savage anarchy, they once more find a master and a monarch, and 
submit themselves to arbitrary sway. 

Such is the circle in which political societies are revolved, and such the na- 
tural order in which the several kinds of government are varied, till they are 
Ht last brought back to that original form from which the progress was begun. 
With the help of being acquainted with these principles, though it may not, 
perhaps, be easy to foretel the exact time of every alteration that may happen 
jn a state, yet, if our sentiments are free from prejudice and passion, we shall 
very rarely be deceived in judging of the degree, either of exaltation or de- 
cline, in which it actually subsists, or in declaring the form into which it must 
at last be changed. With regard especially to the commonwealth of Rome, 
this view of things cannot fkil to lead us into the knowledge both of the origi- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF-POLYBIUS. ?7i> 

nal constitution, and the gradual prog-res of it towards perfection, as well as 
of the future revolution also that awaits it. For us this government, above all 
others, received, as we have already observed, both its first establishment and, 
subsequent increase from the settled laws of nature, it is reasonable to believe 
that it will follow the same laws likewise in being changed hereafter into a 
contrary form. But this will be more distinctly seen in the following parts of 
this discourse. I shall now give a short account of the frame of government 
.that was established by Lycurgus. Such a digression will not be foreign to 
my design. 

This legislator, then, having considered with himself^ that, according to the 
necessary and established course of all things, the several accidents and 
changes that have now been mentioned were inevitable, formed this conclu- 
sion : that every simple and single kind of government was insecure, on ac- 
count of its proneness to degenerate into that more vicious' kind, which was 
most nearly allied to it by nature. For as rust is the inbred bane of iron, 
and worms of wood ; and as these substances, even though they should escape 
all external violence, at last fall a prey to -the evils that are as it were conge- 
nial with them ; in the same manner likewise, every single kind of government 
breeds within itself some certain vice, which is attached by nature to its very 
form, and which soon causes its destruction. Thus royalty degenerates into 
tyrauny ; aristocracy into oligarchy ; and democracy into savage violence. Nor 
is it possible, as we have already shown, but that in the course of time these 
conversions must be thus produced. L}'curgus, therefore, foreseeing this ne- 
cessity, instead of adopting either of the single forms of government^ collected 
what was excellent in them, all ,* and so' joined together the principles that 
were peculiar to each several form, that vio one of them might be extended 
beyond proper bounds, and slide into the evil to which it was inclined by 
nature : but that each separate power, being still counteracted by the rest, 
. might be retained in due position, and the whole government be preserved in 
equal balance ; as a vessel, when impelled to either side by the wind, is kept 
steady by a contrary force. Thus the dread of the people, to whom a certain 
share was allotted in the government, restrained the excesses and abu^e of 
royalty. The people, on the other hand, were maintained in a due submission 
to the kings, by their apprehension, of the power of the senate. For the mem- 
bers of the senate, being ail selected from the best among the citizens, were 
always ready to support the cause of justice ; and, by throwing their own 
weight into the scale, when either side was in danger of being oppressed 
by the other, to give such strength to the weakest party, as the constitution 
of the state required. By these means, the Lacedaemonians preserved their 
liberty entire, for a much longer time than any other people. And thus it 
was that Lycurgus, having been taught by reason to foresee a certain train of 
causes and events, was able to give a lasting strength to his establishment. 
The Romans, on the other hand, though they arrived indeed at the same per-* 
faction in the constitution of their state, were not led to it by foresight or by- 
reason. But, during the course of many contests and disorders in which ibey 
were engaged, having been careful always to adopt, upon every change, such 
improvements as the occasion itself suggested to them, they at last obtained 
the same end likewise, as that which Lycurgus had proposed ; and complet- 
ed the most beautiful frame of government, of ail that are in our times 
known. 

Let me only add, that a good judge of history will not form his opinion of 
a writer from any thing that is omitted by him, but from that which he relates.- 
If indeed any falsehood should be found in the things which he relates, it may 
be reasonable to impute the omission of the rest to ignorance. Jixit if, on the 
other hand, all that he relates be true, it ought then to be acknowledged, that 
his silence with regard to some particular things is not the effect of ignorance^ 
feut of judgment and design. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



CHAP. II. 

The three kinds of government, of which we have been speaking 1 , were all 
found united in the commonwealth of Rome. And so even was the balance 
between them all, and so regular the administration that resulted from their 
union, that it was no easy thing, even for the Romans themselves, to deter- 
mine with assurance, whether the entire state waa to be esteemed an aristo- 
cracy, a democracy, or a monarchy. For if they turned their view upon the 
power of the consuls, the government appeared to be purely monarchical and. 
regal. If, again, the authority of the senate was considered, it then seemed 
to wear the form of -aristocracy. And, lastly, if regard was had to the share 
which the people possessed in the administration of affairs, it could then 
scarcely fail to be denominated a popular state. The several powers that 
were appropriated to each of these distinct branches of the constitution at the 
time of which we are speaking, and which, with very little variation, are even 
still preserved, are these which follow. 

The consuls, while t'ey remain in Rome, before they lead out the armies 
into the field, are the masters of all public affairs, For all the other magi- 
strates, the tribunes aloue excepted, are subject to them, and bound to obey 
their commands. They introduce ambassadors into the senate. They 
propose also to the senate the subjects of debate; and direct all the forma 
that are observed in making the decrees. Nor is it less a part of their 
office likewise, to attend to those affairs that are transacted by the people j 
to call together ^general assemblies ; to report to them the resolutions of the 
senate ; and to ratify whatever is determined by the greater number. In all 
the preparations that are made for war, as well as in the whole administration 
in the field, they possess an almost absolute authority. For to them it belongs, 
to impose upon the allies whatever services they judge expedient ; to appoint 
the military tribunes ; to enrol the legions, and make the necessary levies ; 
and to inflict punishments in the field, upon all that are subject to their com- 
mand. Add to this, that they have the power likewise to expend whatever 
sums they may think convenient from the public treasure ; being attended 
for that purpose by a qusestor, who is always ready to receive and execute 
their orders. When any one therefore directs his view to this part of the 
constitution, it is very reasonable for him to conclude, that the government 
is no other than a simple royalty. Let me only observe, that if in some of 
these particular points, or in those that will be hereafter mentioned, any change 
should be either now remarked, or should happen at some future time, such 
an alteration will not destroy the general principles of this discourse. 

To the senate belongs, in the first place, the sole care and management of 
the public money. For all the returns that are brought into the treasury, as 
well as all the payments that are issued from it, are directed by their orders. 
Nor is it allowed to the quaestors to apply any part of the revenue to particular 
occasions as they arise, without a decree of the senate ; those sums alone ex- 
cepted, which are expended in the service of the consuls. And even those 
more general, as well as greatest disbursements, which are employed, at the 
return of every five years, in building and repairing the public edifices, are 
assigned to the censors for that purpose, by "the express permission of the 
senate. To the senate also is referred the cognizance of ail the crimes com- 
mitted in any part of Italy, that demand a public examination and inquiry : 
such as treasons, conspiracies, poisonings, and assassi nations. Add to this, 
that when any controversies arise, either between private men, or any of the 
cities of Italy, it is the part of the senate to adjust all disputes ; to censure 
those that are deserving of blame ; and to yield assistance 1o those who stand 
in need of protection and defence. When any tmbassies are sent out of Italy ; 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. : ,. .8S.1 



BnBE-T-scnoaar.f-^sas 



-either to reconcile contending states ; to offer exhortations and advice; or 
•even, as it sometimes happens, to impose commands ; to propose conditions 
of a treaty ; or to make a denunciation of war J the care and conduct of all 
these transactions is intrusted wholly to the senate. When any ambassadors 
also arrive at Rome, it is the senate likewise that determines, in what manner 
they shall be received and treated, and what answer shall be given to their 
demands. In all these things, that have now been mentioned, the people has 
no share. To those therefore, who come to reside in Rome during the absence 
of the consuls, the government appears to be purely aristocratical. Many of 
the Greeks especially and of the foreign princes-, are easily led into this per- 
suasion : when they "perceive that almost all the affairs, which they- are forced 
to negociate with the Romans, are determined by the senate. 

And now it may well be asked, what part is left to the people in this go- 
vernment: since the senate, on the one hand, is vested with the sovereign 
power, in the several instances that have been here enumerated, and more 
especially in all things that concern the management and disposal of the 
public treasure ; and since the consuls, on the other hand, are intrusted with 
the absolute direction of the preparations that are made for war, and exercise 
an uncontrolled authority in the field. There is r however, a part still alloted 
to the people ; and indeed the most important part, ; . For hist, the people are 
the sole dispensers of rewards and punishments ; which are the only bands, by 
which states and kingdoms, and, in a word,, all human societies, are held to- 
gether; For when the 'difference between these is overlooked, or when they 
are distributed without xlue distinction, nothing but disorder can ensue. Nor 
is it possible, indeed, that government should be maintained, if the wicked 
stand in equal estimation with the good. The people then, when any of- 
fences demand such punishment, frequently condemn the citizens to the pay- 
ment of a fine: those especially who have been invested with the dignities of 
the state. To the people alone belongs the right to sentence any one to die. 
■Upon this occasion, they have a custom which deserves to be mentioned with 




yet o 

mr, Naples', or any other of the confederate cities. The public magistracies 
are alloted also by the people to those who are esteemed worthy of them : 
and these are the noblest rewards that any government can bestow on virtue. 
To the people belongs the power <nf approving or rejecting laws: and, which 
is still of greater importance, peace and war are likewise fixed by their deli- 
berations. When any alliance is concluded, any war ended, or treaty made ; 
to them the conditions are referred, aud by them either annulled or ratified. 
And thus again, from a view of all these circumstances, it might with reason 
be imagined, that the people had engrossed the largest portion of the govern- 
ment, and that the state was plainly a democracy. 

Such are the parts of the administration, which are distinctly assigned to 
each of the three forms of government, that are united in the commonwealth 
of Rome. It now remains to be considered, in what manner each several form 
is enabled to "counteract the others, or to co-operate with them. 

When the consuls, invested with the power that has been mentioned," lead* 
the armies into the field, though they seem indeed to hold such absolute' 
authority as is sufficient for all purposes, yet are they in truth a o dependent. 
both on the senate and the people, that without their assistance they are by- 
no means able to accomplish any design. It is well known, that armies demand 
a continual supply of necessaries. But' neither corn, nor habits, nor even the 
military stipends," can at any time be trausmitted'to the legions; unless by aiti 
express order of the senate. Any opposition, therefore,/or delay, on the paft 
of this assembly, is sufficient always to defeat tiie enterprise's of the generals. 
It is the senate likewise, that either compels the consuls to leave their designs 
VOL. 1. NO. 5. 2 N 



S82 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

imperfect, or enables thern to complete the projects which they have formed, 
by sending ?i successor into each of their several provinces, upon the expira- 
tion of the Annual term, or by continuing them in the same command. The 
senate also has the power to aggrandize and amplify the victories that are 
gained, or, On tire contrary, to depreciate and, debase them. For that which 
is called among the Romans a triumph, in which a sensible representation 
of the actions of the generals is exposed in solemn procession to the view of all 
the citizens, can neither be exhibited with due pomp and splendour, nor in- 
deed be in anv manner celebrated, unless the consent of the senate be first 
obtained, together with the sums that are requisite for the expense. Nor is it 
less necessary on the other hand, thai the consuls, hew far soever they may 
happen to be removed frcniRonie, should be careful to preserve the good affections 
©f the people. For the people, as we have already mentioned, annuls or rati- 
fies all treaties. But that which is of greatest moment is, that the consuls, 
at the time of laying down their office, are bound also to submit their past 
administration to the judgment of the people. And thus these magistrates 
can at no time think themselves secure, if they neglect to gain the approba- 
tion both of the senate and the people. 

In the same manner the senate also, though invested with so great autho- 
rity, is bound to yield a certain attention to the people, and to act in concert 
■with them, in all affairs that are of great and general importance. With re- 
gard especially to those offences that are committed against the state, and 
which demand a capital punishment, no inquiry can be perfected, nor any 
judgment carried into execution, unless the people confirm what the senate 
has before decreed. Nor are the things which more immediately regard the 
genate itself less subject to the same control. For if a law should at any time 
be proposed, to lessen the received authority of the senators ; to detract from 
their honours and pre-eminence; or even to deprive them of a part of their 
possessions ; it belongs wholly to the people to establish or reject it. And 
even still more ; the interposition of a single tribune is sufficient, not only to 
suspend the deliberations of the senate, but to prevent them also from hold- 
ing any meeting or assembly. Now the peculiar office of the tribunes is, to 
declare those sentiments that are most pleasing to the people; and principally 
to promote their interests and designs. And thus the senate, on account of 
all these reasons, is forced to cultivate the favour, and gratify the inclinations 
of the people. 

The people again, on their part, are held in a dependence on the senate, 
and are obliged to pay a certain deference, both to the particular members, 
£ind to the general body. In every part of Italy there are works of various 
kinds, which are let to farm by the censors ; such as the building, or repair- 
ins?, of the public edifices, which are almost innumerable ; the care of rivers, 
harbours, gardens, mines, and lands ; every thing, in a word, that falls be- 
heath the dominion of the Romans. In all these things, the people are the 
undertakers ; insomuch that there are scarcely any to be found, that are not 
in some degree involved, either in the contracts, of in the management of the 
works. For some take the farms of the censors at a certain price ; others be- 
come partners with the first. Some again engage themselves as sureties 
for the farmers ; and others, in support also of these sureties, pledge their own 
fortunes to the state. Now the supreme direction of all these affairs is placed 
y/holly in the senate. The senate has the power to allot a longer lime; to 
lighten the conditions of the agreement, in case that any accident has inter- 
vened; or even to release the contractors from their bargain, if the terms, 
should, be found impracticable. There are also many other circumstances, 
in which those that are engaged in any of these public works may be either 
greatly injured or greatly benefited by the senate ; since to this body, as we 
have already observed, all things that belong to these transactions are con- 
stantly referred. But there is still another advantage of much greater rno» 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 283 

^'■*"»— ■—"'"'■" ■ j-'»m»'^'"««»»««"""»!'-»»'! i !» j ''''"'- 1111 .......Min i ii ■■ ;jp 

ineut. For from this order likewise judges are selected, in almost every 
accusation of considerable weight, whether it be of a public or private nature. 
The people, therefore, being by these means held under due subjection and 
restraint, and doubtful of obtaining that protection, which they foresee that 
they may at some time want, are always cautious of exciting any opposition 
to the measures of the senate. Nor are they, on the other hand, less ready to 
pay obedience to the orders of'the consuls; through the dread of that supreme 
authority, to which the citizens in general, as well as each particular man, are 
obnoxious in the field. 

Thus, while each of these separate parts is enabled either to assist or ob- 
struct the rest, the government, by the apt contexture of them all in the gene- 
ral frame, is so well secured against every accident, that it seems scarcely 
possible to invent a more perfect system. For when the dread of any common, 
danger, that threatens from abroad, constrains all the orders of the. state 
to unite together, and co-operate with joint assistance; such is the strength, 
of the republic, that as, on the one hand, no measures that are necessary are 
neglected, while all men fix their thoughts upon the present exigency ; so 
neither is it possible, on the other hand, that their designs should at any time 
be frustrated through the want of due celerity, because all in general, as well 
as every citizen in particular, employ their utmost efforts, to carry what has 
been determined into execution. Thus the government, by the very form and 
peculiar nature of its constitution, is equally enabled to resist all attacks, and 
to accomplish every purpose.' And»when again all apprehensions of foreign 
enemies are past, and the Romans being now settled in tranquillity, and en- 
joying at their leisure all the fruits of victory, begin to yield to the seduction 
of ease and plenty, and, as it happens usually in such conjunctures, become 
haughty and ungovernable ; then chiefly we may observe, in what manner the 
same constitution likewise finds in itself a remedy against the impending 
danger. For whenever either of the separate parts of the republic attempt* 
to exceed its proper limits, excites contention and dispute, and struggles to 
■obtain a greater share of power, than that which is assigned to it by the laws, 
it is manifest, that since no one single part, as we have shown in this discourse, 
is in itself supreme ©r absolute, but that on the contrary the powers which are 
assigned to each are still subject to reciprocal controul, the part which thus 
■aspires must soon be reduced again within its ©wn just bounds, and not be 
suffered to insult 01 depress the rest. And thus the several orders, of which 
the state is framed, are forced always to maintain their due position; being 
partly counterworked in their designs ; and partly also restrained from making 
any attempt, by the dread of falling under that authority to which they are 
exposed. 



EXTRACT THE SECONfh 

The military institutions of the Romans* 

CHAP. I. 

As soon as the consuls are declared, the military tribunes are next appointed. 
Of these, fourteen are taken from the citizens who have carried arms in five 
campaigns; and ten more from those who have completed ten. For every 
citizen, before he arrives at the age of forty-six, is obliged to serve either ten 
years in the cavalry, or sixteen in the infantry : those alone excepted who are 
placed by the censors below the rate of four hundred drachmae ; and who are 
all reserved for the service of the sea. In the case of any pressing danger:, the 
time of continuing in the infantry is extended to twenty year.s. No citizen is 
permitted by the laws to sue for any magistracy before he has completed tile 
service of ten campaigns- 



584 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU& 

V* 7 heh the 'infolrnents are to be made, the consuls give notice before to the 
people of a certain day, upon which all the Romans that are of sufficient, age? 
are required to attend. This is done every year. And when the day arrives, 
and the men all appear at Rome, and are assembled afterwards in the Capitol r 
the tribunes of the youngest order divide themselves, as they are appointed 
either by the consuls or the people, into four' separate bodies. For this division 
corresponds with the first and general distribution of all the forces into four 
separate legions. Of these tribunes, therefore, the four first named are as- 
sip-ned to the first legion ; the three next to the second ; the following four 
to the third ;"and the last three appointed to the fourth. Of the tribunes of 
the oldest order the two that are first named are placed in the first 
region ; the three second in the second ; the two that follow in the 
third ; and the remaining three in the fourth- By this distribution and? 
division an equal number of commanders is«alloted to each legion. When 
this is done, the tribunes of each legion, having taken their seats apart, draw- 
out the tribes one by one by lot ; and calling to them that upon which the lot 
first falls, they select from it four young men, as nearly equal as is possible 
both in age and stature. And when these are brought forward from the rest* . 
the tribunes of the first legion first choose one ; then those of the second a se- 
cond ; those of the third take the third ; and those of the fourth the last. After 
these four more are made to approach. And now the tribunes of the second 
leo-ion first make their choice ; then those of the rest in order ; and last of . 
all the tribunes of the first. In the same manner again, from the next four. 
that follow, the tribunes of the third legion choose the first ; and those of the 
second the last. And thus, by observing the same method of rotation to the end, . 
it happens that the legions, with respect to the men of which they are composed,., 
are all alike and equal. The number alloted to each legion is four thousand 
and two hundred ' r and sometimes five thousand, when any great and unusual* 
danger is foreseen. After these had been thus selected, it was antiently the 
custom to choose the cavalry ; and to add two hundred horsemen to each four 
thousand of the infantry. But in the present times, the citizens, of whom th«-' 
cavalry is composed, are first inrolled ; having been before appointed by the 
censors, according to the rate of their revenue ; and three hundred are assign* 
ed to every legion. 

When the inrolmenls are in this manner finished, the tribanes having as** 
sembled together in separate bodies the soldiers of their respective legions, 
choose out a maa that seems most proper for the purpose, and make him 
swear in the following words : " that he will be obedient to his commanders, 
and execute all the orders that he shall receive &om them to the utmost of his- 
power." The rest of the soldiers of the legion, advancing one by one, swear 
also that they will perform what the first has sworn. About the same time, 
likewise, the consuls send notice to the magistrates of the allied cities of Italy, 
from which they design to draw any forces, ??hat number of troops are wanted, 
and at what time and place they are required to join the Roman army. The 
cities, having raised their levies in the same manner that has now been men- 
tioned, and administered to them the same oath, send them away attended by 
a paymaster and a general. 

At Rome the tribunes, after the ceremony of the oath is finished, command? 
all the legions to return without arms upon a certain day, and then dismiss- 
them. A ud when they are met together again at the appointed time, those 
that are youngest, and of the lowest condition, are set apart for the light- 
armed troops. From the next aboye these in age are selected the hastati f 
from those that are in full strength and vigour, the principes and the oldest 
of all that are inrolled are the triarii. For every legion is composed of all- 
these different bodies ; different in name, in age, and in the manner in 
which they are armed. This division is so adjusted that- the triarii amount 



GENERAL HISTORY OF PO LYBiUS. ,,,885 

to sixlmndred men; the pvincipes are twelve hundred; the hastati an equal 
number ; and all the rest light-armed. If a legion consist of more than tour 
thousand men, the several bodies are increased in due proportion; except only 
that the number of the triarii always remains the same. 

The vounoestof these troops are armed with a sword, light javelins, and a 
buckler*. The buckler is both strongly made, and of a size sufficient for se- 
curity. For it is of a circular form, and has three feet in the diameter They 
wear likewise upon their heads some simple sort of covering, such as the skin, 
of a wolf, or something of a similar kind, which serves both for then- defence, 
and to noint out also to the commanders those particular soldiers that, are du* 
tinjmished either by their bravery or want of courage m th? tune of action. 
f hi wood of the. javelins is of the length of two cubits, and of the thickness 
of a ringer. The 'iron part is a span in length, and is drawn out to such 3 
slende/fineness towards the point, that it never fads to be bent in the very hrs 
discharge, so that the enemy cannot throw it back again. Otheiwise it would 
be a common javelin. . ■ '•' ' - , ■ c ■ ■, ,1 „■ 

The next in age, who are called the hastati, are ordered to furnish them, 
selves with a complete suit of armour. This, among toe Romans, consists m 
tlie first place, of a shield of a convex surface the breadth o whicn » two feet 
and a half, and the length four feet, or four feet and a palm in those o, the 
fertest size. It is composed of two planks glued together,, and covered first 
with linen, and afterwards with calf-skin. ' The extreme edges of , t, both above 
and below, are yarded with plates of iron; as well to .secure it a g^M*f 
strokes of swords, as that it may be rested als* upon the grouua without ie~ 
ceiviuo- any injure- To the surface is fitted likewise a shell of iron, which 
iervesto turn aside the more violent strokes of stones or spears, or any other 
ponderous weapon. After the shield comes the sword, wmch is earned upon 
he right thigh, and is called the Spanish sword. It is ormed not only to. 
push with at the point, but to make a falling stroke with either edge and with 
singular effect ; for the blade is remarkably strong and firm, io these arms 
are added two piles or javelins: a helmet made of brass ; and boots or hj 
leo-s. The piles are of two sorts, the on,, large, the other slenaer. Of the 
former, those that are round have the breadth of a palm in their **^<*9* 
those that are square, the breadth of a palm likewise in a side 1 he moi e 
slender, which are carried with the other, resemble a common javelin oi a mo- 
derate Size. In both sorts, the wooden part is of about he lengtivof three 
cubits. The iron, which is of the same length likewise, and turned outward at 
the point in the form of a double hook, is fastened to the wood with so great 
care and foresight, being carried upwards tc the very middle of it, fd trans- 
fixed with many close-set rivets, that it is sooner broken in use than loosened . 
thouoh in the part in which it is joined to the wood, it « not less than a fanger 
and a half in thickness. Upon the helmet is worn an ornament of three up- 
right feathers, either red or black, of about a cubit in height ; winch btw 
fixed upon the very top of the head, and added to their other arms make 
the troop seem to be of double size, and gives them an appearance which >* 
both beautiful and terrible. Reside these arms, the soldiers, in general, place 
also upon their breasts a square plate of bras,, of the measure of a span ou 
either side, which is called the guard of the heart. But all those who a,e 
rated at more than, ten thousand drachm* cover their breasts with a coat or 
mail The principes and the triarii are armed in the ?ame manner likewise us 
the hastati, except only that the tri-cfrh carry pikes instead of javelins. 

From each of these several sorts of soldiers, the youngest alone excepted, 
ten men of distinguished merit are first selected, and, alter these, en more. 
These are all called commanders of companies; and ne that is first chosen nas 
a seat in the military council. After these, twenty more are appointed to con- 
duct the rear, and are chosen by the former twenty.. The soldiers of each dif- 
ferent order, the light troops excepted, are then divided into ten separate 



48 GENERAL HISTORY OJF" POLYBIUSL 

_ i „ : ^ _ ^ __ ^ .. — ii j_ i _jjm i _n i M_ ij___m^..;... .i__ i_n«ii« ii.i- 'iii i - ,4mmu*i 

parts ; to each of which are assigned four officers, of those who have been thus 
selected"; two to lead the van, and two to take the care of the rear. The 
light-armed troops are distributed in jnst proportion among them all. Each 
separate part is called a company, a band, or an ensign : and the leaders, cap- 
tains of companies or centurions. Last of all, two "of the bravest and most 
vigorous among the soldiers are appointed by the captains to carry the stand- 
ards in each company, It is not without good reason that two captains are 
assigned to every company. For as it always is uncertain, what will be the 
conduct of an officer, or to whit accidents he may be exposed ; and, as in the 
affairs of war, there is ho room for pretext or excuse, ibis method is contrived, 
that the company may not upon any occasion be destitute of a leader. When 
the captains therefore both are p -sent, he that was first chosen leads the right, 
and the other the left of the company 1 . And when eitlier-of thern is absent, he 
that remains takes the command of the whole. In the choice of those captains 
not those that are the boldest and most enterprising are esteemed the best, but 
those rather that are steady and sedate, prudent in conduct, and skilful in 
command. Nor is it so much requited that they should be at all times eager 
to begin the combat, a;,d throw themselves precipitately into action, as that, 
when they are pressed, or even conquered by a" superior force, they should 
still maintain their ground, and rather die than desert their station. 

The cavalry is divided also into ten parts or troops. In each of these, three, 
captains first are chosen, who afterwards appoint three other officers to conduct 
the rear. The first of the captains commands the whole troop, the other two 
hold the rank and office of decurions : and all of them are called by that name. 
In the absence of the first captain, the next in order takes the entire command. 
The manner in which these "troops are armed is at this time the same as that 
of the Greeks. But antiently it was very different. For, first, they wore no- 
armour upon their bodies, but were covered, in the time of action, with only 
an under garment. In this method, they wwe able indeed to descend from 
their horses, or leap up again upon them, with greater quickness and facility £ 
but, as they were almost naked, they were too much exposed to danger in all 
close engagements. The spears also that were in use among them informer 
times vvere, in a double respect, very unfit for service. First, as they were of 
a slender make, and always trembled in the hand, it not only was extremely 
difficult to direct them with exactness towards the destined mark, but verV 
frequently, even before -their points had reached the enemy, the greatest part 
of them were shaken into pieces by the bare motion of the horses. Add to 
this, that these spears, not being armed with iron at the lowest end, were 
formed to strike only with the point, and, when they were broken by this- 
stroke, were afterwards incapable of any farther use. "Their buckler was "made 
of the hide of an ox, and in form was not unlike to those globular dishes which 
are used in'saerifices. But this was also of too infirm a texture for defence j 
and, as it was at first not very capable, of service, it afterwards became wholly 
useless, when the substance of it had been softened and relaxed by rain. The 
Romans, therefore, having observed these defects, soon changed their weapons 
for the armour of the Greeks. For the Grecian spear, which is firm and 
stable, not only serves to make the first stroke with the point in just direction 
and with sure effect,' but, with the help of the iron at the opposite end, may, 
when turned, be employed against the enemy, with equal steadiness and force. 
In the same manner also, the Grecian shields, being strong in texture, and 
capable of being held in a fixed position, are alike serviceable both for attack 
and for defence. These advantages were soon perceived, and the arms adopted 
by the cavalry. For the Romans, above all other people, are excellent m 
admitting foreign customs that are preferable to their own, 

As. soon as this partition of the troops is finished, and the necessary order* 
given by the tribunes concerning their arms, they are then commanded to 
return to their respective habitations, till the day arrives upon which they are 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYRIUS. «87 



e trtVf" 



by oath to assemble together in a certain place appointed by the consuls. 
Each of the consuls usually appoints a different place for the assembling of 
his whole army; for, to each of them are alloted separately two Roman 
legiorts, together with an equal part of the allies. No pretence of accident ia 
at any time allowed to those that are enrolled, nor any excuse admitted, iu 
opposition to their oath, to discharge them from appearing on the day pre- 
scribed, unless some auspices should intervene, or some disaster happen, which 
renders their attendance absolutely impracticable. When they are all met 
together, the distribution of the allies, who are assembled also with the Ro- 
mans, is regulated by twelve officers, called prefects, and appointed by the con- 
suls, in the following manner: They first choose out from all the allies a body 
of the bravest and most skilful soldiers, both cavalry and infantry, to serve 
near the person, and under the immediate orders, of the consuls. These are 
called the extraordinary or selected troops. The whole infantry of the allies 
is usually the same in number with that of the Romans : but the cavalry thret? 
times as many. Among these, about a third part of the cavalry, and a fifth 
part of the infantry, are set apart as extraordinaries. The rest are then divided 
by the prelects into two equal bodies; one of which is called the right, and 
the other the left wing. When all things are thus prepared, the tribunes 
direct both the Romans and the allies to encamp. As the method of this 
encampment is uniform and simple, at all times and in every place the same, 
I shall here endeavour to set before the reader a clear description of the order 
that is observed in the Roman armies, both in their marches and encampments; 
and of the manner also iu which they are drawn up in battle. For no man, 
surely, who is not utterly averse to all great and laudable pursuits, can be un- 
willing to attend to such inquiries, in which his search will be rewarded with a 
kind of knowledge not unworthy of the pains. 



CHAP. II. 

Tins then is the manner in which the Romans form their camp. As soon as 
the ground is chosen for the purpose, that part of it which is judged to be the 
most convenient, both for the dispatch of-orders, and for discerning every 
thing that is transacted, is first marked out for the place of the consular tent. 
In this place an ensign is planted in the ground, and round it is measured a 
quadrangular figure, every side of which is distant from the ensign a hundred 
feet, so that the whole contents of it are equal to the space of four acres, Oa 
one side of this figure, the side that appears to be the most commodious for 
•water and for forage, the Roman legions are disposed in the following order: 
In every legion there are six tribunes, as we have already mentioned, and two 
legions are assigned to each of the consuls. With each consul, therefore, 
twelve tribunes always are encamped. Their tents are ranged in one right 
line, which is parallel to that side of the quadrangular space that has been 
chosen, and distant from it fifty feet. The ground between it is occupied by 
their horses, their beasts of burthen, and other baggage. These tents are so 
disposed, that the back of them is turned towards the consular ground^ while 
the opposite side looks down upon the external aspect of the camp, which we 
shall hereafter therefore call the front. They are set at equal distances each 
from the other, and so extended, that the line upon which they stand tra- 
verses the whole breadth of the space that is occupied by the legions. 

A hundred feet are then measured downwards, from the front of tire tents of 
the tribunes; and at the extremity of this distance a line is drawn which runs 
parallel to these tents. From this line forwards the legions are encamped in 
the following manner : The line being first divided into two equal parts, from 
the point of the division another right line is drawn, on either side of which, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



and at an equal distance from it, is placed the cavalry of the two legions ; ou=» 
posite the one to the other, and separated from each other by a space of fifty 
feet. i 

The disposition of the tents, both of the cavalry, and of the infantry, is the 
same. For every company, as well as every troop, occupies a square piece 
of ground, the front of which is turned towards the open spaces, and contains 
in length a hundred feet. . The depth of it is usually so adjusted as to Be 
•equal to the length ; except in the encampment of the triarii and the allies. 
When the legions are composed of any greater number, both the length and 
-depth -of' this ground are increased in due proportion. The cavalry, being 
"thus. placed towards the middle of 'die tents of the tribunes, forms a kind of 
street, which runs down travesely from the right line before mentioned, and 
the space. that lies before those tents. All the other spaces bear also the re- 
semblance of regular streets; the sides of which are formed by the troops and 
companies, which are .ranged lengthways through the camp. 

Behind the cavalry, and in the same form likewise, are placed the triarii of 
l>oth legions ; a company being joined close to every troop; but looking a 
contrary way ; and containing in depth only one half of its length. For the 
triarii usual!}* amount to no more than half of the number of the other bodies. 
But as-the depth of the companies is thus diminished, the ground upon which 1 
they are ranged is rendered equal in length to that which is occupied by the 
rest. • : 

Opposite to the triarii of the two legions, and at the distance of fifty feet on 
either side, the prirrci pes are encamped ; with their faces turned towards the 
open spaces. By this position, two more streets are formed ; which take their 
beginning also at the same right line or space of a hundred feet that lies be- 
fore the tents of the tribunes; and are ended on the opposite side, which we 
before called the front of all the camp. Next,±o the principes are lodged the 
nastati ; being placed close behind the former, but looking also a contrary 
way. As each of the different bodies, of which a legion is composed, is divided 
into ten companies, from hence it happens, that the several intervals or streets 
are all of an equal length, and are alike terminated by that side of the camp 
which is the front ; towards 'which also the last of all the companies are always 
turned. 

At the distance of fifty feet from the hastati, and opposite also to them, is 
lodged the cavalry of the allies ; beginning from the same right line ; and 
extended likewise, as the other bodies, down to the front of the camp. The , 
whole infantry of the allies/ as we have already mentioned, before the extra- 
ordinaries are selected, is equal to that of the legions: and the cavalry, after 
a third part has been taken from it to serve as extraordinaries, is double in 
number to the Roman cavalry. The depth therefore of the ground, upon 
which these troops are placed, is enlarged in such proportion, that they cover 
always the same space in length with that which is occupied by the Romans. 
The' several streets, which are five in -number, being thus completely formed, 
the infantry of the allies, to whose companies a depth of ground, is also assign- 
ed in proportion to their number, is", in the same manner, ranged close behind 
the cavalry, but looking a contrary way. For their faces are turned towards 
the m'treneli merit, and look down upon both sides of the camp. 

In every company," the foremost tents on either side are occupied by the 
centurions. In this disposition both of the infantiy and cavalry, the sixth 
company and the six troops are separated from the fifth by a distance of fifty 
feet. By this division another street is formed, which traverses all the rest, 
and passes through the middle of the camp, in a line parallel to the tents 
of the tribunes. This street, on account of the position of it below five 
companies is called the Quintan. 

The space that fills behind the tents of the tribunes, and which lies close, 
on either, to' the consular ground, is atloted, one side of it for the forum, and 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



the other for the place of the quaestor and the military stores. Behind the last 
of the tents of the tribunes on either side, and in a line, which, falling upon 
those tents, forms that kind of figure which is called the force ps, the extraor- 
dinary cavalry is lodged, together with the volunteers that accompany the 
consul ; being all of thera extended along the two sides of the camp ; with 
their faces turned towards the place of the cnuestor on the one side, and to the 
forum on the other. And as they are in this manner placed near the consul 
in the camp, so likewise in the marches, and in a word, upon all occasions 
that arise, they are bound to observe with particular attention both the quaes- 
tor and the consul : and to be at all times ready to receive their orders. Close 
behind this cavalry, but with their faces turned towards the intrenchment, 
the infantry which is selected also for the same service is encamped. 

Above these troops is left an open space of a hundred feet in breadth, and 
parallel to the tents of the tribunes, which passes along the forum, the consular 
ground and the place of the quaestor; and is continued through the whole 
extent of the camp. On the upper side of it is placed the extraordinary ca- 
valry of the allies; looking down upon th« forum, the place of the quaestor, 
and the consular ground. Between the middle of their tents, and opposite to 
the consular ground, is left another open space, of the breadth of fifty feet, 
which divides the former at right angles, and leads towards the hindmost part 
of the camp. Close again behind this cavalry, the extraordinary infantry of 
the allies is lodged ; with their faces turned towards the intrenchment, and to 
the rear of all the camp. The ground that remains unoccupied on either side 
is reserved for strangers, or for such of the allies as are brought by any tempo- 
rary occasion to the army. When the arrangement is thus completed, the 
entire camp forms the figure of an equilateral square: and with respect to the 
several parts, the separation of them into streets, together with the order in 
which all things are disposed, renders the appearance not unlike to a 
city, 

The intrenchment is distant from the tents on every side two hundred feet. 
The ground that lies between is subservient to many valuable purposes. It 
renders the entrance of the legions into the camp as well as their egress from 
it both easy and commodious. For as the several companies advance into this 
open space according to the direction of their respective streets, they never 
meet together in the way, nor exposed to the danger of being thrown down 
and trampled upon each by the other. In this place likewise the cattle and 
all the spoil that is taken from the enemy is kept in safety during the night. 
But the greatest advantage is, that in case of an attack by night, neither fire 
nor scarcely any weapon can reach the troops ', and even those few javelins 
tha£ happen to fall among them are rendered ineffectual by the distance, as 
well as by the tents that cover them on every side. 

From this detail of the numbers, both of the infantry and cavalry, of which 
an army is at any time composed; whether four or five thousand men be al- 
loted to each legion ; from the description of the depth and length of the 
ground upon which the companies are lodged ; and from the account of the 
measure and respective distances of the streets and open spaces ; it will be 
easy to conceive the extent and whole circumference of the camp. When the 
allies that first join the army, or those that are brought by any occasion to the 
camp, exceed the usual number, the ground that lies on one side of the conr 
6ular tent, together with that which was before mentioned, is assigned to the 
latter ; the forum and the place of the quaestor being thrown together for this 
purpose as the necessity requires. And with regard to the former, the num- 
bers that are redundant are disposed in another separate street, behind the 
Roman legions, ou both sides of the camp. When the four legions and both 
the consuls are assembled together within one intrenchment, in order to un- 
derstand the manner of their encampment, nothing more is necessary than to 
eoneeive two armies lodged in the form that has been novt described, turned 
VOL. I. NO. 6*. So 



sgo GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

one towards the other, and joined together in the part that is assigned to the 
extraordinaries of either army ; who are placed, as we have already mentioned, 
in the rear of all the camp, with their faces turned towards the iutrenchment. 
In this position the camp forms the figure of an oblong square. The ground 
upon which it stands is double in extent to that of the former camp ; and the cir- 
cumference of it larger by one half. Such is the method which is constantly 
observed when both consuls are encamped together within the same intrench- 
ment. And when they form separate camps, the only difference is, that the 
forum, the place of the qusestor, and the consular tents, are placed in the 
middle, between both the armies. 



CHAP. III. 

As soon as the encampment is completed, the tribunes, having assembled to- 
gether all the persons, both free men and slaves, that are in the army, admi- 
nister to every one of them apart the following oath : " That they will not. 
steal any thing from the camp ; and even if they find any thing that they will 
bring it to the tribunes." Two companies are then selected from the prin- 
cipes and the hastati of each legion ; to whose care is assigned the ground 
that lies before the tents of the tribunes. For as the Romans usually pass 
the whole time of day in this open space, they employ great care to keep it 
continually cleansed and sprinkled. Of the remainiug eighteen companies 
three are alloted to every tribune. For in every legion there are twenty 
companies of principes and hastati, as we have already mentioned, and six 
tribunes. The service which these three companies are obliged to perform 
in turn for the tribune to whom they a/e respectively assigned is.to fix his 
tent, to make the ground around it plain and level, and to cover his baggage, 
if it be necessary, with a fence. It is their duty likewise to place a double 
guard near him for his security. This guard consists of four soldiers, two of 
them are stationed before the tent, and two behind it, near to the horses. As 
three companies are thus alloted to every tribune, and as each company, with- 
out including the triarii and the light-armed troops, who are both exempted 
from this duty, contains more than a hundred men, this service, falling to each 
company in turn upon every fourth day only, becomes very light and easy ; 
and, while it ministers in all things that are necessary to the convenience of the 
tribunes, renders their office likewise more illustrious, and brings respect to 
their authority. 

The triarii are discharged from bearing any part in this attendance. But 
each of their companies is obliged to furnish every day a guard to the troop 
of cavalry that lies close behind it. The duty of this guard, among other 
functions, is principally to observe the horses ; that they may not at any time 
be rendered unfit for service by being entangled in the bands that hold them j 
or by breaking away, and falling in among other horses, create tumult and 
disorder in the camp. One company alone which is selected in turn from the 
whole body of these troops is stationed round the tent of the consul ; as well 
-to secure his person against all surprise, as for the sake of adding splendour 
also to his dignity. 

The intrenebment is made by the allies, on those two sides, near to which 
their two wings are encamped. The two other sides are left to the Romans ; 
to each legion one. Each side is divided into certain portions, according to 
the number of the companies ; and a centurion assigned, to overlook the work 
in every portion. The whole side is afterwards examined and approved by 
two of the tribunes ; whose office it is to attend to every thing that is done 
in the camp. For the tribunes dividing among themselves the time of their 
campaign, and presiding, two in turn, during two months of the six, have the 
supreme direction of every kind of necessary work and service, that falls within 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. fi9» 



the time of their command. The same duty is performed, in the same man* 
ner likewise, among the allies, by the officers who are called prefects. 

As soon as daylight appears, the leaders of the cavalry, and the centurions, 
attend all together at the tents of the tribunes ; and the tribunes at that 
of the consul. The necessary orders are then delivered by the consul to the 
tribunes ; by the tribunes to the centurions and the leaders of the cavalry ; 
and by these, as the proper time for each arrives, to the rest of the army. 

The delivery of the signal for the night is secured in the following manner. 
Every tenth cohort, both of infantry and cavalry, is lodged at the extreme 
end of those lines which form the separate streets. From each of these a sol- 
dier is selected, who is discharged from all the duties of the guard. This 
soldier, every day about the time of the setting sun, goes to the tent of the tri- 
bune, and receives from him the signal ; which is a flat tablet of wood, with 
*ome word inscribed upon it ; and, having returned back again to his own 
company, he then delivers the tablet with the signal, in the presence of some 
witnesses, to the leader of the cohort that i3 lodged next to his own. From, 
him again, it passes to the following cohort ; and, in the same manner, 
through all the rest in order, till it arrives at the first cohorts, which lie nearest 
to the tents of the tribunes ; and from thence it is carried back again to the 
tribunes, while it is yet day. If all the tablets that were delivered are brought 
back, the tribune then perceives that the signal has passed through all the 
camp. But if any one be wanting, he immediately examines into the fact; 
and, having discerned by the inscriptions in what quarter the tablet has-been 
stopped, inflicts a suitable punishment upon those that have been the cause of 
that neglect. - 

The guards for the night are thus disposed. One entire company is always 
stationed round the consular tent. * The tents of the tribunes, and the cavalry, 
are guarded by soldiers taken from each company, in the manner that has 
before been mentioned. Each separate company appoints a guard likewise 
for itself from its own body. The other guards are disposed as the consul di- 
rects. But the usual custom is, to allot three soldiers to the queestor ; and 
two to each of the members of the council. The external sides of the camp 
are guarded by the light-armed forces ; who are distributed everyday along 
the whole entrenchment. From the same body, ten men are also stationed be- 
fore every gate that leads into the camp. 

Among those that are appointed lor the watch, one soldier from each guard, 
the same whose duty it is to take the first watch, is carried in the evening to 
the tribune, by one of the conductors of the rear of every company. The 
tribunes having given to all of them some small tablets of wood, inscribed with 
aeertain character, and appropriated to each particular guard, dismisses them 
to their respective stations. 

The care of making the rounds is intrusted to the cavalry. The captain of 
the first troop in each of the legions is bound to send his orders in the morn- 
ing to one of the conductors of the rear ; commanding him to appoint, before 
the time of dinner, four soldiers of the troop to go the rounds ; and to send 
notice also afterwards, in the evening, to the leader of the second troop, that it 
is his turn to inspect the watch on the following day. The leader of the se- 
cond troop gives notice, in like manner, for the third day ; and the same me- 
thod is observed through all the rest. The four soldiers, who are thus selected 
from the first troop by the conductor of the rear, having determined among 
themselves each particular watch by lot, go afterwards to the tent of the tri- 
bune, and receive from thence, in writing, an account of the several posts, and 
of the number of the guards which they are required to visit. They then take 
their station near to the first company of the triarii. For the leader of this 
company has the care of marking the time of every watch by the sound of a 
trumpet ; and when the signal is made, he, to whose inspection the first watch 
was alloted, taking with him some of his friends as witnesses, goes round to all 



2^2 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



the po»ts that are recited in his orders, and visits all the guards : not those alone 
that are stationed round the intrenchment, and before the gates, but those also> 
that are placed in every single company, and in every troop. If he finds the cen- 
tinels awake, and fixed in their several stations, he receives from them the wooden 
tablets: but if he discovers that any one is sleeping, or has left his post, he de- 
sires those that are present to bear testimony to the fact, and then retires. The 
same method is observed in all the following watches. The care of sounding 
the trumpet, by which notice is given in the same moment both to the centi- 
nels and the inspectors of the watch, is left, as we have said, to the captains 
of the first company of the triarii, who perform this duty alternately, day by 
day. 

As soon as morning appears, those who have made the rounds carry the 
tablets to the tribune. If they bring the full number back, they are 
suffered to depart without any question. But if the number be less than that 
of the guards, the inscriptions are immediately examined, in order to discover 
from what particular guard the tablet has not been returned. When this is 
known, the centurion is ordered to attend, and to bring with him the soldier* 
that were appointed for that guard, that they may be questioned face to face 
with him who made the rounds. If the fault be in the guard, he that made the 
rounds appeals at once to the testimony of his friends who were present. Such 
evidence always is demanded from him ; and in case that he is not able to bring 
this proof the whole blame rests upon himself. The council is then assembled J 
the cause is judged by the tribune, and the guilty person sentenced to be 
bastinaded. This punishment is inflicted in the following manner. 

The tribune, taking a stick into his hand, gently touches the criminal : and 
immediately afterwards all the soldiers of the legion attack him with sticks and 
stones ; so that the greatest part of those that are thus condemned are destroyed 
immediately in the camp. If any one escapes, yet he is not saved : for all return 
into his country is shut against him ; nor would any of his friends or kindred ever 
dare to receiye him into their houses. Those, therefore, who have once fallen 
into this misfortune are lost without resource. The conductor of the rear, and 
the leader of the troops, if ever they neglect to give the necessary notice in due 
time, the first to the inspectors of the watch, and the second to the leader of the 
succeeding troop, are subject also to this punishment. From the dread of a dis- 
cipline so severe, and which leaves noplace for mercy, every thing that be- 
longs to the guards of the night is performed with the exactest diligence and 
care. 

The soldiers are subject to the control of the tribunes, as these are to that of 
tjhe consuls- The tribunes have the power of imposing fines, and demanding 
sureties, and of punishing with stripes. The same authority is exercised by *he 
prefects among the allies. 

The punishment of the T)astinade is inflicted also upon those who steal any 
thing in the camp; those who bear false testimony; who, in their youth, abuse 
their bodies : and who have been three times convicted of one fault. These 
offences are punished as crimes. There are others that ate regarded as the ef» 
fects of cowardice, and disgraceful to the military character. When a soldier, 
for example, with a view of obtaining a reward, makes a report to the tribunes 
of some brave action which he has not performed. When anyone, through 
fear, deserts his station, or throws away his arms in the time of an engagement* 
For hence it happens that many, through the dread of the alloted punishment, 
when they are attacked by much greater numbers, will even encounter mani- 
fest destruction, rather than desert that post which they had been ordered to 
maintain. Others again, when they have lost their shield, or sword, or any other 
part of their arms, in the time of the action, throw themselves precipitately into 
the very midst of the enemy ; hoping either to recover what they have lost, or to 
avoia by death the reproaches of their fellow-soldiers, and the disgrace that is 
ready to receive them. . „.. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 29s 



If it happens that many are at one time guilty of the same fault, and that 
whole companies retire before the enemy, and desert their station; instead of 
punishing all of them with death, an expedient is employed which is both use- 
ful and full of terror. The tribune, assembling together all the soldiers of the 
legion, commands the criminals to be brought forwards : and, having sharply- 
reproached them with their cowardice, he then draws out, by lot, either rive or 
eight, or twenty men, according to the number of those that have offended. For 
the proportion is usually so adjusted, that every tenth man is reserved for punish- 
ment. Those who are thus separated from the rest by lot are bastinaded with- 
out remission in the manner before described. The others are sentenced to be 
fed with barley instead of wheat ; and are lodged without the intrenchment, ex- 
posed to insults from the enemy. As the danger, therefore, and the dread of 
death, hangs equally over all the guilty, because no one can foresee upon whom 
the lot will fall ; and as the shame and infamy of receiving barley only for 
their support is extended also alike to all, this institution is perfectly welt 
contrived, both for impressing present terror, and for the prevention of future 
faults. . 

The method by which the young men are animated to brave all danger is 
also admirable. When an action has passed in which any of the soldiers have 
shewn signal proofs of courage, the consul, assembling the troops together, 
commands those to approach who have distinguished themselves by any emi- 
nent exploit. And, having first bestowed on every one of them apart the 1 
commendation that is due to this particular instance of their valour, and re- 
counted likewise all their former actions that have ever merited applause, he 
then distributes among them the following rewards. To him who ha* 
wounded an enemy, a javelin. To him who has killed an enemy, and stripped 
. him of his armour, if he be a soldier In the infantry, a goblet ; if in the cavalry, 
furniture for his horse; though, in former times, this last was presented only 
with a javelin. These rewards, however! are not bestowed upon the soldiers 
who, in a general battle, or in the attack of a city, wound or spoil ah enemy ; 
but upon those alone who, in separate skirmishes, and when any occasion of- 
fers, in which no necessity requires them to engage in single contest, throw 
' themselves voluntarily into danger, and with design provoke the combat. 
When a city is taken" b)*4torm, those who mount first upon the walls are 
honoured with a golden crown. Those also who have saved the lives of any of 
the citizens, or the allies, by covering them from the enemy in the time ot 
battle, receive presents from the consul, and are crowned likewise by the per- 
sons themselves who have been thus preserved, and who, if they refuse this 
office, are compelled by the judgment of the tribunes to perform it. Add to 
this-, that those who are thus saved are bound, during the remainder of their 
lives, to reverence their preserver as a father, and to render to him all the du- 
ties which they would pay to him who gave them birth. Nor are the effects 
of these rewards, in raising a spirit of emulation and of courage, confined to 
those alone who are present in the army, but extended likewise to ail the citi- 
zens at home. For those who have obtained those presents, beside the honour 
which they acquire among their fellow-soldiers, and the reputation which im- 
mediately attends them in their country, are distinguished after their return, 
by wearing in all solemn processions such ornaments as are permitted only to^ 
be worn by those who have received them from the consuls, as the rewards of 
their valour. They hang up likewise, in the most conspicuous parts of their 
houses, the spoils which they have taken, as a monument and evidence of their 
exploits. Since such, therefore, is the attention and the care with which tie 
Romans distribute rewards and punishments in their armies, it is not to be 
thought strange that the wars in which they engage are always ended with 
glory and success. 

The military stipends are thus regulated. The pay of a soldier in the in- 
fantry is two oboli by the day ; and double to the centurions. The pay of the 



294 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

cavalry is a drachma. The allowance of corn to each man in the infantry con- 
sists of about two third parts of an attic bushel of wheat by the month. In 
the cavalry, it is seven bushels of barley, and two of wheat. To the infantry of 
the allies the same quantity is distributed as to that of the Romans ; but their 
cavalry receives only one bushel and a third of wheat, and five of barley. The 
whole of this allowance is given without reserve to the allies. But the Roman 
soldiers are obliged to purchase their corn and clothes, together with the arms 
which they occasionally want, at a certain stated price, which is deducted by 
the quaestor from their pay. 

In breaking up the camp the following order is observed : When the first 
signal is made, the soldiers all take down the tents, and collect the baggage.* 
No tent, however, is at any time either set up or taken down until those of the 
consul and the tribunes are first set up, or first removed. Upon the secoud 
signal the baggage is placed upon the beasts of burden ; and, at the thirds 
the foremost of the troops begin their march, and the whole camp is put in 
motion. In the van are usually placed the extraordinaries, and, after these, 
the right wing of the allies, which is followed by the baggage of both these 
bodies. Next to these marches the first of the Roman legions, with its bag- 
gage ^lso behind it. The second legion follows, having behind it, likewise, 
both its own baggage and the baggage of the allies, who are in the rear; for 
the rear of all the march is closed with the left wing of the allies. The cavalry 
marches sometimes in the rear of the respective bodies to which it belongs ; 
and sometimes on the flanks of the beasts that are loaded with the baggage, 
keeping them together in due order, and covering them from insult. Wheu 
any attack is expected to be made upon the rear, the extraordinaries of the 
allies, instead of leading the van, are posted in the rear. In all the other parts 
the disposition remains the same. Of the two legions, and the two wings of the 
allies, those that are on one day foremost in the march, on the following day 
are placed behind ; that, by thus changing their rank alternately, all the 
troops may obtain the same advantage in their turn, of arriving first at water 
and at forage. There is also another disposition which is used when any im- 
mediate danger threatens, and the march is made through an open country* 
At such times the hastati, the principes, and the triarii, are ranged in three 
parallel lines, each behind the other, with the baggage of the hastati in the 
front. Behind the hastati is placed the baggage of the principes, who are 
followed likewise by that of the triarii ; so that the baggage and the several 
bodies are mingled in alternate order. The march being thus disposed, the 
troops, as soon as any attack is made, turning either to the left or to the 
right, advance forwards from the baggage towards that side upon which the 
enemy appears. And thus, in a moment of time, and by one single move- 
ment, the whole army is formed in order of battle ; except only that the has- 
tati are, perhaps, obliged to make an evolution; and the beasts of burden 
also, with all those that attend upon the baggage, being now thrown into the 
rear of all the troops, are covered by them from all danger. 

At the end of a march, when the army arrives near the place of its encamp- 
ment, a tribune and some centurions, who are appointed always for this pur- 
pose, advance before the rest. And having surveyed the whole ground upon 
which the encampment is to be made, they first determine the place of the 
consular tent, and on which side of it the legions may most commodiously be 
lodged. When this is done, they measure out the space that is alloted for 
the consul ; and then draw a line for the place of the tent of the tribunes ; 
•nd parallel to it another line, below which the legions are to be encamped. 
In the same manne also the several portions of the ground, which lies on the 
other side of the consular tent, and which we have already particularly de- 
scribed, are ascertained by lines. And as the distances are fixed, and well 
known by use, the admeasurement of the whole is easy, and soon completed. 
Four ensigns are then planted in the ground, the first in the place in which 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 205 



the tent of Ihe consul is to be set up ; the second, on that side of the consular 
ground which has been chosen for the front of the camp ; the third in the 
middle of the line that is designed for the tents of the tribunes ; and the last 
upon the other parallel hue below which the legions are to be encamped. 
These ensigns are all of a purple colour, that of the consul excepted, which is 
white. The portions on the other side of the consular ground are sometimes 
marked by simple pikes fixed in the ground, and sometimes by ensigns of 
some different colour. Last of all, the several streets are drawn out by 
measure, and pikes also planted to denote the limits of each particular street. 
The necessary effect of this method is, that when the troops upon their march 
approach so near as to discover the place of their encampment, they are able to 
discern at once al! the different parts of the camp ; being taught by the ensign 
of the consul to point out and distinguish all the rest. And as they all occupy 
the same place always in the camp, so that each man knows in what particular 
«treet,and in what part also of the street, he is going to be lodged, their entrance 
very much resembles that of a body of soldiers into their own native city. For, a9 
these, already knowing, both in general and in particular, the quarters of the city 
in which their habitations stand, turn aside immediately from the gates, and ar- 
rive at their several houses without mistake; just so it happens in the Roman 
camp. It is to this facility, indeed, that the Romans chiefly attend upon such 
occasions; and, for the sake of obtaining it, pursue so contrary a method to 
that of the Greeks. For the Greeks, when they encamp, consider principally 
the natural strength of the place that is chosen, and accommodate their die- 
position to it ; being partly studious to avoid the labour of throwing up an 
entrenchment; and partly persuaded also, that fortifications raised by art are 
always less secure than those that are made by nature. In compliance, there- 
fore, with what the nature of the ground demands, they not only are obliged 
to give every kind of figure to their camp, but to vary also the position of the 
several parts, as the place for each is favourable or improper. And from hence 
it happens that the soldier never knows with certainty either his own place in 
the camp, or that of the body to which he belongs. But the Romans wil- 
lingly submit to the task of making an entrenchment, and to other painful 
works, for the sake of the advantage that is found in employing a method 
which is never changed, and which renders all the parts of the camp familiar 
to the army. 

Such then in general are the institutions of the Romans, which belong to- 
the establishment of their armies, and more especially to the manner of their 
encampment. 

EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

JSome peculiar excellences in the Roman government and manner*, illustrated 
by a comparison of them with those 0/ other states. 

CHAP. I. 

The states, which almost all writers have transmitted to us with applause, are 
those of Lacedaemon, Mantinea, Crete, and Carthage. To these some have 
also added the government of Thebes and Athens. With regard to the first, 
it may be allowed, perhaps, that they merit some distinction. But the re- 
publics of Thebes and Athens very little deserve, in my opinion, to be made 
the subject of any particular discourse; because they neither rose by natural 
steps to greatness, nor remained for any long continuance in a prosperous 
state, nor sunk again by a gradual decline. But having owed all their exalta- 
tion merely to some favourable seasons, and borrowed a kind of transient 
splendour from the times, in that very moment which saw them flourish, and 
which seemed to promise a lasting confirmation of their power, they were 



296 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



thrown back again by fortune into a contrary state. Thus the Thebans, hav- 
ing applied to their own advantage the imprudent conduct of the Lacedsemo- 
iiians, and the hatred in which they were held by their allies, acquired, indeed, 
through the ability of one or two of their citizens who discerned these circum- 
stances, the reputation of superiority among the Greeks. But that the suc- 
cess which they at this time gained, arose not from the constitution of the go- 
vernment, but from the skill of those who governed, the ill fortune that fol- 
lowed close behind rendered clear and incontestible. For as the power of 
Thebes grew up and flourished with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, 
and, when they died, was immediately dissolved, there needs no farther proof 
that the splendour which then accrued to the republic was derived wholly 
from the virtue of these citizens, and not from any excellence in the state. 
The same observation may be applied as justly to the commonwealth of 
Athens, which flourished indeed at many other particular seasons ; but having 
been raised by the able conduct of Themistocles to the greatest height of 
glory, within a short time afterwards was sunk again in weakness and disgrace. 
The cause of this sudden change was no other than the irregular constitution of 
the government. For the Athenian state may very aptly be compared to a 
ship in which there is no person that commands. In such a vessel, when the 
mariners, either through the dread of enemies, or the impending dangers of a 
storm, are compelled to act together in concert, and attend to the orders of the 
pilot, all things that are necessary are performed by them with diligence and 
skill. But no sooner are these apprehensions past than they begin to reject 
all controul, and engage in mutual contest, such as the diversity of their senti- 
ments inspires. And while some among them are earnest for continuing their 
course, and others not less urgent with the pilot to cast anchor; while the first 
unfurl the sails, and the. latter interpose with violence, and command them to 
be furled; this spirit of contention and seditious obstinacy not only affords a 
shameful spectacle to those that behold it at a distance, but renders the safety 
likewise of all who are embarked in the vessel so precarious, that very fre- 
quently, when they have escaped the dangers of the greatest seas and most 
dreadful tempests, they are at last wrecked even in the harbour, and when 
they had just gained the laud. In the same manner the Athenian state, after 
having been conducted, by the virtue of the governors and the people, through 
all the difficulties of the most threatening seasons, has often unaccountably 
been overset in times of perfect safety and tranquillity. There is no need, 
therefore, to say more concerning this republic, or that of Thebes ; in both of 
which the multitude disposes all things as the impulse of their own peculiar 
passions 'prompts them: the people in the one, being naturally precipitate and 
eager above the rest of men; and in the other, trained up to habits of force 
and violence. 

Let us pass on then to the government of Crete ; and consider upon what 
grounds it is that the most sensible of the antieut writers, such as Ephorus, 
Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato, have ventured to affirm ; first, that the 
frame of this republic very much resembles, or rather is the same with that of 
Sparta ; aud secondly, that the constitution itself is such as deserves to be 
applauded. In my judgment, their opinion with respect to both these points 
is very distant from the truth. Whether it be or not, the following observa- 
tions may enable us to determine. And first, concerning the little resemblance' 
that is to be found between these two states. 

There are three things mentioned by these writers as distinguishing the 
Spartan government. The first is f h£ eq uality of possessions in land, of 
which no one is permitted to obtain a greater portion than another ; the whole 
lands that belong to the community being divided in equal shares among all 
the citizens. The second is the neglect of wealth that prevails among this 
people. That even the use of money is unknown among them ; aud that, by 
consequence, the very root of that contention which, springs from, the ■ jjfc>8- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 297 




session of less and more, is utterly destroyed. In the last place, as they affirm, 
the 

the sei 

these points the government of Crete is contrary to' that of Sparta. For the 
Cretans are permitted by their laws to possess, without any bounds, as large a 
property in lands as they are able to obtain. The estimation also of money is 
so great among them that it is not only necessary, but even highly honourable, 
to acquire it. ° And, indeed, the desire of amassing wealth, and the habit ot 
increasing it, are so deeply implanted in the very manners of this people, that 
they alone of all mankind think nothing sordid or dishonourable that is joined 
with gain. Lastly, in this island, all the public offices are renewed every year, 
and are constituted in a manner purely democratical. I have often, therefore, 
been led to wonder, that states which differ so essentially should be thus joined 
together by these writers, as if they were of a similar kind and nature. But 
it is not only to be imputed to them that they have barely overlooked this dif- 
ference. For when they have employed great pains to shew thatLycurgus 
alone, of all mankind, discerned the means that were most proper to give sta- 
bility to government; that as every state can only be maintained by bravery in 
war, and union among the citizens^ this legislator, when he took away from his 
republic the desire of "riches, removed also with it all civil tumult and dissen- 
tion, and that the Lacedaemonians, being thus freed from these domestic evils, 
lived together in perfect concord, and preserved such order in their government, 
as was not to be found in any of the states of Greece ; when they have dis- 
coursed, I say, at large, on all these circumstances, and seen also, on the other 
hand, that the natural lust of wealth which prevails among the Cretans gives 
birth continually both to private contests and to public dissentions and divi- 
sions, produces murders and intestine wars ; yet still, as if a difference so ac- 
knowledged were of small importance, they boldly venture to affirm, that thee 
is a close'resemblance between the two republics. And indeed Ephorus,when 
he treats of either of them, employs indiscriminately the same expressions, the 
proper names alone excepted; so that, unless we attend to these, it is tut 
possible to distinguish which of the two is designed by his discourse. Such, then, 
is the difference between the government of Crete and that of Sparta, 1 shall 
now endeavour to shew that the first is neither worthy of applause nor imitation. 
There are two things which are essential parts in every government, and ac- 
cording to which the principles and the constitution of the state itself will be 
found, to deserve either praise or censure. These are, the manners and the 
laws. The manners and the laws that are most worthy to be approved are 
those which form the lives of individuals to sanctity and moderation, and the 
general temper of the whole community to mildness and to justice; and those 
which produce contrary effects are fit to be rejected. When we perceive, 
therefore, that the laws and manners of a state are such as tend to promote 
the exercise of honesty and virtue, as it is very reasonable for us to conclude 
that the state itself is virtuous, and the members of it free from all reproach ; 
so, on the other hand, when an immoderate desire of gain governs the life of 
every private citizen, and the public transactions of the" state are contrary to 
justice, we may safely venture to declare that the laws of this community are 
bad, the manners of the people corrupt and vicious, and the whole govern- 
ment contemptible. 

Now, if we consider the character and conduct of the Cretans, it is certain 
that scarcely an example can be found of any nation in which the private man- 
ners of the citizens are more replete with artifice and fraud, or where the public 
enterprises are more unjust. As this republic, therefore, neither bears any 
resemblance to that of Sparta, nor deserves in any manner to be approved or 
imitated, we shall here reject it us unworthy of our notice in that comparison 
vrhich we propose. 

fOU 1. NO. 6. 5 P 



29B GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU& 



Nor is it reasonable to expect, that we should allow any place in this in- 
quiry to the commonwealth of Plato, how much soever it may have been cele- 
brated, by philosophers. For, as in the contests between artists, or combatants, 
in the public games, no persons are permitted who have not first been trained 
in proper discipline, and prepared by exercise ; so neither can this republic 
hope to be received into any competition concerning excellence, till it has first 
shewn its strength in some real action. To compare it, such as it has hitherto 
remained, with the republics of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage, would be no less 
absurd than to compare a statue with a breathing and living man. For though 
the beauty of the work riit^Ht deserve, perhaps the highest commendation, yet 
the comparison of an inanimate form with an animated being would very 
justly appear defective and incongruous to every eye. Leaving therefore this 
republic and that of Crete, let us return again to the government of Sparta. 

When I consider the laws that were invented by Lycurgus, as tending to 
promote union among the citizens, to secure the Laconiau territory from all 
dano-ei', and to maintain its people in the undisturbed enjoyment of their li- 
berty, they appear to have been so wisely framed, and adapted with such" true 
foresight to all these purposes, that I am almost tempted to regard them, 
rather as the work of some divinity than the effort of any human mind. In 
establishing an equality of possessions, and in restraining all the citizens to the 
constant use of one simple and common diet, he chose the means that were 
most effectual to render the Lacedaemonians moderate in their desires, and to 
banish all contention from the state. By accustoming them to painful la- 
bours, and dangerous exercises, he formed them to be brave and daring. And 
where temperance and fortitude meet together, in any man, or in any com- 
pany of men, it is scarcely possible that those who are habituated to the prac- 
tice of these virtues should ever be disturbed by intestine evils, or be subdued 
by external force. Lycurgus, therefore, having thus raised the frame of his 
republic upon these two principles, secured all Laconia against the dread of 
any hostile attempts, and established the liberty of Sparta upon such strong 
foundations that it subsisted during many ages. But it appears to me that 
this legislator, both in the frame of his particular laws, and in the genera! con- 
stitution of the government, wholly overlooked one great precaution, the pre- 
caution that was necessary to restrain his people from invading the territory of 
their neighbours, from aspiring to an extended sovereignty, or raising them- 
selves inVny manner to be the arbiters of all affairs. As the particular mem- 
bers of the state were accustomed by his institutions to live in the simplest 
and most frugal manner, and to remain satisfied with their own possessions, it 
was also no less requisite, either to infuse into the whole community the same 
willing spirit of contentedness and moderation, or to force them through neces- 
sity to adopt it. 

But Lycurgus, while he freed his citizens from jealousy and envious com- 
petition iu their private manners, and in the administration of their own 
particular government, at the same time allowed full scope to their ambitious 
projects against the rest of Greece, and suffered them to become most eager 
and aspiring in the pursuit both of wealth and power. For who is ignorant 
that the Lacedaemonians, the first almost of all the Greeks, were led by the 
desire of <rain to invade the territory of their neighbours, and declared war 
against the Messsenians, with design to reduce them into slavery ? Who has 
not heard, that, when they had invested Messene with their forces they per- 
sisted in the attempt with so great obstinacy that they bound themselves by an 
oath uever to raise the siege till the city should be taken ? Nor is it less no- 
torious to all mankind that, with a view of establishing their own dominion 
over the Grecian states, they submitted to obey the orders even of a people 
■whom they had conquered. For after having bravely maintained the cause of the 
common liberty of all the Greeks, and subdued the Persians who brought an 
army to invade it ; after having defeated and forced them to return, they 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 299 



basely yielded to them many cities by the peace that was concluded by Antal- 
cidas ; that they might obtain in return the treasure that was necessary for 
acquiring to themselves the sovereignty of Gieece. Upon this occasion it 
was that they first perceived in what part their government was defective. For 
as long as they confined their views of conquest to the neighbouring states, 
and to the limits of Peloponnesus, they were able to draw from Lacouia itself 
such supplies as were sufficient for the accomplishment of their designs ; as 
all things that were necessary were collected within their reach; and as the 
distance was commodious for their return back again to their country, and 
for transporting all their stores. But when they attempted to maintain fleets upon 
the sea, and to send their armies beyond the bounds of Peloponnesus, it very soon 
was seen that neithertheiriron money, northe exchange oftheirown natural com- 
modities that was permitted by Lycurgus, was capable of supplying all their 
wants ; but that money of a common currency, and stores drawn from foreign 
countries, were necessary to support such enterprises. They were 'forced, 
therefore, to supplicate assistance from the court of Persia ; to impose a tri* 
bute upon the islands ; and to exact contributions from all the Greeks ; being 
fully assured that, while they adhered to the institutions of Lycurgus, they 
could never hope to obtain the supreme command in Greece, nor be able even 
in any manner to contend for superiority with other state?. But to what pur- 
pose is this digression ? It is to shew by the evidence of facts that the laws of 
Lycurgus were perfectly well contrived, for maintaining his people in tht un- 
disturbed possession of their own proper territory, and for preserving their 
liberty inviolable ; and that, where men . propose to themselves these advan- 
tages as the sole objects of political institutions, it must be acknowledged that 
'there neither is, nor ever was, any system or frame of government more eligible 
than that of Sparta. But if a people, on the other hand, should desire to en» 
large their views, and esteem it more great aud glorious to hold many in sub- 
jection, to extend their empire over various countries, and to draw the sub- 
mission of all mankind towards them ; it must then also be confessed, that 
the Lacedaemonian constitution is defective; and that the Roman government 
is framed with greater strength for the accomplishment of such designs. The 
truth of this remark is manifest from that which happened in thetwo republics* 
For the Lacedaemonians no sooner endeavoured to obtain the sovereignty of 
Greece than they brought their own liberty into danger. But the Romans, 
having once subdued to their dominion all the parts of Italy, reduced, within 
a short time afterwards, the whole world beneath their yoke ; being greatly 
assisted in the execution of this vast attempt by the plenty of all necessary 
stores, and the facility with which they were continually supplied. 



CHAP. II. 

The government of Carthage seems also to have been originally well contrived 
with regard to those general forms that have been mentioned. For there were 
kings in this government, together with a senate, which was vested with aris- 
tocratical authority. The people likewise enjoy the exercise of certain powers 
that were appropriated to them. In a word, the entire frame of the, republic 
very much resembled those of Rome and Sparta. But at the time of the war 
of Annibal the Carthaginian constitution was worse in its condition than the 
Roman. For as nature has assigned to every body, even' government, and 
every action, three successive periods ; the first, of growth ; the second, of 
perfection; and that which follows, of decay ; and as the period of perfection 
is the time in which they severally display their greatest strength; from htm e 
arose the difference that was then found between the two republics. For the 
government of Carthage, having reached the highest point of vigour and per- 
fection much sooner than that of Rome, had now declined from it in the same 



300 GENERAL HISTORY OF ROLYBIUS. 

proportion : whereas the Romans, at this rery time, had just raised their 
constitution to the most flourishing- and perfect state. The effect of this dif- 
ference was, that among the Carthaginians the people possessed the greatest 
sway in all deliberations, but the senate among- the Romans. And as, in the 
one republic, all measures were determined by the multitude ; and, in the 
other, by the most eminent citizens ; of so great force was this advantage in 
the conduct of affairs, that the Romans, though brought by repeated losses 
into the greatest danger, became, through the wisdom of their counsels, supe- 
rior to the Carthaginians in the war. 

If we descend to a more particular comparison, we shall find, that with 
respect to military science, for example, the Carthaginians, in the manage- 
ment and conduct of a naval war, are more skilful than the Romans. For 
the Carthaginians have derived this knowledge from their ancestors through a 
lon°- course of ages ; and are more exercised in maritime affairs than any other 
people. But the Romans, on the other hand, are far superior in all things 
that belong to the establishment and discipline of armies. For this discipline, 
which is regarded by them as the chief and coustant object of their care, i* 
utterly neglected by the Carthaginians ; except only that they bestow some 
little attention upon their cavalry. The reason of this difference is, that the 
Carthaginians employ foreign mercenaries ; and that on the contrary the Ro- 
man armies are composed of citizens, and of the people of the country. Now 
in this respect the government of Rome is greatly preferable to that of Car- 
thage. For while the Carthaginians intrust the preservation of their liberty 
to the care of venal troops; the Romans place all their confidence in their 
own bravery, and in the assistance of their allies. From hence it happens, 
that tlie Romans, though at first defeated, are always able to renew the war ; 
and that the Carthaginian armies never are repaired without great difficulty. 
Add to this, that the Romans, fighting for their country and their children, 
never suffer their ardour to be slackened ; but persist with the same steady 
spirit till they become superior to their enemies. From hence it happens, 
likewise that even in actions upon the sea, the Romans, though inferior to the 
Carthaginians, as we have already observed, in nalral knowledge and expe* 
rience, very frequently obtain success through the mere bravery of their forces, 
For though in all such contests a skill in maritime affairs must be allowed to 
be of the greatest use ; yet, on the other hand, the valour of the troops that 
are en^a^ed is no less effectual to draw the victory to their side. 

Now the people of Italy are by nature superior to the Carthaginians and-ttoe 
Africans both in bodily strength, and in courage* Add to this, that they have 
among them certain institution's by which the young men are greatly animated 
to perform acts of bravery. It will be sufficient to mention one of these, as a 
proof of the attention that is shown by the Romsin government, to infuse such 
a spirit into the citizens as shall lead them to encounter every kind of danger 
for the sake of obtaining reputation in' their country. When any illustrious per- 
son dies he is carried in procession with the rest of the funeral j.orap, to the 
rostra in the forum; sometimes placed conspicuous in an upright posture; 
and sometimes, though less frequently, reclined. And while the people are 
all standing round, his son, if he has one of sufficient age, and who is then at 
Rome or, if otherwise, some person of his kindred, ascends the rostra, and 
extols the virtues of the deceased, and the great deeds that were performed by 
him in his life. By this discourse, which recals his past actions to remem-* 
brance and places them in open view before all the multitude, not those alone 
who were sharers in his victories, but even the rest who bore no part in his 
exploits, are moved to such sympathy of sorrow, that the accident seems rather 
to be a public misfortune, than a private loss. He is then buried with the 
usual rites ; and afterwards an image, which, both in features and complexion, 
expresses an exact resemblance of his face, is set up in the most conspicuous 
part of the house, inclosed in a shrine of wood. Upon solemn festivals, these 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 301 



images are uncovered, and adorned with the greatest care. And when any 
other person of the same family dies, they are carried also in the funeral pro- 
cession, with a body added to the bust, that the representation may be just, 
even with regard to size. They are dressed likewise hi the habits, that belong 
to the ranks which they severally filled when they were alive. If they were 
consuls or praetors, in a gown bordered with purple : if censors, in a purple 
robe: and if they triumphed, or obtained any similar honour, in a vest em- 
broidered with gold. Thus apparelled, they are drawn along in chariots pre- 
ceded by the rods and axes, and other ensigns of their former dignity. And 
when they arrive at the forum, they are all seated upon chairs of ivory ; and 
there exhibit the noblest object that can be offered to a youthful mind, warm- 
ed with the love of virtue and of glory. For who can behold without emotion 
the forms of so many illustrious men, thus living, as it were, and breathing 
together in his presence ? Or what spectacle can be conceived more grtat and 
striking? The person also that is appointed to harangue, when he has exhaust- 
ed all the praises of the deceased, turns his* discovirse to the rest, whose images 
are before him ; and, beginning with the most ancient of them, recounts the 
fortunes and the exploits of every one in turn. By this method, which renews 
continually the remembrance of men celebrated for their virtue, the fame of 
every great and noble action becomes immortal; and the glory of those, by 
whose services their country has been benefited, is rendered familiar to the 
people, and delivered down to future times. But the chief advantage is, that 
by the hope of obtaining this honourable fame, which is reserved for virtue, 
the young men are animated to* sustain all danger, in the cause of the common 
safety. For from hence it has happened, that many among the Romans have 
voluntarily engaged in single combat, in order to decide the fortune of an 
entire war. Many also have devoted themselves to inevitable death ; some of 
them in battle, to save the lives of other citizens ; and some iu time of peace, 
to rescue the whole state from destruction. Others again, who have been 
invested with the highest dignities, have, in defiance of all law and custom, 
condemned their own sons to die ; showing greater regard to the advantage of 
their country, than to the bonds of nature, and the closest ties of kindred* 
Very frequent are the examples of this kind, that are recorded in the Roinars 
story. I shall here mention one, as a signal instance, and proof of the truth 
of all that I have affirmed. \ Horatius, surnamed Codes, being engaged in 
combat with two enemies, at the farthest extremity of the bridge that led into 
Tiber, and perceiving that many others were advancing fast to their assistance* 
was apprehensive that they would force their way together into the city. 
Turning himself therefore to his companions that were behind him, he 
called to them aloud, that they should immediately retire and break the 
bridge. While they were employed in this work, Horatius, though covered 
over with wounds, still maintained his post, and stopped the progress of the 
enemies ; who were struck with his firmness and intrepid courage, even more 
than with the strength of his resistance. } And when the bridge was broken, 
and the city secured from insult, he threw himself into the river with his ar- 
mour, and there lost his life as he had designed ; having preferred the safety of 
his country, and the future fame that was sure to follow such an action, to his 
own present existence, and to the time that remained for him to live. Such is 
the spirit, and such the emulation of achieving glorious actions, which the 
Roman institutions are fitted to infuse into the minds of youth. — 

In all things that regard the acquisition of wealth, the manners also, and 
the customs of the Romans, are greatly preferable to those of the Carthagi- 
nians. Among the latter, nothing is reputed infamous, that is joined with 
gain. But among the former, nothing is held more base than to be corrupted* 
by gifts, or to covet au increase of wealth by means that are unjust. For a» 
much as they esteem the possession of honest riches to be fair and honourable, 
»o much on the oilier baud, all those that are amassed by unlawful arts are 



302 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



viewed by them with horror and reproach. The truth of this fact is clearly 
seen in the following instance. Among the Carthaginians, money is openly 
employed to obtain, the dignities of the state ; but all such proceeding is & 
capital crime in Rome. As the rewards, therefore, that are proposed to Virtue 
in the two republics are so different, it cannot but happen, that the attention 
of the citizens to form their minds to virtuous actions must he also dif- 
ferent. 

, But among all the useful institutions that demonstrate the superior excel- 
lence of the Roman government, the most considerable, perhaps, is the opi- 
nion which the people are taught to hold concerning the gods; and that, 
which other men regard as an object of disgrace appears, in my judgment, to 
be the very thing by which this republic chiefly is sustained. I mean, super- 
stition : which is impressed with all its terrors; and influences both the pri- 
vate, actions of the citizens, and the public administration also of the state, in a 
degree that can scarcely be exceeded. This may appear astonishing to many. 
To me it is evident that this contrivance was at" first adopted for the sake of 
the multitude. For if it were possible that a state could be composed of wise 
men only, there would be no need, perhaps, of any such invention. Rut as the 
people universally are fickle and inconstant, filled with irregular desires, pre- 
cipitate in their passions, and prone to violence ; there is no way left to re- 
strain them, but by the dread of things unseen, and by the pageantry of ter- 
rifying fiction. The ancients therefore acted not absurdly, nor without good 
reason, when they inculcated the notions concerning the gods, and the belief 
of infernal punishments; but much more those of the present age are 'to be 
charged with rashness and absurdity, in endeavouring to extirpate these opi- 
nions. For, not to mention other effects that flow from such an institution ; 
sf,_among the Greeks, for example, a single talent only be intrusted to those 
who have the management of any of the public money ; though they <?'\ve ten 
written sureties, with as many seals, and twice as many witnesses, thev'are un- 
able to discharge the trust reposed in them with integrity. But the Romans, 
on the other hand, who, in the course of their magistracies, and in embassies, 
disburse the greatest sums, are prevailed on, by the single obligation of an 
oath, to perform their duty with inviolable honesty. And as, in other states, 
a man is rarely to be found whose hands are pure from public robbery ; so 
among the Romans, it is no less rare to discover one that is tainted with 'this 
crime. 

But. all things are subject to decay and change. This is a truth so evident, 
and so demonstrated by the perpetual and the necessary course of nature, that 
it needs no other proof. Now there are two ways by which every kind of o-c-_ 
vernmeBt is destroyed ; either by some accident that happens from withoutfor 
some evil that arises within itself. What the first will be is not always easy to 
foresee ; but the latter is certain and determinate. We have already shown 
what are the original and what the secondary forms of government ; and in what 
manner also they are reciprocally converted each into the other. Whoever 
therefore, is able to connect the beginning with the end in this inquiry will' 
be able also to declare, with some assurance, what will be the future fortune of 
the Roman government : at least, in myjudgment, nothing is more easy. 
For when a state, having passed with safety through many and great dangers, 
arrives at the highest degree of power, and possesses an entire and undisputed 
sovereignty, it is manifest that the long continuance of prosperity must give 
birth to costly and luxurious manners, and that the minds of men will be 
heated with ambitious contests, and become too eager and aspiring in the pur- 
suit of dignities. And as these evils are continually increased, the desire of 
power and rule, and the imagined ignominy of remaining in a subject state, 
will first begin to work the ruin of the republic ; arrogance and luxurv will af- 
terwards advance it; and, in the end, the change will be completed by the 
people i when the avarice of some is'found to injure and oppress them 3 and the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBItJS. 303 



ambition of others swells their vanity, and poisons them with flattering hopes. 
For then, being inflamed with hopes, and following only the dictates of their 
passions, they no longer will submit to any control, or be contented -with an 
equal share of the administration, in conjunction with their rulers ; but will 
draw to themselves the entire sovereignty and supreme direction of all affairs. 
When this is done, the government will assume, indeed, the fairest of all 
names, that of a free and popular state ; but will, in truth, be the greutestof 
all evils, — the government of the multitude. 

As we have thus sufficiently explained the constitution and the growth of 
the Roman government ; have marked the causes of that greatness in which it 
now subsists ; and shown, by comparison, in what view it may be judged in- 
ferior, and in what superior, to other states; we shall here close this discourse. 
But as every skilful artist offers some piece of work to public view, as a proof 
of his abilities ; in the same manner we also, taking some part of history that 
iseonaected with the times from which we were led into this digression, and 
making a short recital of one single action, shall endeavour to demonstrate by 
fact, as well as words, what was the strength, and how great the vigour, which 
at that time were displayed by this republic. 

When Annihal, alter the battle of Carina?, hod taken prisoners eight thou- 
sand of the Romans, who were left to guard the camp, he permitted them to 
send a deputation to Rome, to treat of their ransom and redemption. Ten 
persons, the most illustrious that were among them', were appointed fortius 
purpose; and the general, having first commanded them to swear that they 
would return to him again, suffered them to depart. But one of the number, 
as soon as they had passed the intrenchment, having said that he had forgotten 
something, went back into the camp, took what he had left, and then con- 
tinued his journey with the rest ; persuading himself that, by this return, he 
had -discharged his promise, and satisfied the obligation of "the oath. When 
they arrived at Rome, they earnestly intreated the senate not to envy them the 
safety that was offered ; but to suffer them to be restored again to "their seve- 
ral families, at the price of three mina? for each prisoner, which was the sum 
that Annibal demanded ; that they were not unworthy of this favour ; that they' 
neither had through cowardice deserted their post in battle, nor done any thin<>" 
that had brought dishonour upon the Roman name ; but that, having been 
left to guard the camp, they had been thrown, by unavoidable necessity, after 
the destruction of all the rest of the army, into the power of the enemy. 
The Romans were at this time weakened by repeated losses ; were deserted by 
almost every one of their allies ; and seemed even to expect that Rome itself 
would instantly be attacked ; yet, when they had heard the deputies, they 
neither were deterred, by adverse fortune, from attending to what was fit and 
and right, nor neglected any of those measures that were necessary to the pub- 
lic safety. But, perceiving that the. design of Annibal, in this proceeding, 
was both to acquire a large supply of money, and, at the same time, to check 
the ardour of his enemies in battle, by opening to their view the means of 
safety, even though they should be conquered, they were so far from yielding 
to this request, that they showed no regard either to the distressed condition of 
their fellow-citizens, or to the services that might be expected from the pri- 
soners ; but resolved to disappoint the hopes, and frustrate the intentions of 
this general, by rejecting all terms of ransom. They made a law also, by 
which it was declared, that the soldiers that were left must either conquer or 
must die ; and that no other hope of safety was reserved for them, in case that 
they were conquered. After this determination they dismissed the nine de- 
puties, who, on account of their oath, were willing to return ; and, taking the 
other, who had endeavoured to elude by sophistry what he had sworn, they sent 
him back bound to the enemy ; so that Annibal was much less filled with joy 
from having vanquished the Romans in the field, than he was struck with ter- 
ror and astonishment at the firmneis and magnanimity that appeared in their 
deliberations* 



3 04 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



BOOK THE SEVENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

Z-eontivm in Sicily described. 

The city of Leontium, considered in its general position, is turned towards the 
north. Through the middle of it runs a level valley, which contains the pub- 
lic buildings alloted to the administration of government and of justice, and, 
in a word, the whole that is called the forum. The two sides of the valley are 
inclosed by two hills, which are rough and broken along the whole extent. But 
the summit of these hills, above the brows, is tiat and plain, and is covered with 
temples and with houses. There are two gates to the city. One of them is in 
the southern extremity of the valley, and conducts to Syracuse. The other is 
on the opposite side, and leads to those lands so famed for their fertility, and 
which are called the Leontine fields. Below the hill that stands on the western 
side of the valley flows the river Lissus : and on the same side, likewise, there is 
a row of houses, built under the very precipice, and in a line parallel to the 
river. Between these houses and the river lies the road which has been men- 
tioned. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

The treaty that ttms concluded between Annibal, general of the Carthaginians, 
and Xenophancs, ambassador from Philip. 

The solemn treaty which Annibal the general, Mago, Myrean, Barrnocar, and 
all the senators of Carthage that were with him, and all the Carthaginians that 
are iu the army with him, have concluded with Xenophanes, the son of 
Cleomachus, the ambassador deputed by king Philip, the son of Demetrius, 
in his own name, and in the name of the Macedonians and their allies. 

In the presence of Jupiter, Juno, and Apollo ; in the presence of the deity 
of the Carthaginians, and of Hercules and lolaus ; in the presence of Mars, 
Triton, and Neptune ; in the presence of all the gods who are with us in the 
camp, and of the sun, the moon, and the earth ; in the presence of the rivers, 
the lakes, and the waters ; in the presence of all the gods who preside over the 
state of Carthage; in the presence of all the gods who preside over the Mace- 
donian empire, and the rest of Greece ; in the presence of all the gods who di- 
rect the affairs of war, and who are present at this treaty ; Annibal the general, 
and all the senators of Carthage that are with him, and all the Carthaginians 
that are in the army with him, have said, 

With the consent of you and of us, this treaty of amity and concord shall 
connect us together, as friends, as kindred, and as brothers, upon the follow- 
ing conditions : 

King Philip and the Macedonians, together with the rest of the Greeks that 
are in alliance with him, shall protect the lords of Carthage ; Annibal the ge- 
neral, and those that are with him ; the governors in every place in which the 
laws of Carthage are observed ; the people of Utica, and all the cities and na- 
tions that are subject to the Carthaginian sway, together with their armies and 
their allies ; the cities likewise, and all the people with whom we are allied, in 
Italy, in Gaul, and in Liguria ; and all those that shall hereafter enter into an 
alliance with us in those countries. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, 
the people of Utica, and all other cities and states that are subject to the Car- 
thaginians, with their allies and armies ; the cities also, and all the people of 
Italy, »}' Gaul, and of Liguria,, that are at this time in alliance with us ; and all 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 305 



others likewise that shall hereafter be received into our alliance in any of 
those ports of Italy; shall protect and defend king Philip and the Macedo- 
nians, together with the rest of the Greeks that are in alliance with them. We 
will not engage in any ill designs, or employ any kind of treachery, the one 
against the other. But with all alacrity and willingness, without any deceit or 
fraud, you, the Macedonians, shall declare yourselves the enemies of those that 
are enemies of the Carthaginians; those kings alone excepted, and those porta 
and cities, with which you are connected by any treaty. And we also, on the 
other side, will be the enemies of those that are enemies of king Philip ; those 
kings, and cities and nations alone excepted, to which we are already bound 
by treaty. You shall be partners also with us in the war in which we are dovt 
engaged against the Romans ; till the gods give to you and to us a happy ter- 
mination of it. You shall supply us with the assistance that is requisite, and 
in the manner that shall be stipulated between us. And if the gods, refusing 
success to our endeavours in the war against the Romans and their allies, 
should dispose us to enter into treaty with them, we shall insist that you also 
be included in the treaty, and that the peace be made upon these expressed 
conditions : that the Romans shall at no time make war against you ; that they 
shall not remain masters of the Corcyreans, nor of the people of Apoi Ionia, 
Epidamnus, Pharos, and Dimalus; nor of the Parthinians, and the Atinta- 
nians ; and that they shall restore also to Demetrius of Pharos all the persons 
of his kindred, who are nowdetained in public custody at Rome. If the Ro- 
mans shall afterwards make war, either against you or us, we will mutually 
send such assistance as shall be requisite to either party. The same thing also 
will we perform, if any other power shall declare war against us; those kings, 
and cities, and states alone excepted, with which we are allied by treaty. If at 
any time it should be judged expedient to add to the present treaty, or to de- 
tract from it, it shall be done with mutual consent. 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

Demetrius of Pharos advises Philip to place a garrison in Ithome. The 
different sentiments of Aratus. 

When the entrails of the victims that have been sacrificed were brought, as 
the custom was, to Philip, he took them in his hands, and inclining to one 
side, and shewing them to Aratus, asked him, what he thought was signified 
by them : that he should relinquish the citadel, or that he should keep pos- 
session of it? In the very instant, Demetrius seized the occasion to reply : 
<c If you have the soul of a diviner in you," said he, " you will relinquish it 
without delay : but if you have the spirit of a king who understands affairs, 
you will keep possession of it ; that you may not, if the present opportunity 
be lost, wish in vain hereafter to obtain another. For, it is only by holding 
both the horns, that you can hope to keep the bull in subjection to you." By 
the horns he designed to signify the two fortresses of Ithome and Acroco- 
rinthus ; and Peloponnesus by the bulb But Philip, turning to Aratus, said, 
" And is this also your advice r" And when the other hesitated, he pressed 
him to declare his sentiments. Aratus, then, after a short silence, made this 
reply; "If you can retain possession of tins citadel, without breaking that 
faith by which you are bound to the Messinians, keep it. But if, by leaving 
a garrison in this place, you stand in the stead of all citadels and garrisons, 
that which Antigonus transmitted to you, and which has hitherto preserved 
vour allies ; I mean good faith ; consider whether it will not now be better to 
draw away your forces from Ithome, and, leaving there your faith, secure to 
yourself by that garrison alone the fidelity of the Messenians, and of all the 
rest of the allies." Philip, if he had followed his own natural inclination, 

VOL. I. NO. 6. £ <J 



80ff GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

-would have been ready enough to have violated his faith ; as we may judge 
from the subsequent actions of his life. But as he had been sharply reproved 
not long before by the younger Aratus, for having ordered some citizens to be 
put to death, and as the elder Aratus at this time addressed him with great 
authority as well as fredom, and besought him not to disregard the advice 
that he had offered, he was prevailed on to desist; and taking Aratus by the 
hand, " Let us return, then," said he, " by the way by which we came. 1 ' 

EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

Antiochus renders himself master of Sardes, by the contrivance of Lagoras, 

of Crete. 

Round the city of Sardes sharp skirmishes passed continually; and little 
"battles both by night, and by day, without any intermission. For every me- 
thod of surprise, and every art, both of attack and of defence, were practised 
on both parties. To enter into a particular description of all that was trans- 
acted would be both useless and altogether tedious. But when the siege had 
now continued to the second year, it was at last ended by the contrivance of 
Lagoras, a Cretan. This man, Who had gained a long experience in the af- 
fairs of war, had remarked that the strongest places very frequently become 
the easiest prey, through the two great security of the inhabitants, who repose 
such confidence either on the natural strength of their cities, or on the works 
"by which they are covered, that they are altogether remiss and negligent m 
- o-uardinii- them. He knew, likewise, that places are often taken by assault 
fei the very parts that are the strongest, and against which it was most impro- 
bable that an enemy would make any attempt. Agreeably to these senti- 
ments, having now considered that the strength of Sardes was such that all 
men despaired of being able to take it by assault, aud hoped only that it • 
misht be at last subdued by famine ; he was the more encouraged by this very 
reason to make the attempt, and turned his thoughts on every side, in order to 
find some fair occasion of rendering himself master of the place. And having 
remarked thut the wall which connected the citadel with the city was not 
guarded, he conceived the hope that in that very part he should be able to 
accomplish his design. That'lhis part via* destitute of guards, he thus disco- 
vered. The wall was built upon a very lofty rock, and at the bottom of the pre- 
cipice was a hollow valley, into which the carcases of the horses and bt asts of 
burden were thrown, that died within the city. In this valley large flocks of 
vultures, and other birds of prey, were continually assembled. And as the 
birds, when they were satiated with food, constantly reposed themselves upon 
the top of the precipice, and upon the wall, Lagoras concluded from this cir- 
cumstance that the wall was certainly not guarded, but was at almost all times 
destitute of people. When he had formed this conjecture, he went himself by 
ni»-ht, and carefully examined in what part he might make his approaches, 
and fix the ladders. And having found on the side of one of the rocks, a, 
place that was proper for the purpose, he then communicated his project to 
the king. Antiochus conceived grout hopes, and entreated him to accomplish 
the design. Lagoras, on his part, promised to employ his utmost, power ; but 
desired that Theodotus the iEtoiiau, and Dionysiu^, ihe captain of the guards^ 
each of whom possessed all the strength and courage which an enterprise of 
this k ; nd require;!, might be associated with him in the undertaking, and 
commanded to assist in the execution of it. To this the king immediately 
consented; and these three together, having regijlated their plan in secret, 
waited for a night, in the latter part of which there would be no moon. V. hen 
such a night was come, on the evening before the day in which the attempt was 
to be made, they chose from the whole army fifteen men, the most distinguished 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYEIUS. 307 

by their strength and courage, to carry the ladders, and to share with 
themselves the danger of mounting the walls. After these they took thirty 
more, tvhti were directed tn lie in ambuscade, at a certain distance ; and, when 
the first should have scaled the walls, and descended to the gate that was near, 
to advance from their concealment, and to cut through the bars and hjng.es of 
the gate from without, while the rest broke the locks and the bolts on the 
inside. Behind these followed another body of two thousand men ; who were 
ordered to enter the city with the rest, and to take possession of the circus of 
the theatre, which commanded both the citadel and the city. And that no 
suspicion of the truth might arise from making these detachments, a report 
was spread that a body of iEtolians designed to throw themselves through the 
valley before mentioned into the city; and that, as notice had been received 
of their design, these forces were prepared to oppose their entrance. 

When all things were now ready, as soon as the moon, had withdrawn hei* 
hgHtj Lagoras and the rest approached the precipices with their ladders, and 
doftcealed themselves under the brow of the rock that hung over the valley* 
When day appeared, and the guards on the side had retired, while the kino-, 
according to his custom, sent one part of his troops to their respective 
posts, and drew out the rest in order of battle hi the Hippodrome, the at- 
tempt remained for some time unnoticed. But no sooner were two ladder* 
raised, upon one of which Dionysius first mounted, and Lagoras upon the other* 
than a great commotion and disorder was spread through all the camp. For 
though neither the garrison in the city, nor Achseus himself, who was in the 
citadel, discerned the men that were attempting to scale the walls, because 
they were covered by the brow of the rock; those that were in the camp very 
Clearly saw the whole of this bold and dangerous action. And while some 
were struck with admiration at an attempt that appeared incredible, and 
others foresaw, but were doubtful of the consequence; they stood fixed in sus» 
pense, and, with an anxiety mingled with joy, expected the event. The king, 
perceiving this commotion, and being willing to draw aside the attention both 
of his own troops and of the besieged from what was done, led out the arm\^ 
and advanced towards the gate that was on the opposite side of the citv, and 
was called the gate of Persis. Achseus, perceiving from the citadel this motion 
of the enemy, so different from any which they had before been used to make* 
was thrown into great perplexity, and knew not what was their design. He 
sent some forces, however, towards the gate. But as the road by which they 
descended from the citadel was narrow, and full of precipices, they arrived too 
late. Aribazus also, who commanded in the city, and who suspected nothing 
of the real truth, led the garrison to the same gate, likewise, which Autiochus 
threatened to attack. And having stationed one part of his forces 1 on the 
walls, he ordered the rest to advance, while dne part killed ail those that thev 
met, through the gate, to stop the enemy as they approached, and to e:i<<ap;e 
them in battle. In the mean time, Lagoras, Dionysius, and Iheodotus, hav- 
ing gained the summit of the rock, and descended from thence to the sate 
that was below, dispersed those that they met, and began to break the «-~ate. 
The thirty also on the outside at the same time advanced, aud assisted in 
fifejakiug it. And when the gate was in this manner soon forced open, the two 
thousand men that had stood ready for that purpose eutered and took posses- 
sion of the circus. As soon as this was perceived, the forces that had been 
stationed upon the walls, aud those that were sent through the gate of Persis, 
by Aribazus, returned back again in haste, to attack those that had en- 
tered the city. But, as the gate was opened for their return, some of the 
troops of Autiochus entered together with them : and having thus made them- 
selves masters of this gate likewise, they then ran to break the rest of the gates 
that were near. Aribazus and all the garrison, after a short engagement with 
those that were already within the city, fled hastily into the citadel. Theo- 
«otug and Lagoras remaining still in their first station,, with great prudence 



308 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



attended to all that passed. The rest of the army entering now on every side 
'were soon masters of the place. And others set fire to the houses, or dispersed! 
themselves in search of plunder, till the whole city was pillaged and destroyed. 
In this manner Antiochus became master of Sardes. 



BOOK THE EIGHTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

Men who trust themselves to others are to be censured or excused, according 
to different circumstances. Examples of both cases. 

When accidents of this kind happen, it would be dangerous to decide, in ge- 
neral, that those who are betrayed into such misfortunes deserve to be blamed j 
or, on the contrary, that they deserve to be excused. For it frequently is 
seen, that, when men have employed all the caution that reason could sug- 
gest, they still fall into the power of those who scruple not to violate the 
established laws of mankind. But if we attend, on the other hand, to the 
particular times and circumstances of such events, it is certain, that by these 
we may be enabled to judge without reserve; and to declare some generals 
among those who have been thus deceived, to be worthy of censure, and other* 
to be free from blame. The following examples will show the truth of this 
remark. 

Archidamus, one of the kings of Lacedsemon, suspecting the ambition of 
Cleomenes, fled from Sparta. But being afterwards prevailed on to return, 
and put himself into the power of his enemy, he lost both his kingdom and 
'his life, and left not the least excuse for his imprudence to future times. 
For while the condition of tilings remained the same, and the -ambition of 
Cleomenes had even acquired new strength, how was it possible that he should 
avoid this fate, if he threw himself again into the hands of those, from whom 
he had escaped by flight, and with the greatest difficulty ? Pelopidas also of 
Thebes, who was well acquainted with the wicked disposition of the tyrant 
Alexander, and who knew likewise, that every tyrant considers those who de- 
fend the cause of liberty as his greatest enemies, when he not only had prevailed 
on Epaminondas, to take arms in support of the democratical government of 
Thebes, and of all Greece, but had himself led an army into Thessaly, in 
order to subvert the monarchy of Alexander, ventured to go on a second em- 
bassy to this very tyrant. By this imprudence, having most assuredly re- 
posed a confidence in those whom he had the greatest reason to distrust, he 
brought great loss upon his country, and destroyed the reputation also which 
he had before (Required. A like misfortune happened to the Roman consul, 
Cnseus Cornelius, who, in opposition to all reason, delivered himself to the 
enemy, in the time of the war of Sicilj r . Many other examples also might be 
found of the same imprudence ; and from these it may fairly be concluded, 
that whoever, without due consideration and inquiry, throw themselves into- 
the power of their enemies, are very greatly to be blamed. 

On the other hand, when men have before employed every necessary kind of 
caution, they cannot be thought to deserve any censure. Never to place a 
confidence in any one is absolutely impracticable. It is sufficient if we take 
gome proper pledges for our security, and act afterwards as reason shall re- 
quire. The best pledges of safety, upon such occasions, are oaths, wives 
and children given as hostages ; and, above all, the former life of the persons 
tr horn we are inclined to trust. If these are employed to betray and ruin us, 
the reproach must fall upon the authors of the treachery, and not upon those 
who are deceived. The first step, therefore, should be, to gain assurances of 
tfuch a kind, that those with whom we treat may be compelled by them to «b- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 309 



serve their faith. But, as these are not always to be obtained, the next course 
is, to take every measure with such prudence, that, if we fall afterwards into 
misfortunes, it may not be imputed to us as a fault. Many examples of this 
sort might be drawn from former ages. But there is none more illustrious 
than that which is found in the very times of which we are writing, the ex- 
ample of Achseus. For this prince, after he had employed the most perfect 
foresight that human foresight wisdom could suggest, and neglected no pre- 
caution that was necessary for his safety, fell into the power of his enemies. 
But so far was he from incurring any blame, that, on the contrary, his misfor- 
tune was pitied and excused ; while the authors of it were condemned to bea? 
the curses and the detestation of mankind. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

Reflections on the greatness of the designs of Rome and Carthage, and the 
persevering obstinacy of the two republics. The advantages of general 
history. 

It will by no means be foreign to my first design, or to the general intention cf 
this work, to desire the reader to pause a while, and to consider the greatness 
of the actions of the Carthaginians and the Romans, and the stubborn coi .- 
stancy with which they severally persisted in their enterprises. For is it not 
astonishing, that, when they were engaged in so great a war in Italy, and in 
another not less important also in Spain, when the prospect of success in these 
two wars was to both equally uncertain, and the present danger alike terrible 
to both, as if these were not sufficient, they at this very time should maintain 
another, both in Sardinia and in Italy, and not only should extend their views 
at once to all these wars, but should be able also to complete the preparations, 
and furnish the supplies that were necessary to all ? But our admiration 
must still increase, if we take a view of things in a more particular detail. The 
Romans had in Italy two complete armies, under the command of the two 
consuls. In Spain they had^two.more : one upon land, at the head of which 
was CnEeus Cornelius ; and another upon the sea, commanded by Publius. 
On the side of the Carthaginians likewise, the armies were the same. Be- 
side these, the Romans had also a fleet, that was stationed on the coasts of 
Greece, to observe the motions of king Philip. At the same time Appius, 
■with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius, at the head of a land 
army, supported the war in Sicily; while Amilcar did the same on the side of 
the Carthaginians. 

From these facts, very clearly will appear the truth of that which we have 
often taken occasion to affirm in the former parts of this work, that it is not 
possible to obtain an entire view and knowledge of the whole of things from 
particular histories. For how can the bare reading of what passed in Sicily 
only, or in Spain, be sufficient to instruct us, either in the greatness of the 
things that were transacted, or more especially in what manner, and through 
what kind of government, that most astonishing event was perfected, which has 
happened in the present age, and of which there is no example in former times; 
that all the known parts of the earth have been reduced beneath the power of 
a single state. In what manner Syracuse was taken by the Romans, and by 
what measures they gained possession of Spain, may be known, perhaps, in 
some degree, from particular histories. But general history alone can show, 
by what steps thev arrived at the sovereignty of the whole ; what circumstances 
counteracted them in their pursuit of that great design; and what again, at 
certain times, co-operated with them. There is, therefore, no other way by 
which we may be enabled to discern, either the greatness of the transactions 
themselves, or th« force of the Rojnan government. For when we read that 



310 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



the Romans attempted the conquest of Sicily only, or of Spain, and main- 
tained vast armies both upon land and sea, such projects, considered singly in 
themselves, contain nothing very great or wonderful. But when it is seen 
that, not these enterprises only, but many others likewise, were at the same 
time formed and executed by the same republic ; and that this very people, 
even while they carried into execution these designs, were involved in various 
difficulties, and sustained many dreadful battles, in their own proper country ; 
it is then only that these transactions will appear in their just light ; that our 
admiration will indeed be raised ; and that we shall obtain a full conception of 
all that we desire to know. Let this, then, serve to show the mistake of those, 
who think that separate and particular relations will instruct them in the 
knowledge of general and universal history. 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

The siege of Syracuse. The Romans are forced to desist from their attempt 
by the wonderful inventions of Archimedes. 

The consul Appius, having taken upon himself the command of the land 
forces, and stationed the army round the Scythian porticoe, from whence the 
wall was continued along the shore, even to the mole of the harbour, resolved 
to make his approaches on that side. As the number of his artificers was very 
great, he prepared, in five days only, a sufficient quantity of blinds and darts, 
with every thing besides that was 'proper for the siege*; and was persuaded 
that, by this celerity, he should be able to attack the enemy, before they had 
made the necessary preparations for their defence. He had not, at this time, 
made due reflection upon the great skill of Archimedes ; nor considered, that 
the mind of a single man is, on some occasions, far superior to the force of 
many hands. But this truth was soon discovered to him by the event. For as 
Syracuse was in itself a place of very great strength : the wall that surrounded 
it being built upon lofty hills, whose tops hanging down over the plain, ren- 
dered all approach from without, except in certain parts, extremely difficult J 
so, within the city likewise, and against all attempts that might be made 
on the side of the sea, so great a quantity of instruments of "defence had 
been contrived by the person just now mentioned, that the besieged were 
at no time idle ; but were ready, at every new attack, to meet the 
motions, and repel the efforts of the enemy. Appius, however, advancing 
with his blinds and ladders, endeavoured to approach that part of the wall 
which was joined to the Hexapylum, on the eastern side of the city. At the 
same time, Marcellus directed his course towards Achradiua, with a fleet of 
sixty quinqueremes, all filled with soldiers, who were armed with bows, slings, 
and javelins, in order to drive the enemy from the walls. There were aTso 
eight other quinqueremes, from one side of which the benches of the rowers 
had been removed; from the right side of some, and from the left of others. 
These vessels, being joined two and two together, on the sides from which 
the benches had been taken, were rowed by the oars on the opposite side, and 
carried to the walls certain machines called sackbuts, the construction and use 
of which may be thus decribed. 

A ladder is made, which has four feet in breadth, and such a length as may- 
make it equal, when raised, to the height of the walls. On either side of it 
is a high breast-work, in the form of a balustrade. This ladder is laid at 
length, upon the sides in which the two vessels are joined, but extending far 
beyond the prows; and at the top of the masts of the vessels are fixed pullies 
and ropes. At the proper time, the ropes are fastened to the top of the ma- 
chine. And while so,r>e, standing on the stem of the vessels, draw the ladder 
upwards by the pullies, others on the prow, at the same time assist in raising 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 311 

it with bars and levers. The vessels being then rowed near to the shore, 
endeavours are used to fix the machine against the walls. At the top of the 
ladder is a little stage, guarded on three sides with blinds, and containing 
four men upon it, who engage with those upon the walls that endeavour to 
obstruct the fixing of the machine. And when it is fixed, these men, being 
now raised above the top of the wall, throw down the blinds on either side, 
and advance to attack the battlements and towers. The rest at the same 
time ascend the ladder, without any fear that it should fail ; because it is 
strongly fastened with ropes to the two vessels. The name of sackbut is be- 
stowed not improperly upon this machine. For when it is raised, the ap- 
pearance of the ladder and the vessels, joined thus together, very much 
resembled the figure of that instrument. 

In this maimer then, when all things now were ready, the Romans design- 
ed to attack the towers. But Archimedes had prepared machines that were 
fitted to every distance. And while the vessels were yet far removed from 
the walls employing catapults and balistte, that were of the largest size, and 
■worked by the strongest springs, he wounded the enemy with his darts and 
stones, and threw them into great disorder. When the darts passed beyond 
them, he then used other machines, of a smaller size, and still proportioned 
to the distance. By these means the Romans were so effectually repulsed, 
that it was not possible for them to approach. Marcellus therefore, perplexed 
with this resistance, was forced to advance silently with his vessels in the night. 
But when they came so near to the land as to be within the reach of darts, 
they were exposed to new danger from another invention, which Archimedes 
had contrived. He had caused openings to be made in many parts of the 
wall, equal in height to the stature of a man, and to the palm of the hand in 
breadth. And having planted on the inside archers, and little scorpions, he 
discharged a multitude of arrows through the openings, and disabled the sol- 
diers that were on board. In this manner, whether the Romans were at a great 
distance, or whether they were near, he not only rendered useless all their 
efforts, but destroyed also many of their men. When they attempted also to 
raise the sackbuts, certain machines which he had raised along the whole wall 
on the inside, and which were before concealed from view, suddenly appeared 
above the walls, and stretched their long beaks far beyond the battlements. 
Some of these machines carried masses of lead, and stones not less than ten 
talents in weight. And when the vessels with the sackbuts came near, the 
beaks, being first turned by ropes and pullies to the proper point, let fall their 
stones; which broke not only the sackbuts, but the vessels likewise, and threw 
all those that were on board into the greatest danger. In the same manner 
also, the rest of the machines, as often as the enemy approached under the 
cover of their blinds, and had secured themselves by that precaution against 
the darts that were discharged through the openings of the wall, let fall upon 
them stones of so large a size, that all the combatants upon the prow were 
forced to retire from their station. 

He invented likewise a hand of iron, hanging by a chain from the beak of a 
machine, which was used in the following manner. The pei*son, who like a 
pilot guided the beak, having let fall the hand, and catched hold of the prow 
of any vessel, drew clown the opposite end of the machine that was on the in- 
side of the walls. And when the vessel wan thus raised erect upon its stern, 
the machine itself was held immoveable; but the chain being suddenly loos- 
ened from the beak by the means of pullies, some of the vessels were thrown 
upon their sides ; others turned with the bottom upwards; and the greatest 
part, as the prows were plunged from a considerable height into the sea, 
were filled with water, and all that were on board thrown into tumnlt and 
disorder. 

Marcellus was in no small degree embarrassed when he found himself en- 
countered in every attempt by such resistance. He perceived that all hi* 



312 . GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US 



efforts were defeated with loss; and were even derided by the enemy. But, 
amidst all the anxiety that he suffered, he could not help jesting- upon the 
intentions of Archimedes. This man, said he, employs our ships as buckets 
to draw water; and boxing about our sackbuts, as if they were unworthy to 
be associated with him, drive*them from hi* company with disgrace. Such 
was the success of the siege on the side of the sea. 

Appius also, on his part, having met with the same obstacles in his ap- 
proaches, was in like manner forced to abandon his design. For while he 
was yet at a considerable distance, great numbers of his army were destroyed 
by the balistae and the catapults. So wonderful was the quantity of stones 
and darts, and so astonishing the force with which they were thrown. The 
machines indeed were worthy of Hiero, who had furnished the expense ; and 
of Archimedes, who designed them, and by whose directions they were 
made. If the troops advanced nearer to the city, they either were stop- 
ped in their approach by the arrows that were discharged through the openings 
in the walls ; or, if they attempted to force their way under the cover of their 
bucklers, were destroyed by stones and beams that were let fall upon their 
heads. Great mischief also was occasioned by those hands of iron that have 
been mentioned ; which lifted men with their armour into the air, and dashed 
them against the ground. Appius, therefore, was at last constrained to return 
back again to his camp. And when he had held a consultation with the 
tribunes, it was with one consent determined by them, that every other method 
should be tried to obtain possession of Syracuse, but that they would no more 
attempt to take it by assault. Nor did they afterwards depart from this re- 
solution. For though they remained eight months before the city, and dur- 
ing that time invented various stratagems, and carried into execution many 
bold designs, they never had the courage to attack the place in the regular 
forms. So wonderful, and of such importance upon some occasions, is the 
power of a single man, and the force of science properly employed. With so 
great armies both by land and sea, the Romans could scarcely have failed to 
take the city if one old man had been removed. But while he is present they 
dare not even to make the attempt, in the manner at least which Archimedes 
was able to oppose. Being persuaded therefore, that, as the city was' crowded 
with inhabitants, it might at last most easily be reduced by famine, they re-, 
solved to have recourse to this as their only hope ; and to intercept by their 
fleet the provisions that should be brought by sea, while the army cut off all 
approach on the side of the land. And that the time employed in the siege 
might not pass wholly without action, but be attended with advantage in some 
other place, the consuls divided the army. And while Appius, with two parts 
of the forces, invested the city, Marcellus with the rest, advancing through 
the country, wasted the lands of the Sicilians who had joined the Carthaginian* 
m the war. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

The death of Aratus, who was poisoned by the order of Philip. 

Though Philip attempted to waste the territory of the Messenians, who were 
now his enemies, the mischief which he occasioned to them was very incon.si-. 
derable. But the same prince found better success in carrying into execution 
the impious designs which he had contrived against the nearest of his friends. 
For not long afterwards Aratus was poisoned by his orders, with the assistance 
of Taurion who presided over the affairs of Peloponnesus. This infamous ac- s 
tion was not for some time discovered to the world. For the poison was not 
of that kind which procures immediate death ; but was one of those which 
weaken the habit «f the body, and destroy life by slow degrees. Aratus him-. 
*«df was very sensible of the injury that he had received ; and the manner ia 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 313 



wjbich the thing was made known was this. The old man, who had kept it 
secret from every one besides, could not restrain himself from letting fall 
some words in the presence of a favourite servant whose name was Cephalo. 
For when this domestic, who attended him with great fidelity during the 
course of his illness, had one day desired his master to remark, that some of 
the spittle that hung upon the wall was mingled with blood: "Such, Ce- 
phalo," said Aratus, " is the reward of the friendship which 1 have had for 
Philip." So great and excellent a tiling is moderation ; which disposed the 
sufferer, and not the author of the injury, to feel the greatest shame ; when 
he found that all the glorious actions which he had shared with Philip, in order 
to promote the service of that prince, had been at last so basely recom- 
pensed. 

Such was the end of this magistrate; who received after his death, not from his 
own country alone, but from the whole republic of the Acheeans,all the honours 
that were due to a man, who had so often held the administration of their go- 
vernment, and performed such signal services for the state. For they decreed 
sacrifices to him, with the other honours that belong to heroes ; and, in a word, 
omitting nothing that could serve to render his name immortal, if the dead 
therefore retain any sense, it is probable that Aratus must now contemplate 
with a pleasing satisfaction not ouly the gratitude of the Acheeans, but ail the 
difficulties also and the dangers which himself encountered in his life. 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH. 

The manner in which Philip took the citadel of Lissas, and the city. 

Philip had for a long time before revolved in his mind the design of render- 
ing himself master of the city of Lissus and the citadel. Beginning his 
march, therefore, with the army, and having after two days passed the defiles, 
he encamped upon the banks of the river Ardaxanus, at no great distance 
from the city. But when he saw that the whole circuit of the city, both on 
the side of the land, and on that also towards the sea, was strongly fortified 
both by nature and by art ; and that the citadel, which stood near, was of so 
great height and strength that it was scarcely possible that it ever should be 
taken by assault ; he laid aside all hopes of being able to reduce the last, 
but judged the conquest of the city to be not absolutely impracticable. Be- 
tween Lissus and the foot of the mountain upon which the citadel was built, 
there was an open space which seemed very proper for his intended attack 
•upon the city. The king, therefore, after some slight skirmishing with the 
enemy upon this ground, contrived the following stratagem. Having allowed 
the army to repose themselves during one whole day, and encouraged them 
as the occasion required, he sent away in the night the greatest and most ser- 
viceable part of the light-armed troops, with orders that they should conceal 
themselves in certain vallies covered with wood, which were on the side of the 
country, at a little distance from the open space that has been mentioned. On 
the following day, taking with him the peltastae, and the remaining part of the 
light-armed forces, and beginning his march on the side towards the sea, he 
advanced round the city to the ground upon which he before had skirmished, 
as if his intention had been to make an attack from thence upon the place. 
The city was filled with people, who had thrown themselves into it from all 
the neighbouring parts of lllyria, upon the first arrival of Philip in tbfe 
country. But the citadel, because it seemed sufficiently secured by its own 
natural strength, was defended by a very small garrison. As soon then as the 
Macedonians approached, the enemy, confident in their numbers, as well as 
in the advantage of the ground, came out in crowds against them from the 
city. Philip, having stationed the peltastes in. the plain, commanded the 

VOL. I. NO. <5. 2 R 



314 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

light-armed forces to advance towards the heights, and to engage with vigour. 
At first the contest was on both sides equal ; but after some time, these tfoop$, 
being pressed by numbers, and disordered by the difficulties of the ground, 
were forced to turn their backs, and retired towards the heavy forces. The 
besieged pursue with eagerness, and attack the heavy forces in the plain. At 
the same time, the troops that were in the citadel, perceiving that Philip drew 
away his army in small divisions, and that some of the cohorts alone sustained 
the fight, while others seemed to retreat, were persuaded that he was preparing 
altgether to leave the field. Leaving therefore their post by stealth, as if the 
situation of the place was alone sufficient to defend it, they descended in 
small bodies, and through private roads, into the plain, expecting to obtain 
some share in the plunder of those that fled. In this moment, the troops that 
had been placed in ambuscade in the vallies advanced unperceived, and at- 
tacked the enemy with vigour. At the same time, likewise, the heavy forces 
returned back again to the charge. The Ulyrians were soon thrown into dis- 
order. Those that had advanced from Lissus fled back again by different 
^rays, and saved themselves within the city. But the garrison of the citadel 
was intercepted by the forces that had risen from the ambuscade. Thus the 
event happened which was the least expected: and Philip gaiwed possession of 
the citadel without any danger. On the following day, after many violent 
and terrible attacks, the city also was taken by the Macedonians. This sud- 
den and unexpected conquest struck so great terror into all the neighbouring 
parts, that almost all the cities of II Syria submitted themselves voluntarily to 
the king. For when he had taken two places of such uncommon strength by 
assault, it seemed that there would be now no. fortress able to withstand hi? 
effortBg'nor any hope of safety for those that should resist his arms, 



EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 

i- 

AckcBUS.t who ivas besieged in the citadel efSardes by Aniiochus, is delivered 
into the power of his enemies by the treachery of Bolis. 

There was a man whose name was Bolis, a Cretan by birth, who had long' 
lived in the court of Ptolemy, and held a military command. He had the 
reputation of possessing, together with a good understanding, a most enter- 
prising courage, and was supposed to be inferior to none in the experience 
•which he bad gained in the affairs of war. Sosibius, having endeavoured in 
many conferences to obtain the confidence of this man, and to render him 
devoted to his interests, at last disclosed to him, that he could not at this 
time perform any service more acceptable to the king, than by contriving 
$ome method to save Ach^us. Bolis, when he had heard him, said that he 
would consider what he had proposed, and then retired. And when he had 
examined the thing by himself, after two or three days he returned, and told 
Sosibius that he would undertake the business : that he had passed some time 
in Sardes, and was well acquainted with the place ; and that Cambylus, who 
commanded a body of Cretans in the army of Antinchus, was not only his 
fellow citizen, but 1 his kinsVian also, and his friend. Now Cambylus was 
statioued in one of the advanced posts that were behind the citadel of Sardes. 
Fur the ground on that side, not being fortified with works, was defended only 
by a line* of Cretans. Sosibius received this account with joy; and was per- 
suaded either that Achreus was not to be rescued from his present danger^ or 
that Bolis alone could save him. And as the latter shewed on his part also the 
greatest eagerness, the affair was soon determined. Some money was imme- 
diately furnished by Sosibius, that nothing might be wanting that was neces- 
sary to the design. He gave him an assurance likewise of much larger sums 
if the attempt should be attended with success. And by exaggerating also i» 



GENERAL HISTORY QF POLYBIUS. 315 

the amplest manner the rewards that might be expected both from Ptolemy 
and from Aehseus, he raised the hopes of Bolis to the greatest height. 

The Cretan, impatient to begin the work, furnished himself with the proper 
instruments of credit, and sailed away immediately to Rhodes, to find Nico- 
niachus, whose affection for Achrsus, and his fidelity towards him, were like 
those of a father towards a son. From thence he went to Ephesus, and joined 
'Melanchomas. For these were the persons whom Aehseus had long employe*! 
to transact his affairs abroad both with Ptolemy and all other states. Bolis, 
therefore, arriving first at Rhodes, and afterwards at Ephesus, communicated 
to these men the whole design. And finding them ready to lend all the as- 
sistance that he desired, he then sent Ariauus, one of his own officers, to Cam- 
bylus, with orders to acquaint him, that Bolis had been sent from Alexandria 
to raise some foreign mercenaries ; but that having some business of great im-» 
portance to communicate to Cambylus, he desired that this general would ap^> 
point a certain place and time, in which they might meet together without the 
knowledge of any other person. Arianus soon discharged his commission, and 
was sent back again by Cambylus, who consented to all that was proposed* 
and fixed the hour and the place in which he would meet Bolis in the night. 

In the mean time Bolis, who was a true Cretan, versatile in his nature* 
Carefully examined the thing in all its circumstances, and considered it on 
every side. At last, however, he joined Cambylus at the appointed place* 
and delivered a letter to him. Upon this letter they immediately held a con* 
sultation that was worthy of two Cretans. For the object of their deliberation 
neither was the safety of the unhappy prince, nor the fidelity which they owed 
to those who had employed them, but their own security alone, and their own 
advantage. With thesebase views, it was not long before they concurred in 
the same opinion : that they would first divide between themselves the ten 
talents that had been given by Sosibius, and afterwards disclose the whole 
matter to Antiochus; and that, when they had obtained some present money 
from the king, together with an assurance also of such future rewards a* 
might be suitable to so great a service, they would engage, with his assistance* 
to deliver Aehseus into his hands. When they had thus determined, Cam* 
bylus took upon himself the part of communicating the business to Antiochus* 
Bolis, on the other hand, engaged, that after some days he would send Ari- 
anus to Achaeus, with letters from Nicomachus and Melancomas. But he left 
it to the care of Cambylus to take such measures, that this officer might enter 
the citadel, and return back again with safety. At the same time it was con- 
certed, that, if Aehseus should fall into the snare, and send back an answer to 
the letters, Bolis should then join Cambylus, and assist in the execution of 
the design. 

When they had in this manner regulated all their plan, they separated; and 
each prepared himself to perform the part which he had undertaken. Cam* 
bylus took the first occasion that was offered, and disclosed the project to the 
king. Antiochus, surprised by an assurance so unexpected and so pleasing, 
was agitated by different passions* In one moment, transported with joy, he. 
promised every thing that was required of him. In the next, being diffident 
«f the success, he demanded an account of every part and circumstance of the 
design, and of the measures that were taken for carrying it into execution* 
At last, giving full credit to the whole, and being persuaded that the thing 
iiud happened by the special favour of the gods, he pressed Cambylus with 
repeated earnestness to accomplish what he had begun. At the same time 
Bolis addressed himself in such a manner to Nicomaehus and Melancbmasr* 
that they entertained not the least suspicion with respect to his sincerity. 
They gave letters therefore to Arianus, to be delivered to Aehseus; and ad- 
v,i$ed this prince to place an entire confidence in Bolis and Cambylus. The 
letters were written \u a certain cipher, which they had always used ;' and 



9\6 GENERAL HISTORY OE POLYBIUS. 



weve so composed, that, if they had fallen into any other hands, the contents 
would have remained unknown. 

Arianus, having introduced himself into the citadel with the assistance of 
Cambylus, delivered the letters to Achseus; and, as he had been employed in 
the affair from the beginning, gave also a distinct and accurate account of all 
that had been done. Being closely examined concerning various matters, 
respecting Bolis and Sosibius, Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most es- 
pecially Cambylus, he answered every question without hesitation, and with 
an air of the most genuine truth. And this he was the better enabled to do, 
because he was a stranger to the secret consultations that had passed between 
: Bolis and Cambylus. Acha?us being satisfied with his answers, hut chiefly 
because he gave credit to what was written hy Nicomachus and Melancomas, 
gent back Arianus with an answer to the letters. And when the same thing 
had been many times repeated, he at last resolved to embrace the measure 
which his friends advised; the rather, indeed, because he had now no other 
hopes of safety. He desired, therefore, that Bolis and Arianus might be sent 
to him, in a night in which there would be no moon ; and said that he would 
deliver himself into their hands. His intention was, first to remove himself 
from the present danger; and, immediately after his escape, to take the route 
of Syria. For he had reason to be persuaded, that his sudden and unexpected 
appearance among the Syrians, while Antiochus* still remained before the 
•citadel of Sardes, would occasion some commotion in the country ; and be 
received with the greatest joy by the people of Antiochi, Ccele-syria, and 
Phoenice. Animated by these flattering hopes, he now expected with im« 
patience, the time in which Bolis should arrive. 

As soon as Melancomas had received these letters, he urged Bolis to de- 
part ; having first recommended the business to him again in the most pressing 
words, and given him an assurance of great rewards, if the design should be 
attended with success. Bolis, having dispatched Arianus to Cambylus with 

■ notice of his coming, met the latter in the night at an appointed place. They 

■ passed a whole day together in adjusting all the parts of their design, and 
then entered the camp by night. The manner in which they regulated their 
plan was this : If Achfeu3 should leaye the citadel alone, or with only one 

•companion, together with Bolis and Arianus, it was certain that no resistance 
could be expected from him ; and that it would be an easy thing for those to 
whom he had intrusted himself to seize his person. But in case that he 
should be attended with a greater number, it would then be a matter of some 
difficulty; especially because the intention was, to take him alive, if it was 

• possible, in order the more to gratify Antiochus. Upon this account it was 
determined, that, in bringing Achteus from the citadel, Arianus should go 
the first, as being acquainted with the track by which he had often passed and 
returned ; and that Bolis should follow behind the rest ; that, as soon as they 
should arrive at a certain place, where Cambylus had engaged to conceal 

. some men iii ambuscade, he might then seize Achseus, and hold him fast ; 
lest, in the tumult and the darkness of the night, he should either save himself 
by flight into the adjoining woods, or throw himself in despair from the top of 
some precipice, and not fall alive, as they had designed, in the power of his 
enemies. 

When all things were thus concerted, Cambylus, unattended by any per- 
son, conducted Bolis in the same night to Antiochus, who also was alone. The 
king received him with great marks of favour; confirmed the promises which 
he had made ; and eartaestly entreated both of them to carry the project into 
execution without delay. They then returned back again to their own part 
of the camp ; and when the morning approached, Bolis and Arianus went 
towards the citadel, and entered it before it was yet day. 

Achseus received Bolis with eager transports of affection ; and asked many 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 317 

questions concerning every circumstance and part of the design. And as he 
judged, both from his appearance and discourse, that he was equal to the 
weight of such an enterprise, he was filled with joy, from the prospect of so 
near a safety. But this joy again was mingled witli no small anxiety and. 
doubt, when he looked forwards to the greatness of the consequences. In this 
uncertainty, as he had joined to an excellent understanding a long experience 
also in affairs, he resolved not to repose an entire confidence in the integrity of 
Bobs. He told him, therefore, that it was not possible for him at this time to 
follow him ; but that he would send with him three or four of his friends ; and 
when these should have joined Melancomas, he would then be ready himself to 
leave the citadel. Thus Achfeus did all that was possible to be done ; but 
considered not that he was practising the arts of a Cretan against a Cretan. 
For Bolis had attentively examined every circumstance that could arise in the 
course of such an undertaking. 

When the night was come in which Achaeus had promised to send out his 
friends, he ordered Bolis and Arianus to wait at the gate of the citadel till 
they should be joined by those whom he had appointed to go with them : and, 
being now ready to depart, he first communicated the design to his wife Lao- 
dice ; who was so struck with the surprise that she lost her senses. Achaeus, 
having employed some time in soothing and calming her disorder, and en- 
couraged her to expect a happy success, chose four of his friends, and, clothin"- 
them in plain habits, himself also taking a simple and vulgar dress, and ap- 
pearing to be a person of mean condition, set forwards on his way towards the 
gate. He had ordered, likewise, that one alone of these attendants should 
answer all the questions that should be asked by Arianus, as well as ask of him 
whatever might be necessary ; and should say that the others were barba- 
rians. When they had joined the traitors, Arianus went the first, as being ac- 
quainted with the way ; and Bolis, as it had been conceited, followed behind 
the rest, but not without great perplexity and doubt. For though, as a Cre- 
tan, he was ready enough, upon any ill occasion, to penetrate through the ar- 
tifice of others, yet in the darkness of the night he neither knew which of the 
persons was Achaeus, nor whether he was indeed among them. But, as the 
path was rough and difficult, and many parte of the descent very slippery and 
full of danger, the pains which the rest employed* sometimes to support 
Achaeus in such places, and sometimes to wait his coming, not being able al- 
together to abstain from that attention which they had been used to pay ta 
their prince, soon discovered to the artful Cretan the person whom he desired 
to know. When they came, therefore, to the place appointed by Cambylu*, 
the signal being given by a whistle, those that were in ambuscade suddenly 
seized the four attendants; while Bolis himself grasped Achaeus, whose hand"* 
were wrapped within his garment, and held him fast : being apprehensive 
.that, perceiving what had happened, he would otherwise destroy himself with 
his sword, which he had brought with him. The rest soon surrounded him on 
every side ; and, making themselves masters of his person, conducted him> to- 
gether with his friends, immediately to Antiochus. 

The king had long been in suspense, and impatiently expected the event. 
Having dismissed his company, he remained alone in his tent, without going 
to rest, attended by two or three guards. When he saw Cambylus enter, and 
place Achaeus bound upon the ground, his astonishment took from him the 
power of speech, so that he remained for a long time silent. At last he melted 
into tears ; being struck, as 1 suppose, with seeing, in this signal instance, how 
difficult it is to guard against the preposterous accidents of fortune. For thia 
Achaeus, who was the son of Andromachus, the brother of Laodice the wife of 
Seleucus ; who himself had married Laodice the daughter of king Mithridates ; 
who was sovereign of all the country on this side of mount Taurus ; who in 
this very moment was thought, both by his own troops and by those o? his ene- 
mies, to be secure in a fortress of the greatest strength ; this very Achaeus is 



S i s GENER A L HISTORY OF POLYBlUS. 



now seated bound upon the ground, and thrown into the power of his greatest 
enemies'; while every person is ignorant of" the transaction, except those alone 
•who had accomplished it. On the morrow, when the courtiers, as the custom 
waSj came to the royal tent at break of day, and beheld Achaeus, they were no 
less astonished than the king had been, and could scarcely give credit to what 
they saw. The council was then assembled, and, after long deliberation con- 
cerning the punishment that should be inflicted upon the unhappy prince, it 
■was at last determined that his hands'and feet should bejtirst cut off, and after- 
wards his head ; that the latter should be sewed up in the skin of an ass ; and 
the body be fixed upon a cross. When this sentence was executed, the whole 
army was so strongly agitated by surprise and terror, that Laodice, who alone knew 
that her husband was gone, conjectured what had happened to him, when she 
beheld from the citadel the great commotion and disorder that was spread 
through all the camp. Soon afterwards, a herald being sent to inform her of 
the death of Achaeus, and to command her to relinquish all affairs, and retire 
from the citadel; the garrison at first answered only with loud lamentation* 
end extravagant cries; not so much on account of the affection which they 
had borne towards Achaeus, as because the event itself was most unexpected 
and astonishing. When their grief had ceased, they found themselves in-*, 
volved in great perplexity. For Antiochus pressed the citadel closely without 
any intermission ; being persuaded that, as Acheeus was now removed, the 
garrison itself would most probably furnish some occasion by which he might 
become master of the place. And this, indeed, soon happened. The soldiers 
fell into sedition, and formed two parties ; one of which joined themselves to 
Ariobazus, while the other adhered to Laodice. And as each of these faC-» 
tions distrusted the other, they in a short time surrendered both themselves 
and the citadel to Antiochus. 

In this manner died Achaeus ; vanquished by the treachery of those whora 
he had trusted, after he had employed every kind of caution that reason could 
suggest. Hi6 fate may afford two useful lessons to posterity. The first, that 
we ought not too easily to place a confidence in any person ; and the other, 
that we never should be elated by prosperous fortune ; but remembeT that, aa 
men, we are subject to the power of every accident. 



EXTRACT THE SEVENTH. 

Annibal takes Tartntum by surprise, and with the assistance of some of th'g 

citizens. 

The young men at first left the city in the night, as if they designed to make 
an excursion in search of booty. But when they approached near to the Car- 
thaginian camp, the rest having concealed themselves in an adjoining wood, 
Philemeuus only and Nico advanced close to the intrenchment. Being taketi 
by the guards, and neither declaring who they were, nor from whence they 
*ame, but only that they had something to communicate to the general, they 1 
were soon brought to Annibal ; and, when they saw him, they desired that 
they might have some discourse with him alone. To this request he readily 
comented. Ami when they were alone with him, having first endeavoured to 
excuse their own conduct and that of their fellow-citizens, they then entered 
into a long and various accusation of the Romans ; that the design which they 
had formed to desert their party might appear to have been suggested to them 
by just reasons. Annibal received what they had said with great marks of 
favour, applauded their resolution, and then dismissed them, commanding 
them after a short sime to return, and discourse with him again upon the busi- 
ness ; and that, for the present, as soon as they had gained a little distance from 
the camp, they should boldly drive away the cattle that were withiu their 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYEIUS. am 



reach, and the men that were with them ; that he would give such or- 
ders that they might do it without danger. Hi* intention was both To gain 
time for himself to examine more closely what had been proposed, and to in- 
duce the Tarentines also to believe that the young men had left the city with 
no other design than to obtain some booty. The young men followed these 
direction 1 ! ; and as Annibal, on the one hand, was greatly pleased that an oc- 
casion had at last been offered to him of becoming master of the city ; so Nico 
aifio and Philemenus were encouraged to persist in their design with double 
ardour ; not only because they had opened a way to converse with Annibal in 
full security, and had found him ready to embrace what they proposed ; but 
because the quantity of the booty likewise which they carried back secured 
them against all suspicion on the part of their own citizens. For such was 
the abundance, that it served both for sacrifices and for feasts. The Taren- 
tines, therefore, not only entertained not any suspicion ; but many of them, 
■were desirous also of bearing a part in these excursions. 

Not long afterwards they again went out of the city, and, having observed 
the same caution as before, concluded with Annibal a solemn treaty unon 
these conditions : that he should leave the Tarentines in full enjoyment of 
their liberty ; and neither should exact any tribute from them, nor impose up- 
on them any law ; and that, as soon as the city should be taken, the Cartha- 
ginians should be allowed to pillage the houses that were occupied by the Ro- 
mans. They received from him likewise a signal by which they might obtain 
admission from the guards, as often as they should come to the camp. From 
this time, therefore, they had frequent opportunities to see and converse with 
Annibal : sometimes leaving the city as if they were going in search of booty, 
and sometimes under the pretence of hunting. 

When the measures were thus prepared that were necessary to accomplish 
the intended project, the rest of the conspirators, while they waited for the 
proper time of action, advised Philemenus to be assiduous in his hunting. 
For this young man had, through all his life, been so devoted to the diversions 
of the held, that the general opinion of him was, that he had almost, no other 
passion. It was concerted, therefore, that he should endeavour to »-airi the • 
favour both of Caius Livius, who commanded in the city, and of the "uards 
also that were stationed at a certain gate, which was below the gate called Ti- 
xnenis, by presenting to them, from time to time, some part of the game 
which he should take. 

Philemenus, having taken upon himself this part of the design, brought 
back continually some game to the city ; either such as himself had taken, or 
what had been prepared for him by Annibal ; and gave one part to the com- 
mander, and another part to the guards, that they might be ready to open to 
him the wicket of the gate. For he both left the city and returned, most 
usually in the night ; on pretence, indeed, of danger from the enemy ; but, in 
reality, because tins season was most suitable to the design* When the guards 
then had been so long accustomed to this practice, that, as soon as Phile- 
menus appeared, and gave the signal by a whistle, they were ready, without 
any delay, to open the gate, the conspirators, having received notice that the 
Roman governor designed, on a certain day, to give a feast to a large company 
in the musaeum, which was near to the citadel, resolved, in concert w:th An- 
jiibal,to choose that day for carrying their project into execution. This ge- 
neral, who, for some time before, had feigued himself to be sick, that bis long- 
continuance in one place might not seem strange to the Romans, pretended 
now that his sickness was worse, and remained with the army at the distance 
of three days' journey from Tarentum. But when the appointed time was 
come, he selected from all the cavalry and infantry about ten thousand of the 
most active and bravest soldiers, and, commanding them to take provisions for 
four days, began his march with the greatest haste, just before the break of 
$ay ; having ordered a body of eighty Numidiau horse to advance at the «lis~ 



320 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



tance of thirty stadia before the rest, that the main bjdy might not be dis- 
cerned by any ; but that all. those whom they should meet might either be 
taken prisoners by them, or, fiyins' into the city, discover only that the Nu- 
tnidians were making incursions in the country. And when they were now 
distant from the city about a hundred and twenty stadia, he commanded the 
troops to rest, and to take their supper upon the banks of a river, where some 
precipices covered them from open view. He then called together the officers ; 
and, not communicating to them the design, exhorted them only to acquit 
themselves like men of courage, and to be assured that, their bravery never 
would receive more ample rewards. In the next place, he commanded them 
to keep the order of the march with the greatest strictness ; and to punish 
every soldier with severity that should leave his rank. And, lastly, that they 
should carefully attend toall his orders, and do nothing except what should 
be commanded. With these orders he dismissed them ; and, as soon as the 
evening approached, again began his march, designing to arrive at the foot of 
the walls about the time of midnight. He took Philemenus with him as a 
guide; and had prepared a wild boar, which was to be used in the execution 
of the design. 

Livius had assembled his friends together in the musaeum on that day, 
agreeable to the notice which the conspirators had before received. About the 
time of sun-set, when the feast was at the height, some messengers arrived 
with the news, that the Nuraidians were making incursions in the country. 
The governor, not apprehending any thing besides, and being diverted indeed 
by this very account, from any suspicion of the truth, gave orders to -some 
officers, that, as soon as the day should appear, they should take one half of 
the cavalry, and endeavour to stop the ravages of the enemy. 

When night was now come, Nico, Tragiscus, and all that rest that were en- 
gaged in the design, having collected themselves together in the city, ex- 
pected the return of Livius ; which, as the feast had been celebrated in the 
day, soon happened. The rest of the young men then remained together in 
their place at a certain distauce. But some of them advanced forwards to 
meet the company ; and, assuming a dissolute and sportive air, began to mimic 
the gestures of those that were returning from the banquet. And when they 
liad joined the governor, whose senses were greatly disordered by the wine, 
they gave a free scope to their mirth. They laughed with him ; received and 
retorted his jests ; and, turning back with him, conducted him in that man- 
ner to his house; where, with a mind dissolved in joy, and free from every 
anxious and disquieting thought, he soon sunk into that deep sleep, which 
drinking in the day is so ready to procure. Nico and Tragiscus then returned 
Lack again to their companions ; and, dividing themselves into three bodies, 
took possession of the avenues that led towards the forum ; that from thence 
they might be able to observe whatever should happen either within or with- 
out the city. There were some also that were stationed near to the house of 
the governor. For they well knew that, if any suspicion should arise of their 
design, it would be first conveyed to Livius ; and that every measure that 
could be taken to prevent the execution must begin from him. Bui when 
the several companies of the evening had at last retired, and all the tumult of 
the city ceased ; when the inhabitants were fast in sleep, and the night far ad- 
vanced, the young men, finding that nothing had appeared to obstruct their 
hopes, again united themselves in one body, and prepared to begin their 
work. 

The measures which they had concerted with the Carthaginians were these : 
that Anniba!, having approached the city on the eastern side, and directing 
his march towards the gate called Temenis, should kindle a fire upon a cer- 
tain tomb, which by some was called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and by others 
of Apollo Hyacinthus : that Tragiscus, on the other hand, as soon as he should 
perceive this fire, shouldLanswer by another within the city ; and that Annibal, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 321 

having then extinguished the fire which he had made, should advance slowly 
towards the gate. Agreeably to this plan, the young men, having traversed 
the streets of the city," came to the place of the tombs. For the eastern side 
of Tarentum is filled with sepulchre3 of the dead ; who, in obedience to an 
antient oracle, are all buried, even to the present age, within the gates. The 
words of the oracle are said to have been these: "That the fortune of Ta- 
rentum would be happier and more prosperous, in proportion to the numbers 
that should inhabit it." The Taretitines, therefore, in order to obtain a full 
accomplishment of the prediction, from that time kept their dead also within 
the city. The young men then, arriving at this place, stood near the tomb of 
Pythionicus, and waited for the event. Annibal soon approached, and made 
the signal that had been concerted. Nico and Tragiscus, filled with confi- 
dence, immediately answered by another fire. And when that of Annibal was 
again extinguished, they then ran with the greatest haste towards the gate, 
that they might be able to kill the guards, before the Carthaginians should 
arrive. For it had been concerted, that the troops should advance leisurely, 
and with a deliberate pace. The whole thing, succeeded as they desired. 
The guards were taken by surprise ; and while one part of the conspirators 
■were employed in killing- them, the rest broke the bars; and, the gate being 
goon set open, Annibal also arrived in the very moment that, was requisite, ; 
having conducted his march with so great prudence, that no discovery had 
been made of it in the city. Making his entry, therefore, without any tumult 
or resistance, as he had at first designed ; and being persuaded that the chief 
part of the work was already finished, he advanced boldly from the lower side 
of the city, through the street that led to the forum ; leaving only a body pf 
two thousand of his cavalry without the gate ; that they might be ready either 
to intercept any enemy that should appear from without, or to serve in the 
case of any of those sudden accidents, which frequently arise in the course of 
such enterprises. When he came near to the forum, he ordered the troops 
to halt, and waited for the arrival of Philemenus ;' not without some solicitude 
with respect to this part of the design. For when himself, after he had made 
the signal of the fire, began his march towards the gate called Temenis, he at 
the same time sent Philemenus, with a wild boar, and a thousand Africans, to 
another gate that was near ; being desirous to employ more means than t ne, 
and not to trust the success of the project to any single measure. 

After some time, Philemenus approached the walls, and made the accus- 
tomed signal by a whistle. The guard immediately descended to the gate. 
Philemenus called to him to open without delay ; and said, that they carried 
a heavy load, having brought with them a wild boar. The guard, being 
pleased with what he heard, and hoping to receive, as at other times, some 
share of the fortunate chase, hastily opened the wicket ofithegate. Philemenus 
then entered, carrying the foremost part of the barrow ; and with him another 
who appeared to be a peasant, and wore the dress of a shepherd.' Two others 
also followed, and supported the burden behind. When the four had en- 
tered, they first killed the guard; who, not suspecting any harm, was em- 
ployed in viewing and in handling the boar. At the same time, thirty Af- 
ricans, who had advanced before the rest, passed leisurely through the wicket, 
and without any interruption. And while one party began to break the bars 
of the gate, others killed the rest of the guards. The signal being then made, 
the whole body of the Africans that were without entered through the gate, 
and directed their march towards the forum, as they had been before com- 
manded. 

When Annibal saw these troops approach, being o.verjoj-ed to find that the 
design had thus far been attended with success, he made haste to. carry into 
execution what remained. Having divided the Gauls, who were in number 
about two thousand, into three separate bodies, he placed at the head of each 
two of the young men who had joined in the conspiracy, together with two 
VOL. I. NO. (), 2 s 



322 GENERAL HISTORY OF PQLYBIUS. 

una. — iiiMWW»M i M.mmM™ — — — »"" m i l hi ———«^— ■■■!!■ ■ . [■■ n i—ii uu ia— i n — k»ih«w « 

Carthaginian officers; and commanded them to take possession of the most 
commodious avenues that led into the forum. He ordered the young men to 
save from slaughter all the citizens that they should meet ; and to proclaim 
aloud, that the Tarentiues should remain in their place, and be assured of 
safety. But he commanded the Carthaginian and Gallic officers to kill every 
Roman that should fail in their way. Immediately these bodies separated, 
and marched by different ways to execute these orders. 

As it now began to be known that the enemy had entered, the whole city 
was filled with clamour and confusion. Livius, being informed of what had 
happened, and finding himself so much inebriated as to be incapable of act- 
in 0- , immediately with his domestics left his house; and, having ordered the 
■wicket of the gate that led to the harbour to be opened to him, went on board 
one of the vessels that were at anchor there, and sailed round to the citadel. 
About the same time Philemenus, having prepared some Roman trumpets, 
and some persons who had learned to blow them, ordered them to be sounded 
near the theatre. The Romans, in obedience to a signal to which they had 
been accustomed, immediately took arms; and, running towards the forum, 
afforded the occasion which their enemies desired. For, as they spread them- 
selves through the streets without any order, they fell, some of them among 
the Carthaginians, and some among the Gauls, and were destroyed by them 
in very great numbers. 

The day began now to appear, and the Tarentines, who had remained quiet 
in their houses, were not able to understand the truth of what had happened. 
For, as on the one hand they heard only the Roman trumpets, and saw no at- 
tempt made to plunder or insult the city, they were ready to persuade them- 
selves that .the Romans themselves had occasioned the disorder. But when 
thev perceived, on the other hand, that many of the Roman soldiers were 
killed in the streets ; and that the Gauls were busy in spoiling them, they 
then began to suspect, that the Carthaginians had found means to enter the 
city. But when it was now clear day, and the Romans had retired into the 
citadel, in which there was a garrison, Annibal, having drawn up all his forces, 
in order of battle, in the forum, ordered proclamation to be made, that the Ta- 
rentines should all meet together in the forum, likewise without arms. At 
the same time, the young men who had joined in the conspiracy ran through 
the city, crying liberty, and exhorting the citizens not to fear, but to consider 
the Carthaginians as their deliverers and friends. When they heard these 
words, as many of the citizens as remained firm in the interests of the Romans 
fled also into the citadel. The rest obeyed the order, and came to the forum 
without arms. As soon as they were assembled, Annibal harangued them in a 
discourse that was full of favour. And when the Tarentines, on their part, 
having obtained so unexpected a deliverance, received all that he said with 
loud and general applause, he then dismissed them ; commanding that each of 
them should inscribe the word Tarentine upon the door of his house; and 
forbidding them, under pain of death, to make the same inscription upon any 
house that belonged to a Roman. Having afterwards divided into several 
bands the troops that wemmost proper for this service, he sent them away to 
pillage all the houses upon which they should see no inscription ; and kept 
the rest of his forces drawn up in order, that they might be ready to support 
the first. The Carthaginians, having collected together in this pillage great 
quantities of plunder of eveiy kind, and obtained a booty that fully answered 
all their expectations, remained under their arms during that whole night. 

On the following day, Annibal, after he had held a consultation with the 
Tarentines, resolved to separate the city from the citadel by a wall, that the 
inhabitants might have nothing to dread from the sallies of the Roman gar- 
rison. He began, therefore, with first throwing up an intrenchment parallel 
to the wall and the ditch of the city. But as he well knew that the enemy 
would employ all their power to obstruct him in this design ; and judging 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 323 

likewise that nothing- was more necessary, with respect to the future time, than 
that he should strike a terror into the Romans, and inspire the Tarentines 
with confidence, he held in readiness some of the bravest of his forces. As 
soon as the work was begun, the Romans sallied out, and began the attack with 
great impetuosity aud courage. At first Annibal only skirmished, in order to 
provoke still more the ardour of the enemy. But when a sufficient number of 
them had advanced beyond the ditch, he then gave the signal to his troops, 
and fell with fury upon the Romans. The light was for some time sharp and 
obstinate; aud such as might be expected upon a narrow ground, and in a 
place that was inclosed with walls. Rut the Romans, being closely pressed, 
•were at last forced to fly. Many of them had fallen in the action ; but the 
greatest part, flying in disorder, were pushed into the ditch, and perished 
there. 

After this success, "Annibal continued the work of the intrenchment in full 
security ; and was pleased to find that the event had fully answered all his 
expectations. For as the Romans were now forced to remain quiet behiud 
their walls, and began to fear that the citadel, as well as themselves, would 
be exposed to danger ; the Tarentines, on the other hand, were so filled with 
confidence, that they were persuaded that, without any assistance from the 
Carthaginians, they should be able to defend themselves against the Romans. 
When this work was finished, at a little distance from the intrenchment, and 
on the side towards the. city, he ordered a ditch to be made, parallel to the in- 
trenchment, and to the wail of the citadel ; and, on the side of the ditch which 
was next to the city, a rampart ; which was covered also on the top with a 
palisade, and was itself almost as secure as a wall. At a moderate distance 
from this rampart, in a line with it, and on the side also that was next to the 
city, he ordered a wall likewise to be built, from the place called Sotira to the 
street that was named the Lower Street. With such fortifications the Taren- 
tines wanted not the presence of an army to secure them against the insults of 
the enemy. Annibal, therefore, leaving only a sufficient garrison, with a 
necessary guard of cavalry, went and encamped at the distance of forty stadia 
from the city, upon the banks of a river which is sometimes called Galesus, 
but most commonly Eurotas, from the river of the same name which flows 
near to the city of Sparta. For there are many appellations of this kind, both 
in the city and through the whole territory of Tarentum, which the Taren- 
tines, who are allowed to have sprung from the Spartan stock, brought with 
them from the country from which they migrated. 

By the great zeal aud diligence of the Tarentines, who were, assisted also by 
the Carthaginians in the work* the building of the wall was in a short time 
finished. Annibal then resolved to attempt to take the citadel. But when 
the necessary preparations were completed, the Romans, having received some 
succours by the sea from Metapontum, in some degree resumed their courage, 
and, making a sally in the night, destroyed all the machines and works. The 
Carthaginians, therefore, were forced to abandon that design. But as the 
■wall was now finished, Annibal assembled the Tarentines together, and told 
them that the thing of greatest importance in the present circumstances 
was, that they should render themselves masters of the sea; that, as the 
citadel commanded the entrance of the harbour, their vessels, not being able 
to sail out of the port, were altogether useless; that the Romans, on the other 
hand, would receive all necessaries by the sea in full security; and that, as. 
lon-g as theenemy should be possessed of this advantage, the liberty of the 
city must still be exposed to danger. But it* the Romans, he said, could be 
but once excluded from the means of receiving any supplies by the sea, they 
would immediately have recourse to a voluntary submission, and surrender 
the citadel. The Tarentines assented to this discourse; but were not able to- 
conceive by what way the thing now mentioned could be accomplished, unless, 
perhaps, by the arrival of a Carthaginian fleet. But this was not. to be ex« 



354- GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



pected at the present time. They knew not, therefore, nor were they able to 
conjecture, to what this discourse of Annibai could lead. And when he 
farther told them, that it was manifestly in their own power, by themselves 
alone, and without any assistance from the Carthaginians, to become masters 
of the sea, they were still more surprised, and unable to comprehend his 
meaning. 

But this geueral, having remarked that the street that was on the 
inside of the wall, and which led from the harbour to the exterior sea, might 
easily be accommodated to the purpose, had conceived the design of, trans- 
porting the vessels over this ground from the port to the southern side of the 
city. As soon then as he disclosed this project, the Tarentines not only acknow- 
ledged that the thing was practicable, but expressed also the highest admira- 
tion, and were persuaded that nothing was too difficult for the sagacity and 
courage of this great commander. Immediately, therefore, they prepared 
some carriages with wheels, and applied themselves with such alacrity, and in 
so great numbers, to the execution of this design, that the work was accom- 
plished almost as soon as it was proposed. The Tarentines, then, when they 
had thus draws their vessels over the land into the open sea, and cut off all 
supplies from the Romans, invested the citadel without any danger. Annibal, 
having left a sufficient garrison in, the city, began his march back again with, 
the army ; and, arriving on the third day in. his first camp,, continued there 
«Juriny; the remainder of the winter. 



BOOK THE NINTH. 
EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

Different kinds of history. The most useful is that which relates publie 

actions. 

These, then, are the most remarkable transactions that were included in the 
Olympiad before mentioned, and in- the course of four years complete; which, 
as we have said, is to be considered as the proper term of an Olympiad. 
These transactions we shall endeav&ur to describe in the two following books. 

I am not ignorant, indeed, that the manner in which 1 write this history has 
something in it unpieasing ; and that the uniformity of the composition must 
render it suitable to the taste and judgment of only one sort of readers. For 
all other historians, or at least the greatest part of them, employ together all 
the several branches of history, and by the means of that variety, attract many 
different persons to the reading of their works. Thus, those, for example, 
who seek only a present satisfaction, are gratified with an account of the origin 
snd descent of families. Others again, more curious and inquisitive, have a 
"pleasure in tracing the settlements of colonies, the foundations of cities, and* 
the migrations of people, as they are found in the work of Ephorus ; and the 
attention of the political reader is fixed by the recital of public actions of 
nations, citie3, and kingdoms. With regard, therefore, to myself, as I have 
confined my labours simply to these actions, and excluded every other subject 
from my work, this history, as I have said, is properly adapted only to one 
sort of men, and has nothing in it that can allure the minds of the greatest 
part of readers. The reasons that induced me to choose this branch of history 
alone, and to reject the rest, have been shewn at large in other parts of this 
work. It may not, however, be improper, for the sake of impressing them 
again more strongly upon the memory, to give a short recapitulation of them 
in this place. 

As these genealogies, then, with all the fabulous stories that attend 
them, as the establishments of colonies, the relations of people one to an- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. sis 

:-. ,.,„,-, ... i.^,..-,— . .... I II gg 

other, and the foundations of cities, have already been recounted by 'many 
writers, and in a very copious manner : the necessary consequence must be, 
that whoever at this time resumes these subjects, either must appropriate to 
himself the labours of another, which of all actions is the basest; or, not claim- 
ing them as his own, must appear to be engaged in a very useless undertak- 
ing - ; since, by his own acknowledgment, he is only busied in compiling an. 
account of those very matters, which have already been sufficiently explained* 
and transmitted to posterity by former writers. For this reason* therefore, as 
well as for many others, I have rejected all such subjects. With regard to 
actions there are two reasons, likewise, that determined me to adopt them as 
the only subject of my work. First, as action's happen in a continually new 
succession, the relation of them also must be always new ; nor is there any 
need, in composing a recital of late events, to go back to others that have al- 
ready been recounted. In the next place, this kind of history, as it has been 
in all times the most instructive, is such most eminently in the present age. 
For so great is the perfection to which all arts and sciences have been raised, 
that those who who are acquainted with them may now examine every thing; 
that happens by some certain rule. Upon these accounts, then, I have confined 
myself, as I have said, to the recital of actions only : and I am persuaded that 
those who shall read my work with due attention will be ready to bear the 
strongest testimony to the truth of these reflections. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

Annibal, having in vain endeavoured to force the Ro?nans to raise the siege of 
Capua, advances tvith the same design towards Rome, but is disappointed in 
his expectation. .. A comparison of Annibal with Epuminondas ; and of the 
Lacedaemonians with the Romans. 

Anmbal, having extended his army in a circle round the whole camp of 
Appius, at first endeavoured by light skirmishing to draw him out to au 
engagement. And when no answer was returned to this invitation, he then 
invested the camp as in a regular siege. The cavalry, advancing together in 
troops, threw their javelins with loud cries*into the very camp ; while the in- 
fantry, ranged also in just cohorts, attempted to tear away the pallisade of the 
intrenchment. The Romans, however, were not moved from their purpose 
even by these attacks; but opposed their light forces only to those who came 
near to the intrenchment ; while the heavy-armed troops, drawn up in cohorts, 
and covering them from the javelins that were thrown, remained quiet in their 
ranks. Annibal, therefore, being grieved to find that he neither could throw 
himself into the city of Capua, nor draw the Romans to an engagement, was 
at last forced to have recourse to other counsels, and to consider with himself 
what measures were most proper to be taken. 

The state, indeed, in which things now appeared might well fill the Car- 
thaginians with perplexity, since it cannot but occasion some embarrassment 
even to those who read only a relation of it. For is it not almost incredible, 
that the Romans, who had been so often defeated by the Carthaginians, that 
they dared not to engage them again in set battle, should yet refuse to retire, 
or to leave the field ? Is it not astonishing, that those very troops, who in 
former times had never left the sides of the hills, should now descend into the 
plains, and lay siege to the noblest city, in the most conspicuous part of Italy; 
while their camp also was surrounded by those very enemies whom they had 
feared to look deliberately in the face ? The Carthaginians, on the other 
nand, who had gained victory after victory without any intermission, were at 
this very time perplexed with no less difficulty than the vanquished. In my 
judgment, however, the conduct both of the one and of the other was founded 



-326 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

simply upon this opinion, which was common to them both, — that the cavalry 
of Annibal was the only cause to which the Carthaginians owed all their vic- 
tories, and the Romans their defeats. Upon this account it was, that the 
atter, immediately after every action, had been accustomed to lead their 
armies along the sides of the hills, in sight, indeed, of the enemy, but in 
places where the cavalry was not able to act against them. And with respect 
particularly to all that now passed in the neighbourhood of Capua, the same 
persuasion very clearly explains the motives that determined either army. For 
the Romans, while they refused to draw out their forces to a battle, through 
*lread of the cavalry of the enemy, at the same time remained with confidence 
in the post which they had taken, as being well assured, that this very cavalry, 
which had occasioned their defeat in every set engagement, was not able to 
snake any impression upon their carnn. The Carthaginians again considered, 
and with no less reason, that it would not be possible for them to keep their 
cavalry long together in a body. For the forage had been purposely de- 
utroyed by the Romans through all the country. Nor was it possible to 
bring from any great distance those supplies of hay and of barley which so 
large a number of horses and beasts of burden would require. And if, on the 
other hand, they should dismiss their cavalry, and remain afterwards in their 
camp, they never could attack, without manifest hazard, an enemy who was 
strongly intrenched, and against whom every engagement, not supported by 
their cavalry, must be attended with very doubtful success. They Avere ap- 
prehensive, likewise, that some new forces might arrive, and encamping close 
behind them, might involve them in the greatest difficulties by intercepting 
their supplies. Annibal, therefore, having concluded from these reasons, that 
it was not possible to draw the Romans from the siege by open force, resolved 
to attempt it in a different way. 

_ He considered with himself, that, if he could make a secret march, and ap- 
pear suddenly in the neighbourhood of Rome, either some advantage might, 
perhaps, be gained against the city, before the inhabitants should be recovered 
from the consternation into which so unexpected an event would throw them; 
or, on the other hand, that Appius would be forced to raise the siege of 
Capua, and hasten to the assistance of his country; or sending away one part 
at least of his army for that purpose, would afford the opportunity of an easv 
victory, both against the forces that should be so separated from the rest, and 
■ those also that would be left behind. Having formed then this design, he 
engaged an African to pass as a deserter into the Roman camp, and from thence 
into the city, with letters which he had taken care to secure. For he had reason 
to fear that the inhabitants, as soon as they should perceive that he was gone, 
would despair of receiving any farther succour, and surrender themselves to 
the Romans. He contrived, therefore, that these letters should be delivered 
to them on the very day following his departure: that, being acquainted with 
his purpose, they might be encouraged still to sustain the siege. 

At Rome, when the news arrived of what passed in the neighbourhood of 
Capua; and that Annibal had encamped close to the Roman army, and even 
invested them in their camp; tiie minds of all men were raised in suspense, 
and were fixed with anxiety and dread. For it seemed that the very moment 
that would decide the war was now approaching. The citizens, therefore, in 
general, and eveiy one particularly, were occupied with no other care, than 
to complete the preparations for that sidej and to send all the necessary 
succours. 

The people of Capua, when they had received the letters from the hands of 
the African, and were informed of the design of Annibal, resolved to wait the 
event, and sustain the siege. In the mean time, this general, on the fifth day 
after he had first encamped, having ordered the troops to take their supper, 
and leaving his fires lighted, decamped in the evening with so great secrecy, 
that the enemy knew not that he was gone. With continual and forced 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 327 

marches, he passed through the territory of the Samnites, taking care always 
to send some troops before, to examine the country, and to occupy the proper 
posts. And while the attention of the Romans was wholly fixed on the affairs 
of Capua, and the condition of the siege, he passed the river Anio before lie 
was discovered, and, advancing still nearer towards Rome, fixed his camp at 
the distance of no more than forty stadia from the oity. The first news of 
this approach filled all Rome with terror and confusion. For, beside that 
the event was sudden, it was most distant likewise from every expectation, 
because Annibal never had approached so near before. Add to this, that an 
opinion also immediately prevailed, that he would not even now have ven- 
tured to approach, unless the legions that were employed in the siege of 
Capua had been first defeated. The men, therefore, made haste to mount 
the walls, and to take all the advantageous poets that were without the city; 
while the women went round to the temples, offering supplications to the 
gods, and sweeping the pavements of the holy shrines with their hair. Foir 
such is the custom of this people, whenever their country is threatened with 
any great and unusual danger. 

Annibal, then, having encamped in the place that has been mentioned, had 
resolved to make an attempt against the city on the following day; when an 
accident, as fortunate as unexpected, occasioned the safety of Rome. The 
consuls, Cneus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, who had before enrolled one 
legion, had ordered the soldiers to attend at Rome with their arms upon this 
very day, to take the military oath. At this very time, likewise, they were 
employed in selecting and enroling men for another legion. Thus a great 
T>ody of troops was assembled, as it were spontaneously, in the moment that 
was requisite. The consuls, placing themselves with confidence at their head, 
went and encamped without the city, and by this measure gave an effectual 
check to the ardour of the Carthaginians. For Annibal had at first advanced, 
and was not without hopes that he should be able to take the city by storm. But 
when he saw that the Romans were drawn up in battle against him; and being 
informed also of the true state of things by a prisoner that was taken, he de- 
sisted from the- attempt ; and leading his army through the country, set fire 
to the houses and plundered all that was within his reach. The booty that 
was gained even in the first excursions was such as exceeded all account ; 
being drawn from a country, into which it never had been expected that an 
cnerny would at any time come. 

The consuls, however, were now so filled with confidence, that they bar! 
the boldness to encamp at the distance of ten stadia only from the Cartha- 
ginian army. But Annibal, having considered that his troops w- j re loaded 
with an immense booty; that he had failed in his attempt against the city ; 
and, above all, that the time was now elapsed, in which he had supposed that 
Appius, informed of the danger with which Rome was threatened, would 
cither raise the siege of Capua, or leaving there a small part only of his force?, 
would hasten with the rest to defend his country ; and that, in either case, he 
should meet him on his way with some advantage; resolved to begin his march 
back again, and decamped early in the moruing. But Publius, having before 
broken the bridges that were upon the river, so that the Carthaginians were 
obliged to ford the stream, pressed closely upon the rear of the army in their 
passage, and threw them into no small disorder. The numbers indeed of the 
Carthaginian cavalry, and the readiness of the Numidians in assisting every 
part that was attacked, prevented the action from being in any manner ge- 
neral. The Romans, however, recovered again a great part of the plunder ; 
and, having taken prisoners also about three hundred men, they then returned 
back to their camp. And being afterwards persuaded, that fear alone had deter- 
mined Annibal to make so precipitate a retreat, they followed closely aftec 
him, leading their army along the sides of the hills. 

The Carthaginian general, keeping in view his first design, for some time 



328 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



continued his march with the greatest haste. But, after five days, being in- 
formed that Appius had not left the siege, he halted till the Romans who were 
following him were come near ; and then falling suddenly upon their camp in 
the night, he killed great numbers of them, and forced the rest to fly out of 
the camp. And when the morning was come, perceiving that they had re- 
treated to a strong eminence that was near, he resolved not to attack them in 
that post ; but continued his route through Daunia and the Brutian district, 
appeared so unexpectedly in the neighbourhood of Rhegium, that he had al- 
most made himself master of the city. For all that were found in the country 
•upon his approach fell into his hands ; and, among them, many of the inha- 
bitants of Rhegium. 

Is there any one now that can withhold his admiration, or refuse the testi- 
mony that is due to the emulation and courage that were so signally displayed 
\ipon this occasion, both by the Carthaginians and the Romans ? The con- 
duct of Epaminondas, in an action not unlike to that which we have now de- 
scribed, has received the applause of all mankind. This general, arriving at 
Tegea with his allies, perceived, that the Lacedaemonians had drawn together 
all their forces, as well as those of their allies, to Mantinea, with design to offer 
battle to the Theban army. .Having ordered his troops, therefore, to take 
their supper at an early hour, he led them out in the beginning of the night, 
under the pretence of occupying certain posts that were most proper for the 
approaching battle. But when this persuasion was spread through all the 
army, he directed his march straight to Sparta, and arrived most unexpectedly 
about the third hour of the night. Finding the place destitute of all defence, 
lie penetrated as far as to the forum, and made himself master of all the parts 
of the city that were on the side of the river. But this fortune soon was 
changed; for Agesilaus, having been informed of what had happened; by ^ 
deserter who had gone in the night to Mantinea, immediately began his march, 
and arrived at Sparta, with all his forces, in the very moment when the city 
■was taken. * 

Epaminondas, therefore, being thus forced to abandon his design, ordered 
liis troops to take their repast upon the banks of the Eurotas; and, having al- 
lowed also sometime for rest, he resolved to march back again in haste by 
the same way by which he had arrived ; being persuaded that, as the whole 
Lacedaemonian army had come in haste to protect their country, Mantinea, in 
its turn, was now left without defence. And this, indeed, was the truth. He 
therefore encouraged his troops ; and, continuing his march all night with the 
greatest haste, arrived about the middle of the day in the neighbourhood of 
Mantinea, which had no force sufficient to make resistance. But it happened 
that the Athenians, who were desirous to bear a part in the intended action 
against the Thebans, arrived at this very time, with design to join the Lace- 
daemonian army. And when the advanced guard of the Thebans had just 
reached the temple of Neptune, which stood at the distance of seven stadia, 
only from Mantinea, in the same instant the Athenians, as if by concert, ap- 
peared upon the top of the hill that commanded the city. On the sight of 
these succours, the Mantineans were at last encouraged to mount the walls, 
and oppose the entrance of the Thebans. It is not without good reason, 
therefore, that historians blame these accidents; and say of Epaminondas, that 
he performed every thing that was to be expected from a skilful general ; and 
while he showed himself to be superior to his enemies, was vanquished only 
by ill fortune. 

The same reflections may be made with respect to the conduct of Annibal 
in the present instance. For when it is considered, that this general first at-! 
tempted, to raise the siege of Capua, by encamping near to the enemy, and 
attacking them in many little combats ; that, when this design had failed, he 
then marched, with the same intention, into the very neighbourhood of Rome; 
that, when accident alone had prerented the success of tins bold project, and 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 329 



forced him to return back again with his army, he still kept his attention fixed 
upon his first design, and stood ready to take advantage of any motion that 
should be made by the army that was employed id the siege ; and, lastly, 
when it is remembered, that he did not even in the end desist from his under- 
taking, till he had dispersed the Romans with great slaughter, and almost 
taken the city by surprise ; who can behold such actions, and not bestow upon 
this great commander the strongest testimony of admiration and applause ? 

With regard to the Romans, they must be allowed, indeed, to have de- 
served, upon this occasion, even a higher degree of praise than the Lacedae- 
monians, in the instance that has been mentioned. For the Lacedaemonians, 
as soon as they knew that Sparta was attacked, marched away in haste, and 
saved indeed their own city ; but suffered Man tinea, as far as it depended upon 
themselves alone, to be lost. But the Romans preserved their country ; and 
yet drew not away their army from the walls of Capua : but, remaining im- 
moveable and fixed in their first purpose, continued to press the siege with, 
the same confidence as before. 

But let it not now be imagined that my purpose, in falling into this digres- 
sion, was barely to extol the Carthaginians and the Romans, Their great ac- 
tions have already been often celebrated in the course of this work. My de« 
sign was rather, by displaying the conduct of the leaders in these two states, to 
afford a lesson to all those who may hereafter be placed at the head of affairs 
in any country ; that, when they call to their remembrance the fame of these 
commanders, and place their actions in full view before them, they may be 
led to emulate such great examples ; and be persuaded that many things, 
which appear to be beyond measure daring and full of danger, are not less safe 
in the execution than admirable in the attempt ; and that the design itself, as 
well when frustrated as when attended with success, will draw after it immortal, 
honour, if it be conducted only with ability and skill. 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

The ill policy of the Romans censured, in carrying into their own country the 
ornaments of the cities which they had conquered. 

Such then was the reason that determined the Romans to remove into their 
own country the ornaments that have been mentioned, and not to leave any 
{>art behind. Whether this resolution was right and agreeable to their in- 
terests, or the contrary, would afford room, perhaps, for much dispute. It 
seems, however, that the strongest reasons might be brought to show, that they 
acted, and still continue to act, very imprudently in this matter. If the GUI'* 
tivation, indeed, of arts like these had been the means of their first advance- 
ment to strength and power, they might then, with good reason, have trans- 
ferred into their own possession such ornaments as had been found effectual to 
promote the greatness of their country. But as in truth it was a kind of life 
that was destitute of all superfluous wealth, and manners far removed from 
elegance und splendour, which enabled them to subdue continually those very 
nations which possessed the most, as well as the most beautiful, of these ern- 
beliishments, how can it be doubted but they erred in judgment upon this oc- 
casion ? Nor are they to be blamed in this respect alone, that, when they 
were conquerors, they relinquished their own manners, and adopted the spirit 
of the conquered in exchange. There is also a certain kind of envy, which 
never fails to accompany such actions; and which, of all things, a powerful 
empire has the greatest cause to dread. For when men behold a state in 
possession of the riches that belonged to others, instead of applauding the 
good fortune, they view it, on the contrary, with secret jealousy ; and are, at 
the same time, moved by sentiments of compassion towards those who have 

TOt. I. NO, 6, 2 T 



350 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

been thus despoiled. And when, in the Farther progress of success, the' whole 
wealth of every foreign state is drawn together to one city, and the people 
themselves are invited, as it were, to take a view of that magnificence which so 
lately was their own, the evil then becomes greater than before. For the 
spectators, not actuated, as in the former instance, by compassion for the suf- 
feringb of their neighbours, are now exasperated by a sense of their own losses : 
and begin to glow, not with envy alone, but with resentment also, against those- 
whom fortune has so favoured. For the remembrance of the calamities which 
•men have felt will naturally excite their hatred against the authors of them.. 
If the Romans, indeed, had only carried away the silver and gold from the 
countries which they conquered, they would have deserved no blame. For 
they could not, in general, have held the vanquished in subjection, unless they 
had deprived them of that source of their strength, and added it to their own* 
But with respect to the riches of a different kind, it would certainly have been 
far more prudent to have suffered them to remain where they were found, to- 
gether with the envy which they inspire ; and to have established the glory of 
their own country, not by the vain ornaments of pictures and statues, but by a 
gravity of manners, and a magnanimity of conduct. But these reflections 
are sufficient. They may serve, perhaps, as instruction at least to future con- 
querors, not to strip the cities which they subdue ;. nor to think it possible that 
the calamities of other nations can .ever become the ornament of thttir owa 
countries. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

A digression, concerning the proper manner of conducting any enterprise-*. 

What things are necessary to be known by the cofnmander of an army. The 

application and use of astronomy and geometry. Examples of generals who 

failed in their attempts, from being unacquainted ivith the principles of those 

sciences. A censure of same common errors, arising from the same defect* 



CHAP. L 

I> the affairs of war, much consideration is, indeed, required, to guard against 
the accidents that may arise in the course of such an undertaking. And yet, 
in every project there is good reason to expect success, if the means of carry- 
in 0- it into execution be conducted only with sound sense and judgment. 

if we examine then the accounts of former wars, it will be very obvious to 
perceive, that those actions which are accomplished openly and by force alone 
are much less frequent than those that are concerted with some stratagem, and 
upon some occasion that is offered. From the same view likewise it will be no 
less evident that, among these last, the number of those that fail is greater 
than of those that are attended with success ; and that the want also of suc- 
cess, upon such occasions, is almost always to be ascribed to the ignorance or 
the negligence of the commanders, cannot reasonably be doubted^ I shall en- 
deavour, therefore, to point out the proper method of conducting enterprises 
of this sort; nottakinginto the consideration things that happen without foresight 
or intention, which deserve the name of chance or accident, rather than »f 
actions, and which are in their nature too unsettled to be fixed by any rule , 
but confining myself wholly to those actions which are undertaken with some 
certain purpose and design. 

Every action, then, of the kind here mentioned, must have a determinate 
point of time ; a certain portion of time ; and a certain place. It requires also 
secrecy; certain persons, through whom, and by whom, it rriust^be accom- 
plished ; and, lastly, a certain manner of carrying it into execution. When a 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 331 

commander has formed his measures right with respect to all these circum- 
stances, it is manifest that his attempt will be attended with success. But, on 
the other hand, the neglect of any one of these will most assuredly defeat the 
whole design. For such is the nature of all concerted enterprises ; a failure 
It) any single part, however inconsiderable, shall have force to overthrow them ; 
v»hile all the measures together scarcely are sufficient to conduct an under- 
taking to its destined end. It is clearly, therefore, a matter of the last im- 
portance, not to leave any thing neglected upon such occasions. 

Now, of all the precautions that have been mentioned, the first to which a 
■commander should attend is that of observing secrecy; thai neither the joy 
which springs from an unexpected prospect of success, nor yet the dread of a 
miscarriage ; that neither friendship nor affection may prevail upon him to 
communicate his design to any persons, except those alone without whose as- 
sistance it cannot be carried into execution ; and not even to these, till the time 
as which their services are severally required obliges him to disclose it. Nor is 
it necessary only that the tongue be silent ; but much more, that the mind also 
make not any discovery. For it has often happened that men, who have 
carefully restrained themselves from speaking, have sometimes, by their coun- 
tenance alone, ana sometimes by their actions, very clearly manifested their 
designs. A second thing to be considered is the different routes, either by ' 
day or by night, and the manner of performing them, both upon land and sea. 
The third, and, indeed, the greatest object is, to know the differences of the 
times that depend upon the heavens ; and to be able to accommodate them 
to the execution of any design* Nor is the manner of executing any enter- 
prise to be regarded as a point of small importance: for this alone has often 
made things practicable which appeared impossible, and ordered others im- 
practicable, which were easy to be performed. In the last place, great atten- 
tion should be paid to signals and countersignals ; as well as to the choice of 
the persons through whose means, and with whose assistance, the undertaking 
is to be accomplished. 

The knowledge that is requisite in the things now mentioned is to be ac- 
quired, partly by experience, partly by inquiry, and partly by the rules of 
science. With respect to the several routes ; the place that is the object of 
the march; the nature of that place ; and the persons fit to be employed in 
the execution of the enterprise, it is best, indeed, when a commander is him- 
self acquainted with these things from his own proper knowledge. But it it 
be otherwise, his duty then is, to wse the greatest care in his inquiries ; not 
trusting rashly to any information that is offered ; nor following any guides, 
without leaving behind him some pledges of thefr fidelity. In these things, 
then, and in others similar to these, a general may obtain sufficient light, by 
consulting that experience which is gained in armies; by employing his own 
industry ; and by making the necessary inquiries. But there are others that 
demand skill and knowledge, and some acquaintance with the rules of theo- 
retical science, especially with those of astronomy and geometry. For with- 
out having recourse to the more difficult branches of these two sciences, there 
are certain parts of them, which, though they require but little labour, are of 
the greatest use upon such occasions, and serve principally to promote the. 
success of all such enterprises as have here been mentioned. 
. Among the things that are to be learned in this method, one of the most 
necessary is the investigation of the theory of the days and nights. If, indeed, 
the days and the nights were at all times equal, there would be no need of 
study, in order to acquire a knowledge which would, in that case, be com- 
mon and obvious to all. But since they are different, not only each from the 
other, but also from themselves, it is plainly a matter of great importance to 
know the Jaws by which they are severally diminished or increased. For, un- 
less he be acquainted with these differences, how 6hall a commander be able to 
measure with exactness the time of a concerted march, either by night or by 



332 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 

day ? How can he be assured, without this knowledge, that he shall not either 
arrive too early, or too late ? It happens also upon such occasions, and, indeed, 
upon such alone, that the first of these mistakes is more dangerous than the 
other : for he who arrives too iate is only forced to abandon his design. Per- 
ceiving his error, while he is yet at a distance, he may return back again with 
safety. But he who comes before the appointed time, being discovered by 
the enemy upon his approach, not onty faiis in the intended enterprise, but is 
in danger also of suffering an entire defeat. It is time, indeed, which gene- 
rally governs in all human actions ; and most particularly in the affairs of war. 
A commander, therefore, should be perfectly acquainted with the time of the 
summer and the winter solstice ; the equinoxes ; and the different degrees of 
the diminution or increase of the nights and days, as they fall between the 
equinoxial points. For this is the only method that can enable him to adjust 
Ins motions to the course of time, either by land or sea. 

Nor is it less necessry that a commander should also know distinctly the 
several portions of the day and of the night ; in order to determine the proper 
hour of rising, and of putting the troops in march. For without beginning 
well, it is not possible to obtain a happy end. Now the time of day may 
easily be known ;< by the shadow from the sun ; by the course which the sun 
takes ; and by the different degrees of his elevation above the earth. But it 
is not so easy to distinguish the time of night ; unless to those who are versed 
in the doctrine of the sphere ; and are able to follow the course of the twelve 
signs, and to mark their disposition in the heavens. With this knowledge, it 
is a matter of no difficulty. For, though the nights are unequal, yet, since in 
the course of every night, six of the signs are raised above the horizon, It ne- 
cessarily follows, that, at the same times of the night, equal parts of the twelve 
signs must always appear. When it is known, then, what part of the zodiac 
the sun occupies in the day, nothing more is requisite than, at the time of his 
setting, to draw a line diametrically through the circle. When this is done, 
as much as the zodiac shall afterwards rise above the horizon, so much also of 
the night will have passed. And if the number only,"and the magnitude of 
the signs lie known, the different parts of the night will be also known. 

When the nights are cloudy, recourse must be had to the moon. For this 
planet is of such a magnitude, that, in whatever part of the heavens it may 
happen to be, the light, of it may always be discerned. It is sometimes from 
the timejaud place of its rising, and sometimes from those of its setting, that 
the hours of tht* night are to be computed. But it will first be requisite to 
know with exactness the different times of its rising upon each several day. 
Nor is this knowledge difficult to be obtained : for, as the course of the vnoou 
is completed in a single month, the right apprehension of its progress, in that 
period, will serve equally in all the rest. 

Upon these principles, it may be observed how well the poet deserves our 
praise, when he represents Ulysses, who possessed all the qualities of a great 
commander, forming conjectures from the appearances of the heavens, not 
only concerning the course of navigation, but with respect also to actions upon 
land. For even those sudden and unexpected events, by which Mrhh fre- 
quently are thrown into the greatest difficulties, may, by this method, be ap- 
prehended with exactness before they happen. Such are violent rains and in- 
undations ; the fall of snows ; a black and clouded air; and other similar ac- 
cidents. If we are, tlierefore, negligent with respect even to things of this 
kind, which are possible to be foreseen, must we not fail, through our own 
fault alone, in almost every thing that we attempt? But, indeed, there is 
scarcely, one of all those precautions, which have been before recited, that can, 
•with safety, be neglected ; if we would avoid falling into those absurdities of 
conduct into which many others are reported to have fallen. I shall here 
mention some of them as examples. 

A rat us, the Achaean proctor, having resolved to attempt to take Cynsetha by 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 385 



surprise, concerted the following- plan with the citizens that were engaged in 
the design. That, on a certain day, having before advanced silently in the 
night, he should take his post near to the river that ran down from the city, 
snd fur some time remain quiet with his army. That, about the middle of the 
day, the citizens, when all things were prepared, should secretly send out one 
of their number, dressed in a mantle, who should take his stand upon a certain 
tomb that was without the city. That the rest should then attack the guards 
of the gate ; who, according to their custom, would be sleeping at that hour ; 
and that Aratus, in this very moment, should rise from his concealment, and 
advance with haste towards the gate. The matter being thus .regulated, 
Aratus came at the appointed time, and, having stationed his troops in secret 
along the river, waited for the signal. It happened that one of the inhabitants, 
who was the master of some of those delicate sheep that were usually pastured 
near to the city, having occasion to give some sudden orders that concerned 
them, came out at the gate, about an hour before the middle of the day, 
dressed in a mantle ; and, standing upon the very tomb that had been 
named, looked round the country in search of his shepherd. Aratus, being 
persuaded that this was the signal that had been concerted, advanced in haste 
towards the gate. But the gate was immediately shut by the guards ; for 
things were not yet ready within the city. Thus this general not only failed 
in his attempt, but brought destruction also upon the citizens that were en- 
gaged in the design. For being now discovered, they all lost their lives in 
torture. What now was the cause of this misfortune ? It was only that Ara- 
tus, who was at this time extremely young, and not acquainted with the sin- 
gular advantage of double and respondent signals, was satisfied with having 
concerted a single signal. So slight is the difference upon which the good or 
ill success of any military enterprise depends. 

In the same manner also, Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, when he had re- 
solved to make an attempt of this kind upon Megalopolis, agreed with some 
of the garrison, who were to be stationed upon that part of the wall that was 
called Colaeum, that he would come with his forces in the night, about the 
time of the third watch- For this was the hour in which these men were ap- 
pointed to take the guard. But not having before considered, that at the 
time of the rising of the Pleiades the nights were extremely short, he did not 
begin his march from Lacedsemon till about the setting of the sun. It was 
therefore full day before he arrived at the destined place. He had the rash- 
ness, however, to attempt to storm the city, but was repulsed with disgrace 
and loss, and was even in danger af suffering an entire defeat ; whereas, on 
the other hand, if he had only been exact in the computation of his time, hi» 
friends might have secured his entrance into the city, and the design have 
been attended with success. 

Thus again king Philip, when he attempted to take Melite in the manner 
that has before been mentioned, was guilty of a double error. For not only 
the ladders which he carried were too short, but be failed also with respect to 
the time. Instead of coming to the place in the middle of the night, as it had 
been concerted, when the people would have been all fast in sleep, he began 
his march from Larissa at an early hour ; and, having entered the territory of 
the Melitaeans, as it was neither safe for him to halt, lest the enemy should 
gain notice of his approach, nor possible to return back again without being 
perceived, he was compelled by necessity to advance, and arrived at the city 
before the inhabitants were yet gone to rest. But as he could not scale the 
walls, because the ladders were not proportioned to the height, so neither wa» 
he able to enter through the gate, because the time of the attack prevented his 
friends that were within the city from favouring his entrance. At last, 
therefore, having only provoked the rage of the inhabitants, and lost 
snany of his men, he sv-as forced to return back without stccoaiplibhing his'pur- 



334 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 

pose; and instructed all mankind, for the time to come, to be suspicious of 
his designs, and to set themselves on their guard against him. 

Another example occurs in the example or' I\icias, the Athenian. This 
general, having found a fair occasion for withdrawing his army from the siege 
of Syracuse, made choice of the proper time of night, and had retreated to a 
safe distance undiscovered by the enemy, when it happened that the moon 
was suddenly eclipsed. Being struck by this event, and vainly imagining 
that it portended some misfortune, he immediately suspended his march. |The 
consequence was, that when he designed to continue his retreat on the following 
night, the Syracusans, having now gained notice of his motions, fell upon him 
as he marched, and rendered themselves masters both of the army and of all the 
leaders. And yet, if he only had inquired of men that were acquainted with 
these matters, he might not only not have lost his own proper time, but have 
rendered the accident itself subservient to his purpose, on account of the igno- 
rance of the enemy. For the ignorance of others is the surest way for con- 
•ducting skilful men to the accomplishment of their designs. It is manifest, 
then, that so much of astronomy should be acquired as may be necessary upon 
such occasions. 

With regard to the measure of ladders, the method of determining it is this*. 
If the height of the waifs be known, by the means of some communication with 
those that are in the city, the proportion of the ladders is then most easy to be 
ascertained. For if the walls, for example, contain ten certain parts of any 
measure in height, the height of the ladders must include at the least twelve 
such parts. The distance of the foot of the ladders from the walls should be 
equal to one half of their height. For this is the most just proportion with 
respect tc the men that are to mount upon them. If the distance be greater, 
the ladders will too easily be broken under the weight. If less, they will then 
«je so erect, that the soldiers, as they ascend, must be continually in danger of 
falling headlong down. If the walls are not to be approached, and the mea-, 
sure of them is unknown, the height of any body that stands perpendicularly 
upon a plane surface may be taken at a distance.. The method of doing this 
is not only practicable but easy for those who are acquainted with the ma.* 
^hematics. 

And thus again, it is evident, that, in order to obtain success in military 
operations, the study of geometry will be also requisite; not, indeed, in its 
whole extent, but so far as teaches to investigate the the theory of relations 
and proportions. For it is not only in measuring the height of walls that this 
science is so necessary, but in changing also the figure of a camp as occasions 
may require. By this method it is that a general is enabled, sometimes, taking 
every kind of figure, to keep still the same proportion between the several 
parts that are contained within the camp ; and sometimes, retaining the same 
figure, to vary the proportion of the parts according to the number ofthosa 
that enter, or that depart from the camp. But these matters have already 
been treated by us at large in our discourse on the orders of battle. 

It will not, 1 think, be objected to me by any reasonable man, that I require 
too much, in making astronomy and geometry a necessary part of study for 
the general of an army. To join, indeed, to auy profession, those foreign and 
superfluous acquisitions which only serve to furnish matter of ostentation and 
idle talk is a labour which I entirely disapprove. But as much as I condemn, 
such unnecessary diligence, so much, on the other hand, must I contend for 
the necessity of drawing from a distant source some knowledge of those thing* 
which are of constant and notorious use, For is it not absurd that persons 
who profess the arts of dancing and music should submit to be instructed in 
the theory of measure and of harmony, and even to be trained in the gym* 
nastic exercises ; because these are all considered as the necessary means of 
obtaining perfection in their respective. arts; and that those who aspire to the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 3S5 

command of armies should be displeased to find, that an acquaintance in some 
degree with other sciences is necessary in their profession ? Shall the men> 
that exercise illiberal arts exert greater pains, and shew a stronger emulation 
to excel, than those who are ambitious to obtain distinction in the noblest and 
most splendid of all employments ? There is no man of sense that will avow 
»uch sentiments. But enoug.li has been said upon this subject. 



CHAP. II. 

The greatest part of men form their opinion of the size of a camp, or of 8 
city, only from the circumference. When they are told, therefore, that Me- 
galopolis contains in circumference fifty stadia, and Laeedaemon no more than 
forty-eight, and yet that this last city is twice as large as the former, they 
know not how to believe it. And if any one, designing to increase the sur- 
prise, should affirm that it is possible that a city or a camp, which contain* 
only forty stadia in circumference, may be twice as large as another that con- 
tains a hundred stadia, they are struck with the greatest astonishment. The 
cause of this surprise is, that men forget those principles of geometry which 
they learned in their youth. And I was the rather inclined to take some 
notice of these matters, because not the vulgar alone, but some even of those 
who are employed in the administration of states, or placed at the head of 
armies, are sometimes astonished, and not able to conceive, that Lacedsemon 
i« u much greater city than Megalopolis, though it be less in its circumference % 
smd again, in the same manner likewise are persuaded, that, by only viewing 
the circumference of a camp, they can easily determine the number of the 
troops which it contains. There is also another error in judging of cities, not 
unlike to that which has been mentioned. Many men imagine, that an un- 
equal and hilly ground will contain more houses than a ground that is flat and 
level. This, however, is not the truth . For tke hou-ses, being raised in a per- 
pendicular line, form right angles, not with the declivity of the ground, but 
with the flat surface which lies below, and upon which the hills themselves also* 
stand. This also may be learned from the very first elements of science. Sup- 
pose a number of houses to be so built apon the sides of a hill, as to rise to an 
equal height ; it is manifest that the roofs of all them together will form a sur- 
face exactly parallel and equal to the surface of the ground which lies under 
the foundations of the houses and the hill. Let this then serve as a lesson tp> 
those persons, who, though they are so ignorant as not to conceive how these 
things can be, are desirous of commanding armies, and of presiding in th* 
government of states. 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH, 

Agrigentum in Sicily described. 

Agrigentum excels almost all other cities not only in the advantages that 
have beea mentioned, but in strength likewise, and especially in ornament and 
beauty. Situated at the distance of only eighteen stadia from the sea, it pos- 
sesses all the conveniences which the sea procures. The whole circuit of the 
city is rendered uncommonly strong both by nature and art. For the walls 
are built upon a rock, which partly by nature, and partly from the labour of 
art, is very steep and broken. It is surrounded also by rivers on different 
sides. On the side towards the sonth, by a river of the same name as the city ; 
and on the west and south-west, by that which is called the Hypsas. Th® 
citadel, which stands upon a hill on the north-east side, is secured all round 
the outside by a deep and inaccessible valley, and lias one way only by which. 



336 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 



ijii H miwrfi ii. il j l.i_ 



it may be entered from the city. On the summit of the hill is a temple dedi~ 
cated to Minerva, and another to Jupiter A tabyrius, as at Rhodes. For as 
the Agrigentines were a colony from Rhodes, they gave to this deity, not im- 
properly, the same appellation by which he was distinguished in the island 
from which they came, The city also itself, which is, indeed, in all respect* 
magnificent, is adorned with porticoes and with temples. Among these, th«? 
temple of Jupiter Olyinpius, though not finished, indeed, with so great 
splendour, is equal in size and in design to any of the temples of Greece. 



EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 

The discourse of Cklmiens, ambassador from the JEtoJians to the JLaeedee- 
monians ; in which he inveighs against the conduct of the kings of Macedon. 
He is answered by Lyciscus, ambassador from the Acarnanians : ivho de- 
fends the Macedonians, and warns the assembly of the fatal consequences of 
bringing the Romans into Greece. 



CHAP. I. 

* * * "Now, that the kings of Macedon have from the first been enemies t& 
the liberties of Greece, there is no man, O Lacedaemonians, that will have the 
boldness to deny. Let me enter, however, into the proof of" this fact. Among 
the various colonies of Greeks that migrated from Athens and from Chalcis, 
that of Olynthus was the first, both in consideration and in power. Philip, 
having subdued this city, ordered the inhabitants to be .sold ; and, by the 
terror of that example, not only obtained possession of all the other cities of 
Thrace, but forced Thessaly also to receive his yoke. Some time afterwards, 
vhen he had defeated the Athenians in battle, he displayed, indeed, great 
generosity after his victory ; n<ft from any desire of shewing kindness to the 
vanquished, for that was far from his intentions, but that others might be 
induced by such an instance of his clemency to submit themselves voluntarily 
to his commands. At that time, however, the power of your republic was so 
great, that it seemed probable that at some convenient season you would not 
fail to place yourselves at the head of all the states of Greece. He seized 
every occasion, therefore, of declaring war against you. He invaded your 
country with his armies ; he wasted your lands, and destroyed your houses ; 
and, at last, having torn both cities and whole provinces from your dominion, 
he bestowed one part of the spoil upon the Argians, gave another to the Te- 
geans and the Megalopolitans, and another- to the Messenians ; and showed a 
willingness to gratify all mankind, if he could only do it with your loss. From 
him Alexander received the sovereignty. This prince again, being per- 
suaded that, as long as Thebes remained, some little ray of hope might be 
still left to Greece, destroyed that city in the manner which, is known to all. 
There is no need that I should enter into, a particular detail of the conduct 
which his successors have held with respect to Greece. For no man is so little 
versed in the transactions of his country as not to have heard, that when Anti- 
pater had gained a complete victory in the Lamian war, he treated the Athe- 
nians, as well as the rest of the Greeks, with the greatest insult and indignity. 
For to such excess did he carry his oppression and injustice, that he ap- 
pointed persons to hunt out \he exiles ; and to destroy in every city all those 
that had opposed his party, or were upon any account obnoxious to the house 
of Macedon. And thus, many of those unhappy men, taken away by violence 
from the temples, and torn even from the altars, lost their lives in torture ; 
while others were compelled to fly, and found no safety for themselves in any 
part of Greece. iEtolia alone afforded to uoxae of them a place of refuge. 



GENERAL HISTORY Of POLYBIUS. S37 



The actions of Cassander and Demetrius, and those of Antigonus Gonatas, 
are still recent in the memory of all. Under these princes garrisons were es- 
tablished, and tyrants supported in every place. Not a single city was ex- 
empted from the name of servitude. But let me now pass on to that last ac- 
tion of Antigonus, which, while it is viewed without suspicion, may lead some 
of you, perhaps, to think that you owe an obligation to the Macedonians. 
Was it then to save the Achaean states that this prince took arms against you 
in the Social war? Or was it to free the Lacedaemonians from the tyranny of* 
Cleomenes ? By no means, surely : it would be too great simplicity to sup- 
pose it. But he foresaw that, if you ever should obtain the supreme com- 
mand ir? Peloponnesus, his own kingdom would be exposed to danger. He had. 
remarked also the great talents of Cleomenes ; as well as the success with 
which fortune seemed to favour your designs. It was fear, therefore, on the 
one hand, and jealousy on the other, that urged him to enter Peloponnesus 
with an army ; not to succour the inhabitants of that country, but to destroy 
T»ur expectations, and to humble your growing power. If the Macedonians* 
therefore, when they were masters of your city, did not suffer it to be pillaged, 
yet you ought not so much to love them on account of that kindness, as you 
ought to hate, and to consider them as your enemies, because they have been* 
upon many occasions, the only obstacle that prevented you from obtaining the 
sovereignty of Greece. With respect to the profligacy of the present Philip* 
this also is too notorious to need any long discussion. The ravages which he 
committed in the temple of Thermum are a sufficient proof of his impiety 
towards the gods ; and his perfidious treatment of the Messeniaus, his allies, au 
example no less evident of the cruelty of his disposition with respect to men* 
Now the iEtolians alone, of all the Greeks, had the courage openly to defy 
Antipater, and afford a refuge to those who had been rendered miserable by 
his injustice. The iEtolians alone opposed the invasion of Brennus and the 
barbarous Gauls. And, lastly, they alone, of all whom you invited, were 
willing to assist you with their arms, in recovering again that supreme do* 
minion which your ancestors had held over the rest of Greece* But enough 
has been said upon this subject. With regard to the present deliberation* 
your votes, indeed, and your decrees, must import a declaration of war. And 
yet it is by no means probable that a war will be the consequence. For it ia 
not to be supposed that the Achseans, weakened as they are by former losses^ 
will attempt to invade your territory ; but rather, that they will esteem it as a 
favour from the gods, if, when they find themselves surrounded on every side 
by the Eleans and Messeniaus, our allies, as well as by our armies, they may be 
able to preserve their own. I am persuaded, likewise* that the ardoutf 
of Philip will be at last abated, wh«n the .iEtolians shall attack him upon 
land, and the Romans and king Afctdus upon the sea. It i^; easy, indeed, 
to conjecture what will happen, from that which has already been experienced* 
For if this prince, when the iEtolians only were his enemies, was never able to 
• ubdue them, how is it to be imagined that he can maintain a war, in which so 
many different powers are combined against him ? 

" Thus, then, have I endeavoured to show, that, even if you had not been 
bound by any treaty, and the matter had been still entire, you ought rather to 
join your arms with the iEtolions, than with the Macedonians. Brit since, in 
fact, you already are engaged, and have determined on the part that you 
would take, what room is there left for any more debate ? If, indeed, the 
treaty which now subsists between you and us had ben earlier than the kind- 
ness that was shown towards you by Antigonus, there might then, perhaps, 
have been some pretence to doubt whether, in favour of more recent benefits, 
you ought not to overlook, in some degree, your former obligations. But if, 
after you had received this so much boaited liberty and safety, these benefits, 
with which you are continually reproached, you assembled your council to de* 
liberate, whether you should enter into an alliance with the iEtolians or the 

vol. i. wo. 6. 2 v 



33 s GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

Macedonians ; if, after frequent consultation, you gave the preference to the 
former ; if you confirmed your alliance with them by exchanging mutual 
pledges of fidelity ; and even assisted them with your forces in the late war 
against the Macedonians, what reasonable doubt can now remain ? By these 
transactions, your obligations to Antigonus and to Philip all were cancelled. 
It should, therefore, now be shown that, since that period, you either have re- 
ceived some injury from the jEtolians, or some new favour from the Macedo- 
nians. But since neither of these can be pretended, what, folly is it to sup- 
pose, that, in violation of oaths and treaties, the very strongest bands that 
unite mankind, you will now become confederates with a people, whose al- 
liance you before rejected with justice, even when you might have embraced 
it without reproach." 

Here Chleeneas ended his harangue, which seemed not easy to be refuted. 
Lyciscus, the ambassador of the Acarnanians, then came forwards in the as- 
sembly. For some time he paused ; observing, that the people were dis- 
coursing together on what they had heard. But, as soon as they were silent, 
he began in the following manner : 



CHAP. II. 

H I am sent to you, Lacedaemonians, by the states of Arcarnania, on the part 
of that republic. But as we have been almost always joined together with 
the Macedonians in the same common hopes, we consider this embassy also as 
common both to them and to ourselves. For as, in the time of war, the su- 
perior strength and greatness of the Macedonian power has made our state to 
be dependent on the prowess of their arms ; so, in the business of negotiation, 
likewise, the interests of the Acarnanians are, by consequence, included in 
the Macedonian rights. You will not, therefore, think it strange, if a great 
part of my discourse should be employed on Philip and the Macedonians. 

" Chlaeneas, then, in the conclusion of his harangue, very shortly stated the 
nature of your present obligations. ' If,' said he, ' since the time wfeen you 
entered into treaty with the iEtolians, you had either suffered any injury or in- 
sult from that people, or received any new kindness from the Macedonians, 
this matter wonld then, perhaps, have remained entire for your deliberation. 
But as nothing of that kind has happened, it is the very height of folly in us 
to believe that, by alledging only those old benefits which you had before ex- 
perienced from Antigonus, we can prevail upon you to violate oaths and trea- 
ties. For my part, indeed, I am ready to confess that, if nothing new had 
happened, and if the affairs of Greece had remained still in the condition in 
which they stood when you concluded your alliance with the iEtolians, there 
wonld be great weakness in the attempt; and all that I am prepared to say would 
be impertinent and vain. But if things are now in a different state, as I shall 
show in the progress of this discourse, you will then, I doubt not, be con- 
vinced that I am able to point out to you your true interest, and that Chlseneaa 
is unacquainted with it. For the sole design and purposse of this embassy is to 
demonstrate to you, if it be possible, from a view of the dangers with which 
Greece is threatened, that the part most suitable and advantageous, the part 
most honourable and most worthy for you to take, is to join yourselves now 
with us in the same common hopes : or, if that cannot be obtained, at least to 
remain quiet during these disputes. But, since those who oppose us have 
dared to load the house of Macedon with various accusations from the earliest 
time, I must also first look backwards, and endeavour to remove the false 
persuasion of those persons, who may have yielded an implicit credit to all 
that they have heard. 

" It was asserted then, by Chlseneas, that Philip, the son of Amyntas, bav- 
in"- rendered himself master ofQlynthus, took occasion, from that success, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 333 



to reduce all Thessaly beneath his yoke. But I, on the contrary, affirm, that 
not the people of Thessaly alone, but all the rest of the Greeks were indebted 
to Philip for their safety. For when Onomarchus and Philomelus had taken 
Delphi, and seized, with sacreligious violence, all the treasures of the god, 
who does not know that their power appeared so formidable, that not a single 
state had the courage to stand before them ; and that it was even feared, that 
this impious outrage would be soon followed also by the conquest of all 
Greece ? At this time it was, that Philip offered himself uncalled ; destroyed 
the tyrants ; secured the temple against future insults ; and preserved the Gre- 
cian liberty. That this is the truth, the fact that followed will serve as a tes- 
timony to all posterity. For the Greeks, not regarding him as the oppressor 
of Thessaly, as Chleeneas had the confidence to affirm, but as the benefactor 
of all Greece, conferred an houour upon him which had no example, and 
with one voice declared him general of their armies, both by land and sea. But 
Philip also invaded the Lacedaemonian territory with an army. Yet you all 
know, that it was not with any purpose of his own that he took this measure. 
But, having been invited, and often called upon by name, by his allies and 
friends in Peloponnesus, he at last consented to it with reluctance. And what 
■was his conduct, Chlseneas, after he arrived ? Instead of complying with the 
desires, instead of gratifying the resentments of the neighbouring states, by 
wasting the lands, and humbling the power of Sparta, he forced his allies, as 
well as his enemies, to embrace such measures as the common interest re- 
quired, and to submit their several pretensions to a fair discussion. * Nor did 
he even assume to himself the right of judging in their disputes ; but referred 
them all to the decision of the general states of Greece. How proper a sub- 
ject is this for censure. Thus again, you have loaded Alexander with re- 
proaches, because he inflicted that punishment upon the Thebans, which their 
ill conduct seemed to have deserved, but have passed over in silence, in what 
manner he revenged the injuries with which the Persians had insulted Greece ; 
and that he delivered you all from the greatest evils, by conquering those bar- 
barianSj and by taking from them the riches which they had employed to cor- 
rupt the Greeks, and to set one state in war against another ; sometimes the 
Athenians against the ancestors of these very Lacedaemonians, and sometimes 
against the Thebans ; and,in a word, that he reduced all Asia beneatn the Gre- 
cian yoke. And how is it that you liave the confidence to mention likewise 
the succeeding princes; who, as conjunctures varied, have been the authors, 
indeed, of evil, as well as of good, to different people? But, whatever resent- 
ment may be allowed upon this account to others, it never can be borne that 
you, the iEtolians, should, of all men, be suffered to complain ; you, by whom 
so many have been injured, and who never have been the occasion of good to 
any. For who were those that invited Antigonus, the son of Demetrius, to 
assist them in dissolving the confederacy of the Achsean states? Who en- 
tered into treaty with Alexander of Epirus, to share with him the cities of 
Acarnania, and to sell the inhabitants as slaves? Was it not you. ? Who ever 
placed at the head of their armies such generals as your nation has employed ? 
men, who dared to plunder even those sacred temples which have always been 
esteemed to be most secure from violence. Such was Timaeus, who pillaged 
the temple of Neptune at Teenarum, and that of Diana at Lussi. Such were 
Pharycus and Pplicritus ; the first of whom spoiled the temple of Juno at 
Argos, and the other that of Neptune in Mantinea. Such also were Latta- 
bus and Nicostratus, who, with a perfidy equal to that of Gauls or Scy- 
thians, attacked the Bcetians in the midst of peace, when they were met to- 
gether in their general assembly. Have the successors of Alexander ever com- 
mitted outrages like these ? Being conscious, therefore, that such actions can 
neither be defended nor excused, you now pretend to boast, that you with- 
stood the irruption of the Gauls at Delphi, and were the means of preserving 
Greeee. But if the Greeks owe any thing to the iEtolians, on account ©f that 



340 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



sin°le service, how greatly must they be indebted to the Macedonians, who 
employ continually their whole life and strength, in securing them against the 
efforts of barbarous nations ? For who does not know that Greece would be 
exposed to perpetual danger, if the zeal of the Macedonian kings, and the 
bulwark of their empire, were not our protection. Let me mention only one 
single instance, When the Gauls, after they had defeated Ptolemy, sur« 
named Ceraunus, had no longer any cause to dread the Macedonians, they 
despised all other powers, and immediately led their army, with Brennus at 
their head, into the very midst of Greece. The same misfortune must fre- 
quently have happened, if the Macedonians had not, in all times, been the 
barrier of this country, Much more might be urged concerning the trans- 
actions of those ancient times • but this that I have said may be sufficient. 
You object impiety to the second Philip, because he destroyed a single 
temple, but make no mention of the sacrilegious violence which yourselves 
had exercised against the holy shrines in Dium and Dodona, and against the 
edifices of the gods. And yet this should have been first recounted. But 
you, reciting only your own sufferings, and exaggerating them far beyond the 
bounds of truth, pass over in silence those much greater evils which you had 
before inflicted upon others ; as well knowing that, in the judgment of man- 
kind, all subsequent injuries are with reason ascribed to those who set the first 
example of outrage and iujustice. With respect to the conduct of Antigonus, 
I shall so far only mention it, that I may not appear to think too lightly of 
what was then transacted, or to set too small a value upon so great a service. 
A greater, indeed, is scarcely to be found in history. It was, in a word, an ac- 
tion that ean never be surpassed. For consider it, Lacedaemonians, as it hap- 
pened. Antigonus was engaged in a war against you. He defeated your 
army in a set battle. Your city and all your territory were wholly in his 
power. It might then have been expected that he would have used all the 
Tights of conquest. For, sq far was he from employing against you any act of 
hardship or oppression, that on the contrary, beside other benefits, he drove 
out your tyrant, and restored again those laws, and that form of government, 
which your ancestors had established. In return for this great kindness, 
yourselves also publicly proclaimed him your benefactor and your preserver, 
in the presence of all the states of Greece, What then, O Lacedaemonians, 
should have been your conduct after such an action ? Suffer me, I entreat 
you, to speak my sentiments with freedom ; not for the sake of loading you 
with any unseasonable reproach ; but because the present conjuncture obliges 
me to declare what the common interest requires. What is it then that I must 
$ay ? That, even in the former war, the Macedonians, and not the iEtolians, 
■were the people with whom you should have joined your arms ; and that now 
again, when you are invited, your alliance should be made with Philip, and 
not with the iEtolians. But this, it will be said, would be a violation of the 
faith of treaties. Which, thpn, is the greatest crime ? to pay no regard to a 
convention which you concluded privately with the iEtolians, or to transgress 
a treaty that was ratified in the presence of all the Greeks ; was inscribed upon 
a column, and cqnsecrated with religious rites ? And how is it that you are 
more afraid of slighting a peoplefrom wht>m you have received no benefit, than of 
being wanting in respect to Philip and the Macedonians, to whose favour you 
are indebted even for the power of holding this assembly ? Can you think 
it necessary that you should satisfy your engagements with your friend*, and 
not rather that you should discharge yoivr obligations, tp those who have pre- 
served you ? To observe a written treaty is certainly an action not so pious, 
as it is impious to take arms against those who ha\e saved you from destruc- 
tion. Yet this is what the iEtolians now solicit you to do. But I shall add 
no more upon this head. What I have already urged may be thought, per- 
haps, by those who judge according to their prejudices, to be too distant from 
the present subject, 1 return, therefore, tp the principles that were first 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 341 

assumed ; and to that which themselves acknowledge to be the chief point in 
this debate, that, if the affairs of Greece remain still in the same condition in 
which they stood when you concluded your alliance with the iEtolians, you 
ought to consider yourselves as bound by those engagements. But if, on the 
contrary, the state of things be entirely changed, you may then, with justice, 
deliberate freely on the part which you are now pressed to take. I ask you 
then, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were then your allies, when you prevailed 
on the Lacedaemonians to act in conjunction with you ? Were they not all 
Greeks ? And with whom are you at this time joined ? And into what con- 
federacy do you now invite this people ? Is it not into a confederacy with bar- 
barians ? Is the condition, then, of your affairs the same as before ? Is it not 
entirely the reverse ? At that time, you contended only for the honour of ob- 
taining the supreme command in Greece, against others of the same race and 
country ; the Achseans, and the Macedonians, with Philip at their head. But 
the end and tendency of the present war is to bring the Greeks themselves 
into a subjection to a foreign enemy ; to an enemy whom, in appearance, in- 
deed, you have invited only to oppose the designs of Philip; but whom, in 
fact, you have armed, without perceiving it, both against yourselves, and 
against all the inhabitants of Greece. For, as it is often seeu in the time of 
war, that those who, with a view to their present safety, admit too strong a- 
garrison within their walls, at the same time that they secure themselves 
against their enemies, become subject to the power of their friends ; just so will 
it happen, from the conduct which the iEtolians now pursue. For, while their 
design is only to weaken Philip, and to humble the power of the Macedo- 
nians, they observe not that the cloud which they are drawing hither from the 
west, though, perhaps, at first, it may only darken Macedon, will, in its pro- 
gress, shed the heaviest evils upon all the Greeks. It is the duty, therefore, 
of them all, to foresee in time the approaching storm ; and upon none is this 
duty more incumbent than upon you, O Lacedaemonians. For what do you 
suppose were the sentiments of your ancestors, when they thrust into a well, 
and threw earth upon the head of the messenger that was sent to them by- 
Xerxes to demand earth and water ; and then bade him to tell his master that 
the Lacedfemonians had given him earth and water agreeably to his demand ? 
What again was their intention, when Leonidas and ail his army exposed 
themselves by their own free choice to certain death ? Was it not to declare, 
that the Lacedeemonians would stand the foremost in maintaining, not only 
their own liberty, but that also of all the Greeks ? And shall now the 
descendants of men like these conclude a treaty with a barbarous nation, 
and join them in making war against the Epirots, the Acarnanians, the 
Boeotians, the Thessalians ; in a word, against almost, every people of 
Greece, except the iEtoiians ? Let the iEtohans themselves commit such 
baseness; for they are accustomed to think no action dishonouiable that can 
satisfy their desire of gain. But these are <-ot the manners of the Lacedae- 
monians. And what may it not be expected that the iEtoiians will attempt, 
when joined in an alliance with the Romans ; they who, with the assistance of 
the Iliyrians only, made an attack upon Pylus from the sea, in contempt of 
treaties; and, by land, laid siege to. Clitor, and earned the inhabitants of 
Cynaetha -. ito slavery ? Can it be doubted that, as they before lormed the 
project oi sharing with Antigouus the cities of Acaruania and Achaia, they 
have now concluded a like agreement with the Romans with respect to the 
whole of Greece ? Can any one be warned of such designs, and not dread the 
arrival of the Romans ? And must we not defeat that senseless profligacy 
which has led the iEtoiians info this alliance ? They have already taken 
Naxus and Oewiade from the Acariranians. Not long before, they attacked 
Anticyva, in coujanction with the Romans. And when the city was subdued* 
the women and children were carried away captive." by the Romans, and re- 
served for ail that wretchedness, which those who fall into the power of a fo= 



348 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU'S. 

reign enemy are condemned to suffer; while the iEtolians divided the houses 
among themselves by lot. Is this then an alliance worthy to be approved ? 
Or can the Lace deemonians, above all others, determine to embrace it ? those 
Lacedsemonians who, when the Persians invaded Greece, resolved, by a pub- 
lic decree, that, as soon as they should have conquered the barbarians, they 
would devote a tenth part of the Thebans victims to the Gods, because this 
people alone, though compelled by necessity to remain quiet, had taken no 
part in the war. Consider, therefore, I entreat you, what your own honour and 
your own dignity require. Let the remembrance of your ancestors, your ap- 
prehension of the power of the Romans, your jealousy of the pernicious con- 
duct of the iEtolians, and, above the rest, your sense of the great kindness that 
•was shown towards you by Antigonus, prevail with you still to be the friends 
of virtuous actions. In a word, rejeet all alliance with the iEtolians, and join 
yourselves to the Achaeans and the Macedonians. Or, if those who possess the 
gseatest power among you should obstruct that measure, resolve to remain 
quiet in this conjuncture, and make not yourselves confederates in the unjust 
designs of the iEtolians." 



EXTRACT THE SEVENTH. 

The siege of Echinus by Philip. 

Philip, having resolved to make his approaches against Echinus in the part 
of the two towers, ordered a tortoise and a battering-ram to be raised before 
each of them, and a gallery to be conducted from one ram to the other, op- 
posite to the space that was between the towers, and parallel to the wall. The 
work, being completed according to this design, was, in its form and aspect, 
3iot unlike to the city. For as the buildings upon the tortoises from the 
structure of the hurdles of which they vrere composed, had the figure and ap- 
pearance of towers, so the gallery that was between, being formed into battle- 
ments at the top, bore no less resemblance to a wall. In the lowest part of 
these towers were placed some pioneers, who filled up the inequalities of the 
ground with earth, that the rollers might move freely. Here also the motions 
of the rams were regulated. Upon the second stage, together with some 
catapults, there were vessels filled with water, and other preparations for se- 
curing the building against fire. Upon the third, which was equal in height . 
to the towers of the city, stood a body of soldiers, ready to engage with those 
that should attempt to obstruct the motions of the rams. From the gallery 
that was between the towers two trenches were opened, and carried forwards 
to the wall of the city ; and in these there were three batteries of balistae ; one 
of which threw stones of the weight of a talent, and the other two, stones of 
thirty pounds. From the camp to the towers, on either side, was a covered 
passage, that the soldiers might pass from the army to the works, or return 
back again from the works to the camp, without being exposed to the darts of 
the besieged. These works were all completed in a very few days, because 
the country afforded all things that were necessary for the purpose in the 
greatest plenty. For Echinus is situated upon the Malian gulf, opposite to 
Thronium, and looks towards the South. The soil also around it is extremely 
fertile. Philip, therefore, was readily supplied with all things that were re- 
quisite for such an undertaking. And when lie had completed his works in 
the manner that has been now described, he began, without delay, to attack 
the city. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 543 



EXTRACT THE EIGHTH. 

The Sources and course of the Euphrates. 

The river Euphrates has its sources in Armenia, and, flowing from thencee 
through Syria and the neighbouring country, passes on to Babylon. It is 
thought that it discharges itself, at last, into the Red Sea. But this is not the 
truth : for it spends itself in channels which are cut through the country, and is 
exhausted before it can reach the sea. This river is different in two respects 
from almost all other rivers. The streams of other rivers are usually in- 
creased, in proportion as they flow through a larger tract of country. Their 
waters also are fullest in the winter, and lowest in the height of summer. 
But the Euphrates, on the contrary, is fullest at the time of the rising of the 
Dog-star ; is no where so large as in Syria ; and in its farther progress is con- 
tinually diminished. The cause of this difference is, that the increase of its 
waters is not made by the winter rains, but by the melting of the snows in, 
summer. And the stream, as it advances, is diminished, by being turned 
aside, and divided into other streams, for the purpose of watering the country. 
Erom hence also it happens, that the transportation of armies down the Eu- 
phrates is, in those parts, extremely tedious ; the vessels being so deeply- 
loaded, and the river so low, that the force of the stream affords but little as* 
$istance in the navigation. 



BOOK THE TENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

The advantages of Tarentum ivith respect to Commerce. 

Aloxg that whole side of Italy which looks towards the sea of Sicily and the 
coasts of Greece, though the extent of it, from the straits of Rhegium to Ta- 
rentnm, be more than two thousand stadia, there is not to be found a single 
harbour, except that of the last mentioned city. But the country itself is in- 
habited by a very numerous people ; composed partly of barbarians, and partly 
©f some of the most considerable colonies of Greece. Among the former are 
the Brutiatis, the Lucanians, a part of the Samnites, the Calabrians, and many 
other nations. The Grecian cities are Rhegium, Caulonia, Locri, Crot»n, 
Metapontum, and Thulium. The merchants, therefore, that come from 
Greece to trade with any of the people who are situated along this coast, are 
obliged to bring their vessels into the harbour of Tarentum, and to make all 
their exchange and traffic in that city. It may be judged what great advan- 
tages must arise from such a situation, if we consider only the flourishing con- 
dition of the inhabitants of Croton. For this people, with the convenience 
only of some places which afford an anchorage in the summer, and which 
cannot be compared, in any respect, with the harbour of Tarentum, though 
they are visited but by a very small number of ships, have drawn to themselves 
great wealth. The advantages also of its situation, with respect to the ports 
of the Adriatic sea, are still very considerable, though not so great as in former 
times. For before Brundusium was built, all the vessels that came from the. 
opposite coast, which lies between Sipontum and the lapygian promontory, 
towards this part of Italy, directed their course always to Tarentum, and used 
that city as the market for vending all their merchandise. Fabius, therefore, 
considering this passage as an object of great importance, neglected every 
•ther care, and employed all his thoughts to guard it. 



344 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

The character ofPublius Scipio illustrated by some of the earliest actions ofhig 
life. His expedition into Spain. He renders himself master of New Car- 
thage. Instances of his humanity, moderation, and continence* 

CHAP. L 

As I am 'now going to relate the things that were performed by Publius 
Scipio in Spain, and to give also a short and general account of all the other 
actions of his life, it will first, I think, be necessary to lead the reader into some 
acquaintance with the character, and the natural disposition of this com- 
mander. For, as he has surpassed almost all that lived before him in the ce- 
lebrity of his name, there are scarcely any that have not a desire to know what 
manner of man he was, and by what abilities, natural or acquired, he accom- 
plished so many and such great exploits. But they are forced either to re- 
main in ignorance, or to form, at least, a very false opinion concerning him ; 
because the writers of his life have wandered themselves widely from the 
truth. That this censure is not ill grounded, will be manifest to every one 
who is able to consider, with a just attention, the account which I shall give, 
«ven of the greatest and the most astonishing of all his actions. 

These writers, then, have all of them concurred in representing Scipio to us 
as one of those favourites of fortune, who, by a kind of spontaneous hazard, and 
in seeming opposition to the rules of reason, conduct all their undertakings to 
the desired end. They think that men of this sort have something in them 
more admirable and more divine than those who follow the guidance of reason 
in erery action. They consider not that one of the things here mentioned is 
barely to be fortunate, aud that the other is worthy of praise ; that the first is 
common even to the most vulgar of mankind ; while the latter is the portion of 
those alone who excel in sense and understanding : and that these l asfc-ag e to be 
regarded as approaching nearest to divine, and as the highest in favour of the 
gods. 

Tome it seems that there is a great resemblance, both in character and in 
conduct, between Scipio and Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedaemonians. 
For it must not be imagined either that Lycurgus, by superstitiously consult- 
ing, upoa all occasions, the Pythian priestess, was taught to frame the Spartan 
government; or that Scipio was directed by dreams and omens to those great 
actions which so much enlarged the empire of his country. But, because they 
both were sensible that the greatest part of men are not easily engaged in new 
and unusual designs, and fear to expose themselves to manifest danger, unless 
they have some reason to expect that they shall be assisted by the gods ; the 
first, by joining the authority of the priestess to all that he proposed, rendered 
hi3 own designs more worthy of credit, and more easy to be received ; and the 
other, by cherishing an opinion in the multitude that he was supported in all 
his undertakings by a supernatural aid, inspired those that were under his com- 
mand with greater confidence, and made them more eager to engage even in 
the most difficult attempts. 

That this great commander was conducted in every action by sound sense 
<and prudence, and that his undertakings always were attended with success, be- 
cause in reason they deserved it, will sufficiently appear from the facts that 
will be hereafter mentioned. The generosity and magnanimity that were so 
conspicuous in his character, are, indeed, acknowledged by all. But the 
readiness of his conception, the sobriety of his judgment, and the extreme at- 
tention with which his understanding was directed to the object which it had 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 3 45 

fg g^gggggtgjggggggagjS»SltKm ■sssaagggass^ggggggg — " g ' '—- ' """ — =■ -"**• ^? 

in view, have remained still unknown ; or been known to those alone who 
lived in friendship with him, and had the opportunity of beholding him in the 
nearest light. Among those was Caiua Lsslius, who was a witness to all his 
words and actions, from his childhood to his death. And he it was who first 
raised in me that opinion of this general which I now have mentioned. For all 
that he related to me concerning him was extremely probable, and perfectly 
consistent with the actions which he performed. 

The first thing, as he informed me, which distinguished Scipio, was his be- 
haviour at the time of the engagement between Annibal and his father, with 
the cavalry near the river Po. He was then but seventeen years old ; and, be- 
cause this \vas his first campaign, he was attended by a troop of select horse- 
men as a guard. In the battle, perceiving that his father, with' only two or 
three of the cavalry, was inclosed by a large body of the enemy, and was al- 
ready dangerously wouuded, he at first exhorted his little troop to go to his 
assistance. And'when these for some time hesitated, because the numbers 
that surrounded the consul were so great, himself with the most desperate fury 
drove his horse into the middle of the combatants. His attendants also being 
then forced to join him in the charge, the. whole body of the enemy was parted 
by the shock ; and the consul, being thus unexpectedly rescued from destruc- 
tion, was the first to proclaim aloud that he owed his preservation to his son. 
As by this action he acquired the reputation of a man whose courage was not 
to be doubted, so, in the subsequent parts of his life, whenever his country 
reposed all her hopes upon him, he was ready to throw himself, without re- 
serve, into every kind of danger. This surely is not the conduct of a man who 
trusts himself to fortune ; but of a commander who is guided by sound sense 
and prudence. 

Some time after this action, his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for the 
aedileship, which is one of the most honourable dignities among the Romans. 
The custom was, to elect two patricians into this office; and at this time there 
were many candidates. At first Scipio had not the confidence to offer himself 
A candidate for this magistracy, in conjunction with his brother. But, as the 
time of the election came near, perceiving tha,t the people were not disposed 
to favour the interests of his brother, but; that himself stood very high in their 
esteem, he judged that the only way of obtaining the seidleshipTor his brother 
would be that both of them should sue for it together. He employed, there- 
fore, the following method. As his father was, at this time, gone to take the 
command in Spain, the consent of his mother alone was necessary to be gained. 
Observing, then, thar-she was busied every day in visiting the temples, and in. 
offering sacrifices to the gods in favour of his brother, and that her mind was 
filled with anxious expectation concerning the event, he told her that he had 
dreamed the same dream twice ; that it seemed to him that he was chosen adile 
with his brother ; and that, as they returned home from the forum together, 
she had met them at the door, and had embraced and kissed them. The 
female heart was touched in a moment by this story. " Oh !" she exclaimed, 
" that I might but see that day !" " Do you consent, then, mother," con- 
tinued he, " that we make the trial ?"■ And when she replied, that she con- 
sented, not suspecting, as he was then extremely young, that he would have 
the bolduessto attempt it, but believing only that he spoke in jest, he ordered 
a white gown to be prepared, such as the candidates for offices are accustomed 
to wear. His mother reflected no more on what had passed. But Scipio, in 
the morning while she was asleep, for the first time put on the gown, and went 
into the forum. The people, struck with the unexpected sight,%and who be- 
fore had entertained strong prejudices in his favour, received him with accla- 
mations and applause. He advanced to the place in which the candidates 
were ranged ; and, standing on the side of his brother, obtained not only his 
own election, but that of his brother also in consideration of himself. They 
then returned home together aediles. The news being carried to the mother, 

VOL. I. NO, 6. 2 X 



S46 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



she ran full of joy, and, meeting them at the door, kissed both her sons with 
transport. 

From this accident, an opinion prevailed among al! who heard the story of 
these dreams, that Scipio, not only when he was asleep, but in his waking mo- 
ments also, and in the time of day, held familiar converse with the gods. , It 
•was no dream, however, that gave him any assistance, in this business : bm%- 
being by nature generous, magnificent, and courteous in his address, he had 
before conciliated the favour of the multitude. Add to this, that he had also 
the skill to choose his proper time, both with the people and his mother. By 
these means it was, that he not only obtained his purpose, but was judged to 
have acted under the impulse of a divine admonition. For it is usual with 
men who, through the fault of their own nature, and from a want either of ac- 
tivity or of skill, are unable to view distinctly the times, the causes, and the 
course of actions, to ascribe those events to the gods and fortune, which are ac- 
complished only by the ready and dexterous management of good sense and 
reason. I thought it necessary to make these reflections, that my readers 
might not be so far misled by the opinion which is falsely propogated concern- 
ing Scipio, as to overlook what was brightest and most admirable in his cha- 
racter : I mean his dexterity and his unwearied application to affairs. In how 
high a degree he possessed these qualities will be more clearly seen from the 
transactions of the history, to which 1 now return. 



CHAP. II. 

•Scipio, having assembled the troops together, exhorted them not to be dis- 
heartened by the loss which they had sustained : • " that their defeat was by 
no means to be ascribed to the superior courage of the Carthaginians ; but 
was occasioned only by the treachery of the Spaniards, and to the imprudent 
division which the generals, reposing too great a confidence in the alliance of 
that people, had made of their forces : that the Carthaginians themselves were 
now in the same condition with respect to both these circumstances; for, be- 
sides that they were divided into separate camps, they had also alienated, by 
injurious treatment, the affections of their allies, and had rendered them their 
enemies : that from hence'it happened, that one part of the Spaniards had al- 
ready sent deputies to the Romans, and that the rest, as soon as the Romans 
should have passed the river, would hasten with alacrity to join them ; not so 
much, indeed, from any motive of' affection, as from a desire to revenge the 
insults which they haft suffered from the Carthaginians : that there was still 
another circumstance, even of greater moment : that the dissention which pre 
vailed among their leaders would prevent the enemy from uniting their whole 
strength in an engagement ; and, if they should venture on a battle with di- 
vided forces, that they would then most easily be defeated : that, with all the^e 
advantages in prospect, 4thejr should now, therefore, pass the river with the 
greatest confidence ; and leave to himself, and to the rest of the commanders, 
the whole care of what was afterwards to be done." 

After this discourse, he left Marcus, who was joined with him in the com- 
mand, with a body of three thousand foot and five hundred horse, to protect 
the allies that were on this side of the Iberus; and then passed the river with 
the rest of the forces, having concealed bom every person his true intention ; 
for he had determined not 1o do any of those things which he had suggested to 
the army : his real design was suddenly to invest ISew Carthage. 

Arid here we may first remark a most signal proof of that peculiar dispo- 
sition which I have ascribed to Scipio. For, first, though he was now no more 
than twenty seven years* old, he took upon himself the conduct of a war, which, 
from the ill success which had attended it, all other -persons had concluded to 
be desperate. In the nest place, when he had engaged himself in this design, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 347 

instead of pursuing- the most obvious and common measures, he formed a plan 
of action, which was alike impenetrable to his own army, and unsuspected by 
the enemy. And, with respect to both these points, he was determined by the 
most solid reasons. While he was still at Rome, he informed himself of the 
true state of things, by a most careful and exact enquiry ; and being -assured 
that the treachery only of the Spaniards, and the division of the Roman armies, 
had occasioned the misfortune of his father, he .neither feared the Carthagi- 
nians, nor yielded to that despondency with which others were possessed. 
When he was afterwards also told that the allies on this side of the Iberus re- 
mained still constant in the Roman friendship; that the Carthaginian gene- 
rals were broken by distentions; and that they treated the people who had 
submitted to them with great severity, he set out upon the expedition with 
full confidence of success, not building his expectations upon fortune, but up- 
on the views which reason had suggested to him. As soon as he arrived v in 
Spain, renewing his enquiries in every part with the greatest diligence, he] was 
informed that the Carthaginian army was divided into three separate bodies; 
that Mago, at the head of one, was posted beyond the pillars of Hercules, in 
the territory of the Conians ; that the second, under the command of Asdru- 
bal, the son of Gesco, was encamped in Lusitania, near the mouth of the 
river ; that the other Asdrubal, with the third, was laying siege to a town in 
the Carpetanian district ; and that each of these different bodies was distant 
full ten days' march from the city of New Carthage. He considered, there- 
fore, with himself, that, as it would be much too dangerous, both on account 
of the late defeats, and because the enemy also were far superior to him in 
their numbers, to venture on a set engagement against their united forces; 
so, on the other hand, if he should attack either of these separate bodies, there 
was reason to fear that, while the body attacked might retire and decline the 
right, the rest also would be able to advance ; and that, being thus inclosed on 
every side, he should fall into the same calamity which had been so fatal to his 
father and his uncle. Upon these considerations he rejected the design of an 
engagement, aud turned all his thoughts towards New Carthage ; a place 
which, as he very well knew, brought many advantages to the enemy, as well 
as great detriment to the Romans, in the progress of the war. 

For, whi'e he remained in winter quarters, having endeavoured to obtain 
from the prisoners a minute and particular knowledge of every thing that re- 
lated to this city, he found that it was almost the oniy place upon the coast of 
Spain that afforded a harbour capable of receiving a fleet and naval forces ; 
that it was so situated that the Carthaginians might pass over to it from Africa 
with the greatest ease ; that large sums of money also, and all the baggage ot 
the army were at this time in it, together with all the hostages which the Car- 
thaginians had taken from the cities of Spain. He learned, likewise, what was 
still of greater importance, that the garrison consisted oniy of a thousand sol- 
diers, appointed to defend the citadel. For it never had been conceived that, 
while the Carthaginians were masters of almost the whole of Spain, any attempt 
would be made to lay siege to this city ; that the multitude of the other inha- 
bitants, indeed, was very great; but that they were all artificers, labourers, 
or seamen, destitute of all experience in the affairs of war, and who would ra- 
ther facilitate than obstruct his attempt against the city, if he should appear 
unexpectedly before it. He knew the manner, likewise, in which the city was 
situated; the fortifications by which it was defended ; and the nature of the 
lake that surrounded it.^ For some fishermen, who frequented the place, had 
informed him that the lake in general was marshy, aud that it was also ford- 
able as often as the tide retired, which usually happened every day, near the 
time of evening. From all these circumstances, he concluded that success in 
this attempt would nor only bring a heavy loss upon the enemy, but tend 
greatly to advance his own affairs ; and that if he should fail, he might at least 
be able, as he was master of the sea, to withdraw the troops in. safety, taking 



34S GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

care oaly tosecure his camp against any insult. And this it would be easy to 
accomplish, because the forces of the enemy were at so great a distance. Lay- 
ing aside, therefore, all other thoughts, he employed him serf, while he was in 
winter quarters, in making preparations for the siege. And though he had 
formed so great a design, and was only of the age that has been mentioned, he 
concealed his intention from every person, except from Caius Laelius, till the 
time came in which he judged it necessary to disclose it. 

-" Now, it is generally acknowledged by historians, that these were the rea- 
sons which determined the conduct ofScipio upon this occasion. And yet, 
when they had gone thus far, they, in the end, I know not hew, ascribe the 
success that followed, not to the prudence of the commander, but to the inter- 
position of the gods and fortune. But this opinion, as it is destitute of all 
support from probability, or from the testimony of those who lived at the time, 
is refuted also by the letters which Scipio himself wrote to Philip ; in which he 
expressly declares, that in every thing that concerned his* expedition into Spain, 
and more particularly in his resolution to attack New Carthage, he was de- 
termined wholly by those considerations which have been here recited. Let 
us now attend to the siege. 



CHAP. III. 

Scipio then, having given secret orders to Caius Lselius, who alone, as we 
have said, was acquainted with his design, to sail to New Carthage with the 
fleet, be^an his march with the land forcen, and advanced with the greatest 
taste. His army consisted of twenty-five thousand foot, and of two thousand; 
and live hundred horse. After seven days march he arrived and encamped on 
the side of the city that looked towards the north. The hinder part of the 
camp he fortitied with a ditch and a double intrenchment, which was drawn 
from one sea to the other. The side that was towards the city he left without 
any fortification, because the nature of the place alone sufficiently secured it 
a.p-ain3t all insult. But before we enter into a particular description of the 
siege, it will be proper to give the reader some conception of the manner in 
which the city was situated, and the country that 'was round it. 

New Carthage then is situate near the middle of the coast of Spain, upon 
a gulf that looks towards the south-west, and which contains in length about 
twenty stadia, and about ten stadia in breadth at the first entrance. The whole 
of this gulf is a perfect harbour. For an island lying at the mouth of it, and 
which leaves on either side a very narrow passage, receives all the waves of the 
sea ; so that the gulf remains entirely calm : except only that its waters are 
sometimes agitated by the south-west winds blowing through those passages, 
.'All the other winds are intercepted by the land, which encloses it on every 
side. In the inmost part of the gulf stands'a mountain in form of a peninsula, 
upon which the city is built. It is surrounded by the sea, upon the east and 
south ■ and on the west by a lake, which is extended also so far towards the 
north, that the rest of the space, which lies between the lake and the sea, and 
which joins the city to the continent, contains only two stadia in breadth. 
The middle part of the city is flat ; and has a level approach to it from the 
sea, on the side towards the south. The other parts are surrounded by hills, 
two of which are very high and rough ; and the other three, though much 
less lofty, are full of cavities, and difficult of approach. Of the former two, 
the largest is that which stands on the side of the east. It extends itself into 
the sea and has a temple consecrated to ^sculapius upon the top. The other 
is in like manner situated opposite to the former upon the west. Upon this 
last is a ip'agineeht and royal place, which was built by Asdrubal, when he 
de3i -ned, as it is said, to declare himself sovereign of the country. The other 
three hills, which are of smaller size, enclose tht city on the side towards the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 343 



north. The first of these, which stands nearest to the east, has the appellation 
of Vulcan. The second, that of Aletes; who is said to have obtained divine 
honours, from having- first discovered the silver mines. The third is called the 
Hill of Saturn. For the convemency of those who use the sea, a communici- 
tion is made by art between the lake and the sea. And across the narrow chan- 
nel, which joins the two together, there is also a bridge, which serves for the 
passage of carriages and beast of burthen, as they come loaded with neces- 
saries from the country in this city. By this situation of the places, the front 
of the Roman camp was secure without any fortification ; being covered by 
the lake and the sea. Even in the part that was opposite to the narrow neck 
that ran between the lake and the sea, and which joined the city to the conti- 
nent, Scipio ha'd neglected to throw up any intrenchment ; either because, by 
thus leaving the very middle of his camp open, he designed to intimidate the 
enemy ; or that, when he should be ready to attack the city, he might advance 
and return back again to his camp, without any impediment. This city for- 
merly contained not more than twenty stadia in circumference. Many write) - * 
indeed affirm it to have been forty. But in this they are mistaken. For my 
own part, I can speak of this matter with assurance. For I take not my ac- 
count from what I have heard, but have myself seen and examined the place. 
At this time the circumference is less. 

The fleet then being arrived at a proper time, Scipio assembled the troops 
together, and explained to them the reasons that had determined him to en- 
gage in the present undertaking, and which were no other than those that have 
now been mentioned. He showed them, that the enterprise itself was practi- 
cable. And having enumerated ali the advantages which would arise to them- 
selves from this conquest, together with the great loss which the enemy would 
sustain, he promised crowns of gold to those who should first mount upon the 
walls, and the other customary rewards to all who should perform any signal 
service in the attack. In the end he told them that the design' had first been 
Suggested to him by Neptune, who stood near him as he slept ; and promised 
that he would so visibly assist him in the very time of the action, that the 
whole army should acknowledge the efficacy of his presence. The justness of 
the reasons that appeared in this discourse, the promise of the golden crowns, 
and above all the rest, the expected assistance of the god, raised in all the sol- 
diers the highest ardour and alacrity. 

On the following day, having stored the fleet with missile weapons of every 
kind, he ordered Lfelius, who commanded it, to press the city on the side of 
the sea. By land, he collected two thousand of the strongest soldiers, toge- 
ther with the men who carried the ladders, and advanced to the assault about 
the third hour of the day. Mago, who (commanded in the city, divided the 
garrison of a thousand men, and leaving one half in the citadel, drew up the 
rest in order of battle upon the hill that stood towards the east. He stationed 
also two thousand of the citizens, to whom he had given the arms that were in, 
the city, near the gate that led to the narrow neck, which joined the city to the 
continent, and which was opposite to the Roman camp. The rest of the inha- 
bitants were ordered to assist with their utmost strength, in every part in which 
the walls should be attacked. 

As soon as the Roman trumpets had given the signal for the assault, Mago 
.ordered the two thousand citizens to advance through the gate ; being per- 
suaded that he should strike a terror into the enemy, and force them to desist 
from their design. They advanced accordingly, and vigorously charged the 
Romans, who where drawn up in battle between their camp and the isthmus. 
At first the engagement was extremely fierce ; and vehement cries were made 
on either side, as the numbers increased that came both from the city and 
from the camp. But the assistance that was sent to either side was very un- 
equal; the Carthaginian succours coming only through a single gate, and hav- 
ing the length of two ttadiat al*o to pa*s ; while the Romans, on the contrary, 



SS5 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS*' 

. rrr: , -:: "■: : : "■ :. r ^f !" " -" r^~— -■■r^»''~r^"-r™-'-^^ m****^ 

were near to the place, and poured in their troops from every side. For Scipio 
liad designedly ranged his forces in battle near to the camp, that he might 
draw the enemy to a greater distance from the city : as well knowing, that if 
this body, which was the very strength of the inhabitants, should be once de- 
feated, the whole city would be thrown into so great confusion, that none 
•would afterwards dare to appear without the walls. As the combatants how- 
ever were all chosen men, the victory remained for some time doubtful. But 
the Carthaginians, unable to sustain the weight of the Romans, who came con- 
tinually from the camp, were at last forced to fly. Many pf them fell m the 
engagement, and in their flight. But the greatest part were crushed, as they 
entered together in crowds through the gate. The inhabitants, on the. sight 
of this defeat, were so struck with consternation, that they immediately aban- 
doned the walls ; and the Romans, who indeed had almost entered the city 
with those that fled, fixed their ladders in full security. 

In this^action Scipio himself was present ; but used all the caution that was 
possible with respect to his person. For he was attended by three soldiers car- 
rying bucklers, who, when any thing was thrown from the wails, joined their 
bucklers together, and covered him from the danger. Under this protection, 
moving from side to side, or placing himself upon some eminence, he greatly 
promoted the success of the action. For, as by this method, he saw every 
.thing that passed, so, being seen also by the army, he inspired the" combatants 
with courage. From hence also it happened, that nothing that was necessary 
was neglected in the course of the engagement : and that whatever the occa- 
sion suggested to him was immediately carried into execution. 

The Romans, who began now to mount the ladders with the greatest confi- 
dence, found much less danger in the resistance of the enemy than from the 
height of the walls. The difficulties indeed which this aloue occasioned, were 
so great, that the besieged began to resume their courage. For some of the 
ladders, being of so large a size as to admit miany to ascend together, were 
broken by the weight. Upon others, the first who mounted lost their sight 
upon so great a height ; and, as soon as they were opposed by the least resist- 
ance, threw themselves headlong down. When any beams also or other things 
of the same kind, were thrown from the battlements, whole bodies of men were 
torn away together, and carried to the ground. These difficulties, however., 
though so many and so great, were none of them sufficient to restrain the 
. ardour and the impetuosity of the Romans. No sooner were the first thrown 
down, than those who followed immediately ascended into the vacant place. 
"But as the day began now to decline, and the soldiers were almost exhausted 
by fatigue, the general ordered the trumpets to sound the sigual of retreat. 

The besieged, persuading themselves that they repelled the danger, began 
to exult with joy. But Scipio, expecting now the time when the sea would 
retire, stationed five hundred men, together with ladders, upon the border of 
the lake. At the same time he selected also a body of fresh troops, and, hav- 
ing exhorted them to perform their duty, he sent them again towards the 
gate upon the isthmus, and gave them a greater number of ladders than be- 
fore, that the whole length of the walls might be attacked. When the signal 
then was made, and the troops began to ascend the ladders in every part, the 
inhabitants within were thrown into the greatest confusion and disorder. At 
the very time when they conceived that they had nothing left to dread, behold 
anew danger just beginning from a new assault. Their darts also began to 
fail ; and the numbers of men which they had already lost had sunk their 
courage. Their embarrassment, therefore, was very great. They defended 
themselves, however, against the assailants with their utmost strength. 

While this contest was at the height, the tide began to retire, and left only a 
very shallow water upon the upper side of the lake ; at the same time running 
through the mouth of it, into the adjoining sea, with such rapidity and force, 
that those who were unacquainted with the nature oi'tiie thing, regarded it a* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBITjS. . ssi 



■mpWB—— MltajH 



22X3, 



a kind of miracle. _ Scipio, who had some guides also ready, exhorted the 
troops that were selected for this service, to enter the lake, and to fear nothing. 
Forthb, among his other talents, was that in which this general principally 
excelled : the art of inspiring his troops with courage, and making them feel 
all the passions which his discourse endeavoured to infuse. They immediately 
obeyed his orders, and pushed their way with eagerness through the lake ; the 
whole army being persuaded that what they had belMtJd was undoubtedly the 
■work of some divinity. It 'was now that they remembered what Scipio had 
said to them in his harangue, concerning the interposition of Neptune in then- 
favour. Animated, therefore, by this persuasion, one part of them formed the 
tortoise, and, advancing with impetuosity to the gate, began to break it with 
bars and hatchets ; while the rest, as they approached the walls, finding the 
battlements deserted, not only fixed their ladders in full security, but gained 
also the top of the wall without any resistance. For, as the besieged, riot hav- 
ing any suspicion that the city ever could be approached on the side of the lake, 
"were wholly. em ployed in other parts, and especially near the gate that led to 
the isthmus; so the cries also, and the confusion that arose from the dis- 
ordered multitude, prevented them from hearing or discerning any thing that 
was proper to be done. The Romans ran from side to side upon the walls, in 
order to attract the enemy : a kind of service, which the manner in which they 
are armed enables them to perform with singular dexterity. And when they 
arrived at the gate, they descended, and breaking the bars, gave entrance to 
those that were without. The body that had attempted to scale the walls on 
the side towards the isthmus, had now also gained the battlements. Thus the 
whole walls were at last in the possession of the Romans. The hill likewise 
that stood on the eastern side of the city, was seized by a part of those who 
entered through the gate, and who attacked and routed the Carthaginian^- 
that were left to guard it. 

As soon as a sufficient number of the troops had entered, Scipio sent away 
the greatest part to destroy the inhabitants ; commanding them to kill all that 
they should meet, wiihout sparing any ; and not attempt to pillage till they 
should receive the signal. Such is the custom among the Romans when they 
have taken a city by Storm. And their design, as I suppose,, is to strike the, 
greater terror. It is common, therefore, to see not men alone lying Slaughtered, 
but dogs also cut in two, and other animals divided limb from limb. Upon the 
present occasion especially, there was much of this kind of carnage, because the 
numbers that were in the place were great. The general himself then marched 
with a thousand men to attack the citadel. At his first approach Mago seemed 
determined to make some resistance. But when lie had considered that the city 
was entirely in the power of the Romans, he sent and obtained a promise of 
$afety for himself, and delivered up the citadel. The signal being then imde, 
the slaughter ceased, and the pillage was begun. When night came on, those 
who had received such orders remained in the camp. The general, with his 
thousand men, was lodged in the citadel. The rest of the soldiers, having 
been called out of the houses by the tribunes, were ordered to bring the 
booty, all of them in their several cohorts, into the forum, and to guard it 
during the night. The light-armed forces were drawn from the camp, and 
were posted upon the hill that was on the eastern side. In this manner the 
Romans became masters of the city of New Carthage in Spain. 

i CHAP. IV. 

On the following day, the baggage of the Carthaginian garrison, and all 
that had been taken both from the citizens and the artificers, being collected 
together in the forum, was distributed by the tribunes among the respective 
legions, according to the usual custom of the Romans. The method which 
$}is people observe, when they have taken, a city, is this: They every day 



35f GENERAL HISTORY OF -POLYBIlTS. 



select, for the purpose of pillage, a certain number of cohorts, according t» 
the size of the city, taking care always that not more than half of the forces 
be'employed in this work. The rest all remain in their several posts, either 
■within or without the city, as occasion requires, 

As their armies usually are composed of two Roman legions with an equal 
number of allies, and some times, though but rarely, of four legions, the men* 
•who are employed in pillaging, bring all the booty, each of them to his respec- 
tive legion. A sale is tma made of all that has been taken, and the money di- 
vided by the tribunes into equal shares, which are allotted to all alike; not only 
to those who were stationed underarms in the several posts, but to those who 
were left in the camp; to the sick likewise, and even to those that had been sent 
away from the camp upon any distant service. And that no part of the plunder 
may be concealed, the soldiers, before they begin to march, and at the time of 
their first encampment, are obliged to swear, that whatever they shall take from 
the enemy they will bring faithfully to the Camp: as we have already more 
particularly mentioned in our discourse on the Roman government. Now, 
by this precaution, of employing one half of the -army only in the pillage, 
•while the rest remain under arms in the several posts, the Romans are secured 
from any danger that might happen to them from the greediness of the sol- 
diers. For as the hope of having a share in the booty is never lost to any of 
the troops, but remains as certain to those who are fixed in the several posts as 
to those who are employed in pillaging, every man remains quiet in his 
station ; whereas, among other nations, a contrary method is frequently at- 
tended with very fatal consequences. So powerful is the desire of gain, that, 
in general, it is this alone which encourages men to suffer hardships, or to 
throw themselves, into dangers, When occasions, therefore, of this kind arise, 
it is not to be supposed, that those who are left in the camp, or stationed in 
any post, will contentedly forego the opportunity that is offered, if e^ery man, 
as the custom is in almost all other armies, be allowed to retain the booty 
which he takes. For though a prince, perhaps, or a general, may at such 
times give the strictest orders for bringing all the spoil together in a common 
heap, yet, whatever the soldiers are able to conceal, they are accustomed to 
consider as their own. And while they all pursue this object with an ardour 
which it is not possible to restrain, the safety of the whole is often brought into 
the greatest danger. Very frequently it has been seen, that commanders, 
when they have succeeded in their first design, and have either taken a city, 
or forced their way into the camp of the enemy, have, from this single cause 
alone, not only lost all the fruits of their victory, but even suffered an entire 
defeat. There is nothing, therefore, that more deserves the foresight and at- 
tention of the leader of an army, than to make such provision, that all the 
troops may be assured of obtaining an equal share of the plunder upon these 
occasions. 

While the tribunes wen? employed in making a distribution of the spoil, 
the general, having ordered all the prisoners, who were not much fewer than 
ten thousand men, to be brought before him, divided them into two separate 
bodies. In the first were the free citizens, together with their wives and 
children: and the artificers of the city in the other. Having exhorted the 
former to embrace the friendship of the Romans, and to bear in remembrance 
the favour which they now received, he dismissed them to their several habi- 
tations. A deliverance so unexpected melted them into tears of joy. They 
prostrated themselves before him, and retired. He then told the artificers that 
for the present they were the public slaves of the Roman people ; but that, if 
they would show an affection towards this people, and serve them with alacrity 
in their respective trades, they might be assured of obtaining their freedom, as 
soon as the war with Carthage should be brought to a happy end. He then 
ordered them to be enrolled by the quaestor; and having divided them into 
band3 of thirty men, appointed a Roman to take the charge of every band* 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. t S53 

The whole number amounted to about two thousand men. From. the rest of 
the prisoners he selected those that were in the vigour of their age, and of the 
strongest bodies, and joining them to his naval forces, so that the whole now- 
consisted of a half part more than double the former number, he not only 
furnished the ships that had been taken from the enemy, but allotted to every 
vessel in the fleet almost twice as many seamen as they had before. For the 
vessels that were taken were eighteen in number; and his own fleet consisted 
of thirty-rive. To these men, likewise, upon condition that they would only 
discharge their duty with diligence and zeal, he gave the same assurance 
of their freedom as soon as the Carthaginians should be conquered. In this 
manner, by his indulgent treatment, he entirely gained the confidence of the 
citizens, and secured their affection both to himself and to the common cause* 
The artificers, encouraged by the hopes of freedom, applied themselves to 
their work with the greatest cheerfulness. And the fleet, by the prudent 
disposition which he made, was increased in the proportion that has been 
mentioned. 

When this b'nsiuesstwas finished, he separated Mago, and the other Cartha- 
ginians that were of rank," from the rest. For among those that were takers^ 
there were two that were of the council of the ancients, and fifteen of the 
senate. Ail these he committed to the care of Laelius; and ordered them to 
be treated with particular attention. He then commanded all the hostages, 
who were in number more thau three hundred, to be brought before him* 
And calling the children to him one by one, he caressed and soothed them; 
telling them that in a short time they should see their parents. The rest he 
ordered to write to their several cities that they were safe and well; and that 
they should soon be permitted to return to their respective habitations, if their 
friends would only consent to embrace the alliance of the Romans. With 
these words, having before selected from the spoil what was most proper for 
his design, he presented all of them with such ornaments as were suitable to 
their sex and age. To the girls he gave bracelets and little pictures; and 
swords and poniards to the young men and boys. 

At this time, one of the female captives, the wife of Mandonius, who was 
the brother of Andobalis, king of the Ilergetes, fell at his feet, and entreated 
him with tears to give such orders concerning the women that were prisoners^ 
that they might obtain more decent treatment than they had experienced from 
the Carthaginians. Scipio was moved at this sight: for the woman was 
advanced in years, and had something venerable in her appearance. He asked 
her, therefore, whether they were in want of any necessaries. And when, she 
made no answer, he ordered those that were appointed to take care of the 
women to be called; and was told by them, that the Carthaginians had always 
furnished them with necessaries in the greatest plenty* But as she still 
embraced his knees, and continued to repeat the same request, Scipi®, being 
more perplexed, and suspecting that the men had told him an untruth, and 
had undoubtedly been negligent in their charge, bade her and the rest of the 
women take courage; and assured them, that he would appoint other persons,, 
who should take eare that they should be in want of nothing. " You under- 
stand not our request," replied the woman after a little silence, " if you think 
that we are thus importunate with you for the sake of meat and drink/' In a 
moment Scipio understood her meaning: and, when he saw before him the 
daughters of Andobalis, and of many other princes, all in the flower of their 
age, he was unable to refrain from teavs. The whole distress of their condi- 
tion was disclosed to him by a single word. He signified therefore to the 
woman, that he now knew perfectly what she intended: and taking her by the 
hand, he again bade her to take courage, and all the rest that were with heri 
assuring them, that he would be no less careful of them, than if they were his 
own sisters or his daughters; and that he would give them in charge to person* 
of approved fidelity, whose behaviour should agree with this assurance, . 
vol. r. ifo. 6. ' 2 x 



3.54 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

After this, lie delivered to the quaestors all the public money that had beet* 
taken from the Carthaginians. The amount of it was more than six h mid red 
talents. He had brought also with him from Rome four hundred: so that, 
with both sums together, he had now more than a thousand talents, to defray 
the expences of the war. 

About the same time also it was, that some young soldiers, having found a 
virgin of a most uncommon bloom and beauty, and knowing that Scipio was 
inclined to the love of women, brought .and placed her before him, and en- 
treated him to receive her as a present. Scipio was struck with the sight; and, 
having expressed his admiration of her beauty, " If I were a private man," 
said he, " you could not have offered to me a more acceptable present; but, 
in the station in which I am now placed, it is quite otherwise." Intimating, 
as I suppose, by this discourse, that, in the hours of leisure and repose, 
young men may sometimes agreeably amuse themselves with these enjoy- 
meats; but that, in seasons of business, the activity both of the mind and 
body is too much obstructed by such indulgence. He therefore thanked the 
soldiers; and having called the father of the virgin^ he delivered her into his 
hands, and exhorted him to marry her to any one of her own citizens whom 
lie should choose. By this instance of his continence and moderation, the 
character of Scipio was raised high in the opinion of all who were under his 
command. 

When he had thus regulated all things, and committed the rest of the 
prisoners to the care of the tribunes, he sent Laelius, with the Carthaginians, 
and some others of the most eminent rank that were taken, in a quinquereme 
to Rome, to carry the news of this success. For he very well knew, that as 
the affairs of Spain had been considered as almost desperate, an account of this 
important conquest could not fail to infuse new courage into the people, and 
engage them to apply themselves with much greater earnestness to the busi* 
n ess of the war. With respect to himself, remaining for some time in New 
Carthage, he exercised continually the naval forces ; and instructed the 
tribunes also to exercise the land army in the following manner. 

On the first day, the legions were commanded to run the space of thirty 
stadia with their arms. On the second, to scour and brighten their arm?, and 
to examine in open view their whole armour. The third day was alloted to 
relaxation and repose. On the fourth, they fought together wi$i wooden 
swords cased with leather, and guarded with a button at the end ; and threw 
javelins, which were covered also with a button. On the fifth day, they 
returned again to the same course of running with which they had begun. 

He employed also a principal part of his attention upon the artificers; that 
the arms might he finished in the completest manner, both for the exercises 
in the field, and for real service. With this view, he not only appointed 
skilful men to regulate the workmen, as we have already mentioned, but 
himself went every day among them, and saw that they were supplied with 
necessaries. And thus, while the legions were exercising themselves conti- 
nually before the walls, and the naval forces upon the sea contending together 
in rowing and in mock engagements; while the workmen in the city were 
sharpening weapons, or labouring in brass and wood; and, in a word, while 
nil, without exception, were employed in preparing arms; whoever had beheld 
iie sight, might have observed in the words of Xenophon, that this city was 
in truth the very working-shop of war. When all things seemed at laat to be 
in the condition which he desired, and the troops were perfect in their exer- 
cise; having secured the city also by placing guards, and making the fortifi- 
cations that were necessary, he put both the army and the fleet in motion, 
and began his march towards Taraco, carrying the hostages also with him. 

The motions which Scipio judged to be most useful for the cavalry upon all 
occasions, and in which he commanded them to be exercised, were these. To 
turn every man singly his horse to the left, and again to the right, aud then to 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 3$ 



make him fall back. With respect to .whole troops, they were also taught to 
turn to one side at once, and to recover again their first position : to turn their 
backs to the enemy in two motions, and to face about again in three: to make 
little* bodies, of ten or of twenty men, go off with speed from the wings, or 
sometimes from the centre; and return again to their place in the main body 
without breaking their ranks; to extend themselves upon the wings, in order 
to prevent the camp from being attacked, or to cover the rear of the army. 
The breaking of the whole body into loose and separate bands, was a thing 
which he thought deserved but little attention ; because it was nothing more 
than the order into which troops would naturally fall upon a march. lu the 
last place, they were instructed so to advance against the enemy, or to retire 
again, in all the different movements, that, even when running with full 
speed, they might keep their ranks entire, and preserve the same distance 
between the troops. For his opinion was, that nothing was more dangerous or 
fatal, than for a body of cavalry to charge with disordered ranks. 

When he had communicated these instructions to the officers and soldiers, 
he afterwards went round to the several cities, and examined, in the first 
place, whether the men comprehended his plan of discipline; and, secondly, 
whether those who commanded in the cities, were clear and perfect in their 
manner of teaching it. For he judged that the success of this new method 
would principally depend upon the skill of the particular commanders. As 
soon as every thing was perfected, he drew out all the cavalry from the cities 
to one place; and himself directed them in all the movements, and made them 
perform the whole exercise in his presence. Nor did he, upon this occasion, 
take his station at the head of all the troops, as the generals of this age are 
accustomed to. do; imagining that the foremost place is the proper place for a 
commander. Rut in truth, they both show a want of judgment, and bring 
much disadvantage upon the service itself, by choosing a post, in which, while 
they are seen by every one, they can themselves see nothing. For the busi- 
ness in question, at such a time, is not to display the power and dignity of 
the commander, but to show ability and skill; to attend to the soldiers in all 
their movements; and, for this purpose, to be sometimes at the head, some- 
times again in the rear of all, and sometimes in the centre. It was thus that 
Scipio acted. He rode from rank to rank, and saw all the troops himself. 
He instructed tnose that were less ready; and corrected in the beginning 
whatever was.amiss. But as so great attention had been used before in exer- 
cising each particular body, the mistakes that now appeared were very few 
and inconsiderable. For this indeed, as Demetrius Phalereus has very justly 
observed, is the only method that can render a bod} 7 of troops perfect in their 
discipline. As a building, says this writer, will be firm and solid, if every 
scantling, and every joint, and each single apartment has been disposed and 
finished with the necessary care, so an army likewise will have its proper 
strength, when every troop, and every soldier, have first been separately 
trained, and rendered perfect in their duty. . 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

An observation on the policy of the Romans, with respect to Greece. 

The present state of things very much resembled, it was said, the disposition 
of an army drawn up in battle. Upon such occasions the light-armed and 
most active of the troops are placed always in front, and are the first attacked; 
but the event of the battle is decided by the phalanx of heavy forces that stand 
behind them. In the same manner the JEtbli&ris, and the people of Pelopon- 
nesus, their allies, are now first exposed to danger; while the Romans, like the 
phalanx, keep themselves in reserve. If the first should be defeated, the 
latter will withdraw themselves in safety from the fray. But if thev should 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



be victorious, which the gods avert, the Romans will then be able to subdue 
not only the 4£toliaus, but -all the rest also of the people of Greece. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

A description of Ecbaiana, the capital city of Media. The expedition of 

Aniiochus against Arsaces. 

Media is the most powerful of all the kingdoms of Asia; whether we consider 
the extent of the country, or the numbers and goodness of the men, and also 
of the horses, which are there produced. For these animals are found in 
?t in so great plenty, that almost all the rest of Asia is supplied with them from 
this province. It is here also that the royal horses are always fed, on account 
of the excellence of the pasture. The whole borders of the province are 
covered with Grecian cities, which were built as a check upon the neigh- 
bouring barbarians, after the country had been subdued by Alexander. 
Ecbatana only is not one of these. This city stands on the north side of 
Media, and commands all that part of Asia which lies along the Mceotis and 
the Euxiue Sea. . It was, even from the most ancient times, the seat of the 
royal residence; and seems in splendour and magnificence, very greatly to 
have exceeded all other cities, It is built on the declivity of the mountain 
Orontes, and not enclosed "with any walls. But there is a citadel in it, the 
fortifications of which are of most wonderful strength: and below the citadel 
stands the palace of the Persian kings, With respect to other particulars I 
am in doubt whether I should speak, or be entirely silent. To those who 
love exaggeration, and to strike their readers with something wonderful in 
their descriptions, this \;ity would afford ample matter for such digression. 
But others, who go not without great diffidence into things that exceed the 
common apprehension, will, for this very reason, be the more perplexed. 
Thus much, however, I shall say. The palace contained seven stadia iu 
circumference. And the magnificence of the structure in every part was such, 
as must have raised a very high opinion of the wealth and power of those who 
"built it. For though the wood was all of cedar, or of cypress, no part of it 
•was left naked; but the beams, the roofs, and the pillars that supported the 
porticoes and peristyles, were all covered, some with plates of silrer, and some 
of °old. The tiles likewise were all of silver. The greatest part of these riches 
was carried away by the Macedonians who attended Alexander; and the rest 
•was pillaged in the reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus, At this time, however, 
when Antiochus arrived, there were still remaining in the temple of Mma 
some pillars cased with gold, and a large quantity of silver tiles laid together 
jn a heap. There were also some few wedges of gold, and a much greater 
number of silver. These were now coined into money with the royal stamp; 
and amounted to the sum of almost four thousand talents. 

Arsaces had expected that Antiochus woidd advance as far as to this city; 
but was persuaded that he never would attempt to lead so great an army 
through the desert that was beyond it: especially because he could not fail of 
be'ia^in great want of water. For, in these parts, no water is ever seen above 
the surface of tlie ground. But, through the whole of the desert, there are 
manv subterraneous wells and stream^*, which are known only to those who 
are acquainted with the country. The account which the inhabitants give of 
these are true; that the Persians, when they were masters of that part of Asia, 
gave to those who brought a stream of water into places in which there was 
none befoie, the free inheritance of the ground for five generations; and that 
the natives, encouraged by this advantage, spared no labour or expence to 
"bring the water, which falls from mount Caucasus in many large streams, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 357 



through subterraneous channels to a very great distance; so that, in the present 
times, thos' who use the waters know not the beginning, nor the course of 
the channels through which they flow. When Arsaces saw, however, that the 
king had determined to pass through the desert, he ordered the wells to be 
broken and filled up. But Antiochus, being informed of this design, sent 
away Nicomedes with a thousand horse; who, finding on his arrival, that 
Arsaces had retreated, and that a small body of cavalry only was emploved in 
stopping the mouths of the streams, forced them to fly upon his first approach, 
and returned back again to Antiochus. 

The king, having passed the desert, arrived at Hecatompylus, a city 
-situated in the middle of the Parthian territory, and which takes its name 
from the great number of roads which lead from it into all the neighbouring 
parts. In tins place he allowed the army some time to rest. And°when he 
had considered with himself, that, if Arsaces had been inclined to venture on 
a battle, he never.would have left his country, or have looked for any ground 
more proper for his own army than that which lay round Hecatompylus, and 
that it was evident from his retreat that he had no such design, he resolved to 
advance into Hyrcania. Arriving at Tagge, and being informed by the inha- 
bitants that the whole way leading to the summit of the mountain Labutas 
which overlooked Hyrcania, was extremely difficult, and that oreat numbers 
of barbarians also had already possessed themselves of all the passes he 
divided his light-armed forces into many little bodies, and sent them away 
tinder different leaders, assigning to each the route which they should take. 
The pioneers of the army were separated also into little bands; and were 
ordered to attend the light-armed troops, and, in every part, as they arrived 
to make the ascent practicable for the heavy forces, and the beasts that were' 
loaded with the baggage. When he had made this disposition, he gave to 
Diogenes the van of the army, which was composed of archers and stingers, 
and those mountaineers who are very skilful in throwing darts or stones' and 
who, not keeping any rank, but engaging man with man, as time and 'place 
may require, perform the greatest service in such difficult passes, ^ext to 
these marched a body of two thousand Cretans, armed with bucklers, and led 
by Polyxenidas of Rhodes. And in the rear of all were the heavy forces 
under the command of Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus an iEtolian. 

As the army advanced, the way was found to be much more rouo-h and dif- 
ficult than it had been before conceived. For as the whole length of the 
ascent was not less than three hundred stadia, so the greatest part of the way 
also was through a deep and hollow road, formed by the winter torrents, anil 
filled with trees and fragments of rocks which had fallen from the mountains 
that hung over it. The barbarians, likewise, not only had increased these 
difficulties, by laying trees together in heaps, and stones of the largest size, 
but had spread themselves upon all the eminences that were most proper fop 
their purpose, along the whole border of the road. And, indeed, if they had 
not wholly been mistaken in their judgment, the king must have been forced 
to desist from his design. For, having persuaded themselves that the whole 
army must necessarily pass along this road, they had taken the measures that 
were most agreeable to this persuasion, and secured the posts that were most 
proper for defending the passage. But they never had considered that, 
though the baggage and the heavy forces mui pass, indeed, along' this way' 
because it was not possible for them to ascend the neighbouring mountains', 
yet the light-armed troops might advance along the very summit of the rocks! 
No sooner, therefore, was the first of their posts attacked, t! an the whole face 
pf things was entirely changed. For Diogenes, perceiving in the very first 
conflict what was necessary to be done, led his troops out of the hollow' way, 
•and, having gained the heights that were above the enemy, galled them with 
■ darts and stones. The scopes especially that were di: ■■charged by t^e slingers, 
from a considerable distance, spread among them so great disorder, that 'they 



358 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



•were forced to abandon their post. The pioneers then cleared the ground in 
full security ; and, as the number of them was great, this task was soon ac- 
complished. And thus, as the archers and slingers, with the rest of the light- 
armed troops, still continued to advance, sometimes spreading, themselves 
along the sides of the rocks, and sometimes uniting in a body, and seizing all 
the advantageous posts ; while the Cretans, as a reserve, marched slowly and 
in good order through the hollow road, the barbarians/unable to sustain these 
different attacks, abandoned their several stations, and retreated together to 
the top of the mountain. In this manner, Antiochus at last conducted his 
army through the passes, though very slowly, and with great difficulty : for 
he had scarcely gained upon the eighth day the summit of the mountain. As 
the enemy had assembled all their forces together in this place, and were per- 
suaded that they should still compel him to desist from his design, a new and 
fierce battle ensued. But the barbarians were defeated in the following man- 
ner. They had formed themselves into a close body, and maintained the fight 
with courage, against the heavy forces that attacked them in front, when they 
perceived that the light-armed troops, having made a circuit in the night, had 
possessed themselves of the eminences in their rear. At this sight they were 
struck with terror, and began to fly with great precipitation. The king 
would not suffer them to be pursued, but ordered the trumpets to sound a 
retreat, that he might descend, with all his army, in good order, into H,yr- 
cania. Having regulated his march as he desired^ he arrived at Tambracus, 
a city not inclosed witn walls, but of great extent, and in which there was also 
a royal palace. In this place he encamped ; and, being informed that the 
greatest part of the routed army, together with many of the neighbouring 
people, had retired to Syrinx, which was at no great distance from Tambracus, 
and, on account both of its strength and situation, was considered as the ca- 
pital of all Hyrcania, he resolved to make himself master of' that cit)^. Ad- 
vancing, therefore, with his army, he extended his forces ronnd it, and began 
the siege. The chief part of his labour was employed in preparing tortoises, 
ior the purpose of filling up the intrenchmei^s. For the city was surrounded 
by three ditches, each of which contained not less than thirty cubits in 
breadth, and fifteen in depth. Upon the top of each was a double pallisade, 
and beyond them a strong wall. It was here that continual combats passed 
■without any intermission ; so that neither the besiegers, nor the besieged, were 
able to remove the wounded and the dead. For they not only fought above 
the ground, but often met together in the mines which they had digged be- 
low. By the activity, however, of the king, as well as from the number of 
the troops employed, the ditches were in a short time filled, and the wall fell 
in the part that was undermined. The barbarians, unable any longer to 
make resistance, killed all the Greeks that were in the place ; and, having 
pillaged the city of all the goods that were of greatest value, endeavoured to 
escape by night. But Antiochus, being informed of their retreat, ordered 
Hyperbasis to pursue them with the mercenaries. The barbarians, upon the 
first approach of these troops, threw away their baggage, and fled back into 
the city. And when they found that the heavy armed forces had also entered 
the city through the breach, they despaired of any farther means of safety, 
and surrendered themselves to the king. 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH. 

The consuls Marccllus and Crispinus are lost through their own imprudence. 
Reflections of the historian upon this event. 

The consuls Marcel las and Crispinus, being desirous to take a perfect view of 
those parte'of the hill that looked towards the camp oftise enemy, ordered the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 359 



rest of the army to remain within the intrenchment, and, attended only by two 
troops of horse, 6ome light-armed, and about thirty lictors, advanced to ex- 
amine the ground. It happened that some of the Numidians, who were ac- 
customed to wait in ambuscade, aud to attack by surprise those who came out 
to skirmish, or upon any occasion advanced from the Roman camp, had at 
this very time concealed themselves, lying close under the foot of the hill. As 
soon, then, as their scout gave notice, by a signal, that some of the enemy 
were above them, they rose from their place, and, winding along the sides of 
the hill, intercepted the consuls, and cut off their return to the camp. The 
consul Claudius, and some others, were killed in the first onset; and the rest, 
being wounded, directed their flight, by different ways, among the precipices. 
The son of Claudius, who was also wounded, very unexpectedly escaped, and 
with great difficulty. The Romans, from their camp, saw distinctly every 
thing that passed, but were not able to send any assistance. For while they 
cried aloud, and were struck with consternation at what had happened ; while 
some bridled their horses, and ethers prepared their arms, the action was en- 
tirely finished. Thus was Marcellus lost through his own simplicity, and by 
not attending to the proper duty of a general. 

I have often been forced, in the course of this history, to make some reflec- 
tions upon faults like these : for, among all into which the leaders of armies 
are betrayed, there is none more frequent, nor any, on the other hand, that af- 
fords a clearer proof of ignorance. What good, indeed, can be expected front 
a man, who knows not that the commander of an army should keep himself, 
as much as it is possible, out of little combats, which decide nothing with re- 
spect to the whole ; and that, if ever any occasion should oblige him to take 
a part in such engagements, he ought to see many fall before the danger be 
suffered to approach himself? Let the base Carian risk his life, as the pro- 
verb expresses it, and not the general. To say afterwards, I did not think 
it, and, Who could have expected such an accident ? is, in my judgment, the 
strongest proof that a general can give of his want of capacity and sense. I 
cannot, therefore, but consider Annibal, who was, indeed, in many other re- 
spects, an excellent commander, as most particularly admirable upon this oc- 
Oount ; that, in all the long time which he passed in a hostile country, amidst 
much variety of fortune, and in the course of so many and so great battles, though 
upon many occasions he surprised the enemy, he never was himself surprised. 
So great was the prudence with which he provided always for the safety of his 
own person. And surely nothing is more commendable than such precau- 
tion. For though an army may have suffered an entire defeat, yet, if the ge- 
neral be unhurt and safe, many favourable occasions may arise for repairing 
the loss that has been sustained. But w r hen he, who is as the pilot in a vessel, 
falls, the army, though superior, perhaps, in the action to the enemy, eannot 
drew any advantage even from victory; because the hopes of every man are 
centured in the leader. Let this, then, serve as a caution to those commanders 
who, through ostentation, youthful folly, a want of experience, or a contempt 
of the enemy, are apt to fall into such absurdity of conduct. For to one or 
other of these causes misfortunes, tike that which has now been mentioned, 
must always be ascribed. 



560 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 



The conduct of Sripio in Spain. He is joined by Mandonias and Andobalis: 
defeats Asdrubal in battle, and, forces him to leave the country. He rejects 
the title of king, which was offered to him by the Spaniards. 



CHAP. I. 

While Scipio remained in winter quarters at Taraco, as we before have men-* 
tioned, he endeavoured to secure the confidence and friendship of the Spa- 
niards," by delivering to them the several hostages which had fallen into his 
power. An accident happened which greatly assisted him in this design. 
Edeco, a powerful prince in the country, no sooner heard that the Romans 
were become masters of New Carthage, and that his wife and children were 
in their hands, than he considered with himself, that it was highly probable 
that the Spaniards would in no long time revolt, and join the conquerors. 
He resolved, therefore, to set the first example of his change ; being per- 
suaded, that by such a measure, he not only should recover again his wife and 
children, but appear also to have embraced the friendship of the Romans, not 
through necessity, but by choice. Nor was he, indeed, disappointed in his 
hopes. As soon as the armies were fixed in winter quarters, he came to Ta- 
raco, with some of the nearest of his friends ; and being admitted into the 
presence of Scipio, < ; he thanked the gods," he said, " who had permitted 
him to be the first in coining to him, of ail the princes of the country. The 
others, indeed, extended their hands towards the Romans ; but still turned 
their eyes towards the Carthaginiaus, and held a correspondence with them; 
but that he, on the contrary, was ready to surrender without reserve, not only 
himself, but his kindred also and friends, to the Romans. That, if Scipio 
Would consider him as an ally and friend, he might draw from such com- 
pliance many great advantages, both now and in future times. That, with 
respect to the present, the rest of the Spaniards, as soon as they should find 
that he was treated as a friend, and had obtained what he desired, would 
hasten to follow his example ; with the hopes of recovering again their fa- 
milies, and of being received into the same alliance. And that hereafter, like- 
wise, possessed, as they wcmld be, with a sense of so great an honour as well 
as kinduess, they would be ready to assist him without reserve, in all the ope- 
rations of the war. He entreated him, therefore, to restore to him his wife and 
children, to consider him as his friend, and to suffer him to return with that de- 
nomination to his own country till some occasion should arise, iu which he 
might shew, in the most effectual manner, the sincerity of his own attachment, 
as well as that of his friends, both to Scipio himself, and to all the interests of 
the Romans." 

Here he ended his discourse. Scipio, who long before had viewed the thing 
in this very light, and had reasoned upon it with himself, in the same'manner 
as Edeco had done, immediately restored his wife auS children, and gave him. 
an assurance of his friendship. And when, in the course of many conversa- 
tions which they afterwards held together, he had insinuated himself, by various 
methods, into the heart of the Spaniard, and had raised also in all his friends 
preat expectations of future honour and advantage, he sent them back to their 
own country. 

The report of this transaction being soon noised abroad, all the Spaniards 
that lived on that side of the Iberus, and who before were enemies of the Ro- 
ttiaus, immediately with one consent embraced their party. When the success 
of this measure had so fully answered all his expectations, Scipio, having now 
bo enemy upon the sea, disbanded. his naval forces; and, selecting the ablest 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. sfJi 



of the men, distributed them among the companies, and increased his land 
army. 

CHAP. II. 

Mandonius and Ahdobalis were two of the roost powerful among the 
prince? i i Spain, and had always been considered as the firmest friends of the 
Carthaginians. But they long had harboured a secret dissatisfaction in their 
minds, because Asdrubal, on pretence that he suspected their fidelity, had 
demanded their wives and children us hostages, together with a large sum in 
money, as we have already related. Conceiving, therefore, the present oppOr» 
tunity to be most favourable for carrying into execution the design winch they, 
had from that time meditated, they withdrew their troops from the Cartha- 
giniau camp by night, and retired to some fortified posts, in winch the* .ere 
secured from being attacked. This revolt was followed also by that of many 
others of the Spaniards, who for a long time had supported with great pain, 
the haughtiness of the Carthaginians, and were ready to seize the first occasion 
that was offered to declare their real inclinations. 

Examples of the same kind have been indeed extremely frequent. It is a 
great thing undoubtedly to obtain success in action, and to defeat an enemy ira 
the field. But, as we have often taken occasion to observe, it requires much 
greater skill and caution to make a good use of victory. There are many 
who know how to conquer, and but few, in the comparison, who use their con- 
quest with advantage. The Carthaginians were among the first of these. 
As soon as they had defeated the Roman army, and killed the two consuls, 
Publius and Cnseus, being persuaded that they should now hold without dis* 
pute the sovereignty of Spain, they treated all the people of the country with 
the greatest haughtiness. Instead, therefore, of allies and friends, they made 
all who had submitted to their power their enemies. And how, indeed, could 
it be otherwise ? They conceived, that one way was the best for gaining em- 
pire, and another for maintaining it. They ought, however, to have learned, 
that men most easily preserve their power, by persisting in the same course of 
conduct by which it was at first obtained. Now nothing is more evident, or 
more confirmed, by a great variety of examples, than that the surest way of 
drawing any people to submission is to flatter them with kindness, and to allure 
them' by the prospect of advantage. But if men, when they have gained the 
end which they desired, reverse this treatment, and load those that have sub- 
mitted to them with rigour and severity, the inclinations of the subjects, as the 
Carthaginians now experienced, will not fail to correspond with the change of 
conduct in the governors. 

In this dangerous condition of affairs the mind of Asdrubal was filled with 
many apprehensions, aud distracted by various thoughts. He was grieved at 
the revolt of Andobalis. The discontent of his own officers, and their opposi- 
tion to his will, added much to his anxiety. He dreaded also the arrival of 
Scipio with his army; and he judged that this would very shortly happen; 
perceiving likewise, that the Spaniards had deserted him, and were hastening 
with one consent to join the Romans, he" at last resolved, that he would dispose 
all things in the best order that was possible, and try the fortune of a battle ; 
that, if happily he should be victorious in the action, he might afterwards 
deliberate upon future measures in full security. If, on the other hand, he 
should be conquered, he would then retreat with the remains Of his army into 
Gaul ; and, being joined by as many of the barbarians as he should be able'to 
draw together in that country, would from theuce pass into Italy, to assist 
Annibal his brother, and to partake with him in the same common hopes. 

While Asdrubal was forming this design, Scipio, having being joined again 
by Lselius, who brought to him the orders of the senate, drew ail the troops 
from their winter quarters, and began his march. In every place through 

YOL. I. NO. 6, g % 



302 GENERAL KISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



which he passed, the Spaniards were prepared to meet him, and joined them- 
selves to the army with alacrity and joy. Among- the rest, Andobalis, who 
had long before sent messages to Scipio, no sdoner was informed ef his ap- 
proach, than he went out of his camp to meet him, attended by his friends. 
Aud when he had joined him, he began with giving an account of his late Con- 
nexion with the Carthaginians : displaying, on the one hand, the advantages 
which they had drawn from his alliance, and the fidelity with which he had 
always served them ; and^ on the other, the many injuries and insults with 
which his services had been requited. He entreated Scipio therefore to be 
himself the judge of what he had heard. That if he should be found to have 
falsely accused the Carthaginians, it might with good reason be supposed, that 
be would not long maintain his faith in this new alliance. But if on the con- 
trary, he had only separated himself from his former friends, because a long 
course of injurious treatment had compelled him t© abandon them, there was 
ijood ground to hope, that, having now embraced the party of the Romans, he 
would adhere to it with a firm affection. He said many other things upon 
this subject. And when he had ended, Scipio, replied : " That he doubted 
not of the truth of .what he had heard. That he could well judge what must 
have been the insolence of the Carthaginians towards him ; not only from the 
manner in which they had treated all the people of Spain; but more particu- 
larly from the insults to which the wives and daughters of Andobalis and the 
other princes had beeu exposed. That himself, on the contrary, when these 
women had fallen into his power, not as hostages, but as prisoners and slaves, 
had observed towards them such strict fidelity, that even they who were their 
parents scarcely could have equalled him in discharging' that duty." Ando- 
balis declared aloud, that he spoke the truth ; and, prostrating himself before 
him, saluted him with the appellation of King. The rest that were present all 
applauded the word. But Scipio, inclining himself towards them, only ex- 
horted them to take courage, and to be assured, that they should receive every 
mark of kindness from the Romans. He then delivered to them their wives 
and daughters, and, on the next day, concluded a treaty with them, in which 
the chief condition was, that they should be subject to the command of the 
Roman leaders, and obey the orders which they should give. The Spaniards, 
after this transaction,, returned back again to their own camp, and, taking 
with them all their forces, came and encamped together with the Romans^ 
and began their march with them towards Asdrubal. 

The Carthaginian general was at this time encamped in the neighbourhood 
of Baetula, a city situated in the Castalonian district, at no great distance from 
the silver mines. But when he heard that the Romans were advancing 
towards him, he went into another camp, which was secured behind by a river. 
In his front he had a plain, which was bordered at the extremity by a rising 
ground, of a height sufficient to cover the camp, and of sufficient length also 
for drawing up the army in battle. In this place he remained, taking care 
only to place continually an advanced guard of troops upon the rising 
ground. As soon as Scipio arrived, he was impatient to engage ; but the 
great advantages of the ground in which Asdrubal was encamped, filled hiin 
with perplexity. When he had waited, however, two whole days, and begaia 
to fear that if Mago, and Asdrubal, the son of Gesco, should advance also with 
their armies, he should then be enclosed on every side, he resolved to make 
some attempt, at least, to draw the enemy to a battle. Having ordered, 
therefore, the rest of the army to remain in the intrenchments, and to hold 
themselves in readiness to engage, he sent away a part of the light-armed 
trqops, together with the extraordinaries of the infantry, to attack those bodies 
of tht enemy that were posted upon the rising ground. This order was exe- 
cuted with vigour. The Carthaginian general remained for some time quiet, 
aud expected the event. But, when he saw that his men were closely pressed 
by the Romans, and that they suffered greatly in the action, he drew out his 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 363. 



army, and, trusting to the advantage of his situation, began to range them in 
order of battle upon the rising ground. Scipio then sent away all the 
light-armed forces, to assist those that were first engaged ; and, at the same 
time, dividing the rest of his army into two equal bodies, he gave one of them 
to La?lius, and ordered him to make a circuit round the rising ground, and 
fall upon the right of the enemy, while himself, with the other, wheeled' 
round on the opposite sideband attacked their left. While this was done, As- 
drubal was but just beginning to draw out his troops from the intrencbments* 
For to this momeut he had remained quiet, not expecting that the Romans 
would risk a battle against him in so strong a post. And now, when the thing 
had happened, it was too late to draw up his army in proper order. The Ro- 
mans, therefore, falling thus upon the wings before they had taken their re- 
spective posts, not only gained the top of the rising ground without resistance, 
but continuing also to advance, while the enemy was still in motion to be 
formed, killed those who presented their Hank to them as they marched, and 
forced the rest, who had just formed themselves in front, to fly. When As- 
drubal perceived that his troops were repulsed in every part, persisting in the 
plan which he had at first formed, he resolved not to continue the battle to 
the last extremity. Taking with him, therefore, the money and the elephants, 
and collecting together as many as he was able of those that fled, he retreated 
towards the Tagus, with design to pass over the Pyreneeun mountains into 
Gauh 

Scipio, not judging it proper to pursue the enemy, lest the other generals 
should in the mean time advance towards him, gave permission to the soldiers 
to pillage the camp. On the following day, he assembled together all the 
prisoners, and gave the necessary orders concerning them. Their numbers 
were ten thousand of the foot, and more than two thousand horse. The 
Spaniards through all the country, who had taken arms in favour of the 
Carthaginians, came and submitted themselves to the Romans at discretion. 
In the conversations which they held with Scipio upon this occasion, they all 
saluted him with the name of king. This appellation had first been given to 
him by Edeco, who had also prostrated kimself before him. Andobalis used 
afterwards the same expression. The word at that time passed without any 
observation. But after the present victory, when Scipio found that all the 
Spaniards addressed him by that title, he thought it a matter that deserved 
his most serious reflection. Having assembled them therefore all together, 
lie told them, that he should always desire to be, and to be esteemed by all, 
a man of a mind truly royal: but that he neither would be a king, nor would 
he be so called by any one; and that, for the time to, come, they should 
"address him by no other appellation than that of general," 

The greatness of soul, that was displayed by Scipio uoon this occasion, 
may very justly be thought to deserve applause. Though at this time he was 
extremely young, and fortune had so favoured him in his Career, that a 
whole subject people made a voluntary offer to him of the royal title, he 
remained constant to himself, and was not to be tempted by so flattering a 
ahow of honour. But this same greatness will appear in a degree much more 
exalted, if we turn our view upon the latter period of his life. For when, 
after his exploits in Spain, he had subdued the Carthaginians, and brought 
the fairest aud the largest provinces of Afric, from the Philsenean altars even 
to the pillars of Hercules, into subjection to his country; when he had con- 
quered Asia and the Assyrian kings; and forced the noblest and the most 
considerable parts of the whole known world to submit to the Roman sway; 
how many occasions arose, of establishing himself in royalty, in almost any 
part of the earth that he should choose ? A situation like this might have 
inspired not only a human mind, but even divinity itself, if I may be allowed 
to say it, with ambitious pride. But so elevated, so superior was the soul of 
$eipio to that of other men, that, though 'sovereignty is regarded as the 



364 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

greatest blessing which the gods can give, and though it was thrown so often 
in his way by fortune, he rejected it with disdain, and preferred his own 
duty, and the interests of his country, to all the dazzling splendour and 
imagined happiness of power. But let us return from this digression.- 

Scipio, having separated the Spaniards from the rest of the prisoners, 
dismissed them without ransom to their .several countries. He permitted 
Andobalis to choose for himself three hundred of the horses, and distributed 
the rest among those who had none. He then took possession of the Cartha- 
ginian camp, because it was situated with so great advantage; and remained 
there with the army, expecting the other generals of the Carthaginians. He 
sent some troops also towards the Pyrensean mountains, to observe the motions 
of Asdrubal. When the summer was ended, he again decamped ; and re- 
turned back to Taraqo, to take his winter quarters in that city. 



EXTRACT THE SEVENTH. 

The preparations of Philip for maintaining the rear against the JEtqlians, 
supported by Attains and the Romans,, A digression on signals by lighted 



torches. 



CHAP, J. 



The iEtolians, haying now conceived the greatest expectations from the arrival 
<pf Attalus and the Romans, struck a terror into all the Greeks, and were 
ready to attack them by land, while Publius Sulpitius and Attalus pressed 
them on the side of the sea. The Achaeans, therefore, sent an embassy to 
Philip, to implore assistance. For, besides the danger which threatened them 
from the ^Etolians, Mechanidas also had drawn together an army upon the 
borders of the Argiau territory. The Eceotians, apprehensive that the fleet 
would make a descent upon their coasts, demanded likewise from Philip a 
leader and a body of troops. The Eubce&ns pressed him with the greatest 
earnestness to take some measures for their defence. The Acarnaniaus urged 
the same request. Ah embassy came also from Epirus. At the same time 
a report was spread that Scerdilsidas and Pleuratus were drawing together 
their forces: and that the Thraeians, who were contiguous to Macedon, and 
especially the Msedians, had resolved to invade that kingdom, as soon as 
Philip should be removed to any distance from it. The JEtolians likewise 
had already secured Thermopylae by ditches and intrenchments, and strong 
bodies of troops; and were persuaded that they had shut the entrance against 
Philip; and that it would not be possible fpr him to advance to the assistance 
of his allies that were within those passes. 

Conjectures like these, in which the leaders pf armies are obliged to exert 
all their strength, and to bring into trial their whole ability both ©f mind and 
body, are those which most particularly deserve the attention of the reader. 
For as, iu the diversions of the field, the force and vigour of the hunted beasts 
are never so conspicuously displayed, as when they are pressed on every side 
by danger; just so it happened with respect to these commanders; and in this 
light it was that Philip now appeared, As soon, therefore, as he had dismissed 
the ambassadors, with assurance that he would assist them with his utmost 
power, he applied his whole astentibn to the war: turning himself on every 
aide; and considering with the greatest care, to what part first he should 
direct his aim. Being informed that Attalus had passed over with his army 
to the island Peparethus, and was master of the open country, he sent a 
garrison to secure the city. He ordered Polyphantas to march with a body of 
troops to cover Phocis and Bceotia. To Chalcis and the other cities of 
Eubcea, he sent Menippus with a thousand heavy-armed soldiers, and five 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 36s 



hundred Agrianians. At the same time he began his own march towards 
Scotussa; having ordered the Macedonian troops to be assembled in that 
place. But when he heard that Attalus had sailed away to Niceaea; and that 
the vEtolian chiefs were assembled together at Heraclea, in order to deliberate 
concerning the operations of the war, he again left Scotussa, and marched 
with the greatest, haste, that he might either prevent or disperse their meet- 
ing. But the assembly had separated before he was able to arrive. He there- 
fore wasted the country; and when he had destroyed, or taken away, all the 
Corn, that was found among the people who lived round the jEuian bay, he 
returned back to Scotussa, and, leaving there the body of his army, went 
himself to Demetrias with the light-armed forces and the royal troop, and 
attehded to the designs of the enemy. And that the earliest knowledge might 
be obtained of all their motions, he sent orders to Peparethus, to the people 
of Phocis, and those of Eubcea, that they should inform him of every thing that 
should happen by signals of .lighted torches raised upon Tisoeum, a mountain 
of Thessaly, which stood commodious for conveying this kind of notice from 
all the parts now mentioned. But as this manner of making signals is of the 
greatest service in war, and no perfect method has hitherto appeared of carry- 
ing it into practice, it will not be unuseful if we here pause a while, and 
bestow upon it such consideration as the importance of the subject well 
Reserves. 



CHAP. II. 

It is a thing well known, that opportunity, which has so" great a share in the 
accomplishment of all designs, has the greatest in those that belong to war. 
Now, of all the inventions which have been contrived for securing opportunity, 
the most effectual is that of making signals by the means of lighted torches. 
By this method, things which have been just transacted, and others at the 
very time in which they happen, may be communicated to those who are 
concerned to know them; though they are distant perhaps three or four days' 
journey, and sometimes even many days from the place, and the requisite 
assistance be received, when it seems scarcely possible to expect it. In 
former times the manner of conveying this notice was too simple; and the 
invention, upon that account, lost much of its advantages. For the method 
was, to settle by concert some fixed and determinate signals. But as the 
things which happen are infinite, the greater part were incapable of being 
signified by such a method. Thus, for example, that an army is arrived at 
Oreum, Peparethus, or at Chalcis, may be expressed by signals before con- 
certed. But accidents of a different kind, such as the revolt of the citizens, 
the discovery of treason, massacres committed in the city, and other events 
like these; accidents which, though they are very frequent, cannot before be 
taken into account; and which, because they happen unexpectedly, require a 
speedier consultation and more quick relief; these accidents never could be 
signified by signals of torches before concerted. For it is not possible that 
signals should be concerted to give notice of events which cannot be foreseen. 

iEneas, who composed a work on the Art of War, perceiving the defects of 
this method, added indeed some little improvement to this invention; but was 
very far from carrying it to that degree of perfection which the thing requires* 
The reader may judge of it from the account that follows. 

Let those, says he, who intend to convey and to receive intelligence of what 
has happened by the means of lighted torches, take two earthen vessels, of a 
depth and breadth exactly equal. The depth of three cubits may commonlv 
be sufficient, and the breadth one. Let them then take two corks, a little 
less in size than the mouths of the vessels, and in the middle of them fix two 
Sticks; which must be divided, on the outside into equal portions, very dis» 



366 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS-. 



distinctly marked, and containing three fingers' breadth in each. Upon each 
of the portions inscribe one or other of those events which usually happen in 
the time of war. On one, for example; " A body of cavalry is come into the 
country." On the next; "A body of heavy infantry." Upon a third; 
** Light-armed forces." On another ; ',' A body of cavalry and infantry.'* 
Then again; " A fleet of ship?." Afterwards; " Corn." And in the same 
manner upon the rest till all the portions are severally filled with those events, 
which are capable of being foreseen, and which the state and condition of the 
war may render probable. Particular care is to be taken^ that the tapholes 
in both the vessels be exactly equal, that the water may be discharged alike 
from both. Let the vessels be then filled with water, and the corks with the 
sticks be placed upon the water ; and then let the tapholes be opened. When 
this is done, it is clear, that, if all things are exactly equal in both vessels, 
tho corks, together with the sticks that are upon them, will sink alike in both, 
as the water is discharged. When the experiment therefore has first been 
made, and the sticks are found to descend in equal time, let the vessels be 
carried to the respective places, in which the signals are to be given and 
received. And when any one of those events, which are inscribed upon the 
sticks, has happened, let those on one side raise a lighted torch, and hold it 
till another torch be shown on the other side. Then let the first be dropped ; 
and the tap-holes of the vessels on both sides be opened. And when, by the 
sinking of the cork, that portion of the stick, which is inscribed with the 
event intended to be communicated, becomes level with the mouth of the 
vessel, let those on one side again rise a lighted torch, and those on the other 
stop the taphole of their Vessel, and examine the inscription that is also level 
"with the mouth. For the writing in this part will be the same in one vessel as 
in the other, if all things have been performed in exact and equal time. 

But this method, though preferable, indeed, to that of making concerted 
signals with the help of torches, is far from being attended with sufficient 
certainty. For it is evident that all things cannot be foreseen : and, if they 
could, that it would be impossible to inscribe them all upon a stick. When 
an event, therefore, happens, of which there was no suspicion, no notice can 
ever be given of it in this method. Add to this, that the inscriptions also 
upon the sticks are themselves too indeterminate. They neither show the 
numbers of the infantry or cavalry ; nor into what part of the country they 
are come, nor the number of the ships arrived ; nor the quantity of the corn. 
For as these are circumstances, which cannot possibly be known before they 
happen, it is by consequence impossible to ascertain or mark them. And yet 
this is the most important part of the whole. For, unless we know the 
numbers of the enemy, and the place into which they are come, how shall it 
be determined what assistance is necessary to be sent? Unless we are informed 
how many ships the fleet contains, and what quantity of corn the allies have 
furnished, how can we frame a judgement with regard to the event, or how in 
a word be able to take any measures? 

The last method which I shall mention, was invented by Cleoxenus or De- 
moclitus, but perfected by myself. This method is precise, and capable of 
signifying every thing that happens with the greatest accuracy. A very exact 
attention, however, is required in using it. It is this which follows : 

Take the alphabet, and divide it into five parts, with five letteis in each. 
In the last part indeed, one letter will be wanting; but this is of no import- 
ance. Then let those who are to give and to receive the signals, write upon 
five tablets the five portions of the letters in their proper order; and concert 
together the following plan. That he, on one side, who is to make the signal, 
shall first raise two lighted torches, and hold them erect, till they are an- 
swered by torches from the other side. This only serves to show, that they 
are on both sides ready and prepared. That afterwards, he again, who gives 
the signal, shall first raise .some torches upon the left handy in order to make 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 36? 



known to those on the other side whieh of the tablets is to be inspected. If 
the first, for example, a single torch : if the second, two : and so of the rest. 
That then he shall raise other torches also upon the right ; to mark in the same 
manner, to those who receive the signal, which of the letters upon the tablet 
is to be observed and written. When they have thus regulated then plan, 
and taken their respective posts, it will be necessary first to have a dioptrical 
instrument, framed, with two holes or tubes ; one for discerning the right, 
and the other the left hand of the person who is to raise the torches on the 
opposite side. The tablets must be placed erect, and in their proper order, 
near the instrument. And, upon the right and left, there should be also a. 
solid fence, of about ten feet in length, and of the height of a man : that the 
torches, being raised along the top of these ramparts, may give a more certain 
light; and, when they are dropped again, that they may also be concealed 
behind them. When all things then are thus prepared, if it be intended, for 
example, to convey this notice ; " that some of the soldiers, about a hundred 
in number, are gone over to the enemy ;" it will be necessary, in the first place, 
to choose words for this purpose which contain the fewest letters. Thus, if it 
be said, " Cretans a hundred have deserted ;" the same thing is expressed in 
less than half of the letters which compose the former sentence. These word* 
then, being first written down, are communicated by means of torches in 
the following manner. The first letter is Cappa, which stands in the second 
division of the alphabet, and upon the second tablet. The person, therefore, 
who makes the signal, first holds up two torches upon the left, to signify that 
it is the second tablet, which is to be inspected: and afterwards five upon the 
right; to show that Cappa is the letter, which he who receives the signal must 
observe and write. For Cappa stands the fifth in the second division of the 
letters. Then again, he holds up four torches upon the left; because Ro is 
found in the fourth division: and two upon the right, to denote that it stands 
the second in that division. From hence, the person who receives the signal 
writes Ro upon his tables: and, in the same manner, all the rest of the letters.. 
By this method, an account of every thing that happens may be conveyed 
with the most perfect accuracy. It is true indeed, that, because every letter 
requires a double signal, a great number of torches must be employed. If 
the necessary pains however be used, the thing will be found to be very prac- 
ticable. In both these methods, it is principally requisite, that the persons 
employed should first be exercised by practice: that, when a real occasion 
happens, the signals may be made and answered without any mistake. 

With respect to the seeming difficulty of the method, it would be easy to 
show, by many instances, that there is a very great difference in the same 
things, when they are first proposed, and when they are afterwards rendered 
familiar to us by habit: and that many things which appear in the beginning to 
be not only difficult, but absolutely impracticable, in the course of time, and 
by continued use, are accomplished with the greatest ease. Among number- 
less examples, the art of reading may be mentioned, as one of the clearest 
and most convincing proofs of the truth of this remark. Take a man, who 
has never learnt to read, but is otherwise a man of sense. Set a child before 
him, who has learned, and order him to read a passage in a book. Itis certain 
that this man will scarcely be able to persuade himself, that the child, as he 
reads, must consider distinctly, first the form of all the letters: in the next 
place their power: and, thirdly, their connexion one with another. For each 
of these things requires a certain portion of time. When he hears him, there- 
fore, read four or five lines together without any hesitation, and in a breath, 
he will find^it very difficult to believe, that the child never saw the book be- 
fore. But," if to the reading some gesture also should be added ; if the child 
should attend to all the stops, and observe all the breathings rough and 
smooth, it will be absolutely impossible to convince the man that this is true. 
From hence, therefore, we may learn, never to be deterred from any useful 



368 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



pursuit by the seeming difficulties that attend it ; but to endeavour rather to 
surmount those difficulties by practice and by habit. It is habit which gives 
to men the noblest acquisitions: even those which are upon many occasions - 
the principal means of their safety. With respect to myself, what induced me 
to enter into a discussion of this kind, was the remark that was made in a 
former part of this work ; that, in the present age, the sciences are advanced 
to so great perfection, that almost every thing is capable of being taught by 
method. Such digressions, therefore, deserve to be considered as some of the 
aaost useful parts of a history that is well composed. 



EXTRACT THE EIGHTH, 

The manner in which the Aspasians pass the Oxus* 

The wandering tribes that are called Aspasians, live between the Oxus and 
the Tanais. The first of these rivers discharges itself into the Hyrcanian sea, 
and the other into the Mceotis. Both of them are so large as to be navigable. 
It is dfficult, therefore, to conceive, in what manner this barbarous people 
pass the Oxus without the help of vessels, and come into Hyrcania with their 
horses*. Two different aecounts are given of this fact, one of which is pro- 
bable ; and the other, though very extraordinary, not impossible. The Oxus 
takes its sources from mount Caucasus; and being increased by the addition 
of many large streams as it flows through Bactriana, rolls its waters over the 
plain with a full and impetuous course. From thence it passes through a 
desert to the top of a craggy precipice ; whose height, together with the 
strength and the rapidity of the waters, throws the stream forward with such 
violence, ? that it falls upon the ground below, at the distance of more than a 
stadium from the rock. By this way, it is said, the Aspasians enter Ayrcania; 
passing close along the rock, and under the fall of the river. But there is an- 
other account, which appears to be much more probable. This account affirm^ 
that at the bottom of the rock there are some large cavities in the ground ; 
that the river, forcing its way downward through these cavities, runs to a 
moderate distance under ground, and afterwards appears again ; and that the 
"barbarians, being well acquainted with the part that is left dry, pass over it 
with their horses into Hyrcania. 

EXTRACT THE NINTH. 

Antiochus gains the victory in an engagement ({gainst Euthydemus, who had 

revolted. f, 

When Antiochus was informed that Euthydemus had encamped with his whole 
army near TPaguria, and that he had stationed a bod} T of ten thousand cavalry 
upon the banks of the river Arius, to defend the passage, he immediately 
raised the siege, and resolved to pass the river, and to advance towards the 
enemy. -Being distant three days' journey from the place, during the first two 
days he moved with a moderate pace ; but, on the evening of the third, having 

.'* There is much geographical error in this account. For Hyrcania itself is situated be- 
tween the Tanais and the Oxus. It might be imagined that what the author calls the 
Oxus should mean the Araxes, which enters the Hyrcanian sea on the western side, as the 
Oxus does on the east. And these two rivers are often mistaken one for the other by tha 
ancients. But, on the other hand, what he afterwards says, that this river rises ia mount 
Caucassus,aud runs^through Bactriana, agrees with the Oxus, but not with the Araxes. The 
truth is, the ancients, even after the expedition of Alexander, had a. very imperfect know- 
ledge of these parts of the globe. As this is almost the single mistake of this kind that J; 
bave observed in Polybius, 1 was willing to remark it. In general, he is more exact and 
accurate in the names of places, and descriptions of countries, than even the professed 
writers of geography. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 369 



ordered the rest of the army to decamp, and follow him at break of day, he 
took the cavalry and the light-armed troops, tog-ether with ten thousand of the 
peltastae, and continued his march all night with the greatest haste : for he 
bad heard that the cavalry of the enemy, wtiich guarded the passage of the 
river by day, retired, as soon as the night came on, to a certain city, which was 
full twenty stadia distant from the river. As the country was a level plain, 
commodious for the march of cavalry, he arrived at the expected time, and 
passed the river with the greatest part of his forces before the day approached. 
But the Bactrian cavalry, being now informed by their scours of what had 
happened, ran towards the river, and were ready to attack the troopy as they 
marched. The king, judging it to be necessary that he should receive their 
first charge, exhorted the two thousand horsemen that always fought near his 
person, to perform their duty ; and, having ordered the rest to range them- 
selves in troops and cohorts, and to take their accustomed posts, led on his 
body of cavalry, and eugaged with the foremost of the enemy. In this action' 
he distinguished himself above all that were with him. Many fell on both 
sides ; but the first squadron -of the enemy was at last broken by the king. 
When the second, and afterwards the third squadron advanced- to the charge, 
the troops of Antiochus were in their turn pressed, and began to fall into dis- 
order. But Pansetolus, bringing up the rest of the cavalry, who were now 
almost all completely formed, rescued the king from danger, aud forced the' 
Bactrians, whose ranks were already broken, to fly in great disorder. Nor did 
they stop their flight till they had reached the camp of Euthydemus, being 
still closely pursued by Fanaetolus, and having lost the greatest part of 
their men. The royal cavalry, when they had killed great numbers, and 
taken many also alive, at last desisted from the pursuit, and encamped upon 
the banks of the river. Antiochus had a horse killed under him in the battle, 
and was himself wounded in the mouth, and lost some of his teeth. Nor was 
there, indeed, any action of his life in which he gained so high a reputation 
for courage, as in this engagement. Euthydemus, disheartened by this de- 
feat, retreated to Zariaspa, a city oi'Bactriana, with all k\s armyo 



BOOK THE ELEVENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

Asdmbal, having entered Italy, is defeated by the Romans. His. death and 

character. 

Asdrubal was, in all respects, dissatisfied with the state in which things ap- 
peared : but, as it was now too late to take other measures, because the Ro- 
mans- were already formed, and beginning to advance towards him, he wa« 
constrained to draw up the Spaniards, and the Gauls that were with him, in 
order of battle. He placed the elephants, which were ten in number, in 
front, increased the depth of his files, and ranged his whole army upon a very 
narrow ground. He then took his post in the centre of the line, behind the. 
elephants; and moved to attack the left of the enemy, having before deter- 
mined, that in this battle he would either conquer or die. Livius, leading on 
his troops with a slow and haughty pace, began the combat with great vigour. 
But Claudius, who commanded on the right, was unable to advance so as to 
surround the enemy, being utterly obstructed by those difficulties of the 
ground which have before been mentioned, and which had determined "Asdru- 
bal to make his whole attack upon the left. Anxious, therefore, and not wil- 
ling to remain inactive, he had recourse to the measure which the occasion 
itself suggested to him. From having drawn away his troops for the right, he 
led them round the field of battle, and, passing beyond the left of the Roman 
army, attacked the Carthaginians in flank behind the elephants. To this mo- 
VOL. 1. n@, 6. 3 A 



37Q GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

tnent the suceess of the battle had remained doubtful ; for both the Cartha- 
ginians and the Romans, well knowing- that they had no hopes of safety but in 
victory, maintained the fight with equal bravery. The service also which the 
elephants performed had been the same to both. For these beasts, being en- 
closed between the two armies, and wounded by the darts, spread no less dis- 
order among- the ranks of the Spaniards than amohg those of the Romans. 
But when Claudius fell upon the enemy from behind, the engagement was no 
longer equal. The Spaniards, pressed at once both in front and rear, were 
almost all slaughtered in their ranks. Six of the elephants were killed, to- 
gether with the men who conducted them ; and four, which had forced 
'their way through the disordered ranks, were afterwards taken, but without 
their leaders. Asdrubal, who had so often distinguished himself upon former 
occasions, displayed no less courage in this last action, and fell in the battle. 
It would be unjust not to pause awhile, and give the praise that is due to the 
character of this great commander. 

It has already been mentioned that he was the brother of Annibal ; and that 
the latter, when he began his march towards Italy, left to him the care of the 
affairs of Spain. The many engagements which he sustainad against the Ro- 
mans in that country ; the various difficulties in, which he was involved by the 
jealousy of those commanders who were sent from time to time into Spain from 
Carthage ; hovy truly he showed himself, npon all those occasions, to be the 
worthy son of Amilcar Barcas ; and with what spirit and magnanimity he sup- 
ported his misfortunes and defeats ; these things have been all related in the. 
former books. Bat his conduct, in the last scene of this contention, is that 
which especially deserves to be remarked, and is most worthy to be imitated. 

The greatest part of genera's and of princes, when they are ready to engage 
in a decisive action, place continually before their eyes the honour and advan- 
tages that may result from victory, and consider only how they may best im- 
prove each circumstance, and in what manner they shall use the fruits of their 
success, but never turn their view upon the consequences of a defeat, nor 
form for themselves any rule of action in the case of a misfortune. And yet 
the conduct which the first of these situations may require, is sufficiently plain 
and obvious; but the second demands great foresight. Now, from hence it 
has happened that commanders, through the want of this attention, and not 
having before determined in what manner they shall act upon such occasions, 
after the bravest efforts of. their soldiers, have often been defeated with dis- 
grace and shame ; have dishonoured all their former actions, and loaded the 
remainder of their lives with reproach and infamy. How many have been lost 
"by this fatal negligence, and how. much one man is, in this respect, superior 
to another, may be learned with little pains. The history of past times is filled 
with such examples. But Asdrubal displayed a very different conduct. As 
long as any hppe remained of performing actions not unworthy of his former 
glory, he attended to nothing so much in every battle as to the care of his own 
safety. But when fortune had taken from him every future prospect, and con- 
fined him to the last desperate- extremity, though "he neglected nothing that 
inight secure the victory, either in the disposition of his army, or in the time 
itself of the engagement, yet he gonsidered also, with no less attention, in what 
manner, in case that he .should be defeated, he might submit with dignity to 
his adverse fortune, and not suffer any thing unworthy of his former actions. 
Let other commanders then be taught" by this example, as, on the one hand, 
net to frustrate the hopes of those who depend upon them, by throwing them- 
selves unnecessarily into danger; so, on the other, never to add disgrace to 
their misfortunes, by cherishing an immoderate desire of life. 

The Romaus, as soon as they had gained the victory, pillaged the camp of 
the enemy. Finding many of the Gauls drunk, and sleeping upon their 
straw, they slaughtered them as victims, without resistance. The prisoners 
were then collected together : and from this part of the booty more than three 
hundred tsdenjs were brought into the public treasury. Not fewer than ten 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 371 



thousand Gauls and Carthaginians fell in the engagement, and about two 
thousand of the Romans. Same of the Carthaginians that were of eminent 
rank were taken alive ; the rest were destroyed in the action. 

When the account of this great success arrived at Rome, so vehement was 
the desire that it might be true, that it was not at first believed. But when 
messengers after messengers not only confirmed the news of the victory, but 
reported also all the circumstances of the battle, the whole city was transported 
with extravagant joy. Every shrine was then adorned, and every temple 
filled with libations and with sacrifices. In a word, so flattering were the 
hopes, and so strong the confidence which possessed all the people, that even 
Annibal, whom they had hitherto so greatly dreaded, seemed no longer to be 
in Italy. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

The disceurse of an ambassador, exhorting the JEtolians to put an end to their 
war with Philip, and to be upon their guard against the designs of the 
Romans. 

cc \Yi TH what earnestness, O iEtolians, king Ptolemy, and the cities of Rhodes 
and Byzantium, of Chios and Mitylene, have endeavoured to persuade you 
to conclude a peace with Philip, let the facts themselves demonstrate. For 
this is neither the first nor the second embassy that has been sent to you with 
that intention. Even from the moment when the war first began we have 
never ceased to follow you ; and have takeu every occasion that was offered, to 
awaken in you an attention to your proper interests ; being led to this measure 
not onlv by the consideration of those evils which the Macedonians and your- 
selves at this time suffer, bat by the foresight of the ruin which will hereafter 
fall upon our own countries also, and indeed upon the whole of Greece. For 
as a fire, when it has once been kindled, is no longer controlled by him who 
lighted it, but is directed in its course either by the winds that blow, or the 
combustion of the matter with which it is fed ; and as it often turns most un- 
accountably the first efforts of its rage against the person himself who raised it 
into a flame, just so it happens in the case of war. Once kindled, it first con- 
sumes the authors of it ; and from thence, spreading itself upon every side, 
devours, without distinction, every thing it meets, acquiring still new strength,; 
and being blown as it were into a flame, by the folly of the neighbouring 
people. You now, therefore, see before you all the Greeks of Asia, and the 
people of all the isles, imploring you to put an end to a war, the effects of 
which they have too great reason to fear will .extend hereafter to themselves; 
Embrace the sentiments which prudence dictates ; attend at last to our en- 
treaties ; and give a favourable answer to our just demand. If the war, indeed,, 
in which you are now engaged, though attended, like all other wars, with pre- 
sent disadvantage, had both been honourable in the first intention, and glo- 
rious also with respect to the events that have happened in it, this persevering 
obstinacy might, perhaps, be excused. But, if the motives that led you into' 
it were most shameful, and if the conduct of it has been loaded with dishonour 
and reproach, how much does it now deserve your most serious consideration ? 
For my part, I shall speak my sentiments without reserve ; and you, if you 
are wise, will not be offended with this freedom. It is certainly much better, 
by censuring your conduct, to preserve you before it be too late, than to sooth 
you with a flattering discourse, which, in a short time, would be followed by 
your own ruin, and by that of all the Greeks. Observe, then, the mistakes 
into which you have fallen. You pretend that you have taken arms against 
Philip, only to prevent the Greeks from falling under the absolute dominion 
of that prince, But the true design and tendency of your engagement is to 



372 GENERAL HISTORY OF -POLYBIUS, 

destroy all Greece, and to bring it into a state of servitude. Your treaty with 
tbe Romans very plainly declares that this is your only purpose; that treaty, 
which subsisted before in writing, and which now is carried into execution. 
While it was only written, it covered you with shame ; and now, when it ap- 
pears in the effects, your dishonour is become notorious to all mankind. The 
name, then, of Philip is only used to cover your true intention. For this prince 
can surfer nothing from the war. His allies, the people of Peloponnesus, those 
of Euboea, Bceotia, and Phocis, the Locrians, the Thessalians, and the Epi- 
rots, have alone any thing to dread from the conditions of your treaty. 
These are they against whom it is stipulated, " that the people and the spoil 
shall be allotted to the Romans, and the cities with the territory to the JEio~ 
lians." If yourselves had taken any cities in open war, you neither would hare 
set the places in flames, nor have exposed the free citizens to any injurious 
treatment. Such cruelty would have been judged too horrible, and worthy 
only of barbarians. Yet you have made. a treaty which delivers all the rest of 
the'Greeks into the hands of a barbarous enemy, and exposes them to the most 
shameful outrage. The fatal tendency of this transaction was for sometime 
unobserved ; but that which has happened to the Oritae, and to the miserable 
people of jEgina, has now shown it in the clearest light. For fortune seems 
to have brought your imprudence into open view, like a machine upon the 
§tage, to unravel the intricacy of your plot. Such was the commencement, 
and such to this time has been the event of the present war. And what can it 
be expected will be the end of it, if all things should succeed as you desire ? 
Must it not be the beginning of the worst of evils, in which all Greece will be 
inovlved ? for when the Romans shall have ended the war in Italy, and this, 
as Annibal is now shut up in a narrow corner of the Brutian district, must 
very shortly happen, it is manifest that they will then bring all their power 
into Greece, on pretence, indeed, of assisting the iEtolians against Philip ; 
but, in reality, with a design to add this country to their other conquests. 
If, after they shall have become the masters of it, they treat the people with 
favour, the whole grace and honour of such indulgence will be their own. 
II', on, the coutrary, they are inclined to use severity, they alone will possess 
the spoils of those that are lost, and alone will exercise the rights of sovereignty 
over those that are preserved. In vain will you then obtest the gods. The 
gods will not be willing, n®r will men be able, to lend you any assistance. 

These, then, are the fatal consequences which you ought to have foreseen 
from the beginning.. Your honour might then have been preserved. But 
since the events that lie in the bosom of futurity too often escape the eye of 
human foresight, yet uow, at least, be warned by those that have already hap- 
pened, and turn yourselves to more prudent counsels. With regard to us, as 
we have omitted nothing that was fit for true friends either to speak or to act 
in the present conjuncture ; so, with respect to the future, likewise, we have 
declared our sentiments with a proper freedom. And we now conjure you, 
with the greatest earnestness, not to envy both yourselves, and the rest of the 
people of Greece, the blessings of liberty and safety." 

When this discourse was ended, and seemed to have made some impression 
upon the people, the ambassadors from Philip came into the assembly, and, 
without entering into any particular discussion, said only, that they had re- 
reived two orders from the king. The first, that they should conclude a peace, 
jf the iEtolians would consent ; and the other, that, if this proposal was re- 
jected, they should immediately depart, having first called the gods to wit- 
ness, and the ambassadors that were present, that the iEtolians, and not Philip, 
must be considered as the caiise of. all tbe evils which should fall hereafter 
upon Greece. ... - ; 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU. 373 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

The sentiments of Philopeemen concerning the brightness and neatness of arms. 
The character of this general. He gains a complete victory against Macha- 
nidasthe tytrant of Sparta, in the battle of Mantinea. 

Upon this occasion it was said by Philopeemen : " that the brightness of 
arms very much contributed to strike an enemy with terror ; and that great ad- 
vantage also arose in action, from having the several parts of the armour well 
iitted to the body. That it was much to be wished, that men would transfer 
that attention to their armour, which they now bestowed upon their common 
dress ; and become as negligent in the care of their dress, as they had hitherto 
been in that of their arms. That such a change would both be serviceable to 
their private fortunes, and be attended likewise with manifest advantage with 
respect to the public safety. " If a man therefore," continued he, " be pre- 
paring himself for any military exercise, or for an expeditionin the field, when 
he puts on his boots, let him be more careful in observing whether they are 
bright and well fitted to his legs, than in examining his shoes or sandals. When 
he takes his buckler, his breast-plate, or his helmet, let him desire to see more 
splendour, and more costly ornaments, in these parts of his armour, than in his. 
coat or mantle. For when men preferred mere show and ostentation to things 
of real use, it was easy to foresee, what would be tlieir conduct in the time of 
danger. In a word, he said, he wished that they would be persuaded, that an 
affected nicety in dress was worthy only of women, and those, perhaps not ex- 
tremely modest ; but, that a display of splendour and of costliness in arms, 
denoted a man of courage; ambitious of acquiring honour ; and determined 
to emyloy his utmost efforts in the defence of himself and of his country." 

All the people that were present, were so struck with this discourse, and 
with the good sense which it contained, that, as soon as the assembly was dis- 
missed, they began to point out those that were elegantly dressed, and forced 
some of them to retire from the forum. And afterwards, in all their military 
exercises and expeditions, they were most particularly careful to bear in re- 
membrance this advice. Such power is there even in a single exhortation, 
when delivered by a person of high authority, not only to deter men from bad 
habits, but to lead them into those that are the best. When the life especiallv 
of the speaker is known to correspond with his discourse, it is impossible not to 
give the fullest credit to his words. And such was the character of Philopee- 
men. Plain in his dress, and frugal in his table, he bestowed but a very slight 
attention upon the care of his body. In his conversation he was agreeably 
concise, and never gave any offence, in the whole course of his life, it was his 
greatest study, always to speak the truth. A few words, therefore, which he 
at any "time spoke, and which seemed to fall from him without design, were 
sufficient to gain an entire credit with those who heard him. The example of 
his life rendered a long discourse unnecessary. With some short sentences 
supported by his credit, and by the opinion which his actions had inspired, he 
often overthrew the long and plausible harangues of those who opposed him in 
the government. But let us now return to the history. 

When the assembly was dissolved, the people all returned back to their 
several cities ; greatly applauding the virtue of the speaker, and the discourse 
which they had heard : and were persuaded, that, under the administration of 
such a governor, the state could never suffer any loss. Philopeemen then went 
round to the several cities, and inspected ever}*- thing with the greatest dili- 
gence and '-are. He assembled the people together ; farmed them into troops; 
and instructed them in the military exercises. And when he had employed 
almost eight months in completiug the necessary preparations, he drew to°-ether 



374 GENERAL HISTORY 'OF PGLYBiUS. 



his army to Mantinea, to defend the liberty of all the people of Peloponnesus 
against the Spartan tyrant. 

Machanidas, filled with confidence, and considering this as favourable to his 
desires, as soon as he heard that the Achaeans were so neat, assembled the Lacedae- 
monian forces at Tegea ; harangued them as the occasiomequired, and next day 
began his march towards Mantinea. Himself led the right wing of the phalanx. 
Upon either side of the van were the mercenaries, in two bodies, parallel each 
to the other : and behind these, a great number of carriages filled with cata- 
pults and darts. At the same time, Philopcemen also drew his army, in three 
divisions out of the city. The Illyrians, the troops that were armed with coats 
of mail, the foreign mercenaries, aud the light armed forces, passed through 
the gate that led to the temple of Neptune. The phalanx through another 
gate that looked towards the west : and the cavalry of the city through a third 
that was near to the former. Upon a hill -of considerable height, that stood 
before the city, and which commanded also the temple of Neptune, and the 
road called Xen-is, he posted first the light-armed forces ; and next to them, 
on the side towards the south, the troops that were armed with mail, and also 
the Illyrians. Next to these, and upon the same right line, the phalanx, 
divided into separate cohorts with the usual distances between, was ranged 
along the border of a ditch, which begin niug at the temple of Neptune, was 
continued through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, as far as to those 
mountains which are the boundary of the Elisphasian territory. Upon the 
right of the phalanx stood the Achaean cavalry, commanded by Aristaenetus, a, 
citizen of Dyme. Upon the left was all the foreign cavalry, formed in close 
order, and without any intervals between the troops. At the head of these was 
Philopcemen. 

When the time of engaging approached, and the enemy appeared in sight, 
this general, riding through the intervals of the phalanx, exhorted the troops 
to perform their duty, in few but very forcible words. But the greatest part 
of what he said was not even heard. For so strong was the affection which the 
whole army bore towards him, so great was their confidence, and such their 
ardour to engage, that the soldiers rather seemed to animate their general ; and, 
with a kind of enthusiastic transport, called upon him to lead them against the 
enemy, and to be assured of victory. As often, however, as he had power to 
speak, he in general endeavoured to make them comprehend, that the object 
of the present contest was, on the part of tho enemy, base and ignominious 
slavery; arid, on their own part, glorious and immortal liberty. 

Machanidas, as he at first advanced, made a show of attacking the right of 
the enemy with his phalanx formed in the oblong square. But when he 
approached nearer, and had gained the distance that was proper for his purpose, 
turning suddenly the whole body to the right, he extended his front till the 
right of his line was equal to the left of the Achaeans ; and at the same time 
disposed his catapults along the whole front at proper distances. Philopcemen, 
perceiving that his intention was, by discharging stones, and wounding the 
cohorts as they stood, to throw the whole phalanx iuto disorder, allowed him 
hot time to effect his purpose; but began the action vigorously with the 
Tarentines, who were posted near the temple of Neptune, upon a ground that 
was flat and level, and very proper for cavalry. Machanidas was then forced 
to send his own Tarentines also to oppose them. The charge was violent, and 
sustained on both sides with greatVourage. The light-armed forees Came soon 
afterwards to support their respective bodies ; so that all the mercenaries of 
both armies were in a short time engaged. And as the combatants fought 
man with man, and without regarding any order, the dispute was for a long 
time doubtful. Nor were the rest of the troops able to discern, to which side 
the dust was driven ; because both parties had changed their ground, and were 
removed far from the place in which the action was first begun. At last, how- 
ever, the mercenaries that belonged to the tyrant, who exceeded the others not 
only in numbers, but in the dexterity also which they had acquired in the us? 
of their arms, prevailed. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 375 



It was reasonable indeed that this should be the issue ; the same which is 
almost always found to happen upon such occasions. For as much as the 
citizens who live under a democratical government display greater courage in 
action than the subjects of a tyrant, so much on the other hand are the merce- 
naries, which a tyrant retains in pay, superior to the foreign soldiers that 
serve in the armies of a democracy. The reason of this difference is, that 
the people in the one case fight for liberty ; and in the other, to be slaves : and 
that the zeal and courage of the mercenaries are rewarded, on the one side, 
with new advantages ; and, on the other, tend only to their loss. For a de- 
mocratical state, when it has once conquered those who attempt to subver- 
it, no longer employs mercenary troops to guard its freedom. But a tyrant, 
in proportion as his successes are increased, has still greater need of such as- 
sistance. For, by accumulating injuries, he adds to the number of those 
whom he has reason to fear. The very safety, therefore, of every tyrant, de- 
pends wholly upon the strength and attachment of his foreign soldiers. 

From these reasons then it happened, that the mercenaries of Machanidas, 
upon this occasion, maintained the action with so great force as well as 
courage, that not even the Ulyrians, nor the heavy forces, which supported 
. the Achaean mercenaries were able to stand against them ; but fled in disorder 
to Man tinea, though that city was distant full seven stadia from the place of 
the action. This occasion afforded also a very clear and convincing proof of 
the truth of a tiling which some have doubted : that the issue of battles is most 
frequently determined by skill on one side, and by the want of it on the other. 
A chief, it must be acknowledged, displays no small ability, when, after hav- 
ing gained the advantage in the first part of a battle, he conducts the action to 
the end with the same success with which it was begun. But his capacity will 
be seen in a much more exalted point of view, if, when he has been defeated 
iu the beginning, he is still able to retain a presence of mind; to obsprve the 
errors which his adversary commits in the course of his success, and to turn 
those errors to his own advantage. For if has often happened, that some, 
when they have seemed to have the victory already in their hands, in a short 
time afterwards have suffered an entire defeat: and that ethers, who have 
failed in the beginning, by some sudden and dexterous effort, have changed 
the whole fortune of the battle, and obtained an unexpected victory. The 
two generals, who commanded in the present action, afford very eminent exam- 
ples of both these cases. 

For when the whole body of the Achaean mercenaries was in this manner 
routed, and the left wing of their army broken and compelled to fly, Macha- 
nidas, whose duty it was to remain in the place, to finish what he had begun, 
to surround the left of the enemy, and to charge their main body both in flank 
a^d front, attempted nothing of this kind; but, putting himself at the head 
of his victorious mercenaries, with an intemperate and childishfvalour, pursued 
those that fled ; as if their own fear alone, after they once were broken, would 
not have been sufficient to carry them even to the gates of the city. But the 
Achaean general, after he had employed all possible efforts to stop the flight 
of the troops, calling to the officers by name, and encouraging them to stand, 
when he perceived they were forced to yield to the strength of the enemy, was 
not himself disheartened, nor quitted the action in despair ; but, having posted 
himself on the wing of his phalanx, as soon as the enemy, by their pursuit of 
those that fled, had left the field clear where the action had passed, he turned 
to the left with his first cohorts, and ran in good order to take possesion of the 
vacant ground. By this position, he both cut off the return of those that 
were engaged in the pursuit, and at the same time commanded the wing of 
the enemy. He exhorted the phalanx to fear nothing, and to remain in their 
place till they should receive the signal to charge. At the same time he or- 
dered Polybius the Megalopolitan, to collect together all the Ulyrians and the 
mercenaries who had not fled with the rest, to post them behind the wing of 



376 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

the phalanx, and to observe, with the greatest care, the return of the enemy 
from the pm-suit. 

The Lacedaemonian phalanx, elated by the first success, without waiting for 
the signal to engage, levelled their spears, and advanced towards the enemy. 
When they came to the bank of the ditch, whether because, as they were now 
so near, there was not time to change their purpose, or' whether the ditch it- 
self, being easy in the descent, and not having either wood or water in it, 
appeared contemptible, they continued their way through it without any hesi- 
tation. Philopcemen, perceiving that the " moment was now come which he 
had long expected, ordered his phalanx also to level their spears, and to ad- 
vance. The Achaeans run together to the charge with loud and terrible cries. 
The Lacedaemonians, who had broken their tanks as they descended into the 
ditch, no sooner saw the enemy upon the bank above them, than they imme- 
diately begau to fly. But great numbei's of them were destroyed in the ditch ; 
some by the Acaeans, and some by their own men. Nor was this event to be 
ascribed to chance, or even to the interposition of a lucky moment, but 
wholly to the ability of the commander. For Philopcemen had covered him- 
self with the ditch in front, not with any intention, as some suspected, to avoid 
a battle, but because his great skill aud judgment had enabled him to fore- 
see, that if Machanidas, not regarding the difficulty of the ditch, should lead 
his phalanx to the charge, the event must happen which now had happened : 
and if the tyrant, on the other hand, stopped by this impediment, should 
change his purpose, and be forced to break the order of his battle, that his 
ignorance would be then confessed ; and that he would leave to his enemies 
the honour of a victory, and carry away the shame of a defeat, even without 
having risked a general engagement. Such disgrace, the greatest indeed that 
can happen in war, has been the lot of many commanders, who, when they 
have formed their army, have been deterred from engaging with the enemy, 
either by the disadvantage of the ground, the superiority of numbers, or some 
other cause; and being forced to break again the order of their battle, have 
depended wholly upon their rear for victory, or for the opportunity af*least of 
making their retreat with safety. With regard to Philopcemen, his foresight 
was proved true by the event ; for the Lacedaemonians were completely routed. 
When he found, then, that his phalanx had thus gained the victory, and 
all things had succeeded most gloriously as he desired, he now turned his 
thoughts to the only, remaining point, which was, to prevent the tyrant from 
escaping. Knowing him to be intercepted, together with his mercenaries 
between the city and the ditch, he stood expecting his return. Machanidas, 
at last coming back from his inconsiderate pursuit, and seeing the flight of his 
forces, was sensible of the mistake which' he had committed, and at the same, 
time perceiving that all was lost. He ordered the mercenaries therefore that 
were near him to form themselves into a close body, and force their way through 
the enemy, who were spread loosely over the field, and busied in pursuing the 
routed army. Some of his troops obeyed this order, and remained for some 
time with him ; conceiving this to be the only expedient by which they might 
be able to escape. But when they came to the bridge that was upon the ditch, 
and found it guarded by the Achaeans, they immediately lost all hope, and all 
of thern dispersed themselves, and sought their safety by different ways. 
Machanidas himself, laying aside all thoughts of attempting to escape by 
the bridge, rode along the bank of the ditch, and looked earnestly for some 
place in which he might pass it. Hhilopccmen soon discerned him by his 
purple habit, and by the trappings of his horse. Leaving, therefore, the care 
of the ridge to Aristcenetus; with ©rders that he should spare none of the 
mercenaries, because they had always been the instruments of establishing 
tyranny in Sparta ; and taking with him two of his intimate friends, P©Iya?nus 
the Cyparisian and Simias, he passed to the other side of the ditch, and rode 
along the bank opposite to the tyrant, with design to stop him in his passage, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 377 



and those who attended him. For he also was followed by two companions ; 
Anaxidamus, and one of the mercenaries. Machanidas, having at last found a 
place that was easy of descent, spurred his horse, and drove him furiously 
through the ditch. But Philopcemen in this very moment turning himself to 
meet him, happily wounded him with a spear; and then shifting the spear in 
his hand, struck him again with the lower part of it, and killed him. Ons 
of his Companions, Anaxidamus, was at the sametime killed by the two friends 
who attended Philopremen ; and the other sought his safety in night. Simias 
then spoiled the bodies; and, having cut off the head of the tyrant, ran to 'show- 
it to those that were engaged in the pursuit : that the soldiers, perceiving 
that Machanidas was dead, might assume new confidence, and follow the flying 
enemy without any fear, even to Tegea. This spectacle produced the effect 
that was desired ; and raised so great ardour in the army, that they even gained 
possession of Tegea upon their first approach. On the following day they 
encamped along the banks of the Eurotas, and were masters of all the open 
country. Thus the Achaens, who not long before had been unable to drive the 
enemy out of their own territory, had now all Laconia in their power, and ra- 
vaged it without resistance. They had lost but few of their men in the action, 
but on the side of the Lacedaemonians, four thousand were killed, and a greater 
number taken prisoners. All the baggage also, and the arrns^ fell into the 
hand's of the Achaeans. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

Reflections on the great abilities of Annibal. The cause of his failing in his 
attempt to subdue the Romans,, 

It is impossible to contemplate the length of the time in which Annibal was 
employed in action ; the general battles, as well as little combats in which he 
was engaged; the sieges that were undertaken by him; the revolts of cities 
that had submitted to him ; the difficult conjectures that often pressed him ; 
and, in a word, the whole extent and greatness, both in design and execution, 
of his war against the Romans, and net to be struck with "admiration of the 
skill, the courage, and the ability of this great commander. How wonderful is 
it, that, in a course of sixteen years, in which he maintained the war in the 
very heart of Italy, he should never once dismiss his army from the field ; and 
yet be able, like a wise and prudent governor, to keep in subjection so great a 
multitude, and to confine them within the bounds of their duty, so that they 
neither mutinied against him, nor broke into any sedition among themselves 
upon any occasion ; though his army was composed of people of various 
countries; of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, and Greeks ; men 
who had different laws, different manners, a different language, and in a word, 
nothing among them that was common ; yet so dexterous was his management, 
that notwithstanding this great diversity, he forced all of them to acknowledge 
one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this too he 
effected in the midst of very various fortune. For sometimes he was carried in 
his course by the most favourable gales ; and sometimes he was involved in 
storms. How high as well as just an opinion must these things convey to us of 
his ability in war ! It may be affirmed with confidence, that, if he had first, 
tried his strength in the other parts of the worlds and had come last to attack 
the Romans, he could scarcely have failed in any pa.rt of his design. But now, 
as he began with those with whom he should have ended, the people that 
was the first object of his conquest was the las.t also which he had the power to 
invade. 



VOL. I. NO. §< 3 B 



J78 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

EXTRACT THE FIFTH. 

The defeat of Asdrubal the son of Gesco, by Publius Scipio. 

Asdrubal, having drawn together his army from the several cities in which 
they had remained during the winter, came and encamped at the foot of a 
mountain, not far from a city that was called Elinga, and threw up an entrench- 
ment round his camp. In his front was a large plain very proper for a bat- 
tle. The number of his forces was seventy thousand foot, and four thousand 
horse; together with thirty^-two elephants. At the same time Scipion sent 
away Marcus Junius to receive from Colichas the troops which that Spaniard 
had raised, and which consisted of three thousand foot and five hundred horse-; 
while himself collected together the rest of the allies, as he advanced in his 
march towards the enemy. When he arrived near Castalo and Baecula, he was 
met by Junius, with the forces which Colichas had sent. He was now involved, 
however, in very great perplexity. On the one hand, the Roman forces alone, 
without the assistance of the allies, were too few to engage in a general battle. 
On the other, to place any dependence upon these allies, in so decisive an ac- 
tion, appeared to be extremely hazardous and full of danger. After much de~> 
liberation, therefore, as the necessity pressed him close on either side, he at last 
yesolved that he would employ the Spaniards in such a manner that they should 
appear to the enemy to bear a part in the action, but that only the Roman le- 
gions should be engaged. Having thus determined, he began his march with 
all the army, which consisted of forty-five thousand foot, and three thousand 
horse: and when he came near to the Carthaginians, and was in sight, he en- 
camped upon some hills that were opposite to the enemy. Mago, judging 
this to be a favourable time for attacking the Romans before they had com- 
pleted their encampment, took with him the greatest part of his own cavalry, 
together with the Numidians, with Massanissa at their head, and advanced with 
speed towards the camp, not doubting but that he should find Scipio wholly 
unprepared. But the Roman general, having foreseen that this might happen, 
had placed a body of cavalry equal to that of the enemy in ambuscade at the 
foot of one of the hills. When these troops then suddenly appeared, the 
Carthaginians were so struck' with surprise at the unexpected sight, that many 
of them, as they turned themselves to fly, were thrown from their horses. The 
rest indeed stood firm, and maintained the fight with courage. But being 
closely pressed, and disordered chiefly by that dexterity with which the Romans 
■were accustomed to quit,their horses in the very time of action; and having 
lost also many of their men, they were forced to turn their backs after a short 
resistance. At first they retreated in good order. But when the Romans 
followed clasely after them, they broke their ranks, and continued their flight 
in disorder even to their own camp. This success inspired the Romans with 
greater eagerness to engage; and on the other hand, depressed the ardour of the 
Carthaginians. During some days that followed, they drew out their forces on 
both sides in the plain that was between the camps. And having tried their 
strength in many little skirmishes between their cavalry and their light- 
armed troops, they at last resolved to engage in a general and decisive 
action. 

Upon this occasion Scipio employed two stratagems. He had remarked 
that Asdrubal always drew out his army at a late hour of the day ; and that 
he placed the Africans in the centre, and the elephants before the Spaniards 
upon the wings. Himself, on the other hand, had been accustomed to bring 
his army into the field at his own time, after the other, and to post the Ro- 
mans opposite to the Africans, in the centre, and the Spaniard's on the wings. 
On the day then in which he had determined to engage, he took, in both these 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



respects, just the contrary method; and by that change, chiefly procured to his 
troops the advantage which they gained against the enemy. For scarcely had 
the moaning begun to appear when he sent orders to the tribunes and to all 
the army, that they should immediately take their repast, put on their 
armour, and march out of the camp. The soldiers, conceiving what would 
follow, obeyed the orders with alacrity. He then sent away the cavalry and 
the light armed troops, commanding them to advance boldly towards the 
camp of the enemy, and to engage in skirmishing: and the sun being now- 
risen, he put himself at the head of the infantry, and began his march. And 
when he arrived near the middle of the plain, lie then drew up the army in 
order of battle, but in an order contrary to that which he before had used- 
For he now placed the Spaniards in the centre, and the Romans upon the 
wings. The Carthaginians, surprised by the unexpected approach of the ca- 
valry towards their camp, and perceiving that the rest of the army was drawn 
up in battle, and already in sight, had scarcely time sufficient to be armed. 
Asdrubal, therefore, before the soldiers had taken any repast, was forced to 
send away in haste his cavalry and light armed troops against the Roman 
cavalry, and to draw up his infantry in the usual order upon the plain, very 
near to the foot of the mountain. 

While the light troops were engaged in skirmishing, the Roman infantry 
remained for some time quiet in their place. But as the day was now ad- 
vanced, and no great advantage was gained on either side, because the custom 
of these troops was to retreat when they were pressed, and then returning 
a^ain to renew the fight, Scipio called back his men from the engagement, 
and having made them pass through the intervals of the cohorts, ranged first 
the light armed, and next to them the cavalry, behind the infantry upon each 
of the wings. He then ordered the whole line to move with equal pace to- 
wards the enemy. But when he came to the distance of about a stadium from 
them, having directed the Spaniards in the centre to keep their ranks, and to 
advance still with the same pace, he ordered the infantry and cavalry of the 
right wing to turn to the right, and those of the left to the left. He then 
took from the right wing three of the foremost troops of cavalry, with the 
accustomed number of light armed in front, and three maniples of infantry, 
which the Romans call a cohort, while Lucius Marcius, and Marcus Junius 
took in the same manner as many from the left ; and then turning, Scipio 
with his division to the left, and the others to the right, they led on the troops 
in a direct line and with great speed against the enemy : the rest of the wings 
making also the same movement, and following close in the same line. In 
this manner, as' the wings were brought near to the enemy, while the Spaniards 
in the centre advanced with a slow place, and were still at a great distance., 
Scipio accomplished what he had at first designed, and fell direct upon both 
the wings of the enemy with only the Roman forces. The movements which 
were made afterwards by the troops that followed, in order to fall into a right 
line with those that led, were contrary the one to the other, not only in the 
two wings, but in the cavalry also and the infantry of either wing ; for, in the 
right wing the cavalry and the light armed forces, by turning to the right, 
fell into the line with those that were before, and attempted to gain the flank 
of the enemy, while the infantry wheeled to the left, and joined their leaders. 
In the left wing the infantry turned to the right, and the cavalty and light 
armed to the left. By these movements of the cavalry and iight armed forces, 
the troops changed their places, so that the right in either wing became the 
left. This change, however, Scipio considered as in itself of no great moment. 
His attention was fixed upon something more important, which was to gain 
the flank of the enemy ; and in this he judged right and reasonably ; for 
though it is necessary, indeed, that a general should know the movements 
that may be made, it is of much greater moment to be able to apply those 
movements upon each occasion to their proper use. 



' 38 ° GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



As soon as the action was begun, the elephants, piereed by the darts of the 
cavalry and light armed troops, and pressed closely on every side, were not 
less hurtful to their friends than to their enemies, For as they were driven 
from side to side in great disorder, they destroyed all without distinction that 
were within their reach. At the same time the infantry upon the wings of 
the Carthaginian army was vigorously attacked ; while their centre, composed 
■ of the Africans, which were the choicest of their troops, remained inactive; 
tor as they dared not, on the one hand, to leave their station and succour the 
wings, lest the Spaniards that were in the centre of the Roman army should 
advance to attack them, so neither were they able, on the other hand, to do 
any thing in their post against the Spaniards, because the latter were still at 
too great a distance from them. Thus the action was maintained by the 
wings alone ; and, as the whole stress of the battle lay upon them, was for some 
time maintained on both sides with equal bravery. But when the sun had now 
gained his greatest height, the Carthaginians, who had been brought hastily 
into the field and before they had taken any repast, began to faint under 
the heat. 1 he Romans, on the other hand, not only were superior in vigour 
and in spirit, but derived also another advantage from the prudence of their 
general, who had opposed the strongest part of his army to the weakest in that 
of the enemy. Asdrubal, therefore, unable any longer to resist, at first re- 
treated slowly, and in good order. But after a short time, his whole arrov, 
turning their backs together, ran in crowds to the foot of the mountain : arid 
irom thence, being still violently pressed, they fled in disorder into their eamp, 
And indeed, if some deity had not interposed to save them, they must after- 
wards have been driven out of their intrenchmenta. But suddenly the face of 
the heavens was changed, and the rain descended in such violent and con- 
tinual torrents, that the Romans were scarcely able to return back again to 
their camp, & 

EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 

The manner in ivkhh Scipio suppressed and punished a sedition that had hap- 
pened in the Roman army. 

Though Scipio had now gained a sufficient experience in affairs, he was 
thrown, however, by this revolt, into a state of great irresolution and per- 
plexity. Nor was this, indeed, without good reason : for as, in the case of 
the human body, the causes of external injuries, of those for example which 
arise from heat and cold, from fatigue, or wounds, may either be guarded 
against before they happen, or afterwards be remedied without much difficulty ; 
while the disorders, on the other hand, which are bred in the body itself, ul- 
cers and diseases, are neither easily foreseen, nor easy to be cured ;• just so it 
happens with respect to governments and armies. When they are attacked 
by any enemy from without, if the necessary attention only be employed, it is 
no hard thing to take the measures that are requisite for their security and 
defence. But to appease the violeuce of intestine tactions, to quell popular 
tumults and seditions, is a work of the greatest difficulty, and such a* requires 
a very uncommon exertion both of address and prudence. There is one pre- 
caution, however, which, in my judgment, would be greatly serviceable in the 
case of states and armies, as well as in humau bodies'; and that is, not to suf- 
fer in any of them a too long continuance in laziness and inactivity, especially 
when they enjoy the blessings of plenty and prosperous fortune. 

Scipio then, who, besides that steady application to affairs which we before 
have mentioned, was very ready also and dexterous, both in thought and ac- 
tion, contrived the following method for remedying the disorder that had hap- 
pened. He called together the tribunes, and told them, that the stipends 
that were demanded should be paid : and, that his promise might gain *be 
greater credit, he directed that the taxes, which had been before imposed up- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 381 



on the cities for the support of the whole army, should be levied publicly, and 
with the greatest diligence ; as if his only intention had been to raise the sums 
that were now required. He ordered tbe tribunes also to go back again to 
the revolted troops, and to use all intreaties to engage them to return to their 
duty, and to come and receive their stipends, either separately, if they should 
choose that method, or- altogether in a body; assuring them also, that when 
this was done, he would then consider in what manner all other things might 
be adjusted. Agreeably to this plan, the money was collected without delay* 
And when Scipio was informed that the tribunes had discharged also their 
commission, he assembled the council together, to consider what was most 
proper to be done. Tbe result of their deliberations was, that the troops 
should come all to New Carthage on an appointed day ; that a general pardon 
should then be granted to the multitude; but that the authors of the mutiny- 
should be punished with the utmost severity. These were in number thirty- 
five. 

When the day was come, and the revolted troops were now on their way 
towards the city, to receive their pardon and the stipends that were due, 
Scipio gave secret instructions to the seven tribunes who had been before 
deputed to them, to meet them as they approached ; and that each of them, 
taking five of the seditious leaders, and accosting them with a show of friend- 
ship, should press them to take a lodging in their quarters, or at least to ac*- 
cept of the entertainment of a supper. Three days before, he had ordered 
the troops that were in the city to furnish themselves with provisions for a con- 
siderable time, on pretence that they were to march, under the command of 
Marcus, against Andobalis, who had revolted. The seditious, being informed 
also of this order, were filled with still greater confidence : for they persuaded 
themselves that, as the rest of the army would be removed, they should have 
all things in their power as soon as they should join the general. 

When they were now ready to enter the city, Scipio sent orders to the other 
troops, that they should begin their march, with all their baggage, very early 
in the morning on the following day. But the tribunes and the prefects were, 
at the same time, secretly commanded to send the baggage forwards as soon 
as they should come out of the city, but to keep the soldiers in arms near the 
gate : to divide them afterwards into parties at every gate ; and t® be. careful 
that none of the seditious should come out of the city. The tribunes, who 
had been appointed to receive the seditious leaders, met them as they arrived; 
and, having accosted them with much civility, carried them to their houses. 
The order given to them was, that they should immediately secure the persons 
of these men; and, when supper was ended, should bind them, and keep 
them safe ; and that no person afterwards should be suffer ed to go out of the 
houses, except only a messenger from each to acquaint the general that the 
thing was dons>. This order was punctually observed and executed. On the 
morrow, when the day appeared, and the seditious hud already begun to 
come in crowds towards the forum, Scipio ordered the assembly to be called. 
As soon as the signal was made, the soldiers ran together, according to their 
custom, expecting eagerly to see again their general, and to hear what he 
would say to them on the present occasion. Scipio then sent orders to the 
tribunes, who were without the gates, that they should bring the troops in 
arms, and surround the assembly. At the same time he presented himself 
before them ; and, in the instant, by his very first appearance, filled them 
with extreme confusion : for they had supposed him to be broken with disease, 
and they behold him vigorous and strong. His very aspect, therefore, so d'if- 
terent from all that they had conceived^ struck them at once with surprise 
and terror. He then began his discourse to them in the following manner : 

He could not, he said, but wonder what motives, either of expectation or 
disgust, had led them into this revolt. That men usually rebelled against 
their country and their leaders, either because they were dissatisfied with the 
conduct of those who held the supreme command, or were displeased with the 



582 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

condition of* affairs ; or, lastly, perhaps, because they were ambitious of .some- 
greater fortune, and had filled their minds with aspiring hopes. ' s Tell me, 
then," continued he, " to which of all these causes is j-our revolt to be as- 
cribed ? Is it with me that you are offended, because the payment of your 
stipends has been so long delayed ? The fault, however, is not mine: fo:r,; 
during the : whole time of my command,; your stipends nave been always fully 
paid. If it be Rome, then, that is in fault, and having neglected to discharge 
your former arrears, was it just that you should show this resentment, taking 
arms against your country, and declaring yourselves the enemies of her who 
bad bred and nourished you ? How much better would it have been to have 
made me the judge of yonr complaints, and to have untreated your friends to 
join together in obtaining for you the relief which you desired ? When mer- 
cenary troops, indeed, who have no other object but their pay, desert the ser* 
vice in which they are engaged, such a conduct, in certain circumstances, may 
perhaps be excused. But in men who fight for themselves, their wives arid 
children, this defection is a most unpardonable crime. It is no other, indeed, 
than if a son, on pretence that his parent had defrauded him in settling an ac- 
count, should go armed to take away the life of him from whom himself had 
received his being. Or will you say, then, that I have employed you in more 
painful duties, or exposed you more frequently to danger, tha'n the rest ; and 
have given to others the advantages of the war, aud the chief part of all the 
booty ? You dare not say that I hsve ever made this distinction : and if you 
dare, you cannot show the proof. To what part of my conduct, then, can 
you impute the cause of your revolt ? Speak, for I wish to be informed. 
There is not one among you that is able to declare, not one among you that 
can even form to himself in thought the least matter of offence against roe; 
Nor is it again in the condition of affairs that you can find any reasonable 
ground of discontent. For when were all things in a more prosperous state ? 
At what time was Rome distinguished by so many victories ? At what pe- 
riod were her soldiers flattered with a fairer prospect ? But some of you, per- 
haps, are diffident of these appearances, and have fixed your hopes upon 
greater advantages, to be found among your enemies. And who are these 
enemies ? Mandonius and Andobalis ? 

" Do not all of you then know, that, when they had first joined our army, 
they broke their treaty with the Carthaginians, and that now again they have 
no less violated the most solemn oaths, by commencing new hostilities against 
ns ? How honourable is it f.u you to place a confidence in men like these, 
and to become, for their sakes, the enemies of your country ? You had surely 
never any hopes that with such allies you could render yourselves the masters 
of Spain; neither assisted by Andobalis, nor separately by yourselves, would 
you ever be able to stand in the field against our forces/ What then was your 
design ? Let me hear it only from yourselves. Is it the skill, the courage 
of those leaders whom you have chosen to command you, that has filled you 
with this confidence ; or those rods and axes which are carried iti solemn state 
before them, and which it even is shameful for me now to mention? No, 
soldiers, these are not the causes, nor can you offer even the smallest matter 
of complaint either against me or your country. I must endeavour to justify 
your conduct, both to Rome and to myself, by those common principles, the 
truth of which is acknowledged by all mankind. The multitude is easily 
deceived; is impelled by the smallest force to every side; and, in a word, is 
susceptible upon all occasions of the same agitations as the sea; for as the 
latter, though in itself it is calm and stable, and carries no face of danger, is 
no sooner set. in motion by some violent blast, than it resembles the winds 
themselves which raise and ruffle it ; in the sarpe manner the multitude also 
assumes an aspect conformable to the designs and temper of those leaders by 
whose counsels it is swayed and agitated. From this consideration all the 
officers or the army aud myself have resolved to pardon your offence, and to 
engage our promise that no remembrance of it ever shall remain. But to those 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 383 

' , ■ _ j __ ___,... ■l.imi.i I. ( l'l__i___ __—______l_l__«l— |— 1IWW1 llll I'll l||l.| 

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•who excited you to this revolt we are inexorable. The crime which they have 
committed, both against us and against their country, shall be punished with 
the severity which it deserves." 

As soon as he had ended this discourse, the troop3 that had surrounded the 
assembly in arms, upon a signal given, clashed their swords against their 
bucklers, and at the same time, the seditious leaders were brought in, bound 
and naked. And while some of them were scourged, and some beheaded, the 
whole multitude was so struck with terror, both by the danger that encom- 
passed them, and by the dismal spectacle that was before their eyes, that not 
one among them changed his countenance, or uttered a single word ; but all 
of them stood iixed in silent astonishment and dread. The leaders, being 
thus but to death, were dragged through the midst of the assembly. The ge- 
neral then, and all the officers, gave a solemn assurance to the rest, that their 
fault should never be remembered. The soldiers, approaching one hy one, 
renewed their oath before the tribunes, that they would be obedient to their 
chiefs, and not engage in any designs against their country. In this manner 
Scipio, by his great prudence, stifled a danger in its birth which might have 
grown to be extremely formidable, and restored again his army to its former 
state. 



EXTRACT THE SEVENTH. 

The revolt of Andobalis. Scipio marches against that prince-; defeats him in 
an engagement ; and finishes the ivdr in Sjiain. 

Scipio, having called together, without delay, and in the city of New Carthage, 
an assembly of all the troops, communicated to them the daring designs of 
Andobalis, and his perfidy towards them. Upon these topics he spoke so 
largely, that the minds of the soldiers were sharpened in the highest degree 
against that that prince. Having then enumerated the many battles in which 
the Romans had been engaged, against the united forces of the Spaniards and 
the Carthaginians, with the Carthaginian leaders also at their head ; it would 
be absurd, he said, to think, when they had been always conquerors in those 
actions, that they could fail *o obtain the victory against the Spaniards alone, 
commanded by Andobalis. That, upon this account, he would not have re- 
course to the assistance of any of the Spaniards, but would employ the 
Romans only in the present expedition; that from thence it might be known 
to all, that it was not b.y the strength of the Spanish forces, as some pretend- 
ed, that the Romans had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain ; but that the 
Roman spirit alone, and the Roman bravery, had conquered both the Cartha- 
ginians and the Spaniards. " Banish, then, " continued he, " from among you 
all dissension; and, if ever you have engaged in any war with confidence, let 
me exhort you now to assume it. With regard to the success, myself, with 
the assistance of the gods, will take such measures as shall secure the victory." 
This discourse inspired such ardour into all the army that, by their coun- 
tenance, they seemed as if they were already in sight of the enemy, and wait- 
ing only for the signal to engage. He then dismissed the assembly. 

On the following day he began his march; and, arriving in ten days upon, 
the banks of the lberus, he passed the river on the fourth day afterwards, and 
encamped near to the enemy, having before him a valley which separated the 
two camps. On the next day, having ordered Lselius to hold the cavalry in 
readiness, and some tribunes to prepare the light-armed forces for action, he 
drove some of the cattle that followed the army into the valley ; and, when 
the Spaniards ran hastily to seize this prey, sent a part of the light armed to 
attack them. The action was soon begun ; and, as greater numbers advanced 
on either side to support the first, a sharp and general skirmishing ensued. 



384 . GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

But Lselius, who stood ready with his cavalry, perceiving the occasion to be 
favourable, tell suddenly upon the enemy; and, having cut off also their re- 
treat at the foot of the mountain, destroyed a great part of trie Spaniard* who 
were dispersed through the valley. The barbarians, enraged by the loss which 
they had sustained, and dreading lest they should seem to be disheartened, and 
to have suffered an entire defeat, drew out all their army as soon as the morning 
appeared, and resolved to engage in a general battle. Scipio, on his part, was 
no less ready. But as he perceived that the Spaniards showed so little skill 
and judgment, that they descended with all their forces into the valley, and 
ranged their infantry as well as their cavalry upon the plain, he waited for some 
time, that as great a number of them as was possible might come down. For 
though he placed great confidence in his cavalry, he depended still more upon 
his infantry ; because the latter, both from their bravery, and from the manner 
also in which they were armed, were far superior to-the Spaniards, in close and 
set engagements. When he saw then, that as great a number had come down 
as he desired, he advanced in order of battle against that part of the Spanish 
army which was posted near to the foot of the mountain ; and sent away four 
cohorts, drawn up in close order, to attack the infantry in the valley. At the 
same time Laelius, having led his cavalry along the hills that extended from 
the camp to the valley, fell upon the cavalry of the enemy in their rear, and 
kept them closely engaged. The Spanish infantry,' being in this manner de» 
prived of the assistance of the cavalry, by which they had expected to be sup- 
ported, were unable to maintain the fight. The cavalry also laboured under no 
less disadvantage. Confined within a narrow ground, and disordered by the 
difficulties of their situation, they killed more of their own men than the Ro- 
mans killed. For theiy were pressed in flank by their own infantry ; by the 
Romam infantry in front ; and by the Roman cavalry in their rear. Such then 
was the course of this engagement. The Spaniards, who had come down into 
the valley, were almost all of them destroyed: and the rest that were drawn up 
near the foot of the hills sought their safety in flight. These were the light- 
armed troops, which composed about a third part of the army. Among these 
Andobalis found means to escape ; and fled to a certain fortified place.' The 
war in Spain being thus entirely finished, Scipio returned back to Taraco full 
joy ; having achieved for his country a glorious conquest, and secured to him- 
self the honour of a splendid -triumph. Being then desirous to be present at 
the election of consuls, as soon as he had regulated all things in Spain, he 
committed the care of the army to Marcus and Syllanus, and sailed away with. 
Lselius and the rest of his friends to Rome. 



EXTRACT THE EIGHTH. 

Antiochus concludes a treaty with Euthydemus ; and returns from his expedi^ 
Hon into the Upper provinces of Asia. 

Euthybemus, who was himself a native of Magnesia, endeavoured to justify 
his conduct, and said that Antiochus had no reason for attempting to- deprive 
him of his kingdom, since he had never rebelled against him, but had only 
obtained possession of Bactriana, by destroying the descendants of those who 
had before revolted. He insisted long upon this point, and entreated Teleas 
to mediate for him with Antiochus, that hostilities might cease, and that he 
might be allowed to retain the name of king. He urged, that such a reconci- 
liation was even necessary for their common safety. That those wandering 
tribes, who were spread in great numbers along the borders of the province, 
were alike dangerous to them both ; and that if ever they should gain admit- 
tance into it, the whole country must inevitably fall into a state of barbarism. 
With these instructions he sent back Teleas to the king. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 385 



r :r ? xT, - zi z n :- Z Z!-..~^.--?aj} 



Antiochus, who had been long desirous of putting an end to the war, ac- 
knowledged the force of these reasons, and declared himself willing to accept 
the peiice that was offered. And when Teieas had gone and returned agai n many- 
times, Euthydemus at last sent his own son Demetrius to ratify the treaty. 
The king received him favourably ; and, judging by his appearance and his 
conversation, as well as by a certain air of majesty that was conspicuous in his 
person, that the young man was worthy of a kingdom, he promised to give 
him one of his daughters in marriage, and to suffer his father to retain the 
name of king. The rest of the treaty was expressed in writing, and the alli- 
ance confirmed by oaths. 

After this transaction, Antiochus, having first distributed a large quantity 
of corn among his troops, and taken the elephants that belonged to Euthyde- 
mus, began his march with all his army. Passing mount Caucasus, he came 
into India, and renewed his alliance with Sophagasenus, the Indian king. In 
this place he obtained more elephants , so that his whole number was now a 
hundred and fifty; and having furnished his army also with anew supply of 
corn, he again decamped; but left Androsthenes behind him, to receive the 
money which the king had engaged to pay. He then traversed the province 
of Arachosia ; and having passed the river Brymanthus, and advanced through 
Drana into Carmania, as the winter now approached, he sent his troops into 
quarters. Such was the end of the expedition of Antiochus into the upper 
provinces of Asia; an expedition which secured tc him the obedience not only 
of those provinces, but of all the maritime cities and al! the princes likewise 
that were on this side of mount Taurus; covered' his own proper kingdom against 
invasion, and gave to ail mankind the highest opinion both of hid courage and 
his love of labour. For from this time, not the people of Asia only, but those 
also of Europe, considered him as a prince that was most worthy to reign. 



BOOK THE TWELFTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

The mistakes of Timceus, in~his accounts ofAfric and of Corsica. The manner 
of conducting herds of swine in Italy and in Greece. 

AFRIC i3 indeed a country of wonderful fertility. How blameable then is 
Timaeue, who not only neglected to acquire a proper knowledge in these mat- 
ters, but with a childish weakness, destitute of judgement, and trusting to the 
credit of antient stories, which have been long ago exploded, represents this 
whole part of the world as a dry and barren sand, incapable of producing any 
fruits. Nor is this country less remarkable with respect to the animals with 
which it abounds. For not only horses and oxen, but sheep also and goatF, 
are found in it in greater numbers than any other part of the world perhaps 
can show. Upon this account it is, that many of the inhabitants of this vast 
country, neglecting the cultivation of the lands, live upon the flesh of the r 
cattle, and among their cattle. Every one also knows, .that Afric breeds ele- 
phants, lions, and leopards, in great numbers, and of a surprising strength ; 
together with buffaloes, which are extremely beautiful, and ostriches of an en- 
ormous size; and that none of these animals are found in any part of Europe. 
But Timseus is silent with respect to all those things ; and seems indeed as if 
he had designed to give such a description of this country as should be most 
contrary to the truth. 

The same want also of exactness and fidelity appears in his account of Ccri 
sica. Speaking of this island in his second book, he says, that the goats, the 
sheep, and the oxen, which are found in great numbers upon it, are all of 

VOL. 1. NO. 7„ 3 V , 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU. 



them wild, as well as the deer, the hares, the wolves, and other animals ; and 
that the inhabitants hunt them with dogs, and pass their whole lives in that 
employment. Now, it is certain that there is not any such thing in the island 
as a wild goat or ox, nor even a hare, a wolf, or a deer, or any other animal 
that is wild, except only some fuxes, some rabbits, and a sort of wild sheep. 
The rabbit, at a distance, appears to be a hare of a smaller size ; but, when 
taken, is found to be»very different from the hare, both in figure and taste. 
This creature lives chiefly under the ground. It is true, indeed, that the 
animals in this island all appear to be wild ; and the reason is this : as the 
island is rough and rocky, and covered also with woods, the shepherds ar« 
not able to follow their cattle into the places in which they are dispersed ; 
but, when they have found a convenient pasture, and are desirous of bringing 
them together, they sound a trumpet. Upon this signal, the whole herd im- 
mediately run together, and follow the call of their own shepherd, never mis- 
taking one for another. When strangers, therefore, come upon the island, 
tmd attempt to take any of the goats, or oxen, which they see feeding by 
themselves, the cattle, not used to be approached, immediately fly. And if 
the shepherd, perceiving what has happened, at the same time sounds his 
trumpet, they all run towards him with the greatest haste. From hence it is, 
that they are supposed to be wild ; and Timseus, having made only a slight 
and cursory inquiry, has falleu into the same mistake. 

' That the cattle should be thus obedient to the sound of a trumpet, is no 
very wonderful thing, in Italy, those who have the care of swine never en- 
close them in separate pastures, nor follow them behind, as the custom is 
among the Greeks, but go always before them, and from time to time sound 
& horn. The swine follow, and run together at the sound, and are so taught 
by habit to distinguish their own proper born, that their exactness, in this 
respect, appears almost incredible to those who never heard of it before. As 
the consumption of these animals is very great in Italy, the herds that are 
raised to satisfy the demand are also very numerous, though fewer, indeed, 
than they were in ancient Italy, when the country was possessed by the Tyr- 
rhenians and the Gauls. At this time, however, a thousand hogs, and some- 
times a greater number, are reared from, a single sow. In the morning they 
are turned out of their pens, in different troops, according to their breed and 
.age. But when the herds meet together, it is not possible to keep them 
thus distinct, or to prevent them from being mingled one with another, either 
when they leave their pens, or as they feed in the pastures, or when they 
. retnrn back again at night. The horn, therefore, was invented, as a method 
of separating, them without any difficulty. For as soon as the conductors go 
to different sides, and sound their horns-, the herd separate themselves each 
from the rest, and run all of them with such alacrity to the sound of their 
own horn, that no violence is sufficient to stop them in their course. In 
Greece, on the contrary, when different herds meet together in the forests, he 
who has the most numerous herd, whenever he rinds a proper opportunity, 
drives away the cattle of his neighbour, which are thus mingled with his own, 
Or some robber, perhaps, who has waited in ambuscade, carries away a whole 
. herd un perceived, if the swine, as it often happens, have wandered too far 
from their conductor, in search of the acorns when they begin to fall. But 
. this is sufficient upon this subject. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 387 



EXTRACT THR SECOND. 

The account given by Aristotle of the Locrians of Italy is confirmed by the 
customs and traditions which are found among that people. 

I HAVE often visited the Locrians, and have even performed for them 
some considerable service. It was through my request that they were ex- 
cused from attending the Roman armies into Spain, and from furnishing the 
"succours wiiich they were bound to send to the Romans by sea, in their war 
against the Illyrians." Upon these accounts, considering me as a person 
whose good offices had exempted them from much fatigue, as well as from 
great danger and expence, they have always treated me with singular respect 
and honour. I should certainly, therefore, be inclined rather to speak fa- 
vourably of this people than otherwise. Yet I cannot hesitate to declare that 
the account which Aristotle has delivered to us concerning this colony is 
nearer to the truth than that which is reported by Timseus. The Locrians 
themselves have, indeed, assured me, that their own traditions are more con- 
formable to the account of Aristotle than to that of Timseus. Of this they 
'mention the following proofs. 

The first is, that all nobility of ancestry among them is derived from wo- 
men, and not from men ; that those, for example, alone are noble, who draw 
their origin from the hundred families ; that these families were noble among 
the Locrians, before they migrated, and were the same, indeed, from which 
a hundred virgins were taken by lot, as the oracle had commanded, and w r ere 
sent to Troy ; that some women of these families came with the colony into 
Italy ; and that those who have descended from them are still reputed noble, 
and are called the descendants of the hundred families. 

Another instance is seen in the appointment of the virgin called the Phiale- 
phorus. The account which the Locrians give of the institution is this. At 
the time when they drove the Sicilians out of this part of Italy, the latter had 
a custom of appointing a young man who was chosen always from the nobles, 
and the most illustrious of their families, to lead the procession in their sa- 
crifices. The Locrians, not having received any religious ceremonies from 
their own nation, adopted many of those that were tised by the people with 
whom they were mixed, and among others this that is here mentioned. But 
they changed it in one circumstance : for, instead of a young man, they ap- 
pointed a virgin to perform the office, because nobility among them was derived 
from women. The same people affirm that they never had any treaty with the 
Locrians of Greece, and that there was no account remaining among them of 
any such treaty ; but that they know, by constant tradition, that they had a 
treaty with the Sicilians, which was executed in the following manner: When 
they came first into the country, and found that the Sicilians were struck 
with terror, and made no attempt to oppose their entrance, they concluded a 
convention with them in these words : " That they would live together as 
friends, and possess the country in common, as long as they should tread u[ - 
■ on this earth, and carry the heads upon their shoulders." But the Locrians, 
at the time of taking this oath, had put some earth within the soles of their 
shoes, and some heads of garlick, which appeared not in sight, upon their 
shoulders. And having afterwards shaken the earth out of their shoes, and 
thrown away the heads, they seized the first favourable opportunity, and in a 
short time drove the Sicilians out of the country. 



38S GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS 



'. m TSi -rfc.^ .aw 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

An observation concerning truth and falsehood, in history. 

T1TVOEUS says that, as a rule, which is, perhaps, defective either in length 
or breadth, is still a rule, and deserves to be so called, if it be only straight 
and even ; and, if it wants this chief and most essential property, ought to 
be called any thing rather than a rule, In the same manner, those written 
memoirs which record events, however faulty they may be in style and dispo* 
sition, and however defective in some necessary properties, yet, if the facts be 
true which are related, deserve to be called a history, and, if these be false, 
are utterly unworthy of that name. For my part, 1 am ready to acknowledge 
that truth should be considered as the principal and most essential part in all 
such compositions. 1 have even said, in a former part of this work, that as 
an animal, when deprived of sight, becomes incapable of performing its natu^ 
ral and proper functions, so, if we take away truth from history, what re- 
mains will be nothing but a useless tale. But there are two kinds of false- 
hood, one which proceeds from ignorance, and the other from design ; and 
as those writers may be excused who offend against the truth through igno-? 
ranee, so those, on the contrary, who pervert it with design, ought never to, 
"be pardoned. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 
The malignity of Timceus censured. 

WHEN men of sense revenge an injury, they examine, in the first place, 
what punishment it becomes them to inflic : :, and not what their* enemies de- 
serve to suffer, la the same manner, also, when we throw, reproaches upon 
.others, we ought principally to consider, not what is fit for them to hear, but 
what is proper for us to speak. For if our own passion and resentment be the 
rule, we snail set no bounds to what we say, but must fall into the most un- 
warrantable excess. 

Upon this account it is, that I cannot allow any degree of credit to Timseus, 
in the things which he has reported against Demochares. His calumnies 
are, indeed, so gross, that they are neither to be admitted nor excused. They 
show too plainly that the natural acrimony of his own temper has 'transported 
Mm beyond ail the bounds of decency, Nor is the account which he has 
given of Agathocles, how much soever that prince may have exceeded all other 
tyrants in' impiety, in any degree more justifiable. For, in the conclusion of 
his history, he writes, that Agathocles, from his earliest youth, was a common 
prostitute, obedient to the call of the most debauched ; that he was a jay and 
ja buzzard, ready to act or to suffer, with all that offered, in the most infamous 
lust ; and that, when he died, his wife, as she lamented over him, used these 
exclamations : " What nave not I for you? What have not you for me?" 
In this instance asain, not only the same spirit is discernible which appeared 
in his censure of Demochares, but such an excess also of rancour as is, in- 
deed, astonishing, For, from the facts which Timoeus himself has mentioned, 
it is evident that Agathocles was endowed by nature with very extraordinary 
talents. To leave the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, and to come to Syracuse 
at the age of eighteen years; to follow his design with such success, as, in a 
short time, to become master of all Sicily ; to render himself formidable and 
dangerous to Carthage; and, lastly, to grow old in the sovereignty which he 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 339 



had gained, and to die with the title of king ; are not these most signal proofs 
that he was born with wonderful abilities, and possessed all the powers that are 
requisite for the administration of great affairs ? The historian, then, instead 
of confining himself to those actions which might serve to villify Agathocles, 
and render him odious in the eyes of posterity, should have insisted likewise 
upon those parts of his conduct that were worthy of praise. For this is indeed 
the proper office of history. But Tiuneus, blinded by his own rancorous 
.spirit, takes a malignant pleasure in recounting, with exaggeration, the defects 
of this prince, but passes hastily over all his shining qualities, and seems not 
to have known,* that to suppress facts in history, is no less a tind of falsehood, 
than to report what never had existence. 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH.. 

A law of Zaleucus concerning the occupancy of a thing contested. A remark- 
able institution of the same lawgiver. 

TWO young men among the Locrians had a contest together concerning -a 
slave. One of them had for a long time had him in his possession. Trie other, 
two days only before the suit, went into the country, took away the boy by 
force in the absence of his master, and carried him to his own house. The 
master, as soon as he was informed of what had happened, went to the house, 
and getting his slave again into his hands, carried him before the judges, and 
contended that, upon his giving sureties, the boy ought to remain with him till 
• the right should be determined. For the law of Zaleucus, he said, declared, that 
the thing contested should remain, during the suit, in the possession of him 
from whom it was taken. The other youn^ man insisted, on the other hand, 
that by this very law the boy ought to be left with him, because he was the 
person from whom he was taken ; and that it was from his house that he was 
brought before the judges. The judges, conceiving that there was some dif- 
ficulty in the case, went and referred it to the cosmopolite; and this magistrate 
explained the law in the following manner. He said, that by the words, " from 
whom it was taken," was to be understood the person who had last held an 
undisturbed possession of the thing in dispute for a certain time; but that, if 
Smy one should come and take away a thing by forte from another, and carry is 
to his own house, and the first possessor should come afterwards and take it from 
him again, the person from whom it last was taken was not the person intended 
by the law. The young man against whom the judgment was given was dis- 
satisfied with this interpretation, and denied it to be the sense of the legisla- 
tor. The cosmopolite then demanded whether any one would dispute with 
him concerning the intention of the law, in the manner which Zaleucus had 
prescribed. The manner was, that the two disputants should speak, each with 
a rope round his neck, in the presence of a thousand persons, and that he who 
should be judged to have contended for a wrong interpretation, should be 
strangled in sight of the assembly. The young man replied that the condition 
was not equal. For the cosmopolite, who was almost ninety years old, had 
only two or three years left to live; but that himself, in all appearance, had still 
the greatest part of his life before him. The facetious answer turned the whole 
matter into pleasantry ; and the judges gave their sentence according to the opi- 
nion of the cosmopolite. 



590 . GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 

The gross absurdities of Callisthenes, in Ms description of the battle between 
Alexander and Darius in Cilicia. 

IN order to show the truth of what I have affirmed, I shall examine only one 
single battle; a battle which is very much celebrated ; which happened at no 
very distant time ; and, because this also is a circumstance of the greatest mo- 
ment, a battle in which Callisthenes himself was present. I mean the battle 
which was fought between Alexander and Darius, in Cilicia. 

In the account, then, which Callisthenes has given of this battle, he relates, 
that Alexander had already led his army through the passes which are called 
the Pylse of Cilicia, when Darius, having advanced along the passes of the 
mountain Amanus, and being informed by the people of the country that his 
enemy still continued his march forwards into Syria, resolved to follow liinj. 
That when he arrived near the passes of Cilicia, he encamped along the river 
Eyramus : that the ground which he occupied contained a space of only four- 
teen stadia from the sea to the foot of the mountain ; and that the river, fall- 
ing down the craggy sides of the mountain, ran obliquely through this ground, 
and passing over the plain, between some hills that were rough and difficult of 
approach, discharged itself into the sea. After this description, he says, that, 
when Alexander returned back again with a design to engage, Darius and his 
officers drew up the whole phalanx, in order of battle, upon the very ground 
upon which they had encamped ; and that they were covered in front by the 
river, which ran close to the camp; that they posted the cavalry near to the 
sea : next to these, in the same line, the mercenaries, along the bank of the 
river; and lastly, the peltastse, adjoining to the foot of the mountain. 

But it is not possible to conceive, that these troops could have been thus 
drawn up in order of battle between the phalanx and the river, if the river ran 
close to the camp : especially if v/e consider the numbers of which the several 
bodies were composed. For the cavalry, as Callisthenes himself affirms, 
amounted to thirty thousand; aud the mercenaries to as great a number.. 
Now it is easy to determine what extent of ground this number of troops 
would require. The uSual method of drawing up cavalry in the time of action 
is to range them eight in depth. It is necessary also to leave a certain space 
between each of the troops in front, that they may be able to perform their se- 
veral motions, A single stadium then will contain eight hundred Jiorse; ten 
stadia eight thousand ; and four stadia, three thousand and two hundred. 
According to this computation, a body of eleven thousand and two hundred 
horse would have filled the whole extent of fourteen stadia. And if the whole 
thirty thousand were formed in order of battle, there must have been three such 
bodies, within a very small number at least, drawn up each behind the other. 
In what place, then, were the mercenaries ranged ? Was it behind the cavalry ? 
But Callisthenes says no such thing. On the contrary, he affirms, that the 
mercenaries were engaged against the Macedonians in the very beginning of 
the action. It is manifest, therefore, that one half of the ground that has been 
mentioned, the part that was on the side of the sea, was occupied by the caval- 
ry ; and the other half, which was next to the mountain, by the mercenaries. 
And from hence we may clearly judge what must have been the depth of the 
cavalry ; and, by consequence, how very distant the river must have been from 
the camp. 

Afterwards he relates, that, when the enemy approached, Darius, who was 
in the centre of the line, called the mercenaries to him from one of the wings. 
But how was this possible ? The very part in which the mercenaries were 
joined to the cavalry was itself the centre. If Darius, then, was among the 



GENERAL HISTORY DF POLYB1US. 391 



mercenaries, ho%v, or from whence, or to what place, did lie call them? He 
then adds also, that the cavalry upon the right wing advanced, and vigorous- 
ly charged the Macedonians ; that the latter received them with equal cou- 
rage ; and that the tight on both sides was maintained with the greatest bra- 
very. But he forgets that there was a river between this cavalry and the Ma- 
cedonians : and such a river too, as he had just before described. 

Nor is this writer more exact in his account with respect to Alexander. He 
says, that this prince first carried with him into Asia forty thousand foot, and 
four thousand live hundred horse; and that, when he was ready to enter 
Cilicia, a new supply arrived from Macedon, of five thousand foot, 
and eight hundred horse. If we take then from these three thou- 
sand foot and three hundred horse, which is the greatest number that 
can be allowed for occasional and absent services, there will remain forty- 
two thousand foot and five thousand horse. With this army Alexander, as the 
historian writes, being informed, after he had advanced beyond the Pylse, that 
Darius had entered Cilicia, and was at the distance of only u hundred stadia 
behind him, immediately returned, and directed his march back again through 
the passes ; having the infantry in his van, behind these the cavalry, and the 
baggage in the rear. As soon as he came into the open plain, he separated 
the army from the baggage, and formed the troops into a phalanx, by thirty- 
two in depth. At some distance afterwards, he ranged them by sixteen in 
depth ; and at last, when he was come near to the enemy, by eight. 

Now these absurdities are even greater than those that were before remarked. 
For when a body of troops marches by sixteen in depth, if we allow the usual 
intervals of six feet between every rank, a stadium will contain only sixteen 
hundred men ; ten stadia, sixteen thousand, and twenty stadia, thirty-two 
thousand. If Alexander, therefore, formed his phalanx by sixteen in depth, he 
must have filled a space of twenty stadia, and wotdd still have wanted room 
for all his cavalry, and for ten thousand of his foot. Callisthenes then adds, 
that when this prince was at the distance of forty stadia from the enemy, he 
ordered the phalanx to advance in an extended front towards them. A greater 
absurdity than this is scarcely to be conceived. For where is the ground, 
especially in Cilicia, that will admit such a phalanx as is here described, to 
advance in an extended front against an enemy, a ground containing twenty 
stadia in depth, and forty in length ? The impediments, also, which would 
inevitably break the order of such a disposition, are too many to be recounted. 
Callisthenes himself has mentioned one, which is alone sufficient. For he 
says, that the torrents, which descended from the hills, had formed so many 
pits in the plain, that the greatest part of the Persians were lost in those 
cavities as they tied. 

But Alexander, perhaps this writer might say, was willing to be ready to 
receive the enemy in what part soever they should come to attack him. But 
nothing is more unfit for this purpose than the phalanx formed in an extended 
front, Tf this front be broken and disunited. And would it not also have been 
much more easy to have ranged the several parts of this great body in the 
very order in which they followed each of them the other in the march ? In- 
stead of forming the whole army in a single line, in which there must have 
been many vacancies, and leading it in an extended front to action, over a 
ground that was covered with bushes and broken cavities, he ought rather 
then to have formed a double, or a quadruple phalanx, one part-following behind 
another. For if the ground would have admitted this order in the march, there 
would have been time sufficient to draw up the troops in the same order in 
battle ; especially as he might have received notice from his scouts of the ap- 
proach of the enemy, even while they were at a considerable distance from 
him. 

Another fault in this description is, that the historian, while he represents 
the phalanx as advancing in an extended front over a plain, forgets to make 



S92 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBiUS. 



the cavalry march before, and places them upon the same line with the in- 
fantry. But the greatest of all his mistakes is this which follows. He says 
that Alexander, when he appoached the enemy, drew up the phalanx eight in 
depth. The whole line, therefore must have heen equal in length to forty sta~ 
dia. Or, let it be supposed, that the men stood so close together as even to be 
wedged one within another. In that case, they must have covered, at the least, 
twenty stadia. And yet Callisthenes had before affirmed that the whole 
length of the ground was less than fourteen" stadia : that a part of it, which 
was nearest to the sea, was occupied by one half of the cavalry ; that the other 
half was posted upon the right ; and that between the whole line and the 
mountain there was left also a considerable distance, that the troops might 
not fall under a body of the enemy, which was posted upon the sides of the 
mountain. I know, indeed, that in order to oppose this body, he here forms a 
part of the line in the figure called the forceps. Let us allow, then, ten thou- 
sand men, which is even a greater number than this purpose would require. 
In that case it is evident that there would remain, according to Callisthenes, 
eleven stadia only at the most, for the length of the whole line ; and that 
thirty-two thousand men, contained in a space of this extent, how closely so- 
ever they were crowded, must necessarily have been formed by thirty in depth. 
And yet Callisthenes affirms, that at the time of action they were ranged by 
eight. Mistakes like these cannot even be excused. For what credit is to be 
given to things that are impossible ? When a writer lays down the exact mea- 
sure of the ground, fixes the number of the men, ascertains the distance of one 
man from another, and gives afterwards an account which is wholly incompati- 
ble with all these circumstances, the falsehood is too glaring to be par- 
doned. 

It would be tedious to examine all the errors into, which this writer has fallen. 
One or two more, however, may just be mentioned. He says that Alexander 
took care to draw up his army in such a manner that he might himself be en- 
gaged against Darius ; and that Darius also had at first the same intention 
with respect to Alexander ; but that he afterwards altered his design. But he 
neither mentions how these princes knew in what part of their respective armies 
they severally intended to engage, nor to what other part Darius retired after 
he had changed his purpose. Now again was it possible for the phalanx to 
advance, in order of battle, up the bank of a river, which was broken and un- 
even, and covered also with bushes in almost every part ? Such an absurdity- 
can never be ascribed to Alexander, who is acknowledged to have been trained 
both in the study and the exercise of war from his earliest age. It must 
therefore be imputed to the historian himself; who, from a want of skill in 
matters of this kind, was unable to distinguish what was possible to be done 
from that which was impracticable. But this will be sufficient concerning 
Ephorus and Callisthenes. 



EXTRACT THE SEVENTH. 
Topics for a discourse in praise of peace. 

IN the first place, he says, the assembly may be told, that men are wak- 
ened in the morning, in the time of war, by trumpets, and in the time of peace, 
by the crowing of cocks. And again, that Hercules, when he instituted the 
Olympic games, as a remission after his toil, sufficiently declared this to be 
his meaning, that, whenever he had brought mischief upon any, by making 
war, he was forced to it by necessity, and the commands of others ; but that 
willingly he had never done harm to any person. To these arguments may be 
added the authority of the poet, who introduces Jupiter expressing his dis- 
pleasure against the god of war, in the following words : 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 3#$ 



Of all the gods that in Olympus dwell, 
Thou art to me most hateful : for in strife, 
In war, and battles, ever is thy joy.* 

In another passage, the wisest of his heroes thus exclaims : 

The man who stirs 
The bloody horrors of intestine war, 
No rights of kindred, or of family, 
No laws of justice knows.-f- 

Of the same kind also are the sentiments of Euripides, expressed in the fol* 
lowing lines : 

Parent of wealth, celestial Peace, 
Thou fairest of the heavenly train, O why, 

Why this delay? Wilt thou attain 
These longing eyes ne'er visit ? How I fear, 

That age, insensible and cold, 
My trembling limbs wil seize, e'er I shall hail 

The moment of thy blest return, 
With the crown'd banquet, and the choral song. % 

Again, it may be urged, that war resembles a disease, and peace a state of 
health : in one, the sick are recovered : but the other destroys those that are 
well. That in peace also the old are buried by the young, as the course of 
nature requires ; but in war, the youny,- are buried by the old. And again, 
that, in the time of war, we are not safe within the walls of our cities; but 
that, in peace, there is full security, even to the farthest limits of the country. 
The other motives which he mentions are of a like kind with these. 



EXTRACT THE EIGHTH. 

Men conversant in affairs are alone properly qualified for writing histoty. 

THERE are two organs given to man by nature, through which all infor- 
mation, and all knowledge of things isj derived, — the hearing, and the sight; 
and of these, the latter is by much the most conformable to truth. For the 
testimony of the eyes, as Heraclitus observes, is far more exact than that 
of the ears. But Timaeus, in making his inquiries, had recourse to the 
easiest, though the least preferable, of these two methods ; and never em- 
ployed his eyes, but only his ears. And even still more, as the knowledge 
which is gained by hearing is also of two sorts; the one derived from reading 
books, and the other from interrogating other men ; Timaeus, as we have al- 
ready shewn, took no pains to obtain the latter. What determined his choice 
in this respect is not difficult to be discovered. The knowledge that is ac- 
quired by reading, is gained without any danger, or any kind of toil. If a 
man will only fix his residence in the neighbourhood of .a library, or in a city 
that abounds with written memoirs, he may make his researches with perfect 
ease, and, reposing himself with full tranquillity, may compare the accounts, 
and detect the errors of former writers. But tiie knowledge which is drawu 
from personal examination and inquiry, is attended with great fatigue and 

* Iliad, b.v. S90. 

t Iliad, b. 1.63. 

^ Chorus from the Cresphonteg, 
"fOL. I. KO. 7. 2 » 



394 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



great expence. It is this, however, which is the most important, and which 
gives, indeed, the chief value to history. Historians themselves are ready to 
acknowledge this truth. For thus Ephorus says, that if it was possible for 
the writers of history to be present at all transactions, such knowledge would 
be preferable to any other. To the same purpose is that passage of Theo- 
pompus, that the experience which is gained in battle renders a man a con- 
summate general : that practice in pleading causes forms the perfect orator ; 
and that the same observation is just with respect to the arts of navigation 
and of medicine. The poet also inculcates the same truth with still greater 
force. For designing to shew, in the person of Ulysses, what kind of qualities 
would render a man fit for the administration of affairs, he describes him ia 
the following words : 

Sing, Muse, the man, for various arts renown'd, 
Who wauder'd long through many different climes. 

And afterrwards : 

Oft through the deep with heartfelt anguish borne. 
To distant nations he his course essay'd, 
Their cities visited, their manners knew.**** 

And in another place he says, that he had experienced 

* The rage of battles, and the boisterous wave.* 

Now such a man also is it, in my judgment, that would alone be able to 
give a proper figure to history. It was said by Plato, that human affairs 
would then be well administered, when philosophers should be kings, or kings 
philosophers. In the same manner I would say, that history would be well 
composed, if those who are engaged in great affairs would undertake to write 
it ; not in a slight and negligent manner, like some of the present age ; but; 
regarding such a work as one of the noblest and most necessary of their 
duties, and pursuing it with unremitted application, as the chief business of 
their lives; or if those, on the other hand, who attempt to write, would think 
it necessary to be also conversant in the practice of affairs. Till this shall 
happen, there will be no end to mistakes in history, New Timseus never used 
the least endeavours to acquire such practice, but, confining his residenceto a 
single place, in which also he was a stranger, he even industriously renounced 
an active life ; was acquainted neither with politics nor war, nor ever exposed 
himself to the fatigue of visiting distant countries, and of making personal in- 
quiries. And yet this man has gained the reputation of being an excellent 
historian. I know not, for my own part, upon what such pretensions can be 
grounded, especially as he has himself acknowledged, that a good historian 
should possess the qualifications which have been here enumerated. For, in 
the preface to his sixth book, he takes notice of an opinion which some persons 
had advanced, that the demonstrative kind of writing required greater genius, 
greater labour, and a greater stock of knowledge, than history. This notion, 
as he says, had before given offence to Ephorus ; and, because that writer 
had not been able sufficiently to refute it, he endeavours to state, and to com- 
pare together, these two kinds of composition. * * * * 

* Odyss. b. i. l. and Iliad, b. xxir. 8, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 395 



BOOK THE THIRTEENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

Avarice compared to a drops}/. Deceit and artifice are too generally prac- 
tised in public affairs. The different conduct of the Achceans, and in some 
degree also of the Iiotnans. 

AS in the ease of those who are diseased with a dropsy, no application of 
liquors from without is sufficient to remove or allay the thirst, unless the in- 
terna! disposition of the body be first changed by proper remedies; in the 
same manner also the desire of gain is never to be satisfied, unless reason be 
employed to correct the vicious inclination in the mind. 

There are many who employ that dark and treacherous policy which has 
now been mentioned ; and yet no one will deny that such a conduct is utterly 
unworthy of a king. But because arts like these are now common in the 
world, some men are willing to suppose, that the practice of them is become 
altogether necessary in the administration of public affairs. The Achaeans, 
however, at all times were distinguished by different sentiments. So far were 
they from forming any secret designs against their friends, in order to enlarge 
their power, that they disdained even to subdue their enemies with the assist- 
ance of deceit. In their opinion, victory was neither honourable nor secure, 
unless it was obtained in open contest, and by the force of superior courage. 
Upon this account they established it as a kind of law among them, never to 
use any concealed weapons, nor to throw darts at a distance; being persuaded 
that an open and close engagement was the only fair method of combat. 
From the same reason it was, that they not only made a public declaration of 
war, but sent notice also, each to the other, of their resolution to try the 
fortune of a battle, and of the place likewise in which they had determined to 
engage. In the present times a general is supposed to be ignorant in his pro- 
fession if he discovers his intentions. Among the Romans alone, some slight 
traces of the ancient virtue still remain. For they make before hand a de- 
nunciation of war ; they seldom form ambuscades ; and they fight always 
man to man in close engagement : but, in general, artifice so much prevails, 
that it is now become the chief study of men to deceive each other, both in the 
administration of civil affairs and in the conduct of war. And this it was which 
gave occasion to these reflexions. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

77t€ designs of Philip against the Rhodians. The character of Heraclides. 

PHILIP, being willing to give a proper subject to Heraclides for the 
exercise of his abilities, commanded him to contvive some method for disabling 
or destroying the Rhodian fleet; and at the same time sent some ambas- 
sadors to Crete, to excite the people of that island agaiust the Rhodians, and 
prevail with them to join him in the war. Heraclides, whose nature was well 
adapted to any ill design, received this commission with joy ; and, after some 
time employed in regulating his plan, sailed away to Rhodes, This Hera- 
clides was originally from Tarentum, and was born of vulgar parents, who 
exercised some mechanical trade. He possessed all the qualities that are 
requisite to form a daring and licentious profligate. From his earliest age he 
abandoned himself to the most scandalous prostitution. He had a ready con- 



S96 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBITJS. 

ception, and a strong memory ; was bold and terrible to his inferiors, but a 
base flatterer of those who were above him. He had first been forced to leave 
Tarentum on account of a suspicion that was entertained against him, as if he 
had designed to betray the place to the Romans. Not that he at that time 
possessed any authority in the city, but being an architect, under the pretence 
of malting some repairs in the walls, he had gotten into his hands the keys of 
the gate which led into the country; he then took refuge among the Romans ; 
and, while he remained in their camp, entered again into a correspondence 
with Annibal, and sent letters to Tarentum : but being discovered, and dread- 
ing the consequences of his treason, he fled into Macedon ; and, having in- 
sinuated himself into the confidence of Philip, gained afterwards so great a 
power over him, that he was almost the principal cause of the ruin of that 
inighty kingdom. 

EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

The force of Truth. 

FOR my part, I am persuaded that "there is not in nature a greater goddess, 
or any that has a stronger power over men, than Truth. For, though all 
unite in opposition to her, and though falsehood draws up a whole train of 
probabilities, and sets them in array against her, she triumphs, I know not 
how, single, and unsupported, and forces her way into the heart. Some- 
times her power is instantly discerned. Sometimes she is obscured for a 
while, but appears at last in perfect splendour, and surmounts, by her own 
force alone^ the falsehood under which she has been oppressed. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

The cruelty of Nobis the tyrant of Sparta, 

THE Lacedaemonian tyrant, Nabis, though he had now for three years held 
the government, was deterred by the ill fortune of Machanides, who had so lately 
been defeated by the Achseans, from attempting any thing of importance; but 
employed himself in forming the design, and laying the foundations of a severe 
and lasting tyranny. With this view, he seemed determined to destroy all that 
■were now left in Sparta, driving into banish inent the citizens that were most dis- 
tinguished by their wealth or families, and distributing their possessions and 
their wives among the chief of those that were attached to his party, and among 
the mercenaries that were retained in his service. These were all of them as- 
sassins, house-breakers, nightly thieves, and robbers. For he spared no pains 
to collect together persons of this sort from every quarter'; men whose crimes 
had forced them to abandon their own countries. Of all these, he was the 
declared protector and the sovereign ; and, as he had formed them also into a 
guard for his person, it was manifest that he had determined to maintain his 
power by wickedness and violence. And, indeed, not satisfied with driving 
the citizens into banishment, he resolved that they should find no safety even 
in the places to which they fled, nor any retreat secure. For some were de- 
stroyed upon the road by messengers whom he sent to* overtake them, aad 
others brought back again and killed. In the cities also in which they had 
fixed their abode, having hired, by the means of unsuspected persons, the 
houses that were adjoining to those in which any of the exiles lived, he sent 
thither some Cretans, who made boles in the walls, and shooting arrow* 
through the openings, killed some as they were standing, and others as they 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 337 



reposed themselves in their own houses. Thus the unhappy Lacedaemonians 
were in no time or place secure ; and in this manner great numbers ot them 
were destroyed. He contrived also a machine, if it may be called, indeed^ by 
such a name ; an image of a woman, magnificently dressed, and tormedm a 
most exact resemblance of his wife. And when his intention was to draw 
money from any of the citizens, he invited them to his house, and at first, with 
much i civility, represented to them the danger with which their country was 
threatened from the Acbaeans ; the number of mercenaries which he was 
forced to retain in pay for the sake of the common safety ; and the great post 
of maintaining the worship of the gods, as well as the other articles ot pubhe 
ex pence. If these arguments prevailed, it wTis sufficient for his purpose : but 
if all his solicitations were without effect, he then used to say, « 1 want, it seems, 
the power of persuasion ; but Ape-a, I believe, will be able to persuade you. 
Apega was the name of his wife, Upon these words, the image of the woman 
that has been mentioned immediately appeared. Nabis, then, taking her by 
the hand, raised her from her seat; and, folding afterwards his arms round 
the person whom he had been soliciting, brought him near, by degrees, to the 
body of the image, whose breasts, hands, and arms were stuck with points ot 
iroiai concealed under the clothes; and then, pressing the back ot the pre- 
tended woman with his hands, by the means of some secret springs he fixed 
the man close to her breast, and soon forced him to promise all that he 
desired. But there were some also who perished in this torture, when they re- 
fused to comply with his demands. 

BOOK THE FOURTEENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

The conduct and exploits of Publius Scipiq in Afric. He sets fire U the 
camps of Asdrubal^ad Syphax. The Carthaginians draw together a new 
army, and are defeated in a set engagement. They resolve to recall Amibat 
from Italy, and to continue the war.. 

CHAP. I. 

WHILE' the consuls were employed in these affairs, Publius Scipio, wii» 
remained still in Afric, having received information, during the winter that 
the Carthaginians were getting ready a fleet, resolved to put his own fleet also 
in order, but not relinquish his design of laying siege to Utica. He still en, 
couraoedalso in himself the hope which he had conceived, that he should be able 
to bring back Syphax again to the Roman party. With this view, taking ad- 
vantage of the neighbourhood of the>o armies he urged him, by continual 
deputations, and was persuaded that he should at last be able to draw him 
away from his alliance with the Carthaginians. "For, when he considered, on 
the one hand, that it was the nature of the Numidians to pass soon from en- 
joyment to disgust, and, on the other, that they were no less ready to break 
thVough their engagements to the gods and men, he had scarcely any doubt 
but that this prince was already satiated, not only with his wife, for whose sake 
he had ioined the Carthaginians, but in general also with his new al hes. But 
while his mind was thus" filled with different cares, and agitated by no les» 
various hopes, unable as he was to contend openly in the held against he 
enemy, whose numbers were far superior to his own, he took tne occasion that 
was offered, to carry into execution an attempt of a different kind, in in* 
manner which we are now going to relate, 



?9S GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



Some of the messengers, whom he had .-sent to Syphax, informed him at 
their return that the tents in which the Carthaginians were lodged during the 
winter were framed of wood of every kind, and of the branches of trees, with- 
out any mixture of earth ; that those of the Numidians who were from the 
beginning in the army, were composed wholly of reeds ; that the rest of the 
Numidians, who had been drawn lately from the cities, had framed their 
tents only with branches ; and that, though some of them were lodged within 
the intrenchment, the greatest part remained without. Having considered, 
therefore, with himself, that, if he could set lire to the camps, it would be an 
action not less surprising to the enemy than serviceable to his own designs, 
he began to take the measures that were necessary for that purpose. In the 
course of all the deputations, it had still been urged by Syphax, that the Car- 
thaginians should retire from Italy, and the Romans also from Afric ; and that 
both of them should retain possession of all that they then held between those 
two countries. To this time, Publius had utterly rejected these conditions, 
but his messengers were now instructed to suggest some little hope to Syphax, 
that it was not impossible but that his offer might be accepted. The Numi- 
dians, softened by this expectation,were more earnest to continue the intercourse 
that was begun ; and suffered the messengers to go and to return more fre- 
quently, and in greater numbers than before,. Sometimes they even remained 
Tvhole daysj without being observed, in either camp. Upon these occasions, 
Publius always sent among his messengers some persons of experienced pru- 
dence, and some officers concealed under a vulgar dress, or disguised in the 
habit of slaves, that they might carefully observe the approaches and the en- 
trances of both the camps. For there were two different camps ; one occupied 
by Asdrubal, with thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse, and another 
at the distance of ten stadia from the former, possessed by the Numidians, 
whose numbers amounted to ten thousand horse, and, at this time, to about 
fifty thousand foot. The latter, as it was easiest of approach, was the best 
suited also to the purpose of being set on fire ; because the Numidians, as J 
have al eady said, had framed their tents, not of wood nor of earth, but only of 
straw and reeds. 

When the spring, then, was come, Scipio, having obtained all the inform- 
ation that was requisie for carrying into execution this design against the ene- 
my, set all his ships afloat, and stored them with military machines, as if his 
purpose had been to atttck Utica on the side of the sea. At the same time he 
sent away a body of two thousand foot, who took possession again of the hill 
which commanded the city, and began to fortify it, and to throw up an intrench- 
ment round it with the greatest diligence. By this measure, likewise, he in- 
duced the enemy to believe that he had nothing in view r but the siege. But 
his true intention Avas, to leave these men as a body of reserve, that they might 
be ready, when the time of the expedition should come, to intercept the gar- 
rison of Utica, if they should sMby out after the departure of the army, and at- 
tack the camp that was near, or attempt to invest the troops that would be left 
to guard it. While he was employed in these preparations, he sent also again 
to Syphax, desiring to be informed, whether he was satisfied with the terms 
that had been proposed ; whether the Carthaginians also were ready to receive 
them ; or whether these last would not again pretend that they wanted a longer 
time to deliberate upon them. He ordered the messengers also not to return 
till they had received an answer to each of these demands. The Numidians 
had now no doubt but that Scipio was sincere in his desire of peace, both be- 
cause he had ordered the messengers not to return without an answer, and had 
seemed likewise more particularly careful to be assured of the consent of the 
Carthaginians. He sent, therefore, immediately to Asdrubal, informing him 
of all that had been done, and urging him to accept the peace that was 
offered, and himself in the meanwhile passed his time without any care 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 390 



or caution, and suffered the Numidians, who came from time to time to 
the army, to remain without the intrenchment. Publius, on his part also, af- 
fected the same show of negligence, but, in reality, was still most intent upon 
the execution of his design. 

As soon as Syphax had received notice from the Carthaginians that he 
might finish the treaty, he, with great joy, communicated the answer to the Ro- 
man deputies, who then returned back to their own camp, to inform their gene- 
ral what the king had done. But Scipio immediately sent them back again 
to acquaint him that, for his own part, he was still firm and earnest in his de- 
sire of peace, but that his counsel were of a different opinion, and had resolved 
that the war should be continued. Bis design in sending this message was, 
that he might not be charged with any breach of* faith, if he should commence 
hostilities while the conferences still subsisted for a treaty. This declaration, 
being made, he thought that, whatever he should attempt, would be free 
from all reproach and blame. 

As Syphax had already conceived the strongest hopes of peace, he was much, 
grieved at this unexpected change, and went himself to Asdrubal to acquaint 
him with the resolution of the Romans. The two generals, being thus rilled 
with new disquietude, deliberated long together concerning the measures that 
were now proper to be pursued. B*ut both their apprehensions and their designs 
were very far distant from the truth : for they conceived not a thought of any 
danger threatening them, or of taking any precaution for their own security, 
but were intent only on the means of attempting something against the ene- 
my, and earnest to contrive some method of drawing them to a battle in the 
open country. 

Before this time Scipio, both by his preparations, and by the orders which 
he gave, had induced the whole army to believe that his intention was to take 
Utica by surprise : but, now having assembled together the ablest of the 
tribunes, and those that were most worthy of his confidence, he disclosed 
to them his design, commanded them to take their supper at the usual hour, 
and that, as soon as the trumpets should have all sounded, according to the 
custom, they should draw the legions out of the camp. For the Roman cus- 
tom is, to sound all the trumpets of the army, immediately after supper, near 
the tent of the general, as the signal for placing, in their respective posts, the 
guards of the night. He then ordered the persons also to be called, who had 
been employed as spies to inspect the camps of the enemy, compared together 
aud closely examined their accounts of the ways and entrances, and to^k the 
opinion of Massanissa concerning all that they reported, because he especially 
was well acquainted with the country. And when all his measures were ad- 
justed, having left a sufficient body of troops to guard the camp, he began his 
march towards the enemy, who were at the distance of about sixty stadia from 
him, at the end of the first watch ; and, arriving.' near them about the end of 
the third, he allotted one half of the Romans, and all the Numidians, to Lae- 
lius and Massanissa, and ordered them to attack the camp of Syphax. He 
exhorted them to behave themselves like men of courage ; to do nothing with- 
out due consideration ; and to remember that, in nightly expeditions, as much 
as the darkness was an impediment to action, so much should this disadvantage 
be compensated by valovir and by prudence. Taking, then, the rest of the 
army, he advanced, but with a slow pace, towards the camp of Asdrubal : 
for his intention was, not to attempt any thing on his part till Lselius should 
have first set fire to the Numidian camp. 

This general, then, and Massanissa, having divided their forces into two 
bodies, approached the camp of the enemy, and began the work. As the 
camp seemed framed, as 1 have said, for the very purpose of being set on fire, 
no sooner was the flame thrown by the foremost troops, and had seized the 
first tents, than in a moment, because the tents were crowded close together, 
'and the quantity of the matter also which fed the conflagration was extremely 



400 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



great, the evil was such as could admit of no remedy. Leelius, keeping his 
troops together, remained in his post, and stood as a reserve, while Massanissa 
distributed his men among all the passages, through which he knew that the 
enemy would endeavour to save themselves from the flames. Not any of the 
Numidians, nor even Syphax himself, had the least suspicion of the truth, but 
supposed that the fire had happened by some accident. With this persuasion, 
either awakened from their sleep, or starting, full of liquor, from their uighly 
revels, they leaped hastily from their tents. Many of them were trampled 
down in the crowds that filled the passages of the camp. Many were inter- 
cepted as they fled, and perished in the tire-; and the rest, who escaped the 
flames, fell all under the sword of the enemy, and were destroyed before they 
knew either what they were doing, or what they suffered. 

The Carthaginians, when they beheld from their camp the greatness of the 
fire, and the height to which the flames were raised, supposed also that the 
misfortune had happened by accident. While some of them, therefore, went 
in haste to carry assistance, the rest, running all out of their tents, stood with- 
out arms befor.e theiutrenchment, and viewed, with astonishment, the dreadful 
spectacle. Scipio, perceiving that all things had happened as he desired, fell 
upon those that were come out ; killed one part, and pursuing the rest, at the 
same time, threw u tire also upon their tents. In an instant the same scene of 
conflagration, and of slaughter, appeared in the Carthaginian camp, as in 
that of the Numidians. Asdrubal used no endeavours to extinguish the 
flames. He now clearly perceived that the fire in the Numidian camp had * 
not happened by accident, but from the bold attempt of the Romans. He 
began, therefore, only to consider by what means he might escape with safety, 
though, indeed, he had but little hopes of being able to accomplish even that 
design. For the fire had spread itself with great rapidity, and encircled every 
part. All the passages also of the camp were filled with horses, with 
beasts of burthen, and with men, some of them half dead, and destroyed 
by the flames, and some driven from their senses by astonishment and horror. 
Such disorder and confusion, which was sufficient to appal even the stoutest 
courage, seemed likewise to preclude every hope of safety. Syphax, also, and 
his officers, were in the same condition. The two ,generals, however, at last 
found means to escape with a small body of horse. But the other thousands, 
-and ten thousands, of men, of horses, and of beasts of burthen, most miserably 
perished in the flames ; or those among the men who escaped the yiolence of 
the? tire, were encountered by a foul and a dishonourable death. For they not 
only were without their arms, but some, even without their clothes, were cut 
down by the enemy, naked as they fled. In a word, every place was filled with 
lamentable shrieks, with disordered cries, with frantic consternation,with confused 
and undistinguishable noise. With all these there was a devouring fire, and 
flames hurled to a tremendous height. Any one of these things alone would 
be sufficient to strike terror into the human heart ; how much more all of 
them together ? It is not possible, indeed, to show anything like the disaster, 
or to form any image of the greatness of it by any comparison : so much do 
the most dreadful accideuts that have hitherto been known fall below the 
horrors of this most astonishing scene. And, in truth, though Scipio was dis- 
tinguished by a course of many glorious actions, there is none, in my judgment, 
among all that he performed, so glorious, or so adventurous, as this exploit. 

When the morning appeared, and the enemies were all either killed or dis- 
persed in flight, he exhorted the tribunes, and pursued, without delay, after 
those that had fled. Asdrubal, though he 'received notice of his approach, 
remained for some time in the city to which he had retired, trusting to the 
strength of the place : but when he perceived that the inhabitants were pre- 
parting to rise against him, not daring to wait the arrival of the Romans, he 
again continued his flight with the rest that had escaped. The number of 
these was five hundred horse, and about two thousand foot* The inhabitants 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 401 



were then quiet, and surrendered themselves to the Romans at discretion. 
Scipio spared the place; but gave two cities that were near to be plundered by 
the army, and then returned back again to his own camp. 



CHAP. II. 

THE Carthaginians were heavily affected by this great loss. The designs 
which they had formed were now entirely frustrated, and all their prospects 
fatally reversed ; for they had nattered themselves with the hopes that they 
should be able to invest the Romans, both by land and sea, upon the hill 
adjoining to Utica, which was the seat of their winter quarters ; and had di- 
rected all their preparations to that purpose ; but now they are not only 
forced, by a most strange and unexpected accident, to leave the enemy in 
possession of all the open country, but have reason also to fear that their 
whole state would soon be exposed to the most imminent danger. Their 
consternation, therefore, and their apprehensions, were extreme. As the con- 
dition, however, of affairs required that something should be determined with 
respect to future measures, the senate met together, but in great perplexity, 
and was distracted by confused and different sentiments ; for some were of 
opinion that Annibal should be called home from Italy ; as if the only hope 
that now remained was in that general, and in his army. Some again advised 
that deputies should be sent to Publius to obtain a truce, and to enter into 
conferences for a treaty ; but others exhorted the assembly to resume their 
courage ; to raise new forces, and to send some messengers to Syphax, who 
had retired to Abba, a city at no great distance, and was employed in col- 
lecting together all those that had escaped from the late misfortune ; and this 
was the opinion which at last prevailed. They ordered Asdrubal, therefore, to 
make new levies, and sent to Syphax, entreating him to assist them, and to 
remain firm to his first .engagements ; at the same time assuring him that 
their general very soon would join him with another army. 

Scipio was at this time intent on his first design of forming the siege of 
Utica ; but when he heard that Syphax remained in his posts, and that the 
Carthaginians were raising a new army, he collected together all his forces, 
and encamped before that city. At the same time, having made also a dis- 
tribution of the spoil, he sent merchants to purchase it, which was done with 
very great advantage. For the soldiers, considering the late success as a 
certain assurance of the entire conquest of all the country, were ready to 
sell their shares of the booty at the smallest rates. 

Syphax and his friends had at first resolved to continue their retreat, and to 
return back to their own country ; but a body of four thousand Celtiberians, 
whom the Cathaginians had just now taken into their pay, having met this 
prince in the neighbourhood of Abba, he was so much encouraged by this 
additional strength, that he remained where he then was, and began to as- 
sume new confidence ; and when his young wife also, the daughter, as we 
have said, of Asdrubal, joined all her power of entreaty, to prevail with him 
not to desert the Carthaginians in the present exigency, he at last suffered 
himself to be persuaded, and complied with all that she desired. The Car- 
thaginians themselves had conceived likewise no small hopes from the arrival 
of these succours. Instead of four thousand, it was pretended that ten thou- 
sand Celtiberians were arrived ; and that their courage, and the manner in 
which they were armed, would render them invincible. This report, as it 
filled every mouth, and was spread universally among the people, inspired 
the troops especially with so great confidence, that they were impatient once 
more to take the field. At the end, therefore, of thirty days, they came and 
joined the Numidians and the Celtiberians, and encamped in the place that 

YOfc. I. HO. 7. 3 E 



402 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



was called the Great Plains ; forming all together an army of thirty thou- 
sand men. 

As soon as it was known in the Roman camp that the enemy had again 
taken the field, Publius resolved to advance towards them. Having given 
the necessary orders, therefore, to the fleet, and to the troops that were em- 
ployed in the siege of Utica, he began his march with the rest of the army, 
disencumbered of all their baggage ; and, arriving on the fifth day in the 
neighbourhod of the Great Plains, fixed his camp upon a hill, at the distance 
of thirty stadia from the enemy. On the next day, he descended into the 
plain, and formed his troops in order, placing his cavalry at the distance of 
seven stadia before the rest. In this situation, both the armies remained dur- 
ing the two following days, and only made trial of their strength in little 
skirmishes; but on the fourth day, the generals, agi*eeably to their design, 
drew out their forces on both sides, and ranged them in order of battle. 
The disposition that was made by Publius was simply the common dispo- 
tion of the Romans. The hastati were first placed in front; behind these the 
principes ; and, lastly, the triarii in the rear. Upon the right wing stood the 
Roman cavalry ; the Numidians a/id Massanissa upon the left. On the side 
of Asdrubal and Syphax, the Celtiberians were drawn up in the centre, oppo- 
site to the Roman cohorts ; the Numidians upon the left wing; and the Car- 
thaginians upon the right. But the Numidians, even in the first onset, fled 
from the charge of the Roman cavalry ; and the Carthaginians from that of 
Massanissa. So much was their courage broken by the late defeats. The 
Celtiberians alone stood firm, and maintained the fight with vigour, having 
but little reason to hope, either that they could escape by flight, as they were 
wholly unacquainted, with the country ; or, that their lives would be spared, 
-if they should fall into the power of the Romans. For, as Seipio had com- 
mitted no hostility against them in the course of the war in Spain, they seemed 
clearly to have violated the laws of good faith and justice, by taking arms 
in favour of the Carthaginians. When the wings, however, were broken, 
these troops were soon surrounded by the principes and the triarii, and were 
almost all of them destroyed in the place, after they had performed the great- 
est service for the Carthaginians, not only in the battle, but in securing also 
their retreat. For if the Romans had not been retarded by this obstacle, 
but had immediately pursued those that fled, scarcely any part of the army 
would have been able to escape. But while they were stopped by the brave 
resistance of these troops, Syphax, with his cavalry, found means to retreat into 
his own kingdom ; and Asdrubal, with the rest that were saved, to Carthage. 
The Roman general, as soon as he had given the necessary orders concern- 
ing the prisoners and the spoil, called together his council, to deliberate on the 
measures that were next to be pursued. In this assembly it was determined, 
that Publius. with one part of the army, should go round to the several cities, 
and, that Laelius and Massanissa, with the Numidians, and a part also of the 
Roman legions, should follow Syphax, and riot allow him time to stand, or to 
make any new preparations. These resolutions were immediately carried into 
execution. Among the cities, some were struck with terror, and surrendered 
themselves voluntarily to the Romans; and others, being invested by them 
-upon their first approach, were immediately taken by storm. Through all 
the country, indeed, so grievous were the distresses which the long continu- 
ance of the war had brought upon the people, and so heavy the tributes that 
were imposed, that all things were ready for a change. 

In the city of Carthage, the minds of men, which had before been much 
disordered, were now filled with new and greater consternation. Their whole 
hopes indeed seemed at once to sink under this second blow, and to give place 
to voluntary despair. There were some, however, among the firmest of the 
senators, who advised, that they should send a fleet to Utica, and endeavour 
to raise the siege of that city, by attacking the Roman fleet, which was wholly 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYSIUS. 4W- 



unprepared for an engagement ; and that Annibal also should be recalled from 
Italy, and a trial he made of that resource without any farther delay. They 
insisted, that both these measures, as far as it could reasonably be judged, 
would be productive of very salutary consequences. But it was urged by 
others, that the times would not now bear any such remedy : that their pre- 
sent business was to fortify the city, and to put it into a condition to sustain a 
siege ; that, if the citizens would only agree in sentiments, chance itself would 
afford many opportunities of retrieving their affairs. At the same time they 
advised, that a consultation likewise should be held concerning peace; and, 
that they should seriously consider, by what kind of treaty, and upon what 
conditions, they might be delivered from the present evils. After long and 
vehement debates, all these opinions were adopted by the senate. As soon, 
therefore, as the assembly was dissolved, the messengers that were to be dis- 
patched to Annibal set sail for Italy ; the commander of the naval forces went 
on board of the fleet, and the rest employed themselves in putting the city 
into a state proper for defence, and in holding constant deliberations together, 
concerning each particular measure that was lit to be pursued. 

The Roman army, having marched through all the country, and not met 
with any resistance, was loaded with an immense booty. Publius, therefore, 
resolved to send away the greatest part of the spoil to be stored in his first 
camp ; and, when he had thus lightened the army, to march and invest Tunis, 
- and to encamp in the very sight of the Cathaginians ; being persuaded, that 
by this boldness, he should strike them most effectually with terror and dis- 
may. 

The Carthaginians, having completed, in a few days, their naval forces, to- 
gether with the necessary stores, were just now ready to sail out to sea, and to 
carry into execution the deisgn that has been mentioned. Oh the arrival of 
Publius at Tunis, the garrison fled from the place, and relinquished it to the 
Romans. Tunis is situated at the distance of a hundred and twenty stadia 
from Carthage, and may be seen from almost every part of the city. It has 
already been mentioned, that both art and nature had concurred in making it 
a place of very uncommon strength. But scarcely had the Romans finished 
their encampment, when they discovered the Carthaginian fleet directing their 
course towards Utica. Publius, therefore, being apprehensive that the conse- 
quences would be fatal to his own fleet, which neither expected such an at- 
tempt, nor was prepared against it, immediately decamped, and marched also 
towards Utica with the greatest haste. On his arrival, perceiving that his 
decked ships were well fitted indeed for the purpose of raising machines, and 
carrying them near the walls ; and, in a word, for every other use that is re- 
quisite in a siege, but were in no respect prepared for an engagement upon the 
sea ; considering also, on the other hand, that the Carthaginians had employed 
the whole time of winter in preparing their fleet for this very design ; he re- 
solved not to engage in a naval action ; but having drawn up the decked 
ships close to the shore, he covered them with a line of the transport vessels^ 
which were ranged by two and by three in depth. * * * * 



404 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



BOOK THE FIFTEENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

Scipia sends am bassadors to Carthage, to demand a restitution of some vessels 
ivhich had been taken by the Carthaginians during the truce. The perfdi~ 
ous attempt of the Carthaginians against the ambassadors. The war is re- 
newed on both sides. The preparations of Annibal and Scipio. The inter- 
mew between these tw& generals. The battle of Zama, 

CHAP. I. 

PUBLIUS was in no small degree disturbed by this perfidious action. 
Not only his own provisions were lost, but the enemy also were at the same 
time furnished with a very plentiful supply. But the chief cause of his con- 
cern was, that the Carthaginians, in malting this attempt, had been guilty of 
an open violation of the late solemn treaty ; and that the war again was 
kindled. He sent, therefore, Lucius Servilius, Lucius Bsebius, and Lucius 
Fabius, ambassadors to Carthage, to complain of this transaction, and at the 
same time to acquaint the Carthaginians, that he had received letters from 
Rome, with an account that the treaty had been ratified by the Roman peo- 
ple. When the ambassadors arrived, and were introduced first into the se- 
nate, and afterwards into an assembly of the people, they discourse on the 
■whole state of affairs with very great boldness. They began with telling the 
Carthaginians, " that when the ambassadors, who had been deputed by them 
to the Roman camp, arrived at Tunis, and were admitted to appear before the 
council, they not only made libations to the gods, and adored the earth, as 
the custom is among other men s but prostrated themselves also in an abject 
manner upon the ground, and kissed the feet of all the assembly. That 
afterwards, when they rose again, they made a vol uutary confession of their 
guilt ; and acknowledged, that they from the first had violated the treaties 
which subsisted between the Carthaginians and the Romans, That they were 
sensible, therefore, that the latter might most reasonably inflict upon them 
every evil„ That they implored them, however, in the name of the common 
fortune of mankind, not to punish them with too great severity ; but rather 
to suffer their inconsiderate folly to become a lasting monument of the Ro- 
man generosity and virtue." The ambassadors then added, " That Scipio, 
and all the members of the council, who remembered this transaction, were 
now struck with surprise, and not able to conceive what confidence it was, 
that had induced the Carthaginians to forget all which they had at that time 
spoken, and to violate again their treaties and their oaths. That it seemed in- 
deed most probable that the return of Annibal, and of the army that was with 
him, had encouraged them in this bold design. That nothing, however, could 
be more absurd and senseless. " For do not all men know," continued they, 
s ' that it is now the second year since Annibal, compelled to retire from every 
part of Italy into the neighbourhood of Lacinium, has been confined, and, as it 
were, besieged 3 in that narrow space, and has now brought away his forces 
with the greatest difficulty. But if he had even returned with conquest, and 
was ready to engage us, victorious as we have been against you in two succes- 
sive battles, you ought surely to entertain very doubtful expectations of suc- 
cess ; and^while you flatter yourselves with the prospect of a victory, to take 
also int© your consideration the possible chance of another -defeat. And if the 
latter should be the event, what gods will you then invoke, or what arguments 
will you employ in your distress, to draw the compassion of the conquerors 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. 405 



towards you, when your perfidiousness and your rash attempt shall have ren- 
dered you alike unworthy of the protection of the gods and of men ?" 

The ambassadors, after this discourse, retired. The greatest part, not only 
of those who directed the administration of the government, but of the rest 
also of the members of the council, beside that they were dissatisfied with the 
conditions the Romans had imposed, were incensed also by the boldness of the 
ambassadors. Add to this, that they were unwilling to lose the vessels that 
had been taken, and the supplies with which they were stored. But the chief 
and most prevailing reason was, that they had conceived the greatest hopes 
that, with the assistance of Annibal, they should now draw the victory to their 
side. The resolution, therefore, of the assembly was, that the ambassadors 
should be sent back without any answer. But the chief persons also in the 
government, having determined to leave no means untried that might serve to 
rekindle the war, concerted between themselves the following project: Pre- 
tending that some care at least should be taken, that the ambassadors might 
return back to their own camp with safety, they prepared two triremes to at- 
tend them. At the same time they sent orders to Asdrubal, who commanded 
their fleet, that he should hold some vessels in readiness not far from the Ro- 
man camp ; and, as soon as these triremes should have left the Romans, that 
he should bear down upon the vessel in which the ambassadors sailed, and sink 
it. For the Carthaginian fleet was at this lime stationed along those parts of 
the coast that were near to Utica. They then suffered the ambassadors to de- 
part, having first ordered those that attended them in the triremes, that, as 
soon as they should have passed beyond the mouth of the river Macar, which 
was the place from whence the camp of the enemy might be discerned, they 
should there leave the Romans, and return. 

Agreeably to these instructions, the commanders of the triremes, when they 
arrived at the appointed place, saluted the Romans, and directed their course 
back again to Carthage. The ambassadors had no suspicion of any ill inten- 
tion ; and only were dissatisfied, because it seemed that the Carthaginians 
showed some contempt towards them in leaving them so soon : but as they 
held on their course alone, they were suddenly attacked by three triremes, 
which had been prepared for the design. As these vessels, however, could not 
pierce with their beaks the Roman quinquereme, because the latter easily with- 
drew itself from the stroke, so neither were the men able to throw themselves 
on board, because the Romans resisted all their efforts with the greatest bra- 
very. The Carthaginians, therefore, shifting their ships from side to side, 
and continuing their fight from every quarter, killed and wounded a great 
uumber of the Romans, till the latter, perceiving that some soldiers from 
their own camp, who had been foraging near to the coast, were drawn together 
upon the shore, and ready to assist them, drove their vessel close in to the 
land. The greatest part of the men that were on board had been killed in the 
action ; but the ambassadors were most strangely and unexpectedly preserved. 
Thus was the war resumed with greater violence than before, and with a more 
implacable rage; for the Romans, incensed by this perfidious action, were 
now mostearnest in their desire to bring the Carthaginians into an entire sub- 
jection. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, being conscious of their 
guilt, resolved to attempt and suffer every thing rather than fall into the power 
of the Romans. When such was the disposition ou both sides, it was manifest 
that the contest could only be decided by a battle. The minds of all men, 
therefore, not in Italy alone and Afric, but in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sar- 
dinia, were held in suspence, and distracted by an anxious expectation of 
the event. 

As Annibal was at this time in great want of cavalry, he sent to a certain 
Numidian named Tychseus, whose territory was contiguous to that of Syphax, 
inviting him to seize the very moment of his safety, and to join him with his 
forces; for he could not but know, that if the Carthaginians should be supe- 



406 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIU. 

rior in the war, he might still be able to hold possession of his kingdom ; but 
if the Romans, on the other hand, should remain the conquerors, the am- 
bition of Massanissa would soon deprive him not only of his dominions, but of 
his life. Tyehaeus was prevailed on by these reasons, and came and joined 
him, as he desired, with a body of two thousand horse. 

Publius, having regulated all things that were necessary for the security of 
the fleet, left the command to Baebius, and himself led the army round the 
country to reduce the cities ; not suffering any to surrender upou terms of 
voluntary submission as before, but taking all of them by storm, and sending 
the inhabitants into slavery, that he might show more strongly the resentment 
which he had conceived against the enemy on account of their late perfidy. 
He sent also continual messengers to Massanissa, to inform him of the manner 
in which the Carthaginians had broken the treaty, and urging him to draw 
together as large a. body of forces as he was able to raise, and to join him 
with the greatest haste. For Massanissa, as we have already mentioned, as 
soon as the treaty was concluded, taking with him his own troops, together 
wi:h ten companies of Roman infantry and cavalry, and some" 1 Roman 
deputies which he had obtained from Scipio, had gone from the camp, in 
order not only to recover his paternal kingdom, but, with the assistance of 
the Romans, to add that of Syphax also to his own dominions. And this de- 
sign he had now completely executed. 



CHAP. II. 

ABOUT this time it happened, that the ambassadors, returning back from 
Rome, arrived at Utica, where the fleet of the Romans lay. Bsebius sent 
away immediately the Roman ambassadors to Publius, but detained those of 
Carthage, whose minds, dejected as they were upon other accounts, were now 
filled with apprehensions of the greatest danger. For, having heard of the 
late wicked attempt of the Carthaginians against the Roman ambassadors, they 
expected to suffer all the vengeance that was due to so base an action. When 
Publius was informed that both the senate and people had readily confirmed 
the treaty, and were disposed also to concur with him in every measure, he 
was filled with no small joy. He then ordered Bsebius to dismiss the Cartha- 
ginian ambassadors with all civility. This resolution was, in my judgment, 
very wise and commendable. For, as he knew his country had always paid 
the most sacred regard to the rights of ambassadors, he considered only what 
was fit for the Romans to do upon such an occasion, and not what the Cartha- 
ginians deserved to suffer. Suppressing, therefore, his own anger, and the 
resentment that was due to the late transaction, he endeavoured to maintain, 
as the poet expresses it, " The glorious deeds of his progenitors ;" and, by this 
conduct, he broke the spirit of ail that were in Carthage, and even of Annibal 
himself, when they saw their own baseness opposed and conquered by such ge- 
nerous virtue. 

The Carthaginians, impatient to behold their cities wasted aud destroyed, 
sent some messengers to Annibal, entreating him not to admit any longer de- 
lay, but to advance towards the enemy, and to bring things to a decision by a 
battle. This general answered, that they should attend to their own business ; 
that it belonged to him alone to choose the time for repose and the time for 
action. But, after fome days, he began his march from Adrumetum, and 
went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Zama, a city which stood at the 
distance of about five days journey from Carthage towards the west. From 
this place he sent three spies, to examine into the situation and condition of 
the Roman camp. These men were discovered by the enemy, and were car- 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 407 



ried to the general. But so far was Publius from punishing them, as the cus- 
tom is upon such occasions, that he ordered a tribune to attend them, and to 
show them distinctly every part of the camp. When this was done, he asked 
the men whether the tribune had faithfully executed his order. And when 
they answered that they had, having furnished them with provisions, and some 
troops also to conduct them, he ordered them to go back, and report to Anni- 
bal the exact account of all that had happened to them. The Carthaginian 
general, struck with the magnanimity and boldness of the action, conceived, I 
know not how, a desire to enter into a conference with Scipio, and sent a herald 
to acquaint him, that he should be glad to hold some discourse with him on 
the state of affairs alone. Publius, when he had received this message, told 
the herald that he accepted the offer, aud that he would send notice to Anmbal 
of the time and the place in which they might meet. On the following day, 
Massanissa arrived at the camp, and brought with him six thousand foot, and 
about the same number of horse. Scipio received him with great favour, and 
congratulated him upon his success, in having prevailed upon all the subjects 
of Syphax to receive him as their prince. He then put the army in motion, 
and went and encamped in the neighbourhood of Margarus; in a post which, 
beside other advantages, had water within the throw of a dart. From this 
place he sent notice to the Carthaginian general, that he was ready to engage 
in a conference with him. On receiving this message, Anmbal also decamped, 
and, approaching to the distance of no more than thirty stadia from the Ro- . 
mans, fixed his camp upon a hill, which, though in other respects well situated, 
was rather too far removed from water. And indeed the soldiers were, upon _ 
this account, exposed to very great hardship. 

On the following day, the two generals came out from their several camps 
with asmallbody of horsemen ; and afterwards, leaving these, they advanced 
forwards, and approached each other, attended only by an interpreter. Anui- 
bal first saluted Scipio, and began in the following manner: 

" Well would it have been if the Romans had never coveted any thing be- 
yond the extent of Italy, nor the Carthaginians beyond that of Afric, but had 
both of them remained contented with the possession of those fair empires 
which nature itself seems indeed to have circumscribed with separate bounds : 
but since we engaged in war against each other, first to acquire the sovereignty 
of Sicily, and afterwards that of Spain ; since at last, like men infatuated by 
fortune, we advanced so far together in our prosperous course, as to bring even 
the safety of our own native seats into alternate danger ; that danger which 
you have so lately known, and to which we also, at this moment, are exposed ; 
what now remains, but to endeavour, by ourselves, to deprecate the anger of 
the gods, and find some means, if it be possible, of putting an end to this most 
obstinate contention. I, for my part, who have seen, in the course of a long 
experience, the great inconstancy of fortune, with how slight a turn she effects 
on eit'ier side the greatest changes, and that she sports with us continually as 
with children, am most ready to consent to a peace. But much do I iear, that 
you, Publius, who still are in the flower of your age, whose designs both in 
Spain aud Afric have all been attended with success, and who have never 
hitherto been driven back again in ybur course by any adverse blast, will be 
inclined to different sentiments, and not be moved by my persuasions, how 
worthy soever they may be of credit. Yet consider only and observe, at least 
in one example, the instability of human affairs ; an example, not drawn from 
distant times, bnt which is present now to your eyes. In a word, view it in 
me, who am before you. I am that Annibal, who, after the battle of Cannse, 
was master of almost the whole of Italy ; and, having advanced not long after- 
wards into the very neighbourhood of Rome, fixed my camp within forty stadia 
only of the city, and deliberated with myself in what manner I should dispose 
of you and of your country. Behold me now, returned back again to Afric, 
fciid holding a conference with you, a Roman, concerning my own safety, and 



408 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYJBIUS. 

that of all the Carthaginians. Let this example incline you to embrace mode- 
rate sentiments, and to judge, in this conjuncture, as it becomes a. man to 
judge ; that is, to choose always the greatest good, and the least of evils. And 
surely no man of sense would ever voluntarily meet the danger to which you 
are now exposed. For if you should gain the victory in the present battle, you 
will add but little either to the reputation of your country, or your own. But, 
if you should be conquered, the whole fame and glory of all your former actions 
will be forever lost. What then is the purpose of this discourse ? It is to in- 
form you, that the countries which have been the objects of our wars, Sardinia, 
Sicily, and Spain, shall be yielded to the Romans, and that the Carthaginians, 
at no future time, shall attempt to recover, by arms, the possession of those 
territories. To the Romans, likewise, shall belong all the islands which lie 
between Sicily and Afric. These conditions, while they leave Carthage in se- 
curity, are at the same time, in my opinion, highly honourable both to your- 
self and to all the Romans." 

Here Annibal ended his discourse, and Scipio answered in the following 
words : 

" It was well known," he said, " that the Carthaginians, and not the Ro~ 
mans, were the cause both of the war of Sicily and of that of Spain ; that An- 
nibal himself was most perfectly acquainted with this truth ; and that the 
gods also had borne testimony to it, by turning the success to the side, not of 
those who had unjustly attacked, but of those who had taken arms in their 
own defence." He then added likewise, " that no man was more strongly im- 
pressed than himself, with a just sense of the instability of fortune, and the un- 
certain course of human affairs. " But with respect," continued he, " to the 
terms which you offer, if, before the Romans had come into Afric, you had 
retired from Italy, and proposed to us the same conditions of peace, you would 
not perhaps have been disappointed in your hopes. At this time, when you 
have been forced most reluctantly to abandon Italy, and we, on the other 
band, have passed over into Afric, and have rendered ourselves the masters of 
all the open country, it is clear that the state of affairs is very considerably 
changed. But, besides this difference, there is something also of much 
greater moment. When your countrymen were defeated, aud sued for peace, 
we refused not to accede to their request. A treaty was framed in writing, 
which, beside those concessions which you have now proposed, contained also 
the following articles : That the Carthaginians should restore, without ransom, 
all the Roman prisoners ; should deliver up to us their decked ships ; should 
pay a sum of five thousand talents ; and, in the last place, that they should 
give hostages for the performance of all that was imposed. Such were the con- 
ditions to which we on both sides gave consent. We then deputed jointly 
some ambassadors to Rome, to lay the treaty before^the senate and the people ; 
on our part intimating, that we approved of the conditions ; the Carthaginians, 
on the other hand, requesting, even with entreaty, that they might be accepted. 
They were accordingly admitted by the senate, and were ratified by the peo- 
ple. But no sooner had the Carthaginians obtained what they desired, than 
they annul at once the whole treaty by an action of the grossest perfidy'. After 
such a conduct, what remains to be done ? Put yourself in my place, and an- 
swer. Shall we release them now from all the heaviest of the conditions that 
were before imposed ? This would, indeed, be an admirable method, by be- 
stowing a reward upon their treachery, to teach them to deceive, in future 
times, the persons by whom they had been obliged. Or think you, if they 
could obtain their wish, that they would hold themselves indebted to us for the 
favour ? They before obtained what, with the most earnest supplication, they 
desired. And yet, no sooner had they conceived some faint hopes from your 
return, than they again disclosed their enmity, and renewed hostilities against 
us. If you had added, therefore, some conditions still more rigorous, the treaty 
might have been once more carried before the Roman people. Bufr since you 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 40$) 

~gag £J ' '■ i," . ■'- ' ' gggaasg ■■ , . ,i . .!, . »J-*"t 

have detracted even from those that were admitted, the terms which you now 
propose cannot so much as be referred to their consideration. To what then 
tends also my discourse ? It is to acquaint you, that you either must submit 
yourselves and your country to us at discretion, or must conquer us in a battle." 
After these discourses, which left no hopes of an accommodation, the two ge- 
nerals parted from each other, and retired. 

On the following day, as soon as the dawn appeared, they drew out 
their forces on both sides, and prepared to engage ; the Carthaginians, for 
their own safety, and the ;>ost,ession of Afric ; the Romans, for the sovereignty 
«f the whole, and for universal empire. Is there any one that can forbear to 
pause at this part of the story, or remain unmoved by the relation ? Never 
were there seen more warlike nations, never more able generals, or more com- 
pletely exercised in all the art and discipline of war; never was a greater prize 
proposed by fortune than that which was now laid before the combatants. 
For it was not Afric alone, or Italy, that waited to reward the conquerors, but 
the entire dominion of the whole known world : and this, indeed, was not long 
afterwards the event. Scipio drew up his army in battle in the following man- 
ner : He placed in the first line the hastati, leaving intervals between the co- 
horts ; in the second, the principes, but posted their cohorts, not as the Roman 
custom was, opposite to the intervals, but behind the cohorts of the former 
line, and at a considerable distance from them, on account of the great num- 
ber of elephants that were in the Carthaginian army. Last of all, in the third 
line, he drew up the triarii. Upon the left wing he stationed Caius Lselius, 
with the cavalry of Italy, and Massanissa and the Nuraidiaus upon the right. 
The intervals of the first line he filled with companies of the light-armed 
troops, who were ordered to begin the action ; and, if they should find them- 
selves too violently pressed by the elephants, that the swiftest of them should 
retire, through the straight intervals, to the rear of all the army ; and the rest, 
iftiicy should be intercepted on their way, direct their course to the right or 
left, along the open distances that were between the lines. When his dispo T 
sition was thus completed, he went round to all the troops, and harangued them 
in few words, but such as the occasion seemed to require, 

" Remember," said he, " your former victories, and show now a courage 
worthy of yourselves and of your country. Let it be ever present to your 
view, that, by gaining the victory in this battle, you not only will become the 
masters of all Afric, but secure to Rome the undisputed sovereignty of the 
rest of the world. If, on the other hand, you should be conquered, they who 
fall bravely in the action will obtain an honour far m,ore glorious than any 
rites of sepulture, the honour of dying for their cquntry ; while those that shall 
escape must be condemned to pass the remainder of their l^ves in the extremity 
of disgrace and misery. For Afric will afford no place pf safety; and, if you 
fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, what your condition must be, your 
own reason will easily instruct you to foresee. But may none of you ever 
know it by experience. When fortune then," continued he, " has offered 
to us, upon either side, so noble a prize, universal empire oj a, glorious death,, 
how lost must we be both to honour and to sense, if we should reject these, 
the greatest of goods, and choose, through a desire of life, the most insup? 
portable of evils. When you advance, therefore, against the enemy, carry 
that resolution with you into action, which is sure always, to surmount the 
strongest resistance. Be determined either tpj^pjmajuer or to die. ^ Retain not 
so much as a thought of life. With such sentiments, tfte victpry cannot fail 
to be your own." 

Such was the harangue of Scipio. Annibal, on his part, having placed the 
elephants, more than eighty in number, at the head of all the army, formed 
his first line of the mercenaries, who were a mixed multitude of Gauls, Ligu- 
rians, Balearics, and Maurusians, and amounted together to about twelve 
thousand men. Behind these were the Carthaginians and the subject Africans. 
vol. 1, no. 7, _x ^., 3 F 



410 - GENERAL HISTORY- QF^OLYBIFSs;.::: 

The third 1 me was composed of the troops which he had brought with him 
from Italy, and was placed at the distance of more than, a stadium, from the se- 
cond line. The cavalry was posted upon the wings ; that of the Numidiara 
auxiliaries upon the left, and the Carthaginian cavalry upon the right. He 
ordered the officers, who commanded the different bodies of the mercenaries, 
to exhort severally their own soldiers, and to encourage them to be assured of 
Victory, since they were now joined by An tubal and his veteran forces. The 
leaders of the Carthaginians were instructed, on the other hand, to lay before 
their view the fatal consequences of a defeat, and to enumerate all the evils tp 
which their wives and children would be exposed. And while these orders 
were obeyed, he himself going round to his own troops, addressed them with 
the greatest earnestness, and in words like these : 

" Remember, soldiers, that we have now borne arms together during 
the course of seventeen years. Remember in how many battles, Ave have 
been engaged against the Romans. Conquerors in them all, we have 
not left to the Romans even the smallest hope that they ever should be 
able to defeat us. But, beside the other innumerable actions in which we al- 
ways obtained the victory, remember also, above all the rest, the battle of Tre- 
bia, which we sustained against the fathev of that very general who now corri- 
•mands the Roman army \ the battle of Thrasymene, against Flaminius ; and 
•that of Canme, against vEmilius. The action, in which we are now ready to 
"engage, is not to be compared with those great battles, with respect either 
to the number or the courage of the troops. For torn now your eyes upon 
the forces of the enemy. Not only they are fewer; they scarcely make even a 
diminutive part of the numbers against winch we Vere then engaged. Nor i* 
"the difference less with respect to courage. The former were troops whose 
strength was entire 5 and who had never been disheartened by any defeat : but 
these before us are either the children of the former, or the wretched remains 
•of those very men whom we subdued in Italy, and who have so often fled be- 
fore us. Lose not, then, upon this occasion, the glory of your general, and 
•your own. Preserve the name which you have acquired, and confirm the 
ooinion which has hitherto prevailed, that you are never to be conquered." 

When the generals had thus, on both sides, harangued their troops, and the 
Nurnjdian cavalry, for some time, had been engaged in skirmishing against 
each other, all things being now ready, An nibal ordered the elephants to be 
led against the enemy. But the noise of the horns and trumpets, sounding 
together on every side, so affrighted some of these beasts-, that they turned 
Back with violence against their own Numidians, and threw them into such 
- disorder, that MassarVissia dispersed, without much difficulty, that whole body 
of cavalry which was on the left of the Carthaginian army. The rest of the 
elephants, encountering with the light-armed forces of the Romans, in the 
^paee that was between the armies, suffered much in the conflict, and made 
great havoc also among the enemy, till at last, having lost all courage, some 
of them took their way through the intervals of the Roman army, which af- 
forded an open and safe passage for them, as Seipio wisely had foreseen ; and 
the rest, di/ecting their course to the right, were chased, by darts from the ca- 
valry, till they were driven quite out of the field. But, as they occasioned 
likewise some disorder upon their own right wing in their flight, Lcelius also 
seized that moment to fall upon the Carthaginian cavalry, and, having forced 
them to turn their backs, he followed closely after them, while Massanissa, on 
bis side, was pursuing 'the Numidian cavalry with no less ardour. 

And now the heavy-armed forces, on both sides, advanced to action with a 
slow and steady pace, those troops alone excepted which had returned with An- 
nibal from Italy, and which remained still in the station in which they at first 
were placed. As soon as they were near, the Romans, shouting all together, 
according to their custom, and rattling their swords against their bucklers, 
threw themselves upon the enemy. On the other side, the Carthaginian mer~ 



. GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 411 

eenaries advanced to the charge with confused and undistinguishable criesi: 
for, as they had been drawn together, as we have said, from different countries, 
there wa$ not among them, as the poet expresses it, 

One voice, one language found ; 
But sounds discordant as their various tribes*. 

In this first onset, as the combatants were so closely joined that they were 
unable to make use of their spears, or even of their swords, and maintained the 
action hand to hand, and man to man, the mercenaries, by their boldness and 
dexterity, obtained at first the advantage, and wounded many of the Romans. 
But the latter, assisted by the excellence of their disposition, and the nature 
of their arms, pressed forward, and still gained ground, being supported also 
i>y the rest of their own army, who followed and encouraged them from behind. 
The mercenaries, on the other hand, were neither followed nor supported* 
For the Carthaginians that were behind them came not near to assist them in 
the action, but stood like men who had lost all courage. At last, therefore, 
the strangers turned their backs ; and, thinking themselves manifestly to have 
been deserted by their own friends, they fell, as they retired, upon the Cartha* 
ginians that were behind, and killed them. The latter, however, fell not 
"without a brave and vigorous defence : for, being thus unexpectedly attacked, 
■and compelled to tight both with their own mercenaries and with the Romans., 
they exerted their utmost efforts, and, engaging with a frantic and disordered 
rage, made a promiscuous slaughter of friends and enemies. Amidst this con- 
fusion, the hastati also were so pressed, that they were forced to break their 
..ranks. But the leaders of the principes, perceiving the disorder, brought up 
their troops close behind to support them ; so that, in the end, the greatest 
part of the Carthaginians and the mercenaries were destroyed in the place, 
partly by themselves, aud partly by the hastati. Annibal would not suffer 
the rest that escaped to be received into the third line, towards which they 
fled, but ordered the foremost ranks to point their spears against them as they 
approached.. They were forced, therefore, to retire along the wings into the 
open plain. 

As the whole ground that was between the forces which now remained was 
covered with blood and slaughter, and dead bodies, the Roman general was, in 
no small degree, perplexed, being apprehensive that this obstacle would pre- 
vent him from obtaining a complete and perfect victory. For it seemed to.be 
no easy thing to lead on the troops, without breaking their ranks, over bleeding 
and slippery carcases, thrown one upon another, and over arms which were 
scattered in confusion, and preposterously intermingled with the heaps of the 
dead. Having ordered the wounded, however, to be carried into the rear of 
the array, he called back the hastati from the pursuit, and drew them up in Or- 
der as tbey returned, in the forepart of the ground upon which the action had 
passed, and the opposite to the centre of the enemy. He then commanded the 
principes and the triarii to close their ranks, to form a wing on either side, and 
to advance over the dead. And when these troops, having surmounted all the 
intermediate obstacles, were come into the same line with the hastati, the ac- 
tion was then begun on both sides, with the greatest eagerness and ardour. 
As the numbers were nearly equal; as the sentiments, the courage, and the 
arms on both sides were the same, the battle remained, for a long time, doubt- 
ful. For so obstinate was the contention, that the men all fell in the place in 
which they fou°ht. But Laelius and Massanissa, returning back from the pur- 
suit of the routed cavalry, arrived most providentially in the very moment in 
which their assistance was chiefly wanted, and fell upon the rear of Annibal. 
The greatest part, therefore, of his troops were now slaughtered in their ranks ; 

•Iliad, IV. 437- 



412 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

■■— ^— - — ! '■<■■'. in ■ i i ii ■ i ii n ■— — | i I, —, .,;., 

and, among those that fled, a very small number only were able to escape, as 
they were followed closely by the cavalry, through an open country. About 
fifteen hundred of the Romans fell in the action ; but, on the side of the Car- 
thaginians, more than twenty thousand were killed, and almost an equal num- 
ber taken prisoners. Such was the battle between Annibal and Scipio ; the 
battle which gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world. 

When the action was ended, Publius, after he had, for some time, pursued 
those that fled, and pillaged the camp of the Carthaginians, returned back t© 
his own camp. Annibal, with a small number of horsemen, continued his re- 
treat, without stopping, and arrived safe at Adrurnetum, having performed, 
upon this occasion, all that was possible to be done by a brave and experienced 
general. For, first, he entered into a conference with his enemy, and endea- 
voured, by himself alone, to terminate the dispute. Nor was this any dis- 
honour to his former victories, but showed only that he was diffident of torture* 
and willing to secure himself against the strange and unexpected accident* 
which happen in war. In the battle, afterwards, so well had he disposed 
things for the action, that no general, using even the same arms, and the same 
.order of battle as the Romans, could have engaged them with greater advan- 
tage. The order of the Romans in battle is very difficult to be broken ; 
because the whole army in general, as well as each particular body, is ready 
always to present a front to their enemies, on which side soever they appear. 
For the cohorts, by a single movement, turn themselves together, as the oc- 
casion requires, towards the side from whence the attack is made. Add to 
this, that their arms also are well contrived, both for protection and offence:, 
their bucklers being large in size, and their swords strong, and not easily in- 
jured by the stroke. Opon these accounts, they are very terrible in action, 
and are not to be conquered without great difficulty. But Annibal opposed to 
•each of these advantages the most effectual obstacles that it was possible for 
reason to contrive. He had collected together a great number of elephant^ 
and stationed them in the front of his army, that they might disturb the order 
-of the enemy, and disperse their ranks. By posting the mercenaries in the 
first line, and the Carthaginians afterwards in a line behind them, he hoped to 
disable the Romans by fatigue, before the battle should be brought to the 
last decision, and render their swords useless, by continual slaughter. As he 
had thus placed the Carthaginians also between two lines, he compelled them, 
to stand, and, as the poet has said, 

Forc;d them by strong necessity to fight. 
However loath*. 

In the last place, he drew up the bravest and the firmest of his troops at a dis- 
tance from the rest, that, observing from afar the progress of the action, and 
possessing their whole strength, as well as their courage entire, they might 
•eize the most favourable moment, and fall with vigour upon the enemy. If, 
therefore, when he had thus employed all possible precautions to secure the 
victory, he was now, for the first time, conquered, he may veiy well be par- 
doned ; for fortune sometimes counteracts the designs of valiant men. Some- 
times again, according to the proverb, 

A brave man by a braver i» subdued. 

And this, indeed, it was which must be allowed to have happened upon the 
present occasion./ 

*Iliad, IV. 3t>. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 41 * 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

Tiic Carthaginians, in the most abject manner, sue for peace. The conditions 
' upon which it is granted by Scipio. The sentiments of Annibal, and his 
behaviour in the senate of Carthage upon this occasion. 

WHEN men, in lamenting the wretchedness of theirfovtuness exceed in their 
actions all the customary Forms of grief, if their behaviour seems to be the 
effect of genuine passion, and to arise only from the greatness of their cala- 
mities, we are all ready to be moved by the strangeness of the sight, and 
can neither see nor hear them without commiserating their condition, But, 
if these appearances are feigned, and assumed only with an intention to de- 
ceive, instead of compassion, they excite indignation and disgust. And this 
was now what happened with respect to the Carthaginian ambassadors. Pub- 
lius told them in a few words ; " That with regard to themselves, they had 
clearly no pretensions to be treated with gentleness or favour ; since, by their 
own acknowledgments, they had at first begun the war against the Romans, by 
attacking Saguntum in contempt of treaties ; and now lately again had vio- 
lated the articles of a convention, which they had ratified in writing, and bound 
themselves by oaths to observe. That the Romans, however, as well upon 
their own account, as in consideration also of the common condition and 
fortune of humanity, had resolved to display towards them upon this occasion 
a generous clemency. That such indeed it must appear to themselves to be, 
if they would view all circumstances in a proper light ; for, since fortune, 
having first precluded them, by the means of their own perfidious conduct, 
from every claim to mercy or to pardon, had now thrown them wholly into 
the power of their enemies, no hardships which they should be forced to suf- 
fer, no conditions which should be imposed, no concessions which should be 
exacted from them, could be considered as rigorous or severe; but rather it 
must appear to be a matter of astonishment, if any article ot favour should 
be yielded to them." After this discourse, he recited first, the condition* of 
indulgence which he was willing to grant ; and afterwards, those of rigour to 
which they were required to submit. The terms which he proposed to them 

« That they should retain all the cities which they held in Afric before 
the beginning of the last war which they had made against the Romans : 
and all the lands likewise which they had anciently possessed, together with 
the cattle, the men, and the goods that were upon them: that from the pre- 
sent day, all hostilities against them should cease : that they should be go- 
yerned by their own laws and customs, and not receive any garrison from the 
Romans." Such were the articles of favour : the others, of a contrary kind, 

were these : , , i i ■ *i 

" That the Carthaginians should restore all that they had taken unjustly 
from the Romans during the continuance of the truce : that they should 
send back all the prisoners and deserters that had at any time fallen into their 
hands : that they should deliver up all their long vessels, ten triremes only except- 
ed • and likewise their elephants : that they should not make war at any time upon 
any state out of Afric, nor upon anyin Afric, without the consent of the Romans : 
that they should restore to king Massanissa the houses, lands, and cities, and 
every thing besides that had belonged to hiin, or to his ancestors, within the 
limits which should hereafter be declared : that they should furnish the Ro- 
man army with corn sufficient for three months ; and pay also the stipends or 
the troops, till an answer should be received from Rome, confirming the con- 
ditions of the treaty: that they should pay ten thousand talents of silver in 
the course of fifty vears; bringing two hundred Euboic talents every year; 



414 • GENERAL HISTORY OF PGLYBIUS. 



that, as&security for their-fideiity, they should give an hundred hostages, which 
should be chosen by the Roman general out of all their youth between the 
age of fourteen and of thirty yeavsj" 

As soon as Publius had finished the recital of these articles, the ambassa- 
dors returned back in haste to Carthage, and reported the terms that were 
proposed. Upon this occasion, when one of the senators was going to ob- 
ject to the conditions, and had begun to speak, Annibal, it is said, stepped 
forwards, and taking hold of the man, dragged him down from his seat ; and, 
when the rest of the senate appeared to be much displeased at an action so 
injurious to the customs of that assembly, he again stood up and said, 
45 That he might well be excused, if bis ignorance had led him to offend 
against any of their establised forms : that they knew that he had left his 
country when he was only nine, years old; and had now returned to it again at; 
the age of more than forty-five : he entreated them, therefore, not so much to 
consider, whether he had violated any custom, as whether he had been moved 
by a real concern for the distressed condition of his country : that what he 
had felt upon that account was indeed the true cause of his offence j. for thai 
it appeared to him to be a most astonishing thing, and altogether preposterous, 
that any Carthaginian, not ignorant of all which their state in general, as 
well as particular men, had designed against the Romans, should not be ready 
to worship his good fortune, when, having fallen into their power, he now 
found himself treated by them with so great clemency: that, if the Cartha- 
ginians had been asked but- a few days before what their country must expect 
to, suffer, if they should be conquered by the Romans, they would not have 
been able to make any answer; so great, so excessive were the calamities 
which were then in prospect. He begged, therefore, that they would not now 
bring the conditions into any debate, but admitthem with UHanimous consent: 
offering sacrifices at the same time to the gods, and joining all together in 
their prayers, that the treaty might be ratified by the Roman people." This 
advice appeared to be so sensible, and so well suited to the present exigency* 
that the senate resolved to consent to a peace upon the terms which have 
been mentioned, and immediately sent away some ambassadors to conclude 
the treaty. < 

EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

j'he iwjust designs ef Philip and Aniiochus against young Ptolemy ; • tviitt 
n reflection on the manner iu which (hose princes afterwards were pur 

. f. nished. 

IT is strange to consider, that, as long as Ptolemy lived, Philip and An- 
tiochus were ready always to support him, though he wanted not their as- 
sistance; and yet no sooner was he dead, and had left an infant son, than 
these princes, whose duty it was, according to the laws of nature, to maintain 
the child in the possession of his kingdom, combined together to share his 
dominions between themselves, and to destroy the helpless orphan : nor did 
they even endeavour, like other tyrants, to cover the shame of this proceeding 
so much, as with the slightest pretext, but prosecuted their design with 
fluch barefaced and brutal violence, as made the saying very applicable fo- 
ihem, which is commonly used concerning fishes, that the destruction of the 
smali, though they are all of them of the same kind, is the life and nourish-* 
inent of the great. We need only to turn our eyes indeed upon the treaty 
|hat \vas made between the two kings upon this occasion, and we shall be- 
hold, as in a glass, the strongest picture of their avowed impiety, their sa- 
vage inhumanity, and their ambition extended beycnd all bouuds. If any 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. * 41/5 

©ne, however, should be disposed to censure fortune, and indeed with good 
show of reason, for admitting such injustice in the course of human affairs, 
he will judge, perhaps, more favourably when he considers, that afterwards 
,she punished both these princes in the manner which their actions merited, 
and exposed them as a memorable warning, to deter all those who in future 
times might be inclined to follow their example; for, while they were prac- 
ticing all the arts of treachery against each other, and tearing away by pieces 
the dominions of the infant king, this deity having raised up the Romans 
against them, inflicted upon them, with the most exact measure of justice, 
those very evils which they had unjustly meditated against others. Subdued, 
each of them in his turn, they were at first compelled to submit to the im- 
position of a tribute, and to receive orders from the Romans. And in the 
end, before any long time had elapsed, the dominions of Ptolemy were 
established again in full security ; while, on the other hand, the kingdom and. 
the successors of Phillip were .entirely subverted and destroyed, and those of 
Antiochus very nearly also involved in the same calamities. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

The Cianians, a people of Bythynia, are conquered and carried into slavery 
by Philip. Reflections on the cause of their misfortune, and the conduct 
of the king. 

THESE great calamities, indeed, in which the Cianians were involved, 
«ught not to be ascribed so much to fortune, or even to the unjust designs of 
others against them, as to their own want of wisdom, and the wrong admi- 
nistration of their government ; for, as they raised continually the very worst 
men into the posts of honour, and punished all those that opposed their mea- 
sures, for the sake only of enriching themselves with the spoils of the plun- 
dered fortunes, they threw themselves, as it may be said, with their own free 
consent, into all that wretchedness which is the necessary result of such a con- 
duct. Examples of this kind are frequent and notorious ; and yet men, I 
know not how, never cease to fall into the same imprudence. They seem not 
to entertain even the smallest diffidence upon such occasions, but are worse 
in this respect than animals that are destitute of reason ; for these, not only 
if they have extricated themselves before with difficulty from any trap or 
snare, but, even if they have seen any other animal in danger, are not easily 
led to the like again, but suspect the very place, and distrust every thiug that 
is before their eyes. But men are strangers to all this caution. Though they 
have heard that many have beeu lost by the ill conduct that has now been 
mentioned: though they see others perishing through the same imprudence; 
allure them only with the prospect of enriching themselves with the spoils of 
others, they catch greedily at the bait, which they are assured has been in all 
times fatal to those who have tasted it, and pursue those very measures which 
are acknowledged to have been pernicious to every government. 

Philip, when he had so well succeeded in this design, and rendered himself 
•master of the city, was elated with no small joy. He thought that he had 
performed an honourable and a glorious action. For be had brought the 
speediest succour to his son-in-law in his distress; he had struck a terror into 
all those that were inclined to oppose him, and had gained, as he supposed, by 
the fairest means, a very great booty in prisoners and in money. But the 
circumstances that were opposite to these he never once considered, though 
they were, indeed, sufficiently notorious. For first, he had assisted his son- 
in-law, not when he was unjustly attacked, but when he had himself made 
war upon his neighbours in direct breath «f treaties. In the next place, by 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



involving a Grecian city, without any just cause, in the most dreadful calami- 
ties of war, he confirmed the opinion which before was entertained concerning 
his inhuman treatment oi' his allies, and taught all posterity to consider him, 
upon both these accounts, as a man who paid no regard to the most sacred 
obligations. Thirdly, this action was a very gross insult upon the ambassa- 
dors, who had come to him from the cities, in order to rescue the Cianians 
from their danger. For while they were encouraged to remain, and were 
soothed by him with daily conferences, they were forced to be spectators of those 
very evils which they had wished most earnestly not to see. Add to all this, 
that the Rhodians now held him in so great abhorrence, that they would not 
so much as suffer the name of Philip to be auy more mentioned among them. 
Indeed, chance itself conspired to raise against him this aversion. For when 
his ambassador, in a studied discourse, which he addressed to the people in the 
theatre at Rhodes, was endeavouring to display the great generosity of his 
master, who, though he had at this time the city of the Cianians almost 
wholly in his power, was willing, as he said, to yield it as a favour to the Rho- 
dians, and to refute, by such indulgence, the calumnies of those that opposed 
his interests, as well as to' give also a most signal proof of his affection towards 
their state, it happened that a certain man arrived from the fleet, and related 
in what manner the Cianians Had been carried into slavery, and the whole 
cruelty that had been exercised upon the occasion. This news being re- 
ported to the assembly by the first magistrate, at the very time when the am- 
bassador was delivering his harangue, struck ail the people with such astonish- 
ment, that they were scarcely able to believe that Philip could be guilty of so 
black a perfidy. And yet this prince, when, by his treacherous conduct, he 
had been false rather to himself than the Cianians, was so destitute of judg- 
ment, as well as lost to all sense of duty, that instead of feeling remorse and 
shame, he, on the contrary, boasted of the action, as if it had been a glorious 
and great exploit. From this time, therefore, the Rhodians regarded him as 
tin enemy, and resolved to hold themselves in readiness to begin hostilities 
against him. Nor was the resentment less which the iEtoliaus conceived 
against him upon the same account. For he had just before composed his 
differences with that people. And yet, in the very moment almost when he 
was extending his hands towards them, when not even any pretence could be 
urged to cover such a conduct, of the three cities, Chalcedon, Lysimachia, 
and Ciaaus, which had lately been received into a confederacy with them, he 
forced the two former to separate themselves from the alliance, and carried 
the inhabitants of the latter into slavery, though an iEtolian governor at that 
very time commanded in the place. With respect to Prusias, though he was 
pleased that his design had been attended with success,yet was he, on the other 
hand, no less dissatisned,when he found that all the advantages of the conquest 
were possessed by another, and that nothing remained for himself but the bare 
ground of a ruined city. He was foreed, however^ to bear what he had no power 
to remedy. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 417 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH. 



I he lamentable destruction of Agathocles, the guardian of young Ptolemy, to- 
gether with all his family, in a popular insurrection at Alexandria.' His 
conduct and character. Some observations on the manner of relating tra- 
gical events in history. 



CHAP. I. 



■ AGATHOCLES, having ordered the Macedonians first to be assembled, 
appeared before them, bringing with him the young king, and attended by his 
sister Agathoclea. For some time he pretended that his tears flowed so fast 
that he was not able to speak ; but when he had often wiped his face with his 
mantle and seemed to have stopped the violent course of his grief, lifting up 
thecmld, "Receive," said he, « O Macedonians, this voun| prince, whom 
ms rather, when he was dying, delivered indeed into the arms of my sister, but 
intrusted to your fidelity. The affection of my sister can now but little avail; 
his preservation depends upon you alone; in your hands rests all his fortune. 
It was notorious long ago to all men of judgment, that Tlepolemus was form- 
ing designs too high for his condition. He has now fixed the day, and even 
the hour in which he has determined to assume the diadem. I ask not " 
continued he, « that you should give credit to me alone, but to those who 
have seen the truth/and who are just now come from being witnesses of the 
transaction With these words, he introduced to them Critolaus, who de- 
clared that he had seen the altars ready, and the victims which the people had 
prepared for the celebration of the' ceremony. But the Macedonians were 
so rar from being moved with compassion towards him from this discourse, that 
they did not even attend to what he said, but began to sneer and to whisper 
together and insulted him with so much scorn, that he scarcely knew in what 
manner he at last withdrew himself from the assembly. He then called to- 
gether, in their proper assemblies, the other bodies of the soldiery, and was 
received with the same ill treatment by them all. 

During the time of this confnsion, many of the troops arrived continual V 
from the armies that were m the upper provinces, and began to urge the V 
kindred and their friends to apply some remedy to the disorders of the state 
and not suffer themselves any longer to be insulted by such unworthy goS 
nois j he peopie were the more easily engaged in this design, and belau to 
fear that even he least delay might be attended with dangerous consequent 
because! epolemus was master of the port of Alexandria, and had it h h 5 ' 
power to stop all the provisions that should be coming to the city. Agathoch* 
also himsel helped greatly at this very time to provoke the feg/tf tfie^SS 
tude, as well as to incense Tlepolemus ; for, as if he had been willin gthK the 
whole city should know that a difference subsisted between this Auernl nnd 
himselr, he took Danae, who was the step-mother of the to| f^m the 
temple of Ceres, and, having dragged her through the streets, w h her face 
uncovered threw her into prison. This action so exasperated he iTfcdTofSl 
men that they no longer communicated their discontent in private co hdence 
and with secrecy as before, but fixed up writings in the night in every pa-t of 
the c,ty, and in the day tune assembled together^ parties, and deck ed aloud 
their detestation of the government. utxiarea aloud 

Agathocles perceiving this disposition of the people, began now to apnre 
bend some fatal consequences. Sometimes he revived that he would en£ 
vour to escape by flight ; but as he had been so impruden as not t hat nJl 

Slat e d^ S ^ Pr T rati °^ ^l^ a ^ Se ' ^ washed to del 
vol r ?o g 7 b ° metUne3 ***' f™ be g— no- to form associations 



418 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



of his friends, and seemed determined to make at least one desperate attempt 
to destroy one part of his enemies, to seize the rest, and afterwards avowedly 
to usurp the tyranny. While he remained in this state of suspence, one of 
his guards, whose name was Moeragences, was accused of betraying all his 
secrets to Tlepoiemus, through the means of a correspondence with Ada?us, 
the governor of Bubaste. Agathocles immediately gave orders to his secretary 
Nicostratus, that he should take this man, and force him, by every kind of 
torture, to declare the truth. He was seized accordingly, and, being con- 
ducted by Nicostratus into a remote apartment of the palace, was at first in- 
terrogated, as he stood, concerning the facts with which he was charged ; and 
when he refused to confess any thing, he was stripped. The guards, some of 
them were preparing the instruments of torture, and others, with rods in Iheir 
bauds, were taking off his clothes, when a servant came running into the apart- 
ment, and, having whispered something to Nicostratus in his ear, retired again 
with the greatest haste. Nicostratus immediately followed him, speaking not 
a word, but smiting continually his thigh. The situation in which Mceragenes 
now found himself was very singular and strange. The rods were already 
raised to strike him, and the instruments of torture lay ready at his feet, 
when the attendants, upon the departure of Nicostratus, stood motionless, and, 
looking one upon another, expected his return. After some time, as he came 
not back, they all gradually withdrew themselves from the apartment. Mcere- 
genes, being thus left aloue, passed through the palace unobserved, and came, 
naked as he was, into a tent of the Macedonians that was near. It happened 
that the soldiers were assembled together to take their dinner. He related to 
them all that had been done, and the surprising circumstances of his escape. 
Though the story appeared to be almost incredible, yet when they saw that he 
was still naked, they could not doubt of the truth ; taking occasion, therefore, 
from this accident, he began now with tears to intreat the Macedonians, not 
only to afford protection to himself, but to take the measures also that were 
necessary for the preservation of the king, or rather indeed for their own 
safety ; for the destruction of them all was imminent and certain, unless they 
would seize the moment, when the hatred of the people against Agathocles, 
and their desire of vengeance, were at the greatest height : and this, he said, 
was now that moment; and nothing was wanting but that some person* should 
begin the enterprise. The soldiers were raised into fury by this discourse, 
and consented to all that was proposed. They went first into the tents of the 
other Macedonians, and afterwards into those of the re6t of the army ; for they 
were all contiguous one to the other, and stood together on the same side of 
the city. 

As the disposition to revolt had long been general, and waited only to be 
called into action, no sooner was this spirit set in motion than it spread every 
way like a raging flame ; so that before four hours had passed, all orders and 
ranks of men, both in the camp and in the eity, were united in the same 
design. An accident also at this time happened, which tended greatly to 
facilitate the success of the undertaking. Some spies were brought to Aga- 
thocles, together with a letter which had been written by Tlepoiemus to the 
army. The purport of the letter was, that Tlepoiemus was preparing to join 
the army ; and the spies declared, that he was now ready to come. On receiving 
this news, Agathocles seemed to be bereaved at once of all his understanding; 
for, instead of preparing himself for action, or taking any of the measures 
which such an exigency required, he calmly retired to his repast, and indulged 
himself in all the pleasures of his table in the usual manner. 

But iEnanthe, oppressed with grief, went into the temple of Ceres and 
Proserpine, which w r as now opened for the celebration of an annual sacrifice. 
At her first entrance, she fell upon her knees, and supplicated the protection 
of the goddesses with the. most soothing prayers ; she then sat down near the. 
akar, and was quiet. Many of the women who were present beheld her grief 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 4\'j * 



and Iter dejection with a secret pleasure, and said nothing. The relations 
only of Polycrates, and some others of rank, not knowing the cause of her 
disorder, came near to her, and were beginning to comfort her ; but CEnanthe 
cried out with a loud voice, " x\pproaeh me not, wild beasts as you are ; 1 
know you very well ; you are enemies to our interests, and are praying the 
goddesses to inflict upon us the worst of evils; but I hope, on the contrary, 
that they will force yourselves to feed upon your own children." With these 
words, she ordered her attendants to drive them from her, and even to strike 
those that should refuse to retire; the women therefore all left the temple, 
lifting up their hands to heaven, and imploring the gods that CEnanthe her- 
self might feel those curses which she had imprecated upon others. And as 
the men already had determined to revolt, this resentment of their wives 
being now spread through every house, added new strength to the rage with 
which they were before inflamed. 

As soon as night was come, in the whole city nothing was to be seen but 
tumult, lighted torches, and people running to and fro in every part; for some 
assembled themselves together in the stadium,with loud cries ; some animated 
the rest; and some, miming every way in disorder, sought for houses and 
secret places in which they might lie concealed. All the open spaces that 
were near to the palace, the square, the stadium, and the court, that were 
round the theatre of Bacchus, were now rilled with an innumerable multitude 
of people of every kind, when Agathocles, who had not long left his table, 
was awakened from sleep, full of wine, and informed of what had happened. 
Immediately collecting all his kindred, Philo only excepted, ne went to the 
king, and, after some few words of lamentation, took him by the hand, and 
carried him up into the gallery that was between the Meander and the Pa- 
bestra, and which led to the entrance of the theatre. He fastened behind 
him the first two doors, and passed on to the third, with only two or three 
guards, the king, and his own family. The doors were framed in the manner 
of ah open lattice, and were fastened with double bars. 

The numbers of the people that were drawn together from all parts of the 
city were now so great, that not only the open places, but the steps also and 
the roofs of the houses were covered with them. A confused noise and clamour 
was heard, from the voices of women and children mingled with those of the 
men ; for such is the custom at Alexandria, as well as at Carthage, that, in 
tumults of this kind, the children are no less active than the men. When 
the day fully appeared, amidst the many undistinguishabie cries, it was heard, 
however, above all the rest, that they called for the king. The Macedonians, 
therefore, now first advancing together in a bady from their tents, took pos- 
session of the gate of the palace, which was the place of the royal audience ; 
and, after some little time, being informed to what part the king had retired, 
they went round to the place, forced open the first doors of the gallery, and, 
as they approached the second, demanded the child, with loud cries. Aga- 
thocles, perceiving that the danger was so near, entreated the guards to go, 
and to declare to the Macedonians, " that he was ready to lay down the 
guardianship of the king, and all his other power ; to divest himself of all 
his honours; and even to abandon all that he possessed. That he desired 
only that his life might be spared, and that small allowance yielded to 
him which would be necessary for his support; that when he should have 
thus gone back again to his first condition, it would no longer be in his 
power, whatever might be his will, to do harm to any person." But the 
guards all refused to be employed in this service, till at last it was under- 
taken by Aristomenes, the same who held afterwards the chief administration 
of the government. 

This man was an Arcananian by birth, and having, as he advanced in life, 
obtained the supreme direction of affairs in Egypt, he governed, with a very 
high reputation, both the king and the kingdom : and demonstrated, indeed, 



420 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



no less ability in maintaining himself in that exalted station, than he had 
shown before in flattering Agathocles during the time of his prosperity; for 
he was the first who, at a banquet, had presented to Agathocles alone of all 
the guests a golden crown; an honour never accustomed to be paid to any 
but kings. He had the courage also to be the first who wore a portrait of 
Agathocles in a ring. And when he had a daughter born, he gave her the 
name of Agathoclea. But this may be sufficient to mark his character. 

This man, then, having received the orders before-mentioned, went out 
through a little wicket, and came to the Macedonians. He had scarcely 
spoken a few words, and begun to declare the intentions of Agathocles, when 
the-soldiers attempted, in the instant, to strike their darts through his 
body. But some persons, having covered him with their hands, and appeased 
that first fury, ordered him immediately to return, aud to tell Agathocles 
that he should either bring out the king, or not dare to come out himself. 
When they had thus dismissed him, they advanced against the second door of 
the gallery, and forced it open. Agathocles, perceiving, both by the answer 
that was brought, and by this new violence, with what rage the Macedonians 
were inflamed, extended now his hands through the lattice of the farthest 
door. Agathoclea likewise showed her breasts, which she said had suckled 
the king. With the most suppliant words that could be uttered, they beg- 
ged that at least their lives might he spared. But when neither their prayers 
nor their entreaties anj thing availed, they at last sent out the child, together 
with the guards. 

The Macedonians, when they had received the king, set him immediately 
Ttpon a horse, and conducted him to the stadium. As soon as he appeared, 
the people broke together into the loudest shouts of acclamation and applause. 
They stopped the horse, took down the king, and conducted him to the seat 
rn which their kings were accustomed to be seen. But the joy which the mul- 
titude showed was still mingled with grief; for while they rejoiced that they 
had gotten the king into their possession, they were grieved, on the other 
hand, that the guilty persons were not taken, and brought to suffer a just pu- 
nishment. They demanded, therefore, with continual clamour, that the au- 
thors of all the evils should be delivered up to the public vengeance. As the 
day was now far advanced, and the people still wanted the objects upon which 
they might vent their rage, Sosibius, who was the son of Sosibius, and was at 
this time one of the royal guards, had recourse to an expedient, the best in- 
deed that could be devised, with respect both to the king and the public 
peace. Perceiving that the commotion was not likely to be appeased, and 
that the young prince also was uneasy at seeing himself surrounded by per- 
sons unknown, and terrified by the noise of a rude multitude, he went and 
asked him, whether he consented that those who had been guilty of crimes 
against his mother and himself should be delivered up to the people. A;.d 
when he answered that he consented, Sosibius ordered some of the guards to 
declare this resolution to the people, and at the same time carried the king to 
his own house, which was near, to give him some refreshment. < As soon as the 
intentions of the king were known, the whole place again resounded with 
shouts of approbation and of joy, 

During this time Agathocles and Agathoclea had retired severally to their 
own apartments. Some of the soldiers, from their own voluntary motion, and 
others urged by the people, soon went in search of them. But the first be- 
ginning of the slaughter that ensued was occasioned by the following acci- 
dent. One of the parasites aud servants of Agathocles, whose name was 
Philo, came drunk into the stadium, and, seeing what was the disposition of 
the people, told those who stood near him that, as soon as Agathocles should 
appear, they would change their sentiments, as they had done before. Upon 
hearing these words, some began to revile him, and others punished him ; 
and, when he attempted to defend himself, they tore his clothes ; and some 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 421 



struck the points of their spears into his body. He was then dragged along, 
still breathing, and with many insults, through the midst of the multitude. 
As the people had now tasted of blood, they were impatient to see the others 
brought out. In a short time afterwards Agathocles came first, loaded with 
chains. As soon as he appeared, some persons ran towards him, and in- 
stantly killed him. In this they performed the office, not of enemies, but 
of friends; for they saved him from the more dreadful death which his crimes 
deserved. After Agathocles, Nico was brought out ; then Agathoclea naked, 
with her sisters ; and afterwards all the rest of their kindred. Last of all, 
CEnanthe also was torn from the temple, and was brought naked on horseback 
into the stadium. All these were now abandoned to the fury of the multi- 
tude. Some bit them with their teeth; some pierced them through with wea- 
pons ; and some tore out their eyes. And as each of them fell, they were di- 
vided limb from limb, till they were all torn into pieces ; for the anger of the 
^Egyptians always is attended with most terrible cruelty. At the same time 
likewise, the young women, who had been educated with Arsinoe, being in- 
formed that Philammon had come three days before to Alexandria from Gy- 
rene, with a design to kill the queen, ran to his house; and, having forced 
their entrance, they murdered him with clubs and stones; strangled his son 
who was an infant ; and then dragged his wife naked into the streets, and 
killed her. In thi? dismal manner perished Agathocles, Agathoclea, and all 
their kindred. 



CHAP. II. 

I AM not ignorant, indeed, with what pains some writers, in order to strike 
their readers with astonishment, have heightened this transaction into a most 
portentous story, and loaded it with a detail of studied observation, exceed- 
ing even the relation itself in length. Some of them ascribing every thing 
that happened to the sole influence of fortune, attempt to paint, in the 
strongest colours, the inconstancy of that goddess, and to show how difficult it 
is for men to secure themselves against her power. Others again, when they 
have represented all the circumstances to be indeed astonishing, endeavoured 
afterwards to assign some probable causes of so wonderful an event. For my 
own part, I have resolved not to undertake the task of making any such in- 
flections; for I cannot discover that Agathocles was distinguished either by 
his military skill and courage, or that he possessed, in any considerable degree, 
that happy dexterity in the administration of civil affairs which might deserve 
to be imitated ; or lastly, that he ever excelled in that talent of courtly in- 
trigue, that refined and crafty policy, by the means of which Sosibius and 
many other ministers preserved through their lives a supreme influence over 
those princes who successively intrusted them with the management of their 
affaire. He was indeed, in all respects, the very reverse of these. For it was 
only the incapacity and weakness of Philopalor which first raised him, with the 
astonishment of all men, into high authority. And when afterwards he had the 
fairest opportunity, upon the death of that prince, to maintain himself in 
his.exalted station, he in a short time threw away, by the mere want of spirit 
and ability, both his power and his life. The story of a man like this needs 
no enlargement, nor affords any room for such reflections as might be drawn 
from the fortunes of that other Agathocles and Dionysius, the two tyrants of 
Sicily, and of some besides, who acquired a name by their ability and great 
exploits. The latter of the two here mentioned derived his origin from the verj r 
lowest of the people. The former left the wheel, the kiln, and the clay, as 
Timteus has said of him in the way of reproach, and came young, to Syracuse: 



422 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



and yet each of them, in his time, raised himself to 'be the tyrant of that 
renowned and opulent city. Afterwards they became the sovereigns of all Si- 
cily ; and were masters likewise "of many of the parts of Italy. Agathocles 
also formed still greater designs ; for he even invaded Afric, and at last died 
in the full possession of all his honours. And from hence it is said, when 
Publius Scipio, the first conqueror of. Carthage, was asked what persons he 
judged to have been the most distinguished by their skill in government, and 
their wisdom in conducting the boldest enterprises, he answered Dionysius 
and Agathocles. These then are the men from whose actions an historian may- 
take a fair occasion to stop his readers with reflections ; to remind them of the 
power of fortune ; to remark the course of human affairs ; and, in a word, 
to inculcate many useful lessons. But others, like the Agathocles, whose fate 
we have described, are very unfit to be made the subjects of such discourse. 
Upon this account, I have related, without any enlargement, the bare circum- 
stances of his fall. But there was also indeed another reason which determined 
me, with no less weight, to reject all amplification in the recital of this story. 
Those changes of fortune, which are dreadful and astonishing, should be 
exhibited in a single view, and so far only as that they may be barely known. 
To keep them afterwards in sight, and to exaggerate them in a long descrip- 
tion, not only is attended with no advantage, but must even be painful to 
those to whom they are shown. In every thing that is offered to the eyes or 
ears, the design should always be to convey either some utility, or some 
pleasure. All history especially should be directed constantly to these two 
ends: but an exaggerated description of astonishing accidents is certainly nei- 
ther useful nor pleasing. It cannot be useful, because no one would wish to 
imitate what is contrary to reason; nor pleasing, because none can be delighted 
either with the sight or the relation of such events as are repugnant both to 
nature and to the common apprehensions of men. We may desire indeed 
once, and for the first time only, to see or to hear of such disasters, for the 
sake of being assured that some things may happen which we conceived to be 
impossible. But when we have this assurance, any lengthened repetition, 
forced upon us, only fills us with disgust. An historian therefore should be 
contented barely to relate what may serve for imitation, or may be heard with 
pleasure. An enlarged description of calamity, which exceeds those bounds, 
may be proper indeed for tragedy, but not for history. Some indulgence, 
however, may be allowed, perhaps, to those historians, who, because they 
neither have considered the works of nature, nor are acquainted with the ge- 
neral course of things in the world, are ready to regard the events which 
themselves have seen, or which they have greedily received from others, as 
the greatest and most wonderful that have happened in any age. Misled by 
this persuasion, and not sensible of the mistake into which they have fallen, 
they set themselves to relate, with large exaggeration, transactions which have 
not even the praise of novelty, since they have before been recounted by 
others, and from which their readers also never can derive either advantage or 
delight. * * * 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 423 



BOOK THE SIXTEENTH. 

EXTRACT THE FIRST. 

The naval engagement between Attains and Philip near the island of 

Chios. 

PHILIP was now filled with great perplexity, and began to be extremely- 
anxious with respect to the event. His progress in the siege had in no degree 
answered his expectation ; and the enemy alto were lying at anchor near him, 
with a greater number of decked ships than his own. As there was, there- 
fore, no room left for choice, he suddenly sailed away with all his fleet. This 
motion occasioned no small surprise in Attalus, who expected that the king 
would still have continued the work of his mines against the city. But Phi- 
lip had persuaded himself, that, by getting first out to sea, he should be se- 
cure from being overtaken by the enemy; and directing his course along the 
coast, might be able to arrive safe at Samos. He was, however, very greatlr 
disappointed in his hopes: for Attalus and Theophiliscus no sooner saw that 
he was getting out to sea, than they resolved immediately to follow him. Their 
fleet was not formed in order; for they had expected, as we have said, that 
Philip would still have persisted in the siege. They exerted, however, their 
whole skill in rowing; and when they had overtaken the enemy, Attalus at- 
tacked the right, which was also the van of their fleet, and Theophiliscus 
the left. Philip, finding himself thus intercepted in his course, gave the sig- 
nal to his ships upon the right, commanding them to turn their prows towards 
the enemy, and to engage with vigour; and himself, with some boats, retired to 
the little islands that were in the middle of the strait, designing to observe 
from thence the progress of the battle. His fleet consisted of fifty-three 
decked ships, besides open vessels, such as boats and long galleys, which 
were in number one hundred and fifty. Some others were left at Samos, 
which he had not been able to get ready. On the side of his enemies were 
sixty-five decked ships, including those sent by the Byzantines; and, beside 
these, nine biremes, and three triremes. 

The vessel in which Attalus sailed began the combat, and the nearest of 
the ships on both sides, without waiting for any signal, immediately engaged 
each with the other as they approached. Attalus, having attacked an octi- 
•reme, laid open the side by a fortunate stroke below the surface of the water, 
so that the vessel sunk at last to the bottom, though the men upon the deck 
.maintained the fight for some time with the greatest bravery. Another vessel 
that belonged to Philip, carrying ten banks of oars, and which was the first 
ship in the fleet, was lost by a very strange accident. A bireme, having fallen 
under the prow of this large ship, was struck by the latter with so great vio- 
lence, that all the art of the pilot was not able to draw out the beak, which 
was fixed fast in the middle of the hulk of the little vessels, just below the 
uppermost bank of the oars. At this very time two quinqueremes came up, 
and striking their beaks into both the sides of the large ship, which was so 
fixed in its position by the little vessel that was suspended from it, that it was 
not able to move, sunk it to the bottom, together with all that were on board. 
Among these was Democrates, the chief commander of the fleet. About the 
same time, likewise, Dionysidorus and Dinocrates, two brothers, and com- 
manders on the side of Attalus, were engaged, with circumstances not less 
singular, the one with a septirevne, and tiie other with an octireme of the 
enemy. Dinocrates, who attacked the latter, having raised the prow of his ves- 
sel, received a stroke in the part that was above the water, and at the same time 
struck his own beak so deep into the lower part of the octireme, that he. was 



424 GENERAL" HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

aw iw i iww.jiw.iii — caw wwi i mi ;■ itm oawomi wJ w iaiam^ ' ^MyBiB^ 



not able to draw it back, though he many times attempted, it by lightening 
his 'stern. In, this situation, he was so closely attacked by the Macedonians, 
that he found himself in the greatest danger. But Attalus, perceiving what , 
had happened, bore down upon the octireme, and, by the violence of the shock s 
separated the two vessels, and set Dinocrates free. The Macedonians were all 
killed after a brave resistance, and the vessel remained in the power of the 
conquerors. Dionysidorus, ( ou his part, bearing down upon the septireme, 
missed his stroke ; and, as he fell against the enemy, lost all the banks of his 
oars upon the right side of his vessel, and all the battlements of his deck* 
The Macedonians attacked him on every ' side with loiul shouts and cries. . 
The vessel was soon sunk, together with all that were onboard. Dionysi- 
dorus alone, and two others, saved themselves by swimming to a bireme that 
was near.- Among the rest of the ships that were engaged, "the contest was... 
more equal. The advantage which Philip had in the number of his small 
vessels was balanced by the strength of the decked .ships on the side of At- . 
talus. And, though -the hopes of success, were the most promising, on-, the side 
of Attalus, the vigour of the Macedonians in the right of the fleet rendered , 
the victory at this time doubtful. „ 

The Rhodians, when they first sailed out to sea, were at a very great dis-". 
taifce behind the enemy, as we before mentioned. But as they far exceeded 
them in the swiftness of their course, they soon reached the ■ rear of the Ma^ . 
cedonian fleet, and began to attack the vessels in stern, as; they were sailing 
from them, and to break their banks. The Macedonians were -then forced to . 
turn, and assist the ships that were thus attacked. And when the rest of -the 
Rhodian vessels were come up, and had joined Theophiliscus, .-the whole fleets 
on both sides turned their prows, the one against the other, and amidst the 
sound of trumpets and the noise of animating cries, engaged in set battle 
with the greatest ardour. The action, however, would have been determined 
in -a very short time, and with little difficulty, if the Macedonians had -not in- 
termingled some small vessels among their decked ships, and by that measure 
frustrated, in various manners, the efforts of the Rhodian fleet. For no sooner 
was the order of battle broken by the first shock, and the ships mingled to- 
gether in confusion, than these small vessels, falling in among the rest, either 
stopped them in their course, or prevented them from turning, and employing 
with advantage their proper strength ; and, by obstructing sometimes the work- 
ing of the oars, sometimes by attacking the prow, and sometimes again the 
stern of the larger ships, rendered the skill of the pilots, and the dexterity 
of "the rowers, alike unserviceable. When any of the ships were engaged 
beak with beak, the Rhodian3 indeed displayed their superior art. For set- 
ting their own vessels low upon the prow, while they received the stroke of the 
enemy above -the water, they at the same time struck the adverse ships below 
it*' and made such breaches as were irreparable. It was but seldom, however, 
that they availed themselves of this advantage. Deterred by the vigour which 
the Macedonians showed, in maintaining the fight hand to hand against them 
from their decks, they in general declined the danger of a close engagement,, 
and chose rather to run through the fleet of the enemy, and to break the oars, 
and then, returning again, to direct their strokes against the stern of the 
vessels, or against the sides, as they were turning themselves obliquely from 
them; and either pierced them with their beaks, or carried away some part 
that was necessary for the working of the ship. By this method they de- 
stroyed a very great number of vessels in the Macedonian fleet. 

• There were three Rhodian quinqueremes, that were distinguished in a very 
remarkable manner iii this engagement. One of these was the vessel in which 
Theophiliscus sailed, who was the commander of the fleet. Philostratus was 
captain in the second. The third had Nicostratus on board, and was com- 
manded by Autolychus. The last of these ships had struck one that be- 
longed to the enemy with so great violence, that the beak was left sticking m 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 425 



the vessel. The ship that was struck soon sunk with all the men ; and the 
other, while the water flowed in fast at the prow, was surrounded on every 
side by the enemy. Autolychns defended himself for some time with the 
greatest courage, till, being covered with wounds, he at last fell with his arms 
into the sea. The rest that were on board maintained the right with no less 
bravery, till they were all likewise killed. At this time Theophiliscus advanced 
towards them. Not being able to save the vessel, which was already filled 
with water, he struck two ships of the enemy, and forced out all that were on 
board. But being soon surrounded by a very great number, both of light 
and heavy vessels, he lost the greatest part of his men, after a brave resistance. 
And having himself also received three wounds, and being pressed by the 
most imminent danger, he at last with great difficulty saved his ship, through 
the assitance of Philostratus, who had courage to take his place in the action. 
Being then joined by some other vessels, he returned once more to right, and, 
though, the strength of his body was much weakened by his wounds, yet such 
was the vigour of his mind, that he distinguished himself by more glorious 
efforts, and by a courage more astonishing than before. 

In this battle there were properly two actions, at a great distance one from 
the other. For the right of the fleet of Philip, which was attacked by At- 
talus, having kept their course close along the shore, as they had at first de- 
signed, was not far distant from the continent of Asia : while his left, which 
had turned to support the ships in the rear, had approached the island Chios, 
and was engaged with the Rhodian fleet. The success of Attaius against the 
right had been almost complete ; and this prince, as he pursued his victory, 
was uow come near to those little inlands where Philip was stationed, expect* 
ing the event of the battle, when he perceived that one of his own quin- 
queremes, which had advanced too far beyond tfce rest, was struck by a Ma- 
cedonian vessel, and was ready to sink. He hastened, therefore, with two 
quadriremes to save this ship. And when the enemy, as he approached, de- 
clined the combat, and retired towards the land, he pursued with the greatest 
eagerness, and was earnest to render himself master of the Macedonian vessel. 
Philip, perceiving that the king was so far separated from the rest of his fleet, 
took four quinqueremes, three biremes, and some boats that were near, and 
stood ready to intercept him in his return. Attaius, finding his return cut 
off, and being filled with the greatest apprehensions for his safety, was at last 
forced to run his ship close in to the land, and escaped safe to Eiythrae, 
with the rest that were on board ; while the vessel, and all the royal furniture, 
fell into the hands of Philip. An artifice, indeed, which he had employed upon 
this occasion, very greatly facilitated his escape. He had ordered his most 
Rplendid furniture to be brought out, and placed upon the deck of the ship. 
When the Macedonians, therefore, first entered from their boats, and saw- 
many rich goblets, a vest of purple, and all the utensils which accompany the 
regal pomp, instead of following the pursuit, they set themselves to pillage 
what was before them, and by that delay gave full time to the king to con- 
tinue b.is flight with safety to Erythrse. 

Though Philip had been by much the greatest sufferer in the whole of the 
engagement, yet so much was he elated with this success, that he sailed back 
again into the open sea, and began with great diligence to draw together his 
ships, and to encourage his men, as if he had now clearly obtained the vic- 
tory. And indeed, when his enemies on the other side perceived that he was 
followed by the royal vessel bound fast to his own, they were all ready to be- 
lieve that Attaius had perished. Dionysidorus among the rest was filled with 
that persuasion. He made the signal, therefore, for bringing together the. 
ahips of his own ; and, having soon collected them into a body, he sailed 
away to the ports of Asia without any danger. At the same time also, the 
Macedonian ships that were engaged against the Rhodians, having for a long 

yah, 1. no. 7. 3 m 



426- GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



time suffered greatly iu the action, withdrew themselves separately from the 
light, under the pretence of carrying assistance to some other part of the fleet. 
The Rhodians, when they had bound fast to the stern of their own ships one 
part of the vessels which they had taken, and broken the rest into pieces, 
directed their course to Chios. In the engagement against Attalus, Philip 
had lost one vessel of ten banks of oars, one of nine, one of seven, and one 
of six, together with ten other decked ships, three biremes, and twenty-five 
boats. These vessels were all destroyed, together with the men that were on 
board. In the engagement against the Rhodians, ten of his decked ships were 
destroyed, and forty boats; two quadriremes were also taken, and seven boats, 
with all their men. On the side of Attalus, one bireme and two quinqueremes 
were sunk, and the royal vessel was taken. Two quinqueremes of the Rhodians 
were destroyed, and some triremes, but none of their vessels taken. No more 
than sixty men were killed on the side of the Rhodians, and about seventy in 
the fleet of Attalus ; but on the.side of Philip, three thousand of the Mace- 
donian soldiers, and six thousand of the naval forces, lost their lives. Two 
thousand also of the Macedonians and their allies were taken prisoners. 
Among these, seven hundred were Egyptians. Such was the end of the naval 
battle near the island of Chios. 
. When the action was finished, Philip assumed to himself, upon two accounts, 
the honour of the victory. The first was, that he had forced Attalus to run 
his vessel in to the land, and bad made himself master of the ship; and the 
other, because he had cast anchor, after the engagement, near the promon- 
tory Argennum, and taken his station in the very midst of the wrecks of the 
fleets. On the next day, likewise, he endeavoured, by his actions, to support 
the same pretension. With this design, and in order to persuade men still 
more strongly that he remained the conqueror, he collected together the 
wrecks of all, the ships, and took up the bodies of his own men that were to 
be distinguished among the dead. But it very soon appeared, that this was 
not his own opinion. For while he was employed in this very work, Diony- 
sidorus and the Rhodians, having joined their fleets together, came sailing to- 
wards the place where he was, and stood for some time before him in order of 
battle. And when he declined the engagement, they returned unmolested 
back to Chios. 

In reality, this prince had never at any time before suffered so great a loss in 
$ single action, either by land or sea. Pie felt himself very deeply affected 
with the misfortune, and was forced to abate much of his former ardour. He 
endeavoured, indeed, by every method, to conceal his sentiments from others ; 
but the very face of things alone rendered even this attempt impracticable. 
For, beside other circumstances, the objects that presented themselves on 
every side, after the engagement, struck all with horror who beheld them. So 
great had been the slaughter, that the whole strait at the time was covered 
with blood, and was filled with dead bodies, with arms, and wrecks of the 
ships. And for many days afterwards, these objects were seen mingled toge- 
ther, and thrown in heaps upon the shores. So dreadful a spectacle not only 
struck Philip with couiusion, but filled all the Macedonians with extreme dis- 
may. Theophiliscus survived one day after the battle : he wrote an account 
of the action to his country, appointed Cleonseus in his stead commander of 
the fleet, and then died of his wounds, having merited immortal honour, not 
only by his courage in the engagement, but on account of the resolution also 
which he had shown in conducting the whole design. For unless his spirit 
had determined him to be thus early in attacking Philip, so universally was 
that prince at this time dreaded, that the present opportunity would have been 
wholly lost. But he not only resolved to begin the war against him, but 
obliged his country also to seize the favourable moment; and forced Attalus 
likewise not to waste hie time in preparations, but to enter immediately into 



GENERAL HISTORY "OF POLYBIUS. 427 



■HalMn 



action, and to try the fortune of a battle without any delay. It was not with- 
out good reason, therefore, that the Rhodians, after his death, decreed such 
honours to his memory as were moat proper to encourage, not those alone 
who were then alive, but the men also of future times, to render upon great 
eccasions the most effectual service to their country. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND. 

The reason why men often abandon their designs. 

WHAT was it then which forced him to stop at once in the midst of this 
pursuit ? It was nothing indeed but the mere nature of things. For we 
often see that men, while they contemplate objects at a distance, and attend 
only to the great advantages that would follow from success, engage eagerly hi 
designs which are impossible to be accomplished. The violence of their de- 
sires precludes altogether the exercise of their reason. But, when the time of 
execution is coine, and the difficulties winch appear, upon a nearer view, are 
found to be absolutely insurmountable, their thoughts are suddenly bewil- 
dered and perplexed ; their understanding becomes confused, and the attempt 
is then abandoned with the same precipitation with which it had before been 
undertaken. 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

Philip renders himself master of Prinassus by a stratagem. 

AFTER some attacks, which the strength of this little city rendered fruit- 
less, ? Philip desisted from the attempt, and, leading his army through the 
country, destroyed the citadels, and plundered the villages that were near. 
He then went and encamped before Prinassus ; and having, in a short time, 
finished his blinds, and completed the other prepartions that were necessary 
for a siege, he began to undermine the wall of the city. But, when he found 
that the rockiness of the soil rendered this work altogether impracticable, he 
had recourse to the following stratagem. He ordered the soldiers to make 
a great noise under ground in the day-time, as if they were employed in digg- 
ing the mines, and, in the night, to bring earth from distant parti, and to lay 
it along the mouths of the pits that were opened, that the besieged, on seeing 
a large quantity of earth, might be struck with apprehensions of their danger. 
At first, however, the inhabitants displayed a great show; of bravery, and 
seemed determined to maintain themselves in their post. But, when Philip 
informed them by a message, that the wall was undermined to the length of 
four hundred feet, and that he left it to their choice whether they would now 
retire with safety, or, remaining till he should set fire to the props, be then 
all destroyed amidst the ruins of the place, they gave an entire credit to his 
account, and delivered up the city, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. --.-"■ 

The situation of lassus. The judgment of ike author concerning wonderful 

stories. 

IASSUS, in Asia, is situated upon the gulf, which is terminated on one side 
by the temple of Neptune, in the Milesian territory, and, on the other, by the 
city of Mindus; and which by many is called the Bargylietic Gulf, from the 
cities of the same name which are spread round the innermost parts of it. 
The inhabitants of lassus boast, that they were originally -a colony from 
Argos ; but that afterwards their ancestors, when they had suffered a great 
loss in the Carian war, received a new colony of Milesians, which was brought 
to them by the son of Neleus, the first founder of Miletus. The city contains 
ten stadia in circumference. There is a report, which is firmly credited, among 
the inhabitants of the Bargylian cities, that no snow or rain ever falls upon 
the statue of the Cindyan Diana, though it stands in the open air. The ^peo- 
ple of lassus affirm the same thing also concerning their statue of Vesta ; and 
both these stones are related as facts by some historians. For my own part, I 
know not how it is, that I am still forced, in the course of my work, to take 
some notice of such traditions, which are scarcely to be heard with patience. 
It is certainly a proof of a most childish folly, to relate things, which, when 
they are brought to be examined, appear to be not only improbable, but even 
not possible. When a writer affirms, for example, that certain bodies, though 
placed in the light of the sun, project no shade, what is it but a plain indica- 
tion of a distempered brain ? aud yet, Theopompus has declared that this 
happens to those who are admitted into the temple of Jupiter, in Arcadia. Of 
the same kind are the stories that have now been mentioned. I must confess, 
indeed, that, when things of this sort tend only to preserve in vulgar minds a 
reverential awe of the divinity, writers may sometimes be excused, if they 
employ their pains in recounting miracles, and in framing legendary tales. 
But nothing which exceeds that point should be allowed. It is not easy, per- 
haps, to fix, in every instance, the exact bounds of this indulgence ; yet neither 
is it absolutely impossible. My opinion is, that ignorance and falsehood may 
be admitted in a small degree ; and, when they are carried farther, that they 
ought to be exploded, 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH. 

Scipio returns io Rome.— His triumph. — 'The death of Syphax* 

NOT long after this time, Publius Scipio returned back to Rome from 
Afric. As the greatness of his actions had raised in men a very high and gene- 
ral expectation, he was surrounded by vast crowds upon his entrance, and re- 
ceived by the people with the greatest marks of favour. Nor was this only 
reasonable, but an act also of necessary duty ; for they who, not long before, 
had not so much as dared to hope that Annibal ever could be driven out of 
Italy, or the danger be removed from their own persons and their families, 
now saw themselves not only freed from the apprehension of any present 
evils, but established also in a lasting and firm security, by the entire con- 
quest of their enemies. Upon this occasion, therefore, they set no bounds to 
their joy. On the day, likewise, in which he entered the city in triumph, 
as the objects that were viewed in the procession represented, most clearly, t© 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBICJS. 4 429 

TTT ,. - ~ U ' ' ' ■ ' ' • "" '"- ^J^ "-^ '"' XJmJ ' ^■W!lWl-triWra'IWWHM 1 | h J . P ■■^■PIL„n ^ ^ 

the senses of the people, the dangers from which they had escaped, they stood, 
as in an extasy of passion, pouring out thanks to the gods, and acknowledg- 
ments to the author of so great a deliverance. Among the rest of the pri- 
soners, Syphax also, the Massaesylian king, was led along a captive in the pro- 
cession ; and, after some time, he died in prison. When the solemnity oflthe 
triumph was finished, there was afterwards in Rome, during many days, a con- 
tinual succession of games and spectacles, the expence of which was defrayed 
by Scipio, with a generosity which was worthy of him. 



EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 

The prudent conduct of Philip after his defeat. 

THERE are many men, indeed, who may be observed to begin an action 
well, and even to redouble their ardour as they advance, till they have made a 
very considerable progress ; but, to conduct an enterprise completely to the 
end, and, even when fortune obstructs them in their course, /to supply by pru- 
dence whatever may have been defective in alacrity and vigour, is the portion 
only of a few. In this view, as the inaction of Attalus and the Rhodians, af- 
ter their late victory, may justly be censured, so, on the other hand, the iftfeg- 
nanimity, and the royal spirit, with which Philip persisted still in his designs, 
deserves not less to be applauded. Let it be remarked, however, that it is 
not my meaning to apply this commendation to the general character and con- 
duct of this prince, but that I am speaking only of the attention which he 
exerted upon the present occasion. Without this distinction, I might be 
charged, perhaps, with inconsistency, in having, not long before, applauded 
Attalus and the Rhodians, and censured Philip, and delivering now a con- 
trary judgment. For this purpose I observed expressly, in the beginning of 
my work, that an historian often is obliged to applaud and to condemn the same 
persons, as different occasions may require; for the revolutions of affairs, and 
sudden accidents, as they arise, are frequently seen to change the intentions of 
men from good to bad, or from bad to good. And even without the im- 
pression of external circumstances, the natural inconstancy of the human mind 
sometimes determines men to a right course of action, and sometimes to that 
which is altogether wrong. The force of one or other of these causes was now 
clearly visible in Philip : for, though this prince suffered no small concern 
from his late defeat, and was apt, almost at all times, to be hurried along by 
violence and passion, yet, upon this occasion, he accommodated himself, with 
a most astonishing prudence, to the exigency of the times. By this con- 
duct, he was again enabled to resume the war against the Rhodians and king 
Attalus, and, in the end, accomplished all that he proposed. Such an 
instance of his prudence deserved not to pass altogether without remark : 
for some men, like bad racers, abandon their designs when they are arrived even 
almost at the end of their course ; while others, on the contrary, obtain a-.vio 
tory against their rivals, by exerting, in that very moment, more strenuous ef- 
forts than before. 

■ . . 

>I/JO; --'.- ..... .J A 

: 9iU t.' .'' 



- ■ 



"4S0 GENERAL HISTORY OF FQLYBIUS. 



'EXTRACT THE SEVENTH. 

The situation of Sestus and 'Abydus. The siege of this last city, and the des- 
perate resolution of the citizens. 

IT would be needlessto enter into a long description of the situation of Ses- 
tus and Abydus, or to enumerate the conveniences which they possess: for 
these cities are so singularly placed, that there is scarcely any one, unless 
among the most vulgar of mankind, who has not acquired some knowledge of 
them. But it will not be "uuuseful, upon the present occasion, to turn the at- 
tention of the reader to a general view of their position. And, indeed, who- 
ever will compare and lay together what I am going to say, may obtain from 
thence ajuster notion of these two cities than even from an examination of 
the ground upon which they stand. 

As it is not possible, then, to sail from the Ocean, or, as it is called by others, 
from the Atlantic, into our sea, without passing through the strait of the Pil- 
lars of Hercules, so neither is there any way of sailing from our sea into the 
Propontis and the Pontus, unless through the passage that lies between Sestus 
and Abydus. In one respect, indeed, these straits are very differently formed : 
for that of the Pillars of Hercules is much larger than tho Hellespont, and 
contains sixty stadia in breadth ; whereas the other, between Sestus -and Aby- 
dus, has no more than two. But, in making this difference, fortune seems to 
have acted not altogether without design. One reason of it, as far as we are 
able to conjecture, seems to be, that the exterior ocean is, by many degrees, 
larger than our sea. To this we may add, that the strait of Abydus is better 
adapted, upon this account, to the necessities of those who live upon it. For, as 
both sides of it are covered with inhabitants, the narrowness of the passage 
serves as a kind of gate for their mutual intercourse. For this purpose they 
sometimes throw a bridge over the strait, and pass from one side to the other 
on foot. At other times, vessels are seen sailing continually upon it. But 
the strait of the Pillars of Hercules is very rarely used, and only by a few. For 
the people that live on both sides, in the extreme borders of Afric and of Eu- 
rope, have but little communication one with another, and scarcely any know- 
ledge of the exterior sea. The city of Abydus is enclosed also on either side 
by the promontories of Europe, and has a harbour which affords, a safe shelter 
to the ships that are stationed in it, against every wind : but without the en- 
trance of the harbour, it is not possible for any vessel ever to cast anchor, on 
account of the rapidity and violence with which the waters are carried through 
the strait. 

This was the city to which Philip, was now laying siege, both by land and by 
seaj On the side of the latter, he had blocked the place closely, by piles 
planted crossways ; and, by land, had carried a,n intrenchment round the walls. 
The greatness of the preparations that were made, the variety of the works 
that were contrived, the skill and artifice that were employed in carrying into 
execution every usual method, either of attack or of defence, these, however 
memorable, are not the things that are most worthy of admiration upon the 
present occasion. But the generous resolution, and the extravagant spirit, 
which appeared in the besieged, were so singular and astonishing, that this 
siege, upon that account alone, deserves, more than any other, to be trans- 
mitted to posterity in lasting characters. At first, reposing an entire confi- 
dence in their own strength, they sustained all the attacks of Philip with the 
greatest firmness, disabling the machines that were advanced against the city 
from the sea, by stones thrown from their balistse, or destroying them by fire, 
so that the Macedonians were scarcely able to withdraw even their ships from 
the danger. On the side of the land, likewise, they repulsed the king in his. 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 4£& 

approaches, with so great vigour and success, that, for some time, they seemed 
to hope that they should force him to desist from his. attempt. But, when 
they saw the outer wall of the city fall down, and that the Macedonians had 
brought their mines very near also to the wall which had been raised within 
the other, to supply the place of that which had fallen, they then sent Iphiades 
and Pantacnotus to treat with Philip, and offered to surrender the city to him 
upon these conditions : that the troops which they had received from Attalus 
aud the Rhodians should be dismissed with an assurance of safety, and the 
free citizens be allowed to depart to what places soever they should choose, 
with the garments upon their bodies. But Philip ordered the deputies to go 
back again, and tell the besieged, that they either must surrender at discre- 
tion, or coutinue to defend themselves with courage. 

The Abydenians, when they had received this answer, met together in coun- 
cil, and, with minds agitated by despair, deliberated on the measures which 
they now should take. They resolved, h'rst, that the slaves should be made 
free, that they might assist, without reserve, in the defence of the city. In the 
next place, that all the women of the city should be assembled together in 
the temple of Diana ; and all the children, with their nurses, in the Gymna- 
sium ; that all their gold and silver, likewise, should be laid together in the 
forum ; and, in the same manner, all their valuable vestments, in the Rho- 
dian quadrireme, and in the trireme of the Cyzicenians. These things being 
thus decreed, were carried into execution with one consent. They then called 
together another assembly ; and, having chosen fifty of the oldest men, who 
were judged to be most worthy of such a trust, and who had strength sufficient, 
also to accomplish all that was proposed, they made them swear, in the pre- 
sence of all the citizens, that, as soon as the enemy should become masters of 
the inner wall, they would kill the women and the children, set fire to the two 
vessels, aud throw the gold and the silver into the sea. After this, the priests 
being called, all the rest of the citizens were engaged, likewise, by a solemn 
oath, that they would either conquer, or die fighting in the defence of their 
country. And, to conclude the whole, having slain some victims in sacrifice, 
they obliged the priests aud priestesses to pronounce, upon the burning en- 
trails, dire execrations against those who should neglect to perform what they 
had sworn. When all was finished, they no longer endeavoured to counter- 
mine the enemy, but resolved only that, as soon as the wall should fall, they 
would exert their utmost efforts upon the breach, and continue fighting till 
thev should all expire. 

And now it may be said, that both the desperate resolution of the Pho- 
caeans, which has before been mentioned, and the magnanimous spirit also of 
the Acarnanians, were surpassed by the daring courage which the Abydenians 
showed upon this occasion. For, when the Phocseans entered into a like de- 
termination with respect to their families, they had still some hopes of sav- 
ing themselves by a victory, having an opportunity of engaging the Thessahans 
in a set battle. The Acarnanians, likewise, had in their power the same re- 
source ; for, when they only expected an invasion from the /Etolians, they passed 
in their council a similar decree. We have before given a particular account of 
these transactions : but the Abydenians, already enclosed on every side, and 
having no means of safety remaining in their power, chose rather to perish, 
every man, together with their wives and children, than to live with the certain 
expectation of seeing their children and their wives fall into the hands of 'their 
enemies. The conduct, therefore, of Fortune, with regard to this last people, 
may well be charged with some injustice. She compassiauated the. distresses 
of the others, retrieved their affairs by a victory, and reinstated them in safety 
when they had almost lost all hope. To the Abydenians alone she showed no 
favour. The men all lost their lives, the city was taken, and the children, 
with all their mothers, came alive into the poweij of, the enemy. For, as sorip 
as the inner wall fell down, the citizens, in observance of their oaths, ail 



4m GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



mounted the breach, and opposed the entrance of the enemy with so great : 
fury, that Philip, though he sent continually, even till night came on, fresh 
troops to the assault, was at last forced to desist, and began to apprehend that 
the whole design was irrecoverably lost : for the foremost of the Abydenians 
not only advanced, with a frantic kind of desperation, over the dead bodies of 
the enemy, nor were contented to employ their spears and their swords alone, 
with a most astonishing force, but, when their weapons were rendered useless* 
or were torn by violence out of their hands, grasping the Macedonians close, 
they threw some of them with their armour upon the ground, broke the spears 
of others, and, catching the fragments from them, turned the points against 
their faces, and against the other parts of their bodies that were Uncovered, 
and, by these means, threw them into extreme consternation and dis-* 
may. But when the night had put an end to the combat, the greatest part of the 
citizens being left dead upon the breach, and the rest disabled by fatigue and 
wounds, Glaucides and Theognetus, having assembled together a small num- 
ber of the oldest men, prevailed with them to abandon that most glorious and 
most admirable determination which they so lately had embraced, and to con- 
sider only their own preseut safety. They resolved, therefore, to save the wo* 
men and the children alive, and, as soon as the day should appear, that they 
would send the priests and priestesses, dressed in their holy habits, to implore 
the mercy of Philip, and to deliver the city to him. 

At the very time of this transaction, Attalus, having heard that the Abyde- 
nians were besieged, sailed through the iEgean sea to Tenedos ; and Marcus 
./Emilius, who was the youngest of the Roman ambassadors, came to Abydus a 
For the ambassadors that were sent from Rome, having received also at Rhode* 
the notice of this siege, and because they had orders likewise to obtain an inter- 
view with Philip, stopped their journey to the other kings, and sent JEmilius 
to Abydus, to confer personally with that prince. The Roman, being ad- 
mitted into his presence, declared to him the orders of the senate : " that he 
should not make war upon any of the people of Greece, nor invade any of the 
dominions that belonged to Ptolemy; and that he should engage to make an 
equitable compensation for the losses which Attalus and the Rhodians had un- 
justly snstained ; that, if he would comply with these conditions, he might 
still remain in peace : if otherwise, that the Romans would declare war against 
him." The king endeavoured to convince the ambassador that the Rhodians 
had first attacked him ; but iEmilius, interrupting him, " And what," said 
he, " did the Athenians ? what the Cianians ? what, at this moment, the un* 
happy Abydenians ? Did either of these first attack yoxi ?" Philip, after 
some hesitation, told him, that, for three reasons, he would excuse the haughti- 
ness of this address. First, because he was a young man, not yet experienced 
in affairs ; in the next place, because he was the handsomest man of his age, 
which, indeed, was true ; and, lastly, because he was a Roman. He then 
addrd, that it was his earnest wish that the Romans would still confine them- 
selves within the bounds of their treaties, and lay aside all thoughts of war* 
" But if they determine otherwise, we shall then," continued he, "invoke 
the assistance of the gods, and defend onrselves against thena with our utmost 
strength. After this discourse, they severally retired. The king then took 
possession of the city, and, without any difficulty, seized all the treasure which 
the Abydenians had before collected, and laid together in heaps. But how 
great was his astonishment, when he saw the numbers of persons that destroyed 
themselves, together with their wives and children, with the most eager| fury ; 
some stabbed, some strangled themselves; some plunged themselves alive 
into wells, and others threw themselves headlong down from the roofs of the 
houses. Filled with grief at this dismal sight, he ordered proclamation to be 
made, that he would allow three days to those who should choose to hang, or 
otherwise destroy themselves. But the Abydenians had before determined 
their own fate,, and adhered inflexibly to their first purpose. They considered 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 433 

HM— BW<M— M "i. 'I'm—I— —i' " '"" if" if'i'w i wj' iw ! i ...' i l 1, m— ^^■ainmi— ,• 

themselves as guilty of. a. kind of treason against those brave citizens who had 
perished in the defence of their country; nor would any among them submit 
to live, except those whose hands were tied, or who were restrained by some 
other kind of force. The rest, with their whole families, without any delayj 
•"tnbraced a voluntary death. 



EXTRACT THE EIGHTH. 

The expedition of Philopoemen against Nabis. 

PIIILOPCEMEN, having first computed the respective distances of all the 
Achaean cities, and considered also which of them lay along the same roads m 
going towards Tegea, wrote letters to them all, and sent them in different par- 
cels to the cities that were at the greatest distance from that place ; the parcels 
being so composed that each of these cities, together with the letter addressed 
to itself, received those likewise that were written to the rest, of the cities which 
stood upon the same road. The first letter was addressed to the chief ma- 
gistrate of the city, and contained the following words: " As soon as you have 
received this letter, assemble together in the forum all the men of military 
age, with their arms. Let them be furnished with provisions, and with money 
for five days; and, when they are formed into a body, conduct them to the 
next city ; on your arrival there, deliver the letter that is addressed also to the. 
chief magistrate of that city, and let the contents of it in like manner be 
obeyed." 

This second letter contained the same orders as the former * and was different 
only in the name of the next city to which the troops, were to be con-, 
ducted. The same method was observed through all the, cities ; and the 
result of this management was, that, as no one was able to, conjecture what 
was the design and object of the expedition, so neither had the troops them-. 
selves any farther knowledge of their march, than that they were going to the 
next city; but remaining still in a state of doubt and ignorance^ joined them- 
selves each to the others, and continued to advance. A.s the. first and most 
distant cities were not all situated at an equal distance from, Tegea, care had 
been also taken that the letters should not be delivered to them all at once, but 
at different times, proportioned to their respective distances. And from hence 
it happpened, that, when neither the Tegeans, nor the troops themselves, had 
conceived any expectation of such an accident, the Acheeans all arrived at 
Tegea in the same moment in arms, and entered the city together by all the 
different gates. The design of Philopoemen was to elude, by this contriv- 
ance, the observation of those spies and gatherers of news, which Nabis, the 
Spartan tyrant, had dispersed through the country. 

Having- thus formed his project, on the day on which the Acheeans were ex- ~ 
pected to arrive, he sent away a select body of troops from Tegea, with or- 
ders that they should conceal themselves during the night in the neighbom- 
hood of Selasia, and early on the following day make incursions into the La- 
cedaemonian territory. That, if the Spartan mercenaries should be drawn to- 
gether to oppose them, they should then retreat towards. Scotita ; and in all 
other things obey the orders of Didascalondas of Crete, to whom he had com- 
municated his whole design. This measure being carried into execution, he 
directed the Achseans to take their supper at an early hour, and then led them 
out of Tegea. Having continued his march all night with the greatest haste, 
he arrived at break of day, and took his post secretly in the neighbourhood of 
Scotita, which lies between Tegea and Sparta. The Spartan mercenaries that 
were stationed in Pcllene, haying received notice in the tnorning, from their 
VOL. I. KD. 7- 3.1 



434 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBItJS. 

scouts, that some troops of the enemy were making incursions in the country, 
immediately sallied out, and attacked them with their aceustomed vigour* 
The Achaeans observed their orders and retreated ; the mercenaries pursued 
with the greatest eagerness ; till, being at last arrived at the place where the 
rest of the Achaeans lay concealed, they were suddenly surrounded by them; 
and were all either killed or taken prisoners. 



BOOK THE SEVENTEENTH. 

EXTRACT THK FIRST. 

Conferences between Philip, Flaminius, and the deputies of the allies. They 
all send ambassadors to Rome. The Roman Senate resolves, that the tear 
shall be continued against Philip. 

CHAP. I. 

"WHEN the day appointed for the conference was come, Philip sailed from 
Demetrias, in an armed sloop, accompanied with five boats, and came into the 
Malian gulph. He was attended by his two secretaries, Apolodorus and 
Demosthenes, both Macedonians; by Brachyllas of Bceotia; and by Cy- 
cliadas, an Achaean, who had been forced to fly out of Peloponnesus, for the 
reasons that have before been mentioned. On the other side, with Titus Fla- 
minius, came the king Amynander; Dionysodorus, on the part of Attalus ; 
and deputies also from the other states and cities. On the part of the Achae- 
ans appeared Aristaenatus and Xenophon ; for the Rhodians, Acesimbrotus, 
their chief naval commander; and, in the name of the iEtolians, Phaeneas^ 
their praetor, with many others that were employed in the administration of the 
government. . , 

When they were all come near together upbn the coast of Nicaea, Flaminius 
steered his vessel close into the land, and went and stood upon the shore ; but 
Philip, though lie also approached the land, stood aloof at some little dis- 
tance from it; and when the former called to him to ceme on shore, he an- 
swered from his ship that he would not do it. The other asked him who it 
was that he feared ? " I fear no one," said Philip, " except the gods ; but I have 
just reason to be distrustful of many that are here present, especially of the 
iEtolians.!' Flaminius was surprised, and said, that the opportunity was the 
same, and the danger equal to all. " The danger is by no means equal, " re- 
plied Plnlip; "for if Phaeneas were to be killed, the iFtoilans might rind many 
other praetors ; but, if the same thing should happen to me, the Macedonians 
would at this time be left without a king." This beginning gave no small 
pfvence tQ all that were present. He was desired, however, by the Roman 
general, to speak what he had to say upon the subject of their meeting. 
Philip answered, that it belonged not to him to speak, but to the Roman. 
That for his own part, therefore, he only desired Flaminius to declare upon 
what conditions he might be suffered to remain in peace. " The conditions," 
replied Flaminius, " are clear and simple. I order you to relinquish every 
part of Greece; to send back all the prisoners and deserters to their respective 
countries ; to restore to the Romans the places which you have conquered in 
Illyria, since the treaty of Epirus ; and to Ptolemy all the cities which you 
have taken from him since the death of Ptolemy Philopator." Then turning 
himself towards the other deputies, he bade them declare the orders which 
they had received from their several states. Dionysodorus began the first, and 
demanded in the name of Attalus, that Philip should deliver to that prince all 
the ships and men which he had taken in the engagement near the island of 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 435 



Chios, and restore also, in the same condition as before, the Nicephorium and 
the temple of Venus, which he had plundered and destroyed. Next to hhri, 
Acesirabrotus, on the part of the Rhodians, required, that the king should 
restore the district of Peraea, which he had taken from them ; withdraw his 
garrisons from Iassus, and the cities of Bargylia and Euromea; allow the 
Perinthians to be united as before jn the same common government as the 
Byzantines; and, in the last place, that he should deliver up Sestus and 
Abydus, together with all the ports and places of traffic which he possessed in 
Asia. After the Rhodians, the Achaeans demanded likewise the restitution 
of Argos and of Corinth. Last of all, the iEtolians insisted also, as the Re- 
mans had done, that Philip should relinquish every part of Greece ; and to this 
they added, that he should restore unhurt the cities which had been before 
associated with them in their government. 

These demands were made by Pheeneas, the iEtolian praetor. But there 
was a certain Alexander, surnamed the Isian, who was considered among the 
JEtolians as a very able speaker, and well versed also in affairs. This man 
then began to speak : " It was not," he said, " to be expected, that Philip 
"would now employ any greater sincerity in making peace than he had at any 
time shewn spirit in making war. That in conferences and negociations, his 
endeayour was always to lay snares; to watch for some advantage; and to act, 
even upon .such occasions, a hostile part. That his manner of making war 
was alike contrary to justice, and void of courage. That he never dared to 
look his enemies in the face, but fled always before them ; pillaging and 
burning the cities in his flight : and depriving the conquerors, by this dis- 
honourable method, of the just fruits of their victory. " How different," con- 
tinued he, " was the conduct of the former kings of Macedon ! They engaged 
continually in set battles, in the open field ; and scarcely at any time destroyed 
or overthrew the cities. Such was the manner in which Alexander maintained 
his war in Asia against Darius, and achieved the conquest of that mighty em- 
pire. The same was the conduct of his generals who came after him, when 
they contended together for the same Asia, against Antigonus. The same was 
that of all the succeeding princes to the time of Pyrrhus. Eager always to 
encounter with their enemies in the field, they employed every effort to deter- 
mine their disputes by arms ; but spared the cities, that the conquerors might 
possess them, and gain subjects by whom they might be honoured. And, in- 
deed, to relinquish the war itself, and only to destroy those things for the sake 
of which it is made, what is it but the work of the very strongest madness ? 
Yet this is the manner in which Philip acts ; for, since the time of his retreat, 
which was made with so great haste through the passes of Epirus, he has de- 
stroyed in Thessaly, among the people who are his allies and friends, more 
cities than their enemies have at any time destroyed." Many other things 
were urged by him in support of the same charge. And he then concluded 
his discourse, with demanding of Philip, for what reason, when Lysimachia 
was confederated with the iEtolians, and governed by an jEtolian praetor, he 
had driven out that magistrate, and placed a Macedonian garrison in the city? 
Upon what pretences, even while himself was allied by treaty with the vEto- 
lians, he had carried the Cianians into slavery, who were associated also with 
the (Etolian state ? And lastly, by what- show of right he now held possession 
of Echinus, of the Pthian Thebes, of Pharsalis, and of Larissa ? 

As soon as he had- ended, Philip approached nearer to the land, and, stand- 
ing forwards in his ship, " This is in truth," said he, " tfu harangue very 
worthy of an JEtolian, a declamation proper only for the stage. For who does 
not know, that no man ever willingly occasions the destruction of his allies; 
but that in certain conjunctures the leaders of armies are forced to take many 
measures that are repugnant to their inclinations." He was still speak- 
ing-, when Phaeneas, who was very near-sighted, roughly interrupted him, 



4$6 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

and told him that he was wandering from the subject; for that he ought either 
to conquer in the field, or to receive the law from the conquerors. " With- 
out doubt," replied Philip, turning himself quickly towards him; " even a 
blind man can see that." For this prince had a strong propensity to raillery ; 
and even at this time, when his affairs were in no very proper condition for 
jesting, he was not able to restrain his natural inclination. Afterwards, ad- 
dressing his discourse again to Alexander, "You demand of me," said he, 
*' for what reason I possessed myself of Lysimachia ? It was to prevent the 
Thracians from taking advantage of your negligence to destroy that city ;' the 
very thing which happened afterwards, when the War forced me to withdraw 
the troops which I had placed there, not as a garsison, but as a defence only 
against those invaders. Nor was it I that made war upon the Cianians. But 
when Prusias had declared war against them, I assisted him, indeed, in con- 
quering their city. If there was any crime in this proceeding, to yourselves 
alone the guilt must be imputed. For how often have we demanded of you, 
both myself and all the states of Greece, an abrogation of the law which allows 
you to take spoils from the spoils? But you have always answered that you 
would sooner separate iEtolia from iEtolia than relinquish that law." Fla- 
minius was astonished, not being able to conceive the meaning of these words. 
Philip, therefore, explained it, by informing him, that it was the custom of his 
people not only vd pillage the lands of those with whom they were at war, but 
that when aiiy other persons, even those that were the allies and friends of the 
iEtolians, were engaged in war against each other, the latter held it to be law- 
ful for them to join their arms, though without any public decree, both to the 
one and to the other of the contending parties, and to ravage the lands of both. 
That upon such occasions they knew not any difference between enmity and 
friendship; for that their neighbours, all equally without distinction, whenever 
any contention arose among them, were sure to have the IEtolians for their ene- 
mies? " With what shew of justice, then," continued he, " do they now urge 
it as a crime, that, when I was, indeed, in friendship with the iEtolians, but at 
the same time was allied to Prusias, I scrupled not to attack the Cianians in 
support of my ally ? But that which is most insufferable is, that these men now 
assume to themselves an equality with the Romans, and, like them, command 
the Macedonians to relinquish the whole of Greece. This language, haughty, 
indeed, as it is, maybe borne, however, from the Romans; but from the 
.iEtolians it is intolerable. And tejl me, I pray you, what is this Greece, from 
which I am commanded to retire ? By what limits is it to be circumscribed ? 
For a great part of the iEtolians are not Greeks. The countries of the Agrse- 
ans, the Apodotee, the Amphilochians, these are no parts of Greece. May I 
be allowed to retain possession of these ?" Flaminius smiled at this pleasantry. 
" But enough has been said," continued Philip, " upon the subject of the 
iEtolians. With regard to Attalus and the Rhodians, it would be thought 
more reasonable, by any equitable judge, that they should restore to me the 
ships and the men which they have taken from me, than that I should restore 
their ships to them. But, if such be your pleasure, Alexander, I will restore 
the district of Perea to the Rhodians, and to Attalus those of his ships and 
men which are still preserved. The Nicephorium and the Temple of Venus, 
since they already are destroyed, it it not in my power, unless by one way 
only, to restore. 1 will send some plants to the place, and some gardeners 
also, who shalfiultivate the ground, and make the trees grow that have been 
cut down."' Flaminius laughed again at this droll conceit; and Philip, 
passing next to the Achaeans, enumerated all the acts of kindness vihich they 
had received from Antigonus, and from himself. He then recounted also the 
many and great honours which this people had conferred upon the kings of 
Macedon. And having, in the last place, recited the decree, by which they 
had renounced the friendship of the Macedonians, and embraced the party of 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 437 

the Romans, he from thence took occasion to inveigh largely against their 
ingratitude and their breach of faith. In conclusion, he said, that he was 
willing, however, to restore Argos to them ; but that with respect to Corinth, 
he would deliberate concerning it with Flaminius. 

Having in this manner finished his discourse to all the rest, he now addres- 
sed himself, as he expressly declared, to Flaminius and the Romans ; and 
desired to be informed, what places and what cities of Greece he was com- 
manded to relinquish; those only which he had conquered, or the others also 
which had been transmitted to him from his ancestors. As Flaminius made 
no answer, Aristaenetus immediately rose up to speak on the part of the 
Achaeans, and Phaeneas for the iEtolians. But the day being now almost closed, 
prevented any farther debate. Philip then requested that he might receive 
all together in writing the conditions upon which peace might be obtained. 
He was left, he said, alone, without a single person, by whom he might be 
advised; and that he wished to retire, and to consider, with his best attention, 
the concessions that were exacted from him. Flaminius had heard with plea- 
sure the railleries which this prince had mingled with his discourse : and not 
being willing that it should be said that he had nothing to reply, he now 
rallied Philip in his turn. " You do well indeed," said he, " to complain 
that you are left alone : how can it be otherwise, when you have put all those 
to death who might at this time have assisted you with the best advice ?" The 
king forced a kind of reluctant smile, and made no reply. The demands of 
the several states were then given to him in writing, and were the same that 
have been mentioned. After this the assembly separated, having appointed a 
second meeting in the same place on the following day. 

On the next day, then, Flaminius came again to the place. All the rest 
also were present, Philip only excepted, who did not appear. But when the 
day was so far advanced, that there remained but little expectation of his 
coming, he at last arrived just in the evening, attended by the same persons 
us before. The conditions, he said, were so perplexing, and so full of diffi- 
culty, that he had wasted the whole day in the consideration of them. But 
the others believed, that his design in coming so late was, that the jEtolians 
and Aclraeans might not have time sufficient to accuse him. For he had ob- 
served, when he retired from the former conference, that they were both ready 
to enter into farther altercation, and to renew their complaints against him. 
And this indeed appeared to be the truth, when now, upon his first approach, 
• he desired to be allowed a separate conference with Flaminius; that, instead 
of skirmishing any more together with words, seme end might at last be put 
to their disputes. As he urged this request with repeated earnestness, Fla- 
minius, when he had first asked the opinion of the rest, and received their con- 
sent for him to hear what the king would offer, took with him the tribune 
Claudius, and, having directed the other deputies to retire to a little distance 
from the shore, ordered Philip to come upou the land. The king accordingly- 
left his ship, attended by Apollodorus and Demosthenes ; joined Flaminius, 
and conferred with him for a very considerable time. What passed on both 
sides upon this occasion it is not easy for me to say. But Flaminius, after 
Philip had departed from him, informed the- rest, that the king was i-eady to 
surrender to the jEtolians Pharsalus and Larissa, but not Thebes ; and to 
the Rhodians the district of Pereea, but not the cities ofilassus and Bargylia : 
that he would restore to the Achaeans both Argos and Corinth : would deliver 
to the Romans all the places in Illyria, and all the prisoners ; and to Attalus, 
. t:he ships which he had taken from him in the iate engagement, together with 
the men likewise that were at this time in his hands. These offers were re- 
jected at once by all the assembly. They demanded that Philip should first 
consent to the condition which they all required; that of relinquishing the 
whole of Greece. Unless this was done, the concessions, which he was dis- 
posed to make to particular state's*, would be vain and ineffectual'. FhlHp, 



438 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 



perceiving that the contest was likely to be vehement, and being apprehen- 
sive that he should again be forced to hear himself accused, desired that the 
assembly might be deferred to the morrow ; that the day was already closed ; 
and that he would either bring himself to yield to the conditions that were 
exacted from him, or prevail with the others to accept the terms which he had 
offered. Flaminius consented to this request, and appointed the shore near 
T hronium for the place of the third conference. 

^ On the following day, they all met together at an early hour. Philip hav- 
ing first, in a short discourse, entreated all that were present, and Flaminius 
above the rest, not to obstruct the conclusion of the peace, when it was mani- 
fest that the greatest part were inclined to consent to some accommodation^ 
said, that he wished, indeed, if it was possible, that all their differences might 
be adjusted among themselves. But, if this was not to be accomplished, he 
then desire^ that he might be allowed to send ambassadors to Rome ; that he 
either would engage the senate to yield to him the matters in dispute, or would 
submit to every thing which they should otherwise enjoin. The deputies all 
at once rejected this proposal, and cried out that the war must be continued. 
Biit Flaminiuis said, that he very well knew that Philip never would perform 
the conditions that were demanded of him : that their compliance, however, 
with this request, woidd bring no iniury to their affairs : that the conditions 
themselves, as they had been now proposed, could not otherwise be ratified 
than by the authority of the senate : and that the present time was the mo&t 
commodious for informing themselves of the inclinations of that assembly ; 
'for a? the armies would not be able to attempt any thing during the winter, by 
employing that season of inaction in sending deputies to Rome, they would ad- 
vance, and not retard, the end which they all desired. As it appeared from 
this discourse that Flaminius himself was not unwilling to refer the matter to 
the senate, the rest readily concurred in this design, and consented that Phi- 
lip should send some ambassadors to Rome. At the same time it was deter- 
mined that ambassadors should be deputed likewise from the other states, to 
lay their pretensions before the senate, and support their accusations again&i 
the king-. 



CHAP. If. 

FLAMINIUS, having in this manner brought the conferences to an en<$ 
snnst favourable to his own intentions, arid the same which he had from the 
first designed, applied himself now to finish what remained of the work ; and, 
while he took such measures as were necessary for his own security, was care- 
ful not to leave any Imudle of advantage to Philip. Granting,, therefore, to 
him a truce for two months, he commanded him to send his ambassadors to 
Rome within that time, and immediately to withdraw his garrisons from Pho- 
cis and from Locris ; at the same time taking also ,every other precaution' that 
was requisite to prevent the allies from receiving any injury from the Macedo- 
nians during the continuance of the truce. He gave these orders in writing 
to Philip, and then made haste to finish what more particularly regarded hia 
own design. He first engaged Amynander to go immediately to Rome; welt 
knowing that this prince, who was of a flexible and pliant disposition, would 
easily be directed by his friends in the city; and that the title also of king 
would raise the public expectation, and give splendour to the negbciation. 
He then deputed thither, on his own part, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of 
his wife; Quintus Fulvius, and Appius Claudius, whose surname was Nero. 
On the part of the iEtolians were sent Alexander the Isian, Damocritus of 
Calydon, Dicsearchus of Trichonium, Polimarchus of Arsinoe, Lamius of 
Ambracia, and Nitomachus of Acarnania. The exiles that had been drireft 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 439 

from Thyreum, and had taken refuge in Ambracia, sent also in their name 
Theodotus of Pherae ; who, after his banishment from Thessaly, had fixed 
his residence in Stratus. The Achaeans deputed Xenophon of iEgium ; king 
Attalus, only Alexander : aud the Athenians, Cephisodorus. 

When these ambassadors arrived at Rome, the senate had not finally deter- 
mined the allotment of the provinces to the magistrates of the year ; but were 
making it the subject of their deliberation, whether both the consuls should 
be sent into Gaul, or one of them be charged with the war against the king 
of Macedon. But after some time, when the friends of Flarninius were at 
last assured that both consuls would remain in Italy, on account of the appre- 
hension of a Gallic war, the deputies were then introduced into the senate, 
and declaimed with great acrimony against Philip. Their discourses were in 
general the same which they had made in the late conferences with the king. 
But the opinion which they chiefly laboured to impress upon the senate was, 
that as long as Philip should hold Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, in sub- 
jection, the Greeks could never entertain so much as a thought of being free : 
that this was acknowledged by Philip himself, who used to tall these places 
the fetters of Greece; and that no declaration ever was more true : for, while 
a royal garrison remained in Corinth, the people of Peloponnesus would be 
-afraid to move. That the Locrians, the Boeotians, and the Phocteans, must 
in the same manner lose all courage, if the king should retain possession of 
Chalcis and the other parts of Eubcea. And lastly, if the Macedonians were 
allowed to hold Demetrias, that the Thessalians and Magnesians could 
never hope to obtain even the smallest portion of freedom. That the otter, 
therefore, that \vas made by Philip to relinquish any other places was merely" 
an empty show, contrived only to elude the present danger: for, if he still 
should be permitted to remain master of those three cities, he would be able 
to bring the Greeks again into subjection, at any time that he should choose. 
Upon this account they requested of the senate either that the king might be 
forced to make an immediate cession of those places ; or otherwise, that 
things might remain in their present state, and the war be continued with 
vigour against him. That the war, indeed, was at this time very nearly 
finished ; since the Macedonians had been already twice defeated, and that 
their supplies by land were all exhausted. To these reasons they, in the end, 
added also their entreaties ; and implored the senate not to disappoint the 
Greeks of their hopes of liberty, nor to deprive themselves of the honour of 
a glorious name. 

When these and other things of the same kind had been urged by the de- 
puties from the several states, the ambassadors of Philip were ready also to 
make a long harangue, but were stopped in the very beginning of it. Being 
asked if they would relinquish Chalcis, Coriuth, and Demetrias, they an- 
swered, that they had received no instructions concerning those places. They 
were loaded, therefore, with reproaches from every side, and were forced to 
be silent. It was then decreed that both the consuls should be sent into Gaul, 
as we before have mentioned ; and that the war should be continued against 
Philip, and Flarninius be intrusted with the affairs of Greece. All things 
happened as Flarninius had desired. Nor was his success, upon this occasion, 
in any degree, to be ascribed to chance, but chiefly to his own foresight and 
prudent management. For there was not in all Rome a man more dexterous, 
or that showed greater wisdom and ability, either in the conduct of public af- 
fairs, or in the advancement of his own particular interests. And yet he was 
at this time very young ; not more than thirty years old. He was the first also , 
of the Romans that led an army into Greece, 



AAO GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



EXTRACT THE SECOND, 

A reflection on the depravity of mankind. 

IT seems that men, who, in the practice of craft and subtlety, exceed all 
other animals, may, Avith good reason, be acknowledged to be more depraved 
than they ; for other animals are subservient only to the appetites of the body;, 
smd by them are led to do wrong ; but men, who have also sentiments to guide 
them, are guilty of ill conduct, not less through the abuse of their acquired 
reason than from the force of their natural desires. 



EXTRACT THE THIRD. 

The difference between the Roman palisade and. that of the Greeks. The mo- 
tions of the Macedonian and Roman armies. The battle of Cynosceplialce ^ 
between Philip and Flaminivs. The Macedonian phalanx compared witk, 
the arms and order of battle of the Romans. 

CHAP. I. 

FLAMINIUS had not yet been able to discover in what place the Macedo- 
nians were encamped. But being assured that they had entered Thessaly, he 
ordered all his soldiers to eut pales for the intrenchment, and to carry them 
with them, that they might be ready for use whenever occasion should require. 
This is a labour, which, in the discipline of the Grecian armies, is considered as 
impracticable ; but the Romans perform it without much difficulty. For the 
Greeks, in their marches, scarcely can support the toil of carrying their own 
bodies. But the Romans, when they have slung their shields by the leathern 
braces behind their shoulders, take their javelins in their hands, and are able at 
the same time to carry the pales. What renders the task indeed the easier is, 
that these pales are very different from those that are used by the Greeks. For 
the Greeks esteem those to be the best which have many and very large 
branches all around the trunk. But the Romans choose those that have only 
two or three branches, or four at the most, and those also upon one side of the 
trunk, and not springing alternately from both. By this method,, the carriage 
of them is rendered altogether easy ; for three or four of them may be laid close 
together, and be carried by a single soldier. In this way also they are much 
better contrived than the other for the security of the camp. The pales used 
by the Greeks are easily torn out of the ground. For, as they are planted 
singly, and each of them standing, as it were, alone, with many great branches 
spreading from the trunk, if two or three soldiers apply their strength to the 
branches, the trunk is soon drawn from the ground, and leaves a very spacious 
opening ; and the adjoining pales also are at the same time loosened ; because 
their branches are too short to be interwoven each with the other. But it is 
otherwise in the method of the Romans. Among them, the branches are bo 
twisted together, that it is not easy to distinguish what branches belong to the 
stems in the several pales, or what stems to the branches. Add to this, that the 
texture of them is so close, as to leave no room for a hand to pass; aud that 
the points also of all the branches are very carefully sharpened. And even 
xvhen it is possible to lay hold on any part, it is still extremely difficult to draw 
out any of the pales ; not only because they are very firmly fixed in the ground, 
but because. the force also, which is applied to any single branch, must at the 
same time draw along many other branches, which are inseparably twisted with 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 441 



it. Nor is it scarcely ever practicable for two or three men to lay hold on the 
same pale together. And if a single pale, or if two, by the efforts of conti- 
nual shaking, should at last be removed from their place, the opening that is 
made is so small, that it is scarcely to be discerned. As these pales then have 
in three respects a very great advantage over the others, in being found almost 
in any place, in being carried with ease, and in forming, when they are used, a 
rampart the most stable and secure, it is manifest, at least in my judgment, 
that there is not any part of the Roman discipline which so well deserves to be 
approved and imitated. 

Flaminius then, having ordered the soldiers, as we have mentioned, to cut 
and carry the pales with them, that they might be ready for use, advanced 
slowly with all the army. When he arrived at the distance of about fifty 
stadia from the city of Pherae, he there encamped, and early on the following 
day he sent out a body of his men, to discover, if it was possible, in what place 
the enemy lay, and what were their designs. Philip, on the other hand, hav- 
ing been informed that the Romans remained still in the neighbourhood of 
Thebes, decamped from Larissa at this very time with all his army, arid* direc- 
ting his march also towards Pherse, arrived before the day was ctosed, at the 
distance of thirty stadia from the city. In this place, he ordered the troops to 
take their refreshment and repose ; and, on the following day, having sent for- 
wards his advanced guard, before it was light, to take possession of the hills 
that were above the city, as soon as the day appeared, he began to draw out 
all his forces from the camp. The troops that were sent forwards from both 
the armies had almost met together, as they advanced on the top of the hills* 
But perceiving the approach of each other through the dawn, when there was 
now but a very moderate distance between them, they immediately halted, and 
sent some to inform the generals of what had happened, and to receive their 
orders. The generals on both sides resolved to remain quiet in their respec- 
tive camps, and recalled the troops that had advanced. On the next day, they 
sent away again on both sides about three hundred of their cavalry and light-* 
armed troops to make discoveries. Among those that went from the Roman 
camp were two troops of JStolians, selected for this service by Flaminius, on 
account of their knowledge of the country. The two bodies met together on 
the road that leads from Pliers to Larissa, and the engagement was begun with 
vigour. But so strenuous were the efforts of Eupolemus, who headed the 
jEtolians, and so well did he animate the troops of Italy to support the charge* 
that the Macedonians suffered very greatly in the action. When the skirmish* 
however, had continued for a considerable time, both parties returned back 
again to their several camps. 

On the following day, the two generals, being alike dissatisfied with the 
ground in the neighbourhood of Pherae, which was covered every where with 
plantations, gardens, and fences, resolved both of them to change their campj 
Philip, therefore, having put his troops in motion, directed his march towards 
Scotussa, with design to draw from thence a plentiful supply of all provisions, 
and afterwards to encamp in some place more commodious for his army. At 
the same time Flaminius, suspecting that this was his intention, began his 
inarch also towards the same place with the greatest haste, that he might be 
able to arrive before the king, and destory the provisions through the country* 
Between the two armies was a chain of lofty hills, which intercepted the view 
of each from the other, so that the Romans saw not the course in which tl.« 
Macedonians directed their march, nor the Macedonians that of the Romans. 
At the end of the day, the former arrived-near Eretria in Pthiotis, and the lat- 
ter upon the banks of the river Onchestus, and remained there for the night, 
not knowing in either army in what place the other had halted. On the next 
day they continued their march forwards, and severally encamped ; Philip 
near the place called Melambium, in the district of Scctussa ; and Flaminius 
in the neighbourhood of Thetidium, in Pharsalia ; but were still alike unac- 

TO J.. III. NO. 7. 3 ft 



442 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



quainted each of them with the situation of the other. On the third day, at 
early dawn, came on violent storms of rain accompanied with thunder, and 
the whole earth was covered with so black a sky, that the soldiers were scarcely 
able to see a step before them. Philip, however, being earnest to accomplish 
his design, resolved to continue his march with all the army. But when he had 
advanced but a little way forwards, he found himself so incommoded by the 
darkness, that he again halted, and encamped, but sent away a body of troops s 
to take their post upon the top of the hills that were between the two armies. 
Flaminins remained still in his camp near Thetidium ; but being solicitous t© 
know in what place the enemy lay, he sent away ten troops of cavalry, toge- 
ther with a thousand of the light-armed infautry, to make discoveries, com- 
manding them to direct their course with caution through the country. Aft 
this party advanced, they were betrayed by the darkness, and fell, without per- 
ceiving them, among the Macedonians, who had taken their station upon the 
top of the hills. The two bodies being alike surprised, stood a while in sus- 
pence ; but after a short time they began to engage together inaction, and 
sent notice to their respective generals of what had happened. As the en- 
gagement became more warm, the Romans were so unequally pressed by the 
Macedonians, that they were forced to send and request succours from the 
camp. Flaminius, therefore, sent away to their assistance Archidamus and 
Eupolemus, both of them iEtolians, and two Roman tribunes, at the head of 
two thousand foot and five hundred horse. On the arrival of these forces, the 
face of the action soon was changed. The Romans, encouraged by this new 
strength, continued the fight with double ardour. The Macedonians, on the 
tfther hand, though they defended themselves with the greatest bravery, yet 
being now pressed in their turn, and incumbered with their heavy armour, 
were forced to retreat back again to the summit of the hills, and from thence 
sent and desired assistance also from their king. Philip, who, for the reasons 
already mentioned, had formed no expectation of engaging upon this day in 
a general battle, had sent out a great part of his troops to forage. But, being 
now informed of what had happened, and as the darkness also was beginning; 
to be dispersed, he ordered Heraclidos of Gyrtone, who led the Thessalian ca- 
valry, Leon who commanded that of Macedon, and Athenagoras, who was at 
the head of all the mercenaries, except those of Thrace, to go and support the 
combatants. The Macedonians, reinforced by so considerable a strength, at- 
tacked the Romans with new vigour ; drove them down back again from the 
summit of the hills, and would have totally dispersed them, if the resistance 
ehiefly of the iEtoIian cavalry, who maintained the fight with an astonishing 
impetuosity and courage, had not prevented the disorder from being complete. 
For, as much as the infantry of this country, on account both of their arms 
and of the manner in which they are ranged in the field, falls below that of 
the rest of Greece in all general battles, so much, on the other hand, is their 
cavalry superior to all other, when they engage in separate actions", or maa 
against man. At this time, therefore, they opposed with such success the 
efforts of the enemy, that the Romans were not driven quite into the plain, 
but turned their faces again, and stopped their flight at a little distance from 
it. Flaminius, perceiving not only that the cavalry and the light-armed force* 
were in this manner routed, but that their flight had spread a consternation als# 
through the rest of the troops, drew his whole army out of the intrenchmenta, 
and ranged them in order of battle near the foot of the hills. 

While the Romans were thus driven back, messenger after messenger, leav- 
ing the detachment upon the hills, came running to Philip, and cried aloud, 
" The enemies, O king, are flying ; lose not the opportunity. The barbarian* 
cannot stand before us. The day is now your own ; the very moment of vic- 
tory is in your hands." These vehement cries forced the king out to engage, 
though he altogether was dissatisfied with the nature of the ground. For 
the bills, of which we are speaking, are called Cynoscephalse, from the re- 
semblance which they bear to the head of a dog ; being parted., round the 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 443 



summit, into ragged clif'ts, and stretched upwards to a considerable height. 
Philip, therefore, who well knew that such a ground would be very disadvan- 
tageous to his troops, had not made from the beginning any disposition for a 
general battle. But, being now so urged and animated by the excessive con- 
fidence of those who brought the news of this first success, he at last gave 
orders to lead the whole army out of the intrenchments. 

Flaminius also, having drawn up all his forces, as we have mentioned, in 
erder of battle, and being now ready to support the detachment that was en- 
gaged upon the hills, at the same time went through all the ranks to encou- 
rage his men. The words which he employed were few, but very forcible,, 
and such as the troops might perfectly understand. " Are not these," said 
he to the soldiers, as if the enemy had stood close before their eyes, " are not 
these the Macedonians whom you attacked upon the heights of Eordeea, ad- 
rancing openly up the sides of the hills under the conduct of Sulpicius, and 
drove with great slaughter from their post ? Are not these the Macedonians, 
who, when they had taken possession of the passes of Epirus, which were 
thought impossible to be forced, were by your courage routed and dispersed ; 
and, throwing away their arms, continued their flight even to their own coun- 
try? And can you have any thing now to fear in engaging the same enemy 
without any disadvantage ? Does the remembrance of those successes offer 
any thing dreadful to your view ? Ought it not rather, on the contrary, to 
inspire you with the strongest confidence? Rouse up then your courage, 
and advance boldly to the fight; for I am wel'l assured that, with the assist- 
ance of the gods, the present action will soon be terminated in the same glo- 
rious manner as the past." When he had ended this harangue, he ordered 
the right wing .of his army to remain still in their post, with the elephants be- 
fore them, and moved 6lowly with the left wing, and the light-armed forces, 
towards the enemy. The Romans that were first engaged upon the hills, 
perceiving themselves to be now supported by the legions, returned back 
again, and renewed the fight with vigour. 

At the same time Philip, when he had drawn up the greatest part of his 
army in order of battle before the intrenchments, putting himself at the head 
of the peltastae, and the right of the phalanx, made haste to ascend the hills, 
and ordered Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to follow him without delay 
with the rest of the forces. As soon as the foremost of the troops had reached 
the summit, he began to form the right of his line tipon {he ground near to 
the top, which was now open and deserted. For the detachment from the 
Macedonian army, that was first engaged, had driven down the Romans to 
the lowest part of the hills. But while the king was still forming his right, 
the mercenaries that were in that detachment came running towards him in 
disorder, being driven back again by the Romans in their turn. For the lat- 
ter, as soon as they were followed by the legionary troops, which were brought 
up, as we have said, to support them, were so strengthened by that new weight, 
that they pressed heavily upon their enemies, and destroyed great numbers of 
them. Philip, therefore, who, at his first arrival upon the hills, he beheld 
with pleasure that the place of the action was at no great distance from the 
Roman camp, cow seeing his troops forced back again, and flying towards him 
Tor support, was compelled by this accident to advance, and engage in a gene- 
ral action, though the greatest part of his phalanx was still in march, and 
had not yet reached the summit of the hills. Having received then the 
troops that were forced back, he collected them altogether, and placed them, 
"both infantry and cavalry, upon his right wing, and gave orders to the pel- 
tastae and the soldiers of the phalanx to double their files, atid close their 
ranks upon the right. When this was done, and the Romans now were near, 
he commanded the phalanx to level their spears and advance, and the light- 
trmed forces to extend themselves, and attack the enemy in their flank. 

Flaminius also, having received into the intervals of his army the troops 
that had been engaged, at the same time advanced against the enemy. The 



444 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBlUS. 



first shock, which was on both sides violent, was attended likewise with a very 
great and unusual noise. For both bodies shouted at Qnce together. The 
cries also of the rest that were at a distance were joined to those of the com- 
batants, and filled all around with astonishment and horror. The right wing, 
however, of Philip had from the first onset very clearly the advantage. The 
higher ground from which they fought, the weight of their disposition, and 
the nature of their arms, well suited to the present action, all joined to give 
them a manifest superiority over the Romans. But with regard to the rest of 
the Macedonian army, the troops that were next in the line to the right stood, 
at a distance from the enemy ; and those of the left wing were not yet arrived, 
having but just now begun to appear upon the tops of the hills. When Fla-* 
minius, therefore, perceived that his troops were not able to maintain their 
ground against the phalanx, that great numbers were already killed, and the 
rest beginning to retreat, he went in haste, and joined the right wing of his 
army, which was now his only resource ; and, having remarked the division 
and disorder of the Macedonians ; that the next in the line to the troops that 
were engaged remained inactive at a distance ; that some were just coming- 
down from the tops of the hills, and others standing upon the summit, he 
placed the elephants at the head of this wing, and advanced against these se- 
veral bodies. The Macedonians, ..not having any leader from whom they 
might receive the command, and being unable to form themselves into a pha- 
lanx, both on account of the inequality of the ground, and because, as they 
were advancing towards that part of their army that was engaged, they were 
still rather in the order of a march than in any order of battle, waited not to 
be attacked by the Romans, but were broken at once by the elephants, and im- 
mediately dispered. The Romans pursued them with the greatest part of 
their forces, and slaughtered them as they fled. But one of the tribunes, at 
the head of no more than twenty companies, took at this time a measure which 
the occasion suggested to him, and which was chiefly the cause that rendered 
the victory complete. Observing that Philip had advanced far beyond the 
rest of his army, and that he continued to press the left wing of the Romans 
with a weight which they were wholly unable to sustain, he quitted the right, 
where the success was clear and uncontested, and making a circuit to one side, 
fell in behind the combatants, and charged the Macedonians in their rear, 
IVow such is the disposition of the phalanx, that the soldiers never can turn, 
or engage singly man with man. The tribune, therefore, went on, killing 
those that were before him, till the Macedonians, having no power to defend 
themselves, threw away their arms, and were forced to seek their safety in 
flight. Fpr the Romans also, who had before begun to retreat, now turned 
again, and charged them at the same time in front. When Philip, who from 
his first success, had flattered himself, as we have said, with the expectation of 
a perfect victory, now saw his troops throwing away their arms, and the enemy 
attacking them in their rear, he retired^ with a small body of infantry and 
cavalry, to a little distance from the place of the action, and surveyed the 
whole state of the battle. And when he perceived that the Romans, who 
were pursuing his left wing likewise, had almost reached the summit of the 
hills, he collected together as many of the Thracians and the Macedonians 
as the time would allow, and resolved to leave the field. Flaminius, as he ar- 
rived upon the tops of the hills, saw some troops of the left wing of the Ma- 
cedonian army, which were just now also ascending to the summit from the 
opposite side. He was preparing to attack them, but stopped when he ob- 
served that they held their spears erect. This is the custom of the Macedo- 
nians, when they either surrender themselves, or pass over to the side of the 
enemy. The Roman general, therefore, as soon as he was informed of the in-r 
tention of this signal, held back his troops from advancing, and determined to 
spare the men who had not courage to resist him. But, in the instant when 
he was forming this resolution, some of his foremost ranks rushed down upon 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYB1US. * 44.5 



them, and killed a great part of them, while a very small number only threw 
away their arms, and escaped by flight. 

The battle being now ended, and the Romans victorious in every part, 
Philip directed his flight towards Tempe. Having rested the first evening in 
the place that is called the Tower of Alexander, he arrived on the next day at 
Gonni, which is situated in the entrance of the valley of Tempe. In this 
place he halted, in order to receive all those that had escaped after the action, 
The Romans pursued the fugitives for some time: some of them began 
to strip the dead, and some to bring together their prisoners; but live 
greatest part ran to pillage the camp of the enemy. On their arrival 
there they found that the jEtolians had already pillaged it. Suppo- 
sing themselves, therefore, to have been defrauded of their just rights, 
they vented bitter complaints against that people, and even loaded their 
own general with reproaches. " You expose us," said they, " to the 
dangers of the war, but the booty you allot to others." They returned back, 
however, to their camp, and there passed the night; and on the following day, 
having collected together the prisoners and the rest of the spoil, they con- 
tinued, their march towards Larissa. The Romans lost in this action about 
seven hundred men. On the side of the Macedonians, eight thousand were 
killed, and not fewer than five thousand taken prisoners. Such was the end of 
the battle of Cynoscephalae, in Thessaly, between king Philip and the 
Romans, 



CHAP. II. 

HAYING left an assurance with my readers, in the sixth book of this work, 
that I would choose some proper time to compare together the arms and the 
orders of battle of the Macedonians and the Romans, and to shew in what re- 
spects they severally have the advantage, or are inferior each to the other, I 
shall here take the occasion which the action now described has offered, and shall 
endeavour to discharge my promise. For as the order of battle of the Mace- 
donian armies was found, in the experience of former ages, to be superior to 
that of the Asiatics and the Greeks, and the Roman order of battle in the 
same manner surpassed that of the Africans and all the western parts of Eu- 
rope ; and as, in later times, these two several orders have been often set in 
opposition each to the other, it must be useful, as well as curious, to trace out 
the difference that is between them, and to explain the advantges that turned 
the victory to the side of the Romans in these engagements. From such a 
view, instead of having recourse to chance, and blindly applauding, like men 
of superficial understanding, the good fortune of the conquerors, we shall be 
able to remark with certainty the true causes of their success, and to ground 
our admiration upon the principles of sound sense and reason. 

With regard to the battles that were fought by Annibal, and the victories 
which he obtained against the Romans, there is no need, upon this occasion, 
to enter into a long discussion of them : for it was not his arms, or his order of 
battle, which rendered that general superior to the Romans, but his dexterity 
alone, and his admirable skill. In the accounts that were given by us of those 
engagements, we have very clearly shown that this was the cause of his suc- 
cess. And this remark is still more strongly confirmed, in the first place, by 
the final issue of the war: for, as soon as the Romans had obtained a general 
whose ability was equal to that of Annibal, they immediately became the con- 
querors. Add to this, that Annibal himself rejected the armour which he first 
had used ; and, having furnished the African troops with the arms that were 
taken from the Romans in the first battle,- used afterwards no other. In the 
same manner, also, Pyrrhus employed not only the arms, but the troops of 



44o v GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



Italy, and ranged, in alternate order, a company of those troops, and a cohort* 
disposed in the manner of the phalanx, in all his battles with the Romans. 
And yet, even with the advantage of this precaution, he was never able to ob~ 
tain any clear or decisive victory against them. It was necessary to premise 
these observations, for the sake of preventing any objection that might be 
made to the truth of what we shall hereafter say. Let us now return to the 
comparison that was proposed. 

It is easy, then, to demonstrate, by many reasons, that, while the phalanx 
retains its proper form, and full power of action, no force is able to stand 
against it in front, or support the violence of its attack. When the ranks are 
closed, in order to engage, each soldier, as he stands with his arms, occupies a 
space of three feet. The spears, in their most ancient form, contained seven- 
teen cubits in length ; but, for the sake of rendering them more commodious 
in action, they have since been reduced to fourteen. Of these, four cubits 
are contained between the part which the soldier grasps in his hands, and the 
lower end of the spear behind, which serves as a counterpoise to the part 
that is extended before him ; and the length, of this last part, from the body of 
the soldier, when the spear is pushed forwards, with both hands, against the 
enemy, is, by consequence, ten cubits. From hence it follows, that when the 
phalanx is closed in its proper form, and every soldier pressed within the ne*- 
cessary distance, with respect to the man that is before him, and upon his 
side, the spears of the fifth rank are extended to the length of two cubits, and 
those of the second, third, and fourth, to a still greater length, beyond the 
foremost rank. The manner in which the men are crowded together, in this 
piethod, is marked by Homer in the following lints ■ 

Shield stuck to shield, to helmet helmet join'd, 
And man to man ; and at each nod that bow'd, 
High waving on their heads the glittering cones, . 
Rattled the hair-crown'd casques : 60 thick they stood*. 

This description is not less exact than beautiful. It is manifest, then, that 
five several spears, differing each from the other in the length of two cubits, 
are extended before every man in the foremost rank. And when it is con- 
sidered, likewise, that the phalanx is formed by sixteen in depth, it will be 
easy to conceive what must be the weight and violence of the entire body, and 
how great the force of its attack. In the ranks, indeed, that are behind the 
fifth, the spears cannot reach so far as to be employed against the enemy. In 
these ranks, therefore, the soldiers, instead of extending their spears forwards, 
rest them upon the shoulders of the men that are before them, with their 
points slanting upwards ; and in this manner they form a kind of rampart, which 
covers their heads, and secures them against those darts which may be carried 
in their flight beyond the first ranks, and fall upon those that are behind. 
But when the whole body advances to charge the enemy, even these hindmost 
ranks are of no small use and moment ; for, as they press continually upon 
those that are before them, they add, by their weight' alone, great force to the 
attack, and deprive also the foremost ranks of the power of drawing themselves 
backwards or retreating. Such, then, is the disposition of the phalanx, with 
regard both to the whole and the several parts. Let us now consider the arms, 
and the order of battle, of the Romans, that we may see, by the comparison, 
in what respects they are different from those of the Macedonians. 

To each of the Roman soldiers, as he stands in arms, is allotted the same 
space likewise of three feet: but, as every soldier, in the time of action, is 
constantly in motion, being forced to shift his shield oontinually, that he may 
cover any part of his body against which a stroke is aimed, and to vary the po r 
sitiou of his sword* so as either to push, or to make a falling stroke, there musj 

* Iliad, XIII. 131.] 



GENERAL HISTORY OF FOLYBIUS. 447 



also be a distance of three feet, the least that can be allowed for performing 
these motions with advantage, between each soldier and the man that stand* 
next to him, both upon his side and behind him. In charging, therefore, 
against the phalanx, every single Roman, as he has two Macedonians opposite 
to him, has also ten spears, which he is forced to encounter. But it is not pos- 
sible for a single man to cut down these spears with his sword, before they can 
take effect against him. Nor is it easy, on the other hand, to force his way- 
through them : for the men that are behind add no weight to the pressure, nor 
any strength to the swords, of those that are in the foremost rank. It will be 
easy, therefore, to conceive, thatwhile the phalanx retains its proper position and 
strength, no troops, as I before observed, can ever support the attack of it in 
front. To what cause, then, is it to be ascribed, that the Roman armies are 
victorious, and those defeated that employ the phalanx ? The cause is this. 
In war, the times and the places of action are various aud indefinite : but there 
is only one time and place, one fixed and determinate manner of action that is 
suited to the phalanx. In the case, then, of a general action, if an enemy be 
forced to encounter with the phalanx in the very time and place which the lat- 
ter requires, it is probable, in the highest degree, from the reasons that have 
been mentioned, that the phalanx always must obtain the victory. But, if it 
be possible to avoid an engagement in such circumstances, and indeed it is 
easy to do it, there is then nothing to be dreaded from this order of battle. 
It is a well known, and an acknowledged truth, that the phalanx requires a 
ground that is plain and naked, and free likewise from obstacles of every 
kind, such as trenches, .breaks, obliquities, the brows of hills, or the channels 
of rivers, and that any of these are sufficient to impede it, and to dissolve the 
•rderin winch it is formed. On the other hand again, it must readily be allowed, 
that, if it be not altogether impossible, it is at least extremely rare, to find a 
ground containing twenty stadia, or more, in its extent, and free from all these 
obstacles. But let it, however, be supposed, that such a ground may, perhaps, 
be found. If the enemy, instead of coming down upon it, should lead their 
army through the country, plundering the cities, and ravaging the lands, of 
what use, then, will be the phalanx ? As long as it remains in this convenient. 
post, it not only has no power to succour its friends, but cannot even preserve 
itself from ruin : for the troops that are masters of the whole country, without 
resistance, will easily cut off from it all supplies. And if, on the other hand, 
it should relinquish its own proper ground, and endeavour to engage in ac- 
tion, the advantage is then so great against it, that it soon becomes an easy 
prey to the enemy. 

But farther: let it be supposed that the enemy will com? down into this 
plain ; yet, if he brings not his whole army at once to receive the attack of the 
phalanx ; or if, in the instant of the charge, he withdraws himself a little from 
the action, it is easy to determine what will be the consequence, from the 
present practice of the Romans. For we now draw not our discourse from 
bare reasoning only, but from facts which have lately happened. When the 
Romans attack the phalanx in front, they never employ all their forces, so as 
to make their line equal to that of the enemy, but lead on a part only of 
their troops, and keep the rest of the army in reserve. Now, whether the 
troops of the phalanx break the line that is opposed to them, or whether them- 
selves are broken, the order peculiar to the phalanx is alike dissolved. For if 
they pursue the fugitives, or if, on the other hand, they retreat and are pur- 
sued, in either case they are separated from the rest of their own body. And 
thus there is left some interval, or space, which the reserve of the Roman army 
takes care to seize, and then charges the remaining part of the phalanx, not m 
front, but in flank, or in the rear. As it is easy, then, to avoid the times and 
circumstances that are advantageous to the phalanx ; and as those, on the con- 
trary, that are disadvantageous to it can never be avoided, it is certain tout 



448 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



tbis difference alone must carry with it a decisive weight in the time of 
action. 

To this it may be added, that the troops of the phalanx also are, like others j 
forced to march, and to encamp, in every kind of place ; to be the first to seize 
the advantageous posts; to invest an enemy, or be invested ; and to engage also 
in sudden actions, without knowing that an enemy was near. These things 
all happen in war, and either tend greatly to promote, or sometimes wholly 
determine the victory. But, at all such times, the Macedonian order of battle 
cither cannot be employed, or is employed in a manner that is altogether use- 
less. For the troops of the phalanx lose all their strength when they engage 
in separate companies, or man with man. The Roman order, on the con- 
trary, is never attended, even upon such occasions, with any disadvantage 
Among the Romans, every single soldier, when he is once armed and ready 
for service, is alike fitted to engage in any time or place, or upon any appear- 
ance of the enemy, and preserves always the same power, aud the same capa- 
city of action, whether he engages with the whole of the army, or only with a 
part ; whether in separate companies, or singly man against man. As the parts, 
therefore, in the Roman order of battle, are so much better contrived for use 
than those in the other, so the success also in action must, in the same propor- 
tion, be- greater in the one than the other. If I have been long in examining 
this subject, it was because many of the Greeks, at the time when the Mace- 
donians were defeated, regarded that event as a thing surpassing all belief; 
and because many others also may hereafter wish to know, from what reasons, 
and in what particular respects, the order of phalanx is excelled by the arms 
and the order of battle,of the Romans. I now return from my digression. 

Philip, when he had done all that was possible in the battle, and had suf- 
fered an entire defeat, collected together as many of the troops as were able to 
escape, and directed his retreat through Tempe towards Macedon ; but first 
sent away one of his guards to Larissa, in the very night that followed the 
action, with orders to destroy and burn all the royal papers. This attention 
which he showed, even in the very moment of his distress, not to leave so ne- 
cessary a duty unperformed, was, indeed, highly worthy of a king : for he 
knew that if these papers should fall into the hands of the Romans, they 
would afford many pretences that might be employed against himself and his 
friends. There are others, perhaps, to be found, who have not borne the 
power of prosperous fortune like men, but have stood firm under the pressure 
of adversity, and supported themselves by their caution and prudence. But 
tins was very peculiarly the character of Philip, as it will be seen in the follow- 
ing parts of this work : for, as we gave a distinct account of the happy dispo- 
sition and virtuous tendency of this prince, in the beginning of his reign, and 
showed afterwards from what causes, and in what time and manner, he changed 
his conduct, and pursued a different course ef action, it will be no less our 
duty also to show, in what manner he returned again to abetter mind, and by 
what wise management, when his misfortunes had inspired him with different 
sentiments, he adjusted all his measures to that necessity which the times, iu 
which he found himself, imposed. The Roman general, when he had made 
the necessary disposition of the prisoners, and the rest of the spoil, continued 
his march with the army towardi Larissa, 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 449 



EXTRACT THE FOURTH. 

Men who are most practised in deceit are often deceived through the want 

of caution. 

IT is manifest, then, from this example, that, though we are all so liable to 
be deceived, both by the same arts, and the same instruments also of fraud, 
vet we are never sufficiently upon our guard against them : for this very artifice 
has been practised upon many occasions, and by many persons. It is not 
strange, perhaps, that mankind in general should so often fall into the snare, 
but that those men who are, as we may say, the very source of all deceit, 
should be themselves deceived, may reasonably be thought astonishing. But, 
indeed, this only happens to them because they do not recollect, upon such 
occasions, the wise admonitions of Epicharmus, "Be sober and distrustful j 
these are the nerves of the mind." 



EXTRACT THE FIFTH. 

The conferences at Lysimachia between Antiochus and the Roman d&* 

puties. 

ABOUT this time, with the rest of the ten Roman deputies, came Publius 
Lentulus from Bargylia, and Lucius Terentius, and Publius Vilius, from 
Thassus ; and within a few days afterwards, notice of their arrival having 
been immediately conveyed to the king, they all assembled together at Lysi- 
machia. Hegesianax also, and Lysias, who had been deputed from Antiochus 
to Flaminius, were at the same time present. la the private interviews that 
passed between the Romans and the king, nothing was to be seen but frank- 
ness and civility : but when they were afterwards all assembled together, and 
brought their business into debate, the aspect of -things was not so friendly. 
For Lucius Cornelius, as he desired the king to deliver up those cities in Asia 
which he had torn from the dominions of Ptolemy, at the same time pressed 
him also, in the most peremptory terms, to relincpiish those that had belonged 
to Philip; since nothing, as he said, could be more absurd than that, when 
the Romans had maintained a war against that prince, Antiochus should come 
afterwards and carry away the spoils. He exhorted him likewise not to as- 
sume any power over the cities that were free; and then added, that, upon 
the whole,' he could not but wonder what design had induced him to pass into 
Europe with so powerful a fleet and army. That, if the thing were to be 
well considered, no other motive could indeed be assigned for such an expedi- 
tion, but an intention to make war upon the Romans. 

The king replied to this dicourse, " That he knew not upon what grounds 
of reason his possession of the cities of Asia was now contested ; and that the 
Romans, of all others, had certainly no right to bring his title into dispute. 
That he wished that they would abstain from meddling with the affairs of Asia, 
as much as he was careful not to meddle at anytime with those of Italy. 
That his design in passing into Europe was to discover the Chersoncsus, and 
the cities of Thrace, which were properly a part of his own dominions: that 
those places had belonged originally to Lysimachus; and, when that prince 
was attacked and vanquished by Seleucus, they had passed, with the rest of 
liis kingdom, to the conqueror, by the just rights of war: that in succeeding 

"VOL. 1. >fo. 7. 3 h 



430 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 

times, while the attention of his ancestors was drawn away to ether objects, 
Ptolemy had first usurped some parts of the dominions that were so acquired, 
and Philip afterwards the rest : that he did not, therefore, now possess them 
as taking an adyantage from the misfortunes of Philip, but only as improv- 
ing an opportunity which was fair to himself, and favourable for the recovery 
of his own proper right: that in bringing back the inhabitants of Lysimachia, 
when they had been driven out. by the Thracians, and restoring the city to its 
former state, he had done no injury to the Romans, nor showed any intention 
to attack them, but designed only to make the place a seat of residence for 
Ins son Seleucus : that, with respect to the cities of Asia that were free, it was 
lit that they should owe their liberty to his grace and favour, and not to the 
command of the Romans : and lastly, with regard also to Ptolemy, that he 
should be ready, without the interposition of others, to adjust all disputes in 
the manner which himself should desire ; for he had resolved not only to live 
in friendship, but even to contract, likewise, an affinity with that prince." 

It was then proposed by Lucius, that the Lampsacenians and Smyrnaeans 
should be called in and heard ; and this accordingly was done* On the part 
of the,. former appeared Parmenio and Pythodorus ; and on that of the latter 
Coeranus. But as they were beginning to harangue with great boldness and 
freedom, Antiochus, being uneasy that he should in this manner seem to give 
an account of his conduct before the Romans, stopped Parmenio from pro- 
ceeding in his discourse, and said, that it was not the Romans, but the Rho- 
dians, that were the proper judges of the matter in dispute. Upon this the 
conference was immediately broken up, and the parties all retired, being alike 
dissatisfied with each other. 



EXTRACT THE SIXTH. 

The death of Scopus, the Mtolian, at Alexandria. 

THOUGH there are many, indeed, who would wish to draw glory frorss 
hazardous actions, there are but few who have the courage to undertake them. 
And yet Scopas had advantages far greater than Cleomens, if he had been wil* 
ling to try the fortune of some bold and desperate attempt: for the latter had 
been unexpectedly prevented by his enemies, and had no hope left, except in 
the assistance of his domestics and his friends. He resolved, however, to 
make trial of that hope, and chose rather to die with honour, than to survive 
with disgrace. But Scopas, on the contrary, though he had a strong force 
ready to support him, and though the infancy of the king rendered the oppor- 
tunity also highly favourable, was prevented merely through his own irre3olu- 
tion and delay ; for Aristomenes, having received notice that he had assent* 
bl«d his friends together at his house, and was holding a consultation with 
them, sent some of the guards to require him to attend the royal council. On 
receiving this message, Scopa3 was struck with such confusion, that he had 
neither courage to carry any thing into execution, nor resolution to obey the 
ordevs of the king. This was senseless in the highest degree. Aristomenes, 
therefore, being informed of his folly, surrounded the house with some troops 
and elephants, and at the same time sent Ptolemy, the son of Eumenes, 
with a body of young soldiers, to conduct him to the council, if he was wil- 
ling to come, or otherwise to bring him by force. When Ptolemy entered 
the house, and told him that the king commanded his attendance, Scopas 
seemed not at first to pay any regard to what he said ; but, fixing his eyes^ 
stedfastly upon him, for some time continued to survey him with a threaten- 
ing air, as if he had been astonished at his boldness. The other, coming 1 



GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 451 



nearer, roughly seized him by his mantle ; and Scopas then called upon his 
friends to help him. But as many of the soldiers were now come in, and 
some person also informed him that the house was surrounded by troops, he 
was forced to yield to the necessity, and followed Ptolemy, together with his 
friends. As soon as he appeared before the council, the charge against him 
having been opened in a few words by {'he king, was then continued by Poly- 
crates, who had lately arrived from Cyprus, and afterwards by Aristomenes. 
The chief heads of the accusation were the facts which have before been men- 
tioned. To these only were added, the secret meetings which he had held 
with his friends, and his refusal to obey the orders of the king. Upon these 
facts he was condemned, not only by the council, but by the ambassadors also 
that were present. For Aristomenes had called together upon this occasion', 
besides many other illustrious men from Greece, the embassadors likewise that 
had been sent by the /Etolians to negotiate a peace. Among these was Dori- 
machus, the son of Nicostxatus. When the accusers had ended, Scopas at- 
tempted indeed to say something in his own defence, but the guilt of his 
actions was so manifest, that what he urged made no impression. He was con- 
veyed therefore to prison with his friends ; and, in the following night, by the 
orders of Aristomenes, ended his life by poison, together with his friende. But 
Dicajarchus, by the same orders, after he had first been tortured, was whipped 
to death with rods, and thus suffered the punishment that was both suitable to 
his crimes, and due, likewise, to the common vengeance of all Greece. For 
this was the same Dicsearchus who, when Philip had resolved, in contempt of 
treaties, to invade the Cychade islands, and the cities of the Hellespont, was 
appointed by that prince the commander of all his fleet, and chief leader of 
the whole expedition. Employed in a design so manifestly impious, he was 
so far from being shocked at the injustice of his undertaking, that lie endea- 
voured, by an action of the most abandoned profligacy, to strike both the gods 
and men with horror ; for, when he had brought his fleet to anchor, he 
erected two altars, one to Impiety, and the other to Injustice; offered 
sacrifices upon them; aud adored those vices as if they had been divinities. 
It seems, therefore, that both the gods and men concurred to inflict upon 
him a most proper punishment; for it was reasonable that a man, whose life 
had been so contrary to nature, should die also a death that was unnatural. 
The rest of the iEtolians, who were willing to return to their own country, 
1 were dismissed by the king, and allowed to carry with them all their goods. 
With regard to Scopas, that passion for acquiring wealth, in which he was 
known during his life to surpass all other men, appeared still more conspi- 
cuously after his death, from the great quantity of money and of valuable 
goods that was found in his house. His custom was to employ the debauched 
and profligate as the ministers of his rapine ; and, with the help of such 
associates, he forced his way into the strongest places through all the king- 
dom, and ransaked them in search of treasure. 

When this disorder was so happily composed, the ministers of the court 
resolved to celebrate the Anacleteria, or proclamation of the king. For 
though this prince had not yet arrived at the customary age, it was thought, 
that, if he should now seem to take the supreme authority into his own hands, 
the affairs of the kingdom would acquire a more settled form, and might be 
again brought back into a better train. The preparations upon this occa- 
sion were very sumptuous; and the ceremony performed with a magnificence' 
that was worthy of such a sovereign. It was supposed that Polycrates was the 
person by whose means chiefly this measure was carried into execution. This 
Polycrates, under the reign of the father of the present prince, though he was 
then very young, had rendered himself, both by his services and his fidelity, 
one of the most distinguished persons of the court. Nor was the credit less 
which he had acquired in the present reign. For having been entrusted with 



452 GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS. 



the government of Cyprus, and the care of collecting the revenues of that 
country, in most difficult and unsettled time*., he not only Lad preserved the 
island for the infant king, hut amassed likewise a very large treasure, and 
now brought it with him to Alexandria, after he had first resigned his govenv 
ment to Ptolemy of Megalopoiis., On accouut of this important service, he 
was received with great applause, and became afterwards very powerful ; and 
yet this man, as he advanced in age, started aside from this honourable 
course, and plunged himself into a life of vice and profligacy. The same 
dishonour is said also to have attended the old age of Ptolemy, the son of 
Agesauder. When we arrive at the proper time, we shall take care to give 
some account of the scandalous actions which they committed, after they had, 
raised themselves into power* 



THE END OF THE HISTORY OF POLYBIUS, 



453 



APPENDIX. 



(THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS IS HERE GIVEN, AS A MORE DETAILED 
EXPLANATION OF SOME OF THE TRANSACTIONS RELATED IN POLY- 
JBIUS.] 

MARCUS CLAUDIUS, who was five times consul, was the sou of Marcus ; 
and, according to Posidonius, the first of his family that bore the name of 
Marcellus, that is, Martial. He had, indeed, a great deal of military expe- 
rience; his make was strong, his arm almost irresistible, and he was naturally 
inclined to war. But though impetuous and lofty in the combat, on other 
occasions he was modest and humane. He was so far a lover of the Grecian 
learning and eloquence, as to honour and admire those that excelled in them, 
though his employments prevented hi« making that progress in them which he 
desired: for if heaven ever designed that any men 

— — in war's rude lists should combat, 
From youth to age- 

as Homer expresses it, certainly it was the principal Romans of those times. 
In their youth, they had to contend with the Carthaginians for the island of 
Sicily; in their middle age with the Gauls for Italy itself; and in their old 
age again with the Carthaginians and Annibal. Thus, even in age, they had 
not the common relaxation and repose, but were called forth by their birth 
and their merit, to accept of military commands. 

As for Marcellus, there was no kind of fighting in which he was not admir- 
ably well skilled ; but in single combat he excelled himself. He therefore 
never refused a challenge, or failed of killing the challenger. In Sicily, seeing 
his brother Otacilius in great danger, he covered him with his shield, slew 
those that attacked him, and saved his life. For these things he received from 
the generals crowns, and other military honours, while but a youth ; and his 
reputation increasing every day, the people appointed him to the office of 
curule sedile, and the priests to that of augur. This is a kind of sacerdotal 
function, to which the law assigns the care of that divination which is taken 
from the flight of birds. 



After the first Carthaginian war, which had lasted twenty-two years, Rome 
was soon engaged in a new war with the Gauls. The Insubrians, a Celtic 
nation, who inhabit that part of Italy which lies at the foot of the Alps, though 
very powerful in themselves, called in the assistance of the Gesatse, a people 
of Gaul who fight for pay on such occasions. It was a wonderful and fortunate 
thing for the Roman people that the Gallic war did not break out at the same 
time with the Punic; and that the Gauls, observing an exact neutrality all 
that time, as if they had waited to take up the conqueror, did not attack the 
Romans till they were victorious, and at leisure to receive them. However, 
this war was not a little alarming to the Romans, as well on account of the 
vicinity of the Gauls, as their character of old as warriors. They were, indeed, 
the enemy whom they dreaded most; for they had made themselves masters 
df Rome ; and from that time it had been provided by law that the priest* 



454 THE LIFE OF MAKCELLUS. 



should be exempted from bearing arms, except it were to defend the city 
against the Gauls. 

The vast preparations 1 they made were farther proofs of their fears (for it is 
said that so many thousands of Romans were never seen in arms either before 
or since) ; and so were the new and extraordinary sacrifices which they offered. 
On other occasions, they had not adopted the rites of barbarous and savage 
nations, but their religious customs had been agreeable to the mild and mer- 
ciful ceremonies of the Greeks ; yet, on the appearance of this war, they were 
forced to comply with certain oracles found in the books of the Sybils ; and 
thereupon they buried two Greeks, a man and a woman, and likewise two 
Gauls, one of each sex, alive in the beast-market; a thing that gave rise to 
certain private and mysterious rites, which still continue to be performed in 
the month of November. 

In the beginning of the war, the Romans sometimes gained great advantages, 
and sometimes were no less signally defeated; but there was no decisive action 
till the consulate of Flaminius and Furius, who led a very powerful army 
against the Insubrians. Then, we are told, the river which runs through the 
Picene was seen flowing with blood, and that three moons appeared over the 
city of Ariminum. But the priests who were to observe the flight of birds at 
the time of choosing consuls, affirmed that the election was faulty and inaus- 
picious. The senate, therefore, immediately seat letters to the camp to recall 
the consuls, insisting that they should return without loss of time, and resign 
their office, and forbidding them to act at all against the enemy in consequence 
of their late appointment. 

Flaminius having received these letters, deferred opening {hem till he had 
engaged and routed the barbarians, and overrun their country ; therefore,when 
he returned, loaded with spoils, the people did not go out to meet him ; and 
because he did not directly obey the order that recalled him, but treated it 
with contempt, he was in danger of losing his triumph. As soon as the tri- 
umph was over, both he and his colleague were deposed, and reduced to th«f 
rank of private citizens. So much regard had the Romans for religion, re- 
ferring all their affairs to the good pleasure of the gods, and, in their greatest 
prosperity, not suffering any neglect of the forms of divination and other sacred 
usages ; for they were fully persuaded that it was a matter of greater im- 
portance to the preservation of their state, to have their generals obedient t» 
the gods, than even to have them victorious in the field. 

To this purpose the following story is remarkable : Tiberius Sempronius, 
•who was as much respected for his valour and probity as any man in Rome, 
while consul, named Scipio Nasica, and Caius Narcius, his successors. When" 
they were gone into the provinces allotted them, Sempronius happening to 
meet with a book which contained the sacred regulations for the conduct of 
■war, found that there was one particular which he never knew before. It was 
this : " When the consul goes to take the auspices in a house, or tent with- 
out the city, hired for that purpose, and is obliged by some necessary business 
to return into the city before any stire sign appears to him, he must not make use 
of that lodge again, but take another, and there begin his observations anew." 
Sempronius was ignorant of this when he named those two consuls, for he had 
twice made use of the same place ; but when he perceived his error, he made 
the senate acquainted with it. They, for their part, did not lightly pass over 
so small a defect, but wrote to the consuls about it, who left their provinces, 
and returned with all speed to Rome, where they laid down their offices. 
This did not happen till long after the affair of which we were speaking. 

But about that very time, two priests of the best families in Rome, Cornell 
Cethegus, and Quintus Sulpicius, were degraded from the priesthood; the 
former, because he did not present the entrails of the victim, according to 
rule ; and the latter, because, as he was sacrificing, the tuft of his cap, which 
was such an one as the Flamines wear, fell off-; and because the squeaking 



THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 455 



of a rat happened to be heard at the moment that Minucius the dictator ap- 
pointed Caius Flamiuius his general of horse, the people obliged them to quit 
their posts, and appointed others in their stead. But, while they observed 
these small matters with such exactness, they gave not into any sort of super- 
stition; for they neither changed nor went beyond the ancient ceremonies. 

Flaminius and his colleague being deposed from the consulship, the magis- 
trates, called interreges, nominated Marcellus to that high office, who, when, 
he. entered upon it, took Cneius Cornelius for his colleague. Though the 
Gauls are said to have been disposed to a reconciliation, and the senate was 
peaceably inclined, yet the people, at the instigation of Marcellus, were for 
war. However, a peace was concluded, which seems to have been broke by 
the Gusatse, who, having passed the Alps with thirty thousand men, prevailed 
with the Insubrians to join them with much greater numbers. Elated with 
their strength, they marched immediately to Acerrse, a city on the banks of 
the Po. There Viridomarus, king of the Gasatee, took ten thousand men from 
the main body, and with this party laid waste all the country about the river. 

When Marcellus was informed of their march, he left his colleague before 
Acerrae, with all the heavy armed infantry, and the third part of the horse ; 
and taking with him the rest of the cavalry, and about six hundred of the light 
armed foot, he set out, and kept forward day and night, till he came up with the 
ten thousand Gesatae nearClastidium, a little town of the Gauls,whieh had very 
lately submitted to the Romans. He had not time to give his troops any 
rest or refreshment ; for* the barbarians immediately perceived his approach, 
and despised his attempt, as he had but a handful of infantry, and they made 
no account of his cavalry. These, as well as all the other Gauls, being skilled 
in fighting on horseback, thought they had the advantage in this respect ; and, 
besides, they greatly exceeded Marcellus in number?. They marched, there- 
fore, directly against him, their king at their head, with great impetuosity\and 
dreadful menaces, as if sure of crushing him at once. Marcellus, because hi* 
party was but small, to prevent its being surrounded, extended the wings of 
his cavalry, thinning and widening the line, till he presented a front nearly 
equal to that of the enemy. He was now advancing to the charge, when his 
horse, terrified with the shouts of the Gauls, turned short, and forcibly car- 
ried him back. Marcellus, fearing that this, interpreted by superstition* 
should cause some disorder in his troops, quickly turned his horse again to- 
wards the enemy, and then paid his adoration to the sun, as if that movement 
had been made, not by accident, but design, for the Romans always turn round 
when they worship the gods. Upon the point of engaging, he vowed to Jupiter 
Feretrius the choicest of the enemy's arms. In the meantime, the king of the 
Gauls spied him, and, judging, by the ensigns of authority, that he was the 
consul, he set spurs to his horse, and advanced a considerable way before the 
rest, brandishing his spear, and loudly challenging him to the combat. He was 
distinguished from the rest of the Gauls bv his stature, as well as by his 
armour, which, being set off with gold and silver, and the most lively colours, 
#hone like lightning. As Marcellus was viewing the disposition of the 
enemy's forces, he cast his eyes upon this rich suit of armour, and concluding 
that in it his vow to Jupiter would be accomplished, he rushed upon the Gaul, 
and pierced his breast-plate with his spear, which stroke, together with the 
weight and force of the consul's horse, brought him to the ground, and with 
two or three more blows he dispatched him. lie then leaped from his horse 
and disarmed him, and lifting up his spoils towards heaven, he said, " O Ju- 
Feretrius, who observest the deeds of great warriors and generals in 
•e, I now call thee to witness that I am the third Roman consul and ge- 
I who have, with my own hands, slain a general and a king! To thee 1 
ecrate the most excellent spoils. Do thou grant us equal success in the 
scution of this war." 
7 hen this prayer was ended, the Roman cavalry encountered both the 



45(5 THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 

enemy's horse and foot at the same time, and gained a victory, not only great 
ill itself, but peculiar in its kind ; for we have no acconnt of such a handful of 
cavalry beating such numbers, both of horse and foot, either before or since. 
Marcellus, having killed the greatest part of the enemy, and taken their arms 
and baggage, returned to his colleague, who had no such good success against 
the Gauls before Milan, which is a great and populous city, and the metro- 
polis of that country. For this reason the Gauls defended it with such spirit 
and resolution, that Scipio, instead of besieging it, seemed rather besieged 
himself. But upon the return of Marcellus, the Gesatae, understanding that 
their king was slain, and his army defeated, drew off their forces \ and so Milan 
was taken ; and the Gauls surrendering the rest of their cities, and referring 
everything to the equity of the Romans, obtained reasonable conditions of 
peace. 

The senate decreed a triumph to Marcellus only; aud whether we consider 
the rich spoils that were displayed in it, the pi'odigious size of the captives, Or 
the magnificence with which the whole was conducted, it was one of the most 
.splendid that was ever seen. But the most agreeable and most uncommon 
spectacle was Marcellus himself, carrying, the armour of Viridomarus, which 
he vowed to Jupiter. He had cut the trunk of an oak in the form of a 
trophy, which he adorned with the spoils of that barbarian, placing every part 
of his arms in handsome order. When the procession began to move, he 
.mounted his chariot, which was drawn by four horses,, and passed through thef 
city, with the trophy on his shoulders, which was the noblest ornament of the 
whole triumph. The army followed, clad in elegant armour, and singing 
odes composed for that occasion, and v other songs of triumph, in honour of 
Jupiter and their general. 

When he came to the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, he set up and consecrated 
the troph} T , being the third and last general who, as yet, has been so gloriously 
distinguished. The first was Romulus, after he had slain Acron, king of the 
Casuinenses; Cornelius CofFus, who slew Volumnius the Tuscan, was the second; 
and the third and last was Marcellus, who killed, with his own hand, Virido- 
marus, king of the Gauls. The god to whom these spoils were devoted wag 
Jupiter, surnamed Feretrius {as some say), from the Greek word Pheretron, 
which signifies a car ; for the trophy was borne on such a carriage, and the 
Greek language, at that time, was much mixed with the Latin. Others say 
Jupiter had that appellation, because he strikes with lightning ; for the Latin 
word J'erire signifies to strike. Others again will have it, that it is on account 
of the strokes which are given in battle; for even now, when the Romans 
charge or pursue an enemy, they encourage each other by calling out, feri, 
feri, strike, strike them down. What they take from the enemy in the field, 
they call by the general name of spoils; but those which a Roman general 
takes from the general of an enemy they call opime spoils. It is indeed 
said, that Numa Pompilius, in his commentaries, makes mention of opime 
spoils of the first, second, and third order ; that he directed the first to be 
consecrated to Jupiter, the second to Mars, and the third to Quirinus ; and 
that the persons who took the first should be rewarded with three hundred asses, 
the second with two hundred, and the third with an hundred. But the most 
received opinion is, that those of the first sort only should be honoured with 
the name of opime, which a general takes iu a pitched battle, when he kills 
the enemy's general with his own hand. But enough of this matter. 

The Romans thought themselves so happy in the glorious period put to this 
war, that they made an offering to Apollo, at Delphi, of a golden cup in testi- 
mony of their gratitude. They also liberally shared the spoils with the ton 
federate cities, and made a very handsome present out of them to Hiero, kiri£ 
of Syracuse, their friend and ally. 

Sometime after this, Annibal, having entered Italy, Marcellus was sent wit 1 
a fleet to Sicily. The war continued to rage, aud that unfortunate blow ws. 



THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 457 



received at Cannse, by which many thousands of Romans fell. That few that 
escaped fled to Canusium ; and it was expected that Armibal, who jhadthus 
destroyed the strength of the Koraau forces, would march directly to Rome. 
Hereupon Marcellus first sent fifteen hundred of his men t« guard the city ; 
and afterwards, by order of the senate, lie went to Canusium, drew out the 
troops that had retired thither, and marched at their head to keep the country 
from being ravaged by the enemy, 

The wars had, by this time, carried off the chief of the Roman nobility, and 
most of their best officers. Still, indeed, there remained Fabius Maximus, a 
man highly respected for his probity and prudence ; but his extraordinary at- 
tention to the avoiding of loss, passed for want of spirit and incapacity for 
action. The Roraaus, therefore, considering him as a proper person for the 
defensive, but not the offensive part of war, bad recourse to Marcellus; and, 
wisely tempering his boldness and activity with the slow and cautious conduct 
cf Fabius, they sometimes appointed them consuls together, and sometimes 
sent out the one in quality of consul, and the other in that of proconsul. Fo- 
fidonius tells us, that Fabius was called the buckler, and Marcellus the sword : 
but Annibal himself said, " He stood in fear of Fabius as his schoolmaster, aud 
of Marcellus as his adversary : for he received hurt from the 'latter, .and the 
former prevented his doing hurt himself." 

Annibal's soldiers, elated with their victory, grew careles?, and, straggling 
from the camp, roamed about the country, where Marcellus fell upon them, 
and cut off great numbers. After this, he went to the relief of Naples and 
Nola. The Neapolitans he confirmed in the Roman interest, to which they 
were themselves well inclined ; but when he entered Nola, he found great di- 
visions there, the senate of that city being unable to restrain the commonalty, 
who were attached to Annibal. There was a citizen in this place named Ban- 
dius, well born, and celebrated for his valour ; for he greatly distinguished 
himself in the battle of Cannae, where, after killing a number of Carthaginians, 
he was found, at last, upon a heap of dead bodies, covered with wounds. An- 
nibal, admiring his bravery, dismissed him, not only without ransom, but with 
handsome presents, honouring him with his friendship and admission to the 
rights of hospitality. Bandius, in gratitude for these favours, heartily es- 
poused the party of Annibal, and, by his authority, drew the people on to a 
revolt. Marcellus thought it wrong to put a man to death who had glonousiy 
fought the battles of Rome. Besides, the general had so engaging a manner 
grafted .upon his native humanity, that he could hardly fail of attracting the 
regards of a m,an of a great and generous spirit. One day, Bandius happening 
to salute him, Marcellus asked him who he was; uot that he was a stranger to 
.his person, but that he might have an opportunity to introduce what he had 
to say. Being told his name was Lucius Bandius, " What !" says Marcellus, 
in seeming admiration, " that Bandius who has been so much talked of in 
Rome for his gallant behaviour at Canna?, who, indeed was the only man that 
.did not abandon the consul iEmilius., but received in his own hodymost of 
the shafts that were aimed at him !" Bandius saving he was the very per- 
son, and showing some of his scars, " Why then," replied Marcellus, " when 
you bore about you such marks of your regard for us, did not you come to us 
one of the first ? Do w.e seem to you slow to reward the virtue of a friend, 
who is honoured even by his enemies ?" After this obliging discourse, he em- 
braced him, and made him a present of a war-horse, and five hundred 
drachmas in silver. 

From this time Bandius was very cordially attached to Marcellus, and con- 
stantly informed him of the proceedings of the opposite party, who were very 
' numerous, and who had resolved, when the Romans marched out against the 
€nemy, to plunder their baggage. Flereupon Marcellus drew up his forces in 
«rder of battle within the city, placed the baggage near the gates, and pub- 
lished an edict, forbidding the inhabitants to appear upon the wall*. Anni- 
vol. i. >ro. 7. 3 m 



L58 THE LIFE OF MARGELLUS. 



bal, seeing no hostile appearanee, concluded that every thing was in great dis- 
order in the city, and therefore he approached with little precaution. At this 
moment, Marcellus commanded the gate that was nest him to be opened, and, 
sallying out with the best of his cavalry, he charged the enemy in front. Soon 
after, the infantry rushed out at another gate, with loud shouts : and while An- 
nibal was dividing his forces to oppose these two parties, a third gate was 
opened, and the rest of the Roman troops issuing out, attacked the enemy on 
the other side, who were greatly disconcerted at such an unexpected sally, and 
who made but a faint resistance against those with whom they were first en- 
gagd, by reason of their being fallen upon by another body. 

Then it was that Annibal's men, struck with terror, and covered with 
wounds, first gave back before the Romans, and were driven to their camp. 
Above rive thousand of them are said to have been slain, whereas of the Ro- 
mans there fell not more than five hundred. Livy does not, indeed, make this 
defeat and loss on the Carthaginian side to have been so considerable: he only 
affirms that Marcellus gained great honour by this battle, and that the cou- 
rage of the Romans was wonderfully restored after all their misfortunes, who 
now no longer believed that they had to do with an enemy that was invincible, 
but one who was liable to suffer in his turn. 

For this reason, the people called Marcellus, though absent, to fill the 
place of one of the consuls who was dead, and prevailed, against the sense of 
the magistrates, to have the election put off till his return. Upon his arrival, 
he was unanimously chosen consul ; but it happening to thunder at that time, 
the augurs saw that the omen was unfortunate, and, as they did not choose to 
declare it such, for' fear of the people, Marcellus voluntarily laid down the 
office. Notwithstanding this, he had the command of the army continued to 
him, in quality of proconsul, and returned immediately to Nola, from whence 
he made excursions to chastise those that had declared for the Carthaginians. 
Annibal made haste to their assistance, and offered him battle, which he de- 
clined. Bui some days after, when he saw that Annibal, no longer expecting 
a battle, had sent out the greatest part of his army to plunder the country, he 
attacked him vigorously, having first provided the foot with long spears, such 
as they use in sea-fights, which they were taught to hurl at the Carthaginians 
at a distance, who, for their part, w-ere not skilled in the use of the javelin, and 
only fought hand to hand with short swords. For this reason, all that at- 
tempted to make he'ad against the Romans were obliged to give way, and fly 
in great confusion, leaving five thousand men slain upon the field, beside the 
loss of four elephants killed, and two taken. What was still of greater im*, 
poitauce, the third day after the battle, above three hundred horse, Spaniards 
and Numidians, came over to Marcellus, a misfortune which never before hap- 
pened to Annibal ; for, though his army was collected from several barbarous 
nations, different both in their manners and their language, yet he had along 
time preserved a perfect unanimity throughout the whole. This body of horse 
ever continued faithful to Marcellus, and those that succeeded him in the 
command. 

Marcellus being appointed consul the third time, passed over into Sicily ; 
for Annibal's great success had encouraged the Carthaginians again to 
support their claim to that island ; and they did it the rather, because the 
affairs at Syracuse were in some confusion upon the death of Hieronymus, its 
sovereign. On this account, the Romans had already sent an army thither, 
tinder the command of Appius Claudius. 

The command devolving upon Marcellus, he was no sooner arrived in Si- 
cily, than a great number of Romans came to throw themselves at his feet, and 
represent to him their distress. Of ihose that fought against Annibal at, 
Cannae, some escaped by flight, and others were taken prisoners ; the latter in 
such numbers, that it was thought the Romans must want men to defend the 
vails of their capital. Yet that commonwealth had so much firmness and els-? 



THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 45§ 



ration of mind, that, though Annibal offered to release the prisoners for a very 
inconsiderable ransom, they refused it by a public act, and left them to be put 
to death, or sold out of Italy. As for those that had saved themselves by 
flight, they sent them into Sicily, with an order not to setfoot on Italian ground 
during the war with Annibal. These came to Marcellus in a body, and, falling 
on their knees, begged, with loud lamentations, and floods of tears, the favour 
of being admitted again into the army, promising to make it appear, by their 
future behaviour, that that defeat was owing to their misfortune, and not to 
their cowardice. Marcellus, moved with compassion, wrote to the senate, de- 
airing leave to recruit his army with these exiles, as he should rind occasion. 
After much deliberation, the senate signified, by a decree, " That the com- 
monwealth had no need of the service of cowards ; that Marcellus, however, 
mi^ht employ them, if he pleased, but on condition that he did not bestow 
upon any of them crowns, or other honorary rewards." This decree gave 
Marcellus some uneasiness, and, after his return from the war in Sicily, he ex* 
postulated with the senate, and complained, " That, for all his services, they 
would not allow him to rescue from infamy these unfortunate citizens." 

His first care, after he arrived in Sicily, was to make reprisals for the injury 
received from Hippocrates the Syracusan general, who, to gratify the Cartha* 
giuians, and, by their means, to set himself up tyrant, had attacked the .Ro- 
mans, and killed great numbers of them, in the district of Leontium, Marcel- 
lus, therefore, laid siege to that city, and took it by storm, but did no harm to 
the inhabitants ; only "such deserters as he found there, he ordered to be beaten 
with rods, and then put to death. Hippocrates took care to give the Syraeu- 
sans the first notice of the taking of Leontium, assuring them, at the same 
time, that Marcellus had put toHhe sword all that were able to bear arms ; 
and while they were under great consternation at this news, he came suddenly 
upon the city, and made himself master of it. 

Hereupon Marcellus marched with his whole army, and encamped before 
Syracuse. He made his attacks both by sea aud land, Appius Claudius com- 
manding the land-forces, and himself the fleet, which consisted of sixty gallies 
of five banks of oars, full of all sorts of arms and missive weapons. Besides 
these, he had a prodigious machine, carried upon eight gallies fastened to- 
gether, with which he approached the walls, relying upon the number of his 
batteries, and other instruments of war, as well as on his own great character.': 
but Archimedes despised all this, and confided in the superiority of bis en- 
gines. 

When the Romans attacked them both by sea and land, they were struck 
dumb with terror, imagining they could not possibly resist such numerous 
forces and so furious an assault. But Archimedes soon began to pluy his en- 
gines, and they shot against the land forces all sorts of missive weapons, and 
stones of an enormous size, with so incredible a noise and rapidity, that no- 
thing could stand before them : they overturned and crushed whatever came 
in their way, and spread terrible disorder throughout the ranks. On the side 
towards the sea were erected vast machines, putting forth, on a sudden, over 
the walls, huge beams, with the necessary tackle, which striking with a prodi- 
gious force on the enemy's galleys, sunk them at once ; while other ships, 
hoisted up at the prows by iron grapples or hooks, like the beaks of cranes, 
and set on end on the stern, were plunged to the bottom of the sea ; aud 
others again, by ropes and grapples, were drawn towards the shore, and after 
being whirled about, aud dashed against the rocks that projected below the 
■walls, were broken to pieces, and the crews perished. Very often a ship lifted 
high above the sea, suspended and, twirling in the air, presented a most dread- 
ful spectacle. There it swung till the men were thrown out by the violence of 
the motion, and then it split against the walls, 01 sunk on the engine's letting 
go its hold. As for the machine which Marcellus brought forward upqu eight 
galleys, and which was called sambuca, on account of its likeness to a magical 



4ff0 THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 



instrnment of that name, whilst it was at a considerable distance from the walTs 9 
Archimedes discharged a stone of ten talents weight, and after that a second 
and a third, all which striking npon it with an amazing noise and force, -shat- 
tered and totally disjointed it. 

Marcellus, in this distress, drew off his galleys as fast as possible, and sent 
orders to the land forces to retreat likewise. He then called a council of war, 
in which it was resolved to come close to the walls, if it was possible, next 
morning before day ; for Archimedes's engines, they thought, being very strong, 
and intended to act at a considerable distance, would then discharge them- 
selves over their heads; and if they were pointed at them when they were so 
near r they would have no effect. But for this Archimedes had long been pre- 
pared, having by him engines fitted to all distances, with suitable weapons and 
shorter beams. Besides, he had caused holes to be made in the walls, in which 
lie placed scorpions that did not carry far, but could be very fast discharged:, 
and l>y these the enemy was galled, without knowing whence the weapon 
came. 

When, therefore, the Romans- were got close to the walls undiscovered, as 
they thought, they were- welcomed with a shower of darts, and huge pieces of 
rocks, which fell as it were perpendicularly upon their heads ; for the engines 
played from every quarter of the walls. This obliged them to retire ; and 
when they were at some distance, other shafts were shot at them in their retreat, 
from the larger machines, which made terrible havock among them, as well as 
greatly damaged their shipping, without any possibility of their annoying the 
Syracusans in their tarn. For Archimedes had placed most of his engines un- 
der covert of the walls; so that the Romans, being infinitely distressed by an 
invisible enemy, seemed to fight against the gods. 

Some time after, Marcellus took notice of a tower but slightly guarded, into 
which a number of men might be privately conveyed, the wall that led to it 
being easy to be scaled. Observing that, on the festival of Diana, the Syracu- 
sans drank freely, and gave a loose to mirth, he not only possessed himself of 
the tower undiscovered, but, before day-light, filled the walls of that quarter 
with soldiers, and forcibly entered the Hexapylum. The Syracusans, as sooa 
as they perceived it, began to move about in great confusion; but Marcellus 
ordering all the trumpets to sound at once, they were seized with consternation, 
and betook themselves to flight, believing that the whole city was lost. 
The Achradina, which was the strongest, the most extensive, and fairest part of 
it, was not taken, being divided by walls from the rest of the city, one part of 
which was called Neapolis, and the other Tyche. The enterprise thus pros- 
pering, Marcellus, at day-break, moved down from the Hexapbylum into the 
city, where he was congratulated by his officers on the great event. But it is 
eaid that he himself, when he surveyed from an eminence that great and mag- 
nificent city, shed many tears, in pity of its impending fate, reflecting into 
what a scene of misery and desolation its fair appearance would be changed, 
when it came to be sacked and plundered by the soldiers : for the troops de- 
manded the plunder, and not one of the officers durst oppose it. Many even 
insisted that the city should be burnt, and levelled with the ground ; but to - 
this Marcellus absolutely refused his consent. It was with reluctance that he 
gave up the effects and the slaves ; and he strictly charged the soldiers not to 
touch any free man or woman, nor to kill or abuse, or make a slave of any 
citizen whatever. 

But though he acted with so much moderation, the city had harder mea- 
sure than he wished, and, amidst the great and general joy, his soul sympa- 
thized with his sufferings, when he considered that in a few hours the prospe- 
rity of such a flourishing state would be no more. It is even said that the 
plunder of Syracuse was as rich as that of Carthage after it. For the rest of 
the city was soon betrayed to the Romans and pillaged ; only the royal trea- 
sure was preserved, and carried into the public treasury at Rome. 



THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 4<Jl 



Marcellus, after this, being called home to a war in the heart of Italy, carried 
With him the most valuable of the statues and paintings in Syracuse, that they 
might embellish his triumph, and be an ornament to Rome: for before this 
time that city neither had nor knew any curiosities of this kind, being a 
stranger to the charms of taste and elegance. Full of arms taken from bar- 
barous nations, and of bloody spoils, and crowned as she was with trophies 
and other monuments of her triumphs, she afforded not a cheerful and plea- 
sing spectacle fit for men brought up in ease and luxury, but her look was 
awful and severe. And as Ephaminondas calls the plains of Bceotia the or^ 
ekestro, or stage of Mars, and Xenophon, says Ephesus, was the arsenal of 
war, so, in my opinion (to use the expression of Pindar,} one might then 
have styled Rome the temple of frowning Mars. 

Finding, at his return, that his enemies opposed his triumph, and consider- 
ing that the war was not quite finished iri Sicily, as well as that a third 
triumph might expose him to the envy of his fellow-citizens, he so far yielded 
as to content himself with leading up the greater triumph on Mount Alba, 
and entering Rome with the less. The less is called by the Greeks evan, and 
by the Romans ovation. In this the general does not ride in a triumphal 
chariot drawn by four horses ; he is not crowned with laurel, nor has he 
trumpets sounding before him, but he walks in sandals, attended with tha 
music of many flutes, and wearing a crown of myrtle; his appearance, 
therefore, having nothing in it warlike, is rather pleasing than formidable. 
This is to me a plain proof that triumphs of old were distinguished not by 
the importance of the achievement, but by the manner of its performance; 
for those that subdued their enemies, by fighting battles and spilling much 
blood, entered with that warlike and dreadful pomp of the greater triumph, 
and, as is customary in the lustration of an army, wore crowns of laurel, and 
adorned their arms with the same. But when a general, without fighting, 
gained his point by treaty and the force of persuasion, the law decreed him 
this honour, called ovation, which had more the appearance of a festival than 
of war: for the flute is an instrument used in time of peace; and the 
myrtle is the tree of Venus, who, of all the deities, is most averse to violence 
and war. 

After this Marcellus marched against Annibal. And though almost all 
the other consuls and generals, after the defeat of Cannae, availed themselves 
of the single art of avoiding an engagement with the Carthaginian, and not; 
one of them durst meet him fairly in the field, Marcellus took quite a differ- 
ent course. He was of opinion, that instead of Annibal's being worn out by 
length of time, the strength of Italy would be insensibly wasted by him ; 
and that the slow cautious maxims of Fabius were not fit to cure the ma- 
lady of his country; since, by pursuing them, the flames of war could not 
be extinguished, until Italy was consumed ; just as timorous physicians neg- 
lect to apply strong though necessary remedies, thinking the distemper will 
abate with the strength of the patient. 

In the first place, he recovei-.d the best towns of the Samnites which had 
revolted. In- them he found considerable magazines of corn and a great quan- 
tity of money, beside making three thousand of Annibal's men, who garri- 
soned them, prisoners. In the next place, when Cneius Fulvius, the procon- 
«uj, with eleven tribunes, was slain, and great part of his army cut in pieces, 
by Annibal, in Apulia, Marcellus sent letters to Rome to exhort the citizens 
to be of good courage, for he himself was on his march to drive Annibal out 
of the country. The reading of these letters, Livy tells us, was so far from 
removing their grief, that it added terror to it, the Romans reckoning the 
present danger as much greater than the past, as Marcellus was a greater man 
thau Fulvius. 

Marcellus then going in quest "of Annibal, according to bis promise, 
entered Lucania, and found him encamped on inaccessible heights near the 



4m THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 

city Numistro. Marcellus himself pitched his tents on the plain, and the 
"next day was the first to draw up his forces iu order of battle. Annibal de- 
clined not the combat, but descended from the hill?, and a battle ensued, 
which was not decisive, indeed, but great and bloody : for though the action 
began at the third hour, it was with difficulty that night put a stop to it. 
Next morning, at break of day, Marcellus again drew up his array, and post- 
ing it among the dead bodies, challenged Annibal to dispute it with him for 
the victory : but Annibal chose to draw off, and Marcellus, after he had 
gathered the spoils of the enemy, and buried his own dead, marched in 
pursuit of him. Though the Carthaginian laid many snares for him, he 
escaped them all; and having the advantage too in all skirmishes, his success 
was looked mpon with admiration. Therefore, when the time of the next 
election came on, the senate thought proper to call the other consul out of 
Sicily, rather than draw off Marcellus, who was grappling with Annibal. 
When he was arrived, they ordered him to declare Quintus Fulvius dictator,, 

The colleague of Marcellus was disposed to appoint another person dictator^ 
and that he might not be obliged to depart from his own opinion, he left 
Rome by night, and sailed back to Sicily. The people, therefore, named 
Quintus Fulvius dictator, and the senate wrote to Marcellus to confirm the 
nomination, which he did accordingly. 

Marcellus was appointed proconsul for the year following ;. and having 
agreed with Fabius Maximus, the consul, by letters, that Fabius should be- 
siege Tarentum, while himself was to watch the motions of Annibal, and 
prevent his relieving the place, he marched after him with all diligence, and 
came up with him at Canusium. And as Annibal shifted his camp con-* 
tinually, to avoid coming to a battle, Marcellus watched him closely, and took 
care to keep him in sight. At last, coming up with him, as he was encamp- 
ing, he so harrassed him with skirmishes, that he drew him to an engagement; 
but night soon came on, and parted the combatants. Next morning early, he 
drew his army out of the intrenchments, and put them in order of battle, so 
that Annibal, in great vexation, assembled the Carthaginians, and begged of 
them to exert themselves more in that battle than ever they had clone before* 
" For you see," said he, " that we can neither take breath after so many vic- 
tories already gained, nor enjoy the least leisure if we are victorious now, un- 
less this man be driven off." 

After this a battle ensued, in which Marcellus seems to have miscarried by 
an unseasonable movement: for seeing his right wing hard pressed, he ordered 
one of the legions to advance to the front to support them. This movement 
put the whole army into disorder, and decided the day in favour of the enemy ; 
two thousand seven hundred Romans being slain upon the spot. Marcellus 
retreated into his camp, and having summoned his troops together, told them, 
*' He saw the arms and bodies of Romans in abundance before him, but not 
©ne Carthaginian." On their begging pardon, he said, " He would not forgive 
while vanquished, but, when they came to be victorious, he "would ; arid that 
he would lead them into the field again the next day, that the" news of the 
victory might reach Rome before that of their flight." Before he ' dismisesd 
them, he gave orders that barley should be measured out, instead of wheat, td 
those companies that had turned their backs. His reprimand made such an 
impression on them, that though many were dangerously wounded, there was 
not a man who did not feel more pain from the words of Marcellus, than he 
did from his wounds. 

Next morning the scarlet robe, which was the ordinary signal of battle, was 
hung out betimes ; and the companies that had come off with dishonour be- 
fore obtained leave, at their earnest request, to be posted in the foremost line ; 
after which the tribunes drew up the rest of the troops in their proper order. 
When this was reported to Annibal, he said, " Ye gods, what can one do with 
a man who is not affected with either bad or good fortune ? This is the only 
man who" will neither give any time to rest when, he is victorious, nor take any 



THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 463 



when he is beaten. We must even resolve to fight with him for ever ; since, 
Wfeether prosperous or unsuccessful, a principle of honour leads him on to new 
attempts and farther exertions of courage." 

Both armies then engaged, and Annibal, seeing no advantage gained by 
either, ordered his elephants to be brought forward into the lirst line, and 
to be pushed against the Romans. The shock caused great confusion at first 
in the Roman front; but Flavins, a tribune, snatching an ensign staff from 
one of the companies, advanced, and, with the point of it, wounded the fore- 
most elephant. The beast, upon this, turned back, and ran upon the second, 
the second upon the next that followed, and so on till they were all put in 
great disorder. Marcellus, observing this, ordered his horse to fall furiously 
upon the enemy, and,*takiug advantage of the confusion already made, to rout 
them entirely. Accordingly they charged with extraordinary vigour, and 
drove the Carthaginians to their intrenchments. The slaughter was dreadful, 
and the fall of the killed, and the plunging of the wounded elephants, contri- 
buted greatly to it. It is said thai, more than eight thousand Carthaginians fell 
in this battle ; of the Romans not above three thousand were slain, but almost 
all the rest were wounded. This gave Annibal opportunity to decamp silently 
in the night, and remove to a great distance from Marcellus, who, by reason of 
the number of his wounded, was not able to pursue him, but retired, by easy 
marches, into Campania, and passed the summer in the city of Sinuessa, to re- 
cover and refresh his soldiers. , ' 

Annibal, thus disengaged from Marcellus, made use of his troops, now at 
liberty, and securely overrau the country, burning and destroying all before 
him. This gave occasion to unfavourable reports of Marcellus at Rome ; and 
his enemies incited Publius Bibulus, one of the tribunes of the people, a man 
of violent temper, and a vehement speaker, to accuse him in form. Accord- 
ingly Bibulus often assembled the people, and endeavoured to persuade them 
to take the command from him, and give it to another ; "Since Marcellus," 
said he, " has only exchanged a few thrusts with Annibal, and then left the 1 
stage, and is gone to the hot baths to refresh himself." 

When Marcellus was apprised of these practices against him, he left his 
army in charge with his lieutenants, and went to Rome to make his defence. 
His appearance had such an effect, that the accuser was totally disappointed in 
his expectations, for Marcellus was not only acquitted on the charge, but a 
fifth time chosen consul. 

He now again set out with his colleague to prosecute the war, and fixed his 
camp between Bantia and Venusia. There he tried every method to provoke 
Annibal to a battle, which he constantly declined. But the Carthaginian 
perceiving that the consuls had ordered some troops to go and lay siege to the 
city of the Epizephyrians, or Western Locrians, he laid an ambuscade in their 
way, under the hill of Petelia, and killed two thousand five hundred of them. 
This added stings to Marcellus's desire oF an engagement, and made him 
draw nearer to the enemy. 

Between the two armies was a hill, which afforded a pretty strong post ; it 
was covered with thickets, and on both sides were hollows, from whence issued 
springs and rivulets. The Romans were surprised that Annibal, who came 
first to so advantageous a place, did not take possession of it, but left it for 
the enemy. He did, indeed, think it a good place for a camp, but a better 
for an ambuscade, and to that use he chose to put it. He filled, therefore, the 
thickets and hollows with a good number of archers and spearmen, assuring 
himself that the convenience of the post would draw the Romans to it. ISor 
was he mistaken in his conjecture. Presently nothing was talked of in the 
Roman army but the expediency of seizing this hill ; and, as if they had been 
all generals, they set forth the many advantages they should have over tha 
enemy, by encamping, or at least raising a fortification upon it. Thus Mar- 
cellus was induced to set out to view the place, -taking with him his colleague 
Crispinus, his eon Marcellus, who was a tribune^ and only two hundred and 



464 THE LIFE OF MARCELLUS. 

twenty horse, among whom there was not one Roman; they were all Tuscans, 
■except forty Fregellanians, of whose courage and fidelity he had sufficient ex- 
perience. On the summit of the hill, which, as we said before, was covered 
with trees and bushes, the enemy had placed a sentinel, who, without being 
seen himself, could see every movement in the Roman camp. Those that lay 
in ambush, haying intelligence from him of what was doing, lay close till 
Marcellus came very near, and they all at once rushed out, spread themselves 
about him, let fly a shower of arrows, and charged him with their swords and 
spears. Some pursued the fugitives, and others attacked those that stood 
their ground. The latter were the forty Fragellanians, for the Tuscans, 
taking to flight at the first charge, the others closed together in a body to de- 
fend the consuls; and they continued the fight till Crispinus, wounded with 
two arrows, turned his horse to make his escape, and Marcellus, being run 
through between the shoulders with a lance, fell down, dead. Then the few 
Fragellanians that remained, leaving the body of Marcellus, carried off hi» 
son, who was wounded, and fled with him to the camp. 

In this skirmish there were not many more than forty men killed, eighteen 
were taken prisoners, besides five lictors. Crispinus died of his wounds a few 
days after. This was a most unparalleled misfortune; the Romans lost both 
the consuls in one action. 

Annibal made but little account of the rest ; but when he knew that Mar- 
cellus was killed, he hastened to the place, and, standing over the body a long 
time, surveyed its size and mein, but without speaking one insulting word, or 
showing the least sign of joy, which might have been expected at the fall of so 
dangerous and formidable an enemy. He stood, indeed, a while astonished at 
the strange death of so great a man ; and at last taking his signet from his 
finger, he caused his body to be magnificently attired and burnt, and the ashes 
to be put in a silver urn, and then placed a crown of gold upon it, and sent it 
to his son. 



FINIS. 



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